james, daniel - racionalization and working class response. the context and limits of factory floor...

8/13/2019 JAMES, DANIEL - Racionalization and Working Class Response. the Context and Limits of Factory Floor Activity in Argentina

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Rationalisation and Working Class Response: The Context and Limits of Factory

Floor Activity in Argentina

Daniel James

Journal of Latin American Studies , Vol. 13, No. 2. (Nov., 1981), pp. 375-402.

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75Lat. Amer. Stud.13 2, 375-402

Rationalisation and Working Class Response:the Context and Limits of Factory FloorActivity in A rgentina*by D A N I E L J A M E S

ntroductionElisabeth Jelin, in an important recent work,l has criticized the overconcernin studies of the Latin American working class with the structural deter-minants of class relations and class activity. As she pointed out, this hastended to lead to a deterministic approach on the part of the social sciences,emphasizing the lack of autonomy of the working class in terms of its failureto construct a comprehensive, radical challenge to the dominant system onthe political level and its domination by, and acceptance of, demobilizing,

bureaucratic leaderships on the trade union level. Explanations of thisphenomenon have been sought in structural factors ranging from the ruralorigins of the urban proletariat to the specific nature of the capital intensiveindustralization i n Latin America in the last decades. The dominance of thisapproach centred on the integration of the working class on a political andtrade union level, and on the bureaucratization of working class organiza-tions, has meant that the social sciences have been unprepared to deal with,and incapable of explaining, the emergence of ruptures in the integratingprocess, the crises which challenge the status quo and which mark the re-

emergence of spontaneity, rank and file democracy and new forms of struggleoutside the accepted rules of the game.

This shift in emphasis towards the study of factors leading to radicalshifts in conscio~isness, to the breaking of the mould of customary androutine practices and forms of organization is undoubtedly salutary. Itenables us to escape from the tyranny of deterministic structural models and

A first version of this article was presented to the workshop on the Latin AmericanW or king Class at the University of Liverpool, 19-20 April, 1979. T h e final versionbenefitted considerably fro m the co mm ents of th e participan ts, especially those ofJuan Carlos Torre.Elisabeth Jelin, 'Espo ntaneid ad Organizaci6n en el Movim ento Obre ro', RevistaLatinoamericana de Sociologia (nueva serie) No.a (1975). A shorter version alsoappeared in Sociologie d u Travail,No 2 (1976).

0022 2 16x18I IJLAS-1326 02.00@ 198I Cam bridg e University Press


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376 Dnniel lames

to appreciate that working class consciousness and forms of activity are notdirectly reducible to general structural factors, and that phenomena such asunion bureaucratization, working class apathy and integration are relative,socially created and conditioned phenomena which always coexist, at leastpotentially, with their opposites. However, the fact remains, as Jelin herselfrecognizes, that the study of structural factors influencing and limiting theforms of class activity and mobilization remains a necessary part of anyanalysis of the moments of crisis, the qualitative leaps in consciousness.

In this context there is a danger that this recent shift in interest towardsthe study of periods of rupture and challenge to the dominant system may

leave unchallenged traditional explanations concerning periods of normality .Potentially at least, the implication may be drawn that periods of accommo-dation and integration are unproblematic simply because they are the normalstate of affairs and may be safely left to the explanatory cares of structuralfactors whether of an economic or psycho-sociological nature. Yet normality

.

s problematic; working class quiescence, the acceptance of bureaucraticleaderships in trade unions, the failure to organize effective rank and fileopposition to such leaderships needs to be analysed without resort to tradi-tional (overtly) deterministic models. Structural factors need to be examinedwhich, at the same time as they are seen as defining the general parameterswithin which class activity develops, are also understood as part of, andresulting from, a dynamic historical process.

This paper is intended as a specific contribution to the study of structuralfactors which define the possibilities, the limits and the forms of workingclass activity. The context is that of Argentine capitalism in the 1950s and1960s; in particular the change which took place from the mid-1950s on inthe model of capital accumulation as that based on highly protectionist

import substitution increasingly reached the limits of its viability. Theeconomic implications of the new development project have received con-siderable attention with particular emphasis being placed on the developmentof new industries, the importation of new machinery and the role of foreigncapital. One author, surveying the shifts brought about by this new project,has gone so far as to describe the periods before and after the mid-1950s asbelonging to different technological epoch^ ^Much less attention has beenpaid, however, to some of the social consequences of this economic processand in particular the implications for the working class.

The fundamental goal of this article is to analyse a crucial, although

Jorge Ka tz, Productive F unctions, Foreign Inve stme nt and G rotuth N . HollandPublishing Co., Amsterdam), quoted inR Mallon, Economic Policy Mating n aConflict Society Harvard Unive rsity Press,1g75 , p. 72.


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Rationalisation and W or ki ng lass Response 377

generally underestimated part of the new development project namely theattempts made by employers and governments from the early 1950s on to'rationalize' production arrangements within Argentine industry and torestructure the balance of forces on the factory floor. Th e first part of thepaper will examine the origins of this rationalization drive in the secondPeronist government; the second will deal with the attitude of the militarygovernment to this question between 1956 and 1958 and the third with theculmination of this process in the early 1960s. Finally, the implications ofthis rationalization drive for issues such as the extent and possibilities ofautonomous rank and file activity, the position of the trade union bureaucracy

and, most fundamentally, the relationship between the two will be considered.

A. T h e Productiv ity Ogensiue under PerdnThe new development project undertaken during Per6n's second governmentinvolved two interrelated aspects. First, it aimed at a shift away from anemphasis on the production of light consumer goods to the production ofintermediate durables and the construction of a capital goods sector. Secondly,it aimed at the renovation of the capital equipment employed already inArgentine industry. This had become a pressing necessity by the early 1950s

and had become a major preoccupation of government and employers.Jost Gelbard, the head of the employers' confederation, the CGE spokeat the Congress of Productivity and Social Welfare in March, 1955 ofthe crucial 'need to renovate outworn production material' employed inArgentine industry.

The capital accumulation necessary for this economic shift would comepartly from foreign investment and partly it would be generated internallyfrom traditional export earnings and from increased labour productivity.Increased labour productivity in its turn could be generated partly by theintroduction of new machinery but there was a clear limit to the extent towhich this was feasible in the short term. Given the decline in the prices forraw materials in the world market, the increasing intensity of competition inthat market and the general stagnation of Argentine agricultural production,the possibilities of large-scale importation of capital goods were limited. Interms of increasing labour productivity, this left only the solution of increas-ing output per man from existing equipment. Gelbard was quite frank aboutboth the problem and the solution:

The private Argentine economy cannot hope, therefore, to achieve high levels ofou tp ut basing itself exclusively on the massive im portation of the mos t mo dern

Report of the proceedings of th e Congress of Prod uctivity and Social Welfare,Hechos e Ideas (1955), p. 2 8 2


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378 Daniel James

capital goo ds . if it is not possible to base increased production on modernmechanisation and automatisation, the problem will have to be solved on the basis

of the existing plant, progressively renewed according to the country s possibilities.That is to say that we have to take as our starting point that which exists now,what we have at the moment, and improve and increase the output and pro-ductivity of each machine, each man and each pr o ~ e ss . ~

T o state the need fo r greater productivity was easy; to achieve it withinthe limits set out by Gelbard was, however, to become the major concerna n d proble m of A rgen tine employers an d State in the last years of P er6n sgovernment. What, precisely, was the problem, and what were the obstaclesto the achievement of this higher labour productivity? T h e problem fro mthe employers poin t of view lay fund am entally i n the unsatisfactory balanceof forces engendered on the factory floor by a self-confident working classan d a strong, state-backed labour m ovem ent. M ore concretely, this was man i-fested in three interrelated ways:( I ) the lack of any adequate definition ofproduction targets an d wo rk effort; 2 the existence in the collective contractsof a series of clauses which, while regarded by the workers as crucial gains interms of regulating working conditions, were viewed by the employers asobstacles to increa sing productivity; 3 ) the power of the internal commissionsof shop floor delegates.

( I ) Production levels, eflort bargain an d worker resistanceLet us look, first, at the question of production levels and work effort.T h a t they w ere unsatisfactory wasa constant theme of employer propagandain the early 19 50s. A t the Congress of the Co nfind us~ riu n 19 53, theCommission on Industrial Rationalization began its deliberations by assertingthat: wh ile the wo rker has a right to receive a min im um salary compatiblewith his needs a nd his dignity he also has a du ty to achieve a m inim um level

of outp ut for his day of work. 5 Th e report wen t on to recomm end th atworkers who did not meet such an obligation should be fired without rightof comp ensation. Similarly, Ge lbard in 19 55 echoed the same concern withhis dem and at the Congress of Productivity for a fair day s wo rk for a fairday s pay .

N o w behind all such appeals for the respecting of m inim um outp ut levels,a fair day s wo rk etc., there lies the notion of a n implicity accepted ratio of

pay to effort which in industrial relations parlance is known as an effortbargain , that is, so muc h pay for so mu ch effort. T h e obligations assumed

Ibid.Report of Commission of Industrial Rationalisation,Proceedings o f Congreso Generalde la Confederacidn de la Industrin (Buenos Aires,1966 p. 3He cko s e Ideas, op . cit., p. 279


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380 Da n i e l J a m e s

cases where incentive schemes generally some form of piece rate were inoperation. Piece rates in these cases would seem to have been slack, with

mutuality a commonly accepted practice.1Employers acquiesced in this for a number of reasons. With the exception-

ally favourable immediate post war conditions, based on an expanding in-ternal market and relative protection from foreign competition, as well as afavourable international situation for Argentine exports, priority was givento maintaining consistency of production to tale advantage of these favour-able conditions rather than to tackling the potentially thorny problem oflabour productivity. This assessment was strengthened by their perception ofthe new strength of organized labour exemplified by the strike wave of 1946and 1948 which amply demonstratcd the capacity of the working class tomobilize, given a favourable labour market and the sympathetically neutralattitude of the state to this mobilization.ll The risk of taking on organizedlabour over the issue of production levels was simply not worth the cost interms of the lost production and political consequences which would haveresulted. Nor, it must be said, did employers generally see fit to tackle thequestion from the other end and invest in modernization of their plant.The result, as we noted above, was that by the early I ~ ~ O S , aith

deteriorating internal and international economic context and the need toreorient the model of capital accumulation to meet this new developmentand ensure future expansion, the issue of labour productivity could no longerbe avoided.

The options open to the employers and state in dealing with this problemwere extremely limited as Gelbard s speech quoted above made clear. Theyconsisted basically in increasing workers output from existing machinery.There were two principle prongs of the strategy as it developed in the lastyears of the Peronist regime. One was a revision of existing incentive schemes;

the tightening up of slack piece rates by lowering fulfilment times, resetting

exemplify the problems they were facing i n terms of labour discipline within thefactories.

1 0 Mutuality refers to the general principle whereby workers and their immediaterepresentatives can insist on joint consultation with management in determiningfactors such as time allowed for a job and quality required. Often mutuality aroseinitially as a management tactic to deal individually with the isolated worker on theshop floor, by-passing the union. However, given strong shop floor organization, itwas a device which could be turned to the advantage of the workers. This wascertainly the case in many parts of British industry, and, I would suggest, inArgentina during the Peronist period. For the British case, see Andrew L. Friedman,Industry and Labour (Macmillan, London, 1977), p. 219.For strikes of 1946-8 period, see Louise M. Doyon, Conpitos opernrios durnnte oregime peronistn 1946-55, Estudos CEBRAP No 13 (July-Sept. 1975).


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Rationalisation and W o rk in g Class Response 38 I

bonus rates with the aid of work study, and undermining mutuality.The other was the fixing of minimum output levels for a day s work and theintroduction of incentive payment schemes based on these levels where theydid not already exist. Th e report of the Commission on Industrial Rational-ization of the ~ o n f i n d z i s t r i aCongress had recommended, the introductionof bonuses in proportion to increased output achieved. This will require theprior determining of normal output levels to make possible the achievementof the bonus. 12 At the Congress of Productivity the same point was reiteratedonly now in far more Tayloristic language. Under the rubric,Concrete measures to improve productivity , the introductory document ofthe Congress advised the use of modern techniques of rationalization whichinclude: work study, job evaluation and payment by results. 13 Thisinsistence of the enlployers on tightening up existing schemes and fixingminimum output levels where none had existed implies clearly both the lackof adequate formal definitions of work effort prior to this and the consequentadvantage taken by the workers of this indefinition, and the employersdetermination to fix henceforth by modern techniques of rationalizationthe precise nature of the workers obligations in the effort bargain whichhad become dangerously imprecise and lax in the immediate post-war

conjuncture.What success did the employers have in implementing this strategy?

It is clear from even the partial evidence I have that they, in fact, encounteredconsiderable difficulties and resistance. Indeed, it was this resistance, whichrarely surfaces in official documents or the press, which led employers toenlist both the state and the union hierarchy in the official productivitycampaign of 1 g 5 5 . l ~The resistance was focused on two levels. One was aresponse to the concrete effects of either introducing new incentive schemesor tightening up of old ones; increased work loads, lowering of fulfilmenttimes or speed up. Thus, for example, one finds in the Buenos Aires metal-working company CEMAC, worker opposition to the company s adoptionof a new incentive scheme. The company wanted a 7 per cent lowering offulfilment times which in future they alone would fix through work study;previously time allowed had been subject to mutual negotiation betweenworkers and management.15 Or, again, one finds resistance in the SIAM diTella plants, where the company had for several years operated an incentive

1 2 Proceedings of t h e Congreso General de la Confindustria, op. cit., p. 4.9

Hechos e Ideas, op. cit., p. 30.4 My own information on this issue is derived mainly from the non-Peronist working-class press, generally associated with various neo-Trotskyist groups who adopted asympathetic though critical attitude to Peronism.

16 La Verdad, 5 January 1954


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scheme whereby workers were divided into two groups, productive andunproductive. Both groups did the same work but the productive group

worked under a bonus system based on a straightforward time saved to timeallowed basis. In late 1954 t ro~~blerose when SIAM unilaterally loweredthe times allowed in the bonus system.16 Similarly, at about the same time,Johnson and Johnson introduced-a device designed to make their machinesrun at a constant speed whereas previously the workers had been able tograduate the speed according to their own rhythm.17

Such resistance to management attempts to redefine what had come to beaccepted as legitimate work effort and production levels when new economicpressures arose is not, of course, unusual. Hyman and Brough have notedthat, a major source of conflict and instability in industrial relations (lies) inexternally generated pressures towards continually increasing productivityand the resulting disruption of established relationships between pay andeffort.18 In the Argentine case it seems clear that worker opposition generally

Ibid., 11-24 September 1954. It is interesting to note that this incentive schemewith its division of productive and non-productive workers was a faithful copy ofclassic Taylorist incentive schemes. Also, it is interesting to note the divisive cffectssuch schemes could have on work force unity. SIAM, in fact, in their battle to getproductive workers to accept the lowering of time rates, promised the unpro-

duct ive~ a wage increase if those working in the incentive scheme accepted the newrates.l La Verdad, 11-24 September 1954. It should be emphasized that we lack adequate

description of the nature and extent of different work and payment systems inArgentine industry during the Peronist period. My own feeling is that those incen-tive schemes which did exist were essentially what Friedman calls money piece

.

work , i.e., where workers are paid at a pride per piece produced. Management sbasic concern was to transform these into more rational systems of time piecework where workers are paid a bonus in relation to the time saved against thetime allowed for a job. As Friedman notes, the latter system involves far greaterdirect control by management of the labour process. See Friedman, op cit., p. 219.

Hyman and Brough, op cit., p. 219. Gouldner s classic analysis of the origins of anunofficial strike is also relevant. He showed that the crucial issue was management swithdrawal of a traditionally indulgent definition of work intensity whichworkers had come to regard as the legitimate definition of the effort bargain . SeeAlvin Gouldner, Wildcat Strike (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1955). Thewidespread working-class opposition to the scientific management movement invarious countries is, of course, also relevant here. For an analysis of such oppositionin the United States, see David Montgomery, Quel standards? Les ouvriers et lartorganisation de la production aux Etats Unis, 1900-~gzo , Le Mouuement Social,No. 2 (Jan.-Mar., 1978). Of course, generally speaking, skilled workers were themost effected by the rationalization drives and were the spearhead of working-classresistance to Taylorism. I have no concrete information on this aspect although myimpression is tha t the issue of craf t working was less important in Argentina.Certainly I did not encounter explicit opinion on this issue. Also one shouldremember, as Montgomery notes, that in the classic period of struggle againstTaylorism the working-class definition of legitimate work practices and work


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Rationalisation and W or ki ng Class Response 383

took the form of a refusal to co-operate rather than overt strike actioncertainly this was the case in the specific instances we mentioned above.

However, there was an important exception: the largest strike of the secondPeronist government, the 1954 national metalworkers strike. While it hasgenerally been assumed that the strike, like others at this time, was essentiallymotivated by salary demands, it would appear that the issue of t ightening upexisting incentive schemes through things such as work study also played animportant role.lg The fourth article of the agreement ending the strike wentout of its way to emphasize that the UniOn Obrera Metal t i rg icn agrees thatits representatives in the different plants will not present obstacles to thejustified readjustment of the rates or bases of bonuses in those cases wheresuch rates are proved to be ant i -econorni~ .~~t seems not unreasonable todeduce from this that factory delegates h a d been obstructing such readjust-ments and that employer attempts to push through such a policy had beenone of the factors leading to the strike.21

The second area of resistance to the employers strategy was a moregeneral one; it lay simply in the rejection by large sectors of the working classof the legitimacy of a n y form of payment by result incentive schemes.The almost obsessive insistence by the employers at both the C onf indus t r i aconference and the Congress of Productivity on the basic need to accept suchschemes indicates their concern to assert, over and above the validity of thespecific mechanisms involved in rationalization, the legitimacy of the idea ofincentive schemes as the basis for establishing the relationship between payand work. While it is true that incentive schemes were increasingly attractiveas a means of gaining wage increases in a period of inflation and governmentcontrolled wage policy, the constant pleas of the employers for the acceptanceof payment by result schemes indicates that they were still a minorityphenomenon in Argentine industry.

Moreover, it is also clear that Argentine workers considered the best wayintensity was a general ethic shared by many sectors of the working class, not justcraftsmen.

9 The two most comprehensive studies of the relationship between labour and thePeronist government are Walter Little, Political Integration in Peronist Argentina(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1971) and Louise M Doyon,op. cit. Neither mentions this issue in connection with the 1954 metalworkers strike.

2 Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n, Registro General de Convenios ColectivosLaudos Acta 2 (Buenos Aires, June 1954).

2 1 It is possible that other of the major strikes in the first half of 1954 also involvedthis issue. Doyon, op. cit. mentions that work to rule became the most commonmeans of labour p-oiest in 1954, there being an enormous increase in the number ofworkers involved in such actions. Again, she relates this to the wages issue though,following the logic of the argument I am presenting here, it would also representthe refusal of workers to cooperate in the employers productivity plans.


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to increase their living standards to be the adequate updating of the basichourly rates contained in the contracts, many of which had been frozen since

1951; this, in fact, was the main demand of the 1954 ~trikes.~Time wagesbased on good basic hourly rates, together with fringe benefits such asincrements for experience, family allowances etc. which had been introducedinto the contracts of the 1946 1948 period, were considered a crucial gainby the working class. They were a concrete expression of what justiciasocial represented for Argentine workers; the ability to earn a good wagewithout being subjected to inhuman pressures within the production process

an ability which the introduction of new payment by result schemes nowthreatened to undercut.

2 Hin dra nce s t o productivity a?zd th e ideological natu re of wo rk er resistanceThis more generalized resistance was carried over into another area ofmanagement strategy: their call for the revision of the clauses in the contractsregulating working conditions. While, for management, these clauses repre-sented a major obstacle to effective rationalization, for workers the workpractices and provisions enshrined in them provided a vital safeguard interms of the quality of life in the factories. The introductory document of the

Congress of Productivity counselled that in future contract negotiations therewill be special reference to those situations which impede, limit and harm thepossibilities of greater productivity. .examples of these situations are thosewhich hinder the movement of personnel from one section to another; thosewhich prevent the carrying out of a job made up of different types ofwork . 2 V n addition to their objections to clauses limiting mobility andestablishing job demarcation, management also called for the revision ofclauses guaranteeing sick leave with pay. Now, these clauses embodied whatworkers had come to regard as a rightful and essential regulation on theirpart of the functioning of the labour process and as such there was atendency to regard them as simply not open to negotiation.

The opposition of the workers to many of the assumptions of the pro-ductivity campaign was clearly echoed in the contributions of the SecretaryGeneral of the General Confederation of Labour (CGT), Eduardo Vuletich,to the Congress of Productivity. In his speech at the opening of the campaignin January, 1955 he warned that, while the CGT was wholly in favour ofincreased productivity, this was not to be achieved by an uncontrolled

increase in worliload, but rather through increasing the efficiency of work,that is to say with less expenditure of physical effort .24 In his speech to the

2 2 See Louise M. Doyon op. cit 2s Hechos e Ideas, op. cit., p 3224 Ibid., p. 17.


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Rationa1i;ation a n d W ork in g Class Resp onse 385

inaugural session of the actual congress in March, he returned to the theme,recalling that it has been said by many employers. . .that the only way to

raise productivity is through greater human effort. . . .25 In contrast to this,he placed the main burden of responsibility on the employers, listing otherfactors, such as modernization of machinery, which also had to be considered.I l e also went on to warn employers that we are not disposed to give up forthis cause (greater productivity) a single one of the conquests we havep i n e d . . . .2 jNow, this was evidently considering the issue on basis offundamentally different criteria from those of the employers.27 For all theirtalk of respecting the dignity of labour and maintaining the basic labourconquests, the entire drift of the employers strategy, with its call for settingadequate effort levels and resetting existing production levels, impliedincreased work intensity and a radical limitation of certain of these conquests.As for plant modernization, Gelbard, as we have already seen, deliberatelyexcluded it from playing an immediate role in greater productivity.

It is important to be clear about the ideological limits and ambiguity ofthis worker resistance. On the one hand it was never generalized into acritique of the criteria underlying capitalist production relations.28 Thus, thegeneral context within which Vuletich s warnings were made was one whichsang the praises of increased productivity based on class harmony and mutualrespect, and an equitable distribution of the benefits of such an increase.In the same way, the opposition to rationalization was never extended to ageneral challenge to management s right to manage its plants. We find, forexample, no demands for workers control emerging out of the battle against

6 Ibid p. 27.2 Ibid p. 275.27 Th is conflict of criteria between workers and employers conc erning productivity is

inherent in any labour process in a class divided society. As Andre Gorz has noted:'F ro m the po int of view of the worker the productivity of labour only increaseswhen it can produce more without increasing fatigue, from the point of view ofcapital the productivity of labour increases every time that it can impose on theworker an increase i n the expenditure of labour power with out a proportionalincrease in salary.' Gorz goes on to specify that 'only the first definition is rigorous;it measures an increase of output without corresponding increase of input, thereforeit is a "technical progress". O n the oth er han d the second definition is manifestlyfalse since it considers only an increase in output without taking into account anincrease in inp ut, to the ex tent that this inp ut is hum an energy.' SeeAndre Gorz,'Tec hniqu e, techniciens et lutte de classes', Les Tem ps Modernes, August-September,197'

2 8 Much less was the opposition directed against the regime itself. As Doyon points

out with relation to the strikes of 1954: . . they did not represent a definitiverupture between the regime and the workers' movement because the majority ofworkers chose very m oderate channels to show their dissatisfaction and did n otdirect their protest against the government.' See Doyon, op. cit.


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Taylorism as the in other c o u n t r i e ~ . ~ ~as case Evidently, the generalacceptance of the legitimacy of capitalist ~r oduction relations and theauthority relations contained within them was itself a reflection of certainof the basic tenets of Peronist ideology. Peronism, for example, contained astrong 'productivist' strain; identifying industrialization and industrialproduction with genuine national development and sovereignty, it stressedthe identity of the working classes' interests with those of such a nationaidevelopment project, carried out in conjunction with a nationally-mindedindustrial bourgeoisie. This general interest of the working class in achievinga high level of independent development which was the essence of itsnationalism was taken as overriding the more specific conflicts of interestarising out of the production process.

On the other hand, however, it is clear that, despite this general endorse-ment in everyday practice within the factories, worker resistance on theseissues did represent an implicit challenge to fundamental aspects of capitalistorganization of p r o d u ~ t i o n . ~ ~ espite the lack of an explicit challenge tomanagerial control, the concrete effect of the workers' insistence on theirreinterpretation of acceptable effort levels and their defence of this 'effortbargain' when management attempted to re-define, it was an inevitable

challenge to employers' authority within the factories. Employers, in fact,clearly perceived this and their complaints are testimony to the reality of sucha challenge. One of the principal themes of Gelbard's speech to the Congressof Productivity was precisely this. He called for the 'maintenance of discip-line and a hierarchical order without which no human association is possible.'H e went on to 'reaffirm for the employers the right to the direction andorganization of the enterprise without interferences which limit their freedomof movement and j~dgement'.~'

Similarly, while Vuletich could not deny the legitimacy of the productivity

campaign involving some worker sacrifices he, nevertheless, insisted on basiccriteria for such a campaign which would inevitably restrict management'sfreedom of manoeuvre when this campaign was put into practice. Moreover,Vuletich, too, could seek authority for his position in Peronist ideology;

29 For an analysis of such demands in the US, see David Montgomery, 'The Past andFuture of Workers' Control', Radiccll America, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1979).

3 Hyman and Brough quote Baldamus who notes in this respect that workers aregenerally socialized into accepting a notion of work obligations but that 'howeverpowerful their content is too diffuse to control behaviour effectively in any concretesituation. Such notions of obligation support th e institution of capitalist employmentbut do not control the specific activities within the institution'. See Hyman andBrough, op. cit., p. 17.

8 Hechos e Ideas, op. cit., p. 281.


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388 Daniel James

of the commissions as the sin qua non for any general advance in theirrationalization strategy. Their concern is easily understood. Effectively theyperceived that only such a limitation could guarantee the translation of formalagreements on rationalization into concrete practice on the factory floor.Any formal agreement allowing the introduction of incentive schemes, thetightening up of time rates, the limitation of mutuality and the guaranteeingof labour mobility could be potentially rendered meaningless in practice bya determined work force and its internal commission. It is important to notehere, too, that the direction of management s attack, both at the Confindzistriuconference and the Congress of Productivity, was not aimed at the existence

per se of the commissions. Wh at they complained of fundamentally was thelack of formal definitions concerning the limits of legitimate areas of activityof the commissions. Thus, the report of the Confi~zdtistriaconference spoke ofthe lack in labour relations of a legal instrument which fixes the norms andproceedings and delimits the rights and obligations of both parts. .thissituation leaves open to the arbitrariness of personal agreements a matter ofthe greatest social importance. The proposed solution was a code whichnormalizes the working relations between internal commissions and em-ployers expressing signalling the rights and obligations of each part .36

There were few positive results for employers in these years in terms ofnationally enforceable agreements between themselves and the unions onthese issues. The union leadership, aware of their membership s hostility,signed the National Agreement on Productivity at the end of the Congress ofProductivity but this was largely a symbolic declaration of intent, therninimum they could do, given the amount of personal political capital Per6nhad invested in the campaign, and scarcely represented the concrete advancethe employers had been looking f ~ r . ~ W n e f the last resolutions agreed to atthe Congress had specified, in fact, that the existing contracts would not beaiTected by any further agreements on prod~~ctivity nd that both sides had

35 Proceedings of Congreso General de la Confi?zdustria op. cit. p. 2 5 036 The reluctance of the GT leadenhip to acquiesce wholeheartedly in the employers

rationalization plans can be seen partly as a reflection of their awareness of thestrength of feeling amongst their membership on this issue. This, of course, impliesa more complex picture of the Pcronist trade union leadership in this period and itsrelationship with its members and the state than is usually found in the literature.Louise M. Doyon, op. c i t provides a convincing analysis in this direction: While i tis certain tha t the workers leaders were fully aware that they could not keep their

positions without the regime s consent they were equally aware that they could notsurvive as leaders of their unions without, a t thc minimum, the tacit acquiescence ofthe mass of their members. Indeed, the metalworkers strike of gjq was a clearindication of the dangers for both the regime and union leadership of a leadershipwhich had lost its standing with its membership.


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Rationalisation and Wo rki ng Class Response 389

to achieve increases in productivity which maintained existing working classsocial gains. The one potentially important concession the employers won

was a clause in the National Agreement confirming that practical recom-mendations for higher productivity would be put into effect through specialproductivity agreements signed over and above existing contracts.37 N o suchagreements were signed, however, in the remaining six months of thePeronist regime.

The reasons for the paucity of concrete results for the employers on thisfundamental issue are various. Given the extent of s h o ~ loor resistance to

1

outright attack in the major areas of employer concern, and given Per6n sgrowing dependence on the working class and the unions in the face of thedisintegration of the original Peronist coalition, there was a limit on how farthe state could exert overt pressure on behalf of the employers.

On the other hand there was also an ideological iimit as tc how farPeronism could officially espouse the rationalization offensive. Within ageneral notion of industrial harmony, Peronism conceived of the company asa community of interests where capital and labour each played a necessaryfunctional role in achieving a shared goal. Management and managerialauthority in this schema were generally conceived of as technical functions ,

not the coercive exercise of power and sanctions within the productiveprocess. Indeed, there were important elements of Peronist ideology whichexplicitly denied the validity of such coercion.3R Now, in the first period ofthe Peronist regime, as was argued above, reality within the factories andofficial ideology more or less corresponded. It was precisely this correspon-dance which the productivity campaign now threatened to destroy. Whateverthe official efforts to project the campaign as a joint venture to the mutualadvantage of both sides, actual working class experience spoke differently.Nor was management too concerned on its part to maintain official fictions

and to hide this reality. The official speeches at the Congress of Productivity,for example, while generally couched within the harmonistic tenets ofofficial ideology, still managed to convey the basic message of a need forsacrifices and a radical change of power within the factories. For the Peronistgovernment to have actively and completely identified itself with these logicalimplications of the campaign would have inevitably undermined the co-herence of some of its basic ideological tenets. Not only would this haveimplied a recognition of the partisan nature of the state bu t also, within the

7 La Nacidn I April 19558 This is not of course a phenomenon peculiar to Peronism. Hyman and Brough

provide a general analysis of the ambiguous role of such values in capitalism and thegeneral problems of ideological legitimation relative to the structure of power incapitalist industry. Hyman and Brough op cir. p. 210


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390 Daniel lames

factories, the unmasking of the fundamentally coercive nature of the socialrelations therein which Peronism as an ideology firmly denied.3g

B. The rationalixation policy of the military governmelzt, 1955-1958Under the military government of General Aramburu an attempt was madeto deal unequivocally with the entire rationalization and productivityquestion. Captain Patr6n Laplacette, the military overseer of the CGT,boasted that the government proposes to carry out in practice the conclusionsarrived at by the Congress of Productivity, which Per6n s government limiteditself to enunciating without taking any appropriate measures to ensure theirrealization. 40 The strategy adopted by the government was twofold. On theone hand there was the use of force by the state and the employers to weakenthe union movement generally and the internal commissions in particular.Especially in the year following Aramburu s November coup, there werewidespread dismissals of thousands of Peronist activists and the arrest ofmany under the national security provisions. In addition, Decree 7x 7 ofApril, 1956 banned all those who had exercised leadership or representativeposts in the CGT or its member unions from holding any position in the

O n the other hand, the government armed itself with the legal means withwhich to effect many of the changes for which the employers had beenclamouring. The crucial measure was Decree 2739 of February, 1956.Article 8 of the decree authorized labour mobility arising from productionreorientation, the implementation of incentive schemes, the right of employersto sign individual productivity agreements with their workers and, finally,the removal of those conditions, classifications and clauses which directlyor indirectly act against the national necessity to increase prod~ctivity. ~~

What were the concrete effects of the military government s strategy inthis area? It is clear that, on one level, the radical shift in the balance ofpower at the national, political level could not help but be reflected in achange of the balance of forces within the factories. In particular one finds anextensive attack on many of the clauses in the contracts dealing with working

Q Juan Carlos Torre has argued that this ambiguity with relation to the productivitycampaign was one of the factors contributing to the September I955 COLIP againstPeronism. See Juan Carlos Torre, Th e Meaning of Current Workers Struggles ,Latin American Perspectives Vol. I No. 3 (1974).

4 La Nacion 2 February, 1956.4

For a detailed analysis of this process, see Daniel James, Unions and Politics: thedevelopment of Peronist trade unionism, 1955-66 (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis,University of London, 1 ~ 7 9 ) .Especially Ch. 3.

4 2 Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n; Nu evo Regime n de Remuneraciones de lasConuenciones Colectivas de Traha jo (Buenos Aires, 1956).


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Rationalisalion and TVorking Class Response 9 I

conditions which were considered hindrances to productivity. The issue oflabour mobility within the factories was, for instance, in the forefront of

employer concern since the contracts contained clauses providing certainsafeguards for the workers in terms of job classifications and salaries.The award made by the Arbitration Tribunal in the dispute betweenrigori iro workers and employers in late 1956 was typical of the way this

issue was dealt with by government and employers. It stated that the normsconcerning the transferring of workers contained in the existing contractlimit the possibility of displacing personnel within an establishment whichArticle 8 of Decree 2739 has authorized.. . in consequence these norms mustbe eliminated. 43 Similarly one finds the employer concern with absenteeismwhich had been manifested at the Congress of Productivity now translatedinto a tightening up of the norms concerning sick leave.

However, it is also necessary to recognize that, to a far greater extent thanhas been commonly realized, the effective changes resulting from this strategywere less clear cut than the employers wished. Thus, while there were exten-sive removals of many of the hindrances to productivity , there was no allembracing, across the board implementation of rationalization schemes, noextensive renewal of the contracts in an overall sense which would have

legally enshrined new production arrangements on a national, industry-widelevel. This was due to several factors. Partly it may be suggested that themilitary government tended to share the sympathies and concerns of therural elite rather than of the industrialists and, although indulging in therhetoric of the need to reassert managerial control and to increase produc-tivity, they were often ambiguous in practice.

This ambiguity was, in fact, present in the very text of Article 8 ofDecree 2739. While labour mobility was authorized, providing it did notaffect the stability, remuneration and category of the worker , the succeed-

ing paragraphs stipulated the removal of all those conditions, classificationsand clauses which directly or indirectly hindered productivity; that is,precisely the classifications and clauses which had previously been used byworkers to limit the effects of mobility and thus to guarantee their stability,remunerations and categories. Faced with this ambiguity and confusion,much depended on the interpretation given the law by the ArbitrationTribunal and Ministry of Labour officials. There is evidence that theirinterpretations were less favourable to employers7 desires than might havebeen expected. One finds, for example, that, faced with the refusal of workersto sign the plant productivity agreements authorized by the Decree, employers

4 3 Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n Social, Laudo del Tribunal Arbitral, hTo. 6311956,(Buenos Aires, 1 ~ 5 6 .


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39 Daniel James

tried to get a series of new clauses concerning production arrangementsinscribed into the existing contracts. The Arbitration Tribunal seems to haveadhered rigidly, however, to the text of the decree which stated that thegeneral conditions of work and the classifications of jobs contained in thepresent contracts are to be reproduced integrally. Specific clauses and classi-fications which hindered productivity could thus be removed but no newclauses added.

The other factor which much be taken into account in explaining thelimited successs in practice of this strategy is simply the degree of working-class resistance it provoked. T he very crudity of the initial attack on workingconditions and work place organization provoked a backlash. After an initialperiod of demoralization following the November coup one finds by themiddle of 1956 the emergence of a network of semi-clandestine internalcommissions now led by a new generation of militants with little or noformal union experience prior to 1955. The issues around which thesecommissions organized were the defence of union organization in thefactories and the resistance to attacks on working conditions. Throughout1956 and 1957 they led a stubborn and bitter defensive action againstmanagement s rationalization plans; indeed, the material basis of what is

known as the Peronist Resistance of these years was centred precisely on theseissues. Moreover, with the official intervention of the formal union structure,the role of organizing and expressing this resistance had, perforce, fallen tothe internal commissions. With no other organizational option open to them,workers had relied even more than usual on the commissions. They thusemerged as the basic organism of the working class resistance to both theconcrete attack on shop floor conditions and the general anti-Peronistoffensive ~ur sued y the g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~ aced with this disquieting realityand plain evidence by 1957 that the frontal attack on conditions andorganization was in fact proving counter-productive, the government s resolveon issues like rationalization inevitably wavered.

C . Rationalization and internal control in th e early 1960sIt was with the Frondizi government of 1958 to 1962 that we find the mostsystematic and successful attempt to resolve this problem for Argentinecapitalism. The modernization of Argentine industry, based on the creationof an adequate capital goods sector, the production of intermediate consumerdurables and the rationalization of existing light manufacture required theintroduction of new production arrangements which would enable the effi-cient use of much of the new machinery being imported under the desar-

See Dan iel James op. cit. for analysis o the Resistance.


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Rutionalisation and Workin g Class Response 393

rollista economic plans of Frondizi and the intensification of output fromexisting older plant. Thus, we find a concerted attempt by management to shift

the balance of forces on the shop floor by dealing with the three main areasof management concern analysed above.45 The concrete measure of mana-gerial and government success in these areas was the introduction of newclauses in the labour contracts signed from 1960 onwards. The new clausestouched on three crucial areas: (I ) the introduction of rationalization andincentive schemes, 2 ) the removal of specific hindrances to productivityparticularly in relation to issues such as labour mobility, flexibility and jobdemarcation, and (3) the definition and limitation of the powers of theinternal commissions.

The ability of management and state to push through these new contractprovisions was itself a product of class struggle in these years at both thefactory level and the national level. The general context within which theemployers and government s offensive was pushed through cannot be evenoutlined within the limits of this article. It must suffice to say that it wascarried out, and its provisions embodied in the new contracts, in the wake ofa profound working class defeat in 1959 and 1960. Consequent on thisdefeat was the use of combined state and managerial repression to break theback of the militancy which had done so much to hinder the plans ofemployers and state under the previous government. With draconian nationalsecurity provisions at the state s disposal on the one hand and the blacklistever present on the other, a whole sector of militants were eliminated fromthe fact~rie s. ~

(I) T h e introduction of clauses concerning n ew production arrangementsIn the contracts signed in these years we find a series of general clausesdealing with this issue. In the textile industry, after a long and bitter fight in

1959, centred on the workers refusal to accept management s insistence ontying any wage increase to an acceptance of productivity clauses, unionopposition to such conditions was broken. In the new contract, Article 3stated that

the norm s contained in this article applicable to productivity plans with newwork systems shal l not be interpreted as hindering or l imit ing the employers inthe exercise of their powers of leadership an d organ isation which ar e entirely theirown. T h e employers shall di rect and organise wo rk in their es tabl ishments in

5 It would seem probable that the urgency of the ma tter was increased by the crucialrole of foreign capital in desarrollista econom ic projects. precondition for theattraction of foreign capita l was the estab lishment ofa reasonable balance of poweron the factory floor.

6 See Daniel James, op. cit., for an analysis of this process, especially Ch.4.


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394 D a n ie l James

the form which they consider best suits the necessary co-ordination of materialelements and labour power with the goal of obtaining optimum levels of pro-d~ct ion. ~?

In the metalworking industry we find a similar process at work. Thecontract signed in 1959 after a month-long strike had simply been an emer-gency increase in wage rates. But, in this industry, too, with constant stateand employer attack and a consequent demoralization amongst rank and fileand activists, there was a e facto introduction by many employers of thenew arrangements. This was initially met by considerable resistance, and byearly 1960 there was something like a mass abandonment of incentiveschemes by the workforce. The employers retaliated by large scale dismissalsand lock-outs which successfully undermined the opposition. By July 1960the union lendership was in a position to sign a new contract negotiated in amatter of days without a single strike. Its concessions concerning new pro-duction arrangements were considerable. Article 83 simply stated: Thesystem of bonuses and other forms of incentive schemes do not form a propermatter for this contract. .t he UOM and/or its delegates in the differentestablishments cannot oppose the revision of existing schemes whan it hasbecome clear that failure to adapt wage systems, methods of work and to

renew machinery will detract from the higher goal of giving incentives tooptimize pr od ~c ti on . ~~ontracts containing very similar clauses were signedin most other industries in the following years.

The implications of such cla ~~ ses ere clear: their very generality impliedcarte b l a n c h e for management in the field of production relations inside thefactories. Th e definition of adequate production standards and effort levelswas now effectively the sole prerogative of management. Another relatedimplication is also clear the undermining of the practice and principle ofmutuality. This was of crucial importance for employers since any formal

right to set time rates and incentive schemes would be limited in practice ifworkers and their representatives could insist on joint consultation on theseissues. This was, indeed, an area where the workers clearly perceived theimpact of management s strategy. As we have seen, it had been basic issueof contention since the early 1950s. It was also the centre of the last ditchresistance of the metal workers to management s growing rationalizationpressure in late 1959 and early 1960. The metalworkers strike of March1960 was basically a rejection by the workers of employer attempts to alter

7

Ministeriode

Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Convencio n Colectiva de Trab ajo,No. 155/60 (Buenos Aires, 1960 .8 Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Convencidn Colectiva e Trabajo,

No. 55/60 (Buenos Aires, 1960 .


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Rationalisation and W or ki ng Class Response 395

unilaterally rates for the job. The metalworkers claimed that any rate above

the normal had to be agreed to by the workers and they instituted anabandonment of incentive schemes and a return to 'normal' work to presstheir case. Their defeat on this issue was formalized and perpetuated inclause 8 3 of the contract signed a few months later.

2 ) T h e in t roduct ion of c lauses rem ov ing h ind ran ces t o productiv ity.The most important employer gains in this field were those concerning labourmobility within the plants. T o cite two examples: Article 1 1 of thefrigorifico workers' contract now stated that 'when the circumstances make

it necessary the companies will arrange loans and transfers of personnel toany other section or task.'50 Similarly Article of the textile contract referringto the Tintor erias Industr iales , Estamperins branch of the industry authorized'the displacement of the workforce within the factory, originating from thereorganization of work in order to obtain greater productivity. It must beunderstood that permanent displacement must be in accord with the principleof industrial rationali~ation.'~~

Now, the importance of labour mobility for the employers must be under-stood within the general context of the detailed job classifications built intoArgentine labour contracts since 1946 Wage scales were related nationallyin these contracts to the different levels of classification and job descriptioncontained in the contracts. Of course, there was a tendency for these classifica-tions to be continuously modified or outdated by new technology whichgenerally tended to lower skill levels and, therefore, de facto, change a job'sclassification. However, the de jure classifications in the contracts still deter-mined wage levels and, given clauses providing wage stability guarantees incase of job changes and generally limiting mobility, this evidently acted

against one of the main incentives for management to introduce newtechnology the lowering of labour costs. Similarly, the existing job classi-fications and mobility safeguards could be used by workers to maintainexisting manning levels when one of the main aims of new technology andproduction arrangements was precisely to lower such levels. Finally, theexistence of the job categories could be the basis for costly demarcationdisputes as workers used the existing job descriptions to oppose newproduction arrangements.

It was primarily in this context that mobility was important to employers

since increased labour mobility was an effective way of overcoming workers'

9 Documentacidn Informacidn Laboral,No I , March 1 0 1960.5 Conuencidn Colectiua e Trabajo, No 41 /64 ,op. cit.6 Convencidn Colectiva e Trabajo, No 155160, op. cit.


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396 Daniel lames

defences based on the fixed job categories in the contracts. The other majoralternative would have been a frontal, national assault on these formalcategories. This would, however, have been unwieldy and expensive in termsof the opposition it would have provoked and also of doubtful efficacy.Mobility, on the other hand, enabled employers to bypass existing jobcategories and in practice create new ones on a plant by plant, ad hoc basis asfitted their individual needs, without any formal nationally-negotiated modi-fication of job descriptions and categories. It is clear that this issue presenteditself as a problem fundamentally for companies in the more traditional areasof industry Textiles, Meatpacking, Food Processing, much of the Metal-working industry. In the new, more dynamic sectors of the economyestablished in the late 1950s and early 1g6os, employers starting from scratchcould install job classifications and general work arrangements which corre-sponded to the new technology. The government aided them in thisendeavour by authorizing, an increasing number of individual plant orcompany contracts, signed outside the national industry wide contracts.Technically advanced companies could thus establish classification and worksystems adequate to their needs. In the traditional industries, where theproblem of outdated equipment was most crucial, renovation and rationaliza-

tion had to take place within the framework of existing traditional normsand already established categories. It was here that labour mobility could beused most advantageously by employers.

The process of removing more minor 'hindrances to productivity' whichhad started under the military government also proceeded apace. This in-volved the removal, as we have seen, of many clauses in the contracts estab-lishing what might be called the general conditions of employment andwhich, while apparently minor, in fact represented a considerable cumulative,worsening of work conditions.

3 ) T h e definition and lim itation of the potvers of th e sho p floor delegatesManagement and government concern with the scope and power of theinternal commissions had not diminished since the Congress of P r o d u c t i ~ i t y . ~ ~

5 2 Th is was the case not only in the new d ynam ic sectors. T h e most modern sectorswithin traditional areas of manufacturing also adopted this tactic. Thus many of themajor companies in the Textile industry, such as Alpargatas an d Ducilo, signedindividual company contracts with the union fro m1960 on.

63 While we lack detailed figures as to the precise extent of the internal commissions

with in A rgentine industry, it is clear that they w ere a widespread phen ome non,particularly in traditional manufacturing industries with a high rate of unionization.Elections were, theoretically, op en to all union m embers a nd ca ndidates we reusually groupe d in rival lists representing the different tendencies into which theArgen tine union m ovem ent was divided at a national level. Th us, typical contest


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R a tio na li s at io n a n d W o r k i n g C la ss R e s p o n s e 97

Galileo Puente, Frondizi s sub-secretary of labour, in a speech which almostexactly mirrored Gelbard s of five years earlier, defined the situation in the

following terms: When I took over the problem of labour relations I foundanarchy, abuses and outrages of all sorts from the workers. The employershad lost control of the factories; the internal commissions ran everything;those who should obey were in fact giving the orders. .the employers musttherefore re-take control of the fact~ries.~~

It was in the wake of the defeats of 19 59 that formal limitations on, andcontrol of, shop floor organization were accepted by the unions and built intothe contracts. As with the rationalization clauses, this was largely a questionof putting a formal stamp of recognition on a process that was increasingly

a reality inside the factories. Internal commissions were already in consider-able disarray owing to both management and government repression, thegrowth of unemployment and general working class demoralization.

The metalworking industry set the pace in this process. Although nottouched on in the emergency contract that ended the strike of 1959, it seemshighly probable that the subject was broached in the negotiations. A weekbefore the end of the strike, the employers organization the FederacidnArgentina de la Zndustria Metalhrgica, made public its own project for theregulation of the commissions. The nature and extent of management concernon this issue is clearly evidenced in these proposals. The main employersuggestions were that: a delegate should not present any problem to manage-ment if he had not previously gone first to his supervisor and then waited

days; a delegate should be at least 25 years of age, with 2 years experiencein the factory and four in the union, together with a good conduct record;delegates were not to be allowed to oppose the orders of managementconcerning the arrangement of production; shop floor meetings were not totake place within work hours, and delegates were not to be allowed out of

their section without written permission from the head of their section.55

in the 19Gos would see a list supported by the national Peronist leadership, a rivaldissident Peronist list and perhaps one supported by Communists. T he list whichwon the majority of shop delegates and therefore controlled the cuerpo de dele-gados for the factory as whole wen t on to control the comisidn in terna dereclamos the internal commission. Although it is clear that shop floor electionswere by no means immune to the sort of undemocratic practices often associatedwith national union elections in Argentina, it would seem reasonable to maintainthat membership participation in these elections was generally considerably greaterthan in the national union elections.

64 Speech of Galileo Puente to the Circulo Argentina de Estudios sobre Organizac idnIndustrial, included in Docum entos del Plenario Nacional d e las 62 Organizaciones,2 May, 1960, Buenos Aires, in mimeo.

6 6 Palabra Obrera, October, 1959


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398 aniel lames

The contract signed in July rgGo included many of the points of theoriginal management proposal, although some of their suggestions had been

watered down. Article 82 of the contract laid down in detail the proportionof delegates to workers in a plant, the requirements a delegate needed tomeet in terms of age and experience, the procedure an internal commissionhad to use in dealing with employers, the specific areas of appropriate concernfor a delegate. Finally, strict limits were placed on a delegate s ability to movearound a factory writ ten permission stating the exact purpose had to beobtained from a superior in order to move out of his own shop. Again, similarrestrictions were to be found in most of the other contracts signed in otherindustries in the following years.

The strictness of control varied somewhat from contract to contract.While the definitions of legitimate areas of delegates intervention were fairlyconsistent, the stipulations concerning the ratio of delegates to workers variedconsiderably. At one extreme one finds the reasonably liberal provisions of themetalworkers contract which provided for one delegate for every 30 workerswhen there were more than 5 workers in a plant. At the other extreme onehas the meat packing industry where article 9 of the contract stated that thenumber of delegates should not exceed one for every 150 workers, or portion

greater than 75The impact of these clauses was not solely in the concrete limitations

contained in the text, though these were important. Clauses like that of themeatpacking industry cited above effectively meant, for instance, that manysections within a frigorifico would have no delegate, subdelegate or com-mission per section. Previously each section and subsection within theindustry had elected its own delegate. An idea of the effect of this clause onthe representative structure of a union within a Irigorifico can be gained ifone bears in mind that that a moderate to large size frigorifico of 1,300workers would be entitled to 8 delegates according to the new contract.

In addition, however, the very fact that the legitimate constituency andmode of functioning of the delegates were now defined formally was itself alimitation of their powers. As noted above, it was precisely the lack of a n yformal definition of their powers or nature which had so irked employersbefore. Now they had formal, legal criteria against which to measure, andcontrol, delegate activity.

D. ConclusionWhat can the preceding analysis teIl us in terms of the concerns outlined i nthe introduction? \SThat, concretely, were the implications of the process wehave described for issues such as the possibilities for effective autonomous


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Rationalisation and W or ki ng lass Response 399

rank and file activity, the creation of organizational structures to express thisactivity and the consequent possibility of effectively challenging oligarchicunion leadership control

It is clear, on one level, that the clauses specifically defining the functionsand limiting the areas of concern of the shop floor delegates restricted thepossibility of effective rank and file activity. There was, however, also a lessobvious but more fundamental result of the productivity campaign as far asthe prospects for real rank and file activity were concerned. The new clausesintroduced in the contracts from the early 1960s on gave the employers a freehand concerning production arrangements and work systems. In doing this,

a whole series of issues around which rank and file interest in union activitycould have been built were, e jure precluded from the internal commissions'area of legitimate concern. Shop floor organization to be viable and healthyneeds to base itself on areas of immediate concern to the worker. The strengthof the commissions during the resistance to the military government after1955 had been precisely based on their perception by the rank and file as theonly viable means of defending shop floor conditions. This whole area ofactivity was now undercut. Issues on which delegates and/or commissionshad previously bargained, and in doing so gained strength, were now

removed from the legitimate constituency of the commissions.Grievance procedures formed a fundamental means of enforcing this

situation. Strictly speaking, highly formalized grievance procedure hadexisted in the contracts since 1946; in practice, however, delegates had oftenbeen able to take advantage of their power within a plant and the fact thatthey were not formally included in such procedures to resolve workers'poblems directly at th; point of Now, however, with the newcontracts of the early 1g6os, they were oficially incorporated into thegrievance procedure, being the lowest rung of a carefully structured hierarchyof bodies through which a grievance had to pass. The ultimate resolutionwas placed firmly in the hands of top union officials and employers' repre-sentatives in conjunction with the Ministry of Labour. In addition, manycontracts also contained clauses specifically committing the workers to work-ing under the new conditions while their complaint went through procedure.Thus, the issue of worker dissatisfaction with new production arrangements,or, in fact, any other aspect of their working conditions, was removed fromthe hands of their direct, on-the-spot representatives. While this cut down the6 6 Of course, it could well be that, given certain circumstances, it would be in manage-

ment s interests to resolve grievances directly at the po int of production. Th is wouldbe particularly the case where there was only weak shop floor organization. Con-versely, grievance procedure could be used by workers as a protection againstmanagement.


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400 aniel James

possibility of work place disruption of production, it also greatly limited thescope for the potential activity of the internal commissions.

The objective possibilities for the internal commissions to play a dominantrole in organizing and expressing working class aspirations and grievanceswithin the factories in the 1960s were generally bleak. Moreover, it may besuggested that this trend was compounded by the very nature of theproductivity schemes introduced at this time. Payment by result schemesoften some form of piece work have in some exceptional circumstancesbecome the basis for strong rank and file organization. This was the case, forexample, in the British engineering industry after the Second World War.68In Argentina, however, this potentially positive result of payment by resultschemes was largely precluded since the very context within which theywere to be implemented was now deemed management's sole concern.Indeed, in many cases, even the setting of bonus rates were considered bymanagement to be their sole prerogative. In the metalworking industry, forexample, it seems clear that, in practice, article 83 of the contract, whichstarted by saying that 'systems of bonuses or any other forms of incentivesdo not constitute a proper concern of this contract', was usually taken asgiving the employer the right to unilaterally set the rate for the job.This meant that only the largely divisive, negative aspects of payment byresult were felt, which inevitably had a deleterious effect on shop floororganization.

Sectional negotiation over the rate for the job, which was, for example,crucial in the development of a strong shop floor organization in Britain inthe 1950s and 1g60s, was thus largely absent in important areas ofArgentine industry in this period. What was left was often simply thediscipline of the piece rate imposed by a victorious management. The use byshop floor representatives of the rate for the job as a bargaining tool with

management over changes in production schedules such as speed up, shiftarrangements and labour mobility, and the building up of a strong rank andfile organization around such bargaining power was simply not possible inArgentina:j rst, because of the general economic situation and, secondly,because issues such as mobility and the rate for the job were, as we have seen,specifically removed from both national and local union control. The illeffects of productivity agreements on shop floor cohesion in this situation wereclearly perceived by many militants. One finds the constantly-voiced concernE It may be argued, too, that the very nature of the collective bargaining system in

Argentina - particularly its highly centralized, national emphasis- compoundedthis situation.See Tony Cliff,T h e Employers Offensive(Pluto Press, London , 1970).

6 ee H uw Beynon, Wo rrjin g for Ford (Penguin, Lo ndon, 1973).


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Rationalisation and Working Class Response 401

by workers in the early 96 s that rationalization was chiefly a managementdevice to turn worker against worker. The more perceptive also noted thatproductivity clauses and payment by result also lessened the workers interestand participation in the union.

What are the implications of this sort of analysis for the question of unionbureaucracies and their domination over the rank and file? Juan Carlos Torre,in a pioneering article, has argued for a multi-faceted approach to the issue ofthe sources of union bureaucracy control and domination of its membership.In particular he has argued for the need for defining the concept of unionbureaucracy, complementing the current concept, which emphasizes uni-lateral control of political resources (institutional and coercive ones) withanother one which analyses the place of a demobilized working class as avehicle for the subordinate relationship established with the bureau~racy. ~~

would argue that the implications of the sort of analysis we have beenpursuing lie precisely in the direction of helping to explain this subordinaterelationship established with the bureaucracy .

There was undoubtedly a large element of quid p ro quo involved in theacceptance by the union leaderships of rationalization. In return for thecontrol of the internal commissions and the acceptance of rationalization,

concrete benefits were gained from the leaderships point of view. Not leastwas the formal recognition of the functions of responsible trade unionism.The provisions of the contracts underlined this. For the first time since theearly 1g5os, the union leadership could be seen to have achieved the com-prehensive renovation of the clauses in the contracts. The clauses concerningareas such as maternity benefit, child birth bonuses, additional payments foryears of service, all of which had remained frozen since the early 1g5os, werenow brought up to date.

The bargaining and administrative functions of the unions were notfundamentally weakened by the acceptance of rationalization. Basically, theproductivity campaign was aimed at shop floor power, not at the unionsper se In addition the union leadership itself obviously had an interest incontrolling this power. The imposition of managerial control and the weaken-ing of delegate power implied a greater facility for the union leadership inthe control of its own membership. In fact, by writing the control of theinternal commissions into the contracts, the employers succeeded in identi-fying their interest in the matter with the union leadership. The onus for

policing the commissions was placed squarely on the shoulders of the unionleadership as executors of the responsibilities assumed by the union side inthe contract.6 Juan Carlos Torre op cit


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402 aniel ames

This does not imply, however, that what was involved was to be explainedin terms of leadership betrayal . While the productivity offensive waspremised on the destruction of the possibility of autonomous rank and fileactivity, there was a basic ambiguity even at this level. In many ways, theleaderships acceptance of rationalization mirrored the rank and file s ownperception. It should be borne in mind, too, that the delegates themselveswere granted a certain place in the hierarchy by the new contracts. If theywere willing to accept the crucial restrictions imposed on their activity, thencertain rights and recognition were accorded to them. Similarly, it is clearthat, at a time of generally falling real wages, much of the union membershipwas increasingly willing to accept productivity clauses in return for wagerises.

The implication of this analysis for the question of the relationship of rankand file activity and union bureaucracy is, therefore, clear. If we are toachieve a more profound understanding of the interrelationship betweenleadership and its constituency, we must accept that the working classstruggles on terrains and within contexts where there objectively existpossibilities for meaningful action and where its class experience leads it toperceive such possibilities. Our argument has been that the prime result of

the rationalization drive which culminated in the early 1960s was radically toshift the balance of forces on the shop floor in favour of employers and tomake the objective possibilities for rank and file activity centred on theinternal commissions very poor. Naturally enough, the union leadershipcould and did abet and take full advantage of this process but it was in nosense the prime cause of the malaise which affected the internal commissionsfor most of the 1960s.

Finally, I would suggest that analysis along these lines partial though mypresentation of it has been has the advantage of moving us away from twometaphysical abstracts which have dominated so much of the debate onPeronist trade unionism and the working class a working class that alwaysstruggles and strives to organize itself independently and a union leadershipwhich always betrays and represses these aspirations.

james, daniel - racionalization and working class response. the context and limits of factory floor...

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