The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 11 | Issue 9 | Number 3 | Article ID 3907 | Feb 27, 2013

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Japan’s Rightward Swing and the Tottori Prefecture HumanRights Ordinance 日本の右傾化と鳥取県人権条例

Arudou Debito

The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 9,No. 3, March 4, 2013.

Japan’s Rightward Swing and theTottori Prefecture Human RightsOrdinance 日本の右傾化と鳥取県人権条例

Arudou Debito

Japan’s swing to the right in the December2012 Lower House election placed three-quarters of the seats in the hands ofconservative parties. The result should come asno surprise. This political movement not onlycapitalized on a putative external threatgenerated by recent international territorialdisputes (with China/Taiwan over theSenkaku/Diaoyu islands and with South Koreaover Takeshima/Dokdo islands). It also rode axenophobic wave dur ing the 2000s ,strengthened by fringe opposition to reformersseeking to give non-Japanese more rights inJapanese politics and society.

This article traces the arc of that xenophobictrajectory by focusing on three significantevents: The defeat in the mid-2000s of anational “Protection of Human Rights” bill(jinken yōgo hōan); Tottori Prefecture’s HumanRights Ordinance of 2005 that was passed on alocal level and then rescinded; and theresounding defeat of proponents of localsuffrage for non-citizens (gaikokujin sanseiken)between 2009-11. The article concludes thatthese developments have perpetuated theunconstitutional status quo of a nation with nolaws against racial discrimination in Japan.

Keywords: Japan, human rights, Tottori, racialdiscrimination, suffrage, minorities, Japanesepolitics, elections, xenophobia, right wing

Introduction

As has been written elsewhere (cf. Arudou2005; 2006a; 2006b et al.), Japan has no law inits Civil or Criminal Code specifically outlawingor punishing racial discrimination (jinshusabetsu). With respect to the United NationsConvention on the Elimination of RacialDiscrimination (which Japan adopted in 1996),Japan has explicitly stated to the UnitedNations that it does not need such a law: “Wedo not recognize that the present situation ofJapan is one in which discriminative actscannot be effectively restrained by the existinglegal system and in which explicit racialdiscriminative acts, which cannot be restrainedby measures other than legislation, areconducted. Therefore, penalization of theseacts is not considered necessary.” (MOFA2001: 5.1)

However, in 2005, a regional government,Tottori Prefecture northwest of Ōsaka, did passa local ordinance (jōrei) explicitly punishinginter alia discrimination by race. Whathappened to that law shortly afterwardsprovides a cautionary tale, demonstrating howpublic fear of granting any power to Non-Japanese occasioned the ordinance to berescinded shortly afterwards. This articledescribes the defeat of a similar bill on anational scale, the public reaction to Tottori’sordinance and the series of events that led toits withdrawal. The aftermath led to thestigmatization of any liberalization favoring

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more rights for Non-Japanese.

Prelude: The Protection of Human RightsBill debates of the mid-2000s

Throughout the 2000s, there was a movementto enforce the exclusionary parameters ofJapanese citizenship by further reinforcing thestatus quo disenfranchising non-citizens. Forexample, one proposal that would haveenfranchised non-citizens by giving them morerights was the Protection of Human Rights Bill(jinken yōgo hōan). It was an amalgamation ofseveral proposals (including the ForeignResidents’ Basic Law (gaikokujin jūmin kihonhō)) that would have protected the rights ofresidents regardless of nationality, ethnicstatus, or social origin.

According to interviews I conducted withproponents of the law in Japan’s human-rightscommunities (2000-5),1 the Basic Law had beendrafted in 1998 after years of fractious debateamong proponents. Rather than beingsubmitted to the Diet as a bill (chinjō or hōan),it was submitted as a “petition” (seigan) forconsideration. The more comprehensive HumanRights Bill (which did not focus specifically onnon-citizen protections against discrimination,and established clear oversight committees anda criminal-penalty structure) was submitted in2002 by the first Koizumi Cabinet, but died incommittee in October 2003 with the dissolutionof the Upper House. When talk was raised ofresubmission, it was shouted down byarguments opposing giving Zainichi Koreans,particularly those affiliated with North Korea,any political power; the proposal had been ill-timed, in light of the political capital beinggained by rightists during a 2002-6 debateconcerning geopolitical stances towards therachi mondai (i.e., North Korean kidnappings ofJapanese that had reportedly occurred between1977-83). The Bill remains in limbo, with adifferent incarnation (the Human Rights ReliefBill, jinken kyūsai hōan) wending its waythrough committees as of this writing.2

Germane to this research is the xenophobicdiscourse behind the defeat of this Bill.Consider one prominent book by a fringepublisher found on bookshelves nationwide thatfeatured famous authors (including anoutspoken Dietmember and a well-knownjournalist) opposing it:

Front and back cover of Danger! TheProtection of Human Rights Bill: TheImminent Threat of the Totalitarianism(zentai shugi) of the Developed Countries(Tendensha Inc., April 28, 2006.). Note theconnections being made in the top leftcorner between this Bill and the ForeignerSuffrage issue (see below): genderequality, the rights of children, the NorthKorean kidnappings, the treatment ofhistory in educational textbooks, andpatriotic visits to Yasukuni Shrine – alldivisive issues of the day between rightistsand leftists in Japanese politics. The backcover features prominent rightistspokespeople Member of Parliament (MP)Hiranuma Takeo and journalist SakuraiYoshiko. Tendensha Inc.’s rudimentaryw e b s i t e m a y b e f o u n d a t h e r e(http://www.tendensha.co.jp). Within thisbook was an excellent manga that madethe opposition’s arguments clearly (NB:Translated into English for the reader’sconvenience by Miki Kaoru, originalJapanese vers ion arch ived here

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(http://www.debito.org/abunaijinkenyougohouan.html)):

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The Danger! book, pp. 37-39. Note the racialized allegations of abuses of power, where darker-skinned or narrower-eyed “foreigners” would become lazy, delinquent, or disobedient towards social contracts if granted any rights.Moreover, this law would also lead to abuses between Japanese in terms of personal revenge or crime-syndicateblackmail. The assumption is that members of the Human Rights Committee (as opposed to the existing system ofHuman Rights Protection Officers footnoted on page 37 of the Danger! book) would not investigate the validity ofclaims beforehand. Remaining unproblematized is the efficacy of people in positions of power (e.g., employer, renter,teacher, or business owner) retaining and enforcing their prejudices towards women and “foreigners.” As can be seenbelow, this claim of reverse discrimination and “victimization” of the discriminator is a common meme withincounterarguments to liberalization proposals favorable to minorities in Japan.)

The Danger! book, p. 40. Continuing withthe meme of victimization, we have Japan’spoliticians now muzzled from debate andcriticism of geopolitical issues, andmembers of the media being denied theirfreedom of speech. Thus any tempering orcontrol of one’s dislike of people for theirethnicity/race/social origin (○○jin ga kiraiin Japanese) necessarily leads to politicalcorrectness (kotoba gari), thought police(shisō keisatsu), arrest, and the North-Koreanization of Japanese society (cf. KimJong-Il on the computer screen).)

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The Danger! book, pp. 143-45. This focuses on the potential official abuses of enforcement, where a person in a positionof power is being victimized: being taken advantage of (as a landlord) by “Asian foreigners”, being caught in thepugilistic crossfire (as a business owner) of a violent racist “Western foreigner,” or being singled out in a crowd whileexercising his right of public protest. The alarmism camouflaged by this absurdist humor neglects to mention that, a)no particular charge has been leveled against the victimized person; if this manga showed National Police Agencyofficers potentially doing the same thing, it would become an argument against any police forces – clearly a reductio adabsurdum; and, b) if anyone does something unlawful (such as violate a residential contract or cause a publicdisturbance), would it not be prudent for the person being victimized above to report it to the police (as acountermeasure to any perpetrator possibly cloaking his illegal activities as an extension of his “human rights”)? Theassumption again is that the new Human Rights Committee will not be able to screen out nuisance cases from bona fidecases – again, an argument that could be made against any policing agency.)

The thrust of these arguments is that changingthe status quo to grant rights to people whowere previously not in a position of power willnecessarily result in those people abusing theirnewfound power and causing social disorder. Inother words, if somebody does something thatsomebody else personally does not like, it willbecome a legitimate claim of a violation ofhuman rights. Unproblematized, however, arethe normalized and unchecked abuses ofmajoritarian power that are being defendedand justified within this manga (as in theabovementioned underlying prejudices against

and intolerance towards women and“foreigners”), not to mention the racialized andstereotyped prejudices of the author towardsminorities in Japan.

Nevertheless, these arguments were madeconcisely and powerfully in a well-organizedmedia campaign that stressed unassailabletropes such as freedom of speech and of thepress (which allegedly were under attack bythe Bill’s allegedly “vague” (aimai) definitionso f “human r ights” ) , grounded in anundercurrent of fear for Japan’s nationalintegrity in the face of looming external threats(particularly North Korea). They were sufficientto defeat the Protection of Human Rights Bill.Similar fear-based counterarguments were alsoone reason why Japan had not hithertosucceeded in passing legislation against racialdiscrimination, and when a measure waspassed at the local level – in Tottori Prefecture– a similar campaign arose to defeat it.

Tottori Prefecture’s Human RightsOrdinance

On October 12, 2005, after nearly a year ofdeliberations and amendments, the TottoriPrefectural Assembly approved a human rightsordinance (tottori-ken jinken shingai kyūsaisuishin oyobi tetsuzuki ni kansuru jōrei) thatwould not only financially penalize eight typesof human rights violations (including physicalabuse, sexual harassment, slander, anddiscrimination by “race” – including “bloodrace, ethnicity, creed, gender, social standing,family status, disability, illness, and sexualorientation”), but also set up an investigativepanel for deliberations and provide for publicexposure of offenders.3 Going farther than thealready-existing Ministry of Justice, Bureau ofHuman Rights (jinken yōgobu, which has nopolicing or punitive powers), it could launchinvestigations, require hearings and writtenexplanations, issue private warnings (makingthem public if they went ignored), demandcompensation for victims, remand cases to the

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courts, and even recommend cases toprosecutors if they thought there was a crimeinvolved. It also had punitive powers, includingfines up to 50,000 yen. Sponsored by TottoriGovernor Katayama Yoshihiro, an advocate notjust of human rights legislation but also ofdecentralized government,4 it was to be a trialmeasure – taking effect on June 1, 2006 andexpiring on March 31, 2010. The carefully-planned ordinance was created by a committeeof 26 people over the course of two years, withinput from a lawyer, several academics andhuman rights activists, and three non-citizenresidents. It passed the Tottori PrefecturalAssembly by a wide margin: 35 votes to 3.

However, the counterattack was immediate.5

The major local newspaper in the neighboringprefecture, the Chūgoku Shimbun (Hiroshima),claimed two days later in an October 14editorial entitled, “We must monitor thisordinance in practice,” that the ordinancewould "in fact shackle (sokubaku) humanrights.” Accusations flew that assemblypersonshad not read the bill properly, or had supportedabstract ideals without thinking them through.Others said the governor had not explained tothe people properly what he was binding themto. Internet petitions blossomed to kill the bill.S o m e s a m p l e c o m p l a i n t s ( w i t h m ycounterarguments in parenthesis, for brevity):a) The ordinance had only been deliberatedupon in the Assembly for a week (though it wasfirst brought up in 2002 and had beendiscussed in committees throughout 2005); b)The ordinance’s definitions of human rightsviolations were too vague, and could hinder themedia in, for example, investigating politiciansfor corruption (even though the ordinance’sClause 31 clearly states that freedom of thepress must be respected); c) Since theinvest igat ive commit tee was not anindependent body, reporting only to thegovernor, this could encourage arbitrarydecisions and cover-ups (similar to the existingBureau of Human Rights, which reports only tothe secretive Ministry of Justice6); d) This

invests judicial and policing powers in anadministrative organ, a violation of theseparation of powers (which means that nooversight committee in Japan is allowed to haveenforcement power – but this calls intoquestion many other ordinances in Japan, suchas those governing garbage disposal, thatmandate fines and incarceration).

The Japan Federation of Bar Associations(Nichibenren) sounded the ordinance’s deathknell in its official statement of November 2,2005: Too much power had been given thegovernor, constricting the people and mediaunder arbitrary guidelines, under a committeechief who could investigate by diktat,overseeing a bureaucracy that could refuse tobe investigated. This called into question thepolicymaking discretion of the committees thathad originally drafted it, and the common senseof the 35 prefectural assembly members whooverwhelmingly passed it. The governmentissued an official Q&A to allay public concern,and the Governor said problems would be dealtwith as they arose, but the original supportersof the ordinance, feeling the media-sponsoredand internet-fomented pressure, did not standup to defend it. In December and January 2006,the prefecture convened informal discussiongroups containing the vice-governor, two courtcounselors, four academics, and five lawyers(but no human rights activists). In addition toother arguments used to rescind the bill, criticsnow wondered how un-appointed untrainedpublic administrators ostensibly could act asjudges.

On March 24, 2006, less than six months afterpassing the ordinance, the Tottori PrefecturalAssembly voted unanimously to suspend itindefinitely. “We should have brought up casesto illustrate specific human rights violations.The public did not seem to understand what wewere trying to prevent,” said Mr. Ishiba, arepresentative of the Tottori Governor's office.7

“They should have held town meetings to raiseawareness about what discrimination is, and

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created separate ordinances for each type ofdiscrimination,” said Assemblywoman OzakiKaoru, who voted against the bill both times.8

Governor Katayama resigned his governorshipin April 2007, saying that ten years in officewas enough.9 The ordinance was laterresubmitted to committees in 2007, where itwas voted down for the last time.10 As of thiswriting, the text of the ordinance, Japan’s firstlegislation explicitly penalizing racialdiscrimination, has been removed from themain Tottori Prefectural website and buriedwithin a new link.11 It effectively remainspreserved in amber as Japan’s only successfullegislation against racial discrimination.

The aftermath: An emboldened xenophobiawithin Japan’s right wing12

When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) tookpower from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)in 2009, one of their liberalizing partyplatforms was granting non-citizen PermanentResidents (ippan eijūsha and tokubetsu eijūsha)the right to vote in local elections (ForeignerSuffrage, or gaikokujin sanseiken), in partbecause non-citizens, particularly the ZainichiSpecial Permanent Residents, had historicallyspent their lives born in, l iving in andcontributing to Japan; moreover, they alreadyhad the vote on local referendums in somemunicipalities. Politically the proposal seemedadvantageous to the DPJ at the time it was firstproposed in 2008 (when the DPJ was theopposition party (yatō)), as it threatened tosplit the then ruling coalition by tempting awayLDP partner Kōmeitō (a religious-based partyfounded by the Sōka Gakkai, which initiallysupported the proposal due to the group’sinternational fol lowing). 1 3 A commoncounterargument to Foreigner Suffrage was, “Ifnon-citizens want to vote, they shouldnaturalize.” However, as seen in opponents’arguments, there were cases of non-Japaneseroots despite Japanese citizenship beingproblematized (including public statements byprominent elected officials like MP Hiranuma

and Tōkyō Governor Ishihara Shintarōquestioning the loyalties of political opponentsdue to their “mixed blood” or alleged “foreignroots,” rather than any logical or legal basis),mooting the efficacy of naturalization as analternative.14

Further, Japanese representatives both outsideand within the DPJ, not to mention fringe-rightist elements within Japanese politics,found the sanseiken proposal a convenientmeans to decry external and internal “foreign”influences over Japanese society. As can beseen below, public fears were stoked byfrequent public meetings, demonstrations, andbilleting that argued that granting any morerights to non-citizens would be “the end ofJapan,” with alarmist invective including North-Korean or Chinese-controlled representativesbeing elected to Japanese office, secessions ofparts of Japan to China and South Korea, andeven alien invasion:

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Magazine-book (mook) purchased by theauthor at Kinokuniya Book Store, Tōkyō,March 7 , 2010, ent i t led “UrgentPublication: Doomsday for Japan due toForeign Suffrage.” The subtitles read,“China will come to invade [Japan]legally,” and “Policies [to bring in]10,000,000 immigrants will make Japaninto a foreign country.” BessetsuTakarajima, 2010.)

Flyer received February 23, 2010, from ananonymous donor who found it in hispostal mailbox in Narita, Chiba Prefecture.Headline reads, “DANGER!! ForeignSuffrage,” depicting the alleged results ofgiving “foreigners” more rights in othercountries (such as Canada and Holland):Foreigners commit crimes in highernumbers where they have the vote, electunqualified ethnic politicians who cannot

even speak the local language, andoutproduce the local population in termsof births. Note the racialized depictions ofundifferentiated slit-eyed midget Chinesehordes in Mao suits getting elected insmal l d i s t r i c t s , tak ing over themanagement of internal natural resources,and ultimately overrunning the Japanesearchipelago. Created and distributed byunknown groups. Notation by the author.)

(Figure 7: Flyer received February 19,2010, from an anonymous donor in Narita,Chiba Prefecture who found this in hisposta l mai lbox . Headl ine reads ,“Something as dangerous as ForeignerSuffrage: We LDP members of Edogawa-ku[Tōkyō] think this way,” listing theirmanifesto, including: “Paying taxes doesnot equal the right to vote,” “There aredoubts about the constitutionality of

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foreigner suffrage,” “Governors of themajor metropolitan areas are one by oneexpressing their opposition,” etc. Note howthe invective of “alien invasion” has beenrendered literally, with a UFO shining aspotlight on the archipelago. Captionbelow the UFO: “Let’s protect Japan.”)

Anti-foreign suffrage public demonstrationin front of Shibuya Station, Tōkyō,November 28, 2009. Note the blue flag thatsays, “Block the dissolution (kaitai) ofJapan,” and the sound truck in the leftbackground that reads, “Okinawa andTsushima [islands] will be snatched away!”Photo courtesy of a contributor who wishesto remain anonymous.)

Flyer received February 28, 2010 from ananonymous donor in Nagoya who foundthis in his postal mailbox. Headline reads,“Be careful of foreign crime,” claimingwith unsourced (and by then erroneous)statistics that “foreign crime” is on therise (with breakdowns by crime andnationality). Note the blackened boxestowards the bottom, where in the first boxreaders are encouraged to do internetsearches under terms “Foreign Suffrage”and “Danger,” thus formally linking“foreign crime” with “foreign votingrights.” The disclaimer at the very bottomreads that this flyer was being distributedby anonymous Internet users “who havebecome aware of these dangers” and areunaffiliated with any group or religion.Notation by the author.)

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Note that it is not a large leap from theofficially-sponsored imagery and invectiveinvolving invasions of Japan by “foreigncriminals” to imagery of invasion andsubversion of Japan through the electoralprocess. There was even formal linkage madeto it within the debate:

In order to gain leverage against the fledglingDPJ Hatoyama Administration (see otherrightist protest f lyers archived here(http://www.debito.org/?p=5353) and here(http://www.debito.org/?p=6509)), rightistelements made formal linkages with other DPJproposals that would have protected the rightsof non-citizens, such as the aforementionedForeign Residents Basic Law (which by thenwas a moribund Bill):

Another flyer from the Shibuya ForeignSuffrage protest of November 28, 2009.Entitled “Protect Japan from the MPsselling [our] country off!” it also advisesreaders to be aware of the by-thenmoribund Foreign Residents Basic Law(gaikokujin jūmin kihon hō), which isallegedly even more dangerous than theF o r e i g n S u f f r a g e B i l l b y b e i n g“unconstitutional and discriminatorytowards Japanese.”)

Even though proponents (including the AsahiShimbun of July 6, 2010, citing an opinion pollof 49% of respondents in favor of non-citizensuffrage and 43% against) took a stand, thelack of a minority opposition voice (not tomention their political disenfranchisement),

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media access, and the inability to choosesympathetic political representatives – a viciouscircle), plus a DPJ already deeply-divided overthe Foreign Suffrage Bill, allowed it to beshouted down. The DPJ formally “postponed”the bill by February 2010, and dropped it fromthe DPJ Manifesto entirely by the July 11, 2011Upper House Elections.15

However, the reactionary social movement thathad crystallized around this bill maintained itsmomentum: The protests against “foreignrights” were then leveraged as a template intosuccessful protests against other DPJ rights-based liberalizing measures, such as separatesurnames for married couples (fūfu bessei)(which LDP head Tanigaki Sadakazu claimed,in similar now-normalized apocalypticinvective, “would destroy the country”).16 Evenafter the DPJ had dropped the foreignersuffrage proposal, the issue was raisedrepeatedly in public demonstrations, with ananti-suffrage rally on April 17, 2010 in theBudōkan (organized by Sassa Atsuyuki, theformer Secretary General of the SecurityCouncil of Japan) attracting a reported 10,257attendees.17 Rightist grassroots activists alsosuccessfully pushed several local andprefectural assemblies nationwide to passformal resolutions in opposition to it.18

Meanwhile, nationalistic and xenophobic mediaused the attention garnered by this movementto create a self-sustaining media presence,19

legitimized by prominent politicians/pundits(such as former – and now current – PM AbeShinzō, MP Hiranuma Takeo, MP KameiShizuka, former Air Self-Defense Forces Chiefof Staff General Tamogami Toshio) basking inthe attention. Thus, by the end of the 2000s,“foreigners” in Japan had become a politicalfootball within a whirlwind of time, money,organizat ion, and energy devoted tonationalistic, xenophobic, and exclusionarycauses20 (including, of course, geopoliticaldisputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands withChina/Taiwan, and the Takeshima/Dokdo

Islands with South Korea, leading toxenophobic rallies within Japan’s ethnicneighborhoods, and the resignation of TōkyōGovernor Ishihara to prepare for reelection tonational office).21

Conclusion

The normal izat ion of rac ia l ized andexclusionary invective in Japanese politics hasenabled political language to shift perceptiblyinto xenophobia, with claims of widespread“foreign crime” (Arudou 2007) being connectedwith contemporary domestic and geopoliticalissues to justify an enforced politicaldisenfranchisement of minorities in Japan. Aspolitical discourse focused upon “foreign”issues, invective turned from exclusionary toapocalyptic, mutating isolated cases of a fewJapanese victims of crime into an image ofJapan as a nation under siege from the outsideworld. One underlying argument has been, ineffect, “more foreigners means less Japan,”making any form of compromise (such asgranting liberalized rights protections not onlyto foreigners, but also to multiethnic Japanesecitizens) impossible without Japan “coming toan end.” In the rightist media, proponentsbegan looking for issues upon which to hangand propel a conservative and exclusionaryagenda. This has caused rights-orientedreforms and legislation not only to be shelved,but also abrogated, which to some degreeexplains why a perpetually-disenfranchisedminority in Japan will find it difficult, despiteconstitutional guarantees, to garner sufficientpublic support behind protecting non-Japanesefrom discriminatory language and behavior.

In fact, in 2012, when this wave of xenophobiacrested into a mainstream territorial disputewith China/Taiwan and South Korea, anypolicymaking legacy supporting “foreigner”issues became part of a poisonous invectivethat contributed to the resounding defeat of theDPJ in December 2012. Given this politicalclimate, any public support for universal

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“human rights issues” in Japan will remainpolitical poison for any legislator as long asthere is any alleged benefit to “foreigners.”Japan’s formerly exclusionary, now xenophobic,status quo will hold for the foreseeable future.

Arudou Debito is a writer, activist, blogger(www.debito.org (http://www.debito.org/)), andcolumnist for the Japan Times. He is the authorof Japanese Only, the Otaru Hot Springs Caseand Rac ia l D iscr iminat ion in Japan(http://www.debito.org/japaneseonly.html#English) (Akashi Shoten, English and Japanese), andcoauthor, with Higuchi Akira, an administrativesolicitor in Sapporo who also is qualified as animmigration lawyer by Sapporo Immigration, ofthe bilingual Handbook for Newcomers,Migran t s and Immigran t s t o J apan(http://www.debito.org/handbook.html) (2nd

edition). Find more details on the book ando t h e r b o o k s b y A r u d o u h e r e(http://www.debito.org/publications.html#BOOKS).

Recommended Citation: Arudou Debito,"Japan’s Rightward Swing and the TottoriPrefecture Human Rights Ordinance," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 9, No. 3, March 4,2013.

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Sakurai, Yoshiko et al. 2006. Kinkyū Shuppan:Abunai! Jinken Yōgo Hōan: Semari kuruSenshinkoku Kei Zentai Shugi no Kyōfu [Urgent

Publication: Danger! The Protection of HumanRights Bill: The Imminent Threat of theTotalitarianism of the Developed Countries].Tōkyō: Tendensha.

Tamogami, Toshio et al. 2010. Kinkyū Shuppan:“Gaikokujin Sanseiken” de Nihon ga NakunaruHi Urgent Publication: Doomsday for Japan due to Foreign Suffrage]. Tōkyō:

Bessetsu Takarajima.

Tanaka, Hiroshi. 2006. In Kim Geduk, ed.Nichi/Kan “Kyōsei Shakai” no Tenbō [A view toa Japanese/Korean “Coexistence Society”].Tōkyō: Shakansha.

Notes

1 See for example the Gaikiren (now Gaikikyō)group webs i te on these sub jec ts a thttp://gaikikyo.jp. This Catholic group was themain proponent of the Bill until the events thattranspired in the next section.

2 See for example “Minshu bumon kaigi, jinkenkyūsai hōan o ryōshō; hantaiha no iken oshikiri.” Sankei Shimbun, August 29, 2012.

3 See “Tottori rights law a first but irks critics.”Japan Times, October 13, 2005. See the text oft h e o r d i n a n c e(https://apjjf.org/admin/site_manage/details/web.archive.org/web/20080329214102/http:/www.pref.tottori.jp/jinken/jorei-kyusai.html) (from adead-link archive).

4 Why did Gov. Katayama make such a boldmove to establish Japan’s first comprehensivehuman rights ordinance? Part of the reason isdue to his background: A graduate of Tōkyō’selite Faculty of Law, Katayama had a steadyrise first as a bureaucrat in the Ministry ofHome Affairs, then other posts including anadministrator in the National Tax Office,Secretary to the Minister of Home Affairs, andhead of the Tottori Prefecture General AffairsDepartment, before becoming Tottori Governor

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in 1999 and being re-elected in 2003.According to an interview (Keiō University,2012), Katayama is a f irm believer indecentralized local governance and, after firstfloating the idea of a local human-rightsordinance in June 2002, probably felt that hisre-election provided a mandate to achieve “realdemocratic local government” through alandmark human-rights ordinance. (He alsostated in 2005 that leaving the creation ofhuman rights laws to the Ministry of Justicealone was not a good idea, and that localgovernments should also work in conjunctionwith the national Protection of Human RightsBill mentioned in the previous section (KaihōShimbun, 2005)). Indicatively, Katayama’sordinance is never mentioned in the Keiōinterview. After its repeal, Katayama did notrun for reelection, but after a break went on tobecome Cabinet Minister of Internal Affairs andCommunications 2010-1 under the KanAdministration, and is currently a professor oflaw at Keiō University.

5 Adapted from Arudou, “How to kill a bill:Tottori’s Human Rights Ordinance is a casestudy in alarmism.” Japan Times, May 2, 2006.

6 See "Watching the detectives: Japan's humanrights bureau falls woefully short of meeting itsown job specifications." Japan Times, July 8,2003.

7 Phone interview, Tottori PrefectureGovernor’s Office, April 25, 2006.

8 Phone interview, April 25, 2006.

9 See “Katayama chiji ga sansen fushutsubahyōmei.” San-in Chūō Shimbun, December 26,2006.

1 0 S e e h e r e

(http://www.pref.tottori.lg.jp/89097.htm).

1 1 S e e h e r e(http://www.pref.tottori.lg.jp/92990.htm).

12 A thoughtful overview of this debate may befound in “Disenfranchised: Japan weighs upwhether to give foreign residents the vote.”Metropolis Magazine, June 17, 2010.

13 See inter alia “Komeito leader welcomesOzawa’s proposal to give foreigners votingrights.” Mainichi Shimbun, January 24, 2008;“Minshuto to push foreign suffrage.” AsahiShimbun, January 25, 2008; “DPJ holdsopposing meetings on foreigners voting in localelections.” Kyodo News, January 31, 2008,which notes that there was allegedly a feelingof international movement in support ofsuffrage liberalization, reporting: “The SouthKorean government has repeatedly called onJapan to allow permanent residents of Koreandescent, who make up the bulk of foreignresidents in Japan, to vote in local elections.South Korea allowed foreigners who have livedin the country for more than three years afterobtaining permanent residency to vote in localelections for the first time in June 2006.” Seealso “FYI: Suffrage; Expats won hard-foughtbattle but suffrage still eludes foreignpermanent residents.” Japan Times, June 3,2008; Tanaka (2006: 76-7), translated here(http://www.debito.org/?p=6209), with a list of25 other developed countries that allowpermanent resident non-citizens to vote undercertain circumstances, showing Japan as theabsolutist outlier.

14 See “Gaikokujin sanseiken ‘Senzo e giridateka: Ishihara chiji ga yoto hihan.” AsahiShimbun, April 18, 2010; “Tokyo governor callsruing party veterans ‘naturalized’.” AP, April19, 2010; “Fukushima shamin tōshu ga Ishiharatochiji no hatsugen no tekkai motomeru.”

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Sankei Shimbun, April 19, 2010; “Natural bornvoters?” The Diplomat, April 20, 2010;“Ishihara snubs SDP retraction request.” JapanTimes, April 24, 2010. See also “’Motomotonihonjin ja nai:’ Hiranuma shi ga Renhō shi ohihan.” Sankei Shimbun, January 18, 2010; “Ex-minister Hiranuma says lawmaker Renho is ‘notoriginally Japanese’.” Kyodo News, January 18,2010; “Non-Japanese suffrage and the racistelement.” Japan Times, February 2, 2010. On arelated note, Hiranuma has a history ofxenophobic, not to mention misogynistic,statements. On February 1, 2006, he statedthat Emperors should only be male becausefemales might marry a “foreigner:” “If[Princess] Aiko becomes the reigning empressand gets involved with a blue-eyed foreignerwhile studying abroad and marries him, theirchild may be the emperor. We should never letthat happen.” Why females are innately moresusceptible to the seductive wiles of“foreigners” than males are was left unclear.See “Female on throne could marry foreigner,Hiranuma warns.” AP, February 2, 2006.

15 See “DPJ holds opposing meetings onforeigners voting in local elections.” KyodoNews, January 31, 2008; “Parties split onforeigner suffrage.” Japan Times, August 18,2009; “DPJ postpones bill to grant local votingrights to permanent foreign residents.”Mainichi Shimbun, February 27, 2010;“Editorial: Foreigners’ voting rights.” AsahiShimbun, July 6, 2010. As they poignantlyargued, in excerpt (official translation), “Somesay foreigner suffrage goes ‘against theConstitution.’ However, it is only natural toconstrue from the Supreme Court ruling ofFebruary 1995 that the Constitution neitherguarantees nor prohibits foreigner suffrage butrather ‘allows’ it. The decision on foreignsuffrage depends on legislative policy. In anage when people easily cross national borders,what kind of society does Japan wish tobecome? How do we de te rmine thequalifications and rights of people who

comprise our country and communities? Towhat extent do we want to open our gates toimmigrants? How do we control social diversityand turn it into energy?” In a counter editorial,the Yomiuri argued in October 2009: “It is notunfathomable that permanent foreign residentswho are nationals of countries hostile to Japancould disrupt or undermine local governments’cooperation with the central government bywielding influence through voting in localelections.” (ibid, Metropolis Magazine, June 17,2010)

16 See “Foreigner suffrage, separate surnamesstir passions in poll run-up.” Japan Times, July3, 2010. “Japan split over maiden names,foreign suffrage.” Kyodo News, July 9, 2010.

17 Archive of further protests and flyers here(http://www.debito.org/?p=6509). See also“Foreigner suffrage opponents rally:Conservative politicians express outrage at DPJp lan .” Japan T imes , Apr i l 18 , 2010;“Lawmakers oppose giving foreign residentsright to vote.” Kyodo News, April 18, 2010.

18 See inter alia “14 prefectures opposeallowing foreigners to vote in local elections.”Kyodo News, February 9, 2010; this includeseight prefectures that once supported themeasure, but changed their stance underpressure;“8 ken gikai ga ‘hantai’ ni tenkō.”Mainichi Shimbun, February 9, 2010. See alsotemplate opposition resolution “Eijū gaikokujine no chihō sanseiken fuyo no hōseika ni hantaisuru ikensho (an),” passed by Tsukuba CityAssembly December 2010, archived here(http://www.debito.org/?p=8459), courtesy ofTsukuba City Councilor Jon Heese.

19 See for example very active Internet channelN i h o n b u n k a C h a n e r u S a k u r a(http://www.ch-sakura.jp). When last accessedin July 2012, a very prominent interview with

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current PM Abe was featured.

2 0 See inter alia Cabinetmember KameiShizuka’s xenophobic comments as FinancialServices Minister in “Foreigner suffrage canfuel nationalism: Kamei.” Japan Times, Feb. 4,2010; “New dissent in Japan is loudly anti-foreign.” New York Times, August 28, 2010; “Ablack sun rises in a declining Japan.” Globe andMail (Canada), October 5, 2010; “Japan: Theland of the r is ing nat ional ism.” TheIndependent (London), November 5, 2010.

21 See for example “Nationalists converge onShin-Okubo’s Koreatown.” Japan Today.com,September 17, 2012. It reports that there havealso been threats of violence towards Zainichiminority shopkeeps, citing Shūkan Kin’yōbi

Magazine: “’It appears that the Zaitokukai(short for Zainichi Tokken wo Yurusanai Shiminno Kai or group opposed to special rights forKoreans in Japan) thinks i t can bui ldmomentum for its movement by harping on theTakeshima and Senkaku issues,’ says journalistYasuda Koichi, who authored a book titled‘Pursuing the darkness of Internet patriots, theZaitokukai’ (Kodansha), about the noisy groupthat has been boosting its membership throughskillful use of the Internet. ‘While I don’t seeany signs yet that they are increasing theirinfluence, they still bear watching,’ Yasudacomments. ‘As far as they are concerned,discriminating against the zainichi (Koreans inJapan) is everything, and they aren’t terriblyconcerned about what will become of thedisputed territories in the future. But they canuse the timing of the dispute as a pretext forpushing their own agenda.’”