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Wayne Greene, Ph.D.President, Pacific Northwest Preparedness Society

VANCOUVER SUN DECEMBER 26TH

"No place on earth was better prepared for something like the 9.0-magnitude earthquake and monster tsunami that struck northeast Japan in March and few could match the organization and resources deployed in its aftermath.”

Don Cayo, Vancouver Sun December 26, 2011

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CYCLE

Mitigation

Preparedness

Response

Recovery

Time

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING SPIRAL

PACIFIC PLATE MOVEMENT

MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI - DIMENSIONS OF THE DISASTER

• Magnitude 9 quake and tsunami (4th largest)• 27,600 people dead or missing• 90% of deaths due to drowning• Previous tsunami in 1896, 1933 and 1960• Some communities had up to 50% of their land destroyed• Destruction of 100,000 buildings, 1,500 roads, 48 bridges,

15 railways, ports, sewage treatment plants and schools is estimated at $200-$300 billion

• A total of 387,000 evacuees were at 2,200 shelters without water and heating and low supplies of food and medicine

• A month after the disaster 130,000 people still in shelters

MIYAKO CITY (IWATE PREFECTURE) PROF. Y. ASAI

RECOVERY EXAMPLES

The following photos are from:

• March 2011

• June 2011

• September 2011

(1) ISHINOMAKI –(MAR 2011)

(1) ISHINOMAKI – (JUNE 2011)

(1) ISHINOMAKI – SUNKEN SHIPS REMOVED FROM THE HARBOUR (SEPT 2011)

( 1 ) K E S S N U M A ( M A R 2 0 1 1 )

(2) Kessnuma (June 2011)

(3) Kessnuma – (September 2011)

(3) NAOTORI – KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE HOUSE (MARCH)

(3) NAOTORI – KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE HOUSE (JUNE)

(3) NAOTORI – KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE HOUSE (SEPT)

MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI

(2) Direct Lessons from Kobe?

• Rapid deployment of 100,000 SDF forces to Sendai; 120,000 blankets, 120,000 bottles of water; 100,000 liters of gasoline, plus food

• Quick acceptance by Japan of international assistance, and better efforts for getting overseas teams on-site rapidly

• US military assistance from Okinawa and Yotsuya• Many other local governments sent aid in the

form of food, medicine and emergency personnel

MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI (CONT.)(3) Crisis Management Problems

• Nuclear power plant drama distracted national government from the humanitarian crisis in the Sanriku coast

• Local governments along the coast (mainly less than 100,000 popl.) overwhelmed and lost mayors, staff and capacity to respond

MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI (CONT.)

(4) Surviving the Tsunami: what worked and what didn’t?

(a) Structural measures:•Sea walls (10m high in Taro) NO•3-storey evacuation buildings NO

(b) Non-structural measures:•Early warning systems (EQ occurred at 14.46; tsunami

warning at 14.49) (YES)

•Pre-disaster education (schools in Ishinomaki-city) YES

•Sanriku culture of “Tendenko” (look out for yourself) YES

KOBE - JANUARY 17TH, 1995

KOBE AND MARCH 11 EARTHQUAKES

Kobe Earthquake

March 11th Earthquake

Mag. 6.9 Mw (7.3 JMA) 9.0 Mw

Date January 17, 1995. 5:46 am

March 11, 2011. 2:46 pm

Location Urban area Coastal and rural region

Hazards Seismologic, fires Seismologic, tsunamis, fires

Deaths 6,434 15,844 (+ 3,451 missing)

Buildings 104,906 117,542

Cities, towns

25 (cities and towns)

241 (cities, towns, and villages)

Cost ¥9.6 trillion ($100 bill.)

¥16-25 trillion yen ($200 bill.)

White Paper 2011: 22

POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES(1) Structural Reforms to Japan’s Crisis Management

System and Preparedness:

• Revised Anti-Disaster Basic Law in December 1995 changed many structural and legal problems attached to dispatching troops for disaster relief and rescue work

• National government instituted an Office of Crisis Management in 1998 under the direct control of the Prime Minister

• Many local governments upgraded their disaster management systems, incorporating new information technologies

POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES

(2) Nation-wide Support System for Disaster Emergency Response:

• National Police Agency• Fire and Disaster Management Agency• Coast Guard• Self-Defense Forces• Inter-prefectural support agreements• Medical transportation action plan• Designation of emergency hospitals• Designation of heliports

POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES

(3) Support for Retrofitting Older Infrastructure:

• Seismic Building Retrofitting Act, 1995

• Subsidies for seismic diagnosis of buildings

• Seismic retrofitting of large buildings

• Seismic retrofitting of houses in dense residential areas

POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES

(4) Other:

• Support system for volunteer activity

• Promotion of community self-defense organizations

• Revision of Compensation Framework for victims (Natural Disaster Victims Relief Law, 1999)

• Revision of Local Tax Laws

“CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS DEMAND A DIFFERENT NATIONAL RESPONSE THAN DO `ROUTINE’ DISASTERS”

(1) preparedness and response

(2) communicating risks

(3) international assistance

(4) critical infrastructure

FUKUSHIMA DISASTER

On 11 March 2011 the Prime Minister of Japan declared a nuclear emergency following a problem with the cooling system power supply at nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The emergency declaration followed the 11th March, 9.0-magnitude earthquake off the country's northeast coast.

FUKUSHIMA

Before the earthquakeOf 6 reactors: 4 were running normally and 2 were in cold shutdown for maintenance

First few minutes after the earthquakeThe 4 active reactors ‘scrammed’ or shut down

External power was lost but the auxillary power kicked in to keep the water moving

FUKUSHIMAAfter the earthquake: Tsunami flooded parts of the plant, shutting down the auxiliary power

No cooling to take the residual heat outside the reactor core.

Heat inside the fuel elements generated steamWater levels decreased gradually uncovering parts of the fuel elements

Cladding breached leading to release of fission products and generated hydrogen

Several explosions occurred because of Hydrogen

Loss of water in the spent fuel pool leading to release of gaseous and aerosol fission products

FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATION

Fukushima Nuclear Plant March 25, 2011

B.E.I.R. HUMAN EXPERIENCE

Early martyrsRadium Dial PaintersTuberculosis PatientsSurvivors of Atomic

BombingsAnkylosing Spondylitis

PatientsUranium Miners

EFFECTS: SOMATIC AND GENETIC

Radiation effects are called somatic if they become manifest in the exposed person and

genetic if they affect their descendants.

SOMATIC EFFECTS, RISK FACTORS

· Cancers indistinguishable from those caused naturally

· Solid tumours (breast, lung, thyroid and GI ) greater numerically than leukemia

· Risk is greater for women - breast and thyroid cancer

· Age effects are important, age independent risk estimates may be inappropriate.

· Synergistic effects may be important

ANNUAL DOSE RATES

Cosmic 0.45

External 0.26

Internal 0.27

Other <0.01

~1.0 mSv/ year

MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE DOSES

Workers (members of public)

5 mSv per year

Atomic Radiation Workers (ARWs )

50 mSv per year

RADIATION FIELDS

JAPANESE PARLIAMENTARY PANEL- JULY 5, 2012

a. Disaster was “made in Japan”

b. Japanese culture: Reflexive Obedience

Reluctance to Question Authority

“Sticking with the Program”

c. Collusion between Government, the Regulators and Tepco

d. Government and Regulators not fully committed to protecting public health and safety

e. The central government failed to convey severity of accident

PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS, JULY 5, 2012

1. Permanent committee in National Diet

2. Reform of the crisis management system

3. Establish system to deal with long-term public health effects

4. Dramatic corporate reform of Tepco*

5. New regulatory body

6. Develop a system of independent investigation commissions

*Tepco: Tokyo Electric Power Company

IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA

(1) More federal/provincial resources to protect against catastrophic disasters; importance of protecting critical infrastructure and local government buildings

(2) Customize risk reduction at the local level based on topography, physical features and land-use planning

(3) Early warning systems are effective when they are properly perceived

THANK YOU