Japan’s normative soft power as a global trouble-shooter

Prepared for the ISA-Global South Conference,

January 2015, Singapore

By

Dr. Yee-Kuang HENG

Associate Professor of International Relations

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,

National University of Singapore

Email: spphyk@nus.edu.sg

Draft Paper: please do not cite

ABSTRACT

Under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, much has been said of Japan’s turn towards

nationalism amid fears of its remilitarisation. However, Japanese foreign policy today is

in fact more nuanced and subtle, comprising a mix of at least three different approaches:

what Inoguchi (2014) terms ‘classical realist’; ‘transformative pragmatist’ and a ‘liberal

international line’. Mirroring Inoguchi’s emphasis on strengthening the second and third

approaches, this paper argues that the notion of ‘normative soft power’ can be usefully

applied to understand Japan’s evolving foreign and security policies in two ways: first,

it has been positioning itself as a trouble-shooter and defender of global norms and

access to global commons. Second, it is adopting a policy of ‘contrast’ with China

which is often depicted as threatening those very same global norms. In the process,

Japan is trying to shape and define what should be ‘legitimate’ and ‘acceptable’

behaviour in the international system.

Introduction

Whether Japan was a rising power (Kano 1976) or a declining one (Fukushima 2011),

the country’s future international role has long provoked debate. Depending on who you

read, Japan today was becoming a ‘normal’ military power (Hughes 2004), a middle

power (Soeya 2005), ‘soft power superpower’ (Watanabe & McConell 2008), or ‘global

ordinary power’ (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006). Japan’s transition ‘from economic

superpower to what power’ (Drifte 1996) continues to befuddle analysts. One might add

to the list the idea of Japan as a ‘normative power’. For scholars working on the notion

of ‘normative power’, the theoretical relationship between ‘norms’ and ‘power’ can be

interpreted through at least two different ways. First, it can be read through the lens of

‘soft’ power whereby the ‘normative’ variant of soft power derives from the legitimacy

a state derives from its degree of alignment or enhancement of global norms or shared

values. (Melissen 2011; Lee 2011). Working outside of Nye’s contested ‘soft power’

framework, other scholars have tended to focus on a state’s influencing activity, which

outlines the domain and range of legitimate behaviour appropriate to the international

system: the legitimacy of what is defined as ‘normal’ is crucial (Jackson 1975) The

‘ability to define what passes for “normal” in world politics is ultimately the greatest

power of all’ (Manners 2002) While these two theoretical approaches differ, there is at

the very least some basic agreement and convergence on the importance of appearing

‘acceptable’ and ‘legitimate’ in order to achieve desired outcomes. Existing research has

addressed mostly the ‘normative’ power capabilities of the EU and China (Manners

2002; Callahan 2012; Kavalski 2014) but there has been less focus on ‘normative’ Japan

until recently. The notion of ‘normative power’ and its relevance to Japan’s foreign

policies have belatedly attracted attention of scholars in recent works. Heng (2014) has

considered the implications for understanding Japan’s potential contributions to

addressing climate change and environmental challenges in Asia and beyond. Zupancic

& Hribernik (2014) for their part argued that Japan’s pursuit of normative power is

complementary to strengthening its ‘hard’ military security through its alliance with the

US and cooperation with other like-minded states. While existing works have

adequately explained the suitability and attraction of normative power concepts to

Japan’s particular post-World War Two political and military context, this paper argues

that there are currently two strategies through which a Japanese normative power

approach can manifest itself. The first is based on the idea of positioning Japan as a

‘trouble-shooting’ nation and solving common challenges to global norms in order to

attract other countries, in the way that a somewhat more passive ‘normative soft power’

approach of Lee and Melissen might suggest. The second is a related strategy of

‘contrast’ whereby Japan seeks to distinguish itself from other states that are seen to

undermine or threaten these global norms. Here, there is a closely interlinked element of

trying to define what is ‘proper’ and ‘desirable’ behaviour of states which is closer to

the more proactive understanding of ‘normative power’ as espoused by scholars like

Manners and Jackson.

Presenting Japan as a global trouble-shooter

In a surprisingly overlooked set of statements, Japan’s New Growth Strategy (2009: 6)

expressed an explicit and clearly outlined desire to become ‘a country that solves

global-scale problems.’ The 2009 White Paper on International Trade of the Ministry of

Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) proposed a new role for Japan as "a problem-

solving country that can proactively contribute to solving problems facing the

international community and take advantage of such contributions for boosting its

national power in a win-win manner to benefit both itself and the world’ (METI 2009:

498). Ex-PM Aso (2009) singled out environmental problems because ‘overcoming

global warming is the greatest challenge of the 21st century’ and Japan should be

‘leading the world in the low-carbon emission revolution’. In other words, Japan is to

become "a trouble-shooting nation for global issues" (Agence France Press 2009).

These suggestions re-appeared as the centrepiece of the 2010 New Growth Strategy,

which argued that since developing Asia faces numerous environmental problems,

Japan can assume leadership positions ‘‘by leading other countries in presenting models

of how problems can be overcome.’ (Cabinet Office 2010: 4). This particular Growth

Strategy formulated by previous governments targeted two issue areas (environmental

degradation and ageing) where Japan can trouble-shoot. However, there is some

semblance of continuity in the basic idea of Tokyo helping to address shared common

challenges that endures under the Abe Shinzo administration. At the same time there is

a key difference in emphasis on issue areas with a stronger and more pronounced

security dimension and this can be seen in Abe’s signature phrase of ‘proactive

contribution to peace’. In his speech at the North Atlantic Council, Abe stressed that

this policy meant also that ‘Japan should play a more proactive role in order fully to

defend freedom of overflight, freedom of navigation, and other global commons.’1

While Japanese government documents tend to provide ‘concrete examples’ of this

proactive stance, ranging from contribution to UN PKOs and non-proliferation efforts,

what is most relevant to this paper is the example given of ‘strengthening the rule of law

1 ‘Japan and NATO as natural partners’, speech by PM Abe Shinzo, Spring/summer 2014,

http://www.japan.go.jp/tomodachi/speech/201405nato.html, accessed 08 September 2014

in global commons’. The 2013 National Security Strategy identified amongst others,

security challenges for Japan in the form of ‘risks to global commons’ where conflicts

of interest over the sea are increasing.2 According to the UN Environment Programme,

the ‘Global Commons’ refers to resource domains or areas that lie outside of the political

reach of any one nation State. Thus international law identifies four global commons namely:

the High Seas; the Atmosphere; Antarctica; and, Outer Space. In Japan’s case, it concerns can

be seen clearly in two domains: maintaining access to the maritime and aviation

commons but Tokyo has also increasingly turned its attention to cyber-space and Outer

Space as well. The Strategy goes on to note that it considers important Japan’s need to

‘maintain and develop ‘open and stable seas’ as well as ‘strengthening the international

order based on shared values and rules’.3 It envisions Japan as ‘a guardian of the rule of law’

as well as proactive participant in rule-making particularly with regard to the sea, outer space

and cyberspace, and strengthen capacity building efforts for developing countries in these

fields.4 To that end, the strategy declared that Japan will strengthen cooperation with partners

and enhance bilateral and multilateral exercise. Another aspect of this approach has involved

capacity-building programmes to resolve weaknesses and deficiencies of countries such as

Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines so that they can also better address challenges to

freedom of navigation, potentially from China. Tokyo has already signalled it will use ODA aid

in a more ‘strategic’ fashion, donating patrol boats to these countries. For instance Japan has

offered to pay for radar systems and radios on Vietnamese maritime police patrol ships. With

regard to assisting ASEAN in ‘safeguarding the seas’, PM Abe has declared its intention to

provide ‘seamless support’ combining various options including defence equipment and

2 Government of Japan, ‘National Security of Japan’, 2013, p.5

3 NSS, p.4

4 NSS, p.31

technology cooperation on surveillance and rescue capabilities; ODA and capability-building by

the JSDF.5 In particular, the 2013 NSS declared that Japan will ‘provide assistance to those

coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication...and strengthen cooperation with

partners in the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan’.6 Other instances of Tokyo

providing help to address shared problems can be seen in its role establishing the Regional

Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia

(ReCAAP) based in Singapore. Japan Coast Guard officials have also helped train ASEAN

maritime enforcement agencies in maritime security and counter-piracy techniques. This idea

of Japan as a trouble-shooter contrasts with Chinese depictions of Tokyo as a ‘trouble-maker in

Asia’. In a speech delivered to the Australian Parliament in July 2014, PM Abe declared. “So far

as national security goes, Japan has been self-absorbed for a long time…As a nation that longs

for permanent peace in the world, and as a country whose economy is among the biggest,

Japan is now determined to do more to enhance peace."We want to make Japan a country

that will work to build an international order that upholds the rule of law, Let us join together

all the more in order to make vast seas from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian, and those skies,

open and free…In everything we say and do we must follow the law and never fall back into

force and coercion’. Maintaining and upholding the freedom of navigation in maritime

sea lines of communication and civil over-flight in international airspace has emerged as

a key indicator of Japan’s trouble-shooting and problem-solving stance. Japan is

defining freedom of access to these global commons as ‘legitimate, desirable normal

behaviour’ activity which it will protect from any problematic challengers. ASEAN

countries may also tend to be more open to align with Japanese policies upholding

‘global norms’ that do not target China specifically.

5 PM Abe speech, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore 31 May 2014

6 NSS, p.24

There has already been evidence of Tokyo grabbing the mantle of trouble-

shooter for itself, on behalf of itself and ASEAN states facing maritime and aviation

challenges from China. It has defined these issues as common shared challenges where

both sides have similar stakes and problems to be addressed. Take for instance PM

Abe’s landmark ‘Bounty of the Open Seas’ speech that was meant to be delivered in

Jakarta in 2013 until a hostage crisis involving Japanese in Algeria drew him back to

Tokyo: ‘Japan's national interest lies eternally in keeping Asia's seas unequivocally

open, free, and peaceful--in maintaining them as the commons for all the people of the

world…seas, which are the most vital commons to us all, are governed by laws and

rules, not by might’. Media reports also suggest that Tokyo managed to insert the

importance of ‘Freedom of navigation’ into Chairman’s statement, despite some

ASEAN concerns, at the 16th

ASEAN-Japan summit, Oct 2013 in Brunei. Again, two

months later, the Joint Statement of the Japan-ASEAN Dec 2013, 40th

Anniversary

Summit in Tokyo declared ‘We underscored the importance of maintaining peace,

stability and prosperity in the region and promoting maritime security and safety,

freedom of navigation; unimpeded commerce, exercise of self-restraint and resolution

of disputes by peaceful means’. The benefit of this trouble-shooting stance adopted by

Tokyo is that it does not explicitly or formally take sides in the territorial disputes and

actually rather chimes with both claimants’ positions and non-claimants. When the

Philippines in April 2014 submitted its case against China at UNCLOS tribunal, its lead counsel

also made its case in terms of international law and legitimate international behaviour:

‘There's a price to be paid for branding yourself as an international outlaw, as a state

that doesn't respect, that doesn't comply with international law’ (Manila's lead counsel

Paul Reichler 02 April 2014). Essentially Manila accused China of ‘illegal’, undesirable

behaviour that goes against international norms. Japan has inserted itself into the

equation for ASEAN states, offering its help as a solutions-provider through capacity-

building and diplomatic support. As for a non-claimant state like Singapore, ‘Singapore

is a non-claimant so we take no sides in the disputes. But we do have interests and our interest

is in maintaining freedom of navigation and stability in this important sea lane of

communication’ (PM Lee Hsien Loong 2012). This position is the same as Tokyo’s. As long as

Tokyo conveys its stance through the prism of access to global commons and maritime

navigation, then it has shared interests with these like-minded countries and is launching

‘influencing activity’ to define what counts as ‘normal’ legitimate international

behaviour in global commons. This basic trouble-shooting position has now expanded

into the field of civil aviation after Beijing’s declaration of the Air Defence

Identification Zone in November 2013. Tokyo managed to obtain ASEAN agreement

on the following joint statement at the Japan-ASEAN summit in Tokyo December

2013: ‘We also agreed to enhance cooperation in ensuring the freedom of

overflight…and the relevant standards and recommended practices by the International

Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)’. Although there was no explicit reference to

China’s ADIZ, most analysts view this as triggered by it. PM Abe later said in his press

conference,‘To the Chinese, we are calling on the withdrawal of all the measures that violate

these general principles.’ Japan is being seen by ASEAN as a potential source of assistance:

Phillipines President Aquino remarked that ASEAN together with Japan could work in a ‘chorus’

against Chinese actions that create ‘instability’ or ‘tensions’.7 Increasingly both access to the

commons in the maritime and aviation are lumped together, and Japan has clearly presented

itself as being able to help address these challenges to ASEAN. As Abe also pointedly said in his

7 Cited in ‘Up to airlines to comply with China’s ADIZ’, Philippine Star, 15 December 2013

http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/12/15/1268212/dotc-airlines-comply-chinas-adiz

press conference in an attempt to draw out common interests, ‘ASEAN's role as a center of

economic growth depends on freedom of the seas and the air.’ In his 2014 speech in Singapore

dubbed the Abe Doctrine, PM Abe continued to stress Japan’s ability to provide solutions to

ASEAN: ‘Japan will offer its utmost support for the efforts of the countries of ASEAN as they

work to ensure the security of the seas and the skies, and thoroughly maintain freedom of

navigation and freedom of overflight’.

The strategy of ‘contrast’

American commentators such as Jeffrey Hornung have written that Beijing is waging a

‘war on international norms’ and that ‘in essence, China is bucking international norms

that guarantee freedom of movement in both the maritime and aerial realms’.8 This

however also appears to present a diplomatic opportunity for Japan. Building on how

Japan has been presenting itself as a trouble-shooter outlined earlier on global commons

and global norms issues, Tokyo can accentuate its more ‘helpful’ and ‘legitimate’

policies while highlighting the flaws and allegedly ‘abnormal’ or ‘unhelpful’,

‘provocative’ ‘reckless’ ‘illegitimate’ behaviour of China. Variations of this theme have

been apparent. For instance, Tokyo was appalled at China’s unilateral declaration of the

ADIZ in November 2013. But this was also a useful impetus for Japan to further raise

its profile as a trouble-shooter, this time in the domain of civil aviation. At the same

time, Japan can contrast its position as defender of freedom of over-flight with Beijing’s

alleged infringement of global norms through unacceptable behaviour. Lauding the

ASEAN-Japan joint statement unveiled in December 2013 in Tokyo where all parties

agreed to cooperate on freedom of navigation, PM Abe took a dig at Chinese policies:

“In contrast, at present we see attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and

the South China Sea through unilateral actions.” Abe criticised the ADIZ because it

‘unjustly infringes on freedom of flight over the high seas’. Chinese behaviour is by

implication seen as ‘abnormal’ and ‘illegitimate’ behaviour; whereas Japan’s position is

presented as reasonable and restrained, supporting ‘normal’ international activity.

Chinese behaviour has been singled out in Japan’s National Security Strategy, which

also declared it will seek to ‘encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role

for peace and stability…to adhere to international norms of behaviour…and promote

measures such as establishing a framework to avert or prevent unexpected situations9’.

The message here is clear: Tokyo is aiming to exert normative power and trying to

shape and influence China’s behaviour in what it (Tokyo) considers the ‘right’ and

‘normal’ desirable direction. As the document asserts, ‘China has taken actions that can

be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion, which are incompatible

8 Jeffrey Hornung, ‘China’s war on international norms’, The National Interest, 12 December 2013,

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinas-war-international-norms-9547?page=2, accessed 09 Jan 2014 9 NSS, p.29

with existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains’. In

particular, intrusions into the Senkaku Islands as well as China’s ADIZ are presented as

an attempt to ‘unduly infringe the freedom of overflight above the high seas’.10

The

2014 Diplomatic Blue Book of Japan depicts Tokyo ‘promoting the establishment of the

rule of law at sea’ in the face of ‘increasing unilateral actions (by other states) in an

attempt to change the status quo by coercion’.11

PM Abe’s speech at the 2014 Shangri

La Dialogue in Singapore similarly proposed ‘three principles on the rule of law at sea’

to maintain confidence and security, another veiled reference to China’s maritime

activities which are contrasted as unpredictable and destabilising. This so-called Abe

Doctrine has ‘shone a negative light on China by raising the importance of international

law and stressing the consensus between Tokyo and its allies on the matter’.12 The

focus on international law and norms of reasonable behaviour confers legitimacy on

Japan as a responsible power; whilst China is presented as behaving irresponsibly

outside the realms of expected behaviour. Abe himself summed this approach at the

Shangri-La Dialogue with something of a slogan: ‘Japan for the rule of law. Asia for the

rule of law. And the rule of law for all of us..all of us should find one common benefit

in keeping our oceans and skies as global commons, where the rule of law is respected

throughout’. Of course, the elephant in the room was China.

Other incidents such as China’s warships directing their fire-control radar at Japanese

vessels and helicopters have also been denounced as ‘one-sided provocation’ by PM

Abe and ‘extremely unusual’ by Japan’s then Defence Minister Onodera. Tokyo

presented itself as calm and collected in not responding by escalating, while Beijing is

depicted as going over the top with unreasonable dangerous and reckless actions. The

2013 National Defence White Paper highlighted these ‘dangerous acts’ and called on

China to ‘accept and stick to the international norms’.13

One positive outcome of this

attempt to define ‘norms’ and desirable behaviour to note is that China eventually

joined other navies in April 2014 to a code of conduct that prohibits radar-locking on military

vessels of other countries.

In the aviation domain, Japan also reported record numbers of intercepts against

Chinese aircraft in fiscal year 2014. Some of these intercepts were described as risky,

involving Chinese planes flying dangerously close to Japanese ones, as close as 50

metres. Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera called China’s actions “completely aberrant”.

Japanese defence officials pin the blame squarely on China for overriding international

10

NSS, 2013, p.22 11

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,m Diplomatic Blue Book 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2014/html/chapter1/stateofaffairs.html. accessed 19 Dec 2014. 12

Bhubhindar Singh, ‘Abe’s doctrine should be applauded, with caveats’, Nikkei Asian Review, 26 June 2014 13

Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence of Japan 2013’, p.3

norms: ‘As they were in a hurry to foster pilots, they have failed to provide enough training

and education about international rules to the pilots," according to a senior SDF official.14

In August 2014, the US also reported a particularly aggressive intercept by Chinese

warplanes of its surveillance aircraft, involving the Chinese fighter executing an

acrobatic barrel-roll around the plane. The Pentagon called this ‘unsafe and

unprofessional’ behaviour. While these remain relatively rare occurrences and by-and-

large, the air activities of all countries involved are safe, the potential for a fatal accident

certainly suggests a clear need for establishing what is desirable and legitimate,

reasonable norms of behaviour. As the US 7th

Fleet commander argued, We try to be very

normative in international airspace, so they know what to expect from us and we know what

to expect from them…The goal is to make such flights ‘boring’ and predictable to China

so they do not provoke a response.’15

The US and Chinese militaries have held talks on

these norms of behaviour. Meanwhile, the Japanese and China are just about to re-start a

dialogue on mechanisms to avoid maritime accidents. The point to note here about the

power to establish global aviation norms is that the ICAO has guidelines for

intercepting civil aircraft, but says little about military planes in terms of universally

agreed procedures.

There have been other examples of this idea of ‘contrast’ being played out

between Chinese and Japanese policies. The most prominent is perhaps an own goal

that China scored itself when it offered a paltry initial offer of $100,000 to aid relief

efforts for the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. This stood in comparison to

the 10m promised by Japan and Beijing received global media criticism as a result.16

Tokyo also took the opportunity to send its largest ever contingent of SDF personnel

overseas, and despatched major surface warships such as the flat-top helicopter

destroyer Ise. However, one must also note that this strategy can work both ways. Japan

is not alone is adopting this strategy to highlight deficiencies in a target state. China too

has pointed out the differences between the way Germany and Japan have addressed

wartime history, with the former often seen as a leading positive example while the

latter is presented as a unrepentant laggard. As Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson

Hua Chunying said in January 2014 in response to suggestions that Japan and China

should learn from Franco-German reconciliation: "People may sigh that there is a world

14

‘The truth about military aircraft encounters in the East China Sea’, Nikkei, 10 June 2014, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/The-truth-about-military-aircraft-encounters-in-East-China-Sea 15

Vice-admiral Robert Thomas, US Navy, Commander of 7th

Fleet, cited in ‘US Commander seeks to make Chinese encounters boring’, 27 Oct 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-24/u-s-commander-seeks-to-make-chinese-military-encounters-boring.html, accessed 08 Dec 2014 16

See ‘China’s Philippines aid controversy’, BBC News, 14 November 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24938874, accessed 09 January 2014

of difference between Japan and Germany on how they treat their aggression history,

including war crimes.’17

Conclusion (of sorts)

While the ‘classical realist’ response of Japan to security and military challenges in its

surrounding vicinity from a rising China and unpredictable North Korea is convincing

to some degree, this paper has argued that what some might label as a more ‘liberal

internationalist’ focus on defending and upholding access to the global commons has

become a central plank of PM Abe Shinzo’s foreign policy trajectory. This is not to say

that Tokyo is motivated by entirely ‘liberal’ concerns but rather this approach is driven

by a hard-nosed even somewhat ‘realist’ appreciation of its deteriorating, indeed ‘severe’

security environment. This ‘defence of the global commons’ approach serves two

particularly useful purposes. First, it is a wide enough net to draw in other states who

share similar concerns but do not want to be explicitly identified as part of a counter-

balancing ‘anti-China posse’ led by Japan. Second, it allows Tokyo to increase its

security profile in a more reassuring fashion, bearing in mind sensitivities to its wartime

atrocities within the Asia-Pacific. The two strategies presented here- of being a ‘trouble-

shooter’ and ‘contrasting’ with China serves key functions of making Japan ‘attractive’

to ASEAN states in a ‘soft power’ framework, but also enables Tokyo to shape and help

prod Beijing to adopt more ‘normal’ behaviour, as scholars such as Ian Manners would

argue. It is perhaps too early to draw any conclusions but Beijing’s 2014 agreement on a

maritime code of conduct is promising, as is the fact that no risky aerial intercepts of US

surveillance planes have occurred since the August 2014 episode. Of ourse China is not

blind to that Japan is attempting to do. As a Chinese state-run station observed on the

day of the joint ASEAN-Japan statement, ‘Japan is loudly publicizing (the importance

of) the safety of the sea and the sky to Asian countries to counter China’s ADIZ and is

forcing them to join the network that encircles China’, Dec 14 2013). It can be counter-

productive if this policy fuels a sense of resentment, suspicion and encirclement within

Chinese policy circles. Finally, what constitutes ‘internationally accepted norms’ and

‘normal behaviour’ remain contentious. UNCLOS articles on EEZ remain ambiguous

and open to interpretation. China, like India and Brazil, is not alone in opposing the

concept of freedom of navigation and military activities within its EEZ. The debate also

extends to the type and intensity of military activity conducted.

17

‘Japan in sharp contrast to Germany: Chinese FM’, Xinhua News, 10 January 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/10/c_133035684.htm, accessed 09 April 2014