james c. morrison (1970) - husserl and brentano on intentionality

International Phenomenological Society

Husserl and Brentano on IntentionalityAuthor(s): James C. MorrisonSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Sep., 1970), pp. 27-46Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105978Accessed: 21/11/2008 12:04

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HUSSERL AND BRENTANO ON INTENTIONALITY

"Finally, many people view phenomenology as a continuation of Brentano's psychology. However highly estimate this work of genius, and however strongly it (and other writings of Brentano's) has affected me in younger years, it must still be said that Brentano has remained far from a phenomenology in our sense.... Nevertheless, he has gained for himself the epoch-making service of making phenomenology possible. He presented to the modem era the idea of Intentionality, which he derived out of consciousness itself in immanent description . . ." 1

The above is general knowledge in the philosophical world. However, it is often assumed on the basis of these facts alone that Husserl's doctrine of Intentionality is essentially the same as Brentano's. Hence scholars will study the latter in order to find out what Husserl's conception of it is and critics will attempt to refute Husserl and even phenomenology in general by refuting Brentano. This is a mistake. Although it is true as a matter of historical fact that Husserl was Brentano's student and first derived this idea from him, it is not true that the meaning and importance each gives to it is the same, even in fundamentals. I believe that a failure to realize this has led to a great deal of misinterpretation and misunder- standing of Husserl and phenomenology. It is the purpose of this essay to attempt to show that Husserl's phenomenological views are very different from and far more developed than Brentano's, and that he even rejects (wholly or in part) many of the latter's, most important doctrines. In order to clarify this problem I propose to discuss Brentano's well- known attempt to distinguish mental and physical phenomena in which he introduces the notion of "Intentional Inexistence." I will then take Up Husserl's views on both the general problem of mental vs. physical phenomena and on the more specific one of Intentionality. No attempt will be made to give a complete account of Husserl's own views on Intentionality, since to do so adequately would imply a discussion of his whole philosophy. Also, I will concentrate almost exclusively on material from the Logische Untersuchungen, since it is here that he makes most explicit and detailed reference to Brentano.

1 Edmund Husserl, Ideen III, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1952, p. 59.

27

28 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

I.

The basic purpose of Brentano's chapter, "On the Basic Difference Between Mental and Physical Phenomena" is ". . . the clarification of the two terms: physical [physisches] phenomenon - mental [psychisches] phenomenon." 2 He begins by asserting that "The entire world of what appears to us falls into two great classes, the class of physical and that of mental phenomena." 3 Brentano assumes this division and its exhaus- tiveness to be obvious for he never attempts to argue for it. The method he adopts is simply to find at least one (perhaps several) specific defining characteristic of each class, i.e., a characteristic that all members of one class have and no members of the other have. I believe that Brentano, in the course of his analysis, finds altogether eight defining characteristics of mental phenomena, although he does not accord all of them equal significance. From his own, Husserl's and our point of view the most important is Intenitonal Inexistence.

The first defining characteristic is given in terms of the notion of presentation (Vorstellung).

(1) "Every presentation of sensation or fantasies offers an example of mental phenomena: and I understand here by presentation not that which is presented but rather the act of presenting. Thus, the hearing of a tone, the seeing of a colored object, the sensing of warm or cold, as well as similar fantasy states are examples .... 4

Here Brentano makes an important distinction between what is presented and the act of presenting, the implication being that all mental phenomena are acts. Further examples of acts include: thinking, judging, remem- brance, expectation, doubt, fear, and willing.5 Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are colors, figure, a landscape, warmth and cold, and pictures (Gebilde) that appear in fantasie.6

2 Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte, Vol. I, Dunker & Humblot, Leipzig 1874, pp. 102-3. (Hereafter: Psych.)

3 Die gesammte Welt unserer Erscheinungen zerfllt in zwei grosse Classen, in die Classe physische und in die der psychischen Phinomene." Note Brentano's use of the term "Erscheinung!'; we will see later that its ambiguities lead him into difficulties. Psych. 101.

4 Psych. 103. 5 Psych. 103. 6 Psych. 104. Note that Brentano does not distinguish here between a sense-

quality (e.g., a color) and a physical object (e.g., a landscape) - both are called physical phenomena. This ambiguity will be seen to be important later, in that it seriously confuses his analysis.

HEUSSERL AND BRENTANO ON INTENTIONALITY 29

(2) "We may accordingly regard it as an indubitably correct determination of mental phenomena that they are either presentations or (in the sense which has been explained) rest on presentations as their basis." 7

Here Brentanomentions the traditional way of defining physical phenomena in terms of extension and spatial determinativeness (lrtliche Be- stimmtheit), the opposite holding for mental phenomena.8 He rejects this solution because he believes some mental phenomena (tones and smells) are not extended. Also, it could be argued that, during the first stages of our experience, the objects of sight and other presentations are not experienced as localized in space. Conversely, we tend to locate our own thoughts in "the space filled by use," i.e., in our bodies.9 Finally, the above definition is rejected because it gives only a negative characteriza- tion of mental phenomena.

(3) "Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the middle ages have called the intentional (or mental mentalle) existence of an object, and what we, although with a not wholly unambiguous expression, would call the reference to a content, direction to an object (by which is not to be understood a reality) or immanent objectivity." 10

That is, each mental phenomenon "contains [enthfilt] in itself something as an object, though not always in the same way."

"In the presentation something is presented, in the judgment something is af- firmed or denied, in love something loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, etc. 92 i1

Further, it is not necessary that the object be an external one (iusserer Gegenstand), for it is possible to desire not the tone itself but simply the hearing of it.12 This raises certain problems about the "levels" of reflection which Brentano does not explicitly go into. But it is clearly implied that the "object" of a given act (hearing) can be another act (the desire to hear). Thus, in the case of desiring to hear a tone the tone is a (non- act) object of the act of hearing which is itself the '~object" of another act, that of desiring. The point Brentano wishes to make is not that a given act cannot be an object, but that every (mental) act has an object, something it refers to.

7Note that it is neither asserted nor implied that all acts are presentations or that all mental phenomena are presentations.

8 Psych. 111-2. 9 Psych. 114. 10 Psych. 115. At Psych. 115. 12 Psych. 117-8.


(4) "[Mental phenomena] are perceived [wahrgenommen] only in inner consciousness, while in the case of the physical only outer perception is possible." 13

Here, inner and outher perception are not defined, but one may assume that the latter involves the bodily sense-organs, the former not. Also, Brentano seems to think of inner perception as a kind of "introspection" or inward "reflection."

(5) "If we thus say that mental phenomena are those which are grasped through inner perception it is thereby implied that its perception is immediately evident.? 14

Further,

"Inner perception ... is really the only perception in the genuine sense of the

word."

The reason for the last assertion is that the phenomena of outer perception cannot be proven as "true and actual." 15 A serious ambiguity arises here, for it is not clear whether Brentano is saying that this is so for external perception in general (all cases) or only for any given case. Nevertheless, it seems that he is asserting that the class of mental phenomena is coextensive with that of objects of inner perception or "genuine" perception and of evident (non-deceptive) perception.

(6) "It is not as if all mental phenomena are internally perceivable by every- one ...; rather, it is apparent and was explicitly noted by us earlier that no mental phenomenon is perceived by more than one individual." 16

This assertion is closely linked with (5) above. Brentano seems to think, that because mental phenomena are perceived by inner perception, and because only the latter is "genuine" perception, it follows that mental phenomena are "private," accessible only to the individual person who has them. By implication, physical phenomena are "public" and accessible (perceivable) by more than one person.

(7) "... They [mental phenomena] are the only phenomena to which an actual as well as intentional existence belongs." 1"

13 Psych. 118. '4 Psych. 119. (My italics.) 15 Psych. 119. 16 Psych. 119. 17 Psych. 120.

HUSSERL AND BRENTANO ON INTENTIONALITY 31

To clarify this characteristic Brentano refers to a view held by Bain that the notion that an unperceived (and also unperceivable?) physical world acts on the mind is self-contradictory. Perception cannot be the effect (Wirkung) of the unperceived and we cannot say what an object is independent of perception. Bain's position here seems similar to that of Berkeley, who also held that the concept of "material substance" is absurd and self-contradictory. Brentano, on the other hand, resists this view, for, if it is true, how could the belief in external objects existing independent of perception and "causing" our perceiving of them ever arise? Further, Brentano accuses Bain of confusing the sensation (Empfindung) in the sense of what is presented with the (act) of sensing, a distinction Brentano himself takes great pains to make. For Brentano, physical ob-o jects exist outside the mind but nevertheless they have only an intentional existence, ie., they are the objects of a possible perception. This view has the twofold virtue of avoiding the self-contradictory concept of at unperceived and unperceivable physical ojbect while at the same time retaining the obvious and important distinction between what is perceived and the act of perceiving it. Thus, there is no temptation to say (with Bain and Berkeley) that physical objects are "part of" or "contained in" our perception of them.'8 To this extent Brentano may be said to hold some form of "idealism," though certainly not a subjectivist Berkelean kind.

Finally, Brentano discusses Spencer's view that a distinguishing characteristic of mental phenomena is that they emerge in consciousness successively one at a time, whereas physical phenomena are synchronous, i.e., they occur more than one at a time.'9 Brentano does not accept this view completely, for he points out that Spencer must be thinking of the life (consciousness) of only one organism,20 for clearly in the case of two organisms each can have a (different) sensation or perception at the same time. Furthermore, Brentano holds this can also be true for only one organism. For example, one can have a presentation and make a judgment about it at the same time.2' It is necessary to distinguish unity and simplicity (which Spencer failed to do) and to realize that neither necessarily excludes the other.22 Mental phenomena, though not simple in the sense of occurring only one at a time, always appear as a unity, i.e., appear as belonging to one consciousness. The implication also seems to be that this consciousness retains its unity over a period of time during

18 Psych. 120-2. Note that this seems inconsistent with (3) above. 19 Psych. 122-3. 20 Psych. 123. 21 Thus, while seeing red I can judge, "I see red." w Psych. 125.


the life of the organism. Thus, the final defining characteristic of mental phenomena is.:

(8) Mental phenomena always appear to consciousness as a unity.23

I will now summarize what I believe are the basic defining characteristics of mental phenomena for Brentano. (1) All mental phenomena are acts (2) All are either presentations or have these as their basis (3) All have the characteristic of Intentional Inexistence (consciousness

= consciousness-of) (4) All are perceived only in inner consciousness (5) All are evident (nondeceptive) (6) All are "private" (7) All have actual as well as intentional existence (8) All always appear as a unity

Having succeeded in distinguishing their respective "subject-matters" (the range of entities which they study) Brentano is able to define psychology and physical science. Physical science is the science of physical phenomena (excluding images), i.e., all those phenomena which "emerge in sensation (Empfindung)." Further, such a science assumes that sensations are the effect of a three-dimensional spatial and temporal world on our sense organs. But as the science of physical phenomena it does not describe the "absolute nature" of this world, but only ascribes to it certain "powers".24 By implication physical phenomena are not these "powers" themselves.25 Conversely, psychology is the science of all mental phenomena but also includes in its subject matter certain non- mental ones, e.g., images, though these are considered only as the "content" of mental phenomena.26

Before turning to Husserl I would like to point out what seem to me to be obvious and fundamental confusions and inconsistencies in Bren- tano's discussion. Note, for example, his assertion above that mental phenomena are the "effects" of a spatiotemporal world. First, what reasd~s are there for believing or even assuming this to be true, and second, are the "objects" constituting this world physical ones? They cer-

23 Psych. 126. 24 Psych. 128. 25 Psych. 129. 26 Psych. 129-30. It is not clear why images are physical phenomena. The most

plausible interpretation would seem to be because they lack Intentional Inexistence. The fact that they are "extended" is ruled out since Brentano does not accept non- extendedness as definitive of the mental. Psych. 111-15.

HuSSERL AND BRENTANO ON INTENTIONALITY 33

tainly are not physical phenomena. Are we left, then, with two "realms" of the physical, "objects" and phenomena? This leads to a radical dualism which implies that no direct knowledge of the world which "causes" physical phenomena is possible. It is also highly unlikely that any indirect knowledge by inference is possible. At least, Brentano does not assert there is or can be and he seems to think we are left in complete ignorance of it. We assume that such a world exists, but say nothing about its nature, other than it is three-dimensional spatially and temporally. And further, how can we know this? Surely this assumption produces absurdity, in that there would be two spatiotemporal "worlds," that of mental and physical phenomena and that of the world of which they are the effect. The fact that Brentano rejects space and time as defining characteristics of physical and mental phenomena respectively is not to the point here, for no one can deny that these phenomena appear to us in space and time and thus have these characteristics. Brentano seems to have fallen into a rather crude form of representational realism which is subject to precisely those criticisms by Bain (and Berkeley) which he himself had earlier rejected both as being necessarily valid in themselves and as applying to his own position.

Another way of putting this same point is that Brentano has here (and at other places in his analysis also) lost sight of the notion of intentional existence and inexistence. For in ascribing the latter to all (and only) mental phenomena and in asserting (against Bain) that physical phenomena exist "outside" the mind and have only an intentional existence (i.e., are the objects of a possible perception) he was in effect denying both a subjective idealism - all reality is "mental" - and the existence of an unperceivable "cause" of phenomena, a "thing-in-itself." In other words, a consistent application of the notion of Intentional Inexistence would necessarily deny the possibility of assuming or even thinking of an unperceivable "world-in-itself." This situation is made even more serious when one considers his assertion that no mental phenomenon is perceivable by more than one person. That is, all mental phenomena are by nature "private." This, together with the assertion that only inner perception is genuine perception comes very close to solipsism, for it seems to imply that all one can ever perceive are the "contents" of one's own mind, and that since physical phenomena are unperceivable they are therefore unknowable! Needless to say, such a view is absurd and would render impossible a science of both mental and physical phenomena. I am not claiming that any of Brentano's defining characteristics of mental phenomena ((1) to (8) above) are in themselves inconsistent with one another, but only that certain other things he says, including some of his explanations of them, lead to serious inconsistencies and confusions. I


suggest further that the basic source of most (if not all) of these problems is an insufficient grasp of Intentional Inexistence and a consequent failure to carry through its full implications. And this brings us to Husserl and Intentionality.

II.

Husserl appended a supplement to the second volume of the Logische Untersuchungen called "Outer and Inner Perception - Physical and Men- tal Phenomena." In it he begins by giving a short "history" of the development of recent scientific and philosophical views about perception and epistemology from the experiences and beliefs of "naive man." Since many of Brentano's basic theses fall within the scope of this "history" it makes a good starting place for our discussion of Husserl's criticism and the development of his own conception of Intentionality.27

Husserl claims that the naive man distinguishes outer and inner perception, and does so on the basis of a distinction of their respective "objects." Thus, the former is perception of external things (Dinge), their properties, relations, etc., and the latter is perception of the self and its properties and relations.28 Philosophically, this naive belief is expressed by Descartes in terms of the dualism of mens vs. corpus and Locke's distinction between sensation and reflection. Sensation is the perception of external things by means of the body, i.e., the sense organs, whereas reflection (inner perception) is turned towards the mind and its "ideas" and does not employ the bodily senses. Further, the distinction between the two kinds of perception is drawn on the basis of a difference in the way they arise. External perception results from the effects of external things on the sense organs and inner perception through reflection on our own minds.29 In addition, outer perception is regarded as intrinsically deceptive (or at least always capable of deception) while inner perception is evident. Because of this, it is implicitly accepted that only inner perception is "worthy of the name." Through finding a descriptive characteristic applying to all instances of the one class and to none of the other it was believed possible to distinguish psychology from the sciences of nature.30 Descartes, by emphasizing the evident, nondeceptive nature of inner perception - while I doubt I cannot doubt that I doubt - and the

27 It is interesting to note the remarkable similarity of Husseri's "history" with Ryle's account of the "genesis" of the "Myth of the Ghost in the Machine." Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., London 1960, Chap. I.

28 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II, Pt. 2, 3rd ed., Max Niemeyer, Halle 1922, p. 222. (Hereafter: L.U.)

29 L.U. 11, 2. 223. 30 L.U. U, 2. 224.


unreliability of the senses, was led to the conclusion that the objects of outer perception have only a phenomenal or "intentional" existence.31 We can thus divide phenomena into two classes, but not the objects in themselves which we suppose to "support" them, i.e., souls and bodies (Seelen and Kirper). The latter are "transcendent" and on the the level of pure description we make no judgments about them.32 As should be obvious, these views apply to a great extent to Brentano, and Husserl makes explicit reference to him by saying that Intentional Inexistence was given as a positive characteristic of inner mental phenomena. This is a purely descriptive characteristic and thus has the obvious virtue of avoiding any reference to a transcendent "metaphysical" world.33 The mental and the physical are conceived of as phenomena given through appearances (Gegebenheit der Erscheinungen). But as appearances they are thought of as appearances of something, that is, as effects of (transcendent) bodies on our souls through the sense organs. This may suffice as a general "history" of Brentano's views and the philosophical tradition in which they were deveoped. Let us now turn to Husserl's criticisms and transformations of them.

First, Husserl says that Brentano holds that: (a) inner perception mental = evident. (b) outer perception = physical = nonevident (truigerisch). That is, the class of entities denoted by each of the three terms in (a) is coextensive, the same being true for the class denoted by the three terms in (b).34 Although Brentano is here in accord with much of the philosophical tradition Husserl feels convinced that not all these equivalences are valid. For Husserl, inner and outer perception do not have completely "the same epistemological character." Not every perception of the I (des Ichs) is evident, if by I we mean the common sense notion of one's own empirical personality.35 His example is that certain mental states (Zustdnde) are not evident since they are perceived as having a location in the body. For instance, a pain is experienced as in my tooth and not (say) in my foot. Here, inner and outer perception are intimately and intrinsically bound up in the total experience or perception, and any possibility of deception in one aspect is immediately carried over to the other. Furthermore, the deceptiveness is not simply a matter of our defec-

31 L.U. II, 2. 225. 32 L.U. II, 2. 226. 33 L.U. II, 2. 227. 34 L.U. HI, 2. 232. 35 L.U. II, 2. 231. One might suppose that Husserl has in mind here the falli-

bility of "introspection."


tive "interpretation" of what is "given" (e.g., a careless introspection).36 As the converse of his criticism of the equivalence between inner per-

ception and evidence Husserl criticizes that between outer perception and nonevidence. Brentano is right in saying that much outer perception (e.g., of a house) is not evident.37 However, it does not follow from this that all outer perception as such is not evident. Brentano fails to make a distinction between the perception as related to the object (Gegenstand) - the house - and perception as related to the "lived sensible contents" (erlebten sinnlichen Inhalteri). The latter are the presenting sensations (Empfindungen) and since, when perceiving a physical object we make no judgment about them,38 we cannot be deceived about them. If, on the other hand, we do turn our attention to these sensible contents we can be mistaken.39 The point, however, is that since the sensible contents are physical phenomena here is case of an evident outer perception. Al- though Husserl does not here give an example what he seems to have in mind is the following. When perceiving a house I have a sensation of its color (say red). Ordinarily, I am "directed upon" the house and not my perceiving of it. Thus, in making a judgment I would say, "The house is red." However, if I turn my attention - reflect upon - my perceiving the house I am turned toward the sensible content of my perception (not the house itself). Thus, I am concerned with how the house appears to me, and in making a judgment I judge not about the house but about its mode of appearance ("The house looks red"). Here, the redness is conceived of as a sensation - as a physical phenomenon - and not as an objective property. It is physical (and not mental) in the sense that it is neither an act nor is it intentional. But since I am not judging about the house as it really is, but only about how it looks to me, I cannot be mistaken, i.e., the perception is evident.

Having denied Brentano's equivalences between inner and evident perception and outer and nonevident perception Husserl goes on to make a fundamental revision of Brentano's account.

"It is certain that the sphere of concepts inner and outer, evident and nonevident perception do not coincide. The first pair is determined through the concepts of mental and physical, however one may now separate them; the second characterizes the fundamental epistemological opposition which we have

36 L.U. II, 2. 232. 37 We have seen above that it is not clear whether for Brentano outer percep-

tion can be of a house, a physical object, or whether it is always and only of physical phenomena, there being a radical "gulf' between these. Objects are the transcendent cause of phenomena and not (say) logical constructions out of them.

38 We judge about the house. 39 L.U. a, 2. 237.


studied in Investigation VI: the opposition between adequate perception (or intuition [Anschauung] in the narrowest sense) . . and the merely supposed, inadequate perception... ." 40

What Husserl wants to do is to replace Brentano's set of incorrect equivalences wit hanother on the basis of the notions of adequate vs. inadequate perception. This amounts to asserting that the distinction between the mental and the physical is not to be drawn in terms of evidence but rather in terms of adequacy. Thus, for Husserl: inner perception mental = adequate outer perception = physical = inadequate To clarify the distinction between evidence and adequacy (which can easily be confused, as in the case of Brentano) Husserl says, that the opposite of the evident. is the deceptive (triigerisch), whereas the opposite of the adequate is "incomplete fulfillment" (unvolikommene Erfifllung).41 To say that a perception is inadequate is simply to say that what is perceived is not perceived completely. That is, at a given time there is some aspect or property of the object which is not "given" or presented to me, that does not appear.42 Conversely, in adequate perception the object is perceived completely, just as it is.43

The distinction between adequate and inadequate perception is obvious in the case of the perception of a physical object. The lattes cannot in principle be perceived adequately for it is always seen from a point of view - in perspectives (Abschattungen) - and there are an infinite number of such perspectives which are perceivable. To say that a physical object could be perceived adequately would amount to saying (for Husserl) that at a given time it could be seen from all possible (an infinite number of) points of view.44 And this is obviously impossible both in itself and for a perceiver (like ourselves) who is himself located in space. Further, to say (as Husserl does) that outer perception of physical objects is not evident is simply to say that at any given time I could be deceived, though this does not imply that we could be deceived at all times. Thus, for Husserl, there is no problem of the "reliability" of the senses in general, as there was for Descartes. (Husserl would no doubt agree that the possibility that we can be deceived in some cases implies that there must be

40 L.U. II, 2. 239. 41 L.U. II, 2. 239. 42 Of course, it might appear at a later occasion and must be able (in principle)

to appear at some occasion, but these considerations are not relevant here. 43 L.U. II, 239 ff. e This absurdity is the converse of the "realist" one of a thing-in-itself, i.e., of

an object that unperceivable, that is, what it is independent. of perception in general


in principle at least one case in which we are not deceived). In short, Husserl rejects what we have designated as Brentano's fifth defining characteristic of mental phenomena, that they are evident.

In Chapter I of the Fifth Investigation in Vol. II of the Logische Untersuchungen Husserl begins by distinguishing three different traditional conceptions of consciousness.45 (a) Consciousness is the "total actual phenomenological permanence of

the mental J.' 46

(b) "Consciousness as inner awareness [Gewahrwerden] of one's own mental lived-experiences [psychischen Erlebnissen]."

(c) 'Consciousness as the comprehensive designation for every kind of 'mental act' or 'intentional lived-experience."'

I would like first to take up relevant aspects of (c), for it is here I think, that the most important of Husserl's criticisms of Brentano emerge. (c) We saw above that Brentano accepted this as a defining characteristic of mental phenomena (designated as (1) in our list above). We are faced with a twofold problem at the start. Is consciousnecs essentially an act and what is the relationship between conscious acts and what Bren- tano means by mental phenomena? Husserl mentions two basic criteria of the mental for Brentano, which by implication he believes are the most important for him. The first is Intentional Inexistence. Moreover, for Brentano there are three basic classes of mental phenomena: presentations, judgments, and feelings. Husserl interprets these as ways of intending an object.48 Thus, one way of intending an object is to present (e.g., perceive) it, another is to make a judgment about it, etc.

Husserl's first objection to this is that not all mental phenomena are acts, and hence not all are intentional.49 Later in his discussion 50 Husserl uses the example of a feeling of being burned to illustrate this point. Such a feeling, he says, is like the contents of sensations (Empfindungs- inhalten) of smoothness, red, and roughness. A pain (say) can be located in the body, and in this loose sense "refers" to an object (say my tooth),

45 L.U. II, 1. 346. Husserl does not assert nor does he imply that this threefold division is exhaustive; nor does he identify his own position with any one of them. A close study of his important works shows that he appropriates elements from all three but goes far beyond them in developing his own highly original views.

46 "Bewusstsein als der gesamte reelie phinomenologische Bestand des empirischen Ich..."

47 L. U. HK, X. 3 66. 48 Vorstellungen, Urteilen and Gemfithsbewegungen.

L.U. II, 1. 367. 49 L.U. 1I, 1. 364. The implication seems to be that if a mental phenomenon

is an act then it is necessarily intentional; also, all intentional phenomena are acts. 50 L.U. II, 1. 388 ff.


but such a "referring" is not at all act-like in character. In short, pain sensations and some other feelings are not acts. However, some feelings are acts,> e.g.,, that of being pleased (Gefallen).51 To be pleased is to be pleased about something, whether this be a real, existing object, a fact, a mere possibility, or whatever. Brentano, of course, would have to conclude, that because some sensations and feelings are nonintentional they are not acts and hence not mental phenomena. But Husserl thinks this to be obviously false. Hence we must deny that all mental phenomena are acts.

Again Husserl thinks it necessary to revise radically Brentano's ter- minology. We saw earlier that he introduced the terms adequate-inadequate perception instead of evident-nonevident to bring out an essential difference between mental and physical phenomena. Now he suggests that the term mental phenomenon be avoided altogether and in its place be used that of intentional lived-experiences (intentionale Erlebnisse).52 A further distinction must be made between the constitutive contents of consciousness and lived-experiences on the one hand,- and the (say) perceived object on the other. The object is in no sense a content or constitutive part of my consciousness or of my lived-experiences. For instance, when I perceive a thing (e.g., a box) I perceive it and not my sensations or experiences of it. If I am perceiving at different times my sensations may (and do) change, but I am nevertheless perceiving the same box. Thus, the box, as the object of an intentional act of consciousness is not the same as, nor is it reducible to, my experiences and sensations of it.53 The latter are immanent "contents" of my consciousness, the former is transcendent.54

In addition, just as lived-experiences and contents of consciousness 5& must be distinguished from the object or objective of consciousness, so contents must be sharply distinguished,, not be confused with the acts of consciousness, e.g., that act of perceiving the box.56

Husserl now points out that it is very misleading to speak as Brentano does of the object which is perceived as "entering into" (treten) con-

51 L.U. II, 1. 388. 52 L.U. II, 1. 378. 53 In this sense Husserl is not a phenomenalist, though we shall see later other

senses in which he is sympathetic to this view. 54 L.U. II, 1. 382 ff. To say that an object is transcendent does not mean (for

Husserl) that it is beyond the possibility of experience. All it means in the present context is that the object is not a lived-experience, is not "mental."

55 The relation between contents (Inhalten) of consciousness and lived-experiences (Erleibnisse) is not wholly clear. For instance, are both acts?

56 L.U. II, 1. 380-1. We thus have the following rough schema: act-content- object.


sciousness, as being "taken up," "contained" (enthalten) in consciousness or the intentional lived-experience.&7 Such expressions blur the distinction between the content and the object. A perceived physical object (or "phenomenon") is not "in" consciousness or a "part" of it - it is always transcendent. The immanent contents which belong to the constituents of an intentional lived-experience are not themselves intended by the latter, i.e., they are not the object of the act. I do not see color sensations or color experiences but colored things. The thing is thus not a "bundle of impressions" or an "idea." We should avoid all talk of immanent objects. Only the acts and contents of consciousness are immanent.&8

To conclude the discussion of consciousness as act or lived-experience I will mention briefly a point made by Husserl in regard to Brentano's doctrine that all mental phenomena are either presentations or are based on them (defining characteristic (2) above). Husserl undertakes a labori- ous and difficult analysis of the notion of presentation, its relationship to judgment, etc., but I will here cite only one small part of it, the distinction between two conceptions of presentation. The first distinction is that a presentation is an act, e.g., of judging, or wishing; the second is that a presentation is the matter of an act (Actmaterie), i.e., what is judged about or wished for.&9 Now, every intentional conscious act has a matter as its object or objective. If, in Brentano's thesis that all mental phenomena are either presentations or are based on them only the second meaning of presentation is used, then his view is acceptable to Husserl.60 However, what is needed is an analysis of presentation, which Brentano certainly does not give. (a) Consciousness is the total phenomenal content of the mental I.61 According to this view, the; act, contents and lived-experiences of the I are real occurrences (Vorkomnisse) and are constantly changing, coming into being and passing away. Examples are perceptions, fantasy presentations, doubt, acts of thinking, pains, etc.62 But again Husserl warns that we must be careful to distinguish these conscious mental experiences from their "objects." For example, a color sensation, perceived or imagined, is a content of consciousness but the colored object is not. It will be remembered that Brentano began his discussion of the difference between mental and physical phenomena by asserting, "The entire world of what appears to us [unserer Erscheinungen] falls into two great clas-

57 Psych. 115-6. 58 L.U. II, 1. 371-5. 59 L.U. II, 1. 456. 60 L.U. II, 1. 458. 61 L.U. II, 1. 346. 62 L.U. IL 1. 347.


ses. . ." 63 The use of the ambiguous term "appearance" can be very misleading, and we saw that Brentano himself was not free of confusion in this respect, e.g., in his failure to realize the transcendent nature of the physical object and his tendency to reduce the physical to the mental by speaking of the latter as being "contained in" consciousness, and as "entering into" consciousness.64 It is reasonable to assume that a failure to distinguished the different meanings of appearance is (at least partly) at the source of these confusions. Husserl, on the other hand, is quite clear on this point. Appearance, he says, can mean either the appearing (erscheinen) of an object or the appearing (erscheinende) object. The former is a "mental" lived-experience, the latter not. The appearance of a thing (Dingerscheinung) is a lived-experience, but the thing that appears is not. Expressed a bit differently, when I perceive a thing the thing appears to me (in a certain way), but what I perceive is not the appearance (of the thing) but the thing.65 By implication, appearances are not "things," and what I perceive are not them but simply the thing that appears. Also, things exist when I (or anyone else) do not perceive them, but "appearances" exist only in perception, which simply means that to say that it is being perceived by someone in a certain way. "The appearances themselves do not appear, they are experienced." 66 One gets the impression in reading Brentano that phenomena and appearance mean basically the same thing. Such a view tends towards subjective idealism and untimately solipsism, and also leads one to posit a thing-in-itself "behind" the apearances or phenomena, as perhaps even "causing" them. Husserl, in denying that objects are appearances or phenomena, avoids falling into this position. (b) Conscious is the inner awareness of one's own mental lived-experiences.67 On this view (perhaps the most familiar in naive thought) conscious "accompanies" the contents and lived-experiences and is related to them in such a way that they are its "objects." 68 According to this, consciousness means much the same as inner perception,69 a term Bren- tano frequently used, and which we gave as his fourth defining characteristic of mental phenomena. Husserl, on the other hand, as wei have already seen, strongly objects to the terms inner and outer perception, and prefers to subsitute for them the concepts of adequate vs. inadequate

63 Psych. 101. 64 Psych. 115. 65 L.U. II, 1. 349 ff. 66 L.U. II, 1. 350. T L.U. II, 1. 346.

68 Consciousness is conceived here as an "inner light." 69 L.U. II, 1. 354 ff.


perception. In regard, then, to our awareness of our lived-experiences, such awareness can be adequate, but need not be. Thus, if our perception is adequate then it is of my own lived-experiences, but the reverse does not necessarily follow. In other words, I can fail to have an adequate perception of a given lived-experience, but the latter are the only things of which adequate perception is possible.70

Further, the I, for Husserl, is an empirical object (empirischer Gegen- stand). As such, it is "reducible" to the contents and unity of consciousness. But we can distinguish the momentary I (the empirical contents of consciousness at a given time) from the I as that which remains and persists through time. This distinction is analogous to that (in the physical world) between the appearance of a thing and the thing that appears. The latter also persists through time and remains a unity through its several appearances. A basic difference between these two kinds of unity, however, lies in the fact that the unity of the physical thing is not phenomenal, that is, it is reducible to laws, e.g., the law of causality.7' Thus, we can construct the following proportion. The complex of mental lived- experiences: mental I appearances of the physical thing: physical thing.72 There is thus no "pure" I "floating above" the empirical contents of consciousness; 73 there is no primitive I as the "center" of the relationships to all lived-experiences. The empirical I can perceive itself just as it can external things - there is no need of a pure I (which cannot perceive itself) to do this.

We may now compare Husserl's views about psychology and its relationship to natural science with those of Brentano. For Husserl, psychology studies the contents and lived-experiences of consciousness in order to determine their origins, laws, causes, etc. It thus studies the empirical I which is nothing but the unity of the relationships of these lived- experiences to one another. Opposed to the empirical I are external physical things which are intended by the I. They are not reducible to mere presentations, but are given as objects. We may define the physical world as the intentional correlate of all mental perceptions and judgments. Thus, to the individual I corresponds the individual world, to the community of I's the social world and to the community of knowers the world in itself. The Berkeley-Hume doctrine that bodies (Korper) are ideas (Ideen) or "bundles" of ideas is false, for bodies are never perceived "inwardly" (innerlich) and adequately as the former are, but always

70 LAU. II, 1. 354-5. 71 L.U. II, 1. 353-4. 72 L.U. II, 1. 361. 73 L.U. II, 1. 353. (Cf. Note 75.)


inadequately. Thus, Husserl ultimately rejects phenomenalism, which he defines here as the view that the distinction between the mental and the physical lies in a correlation of laws, avoiding any reference to "metaphysical" entities like souls (Seele) and bodies. A phenomenalistic psychology, then (one which Brentano certainly strove for) is a psychology "without a soul," i.e., a psychology of mental phenomena.74 To this extent Husserl would agree with phenomenalism, though, as we have seen above, he clearly rejects any attempt to "reduce" physical objects to phenomena ("sense-data"), appearances, or the contents and experience of consciousness. And since this is a fundamental tenet of phenomenalism (and empiricism in general), I think it fair to say that, on this ground alone he rejects phenomenalism.75

'III.

Let us now conclude and attempt to summarize the results of our discussion. Husserl warns that there are two errors that must, above all, be avoided. The first is the representational theory (Bildertheorie), according to which the physical thing is "outside" conscious and its representatives (Bilder, Vertreter) are "in" consciousness. The second error is that the intentional object is immanent, i.e., is a sign (Zeichen) or representation. These views are both fundamentally false. The intentional object is not an "internal representation" and the external thing is not something "represented." Rather, the intentional object is the transcendent, external object.76

I have attempted to show above that Brentano, probably because of a lack of ultimate clarity about the intentional nature of consciousness, was led to hold certain views which are ultimately inconsistent with its true meaning, e.g., he fell at times into a form of representationalism, subjective idealism, and perhaps even solipsism. That is, he committed (or came very close to committing) both the errors Husserl warns against above. More specifically, we can summarize our discussion of Husserl's

74 This material is taken from the first edition of the Logische Untersuchungen, 1900-01, Chap. I, par. 7. It does not appear in the second and third editions.

75 Another sense in which Husserl is sympathetic to phenomenalism is his defining the I in terms of empirical contents and his denial of a "pure" I. Of course, after the Logische Untersuchungen he rejects this view, principally in the Ideen where the notion of a transcendental philosophy and hence of a transcendental ego is fully developed. Phenomenology and phenomenalism should not be confused.

76 L.U. II, 1. 421-5. This does not imply that all intentional objects are external physical ones, since "ideal" objects (e.g., essences (Wesen)) are intentional objects. To say that an object is intentional is to say simply that it is the object (referent) of an actual or possible act of consciousness. It implies nothing about the objects "reality"l or "mode of being."


criticism of Brentano by referring to our list of the latter's eight defining characteristics of mental phenomena.

Husserl denies (1) - all mental phenomena are acts - since sensations and certain feelings are clearly "mental" yet do not refer to an object other than themselves. He accepts (2) with the important reservation that presentation be taken in the sense of act only (in which case (2) is trivially true). He accepts (3) - all act-mental phenomena have Inten- tional Inexistence - only in its bare form, i.e., all consciousness is consciousness=of. But he goes on to develop his own highly original notion of Intentionality, denying many of the basic aspects of Brentano's own analysiS,.77 Husserl rejects (4) and (5) by substituting for the term inner perception that of adequate perception and by distinguishing adequate perception from evidence. (8) is accepted (with certain clarifications) to the extent that consciousness can be conceived of as identical with the unity of "mental phenomena" and that the latter are always experienced as a unity persisting through time. Husserl accepts (7) in that he defines the physical world as the correlate of intentional acts of consciousness.78 Thus, the physical world is not "actual" in the sense that it must be conceived as the object of a possible consciousness, whereas consciousness itself is actual in the sense that its object need not be real or existent and its acts, qua acts, are not intentional objects.79 Characteristic (6) -

that of the "privacy" of all mental phenomena - was not explicitly dis- cussed, though I think we may suppose that Husserl would not reject it altogether, since i one sense it is trivially true. For instance,. you cannot have my pain since if you did it would be your pain and not mine. And the converse is true in regard to my having your pains.

In my discussion I have concentrated on Husserl's detailed criticism of Brentano in the Logische Untersuchungen. I would now like to conclude with a short statement of what I think his most fundamental objection is, based on the later developments of phenomenology from a "descriptive psychology"' in the Logische Untersuchungen to the mature statement of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy in the Ideen (1913). One must be clear about the fundamentally different motives and aims of each thinker. Brentano was concerned to ground psychology on

77 It should be onted that Brentano never uses the term "Intentionality" and Husserl never uses that of "Intentional Inexistence" except when referring to Brentano or Scholasticism. This fact by itself should give pause to critics and interpreters of Husseri who think his views to be the same as Brentano's and hence can refute him by refuting Brentano.

78 To this extent Husserl rejects traditional "realism," which for him is committed ultimately to the existence of a thing-in-itself.

79 Of course, an intentional act can become the "object of another act; e.g., one can htink about thinking.


empiricist-naturalist principles and to delineate its own peculiar subject matter as opposed to that of the natural physical sciences. Thus, for him, the notion of Intentional Inexistence was significant as a defining characteristic of mental phenomena. For Husserl, on the other hand, not psychology but philosophy was his central concern. More specifically, the significance of Intentionality lay in its implications for the establishing of philosophy as a "rigorous science." Such a science is possible only on the basis of a radical critique of knowledge, which critique would strive to trace all our knowledge back to its original sources in immediate experience, to the evident self-givenness of all beings. This is the basic meaning of: To the things themselves (Zu den Sachen selbst)! And since the things themselves are first "given" - constituted - in sub- jectivity, the intentionality of consciousness becomes the guiding "clue" for the project of a phenomenological philosophy. All this, of course, lies very far from Brentano.

In the view of the later developments in the Ideen it becomes clear that Huserl regards Brentano's psychology and philosophy, and hence his notion of Intentional Inexistence, as a naive and dogmatic Naturalism.80 That is, Brentano conceived consciousness - mental phenomena - as inner-worldly and mundane. They are thus part of nature just as physical phenomena are. To this extent, the laws of psychology are natural laws, whether or not they are ultimately reducible to the laws of physics. In other words, for Husserl, Brentano's fundamental mistake lay in not seeing that the intentional structure of consciousness ultimately implies that all beings in the world are relative to consciousness in so far as they must be conceived as a possible correlate or object of consciousness, and that therefore the latter itself cannot be part of the world or nature, but must be transcendental.8' The final justification and clarification of the meaning of this transcendental idealism must be left to Husserl himself and his writings. Suffice it to say here that Brentano's basic error consists in not understanding the transcendental implications of his notion of Intentional Inexistence and hence the inadequacy of any "naturaliza- tion of consciousness." On the other hand, perhaps his greatest contri- bution was in seeing the formal structure of consciousness as consciousness-of and the inadequacy of the traditional conception of consciousness and the mind as "thinking substance" (Cartesian rationalism) and/or a "bundle of ideas" (empiricism). Closely allied with this insight is that of the difference between a descriptive and genetic psychology, which dis-

80 Cf. Husserl's Ideen III, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1952, p. 156. 81 This, for Husserl, is the utlimate meaning of Descartes' Cogito.


inction opened the path for Husserl's own radically original conception of a transcendental phenomenological psychology.

"... However much I see in the [Brentano's] transformation of the Scholastic concept of Intentionality a great discovery, through which alone phenomenology has become possible, one must still essentially distinguish the pure psychology, in my sense, implicitly contained in phenomenology and the psychology of Brentano." 82

And, of course, such an "essential distinction" is even more necessary in regard to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a whole.

JAMES C. MORRISON. UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

82 Ideen HI. p. 155.

james c. morrison (1970) - husserl and brentano on intentionality

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