jackson school of international studies student academic journal 2010

Vol. 1 No. 2 Autumn 2010

Jackson School Journa l of Internat iona l Stud ies

The Colombian Civil War - Small States in Peacemaking RolesBonsai Democracy - Israeli-Soviet Relations

Tourism and Native Hawaiian Resistance - Expert Insights on Research

Jackson School Journal of International Studies

Volume 1 Number 2 Autumn 2010

The Jackson School Journal of International Studies

Vol. 1, No. 2: Autumn 2010

Editor-in-ChiefCharmila Ajmera

Editorial BoardKelsey Barrett Sarah Boone Ulysses Lin Julie Mendel

Advisory BoardSara Curran, Associate Professor of International Studies and Public Affairs, Chair of the International Studies Program Gary Hamilton, Professor of International Studies and Sociology Reşat Kasaba, Professor of International Studies and SociologyWolfram Latsch, Assistant Professor in International Studies José Antonio Lucero, Associate Professor of International StudiesJessica Beyer, Doctoral Candidate, Political Science at the University of Washington

ReviewersSam Combs, Allie Ferguson, Genevieve Gebhart, Naomi Joswiak, Kim Selling, Lucas Simons, Nicolle Thompson.

The Jackson School Journal of International Studies publishes Spring and Autumn editions and receives generous support from the Center for Global Studies and The Hellmann Fund for Innovation and Excellence in International Studies.

For print copies of the Jackson School Journal, please contact the Center for Global Studies at the University of Washington, Box 353650, Seattle, WA 98195, (206) 685-2707.

The views expressed in this Journal are not necessarily those of the editors or the Henry M. Jackson School.

Access the Jackson School Journal online at: https://digital.lib.washington.edu/ojs/index.php/JSJIS

Cover Photograph by Marco Suàrez.

Over a year has passed since thispublication’sinceptionandtheeditorialboardisveryproudof whatwehaveaccomplishedthusfar.Our inaugural issue, published last spring,wastheproductof muchhardwork,manyspeedbumpsandaninordinateamountof caffeine.Welearnedagreatdealfromourfirstpublicationandhaveputourmishapsandmistakestogooduse.Thesecondissueof theJacksonSchoolJournalof International Studies has been expandedto include more articles—which encompass awide breadth of topics, area studies and bothhistoricalandcontemporaryissues—andanewsection.InadditiontoResearchDiscoursesandPolicyBriefings,wehave added aportion thatfeaturesexemplaryessaysspecificallywrittenforJackson School classes, called “Jackson SchoolFocus.” This section will profile the varioustypes of essays that are common in JacksonSchoolclasses,suchas“WhyQuestion”papers,Practical Moral Projects, Task Force reports,KeyInterestpapersandthelike.Byshowcasingthiswork,wehopetocreateavalueableresourceforstudentsfacedwiththesecommontypesof researchassignments. In our “Expert Insights” section forthisissue,wefeaturetwoindividualsyoumaybewellfamiliarwithif youhavetakentheSIS200series:Meredith Bauer and Randy Thompson.Each is profiled in an interview, providing

advice and insights into the 200 series andgivingsomebackgroundontheirownacademicinterests and experiences. Meredith has alsowrittenaninformativeandinstructivepieceontravelabroad,fieldresearchandwritingathesis.Randy has submitted a sample of the writingandresearchheiscurrentlyworkingonforhismaster’sthesis,whichconcernsahistoricalfigurefamiliartoallstudentsintheJacksonSchool. Aswecontinuetogrowandexpandourwrittenpublication,we are also expandingournumber,welcomingnewauthors,reviewersandeditorstoourteam.Wearethrilledtowidenourreaderbaseandcollaboratewithmorestudentsbothwithinandoutsideof theJacksonSchool.In the coming months we will be workingto recruit submissions for our Spring issue,welcomeneweditorstoourboard,buildanewwebsitewithexpandedcapabilitiesandfeaturesandsolidifyourpresenceoncampus.Wehopethatthecontinuedgrowthof theJacksonSchoolJournalsucceeds inprovidingyou, theJacksonSchool studentbody,with invaluable resourcesand opportunities for writing, research andscholarship.

Sincerely,CharmilaAjmera,KelseyBarrett,SarahBoone,UlyssesLin&JulieMendel

Letter from the Editors

Thesecondissueof theJacksonSchoolJournalisdedicatedtotheco-foundingEditors-in-Chief JeffreyLupoandMichaelTruong

fortheirinspiringvision.

Table of Contents

Jackson School Journal of International Studies Volume 1 Number 2 - Autumn 2010

The Colombian Civil War Potential for Justice in a Culture of Violence By Giselle Lopez

8Small States in Peacemaking Roles The Norwegian Model of Conflict Resolution in Sudan By Marcus Foster

24Bonsai Democracy A Look into the Evolution of Japan’s Government By Matias Villaseca

36From Friends to Foes The Deterioration of Soviet-Israeli Relations in the Mid-20th Century By Ruben Shimonov

48Contradiction and Commodification Native Hawaiian Resistance to Tourism By Genevieve Gebhart

66Expert Insights Thoughts on High Quality Research Meredith Bauer & Randy Thompson

77Appendix: Bibliographies

94

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The internal armed conflict in Colombiahas been characterized by decades of

widespreadinternalviolence,politicalinstability,andblatantdisregardfornormsof internationallaw. The conflict has ravaged the country,displaced millions, and effectively placed themajorityof thecivilianpopulationinthemiddleof violentclashes.InColombia,thegovernmenthasattemptedtodealwithrebelforcesusingitsownmilitaryandtheassistanceof paramilitarygroups.Inlightof strongevidencethatexposesthe extremely unlawful tactics used by theparamilitaryforces,thestate’srelianceontheseexternal groups to fight this war has greatlyundermined its legitimacy. Although illegalarmedgroupshavebeenweakenedandpolicies

have aimed to address victims’ rights andestablishaccountability,severalof thesepolicieshave proved inefficient and inequitable, andsustainablesecurityandpeaceremainobjectives.Thisessaywillexplainthecomplexbackgroundand causal factors of the conflict, the natureof theviolence,andpotentialforfutureaction.In lightof recentdevelopments,IrecommendthattheColombiangovernmenttakeactionstostrengthenthejudiciary,toestablishlocalcitizen-securityinitiatives,andtopasscriticallegislationthat will address the enormity of crimes andsufferingof victims;thesestepsareessentialtopromotepeace,security,andaccountabilityandtoregainthetrustof theColombianpeople.

Abstract For decades Colombia has been plagued by an internal armed conflict that is rooted in a complex history of socioeconomic inequality, political corruption, and a culture of violence. Due to the state’s inability to effectively address widespread instability and corruption, the civilian population has been placed in the midst of hor-rific violence and clashes between various armed groups. Colombia’s culture of vio-lence and the prevalence of impunity underscore grave humanitarian concerns that demand a solution. In an effort to explain the complex history of this conflict and the factors that allowed for the enormous suffering of its victims, this essay will outline the background, causal factors, and the nature of the violence. To establish a last-ing peace and to address the suffering of the civilian population in this conflict, this essay recommends that the Colombian government take actions to strengthen and establish mechanisms that promote security, accountability, and justice.

The Colombian Civil WarGiselle Lopez

Policy Briefing

Potential for Justice in a Culture of Violence

Autumn 2010 9

Background

The long-standing internal armedconflictinColombiahasitsrootsinanextensivehistoryof strugglesforpolitical,economic,andsocialrights.Sinceitsbeginningsinacivilwarof the1950s,thewarhasinvolvedmultiplearmedactors and agendas of violence, power, drugs,and greed.1 These agendas have complicatedthe development of the conflict and haveovershadowed the political partisanship andideologies – borne out of socioeconomicinequitiesandpoliticalexclusion–thatprovidedtheoriginalbackdropforthisviolentwar.2 Formorethanacentury,rulingpowerinColombiahasbeensharedbetweentwopoliticalparties,theConservatives(PartidoConservadorColombiano,orPCC)andtheLiberals(PartidoLiberal Colombiano, or PL); throughout thetwentieth century, the intense rivalry betweenthesepartieswasexacerbatedbyvastsocialandeconomicinequality,andoftenledtoviolence.3From1949to1958,inthemidstof widespreadinternal unrest, a partisan civil war emergedand claimed the lives of an estimated 280,000people.4LaViolencia,as itwascalled,markedthe beginning of the violent internal armedconflict that has lasted for more than half acentury.5 The emergence of armed groups ledto continuation and escalation of hostilitieswith widespread violence that underminedthe legitimacy of state power. Leftist guerrillagroupsemergedinthemid-1960sasareactionto factors such as exclusion of politicalmovementsoutsideof theNationalFront, themarginalizationof theruralpoor,theinfluenceof communistandsocialist ideologies,and theineffectiveness of the judicial system.6 TheFuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia

(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,or FARC) had its beginnings in La Violenciaand was a mostly rural movement composedof a loose association of peasant self-defensegroups; it later came increasingly under theinfluenceof theCommunistPartyanddeclareditself a revolutionary army in 1964.7 With astrong presence throughout Colombia, theFARCisconsideredthemostpowerfulguerrillagroupintheconflict.8TheNationalLiberationArmy(ELN)isanotherguerrillagroupthathadits roots in La Violencia and continues to beone of themain parties to the conflict.9 Theguerrillaforceshaveexpandedtheirforcesoverthecourseof theconflict:theFARCincreasedfromanestimated3,600combatantsin1986to16,500in1996,whiletheELNwentfromabout800in1986to4,500in2001.10 In the 1980s, paramilitary forceswerecreated by the military with U.S. aid; thoughthey were created to combat revolutionaries,the paramilitaries were soon engaged in drugtrafficking andwere terrorizing the citizensof Colombia.11Kidnappings,summaryexecutions,and armed violence against civilians becamecharacteristics of daily life in cities and ruralareas, and this forced greater efforts to meetdemands of the revolutionaries, furtherunderminingstatepower.12Withaninefficientjudiciaryandtheshiftof cocacultivationfromBoliviaandPerutoColombiainthemid-1980s,drug cultivation also began to prosper. Thewealth generated from the drug cartels fueledviolenceandcorruptionandstrengthenedbothguerrillaandparamilitaryactivity.13 For the past 25 years, Colombiangovernmentshavealternatedbetweenstrategiesof warandpeace ineffortstodealwith illegalarmedactorswhohavedefiedtheauthorityof thestate.14

The Colombian Civil War

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While negotiations led to thedisarmamentof several smaller armedgroups,a number of failed attempts to form peaceagreementswith theFARCandtheELNhave

allowed the internal conflict to continue toplague Colombia and its citizens.15 In 2002,after the breakdown of peace talks betweenPresidentAndrésPastrana and theFARC, andjustbeforetheelectionof PresidentUribe,thegovernmentof Colombiaabandonedthepeaceprocess and announced plans to destroy therevolutionarygroupsusingmilitaryoffensives.16After 2002, violence declined as guerrillas andparamilitaries were militarily and financiallyweakened;homicidesandkidnappingsdecreasedsignificantlyfrom2000to2007.17Whilesecurityconditions have improved, the violence anddisplacementhascontinued,particularlyinruralareas.18Inaddition,whilethedemobilizationof theSelf-DefenseForcesof Colombia(AUC),aright-wingparamilitaryforce, led toadramaticdeclineinparamilitaryviolence,italsogenerateddozens of new criminal and drug-traffickingorganizations and networks that continue toterrorizethecivilianpopulation.19 TheinternalarmedconflictinColombiaisshapedbyacomplexhistoryof tensionsandstrugglesbetweenarmedgroupsand thestate.Fordecadesthisconflicthasledtowidespread

violence and wholesale violations of humanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlawbyallsidesof theconflict,andcontinuestobeamajorissueconcerningtheinternationalcommunity.

Causal Factors of the Conflict

There are several complex factorsthat have contributed to the Colombian civilwar.These factors representnotonly the rootcausesof theconflictbutalsoforcesthathaveallowed for the continuation of the war andtheescalationsof violencethatcharacterize itsevolution. Structural deficiencies historicallycontributing to widespread inequalities,institutional weaknesses of the state, andproliferation of the drug trade are all primarycontributing factors that have influenced theconflictandthehumanitariancrisisthatexistsinthecountrytoday.

StructuralDeficienciesandInequality

Although the urban population inColombia represents themajority of the totalpopulation, the historical roots of politicalviolence are primarily rural. A history of unequal access to land and natural resourcesand struggles to gain political and economicpowerhas traditionallycharacterized thestatusof Colombia’s rural population.20 Politicalexclusion throughout the twentieth centuryfavored economic elites and neoliberal tradeinterests,andledtounequalaccesstolandandresources.21 A combination of availability of natural resources – including land, agriculturalresources,andoil–andhighlevelsof inequality

Giselle Lopez

“Kidnappings, summary executions, andarmed violence against civilians becamecharacteristics of daily life in cities andruralareas,andthisforcedgreatereffortstomeetdemandsof therevolutionaries,furtherunderminingstatepower.”

Autumn 2010 11

transformed rural areas into a battlegroundbetween guerrilla and paramilitary groupsas they competed for resources.22 With theincreasedviolence in thecountryside,entryof displaced people into local communities alsoledtoadditionalwidespreadviolenceinconflictoverlandandresources.23 Therootsof violenceinColombialayina foundationof economic inequality tied topoverty,unemployment,andlackof education.24Despitepositivegrowthrates inthe1980sand1990s, in200152%of thepopulation lived inpoverty,unemploymentremainedat20%,63%of the campesinos (farmers) owned less than5% of the land, and drug traffickers ownedmore thanhalf of themostproductive land.25Thismarginalization had significant effects onthe conflict, contributing to insecurity of thepopulation and highlighting inadequacies of stateinstitutions.

Weaknessesof theState

“[L]evels of violence in Colombiawould likely decline if the central governmentand state institutions were strong enough tocreate and enforce rule of law and repressviolent challenges to state authority.”26 Thehistoricweaknessof theColombianstatestemsfrom its institutional deficiency. With largeportionsof Colombianterritorylackingastrongstate presence, the state is inefficient in taxcollection andhas an extremelyweak resourcebase.27 Because of this lack of resources, theColombianmilitary issmallandweakbyLatinAmerican standards.28 As a result of poortraining and organization, the military wasunabletoassertitself interritorycontrolledbyguerrillas, and relied on paramilitary forces todealwithrebelforces.29Theunlawfulmethods

usedbyparamilitariesagainstrebelsandciviliansunderminedthelegitimacyof stateauthority.30 Colombia’s physical and politicalgeography also has proved a major obstacleto state building; with several discontiguouspopulation centers, Colombia’s ruralcommunitiesremaininsemi-isolationaslimitedparticipantsintheeconomyandpoliticsof thenation.31 As a result, Colombian rebels havebeenabletoconsolidatetheiroperationsinareaswhere the statepresence isweak; it is in thesestatelessareasthatillicitdrugcultivationisalsomostprevalent.32 Theseweaknessesareasignificantrootcauseof theconflictandhighlight reasons forthe government’s inherent inability to forma lasting peace andmitigate the effects of theconflict.

DrugTradeandEscalationsof theViolence

Over the course of thewar, the drugtrade has provided a steady source of incomethat fueled the conflict and contributed toits intractability.33 As their profits from thecocainetradeinthe1980swereconvertedintoimmensepowerwithintheeconomyandsociety,drug traffickers expanded their operations:they terrorized the judicial system throughsystematic assassinations of judges andpolice,


“...Colombian rebels have been able toconsolidatetheiroperationsinareaswherethestatepresenceisweak;itisinthesestatelessareasthatillicitdrugcultivationisalsomostprevalent.”

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bombingsof newspaperoffices,andthekillingof pro-extradition politicians.34 They alsobegan to support the rebel forces –while theELNdistanceditself fromthedrugtrade, it isestimated that 70% of the FARC’s income isderivedfromthetrade.35Tiredof beingtargetedby guerrillas, drug traffickers turned on theleft and began to finance paramilitary squads:“through the support of the drug traffickers,theparamilitariesbecame increasingly effectivein terrorizing the populace in communitiesperceived as supporters of the guerrillas.”36With cultivation of illicit drugs, guerrillas andparamilitarieshaveengagedinadeadlyconflictfor control of coca fields and trade routes,essential resources for those involved in bothinsurgencyandcounter-insurgency.37 Cocaitself issubjecttoaglobalregimeof opposition to illicit drugs, dominated bythe United States.38 This opposition has hadnumerous unintended consequences: it hasgiven coca extraordinary value as “lootable”wealthappropriatedbycombatantsincivilwars;it hasmade it difficult for the government toappropriate directly theprofits associatedwithdrug cultivation, allowing non-state actors tocapturemost of the profits of the trade; andthecoercivemilitaryandpoliceactivitiesof the“War on Drugs” has simply shifted the flowof profits toadifferentsetof privateactors.39While therewere a series of tactical successesin the 1990s, U.S.-promoted antidrug policieshave actually strengthened the FARC; theypushed coca cultivation into FARC-dominatedareas, providing the FARC with opportunitiesto extract resources from the cocaine industryand deepen its insurgency against the state.40Thelarge-scaledeficienciesinstatesovereigntyhave also allowed for the growth of the drugtradeandtheexpansionof theguerrillaforces

instatelessandpoliticallyvulnerableareas.41 The causal factors of this conflict arenumerous and complex, and involve a deephistory of institutional problems in Colombiaanddestructivedevelopmentsthatthriveonthestate’sweaknessesandthemarginalizationof thepopulation.Inadditiontotheseinternalfactors,theinvolvementof theinternationalcommunitypresents some critical external factors thathaveaffectedthenatureof theconflictandthepotentialforalastingpeace.

The Role of the International Community In the 1980s and 1990s, the “war ondrugs”shapedU.S.policydirectivesintheregion;in1999theUnitedStatessupportedColombia’seffortstocombatdrugtraffickingbyfinancingan anti-narcotics battalion and its operations.42

Intheaftermathof the9/11terroristattacks,thewaronterrordroveU.S.foreignpolicyconcernstocombatinsurgencies,includingafightagainstarmedgroupsinColombia.43U.S.involvementintheregionthroughoutthisperiodhadseriousimplicationsforhopesof alastingpeace. The most significant and historicalmilestone in Colombia-U.S. relations was PlanColombia, formed in a partnership betweenPresident Clinton and then-ColombianPresident Andrés Pastrana.44 Plan Colombiawasamulti-billiondollarplantostrengthentheColombianstate.From2000to2007,ColombiareceivedmorethanUS$5billionforitsmilitaryand police to conduct counterinsurgency andantinarcotics operations, and for oil pipelineprotection.45PlanColombiawaswidelycriticizedforworseningthesituationinColombia:ratherthan fighting various drug cartels or right-

Giselle Lopez

Autumn 2010 13

wing paramilitary groups (who have admittedthat 70% of their finances come from drugtrafficking),theplantargetedtheFARC,turnedColombiaintothethird-largestrecipientof U.S.military aid in the world, and helped escalatethewarbypushingtheFARCdeeperintodrugtrafficking.46 Additionally, from1993 to 2003,more than 35,000 Colombians were killed,thevastmajority (about82%)at thehandsof death squads operating in collusion with theColombian military, which was backed by theUnitedStates.47 Involvement from the rest of theinternational community has been primarilydirectedatattempts toformpeaceagreementsto end the conflict and negotiate cease-fires,demobilization, and exchanges of prisoners.Third parties have played a marginal role inpeacenegotiations inColombia:nothirdpartyhasever servedasa full-fledgedmediator,andtheUNhasneversentapeacekeepingorpeace-buildingmission to help implement any peace

accords.48 Asaresult, therehavebeennorealoutside enforcement mechanisms in place toimplementaforpartiestoapeaceaccord. Within the region of Latin America,relationsbetweenColombiaandothercountrieshavealsobeenstrainedduetodrugtraffickingandguerrillaactivity inborderareas,aswellasdisagreements over Colombia’s management

of the conflict. Tensions with Ecuador andVenezuela have heightened as a result of aseriesof eventsthatincludedthesuspensionof VenezuelanpresidentHugoChávezasmediatorfor a hostage exchange with the FARC, themilitaryincursionintoEcuadoreanterritorythatkilledFARCleaderRaulReyes,andtheemergenceof information linking the Venezuelan andEcuadorean governments, among others, totheFARCleadership.49 SuchtensionsbetweenColombiaandneighboringcountrieshavemadeitdifficulttocreatesolidarityintheregionandtorealizecommongoalsof peace. Public resentment of U.S. supportfor a corrupt military, counterproductiveinterventions, insufficient involvement of theinternational community and strained relationswithothercountriesintheregionhaveallbeenobstacles in the development of lasting peaceinitiatives and a permanent end to the war.50Yet these failures of outside intervention alsounderscore a historic inability of the state toeffectively and lawfullydealwith the threatof illegalarmedactors,afactthathashadsignificantimplications for thenatureof theconflict andthesufferingof itsvictims.

Nature of the Violence and Violations of International Law

There are several implications of international humanitarian law in this conflict.The two provisions of the Conventions thatapply to internalarmedconflictsareCommonArticle 3 of the Geneva Conventions andAdditional Protocol II.51 To protect civilians,Article3prohibitsviolence,murder,mutilation,


“[F]rom1993to2003,morethan35,000Colombians were killed, the vast majority(about82%)atthehandsof deathsquadsoperating in collusion with the Colombianmilitary, which was backed by theUnitedStates..”

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torture,hostagetaking,degradingtreatment,andextrajudicial killings or passing of sentences.52

Intemporaryagreements,allarmedpartieshavedemonstratedawillingnesstoactinaccordancewiththelawsof war.53Inpractice,however,allarmedpartieshavecommittedgraveviolationsof theselawstothedetrimentof theColombianpeople.

ViolationsbytheStateandParamilitaryForces

AccordingtoHumanRightsWatch,atthe root of many violations of thewar is theColombian army’s consistent and pervasivefailure or unwillingness to distinguish civiliansfrom combatants in accordance with the laws

of war.54 Paramilitary groups, allied under thenameUnitedSelf-DefenseGroupsof Colombia(AUC), have engaged in particularly brutalviolence in theconflict;paramilitaries see theirnon-state status as a carte blanche to combatguerrillagroupsbyusingtheirsametactics.55Thetiesbetween thestate forcesandparamilitariesaresignificant:

Witnesses frequently state that [massacres] wereperpetrated by members of the armed forces passingthemselvesoff asparamilitaries,jointactionsbymembersof the armed forces or police and paramilitaries, oractionsbyparamilitariesenjoyingthecomplicity,supportoracquiescenceof theregularforces.56

When questioned about executions andmassacresconductedbyjointparamilitaryunits,leadersof thearmedforceshavedeniedmilitaryparticipation in theoperationandclaimedthatthe victims were guerrillas, fugitives, or theirsupporters.57 Inadditiontoengaginginindiscriminateattacks, the army and paramilitaries have beenimplicated in crimes of torture, widespreadforceddisplacement,death threats, andattackson groups protected under international law.58In its efforts to weaken rebel groups, thegovernment evencameclose to settingoff aninternational conflict. The 2008 Colombianarmy’s invasion of a rebel camp in Ecuador,whichledtothekillingof RaúlReyesandotherFARCleaders,nearlyprovokedaninternationalwarasEcuadorandVenezuelasenttroopstotheborder and protested Colombia’s violation of Ecuador’sterritorialintegrity.59Theconflictwasprevented,butthissignaledtheextremeactionsthatthegovernmentiswillingtotaketocombatguerrillaforces.

ViolationsbyGuerillaGroups

Each night they kill groups of five or sixdefenseless people, who are cruelly and monstrouslymassacredafterbeingtortured.Thescreamsof humblepeopleareaudible,beggingformercy.60 Just as army and paramilitary forceshaveengagedingrossviolations,thetacticsusedby guerrilla groups in the conflict have been

Giselle Lopez

“Bothkillingsandtortureof civilianshavebeenusedtospreadterror,63andColombiahasbecomeknownasthe“kidnapcapitalof theworld”:between2002and2009,morethan17,000peoplewerekidnapped–includingprominent legislators, governmentministers,presidential candidates, businesspeople, andU.S.contractors..”

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characterizedblatantdisregardforinternationalnorms.Alargenumberof crimesagainstcivilianshavebeenattributedtotheFARCandtheELNrebelgroups;in2009,amongotherviolationsof internationalhumanitarianlaw,therewereatleast27massacres,18indiscriminateattacks,actsof terrorism, forced displacement, torture, sexualviolence againstwomen and girls, kidnappingsandhostage-takings,andattacksonmedicalandotherpublicbuildings.61Whileguerrillagroupshaveclaimedthattheyrespectinternationallaw,they have demonstrated support only whentherehasbeenapoliticaladvantagetodoso.62 Throughout the conflict, the guerrillaforceshaveusedseveraltacticstoterrorizethecivilian population and support their militaryobjectives.Bothkillingsandtortureof civilianshavebeenusedtospreadterror,63andColombiahas become known as the “kidnap capital of theworld”:between2002and2009,morethan17,000 people were kidnapped – includingprominent legislators, government ministers,presidentialcandidates,businesspeople,andU.S.contractors.64Widespread recruitment of childsoldiers,useof anti-personnellandmines,sexualviolence, torture, and enforced disappearancehavealsocharacterized theextremely inhumantacticsutilizedbytheguerrillagroupsagainstthecivilianpopulationthroughoutthewar.65 IncontrasttotheFARC,theELNwasoneof thefirst insurgent groups inColombiatobeginaninternaldiscussionof humanitarianlaw.Inthe1990s,thegroupadopteda“GuerrillaCode” that expressed general compliancewithProtocol II in regulating the behavior of militants.66 Nevertheless, the ELN, like theFARC,hascontinuedtoengageinindiscriminateattacks, massacres, kidnappings, torture, andotheractsthatviolatethelawsof war.67 Violations of humanitarian law have

beencommonpracticebyall sides throughoutthis conflict, and have effectively placed thecivilianpopulationatthecenterof itsviolence.

ForcedDisplacement

The effects of this conflict on thepopulation are most clearly reflected in thenumbers of those forced to flee their homesfrom theviolence.According to theUNHCR,anestimated3millionpeopleremaindisplacedthroughoutColombiaasaresultof theconflict.68Since 1980, all parties have provoked forceddisplacements of the civilian population.69

Displacementhasledtoanumberof concerns:displaced populations have lost millions of hectaresof land,muchof whichhasbeentakenby illegal armed groups; threats against andmurders of leaders of displaced communitieshavebecomeprevalent;70andwithanestimated4.3millionundernourishedpersonsinColombiaandtheinterruptionof activitiestoobtainfood,the conflict has led to acute food insecurityfor those internally displaced.71 The issue of forceddisplacementclearlyillustratesthewidelydestructive and indiscriminatory nature of theconflictandrepresentsoneof themostseriousissuessurroundingtheColombianwar.

Recent Developments

The last decade has seen severalpositive developments in Colombia’s conflict.During the Uribe administration and the newSantos administration new developments havebeen made that demonstrate an encouragingwillingness to establish accountability andsecurity mechanisms and to curb corruption.Yetwhilesomeof thesedevelopmentsrepresent


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majorgainsforvictims’rightsandjustice,othersportray the limitations of corruption, limitedresources, and political interests. Progressivemeasures are critical to advancing claims tojustice andpeace,but eachmeasure shouldbeanalyzedcriticallytodetermineitssustainabilityandeffectiveness. Followingthe2002breakdownof peacetalksbetweenPresidentAndrésPastranaandtheFARC,ÁlvaroUribewaselectedpresidentbasedonhiscommitmenttoall-outmilitaryvictoryovertheguerrillas.72Whilethisnewapproachhasledto improved security conditions inmany largecitiesandtowns,theviolenceanddisplacementhas continued, particularly in the rural areas.73Additionally, while the demobilization of theSelf-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) ledto a decline in paramilitary violence, it alsogenerated dozens of new criminal and drug-trafficking organizations and networks thatcontinue to terrorize the population.74 TheUribe administration succeeded in promotingconstitutional order and institutional stability,yetpolitickingandcorruptionatlowerlevelsof governmentinstitutionhasprevailed.75 Inadditiontoashiftinthegovernment’sapproach toward counterinsurgency, thedisarmament,demobilization,andreintegration(DDR) process in Colombia, which began in1992andcontinuestoday,representsthegoalof transitionaljustice;thisprocesshastheobjectiveof securing the rights of citizens and creatingspace for the reintegration of demobilizedarmedgroups.76Theprocessinvolvesprovisionof amnesty to any former combatants notunder investigation, and reintegration throughprovisionof benefits.77Whilethereishopethatthisprocessmayprovideabasisof peaceandjustice,“itremainstobeseenif theColombianDDR and transitional justice model can be

implementedsoitsatisfiesboththerequirementsfor an immediate cessation of violence whilealsomeetingvictims’demandsforreparation.”78 Aspartof DDRandfortheprosecutionof alleged crimes, the government passed theJustice and Peace Law (JPL) in 2005.79 Withthislaw,combatantschargedwithviolationsareeligiblefortrialandbenefitsafterrelinquishingillegally acquired property and ceasing illegalactivities, child soldiers are handed over toauthorities,anddemobilizedindividualsreceivebenefits if they provide information.80 Whilethousands have demobilized and applied forbenefits through the JPL, challenges remain.Implementation of the law was stymied byrelative disinterest of the Uribe governmentin promoting victims’ rights, and problemswereexacerbatedbydeficiencies in the judicialprocessandinreparations,aswellaspersistenceof theconflict.81 While political issues have hinderedprogress at the national level, initiatives bycivil society organizations, in alliance withdisempowered groups and victims, havehelped to create a more inclusive system toaddressmajor issues of the conflict.82 At thelocal level, Colombian citizens have carriedout negotiations with armed actors to releasekidnap victims, prevent displacement, andallowsafepassageof foodandmedicine; theyhave also addressed corruption and createdopportunities for economic development.83Becausethegovernmenthasprioritizedeffortstoreestablishsecurityaboveinterestsof justiceand victims’ rights, initiatives such as the JPLhave hindered the progress of justice.84 Withanabilitytoaddressconcernsof communities,theparticipationof victimsandcivil society isabsolutelycrucialtoanyplanforpeace.

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Autumn 2010 17

Victim’sRightsandJusticeInitiatives

JusticeandPeaceAct

WhiletheJusticeandPeaceActof 2005wasprecedentialset importantprecendents, theAct had numerous shortcomings and flaws. Itrequiredwar criminals to surrendervoluntarilytoreceiveamnestyinreturn,placedrestrictionson the investigative and prosecutorial process,gavereducedsentencesforallacceptedcharges,andmadeparamilitarycrimesdomesticpoliticalcrimestopreventwarcriminalsfrombeingtriedbytheUSortheICC.85Mostsignificantly,thedecreedeniedallstateresponsibilityinthecrimesperpetrated.86 According to numerous articlespublished on the subject, the Act exemplifiedthe government’s failure to adequately addressgross violations of international law.87 Inaddition,reparationshavebeenhamperedbytheslowjudicialproceedingsandlimitedinventoryinthefundforvictimsreparations.88Byplacingan emphasis on economic reparation, it hasundermined efforts at establishing the truthbehindthecrimesthattheseindividualssufferedand the responsibility of the criminals.89 Forthese reasons, the Justice and Peace Act hasrepresentedanincompleteapplicationof justice.

Victims’Law

The Santos administration’s “Victims’Law”was sent toCongress on September 17,2010, and if passed may represent the mostsignificant advancement in human rights andjusticetodate.Itbuildsonthe2009draft,whichfailedbecausetheUribeadministrationopposedkey elements that would have investigatedstate abuses and violations of internationalhumanitarian law.90 The new law extends

protection to all victimswho suffereddamagein the conflict, includes victims of crimescommittedbystateagents,providesfinancialandnon-financial reparations to victims, providesspecialprotectionandlegalaid,andgivesprioritytovulnerablegroups.91Thislawwouldmarkamajoradvancementinfullyrecognizingvictims’rights. While the bill is consistent withinternational standards and would represent amajor step forward in recognition of victims’rights and application of justice, severalproblemswiththebillhavebeenidentified.First,thebillallocatesonly$22millionforreparationsover15years,whichisameageramountwhentakingintoaccountthevastmeasuresthatwouldhavetobeimplementedtoenforceitsclaims.Inaddition,asidentifiedbyAmnestyInternational,

there are several major concerns regardingthe law: ambiguity about addressing crimesof international humanitarian law, denial of compensation tofuturevictimsof theconflictandtovictimsof stateagentsotherthansecurityforces, failure to effectively address restitutionof land misappropriated by paramilitaries andacknowledge state responsibility in abusinghumanrightsandviolatingIHL,andineligibilityof thousandsof recentvictimsof paramilitaryviolence because the government denies that


“The Santos administration’s ‘Victims’Law’wassenttoCongressonSeptember17,2010,andif passedmayrepresentthemostsignificantadvancementinhumanrightsandjusticetodate.”

18 Vol. 1 - No. 2

such groups still operate.92 These concernsarevalidandimportantforthegovernmentof Colombiatoconsider.Tomaintainlegitimacy,itis essential that all victims of violence receivethe same access to reparations and justice andthat there are adequate resources to providereparations. Nevertheless, the urgent interestsof justice and victims’ rights demand swiftactions;thisbillhaspotentialasacomprehensiveand progressive resolution to address crimescommitted by all groups and to promote theprinciplesof justiceandpeace. For the armed parties to the conflict,impunity has generally remained the rule.These groups have failed to comply withhumanitarian law by neither investigating norpunishing individualswhocommitviolations.93With flagrant violations of the laws of warandahighly incompetent judiciary,Colombia’sgovernment has historically failed to fulfill itsresponsibility to promote accountability andprotect its citizens.With issues of corruption,there have been recommendations by civilsocietygroupsthattheICCbringaprosecutionagainstofficialsof theColombiangovernmentfor their support of war crimes.94 However,recentdevelopmentshaveprovidedgroundsforhopeof moreeffectivesystemsof accountabilityand recognition of human rights. Althoughthereisroomforimprovement,initiativessuchasthesearecrucialtoestablishaccountabilityforthecrimescommitted, to implement initiativesthat strengthen security and curb corruption,andtoregaintheconfidenceof theColombiansintheirgovernment.

Recommendations for Future Action

“If youwantpeace,workforjustice.”–PopePaulVI

The civilian population of Colombiahas suffered extensively from the culture of violenceandunlawfulnessthathascharacterizedthis conflict. These citizens have demanded

justiceandcompensationfor theirsufferingasvictims of the conflict. Although there havebeen advancements in favor of justice andpeace initiatives, there is still a desperate needformoreeffectiveinitiativestopromotepeace,accountability, justice, andsecurity. Inorder torealize these goals, I strongly recommend thatthe Colombian government strengthen thejudiciaryandcurbcorruptioninthegovernment,establish and strengthen local citizen-securityinitiatives,andpasscriticallegislationtoaddressthe enormous suffering of all victims in thisconflict.

Strengthenjudiciaryandcurbcorruption

“Thejudicialsystemtoooftenisunableto bring offenders to justice. Its capacity andindependence need to be strengthened so itcan better address high levels of impunity.”95The inefficiencyandpartialityof thecourts inColombiahasbeenasignificantconcerninthepursuitof justice,andhasgravelyunderminedcitizen trust in judicial institutions.During theUribeadministrationthejudiciaryandexecutive

Giselle Lopez

“With flagrant violations of the laws of war and a highly incompetent judiciary,Colombia’s government has historicallyfailed to fulfill its responsibility topromoteaccountabilityandprotectitscitizens..”

Autumn 2010 19

hada troubled relationship; allegedly, theDAS(DepartamentoAdministrativodeSeguridad),astate-sponsoredintelligenceagency,wasinvolvedin wire-tapping several judges and oppositionpoliticians.96Sincebecomingpresident,Santoshasdisbanded theDASandhaspromoted theestablishment of a new agency that is subjectto oversight by the judiciary rather than thepresidency.97Suchmeasurescanstrengthentheintegrityof thejudiciaryandcombatcorruptionin the government. Implementation of thesemeasures by the Colombian government isnecessarynotonlytoprovidelegitimacytostateauthority, but also to promote realization of domesticjusticeforperpetratorsandvictims.

Establishandstrengthenlocalcitizen-securityinitiatives

Withanincreaseinurbanviolencesince2008andalimitedandgenerallyuncoordinatedstateresponsetosuchviolence,citizens-securityinitiatives that promote local enforcement andstrengthen the role of civil society groupsshouldbeapriority.Fightingcorruptioninlawenforcementagencies,engaginglocalauthorities,and providing more intelligence to investigateindividual perpetrators and criminal structuresareessentialactionsthatthegovernmentshouldtake to achieve this aim. The Citizen SecurityLaw, passed in October 2010, would addresssomeof thesegoals.Thepackage’spreventivemeasures,however,areoutbalancedbyitsotherobjectives involving reactive, repressiveactionsthatmayfillalreadyovercrowdedjailswithmoreprisonersthantheycanhandle.98Forviolenceinthecountryside,thegovernmentshouldengagewith local civil society groups to understandtheir concerns anddevelopdetailedprotectionplans. Citizen-security efforts can provideenvironments in which state representatives

canoperateandcitizenscanengagewiththemwithoutfearof beingtargetedbyarmedgroups. As discussed, structural deficiencies,socioeconomic inequality, weaknesses of thestate,andthedrugtradeinColombiahavebeenhighlyinfluentialintheproliferationof tensionsandescalationsof violenceduringtheconflict.Addressing these factors is critical to thepolitical, social, and economic stability of thecountryanditscitizens,andwillgreatlybenefitpeaceinitiatives.Civilsocietyorganizationshaveandcancontinuetohelpthegovernmentreachmarginalizedgroupsof thepopulation,facilitatediscussions on peace initiatives, and engage incommunication with armed groups.99 Thesegroups help to consolidate state presence inmore vulnerable regions and therefore reducetheweaknesses of the state. For all of thesereasons,localinitiativesareessentialtopromotepeaceandsecurityandtogiveavoicetocitizens.

Pass critical legislation to promote justice and victims’rights:Victims’Law

Although human rights groups haveidentifiedfundamentalproblemsintheVictims’Law, this bill represents a bold initiative and awillingnessof thegovernmenttoacknowledgenot only the crimes of rebel groups but alsothoseof paramilitariesandstateforces.Passageof thisbilliscriticaltoestablishingtruthbehindthe crimes and justice through reparation forthe suffering of the victims. An urgent needfor justice and sustainable peace requires thatthe government pass this law to acknowledgethe rights of victims and provide assurancethattheywillneveragainenduresuchviolenceandflagrantviolationsof thelaw.Fordecades,impunity has remained the rule in Colombia;recent developments provide grounds for


20 Vol. 1 - No. 2

hope of reversing this trend by establishingmore effective systems of accountability andrecognition of human rights. It is absolutelycrucial for theColombiangovernment topasssuchinitiativesinordertoestablishaccountabilityforcrimesandtoregaintheconfidenceof theColombianpeople.

Conclusion

Restoring the State’s capacity to meet itsresponsibilities depends on a process of social andcommunity reconstruction. For this reason, peace isnot a simple question of political will… peace mustbe constructed gradually. State institutions must bedevelopedandstrengthenedinordertoguaranteesecurityandrespectfortherightsandfreedomsof allcitizensinallpartsof thenationalterritory.100

In the 21st century, Colombia facesnumerous challenges in consolidating thecentralpowerof thestate,buildingafoundationfor peace and security, and restoring itsintegrity among the population. With recentdevelopments, the Colombian state has takenimportant steps in addressing many of thepoliticalandsocioeconomicproblemsthathavehistorically hindered progress toward peace.Yet there remains a great deal of progress tobemade.Asustainablepeace inColombiawillrequirethestrengtheningof socialandpoliticalinstitutionstorestorethelegitimacyof thestateandtoprotecthumanrights.Theestablishmentof thorough and effective accountabilitymechanisms for violations of internationalhumanitarianlawisessentialtoreconstructvitalsocialandcommunitystructuresandtorestoretheconfidenceof thecivilianpopulation.Forthefuture of Colombia and interests of domestic

and international security, the Colombiangovernmentmust rectify its failures toprovidesecurityandrespecthumanrights.Bysupportinginitiatives that promote the interests of peace,security, and justice, thegovernmentcanbringa formal end to this conflict and formallyacknowledgethesufferingof itsvictims.

1Bouvier,VirginiaMarie,Colombia:BuildingPeaceinaTimeof War(Washington,D.C.:UnitedStatesInstituteof Peace,2009),3.

2Ibid.,3.3“Colombia:RecentHistory,”EuropaWorldPlus,

RoutledgeTaylorandFrancisGroup,accessedApril22,2010,http://www.europaworld.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/entry/co.is.4.

4Ibid.5Bouvier,9.6“Colombia:CountryProfile–September2008

MainReport,”EconomistIntelligenceUnit,September2008,accessedApril29,2010,http://portal.eiu.com.

7WarWithoutQuarter:ColombiaandInternationalHumanitarianLaw,HumanRightsWatch(NewYork:HumanRightsWatch,1998),131.

8Ibid.,131.9Ibid.,161.10Bouvier,43.11RebecaToledo,WarinColombia:MadeinU.S.A.

(NewYork:InternationalActionCenter,2003),44.

12Ibid.,44.13“Colombia:CountryProfile.”14Bouvier,9.15Bouvier,9-10.16Toledo,44.17“Colombia:CountryProfile.”18Bouvier,10.

Giselle Lopez

Autumn 2010 21

19Bouvier,10.20CarolineO.N.MoserandCathyMcIlwaine,

EncounterswithViolenceinLatinAmerica:UrbanPoorPerceptionsfromColombiaandGuatemala(NewYork:Routledge,2004),71.

21Ibid.,35.22Moser,72.23Moser,72.24Moser,88.25WilliamAvilés,“Institutions,MilitaryPolicy,and

HumanRightsinColombia,”LatinAmericanPerspectives28,no.1(2001):36-37.

26AlexMcDougall,“StatePowerandItsImplicationsforCivilWarColombia,”StudiesinConflictandTerrorism32,no.4(2009):326.

27Ibid.,327.28Ibid.29McDougall,333.30Ibid.31McDougall,332.32WilliamAvilésandEduardoPosada-Carbó,

“AssessingColombia’sPoliticalSystem,”LatinAmericanPerspectives28,no.1(2001):166.

33Bouvier,4.34Avilés,“AssessingColombia’sPoliticalSystem,”

172.35Bouvier,62.36Avilés,“AssessingColombia’sPoliticalSystem.”

172.37Moser,73.38MarkPecenyandMichaelDurnan,“TheFARC’s

BestFriend:U.S.AntidrugPoliciesandtheDeepeningof Columbia’sCivilWarinthe1990s,”LatinAmericanPolitics&Society48,no.2(2006):96.

39Ibid.,96.40Ibid.,95.41Avilés,et.al.,“AssessingColombia’sPolitical

System,”166.42Bouvier,5.“Colombia:RecentHistory.”43Bouvier,5.44Bouvier,5.45Bouvier,5.

46Bouvier,56.47Toledo,51.48Avilés,et.al.,“Institutions,MilitaryPolicy,and

HumanRightsinColombia,”49.49“Colombia:CountryProfile.”50Bouvier,12.51WarWithoutQuarter,21.52Ibid.53Ibid.,24.54Ibid.,44.55Ibid.,102.56UnitedNations,andUnitedNationsHuman

RightsCouncil,Reportof theUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRightsontheSituationof HumanRightsinColombia(Geneva:UnitedNations,2008),16.

57WarWithoutQuarter,66.58Ibid.,81-84.59Bouvier,12.60Bouvier,100.61UnitedNations,14.62WarWithoutQuarter,133.63Ibid.,138.64Bouvier,5.65UnitedNations,10-14.66WarWithoutQuarter,162.67Ibid.,171-178.68UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees,

“2010UNHCRcountryoperationsprofile–Colombia,”accessedApril22,2010,http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e492ad6.

69WarWithoutQuarter,205.70UnitedNations,15.71UnitedNations,17.72Columbia:BeyondNegotionation,HumanRights

Watch(NewYork:HumanRightsWatch,2001),10.

73Ibid.,10.


22 Vol. 1 - No. 2

74Ibid.75“Colombia:CountryProfile.”76PaulaTorres,YanethGihaandSergioJaramillo,

“TransitionalJusticeandtheDDR:TheCaseof Colombia,”InternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice,June2009,accessedMay5,2010,http://www.ictj.org/static/Publications/Giha_Torres_Jaramillo_DDR_Colombia_ResearchBrief_RB_2009.pdf,3.

77Ibid.,2.78Ibid.79Ibid.,3.80Ibid.81“CorrectingCourse:VictimsandtheJusticeand

PeaceLawinColombia,”InternationalCrisisGroup,October30,2008,accessedMay5,2010,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/029-correcting-course-victims-and-the-justice-and-peace-law-in-colombia.aspx.

82Bouvier,13.83Bouvier,14.84“CorrectingCourse.”85Ibid.86“Colombia:PresidentSantos’sConflictResolution

Opportunity,”InternationalCrisisGroup,LatinAmericaReport,October13,2010,9.

87A.Bolletino,“CrimesAgainstHumanityinColombia:TheInternationalCriminalCourt’sJurisdictionOvertheMay2003AttackontheBetoyesGuahiboIndigenousReserveandColombianAccountability,”HumanRightsReview9,no.4(2008):495.

88“PresidentSantos’sConflictResolutionOpportunity,”9.

89Ibid.90Ibid.,22.91Ibid.92“Colombia:Congressmustnotapproveseriously

flawed‘Victims’Law,’”AmnestyInternational,November24,2008,accessedDecember3,2010,http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/492bb7e71e.html.

93Colombia:BeyondNegotiation,26-28.94Ibid.,500.95“PresidentSantos’sConflictResolution

Opportunity,”18.96“Colombiapolitics:Fissuresemerge,”Economist

IntelligenceUnit,ViewsWire,November12,2010,accessedNovember22,2010,http://viewswire.eiu.com/index.

97Ibid.98“PresidentSantos’sConflictResolution

Opportunity,”15.99Bouvier,14.100CharlesBergquist,RicardoPenaranda,and

GonzaloSanchez,ViolenceinColombia:1990-2000(RowmanandLittlefield,2001),233.

Giselle Lopez is originally fromAustin, Texas, and is a senior in the JacksonSchoolmajoringinInternationalStudieswithafocusinHumanRights,Law,SocietyandJustice.Shehasaninterestininternationalhumanitarianlaw, human rights, and conflict resolution,particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and LatinAmerica.Aftergraduation,GiselleplanstoearnamastersininternationalaffairsandtopursueacareerinforeigndiplomacyorwiththeUnitedNations. This paper was originally writen as aQualifying Paper for SISME 420, a course onInternational Humanitarian Law, taught byProfessorF.M.Lorenz.

PapereditedbyKelseyBarrett.

Giselle Lopez

Autumn 2010 23


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In today’s increasingly multi-polar world,smallandmediumsizedstatesarebeginning

to assume roles as economic, political andsecurity powerhouses. The Nordic states haveemerged as leaders in this movement, andhave led efforts at environmental protection,humanitarian aid and conflict resolution.Norwayinparticularhasemergedasasuccessfulgloballeaderinthefieldof conflictresolution.The state’s accomplishments are interesting asthey challenge traditional scholarship, whichoften dismisses smaller powers as incapableof succeeding in internationalmediation.Thisassumption is based on small states’ lack of

hard-power resources, suchas themilitaryandeconomicresourcesavailabletolargerpowers. Yet, the Norwegians have gainedinternational respect through successfulpeace-makingeffortsinIsrael-Palestine,Guatemala,SriLankaandSudan,tonameafew.Theirsuccessisunusualgiventheseeminglyintractablenatureof the conflicts in these states. Norwegianparticipation in the high-profile 1993 OsloAccordsbetweenIsraelandthePLOsignificantlycontributed to the reputation Norway nowenjoysasaglobalplayer.Thisabilitytoachievetoughobjectives inpeacemakinghas increasedrespect for Norway from US diplomats and

Abstract In the field of conflict resolution, little attention has been paid to the contributions of small states like Norway. Academic literature often treats Norway as merely a host to parties in negotiation. I contest this by analyzing the “Norwegian Model” of conflict resolution in relation to their involvement in Sudan. I begin by looking at the reasons and qualifications for Norway’s role. By addressing Norway’s involvement I argue that the type of facilitative conflict resolution Norway practices is incredibly effective for the complex, multi-level conflicts seen in the world today. I then explain Norway’s strategy of working as a go-between to facilitate peace talks. This is followed by a discussion of Norway’s strategy of high and low level engagement in Sudan. I argue that this model helped spur success in reaching an agreement between the belligerents. I conclude by looking at prospects for future success.

Small States in Peacemaking RolesThe Norwegian Model of Conflict Resolution in Sudan

Marcus Foster

Research Discourse

Autumn 2010 25

policymakers.1 Norway’s diplomatic engagement inSudan is a particularly adept example of theirsuccess in conflict resolution. The Sudanesewarbeganin1983afterdecadesof unrestandconflict between southern non-Arab peoplesand the Arab-ruled north. This civil conflictevolvedintooneof thebloodiestconflictssinceWorldWar II, with circumstances exacerbatedby competition for control of southern oilfields and fertile lands. In 2002, after years of unsuccessful talks between the Governmentof Sudan (GOS) and the Southern People’sLiberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), aworkinggroupof representativesfromtheUS,UK, and Norway, supported by other states,emerged.SpurredbyNorwegianfacilitationof dialoguebetweenGOSandSPLM/Adiplomats,this group broke the diplomatic deadlock andproducedtheComprehensivePeaceAgreement(CPA) of 2005. Since that time, provisions of the CPA have been implemented, includingpreparations fora secessionvoteby theSouthscheduledforJanuary2011.2

Amidst larger nations like theUS andtheUK,whatfactorscontributedtothesuccessof Norway—a significantly smaller nation—in helping to forge the 2005 CPA in Sudan?Norway’s efforts in peacemaking have beenremarkablydifferentfromthoseof otherstates,andIwillarguethattheyhavebeensuccessfulin part because of their creation of a newmodelof conflictresolutionwhichemphasizespersonal trust, long term commitment, andneutrality.However, applying this theory aloneto case studies does not fully explain theirsuccess. I argue that to understand Norway’sunique success in conflict resolution inSudan,itisnecessarytoanalyzetheapplicationsof the“NorwegianModel,”asdefinedbyKelleherand

Taulbee, at both the high levels of diplomacy,and the low, or grassroots level of conflictresolution.

TheNorwegianModel

Before analyzing the case study of Sudan, it is necessary to understand anddefine “The Norwegian Model” of conflictresolution.AstudyperformedbyscholarsJamesTaulbeeandAnnKelleherfoundanumberof proceduralsimilaritiesbetweenmultiplecasesof Norwegian conflict resolution. Together thesecharacteristics constitute the core elements of theNorwegianModel.Thesefactorsare:

1. Personaltrust:Legitimacyderived frompersonalcontacts2. Secrecyandconfidentiality3. Longtermcommitment4. Governmentfundingatcritical points5. Activefacilitation6. Neutrality:Acceptanceof Norway’s roleasanunbiasedteamplayer,with anultimateinterestincooperation3

Whileallof thesecharacteristicscanbefoundinNorway’sparticipationintheSudanesepeace process, I argue that the first, third andsixth characteristics were the most importantand effective. To understandwhyNorway hasbeen uniquely successful in comparison toattempts by other foreign nations involved intheconflict,itiscriticaltolookathowNorwayemployedpersonaltrust,longtermcommitment,and neutrality in both formal, governmentalnegotiations and in grassroots peace buildingefforts. In this paper, I analyze these three

Small States in Peacemaking Roles

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characteristicsof theNorwegianModelwithinthehigh-levelandlow-levelspheresof conflictresolution to demonstrate why Norway’sapproach in Sudan was effective in reachingtheagreementof 2005. Ibeginbynoting thereasons for Norway’s increasingly prominentroleasaconflictnegotiatorandmotivationsforengaginginthiswork.AfterexaminingexistingscholarlyperspectivesrelatedtotheNorwegianModel,IdescribehowtheModelwasappliedinSudanat thehighand low levelsandhowthismethodprovedsuccessful.

Multiplying Conflicts and the Global Need for New Peacemakers Beforelookingatthecaseof Sudan,itisimportanttounderstandwhyNorway,asmallstate, has become a prominent force in globalconflict resolution. Two broad factors induceNorway toundertake its roleasapeacemaker:theconditionsof theinternationalsystem,andthedomesticpoliciesandvaluesof Norwegians.Thefirst of these can best be summedup bywhatPaulRogers calls “the jungleof snakes.”Rogers quotes former CIA Chief JamesWoolsey,whosaidthatbytheendof theColdWar the “dragon” of the Soviet Union hadbeenslain,butthatthesecuritysituationintheworldwas characterized by a large number of small conflicts in the global south.No longerwasthereasingleloomingthreattoUSsecurity,butadiversearrayof smallthreatsthatWoolseylikenedtosnakesinajungle.Intheiroverviewof peacemakingmethodsandpractices,WilliamZartmanandJ.LewisRasmussencontendthat

duringtheColdWartheUSandUSSRkeptsmallconflicts incheck“lest theyturn intotails thatwag thedogsof globalwar. ”4They concludethatthesuddenendof theColdWarnotonlyremoved a major geo-strategic motivation forgreat power interest in peacemaking, but thatchanging norms spurred new conflicts oversovereignty, liberty, identity and power.5 ThisshiftinpostColdWarpoliticsopenedthedoorforsmallstatefacilitationinconflictresolution. Understanding how small statesundertake monumental efforts on theinternationalstageisgainingacademicattention.Political scientistRonaldBehringer argues thatmid-sized powers engage in specific types of diplomacy as a consequence of their inabilityto competewith larger powers. In Behringer’sconception,sizematters.Kelleheragrees,arguingthatsmallstatesarenotjust“miniversions”of large states, but that they have fundamentallydifferent concerns that must be studied.6 ForBehringer, this means not only that middleand small powers engage in multilateralism,but that they practice “niche diplomacy.”7 Forexample,Swedenhasspecializedinforeignaid,andNorway,inconflictresolution.Ratherthanengaging in diverse aspects of foreign policy,Norway can develop a narrow but very deepspecialization in conflict resolution. For thisreason,Norway’ssmallsizeactuallyhelpsratherthan hinders her ability to engage in effectivemediation. This explanation of how Norwaycame tobe amajorplayer is important, aswelook deeper into the specifically facilitativenatureof its’diplomaticpractices.

Personal Trust, Long Term Commitment, and

Marcus Foster

Autumn 2010 27

Neutrality: A Review of Existing Scholarship

In this section I examine literaturethat explains Norway’s ability to efficientlyworkwith the parties in creating a frameworkforenduringpeace.Intheirstatisticalstudyof manycasesof conflict resolution,Beardsleyetalanalyze theeffectof threestylesof conflictresolution. These three styles are facilitation,formulation and manipulation.8 Facilitationmeansmaintaining open dialogue between thebelligerentpartiesthroughprovisionof safeandnon-coercivespacesfordiscussion.Formulationis a more interactive model in which themediatorpresentssolutionsandtakesanactiveroleinnegotiations.Finally,manipulationisthemost intrusive method, involving active useof “carrots and sticks” to create movementtowards an agreement that both parties willsign. Each of these methods has distinctadvantages and disadvantages.Norway followsthe facilitation model, with some formulationtactics.TheNorwegianpreferenceforteamworknecessitates active facilitation and formulationtokeepconversationsmoving.Theadvantagetothisstrategy,accordingtoBeardsleyetal,isthatthefacilitatorhasgreaterabilitytochangefocalpoints of negotiation, thereby circumventingimpasses andmoving aheadwhere progress ispossible.Bysuggestingnewavenuesof dialogue,the facilitator can steer around points whichcausenegotiationtobecomedeadlocked.Whatismore, I argue that the three aspects of theNorwegianModelthatwereessentialtosuccessin Sudan are all characteristics of facilitationstylemediation. The Norwegian model of facilitationisparticularlyeffectivebecauseof thepersonal

trust their delegates are able to establish. Bybuildingarapportwiththeconflictingparties,amediatorcanshowthattheyarewillingtoworkfaithfully without danger of betraying one of theparties.TrustiskeytotheuniquehighandlowlevelapproachbywhichNorwaybuildsandmaintainsbondswithbelligerentparties,therebymovingnegotiationforward.Facilitationisalsoastyleof mediationthatrequiresaconsiderableinvestmentintime,andneutrality. The last of the characteristic of theNorwegian Model, neutrality, has receivedsignificantattentionbyscholars.Behringerwritesthat comparative studies of smaller powers’foreignpolicieshaveconcludedthatsmallstatescommonly engage in a processwhich he calls“middlepowermanship.”Behringerargues,“middle power states engage inmiddlepowermanship:

‘[the] tendency to pursue multilateralsolutions to international problems,[the] tendency to embrace compromisepositionsininternationaldisputes,and[the]tendencytoembracenotionsof ‘good internationalcitizenship’ toguide...diplomacy.’”9

Behringer postulates that small statestend to engage in “team effort” internationalrelations,oftenbecausetheylackthehardpowerresourcesnecessaryformanipulationtactics.Hefurtherarguesthatsmallstatesshareabelief inthe need for humanitarian concerns to guidediplomacy.10Inananalogythatfurtherillustratesmiddlepowermanship, Arthur Lall likens smallstatestotugboats.11Smallstatesaremorenimbleandsocancarefullyguidethe“oceanliners”of theUSandtheothermajorplayersaroundthemetaphoricalnegotiatingharbor.Theconceptof


28 Vol. 1 - No. 2

middlepowermanship and the tugboat analogyare instructive for my argument because theyaptlydescribehowNorwaywasinstrumentaltotheprocessof facilitationinSudan. Statistical evidence has shown thatfacilitationconsistently lowers tensionbetweenthebelligerentpartieswhenapeaceagreementissigned.12 Thereasonfor this is trust.Whenthe parties have been locked in combat foryears, trust that the other side will abide byan agreement is understandably scarce. Byfacilitatinggood-faithdiscussionsbetweenhigh-levelleaders,Norwaymanagedtobuildatleastatentativelevelof trustinSudan.Asdiscussedabove,facilitationcreateslowtensionzonesof agreementbetweenleaders. Through the facilitation-formulationstyle, Norway helped the GOS and SPLM/Acreate for themselves a document which wasagreeable to both sides and addressed long-standing issues like self-determination.13AccordingtoBeardsleyetal,thesecharacteristicscorrelatestatisticallywithenduringpeace.

Norwegian Engagement in Sudan

Norway’s reliance on a model of personal trust, longstanding commitment, andthe advantages of neutrality—or Kelleher’scharacteristics 1, 3 and 6—was critical tosuccessfulconflictresolutioninSudan. First,theconfidence-buildingmeasuresof personalconnectionswereconsciouslybuiltandallowedNorwaytogetitsfootinthedoorof conflictresolution.InSudan,Norwayhiredformeraidworkerswithintimateknowledgeof theSudanesegovernmentandcitizenstoworkon negotiation teams. They worked with the

Sudanese government, rebels and powers liketheUSformanyyearstomovebeyondstickingpoints in negotiations. This commitment overtime constitutes the next important part of Norway’ssuccessfuleffortinSudan. Talks inSudanpersistedforyears,butwerenotrushedbytheNorwegianswhostrovetocreateaworkablepeaceratherthanhurryingthrough an agreement. As Kelleher argues,“they are accustomed to spending the time ittakes to sort out strongly held convictions.”14Kelleher also argues that addressing long-termproblems—whichtheNorwegianspayparticularattention to when facilitating negotiations—increases the chances of tension reduction.15The Sudanese ambassador recognized themeaningful commitment of Norwegiannegotiators saying, “Norwegians were alwaysavailable inhardandcriticaltimes.”16 Creatingcompromise between strongly held opinionstakes time and commitment,makingNorway’scharacteristicpatiencehighlyvaluable. Norway successfully used the sixthcharacteristic of the Norwegian model,neutral middlepowermanship, to succeed inbrokering peace in Sudan. The concept of middlepowermanship gives us a starting pointto investigate how the Norwegian Modelwas successful. Through high and low levelengagement ingovernment,societyandwithamyriad of actors,Norway displayed its uniquemodel leading up to the signing of the 2005Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement.Its innovative use of NGO/governmentalcooperation, confidential and long termnegotiations kept talks from stalemate andcreatedthefoundationsforamulti-levelpeace. Many of the new internal conflictscountriesfacecannotsimplybeendedwiththesigning of a document, but require complex

Marcus Foster

Autumn 2010 29

engagementwithmanygroupsandindividuals.AnnKelleherarguesthatcontemporaryviolent

civil conflicts are much more complex thanconflictsof thepast.17ThisiscertainlytrueinSudan,where ethnic and religious tensions areexacerbatedbyconflictoverresourcedominanceintheSouth.Disputesoveroilcompoundinter-clan tensions and the Sudan crisis has literallypittedneighboragainstneighbor.Accordingly,itisimportanttoexaminethisconflictonseverallevels. Scholar Paul Ledrach has developed astyleof analysisthatlooksatthevariouslevelsof conflictresolution.Usinghismethod,Iarguethatanalysisof Sudan’sconflictat thetopandbottomlevelsof societyshedsthemostlightonhowtheirstyleof negotiationsucceeded.

High-Level Facilitation

The upper level of negotiation isconcernedwith the interactions of officials inthegovernmentsof thepartiesinvolved.Inthecase of Sudan, this includes GOS diplomats,SPLM/Aofficials,andUS,UKandNorwegiannegotiators. The recognition of Norwegianexpertise on Sudan was highlighted when USenvoyJohnDanforthwenttoOsloforabriefingbefore heading to Sudan for negotiations. By

thistime,theNorwegianswereseenasexpertsonSudan.Danforthknewtheirknowledgewascritical to the coming negotiations. But howwas it that Norwegian leaders had come tohave suchexpertise?Asnotedabove,KelleherandTaulbee’sfirstcharacteristicof Norwegianconflict resolution is “legitimacy derived frompersonalcontactstobuildconfidenceandtruston both sides of the conflict.”18 For years,NorwegianswereengagedwithSudaneseleadersandsocietyatlarge.Personalconnectionsatthehighpoliticallevelareformedbythepracticeof the Norwegian foreign ministry hiring formerNGO workers for top level negotiations.19This practice allowed those with intimateknowledgeof theplayers’attitudes,interestsandconcernstosharetheirideas.Wheretraditionalnegotiation is often an academic exercise,applyinghigh-mindedidealstomessyandever-changing situations, Norway’s approach of involvingindividualswithwell-foundedpersonalconnections quickly demonstrated their abilitytoget thingsdone.Thedeadlockof 2002wasquicklybroken, largelybecauseof the intimateknowledge that Norwegian leaders broughtto the table. Kelleher cites the example of NorwegianPeople’sAidandNorwegianChurchAidworkerswhohad“developedtrusted,long-standing,personalrelationshipswithindividualsinSudan’sgovernment,itsoppositionandlocalcommunities.”20Notonlydid thepeoplehiredhaveagreatdealof experience,but theywereretainedthroughouttheentireprocess,assuringcontinuity. TheNorwegian commitment topeacein Sudan was characterized by a consistentpolicythatmadealong-termviewmorefeasible.Kelleherpointsoutthat“oftenNorwegiansdonot allow personal and ideological differencestoundermineapolicyobjective.”21Incontrast


“TalksinSudanpersistedforyears,butwerenotrushedbytheNorwegianswhostrovetocreateaworkablepeaceratherthanhurryingthroughanagreement.”

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with ever-changing US foreign policy, certainNorwegiannormsareessentiallyunaffectedbypettypoliticaldifferences.OncetheNorwegianshad decided towork for peace in Sudan, theyspokewithonevoice.Evidenceof thiscanbeseen,asKellehernotes, in thefact thatseveralchanges of government occurred in Norwaywith little or no change to their policy andpractices in Sudan.22 This is very differentfromotherparties,suchastheUS,whoseshiftsin domestic politics often greatly alter theirpositionsoninternationalrelations. Also, unlike the negotiators of manyother countries, Norway consciously keeps itsnegotiators and field personnel for as long aspossible.Thisapproachisakeytocharacteristicnumberthree:Timeandpatience.Along-termview is necessary if complex issues are to beresolved.Kelleher notes that a numberof thekeyplayers in the Sudanese conflict resolutionprocess were hired during a relatively chaoticperiod of negotiations in the mid 1990’s andwere retained until the signing of the CPA in2005.23 Maintaining trustwasmuch easier fortheNorwegian team than for theoft-changingmembership of the US and UK teams. TheNorwegians also used this trust to push alongdeadlocked negotiations by inviting leaders toNorwayforinformaldiscussions.Thisapproachwas developed in the Israeli-Palestinian andGuatemalan peace processes facilitated byNorway, and were also employed successfullyinSudan.Longtermtrustedcontactsmadeallthedifference,asdidkeepingaforward-lookingviewthatdidnotpushforshort termgainsattheexpenseof aqualityagreement. Finally, the Norwegian team workedneutrallyasafacilitatortoproposeanddiscusssolutions. Instead of pushing an agenda, theycreated a forum for discussion between the

GOSandSPLM/A.Beardsleyetalshowthereis a correlation between sustained peace andthe formation of an agreement by the playersrather than outside powers.24 Acknowledginghis position as a neutral party, Norwegian

negotiatorJanEgelandsaid,“Wehaven’tmadepeaceanywhere.Thepartieshave.”25Thisquotereflects Norway’s humility and team-playerattitudeinnegotiations.Theyeveninsistonthetitle of “facilitator” while engaged in conflictresolution.26 In pursuance of this strategy,Norwayseekstoopendialoguebetweenparties.Through tactics like inviting authorities toNorwayforunofficialtalks,theycreatetrustandunderstandingbetweentheplayers.Additionally,the Norwegian team acts as an unbiased go-betweenwhereface-to-facetalksareimpossible.According to Beardsley et al, such facilitationwas effective in revealing common ground tothepartiesthroughhonestdialogue.27 Norwegian facilitation tactics oftenwent beyond traditional formal conferenceroomtalkswiththeparties.Inoneexampleof this,Norwegian negotiatorHalvor Aschjem, aNorwegian Church Aid manager with strongpersonal contacts in the GOS and SPLM/A,invited leaders fromboth sides to his farm in

Marcus Foster

“MaintainingtrustwasmucheasierfortheNorwegian team than for the oft-changingmembershipof theUSandUKteams.TheNorwegiansalsousedthistrusttopushalongdeadlockednegotiationsbyinvitingleaderstoNorwayforinformaldiscussions.”

Autumn 2010 31

Norway.Thisallowedtalksthatwerewelloutof themediaspotlight.28Aschjemwasactingasatugboatthatclearedtheoverbearingnegotiatorsandmetaphoricalmediaboatsfromtheharbor.He could then safely facilitate the movementof the two sides with little risk of collision.Arthur Lall argues that a key contribution of small states in conflict resolution is the abilitytomaintainopencommunication.Hesays thisis “no easy thing to do in a world in whichdiscontent or disagreement frequently resultsin the breaking of diplomatic relations andotherchannelsof communication.”29Norwayoffered an elegant solution by designating alow-intensity environment where ideas couldbeexchangedandtrustbuilt.SuchanapproachwaseffectivebecauseSudanese leadersdidnothave tofear losingfaceandcouldspeakfreelyin a lower-stakes environment. This strategyfunctioned well because Norway had virtuallynoself-interestinnegotiatinginSudan. At the upper levels, the NorwegianModel succeeded in enabling essentialcommunication between the parties. Norway’scontribution to high-level negotiations wascrucial, but equally important was Norwegianengagementatthelowlevel.

Low-Level Facilitation NorwayoftenhiredexperiencedNGOworkers for diplomaticwork, but theworkof these people on the ground constitutes animportant and under-recognized part of theNorwegian Model. Critical to the Norwegianapproach is the recognition that modernconflictsdifferconsiderablyfromhistoricnormsof state warfare. In modern conflicts, wheremuchof theviolenceiscarriedoutbyunofficial

militants, an enduring peace settlement mustaddress interpersonal conflict as well as state-level political conflict. According to Kelleher,bythemid-1990’sjustasmuchdestructionwasresultingfromfightingamongstsouthernersasfromGOS-SPLM/Afighting.Theinternalorderhadbrokendownand“power seemed toonlycomefromguns,andmany,manyyoungmenhadthem.”30Inthiscontext,itwouldmatterlittleif thehighlevelleaderssignedanagreement.Low-level looting,violenceandfeelingsof fearandrevengehadtakenholdtoostronglyforwordsonpapertomakeasignificantdifference.ItisherethatNorwegianengagementonthegroundbegantoproducemeaningfulresults. Asthepeopleof SouthernSudanbegantoseethatthecycleof internecineviolencehadtobestopped,NorwegianChurchAidsteppedin. Along with other NGOs, they facilitatedwhatcametobeknownasthePeople-to-Peopleprocess. Grassroots peace conferences werefunded and facilitated by a group of “ChurchCouncils,” forums, and associations. Amongthese,NorwegianChurchAidtookaleadingroleinfacilitation.31 Again,theNorwegiantugboatwaschuggingaroundtheharbor.Adiversearrayof NGO’s, donors, and churches in the northand south of Sudan had to be coordinated.Theyworkedtoraiseawarenessof thehorrorsinSudanandproducedaconsensusinsupportof the peace process. This critical componentof the process was helped by the long termdedicationof NorwegianNGO’s in Sudan. Inthebeginningsof thecrisis intheearly1980’s,Norwegian Church Aid was one of the onlygroupsallowedbytheSudaneseGovernmenttoconducthumanitarianmissionsinSudan.32ThismeantthatNorwegianChurchAidofficialshadtheexperienceandthusthe“personaltrust”of characteristiconeof theNorwegianModel.


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Thistrusthelpedsuppressthespiralof violence consuming Sudanese society throughthe People-to-People process. As discussedabove, the intractability of the problem wasmucharesultof long-termingrainedviolence.Violencewasretributiveandcyclical,oftennotbased on the initial reasons for conflict. Bypromoting low-level negotiation, Norwegiansaddressed the underlying violence whichhad plagued Sudan for decades. Advocacyand coordination of the People-to-Peopleprocesswaspossiblebecauseof thelongtermengagementof Norway,whichhadcreatedthenecessaryrelationshipsandexperiencetosecurethepeaceagreementreachedin2005. Lastly,neutralityisacriticalprerequisiteto success in low level conflict resolution.Norwaywassuccessfulatthelowlevelbecausethe dividedpopulace sawNorway as a neutralparty and a trustedmediator.Kelleher reportsthatoneSudaneseofficialfelt“Norwegianshadnodirect interestandsowereveryacceptable,indeed appealing to both parties. They wereperceived as not having intentions in theSudan.”33OftentheUSandothersuper-powersareseenashavingstronginterestsforonesideor the other. Negotiations between Israel andPalestine,forexample,haveoftenbeenseenbytheconflictingpartiesasinsincerebecauseof theperceivedUSbiasinfavorof Israel.Inaddition,astheUSandtheUKmustjuggleavastarrayof geo-strategic interests, these nations carry“moralbaggage”thataffectstheirlegitimacyintheeyesof observers.Norway,byvirtueof itssmallsize,carrieslittlemoralbaggage,andwasseen in theeyesof thepeopleof Sudanasanimpartialmediator.

Conclusions

TheNorwegianModel relies onworkat the top and bottom levels of the peaceprocess. Part of what makes it so effectiveis the blending of the two. Negotiators likeHalvor Aschjem had experience working withthe people of Sudan and were thus able toapplyexperiencesonthegroundtoupperlevelnegotiationsaswell.Aboveall,itwasNorway’slong termcommitment to addressing all levelsof the conflict that allowed it to be such aneffective negotiator in Sudan. As discussed,theinternationalsystemof todayisparticularlysusceptibletocomplexandintractableconflicts.

Fortunately states likeNorway are in a uniquepositiontoaddresstheseissues,becauseof theirsizeandinnovativemodels.UltimatesuccessinplaceslikeSudanisnotcertain,asviolencestillcontinues, however cases of cooperation suchas the Sudanese Peace Agreement prove thatmediationcanbeeffective.Theoreticalworkandcomparisonswithrelevantcases, lendcredencetotheideathatpeacewillprevailinSudan,andonJanuary9th2011,SouthernSudanwillvoteonareferendumtocreateanindependentstate.ManyhopethatthiswillbethefinalchapterinthelongestcivilwarinAfricanhistory. Traditional theories of internationalrelationsassumethatsmallnationslackthehugeresources necessary to provide “carrots andsticks”whichcanensureadherence toapeace

“The Norwegian Model relies on workat the top and bottom levels of the peaceprocess.Partof whatmakesitsoeffectiveistheblendingof thetwo.”

Marcus Foster

Autumn 2010 33

agreementliketheCPAinSudan.However,byworkingintandemwiththeUSandotherlargepowers, Norway can focus on the facilitationmethodsthatmakebestuseof its’comparativeadvantages. Given that mediators followed amodelof facilitationatalllevelsof theconflict,the Sudanese case in particular shows thatit is indeed possible to create durable peaceagreementswiththeNorwegianModel.Iarguethat this lesson can and should be applied toother cases of conflict resolution. Norwayartfully solved the problem of intractability inSudan by engagingwith personal connections,long term commitment and neutrality. Thissuccessful model could be utilized in othercrises. As we move into the future, there ishope that Sudan will see peace. Due in largepart to the dedicated, behind-the-scenes workof the Norwegian government and NGO’s,thedecades-longstrife inSudanmayfinallybedrawing to a close. Following the progress of SudancanservetofurtherrefinetheNorwegianModel and assess its effectiveness. Becausetherearesofewreal-worldcasesof successfulmediation, it is important thatscholarsexpandon this research and consider the implicationsforothernationstornapartbycivilwar.

1 Anne Kelleher, “A Small State’s Multiple-levelApproach to Peace-making: Norway’s Rolein Achieving Sudan’s Comprehensive PeaceAgreement,”CivilWars8no.3-6(2006):289.

2 JosephineWhitaker, “Fears of RenewedViolenceAfter Bashir Wins Sudanese Election.”Open Security. 29 April 2010. http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/security_briefings/290410.29December2010

3AdrienneHayes,The path to peace? : an examinationof the Norwegian model of conflict mediation inthe Guatemalan and Sri Lankan peace processes.(University of Washington Dissertation,2007),18.

4 I. William Zartman, and J. Lewis Rasmussen,PeacemakinginInternationalConflictMethodsandTechniques (Washington, DC: United StatesInstituteof Peace,1997),4.

5Ibid.5.6Kelleher,287.7Behringer,307.8KyleC.Beardsley,DavidM.Quinn,BiswasBidisha,

andJohnathanWilkenfeld.“MediationStyleand Crisis Outcomes,” Journal of ConflictResolution50,no.1(2006):2.

9Ronald Behringer, “Middle Power Leadership onThe Human Security Agenda,” CooperationandConflict40,no.3(2005):307.

10Ibid.307.11ArthurS.Lall,MultilateralNegotiationInstrumentand

Methods (NewYork:PergamonPress,1985):82.

12Beardsley,12.13Government of the Republic of Sudan and the

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, “Comprehensive Peace Agreement,”ReliefWeb. N.p., January 9, 2005, accessedMay 15, 2010, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-6AZBDB?OpenDocument14Kelleher,3.

15Ibid.,24.16Ibid.,3.17Ibid.,28618Hayes,18.19Kelleher,291.20Ibid.,292.21Ibid.,293.22Ibid.,28923Ibid.,292.24Beardsley,26.25Hayes,52.26Ibid.,52.27Beardsley,11.


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28Ibid.,299.29Lall,85.30Kelleher,301.31Ibid.,302.32Ibid.,297.33Kelleher,288.

Marcus Foster,ispersuingthetrackof Diplomacy,PeaceandSecuritywithintheJack-son School of International Studies. ThroughhisworkwithPoliticalScienceProfessorChris-tine Ingebritsen, Marcus became interested intheinfluenceNordicstateshaveoninternationalrelations.ThispaperwasrevisedfromaJacksonSchoolQualifyingPaper,advisedbyDr.Ingeb-ritsenintheSpringof 2010.

PapereditedbySarahBoone.

Marcus Foster

Autumn 2010 35


36 Vol. 1 - No. 2

Bonsai DemocracyA Look Into the Evolution of Japan’s Government

Forged by rapid change, and sustained bythe tenacious adaptability so characteristic

of thenation, Japanmiraculously rose, againstallexpectations,fromtherubbleafterWWIItoeconomicprominencewithinjustafewdecades.Throughout its history, the country’s politicalstructurehasfluctuatedwidely,movingfromatraditionalfeudalisolationistsystemtoashort-lived, open Industrial Age democracy, beforebacktracking tomilitaristic, xenophobia. It hasdone this by fusing rapid modernization withsociopoliticalconservatism. Following the end of WWII, the USOccupation under the Supreme Command of theAlliedPowers (SCAP) transformed Japan’simperialist system into a democracy, with theclearintenttoeradicateformerTokugawafeudal

practices that were based on hierarchical andculturalvalues.Itwas thought thismightdeterJapan fromembracing theAmerican imageof democracy. The US Occupation authoritiestook what was left of Japanese governmentalstructureanddismantled it, therebypavingthewayfortherapidimplementationof reforms,astherewasnoworkingstructuretoopposethem.This enabled SCAP to reconstruct Japan’spolitical system as it saw fit. By establishingthese new political foundations and moldingJapan’sgovernmentintoademocraticstructurebased on democratic values, the Americansimaginedtheycouldcircumventtraditionalideasof hierarchyandmake Japan trulydemocratic.Thiswasalargelymistakenpresumption.SCAPmayhavesucceededhad itnotunderestimated

Abstract

After Japan’s defeat in WWII, American authorities under General MacArthur introduced a new constitution and governmental institutions they hoped would swiftly change Japan into an American-style democracy. This paper argues that as Japanese culture inherently conflicts with egalitarianism, Japan could not fully adopt American notions of democracy. The author characterizes Japanese democracy as dominated by the bureaucracy and one-party rule, and explores the Japanese ideas of groupism, hierarchy, and consensual decision-making that changed democracy to fit Japan.

Matias Villaseca

Research Discourse

Autumn 2010 37

theinherentpowerof theJapanesebureaucracy,whichwasamongthefewstructuralinstitutionsthat theOccupation authorities chose to leavelargely intact. The Japanese bureaucracyexploitedthe“maskof US-styledemocracy”inorder to cloak its socio-political structure. Byembracing democracy, at least on the surface,the bureaucracy made Japan’s political systemappeardemocraticandwasthusabletopreserveits conservative traditional structures and themechanisms throughwhich the groupwieldeditspower. In thisway, Japancouldworkwiththe international system through an agreeableinterfacewhichwouldbridge the gapbetweenthe outside-world and its political innards,facilitating communication and allowing Japanto keep its core values intact. The result wasthecreationof awholenewstyleof democracy:Japanese-styledemocracy–asystemof inflatedbureaucratic power maintained by traditionalculturalnotionsof legitimateauthority. Japan is a bonsai democracy. Whilethese two systems –the Japanese traditionalcultural system and the democratic system –were incompatible from the very beginningsince their founding valueswere conflicting inessence, one or the other would have to giveway. Implementing the structure set in placeby the Occupation, while assimilating variousinstitutionsandshapingthemtofittheexistingJapanese concepts of political legitimacy,hierarchy and community, postwar Japaneffectively“bonsified”democracy;theAmericandemocratic ideals that SCAP had so hopedto proselytize were mimicked, constrained,trimmed and then shrunk to fit the Japanesesocio-political aesthetic. Democracy was theelementthatchangedinordertofitJapan,ratherthanthereverse(asSCAPhadintended). The process of bonsification can

be broken down into two major operations:structural andcultural. While thefirst createdthe foundations for a “bonsified democracy”,the second implemented and reinforced itsfounding,providing itwithenoughprecedentstoensureitscontinuedsuccess.

Structural “Bonsification”

When the US Occupation establisheditself in Japan during the five years after thewar, itconductedapoliticalpurge tofilteroutanyone who had been involved in governingfascistJapanduringitswarringyears.Thiswasone of themost severe operations that SCAPimplemented: the purging of some 220,000people from political office under the newsystem.1Mostof thepeoplewhowerepurgedwere in fact from military backgrounds; anunsurprising fact, as the military had virtuallyassumed control over Japan during the lastyearsof thewar. However,only some“2,000civil servantswerepurged,of which [staff of]the internal affairs ministry accounted for thebulk...”2 As a result, most of the bureaucracywaspreserved.Leavingthebureaucracyintactwas,initself,thesinglemostdevastatingmistakethat the USOccupationmade in its push fordemocratization,foritleftrelativelyuncheckedauthoritywithnon-electedcivil servants ratherthanpublicly-electedofficials. This decision was not, however,withoutbasis,astheauthoritiesinchargeof theUSOccupationchosetogovernbyindirectrule,throughtheJapaneseadministrativemachinery,instead of assuming direct military rule as inthecaseof Germany.Anotherreasonforthisdecision had to do with the realization that

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SCAP simply did not have enough personnel,in general, and, more specifically, personnelwho spoke Japanese. The assumption thatthe Japanese bureaucracy was simply a tool,without independent thought, that could beused to implement its directives, was a fatalmiscalculation, as the bureaucracy would

later retain a disproportionate amount of authority and autonomy in pushing forwardits own agendas. Thebestway to understandthe Japanese bureaucracy’s preeminence is tolook back at its history. Through the MeijiRestoration(1868-1912),theJapanesestructureof governance was reorganized in one of the fastest modernization processes seen inhistory.Alongwiththeoverthrowof thefeudalgovernment, the Tokugawa Bakufu, there wasalso, at least in appearance, the “adoption of a constitution, new legal system, a version of parliamentary democracy, and other elementsof themodernnation state, allmodeledmoreorlessalongWesternLines.”3Whiletheinitialmotivesof theMeijiRestorationweretowrest

control from the increasingly impotent andpanickedTokugawaandcounterWesternthreatsto thesociopoliticalstabilityof thenation, thesmallgroupof youngsamuraifromtheSatsumaandChoshuClan that led the coupd’état andwho would later became the Meiji oligarchs,soon decided to learn from theWest in orderto attain a position of equality with the greatWesternpowers.Inordertoaccomplishthisintheshortestpossibleamountof time,“anelitegroup of proto-bureaucrats – mostly formersamuraiwhocametodominatethegovernment–”wereput inchargeof steering the ignorantpopulation.4 The entire country’s resourceswere mobilized with incredible efficiency inorder to achieve this “grand national design”,whichwasallbeinglaidoutbythenewlyformedbureaucracy. The bureaucrats’ amassedpowerwas legitimized on the basis of their highlyeducated backgrounds. Hierarchical rule hadprecedents,andthuswasunobstructed. “From the start, the Japanesebureaucracy was based on the premise thatthe citizenrywas ignorant and needed leaders,and since parliamentarians were chosen by anignorant electorate, they too were ignorant.Under this assumption, the bureaucrats, whowere unelected, hired civil servants, felt itwasnatural and proper that they become the defacto national leaders.”5During the war years,“the powers nominally vested in theDiet andinpoliticalpartiesevaporated,asthe‘Emperor’sbureaucrats assumed virtually dictatorialcontrol.”6Evidently, even though the JapanesebureaucracywasbasedonaWesternmodel,thereweresomefundamentaldifferencesbetweentheJapaneseperceptionof thebureaucracyandtheOccupation’sperceptionof it,andthisledtoacrucialmisunderstanding. SCAPwas not abletoevaluatetheinherentpowerof theJapanese

“Implementing the structure set inplacebythe Occupation, while assimilating variousinstitutions and shaping them to fit theexisting Japanese concepts of politicallegitimacy,hierarchyandcommunity,postwarJapan effectively “bonsified” democracy; theAmerican democratic ideals that SCAPhadsohopedtoproselytizeweremimicked,constrained,trimmedandthenshrunktofittheJapanesesocio-politicalaesthetic..”

Matias Villaseca

Autumn 2010 39

bureaucracyandthusdidnotfocusenougheffortonmakingchangesaccordingly,amistakewhichcouldhavebeenavoidedbyimplementingmorestructural checks and balances and by keepingpower dispersed among different institutionssupportedbytheelectorate. After thepoliticalpurge, themembersof thebureaucracycametounderstandthattheyhadnotbeenspecificallytargeted,buttheyalsocame to realize that, if they did nothing, theywouldhavetostandbyandwatchtheUStakeadministrativepowerandgiveittothe“ignorant”masses. Feeling the pressure and nearlysuccumbing to it, without viable alternativeoptions, the Japanesebureaucracy realized thatithadagoldenopportunitytoworkthroughthesystemof indirectrulethatwasbeingguidedbySCAPinordertoshapetheimplementationof Japan’sdemocratization.Thebureaucracythusembraceddemocracyatasuperficiallevel,givingupitsforthrightobstructionismwhileengaginginsubversiveeffortsbycreatingloopholesinthedemocratic structure in Japanwhich eased theintroductionof thatstructureintotheJapanesesocial system while veiling the two systems’inherentdiscordance.

Consequences for Leaving the Bureaucracy Intact

Atthe“constructionsite”of democracyinJapan,whiletheUSOccupationunloadedallof itsmaterialsforreform,thebureaucracyactedasafilter,decidingwhatwasusefulandwhatwastoo undesirable to be left unmodified. Theseefforts were aided by SCAP’s implementationof the“reversecourse”,bringingaboutachangein thedirectionof theOccupation’s intentionswhichwaswelcomedbythebureaucracy.Even

though the bureaucracy could not screen outunwanted material completely, many times itwouldmodifyoradjustwhatitfoundunsuitableso that it could be useful in the future. As aresult, SCAP’s aims were filtered through thebureaucracy and were not as effective. Forinstance, “to circumvent the intent, if not theletter, of the constitution – which explicitlyforbids bureaucrats from taking part in thelegislative process - the bureaucrats sneakedthroughaclauseintheCabinetActthatallowedthemtoproposebills.TheythenaddedasimilarclausetotheDietAct,permittingthemtojoinDiet deliberations of their own proposals asformalmembersof thevariouscommittees.”7Asithappens,duetotheextensivepoliticalpurge,many of the newly “elected representatives– few of whom had any specialized expertisein the legislativeprocess itself - left the actualdraftingof billstothebureaucrats.Dietdebatebecameamereformality.CabinetministersandDietmembersliterallyreadtoeachotherfromscriptsauthoredbythesamebureaucrats.Intheend,thebureaucracyreemergedasthedominantforce behind Japan’s legislative process.”8

The emergence of a powerful institution, i.e.the bureaucracy, preceding the war and theutter dismantlement of the greater JapanesegovernmentledtoaweakDietwhichcouldnotassertpower for itself –anearlyproblemthatwouldcompounditself intheyearstocome. The bureaucrats found the need forcentralized power in order to extend theirinfluence, efficiently organize the country’sresources and thus maintain what was closeto de facto rule, which “an American-styledivisionof state,eachwithitsownindependentlegislative,executive, andother institutions likealocalmilitia,police,andcourt”wouldbecomeits“worstnightmare.”9ButasTanakaKakuei,a

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formerprimeministersaid,“MoneyistheMilkof politics”, and the bureaucracy understoodthisstatementtoitsfullestextent.Consequently,thebureaucracywouldmanipulatesituationsinorder tobring thegovernorsunder thecentralgovernment’s control, using the power of monetarycapitaltoconsolidateitsefforts.WhileitwastheOccupationauthorities’intentionforlocalgovernmentstotakethefirstshareof alltaxrevenues,therestforthecentralgovernment,“the bureaucrats cunningly negated this policybysayingthatsuchcriticalnationalundertakingsas foreign affairs, defense, and nationwideinfrastructure projects should receive priorityfunding.”10Inturn,theUSauthoritiesacceptedthis appeal and its accompanying explanation,and the bureaucrats emerged victorious yetagainincreatinganichewhichtheycouldthenlaterexploit, since itwouldbe leftup to themto independently determine what tax-fundedundertakingswouldbedefinedas“national”inscope.Throughtheirsubsequentinterpretationof whatwasnational,“eventhedevelopmentof local rail facilities and their environsbecameanationalprojectsincetheycouldbeconsideredpart of the nationwide urban developmentscheme.”11Duetoitscontrolovertaxrevenues,thebureaucracywasabletodecidewhatfundsitwouldallocatetolocalgovernmentsfortheirlocal projects, so that even today, “prefecturalgovernments and city mayors spend mostof their time in various bureaucratic officesbegging for subsidies,” instead of performingtheirowndutiesinordertomeettheneedsof thecommunitiestheyserve.12

ThoughJapan’snewconstitutionlegallyeradicated the separation of power and thedecentralization of command characteristic of the Pre-war period, the bureaucrats were ableto successfully maneuver themselves into a

position that allowed them to take this powerback,throughtheuseof technicaltraps,andre-establishthemselvesintheirtraditionalroles,asdictatedduringtheMeijiperiod(1868-1912)toprotectand leadeconomicgrowthas theysawfit.

Thebureaucracyhasalwaysbelieved thatstate capitalism (that is, bureaucraticallyguided economic policies) was the mosteffective way for a developing countryto catch up. Japan’s postwar economicmiracleseemstohaveproventhemright.13

SCAP’s misunderstanding of thebureaucracy allowed for the power of the bureaucracy to eclipse that of electedofficials,which further gave rise to a seriesof underestimationswhichhad theirown specificramifications. It was misunderstanding andrelative ignorance on the part of SCAP thatwould also give rise to Yoshida Shigeru, whowouldlaterbecomea“knot”fromwhichJapan’sbonsaidemocracywouldfindalternativemeanstogrowandbranchoutof.

Yoshida Shigeru As a direct consequence of thepolitical purges that occurred early on in theUS Occupation, supported by SCAP’s naïveperception of the bureaucracy’s neutrality andobjectivity,manyexperiencedbureaucratsmovedintoleadingpositionsintheconservativeparties.For the conservative parties to draw leadersfrom among the ranks of former bureaucratshad been common in the pre-war period, butthispracticebecameevenmoreprevalentduringthepostwarperiod.

Matias Villaseca

Autumn 2010 41

To SCAP, Yoshida Shigeru seemed tobetheidealpersontorepresentthemandleadJapan into this new democratic arena. It wasYoshida’s track record whichmisled SCAP, ashewasabureaucrat,ascholarandananglophilewhohadevenbeenunderhousearrestneartheendof thewarbecauseof politicaldifferenceswiththerulingmilitaryelites.

Shrewd and arrogant, brilliant andabrasive, scion of a prominent family,[Yoshida] rose through the ranks of theprewar Foreign Ministry, serving duringthe1930sasambassadortoItalyandthentoGreatBritain.Devotedtotheimperialcause,hebelieved itwasbestpursuedbyaccommodation to and “making use” of theAnglo-Americanpowers.Inthe1930shewasoftenappalled,notbythegoalsof Japanese imperialismbutbythewaytheywere implemented, which he believedneedlessly affronted the Anglo-Americanpowers.Duringthewar,hisoppositiontothemilitarists landed him in the custodyof theKempeitai,themilitarypolice,whoheldhimunderarrestfortenweeksaftertheydiscoveredhewasbehindasecretbutabortive attempt to bring about an earlyendtothewar.14[Yohansen]

Ironically, during the early postwarperiod under Yoshida’s leadership, the LiberalParty became recognized as the leadingconservativeparty.Yoshidawasanationalistandaconservative,andwas“determinedtopreserveasmuch as possible of the old imperial orderandtosetJapanonapaththatwouldrestorethenationasagreatpower,”yetinapeaceable,pro-Westernfashion.15Throughouthislengthytermfrom1946to1954(excludingabrief fallfrom

power from 1947 to 1948), Yoshida broughtmany former bureaucrats into the LiberalPartyandsobothincreasedthenumberof hisfollowerswithinthepartyandstrengthenedtherelationship between the bureaucracy and therulingparty. Lateron,when theLiberalParty(LP) and the Democratic Party (DP) joinedto make the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),he continued to cast his shadow over them,by helping mold ideologies behind the futurepoliticaltraditionof the“IronTriangle”.Throughthefirsthalf of thepostwarera,Japanfunctionedonthebasisof asystemcomposedof thethreegreatestcentersof power:bigbusinessand agriculture, the conservative ruling party,and the bureaucracy. In this “Iron Triangle”,the bureaucracy was the strongest side, andYoshida, a former bureaucrat, fully graspedwhatthismeant,installinghisfollowersinboththe bureaucracy and within his political party.These people came to be known as Yoshida’s“students”,astheywerestudyingeconomicandinternationalrelationprecedentsthatgavemajorcollateralinfluencetothebureaucracy,whichwerelatercoinedthe“YoshidaDoctrine”.Noticingtheonsetof theColdWarandJapan’sstrategicimportance in the region,Yoshidapointedoutthat“Thereareexamplesinhistorywhenacountrylosesawar,butwinsitspeace”.Insayingthis,hewasalludingtosituationsinwhichacountrylosesawarbutthentakesadvantageof quarrelsamongthevictors.Tocapitalizeonthesituation:The Yoshida Doctrine, which would organizethe Japanese into a strong national mission,focusedaroundeconomicgrowth.1. Japan’seconomicrehabilitationmustbe the prime national goal. Political-economic cooperation with the UnitedStateswasnecessaryforthispurpose,

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2. Japan should remain lightly armedand avoid involvement in internationalpolitical-strategic issues. Notonlywouldthislowmilitaryposturefreetheenergiesof its people for productive industrialdevelopment, it would avoid divisiveinternalstruggles.3. Togainalong-termguaranteeof itsown security, Japan would provide basesfortheUSArmy,Navy,andAirForce.The Yoshida Doctrine became Japan’sinternational strategy for the next fortyyearsuntiltheColdWarended.16

With thevictoryandestablishmentof Communist China and the onset of the ColdWar, the US attitude toward Japan changed,as it took on a new strategic significance as afaithful representative in Asia that could helptosuppressthespreadof Communism.Alongwith starting the Red Purge of 1950, whichdamagedtheCommunistPartyinJapanbeyondcontention for political leadership, this led theUStoadoptthe“reversecourse”(1947),whichwasaimedatsupportingeconomicrehabilitationwiththe“Dodgeline”(1949)-harshmeasuresthatwouldattractdirect foreign investmentbychoking inflation and stabilizing the economy.Japan would rely almost entirely on the USfor protection, which allowed the Japaneseto focus efforts and funds on rapid economicdevelopment, which would become a nationalobsession.Towhetthisappetiteforeconomicadvancement, big business and agriculturewould support the LDP,which then relied onbureaucratic ministries to produce favorablestatutes and macro manage the industries of thenation. Variousministries, particularly theMinistry of International Trade and Industry(MITI), thus were crucial in appeasing the

constituents keeping the LDP in power fordecades.

MITI and Industrial Policy MITI was founded in 1949, whichwas the same year that saw the introductionof the Foreign Exchange and Foreign TradeControl Laws. These two laws gaveMITI itsfirstandmost importantmeansof influencingcorporate decision-making by giving it theauthoritytoallocateallforeignexchange.Thisnewministry used the foreign exchange fromexports and imports to accelerate the growthrateof variousspecific industriesbyextendingpreferentialloansorbyallowingthemtoimportthe newest technologies at almost no cost.In 1950, MITI acquired another importanttool: the Foreign Capital Law. MITI usedthese three laws in developing the system of government intervention and participation inthemanagementof Japanesebusinesses. Thishigh-growth system – a fusion between thebureaucracyandtheprivatesector–would layout the initial stepping stones for the postwareconomicmiracle.Finally,MITI,togetherwiththe Ministry of Finance, founded the JapanDevelopment Bank (1951), which drew uponanenormous investmentpoolcalledtheFiscalInvestmentandLoanPlan.Thefundingforthisplan came from the composite savings of thenation,whichwerechanneledintoitthroughthepostalsavingssystem. Japan thus became known as a“developmental state” throughout this period,referringtoitsstate-ledmacroeconomicplanningand development. This state-led developmentprocess was another of the major changesassociated with the structural bonsification of

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Autumn 2010 43

Japanesedemocracy.IncontrasttotheUSstyleof democracy,where free trade,openmarkets,and strict separations between the privateand public sectors have been the foundingprinciples,Japan’sBonsaiDemocracyfeaturedapowerfulbureaucracythatfavoredbigbusinesscartels,which then fedsupport to theparty inpower.Toanationthatdesiredonceagaintobean“honorablenation”,thebureaucracytookituponthemselvestomicromanagethecountry.

Structural Bonsification - Conclusions

Because of the misperception of YoshidaShigeruand theJapanesebureaucracy,SCAPlostmuchof itscontrolovertheprocessof democratizing the country according to aWesternmodel. Theconservativebureaucracyreadily tookeachandeveryopportunity itwasgivenbytheblundersof theUSOccupationandusedthemtoobstruct theprocessof US-styledemocratization. The structural bonsificationof Japantookplace intheprocessof workingaround and trimming any “inconveniences”of structure set up by SCAP, shaping thefoundationalaspectsof democracyinJapanandthenconsolidatingitintheformof precedentsfromwhichallotherlaws,decisionsandpoliciesbranchedout. Throughitsexploitationof theopportunities that it managed to create, theJapanesebureaucracywasabletoretainrelativelydisproportionate control and power over itsowncountryand,byblurringthelinesbetweentherulingpartyanditself,createdanewstyleof shrunken,bonsaidemocracy.

Cultural Bonsification

The second stageof thebonsificationof Japanesedemocracywas a cultural process,mediating the disparities between US-styledemocraticvaluesandthecoreJapaneseculturalvalues. These core values ultimately affectedthe structure and functioning of democracyin Japan, strengthening the changes that thebureaucracy made through the structuralbonsificationof democracy.Atthesametime,inessence,Japanesecorevaluesarenotessentiallydemocratic in nature and thus conflicted andoverpoweredmanyegalitariannotionsthathadbeen introduced. The Japanese populace hadbeenaccustomedtohavingadefinitestructureinpersonal relationships, in essence, tohavingsomeone todirect their actionsand tohelp togivethemfocusandpurpose.

Hierarchy and Political Structure

Hierarchyisadefiningcharacteristicof Japaneseculture.Throughlanguageorcustom,it is evident that hierarchy is something thatis deeply embedded in Japan. For instance,whenaddressingpeople, the Japaneseuseveryspecializedwordcategories, suchasSenpai forpeople hierarchically above them, Kohai forpeople below them, andDoryo for people of the same rank or status as they. In Japanesepolitics, especially within the factions of theLDP, the factors that determine who willsucceed are not strictly defined policies andideals,intensedebatesontheprosandconsof differingarguments,orapopularvote.Instead,Diet seat successors are chosen based on thepowerof consensualdecision-making,personal

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relationships,andtheabilitytounderstandandsatisfythenuancesof innerpartypolitics.Consensual decision-making, in the Japanesecontext, is based upon the belief that theexperience and statusof apersonhas adirectcorrelation with that person’s ability to assessdecisions in different situations. Thus, thevoteof anewcomerandthevoteof themostrespectedstrategistcannotbeputonthesamelevel, just as a board of director’s decisioncannot be put on the same level as a CEO’sdecision. For example, in a school boardmeeting,themajorityof individualsmaydiscussandselectchoice“A”asthebestchoicetosomematter. The director of the school, sitting attheendof the table, afterhearingeverybody’sopinion,willdecidethatoption“B”wouldbestsuitthesituation.Everybodywillthenagreeandthenmoveontothenexttopic. Eventhoughthe majority opinion had differed from thedirector’s view, thefinal assessmentwas in thehandsof thepersonwiththehigheststatus,notthemandateof themajority,whichillustratesadecidedlynon-democraticconceptprevalent inJapanesesociety. Political dynasties have also been akey factor in Japanese structural democracy.Many times, government ministers, as wellas candidates for seats in theDiet, are closelyconnectedtoorrelatedtothosewhohavelongbeenonthepoliticalscene.Infact,uponcloseinspection, it may be seen that approximately30%-40%of theseatsintheDietaresomehowinherited.

Of the133candidateselectedtotheJapaneseDietinthe1990generalelection,60of them(45%)wererelatedtocurrentor previousDietmembers. Inmany of thesecases,the“new”candidateranfora

seatvacatedbyhisfatherorotherrelative.Thus, the riseof second-generationDietmembers and the increasing number of hereditary seats has become a seriouspolitical issue in Japan. Succession byinheritance violates basic notions of democracy. The public and press tendto see the election of second-generationcandidatesasvirtuallyguaranteed,offeringthe electorate no significant choices andthreatening the legitimacy of Japanesedemocracy.17

This does indeed reveal the situationthathasarisenintheDietconcerning“second-generation” Diet members, although asubsequent point to note is that this situationdoes not threaten “the legitimacy of Japanesedemocracy,”somuchasexhibititsnature. The idea of having an elite groupin charge of steering the masses in the rightdirectionisthereasoningbehindtheconceptof ameritocracyand theappreciationof heredityinJapanesesociety.Theprevailingfeelingisthatfamilies that have better education and moreknowledge about certain jobs andoccupationsshouldbeputinchargebecausetheyunderstandthembetterthananyoneelse.Thetendencyof thegeneralJapanesepopulacethenistoassumerelative, humble ignorance in economic andpolitical matters, thus delegating governanceto more informed and instructed people - anidea that influenced the decision to adopt aParliamentaryratherthanaPresidentialsystem.Fromthisangle,then,theideaof ameritocraticgovernmentwithanaspectof elitismdoesnotappearsoobjectionable,asitperhapsgivesthesystemwhat the populace expects of it:moreclarity, efficiency, and direction. However,without mass contention from a discontent

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Autumn 2010 45

populace, the system relies too heavily onthe decisions of a certain group of peopleenfranchised beyond being easily stopped.This acceptance of one’s place and respectivepower in the social hierarchy is one of themostcontroversialaspectsinvolvedinJapanesedemocracy,anditisonethathasledmanypeopletocontendthat“Japan’s[democratic]constitutionexiststodayinnameonly.”18(18)However,thisis not entirely true. The Japanese elect theirgovernment (although it should be taken intoaccount that, in a parliamentary system, theabilitytospecificallyelectgovernmentalofficialsisconsiderablywatereddown)and,if theyweresufficientlydispleasedwithit,theycouldsimplyvotedifferently.However,thisisthecruxof theissue:theychoosenotto.TheJapanesepeoplebelieve that the inheritance of positions andelitism in general are not outlandish forms of corruption–eventhoughthisissometimestheresult–butthereflectionof amoreseriousandresponsible approach to selecting the correctleaders.

Groupism

The term “groupism” refers to theexistenceof averystrongbondbetweenpeoplewhosharesomeaspectof theirday-to-daylife.Thesenseof belongingtoagroupisparamountinJapan,andthoseinvolvedinpoliticsperhapsknowthisthebest. Thepostwarpoliticalsystemhasbeen,byandlarge,undertheconstantinfluenceof theconservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),which itself coalesced from various smallergroups. From 1946 to 1955, the progressiveparties were so disorganized and dispersedthat bothYoshida (PrimeMinister during that

period)andtheLiberalPartywereable toruleuninterruptedly for the first decade after thedefeatof JapaninWWII.Aftersomeshiftingabout and a short-lived fall frompowerwhenthe Liberal Party had to give way to anotherconservative force, the Democratic Party andtheprogressiveforcesdecidedto join togetherand form the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Asa counter-measure to avoid losing power to asocialistforce,agroupof bigbusinessesdecidedthat itwas timefor theconservativeparties toputanendtotheirinternaldisagreements,andthe conservatives merged to create the LDP.Withthetwobiggestpoliticalpartiesnowjoinedunderonebanner,thepossibilitythatapotentialrivalwouldemergewasgreatlydiminishedandthe JSP became an eternal opposition force,leavingtheLDPtoenjoyvirtuallyuninterruptedruleforthenext40yearsunderwhatwouldbecalledthe“55’system.”Forthefirsttwentyyearsof the 55’ system theRulingTriad, composedof thebureaucracy,theLDP,andbigbusiness,dictated the political system and its workings.Inthissystem,eachindividualgroupsupporteditself andreinforceditsinfluencebyhelpingtheother two groups and receiving support fromthem in return. The LDP was able to holdpowerforsolongbecausetheLDPdidnothavestrictideals,asAmericanpartiestendtodo,butinsteadfocusedonreachingaconsensusaboutanydecisionsthathadtobemade.Insteadof committingitself toasingleideology,itsimplyexpandedtoaccommodateasmuchaspossible.

Cultural Bonsification – Conclusion

Through theIronTriangleandJapan’sdevelopmental state, the foundations of

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Japanese-styledemocracywerelaidinJapan,butit was the culture that reinforced the positionof thebureaucracyandtheLDPevenaftertheUS Occupation ended. Japanese core valuesclashedhead toheadwith the implementationof democracyinJapanbecausetheirobjectiveswere polar opposites. While Americandemocracy emphasized the importance of the“everyman’s”involvementinthesystem,bonsaidemocracysawdelegationtosocialelites;whiletheAmericansystemischaracterizedbychecksand balances, and a two-party system split onideology,theJapanesecommitmenttogroupism,consensual decision-making, and hierarchy hasled to themonolithicallianceof theLDPandthebureaucracy.

Conclusion

The US Occupation imposed aset model of democracy on Japan with theexpectation that it would, in essence, changeJapanitself byalteringwaysof thinking,acting,relationships between people, and even thesociety’straditionalcoreculturalvalues. SCAPbelieved that introducing democratic deviceswould logically make the nation democratic.However, even though Japan had gonethrough periods of incredible change in thepast and had suffered numerous psychological

shocks during the Occupation it still held itscore traditional mentalities and proved to betoo hard for egalitarian ideals to fully pierce.These psychological shocks included, first of all, thebitternessof being ledastraybyawar-mongering administration, and the realizationof the folly of imperialistic ventures that hadweighedontheshouldersof theentirenation,bothpsychologicallyandeconomically.Second,therewerethetwinshocksof theatomicbombsdropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Third,therewastheshockof Japan’ssurrender,whichto most people came as a surprise, since themediawastightlycontrolledbythegovernmentand had convinced Japan it was making greatstridestowardvictory.And,finally,therewastheshockof theemperor’sdeclarationof humanity,whichwastantamounttotellingthemthattheyhadenduredlonganddrearyfightingnotforadeity they had pledged allegiance to, but for afalliblebeinglikethemselves.Evenundertheseincredible psychological shocks, the Japaneseweretoostrongof aculturetoallowaforeignnationtocomeinandsimplychangetheirsocietyand perceptions of legitimate governmentovernight.Intheend,Japanshapedandclippedthe“freedoms”of democracy,ratherthanviceversa. While there were two stages in thetransformationof democracy,bonsaidemocracy,thoughstunted,isnonethelessstillademocracy,definedbythedifferentvaluesandexpectationsof itspeoplethatredefinethesystematitsmostprimarylevel.US-styledemocracyworkswellindevelopedcountriesbutdoesnotworkaswellindevelopingnationsthataretryingtocatchuptotherestof theworld.Japan,beingacountrythat industrializedmuch later–andthen,aftertheendof thewar,hadtoessentiallycompletelyrebuildfromscratch–wasoneof thecountries

“At the same time, in essence, Japanesecorevaluesarenotessentiallydemocratic innatureand thus conflictedandoverpoweredmany egalitarian notions that had beenintroduced.”

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Autumn 2010 47

that placed a high priority on catching up tothe developed world and was ready to trustthepoliticalandgovernmental institutionsthatcoalesced out of the Occupation in order toattainitsgoals. Perhapsoneof thedeepestunderlyingproblems for Japan’s democracy is that Japanhas never had a democratic revolution. Japanhas had two democratic constitutions – theMeiji constitution and the new (MacArthur)constitution–butbothhavebeenhandeddownfromabove,firstfromthemonarchy/oligarchy,then the Americans. In order for a countryto appreciate democracy, to acknowledgethe significance of such things as freedomof speech, freedom of thought, and equalopportunities for everyone, and to have a realunderstandingthatthepoliticalorganizationsinademocraticgovernmentare there inorder toserve thepeople rather than for thepeople toservethegovernment,acountryneedstowantdemocracy, to strive for democracy and to bewillingtodefenddemocracy.Whenitispasseddown in theway that ithasbeen in Japan, thepeoplemaynotknowwhat it isorhowtouseit, and may even feel that it demands a greatdeal of time and effort that could be devotedtosomethingmoretangible.UntiltheJapanesepeoplecomestotrulyvaluedemocracy,changesmay occur that may bring about a greaterdissemination of democratic valueswithin thepopulation,butJapan’sculturewillcontinuetomarkJapan’sbonsaidemocracyasunique.

1KennethB.Pyle,TheMakingof ModernJapan(Lexington:Heath,1996).215.

2DanielI.Okimoto,andThomasP.Rohlen.InsidetheJapaneseSystem:ReadingsonContemporary

SocietyandPoliticalEconomy(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1988)45.

3MasaoMiyamoto,Straitjacketsociety:AnInsider’sIrreverentViewof BureaucraticJapan(Tokyo:KodanshaInternational,1994)9.

4Ibid.,9-10.5Ibid.,10.6Ibid.,10.7Ibid.,11.8Ibid.,11.9Ibid.,11.10Ibid.,12.11Ibid.,12.12Ibid.,12.13Ibid.,13.14Pyle,229.15Ibid.,229-230.16Ibid.,235.17Ishibashi,Michihiro,andStevenR.Reed.

“Second-generationDietmembersanddemocracyinJapan:Hereditaryseats,”AsianSurvey32,no.4(1992):366-379.

18Miyamoto,9.

Matias Villaseca,isastudentintheJacksonSchool.

PapereditedbyUlyssesLin.

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From Friends to FoesThe Deterioration of Soviet-Israeli Relations in the Mid-20th Century

Introduction: The Soviet-Israeli Enigma

When considering political actors thathavebeenkeysupportersof theStateof Israel,theformerSovietUnionmightnotreadilycometo mind. Disregarding an important chapterin Israel’s history, many scholars exclusivelyreference the United States as the most

significant champion of Israel from the timeof its incipience. However, such an assertionignoresanotherfarlessacknowledgedpatron—the Soviet bloc. Soviet support for Israel didnot only exist during the state’s formativeyears,butwasperhapsthestrongestsourceof foreignassistanceforthecountryinthemid-20thcentury.Advocatingfortherightof Israeliself-sovereignty, lending indispensible military aid,andcensuringArabattacksonthenewlyformed

This paper sheds light on an often overlooked, but integral, chapter in Soviet and modern Middle Eastern history as it investigates the rise and fall of auspicious Soviet-Israeli relations in the 1940s and 1950s. In the mid-20th century, Soviet support for Israel played a crucial role in the formation and survival of the nascent state. However, within the span of just a few years, the Soviet bloc adopted an antagonistic attitude towards Israel. This paper utilizes two analytical approaches to explain the abrupt shift in Soviet-Israeli ties. The first approach involves a delineation of five events, each of which played a decisive role in fomenting increasingly greater tension between the Soviet bloc and the Middle Eastern state. In the second analytical method, the article critically analyzes the Soviet bloc’s ostensibly friendly period with Israel to demonstrate that Moscow’s primary goal was to gain a strategic foothold in the Middle East. Combining both approaches, the paper ultimately claims that a nuanced understanding of key historical processes in the mid-20th century, as well as a critical look at underlying Soviet motivations in the Middle East, are needed to explain the eventual souring of Soviet-Israeli relations. More generally, the paper argues that the disintegration of Soviet-Israeli relations in the mid-20th century must be elucidated via a broader understanding of the dynamics of Cold War politics.

Ruben Shimonov

Research Discourse

Spring 2011 47

state,Sovietsupportplayedacrucialroleintheformationandsurvivalof thenascentcountry.1

However,within a short numberof years, theSoviet bloc abandoned this patronage andadopted an antagonistic attitude toward Israel.Additionally, it began to offer political andmilitaryaidtoArabcountries indirectconflictwiththestate.2 Thus, the puzzle becomes quiteapparent:WhydidtheSovietregimedrasticallyand swiftly reverse its foreign policy towardsIsrael?Inanalyzingsomeof theprimarycausesfor the abrupt shift, this paper gathers datafrom both primary sources—mass media andgovernmentaldocuments—aswellassecondaryhistorical and theoretical literature. Using thedata, I first provide the necessary historicalbackground,describingboththecordialrelationsthattheSovietblocmaintainedwithIsraelduringthestate’sformativeyears,aswellastherelativelysuddenshiftthatsubsequentlyoccurred.Ithenutilize twoanalyticalapproaches toexplain thetransformation. The first approach involves adelineationof fiveevents,eachof whichplayedadecisiveroleinfomentingincreasinglygreatertension between the Soviet bloc and Israel,ultimatelycatalyzingthecompletedisintegrationof Soviet-Israelirelations.Theseevents—GoldaMeir’svisittoMoscowin1948,the1950TripartiteDeclaration, the outbreak of theKoreanWar,the 1952 Slánský Trial, and the Doctor’s Plotscandal of 1953—highlight the apprehensionthattheSovietblocpossessedtowardspoliticalactorsshowinganyformof perceivedWesternalignment. In the second approach, I criticallyanalyze Soviet motives during the ostensiblyfriendly periodwith Israel—thus showing thattheEasternbloc’sintentionswereinfactnevertosupporttheIsraelicauseforself-determination,but rather to gain influence and a strategic

footingintheMiddleEast.Thisobjectivefueledboth the initial, seemingly amicable period aswellasthelaterhostilitywithIsrael. Combining both approaches witha realist theoretical framework and a globallevel of analysis, this paper ultimately arguesthat a nuanced understanding of particularhistorical processes in the mid-20th century,as well as a critical look at underlying Sovietmotivationsduringtheperiodof strongSoviet-Israelirelations,arebothneededtoexplaintheeventualsouringof Soviet-Israelirelations.Theintegrationof thesemethodologiesrevealscoredynamicsof ColdWarpoliticsthatarenecessaryto elucidate thedisintegrationof Soviet-Israelirelationsinthe1950s.

From Strong Relations to Strained Relations: A Historical Background

In order to set the stage for theeventual demise in Soviet-Israeli relations, aninevestigation of the initial support accordedtoIsraelbytheSovietblocinthelate1940sisnecessary.An examinationof this timeperiodreveals that Soviet diplomatic and militaryassistanceplayedapivotalrole inthefoundingandsurvivalof Israel. Inautumnof 1947, thenewlyformedUnitedNationswasfacedwithachallengingtaskinaregionthatwouldprovetobeacontinuousglobalflashpoint.Thechallengeregarded the establishment of a Jewish statewithin the British Mandate for Palestine. IntwomonumentalspeechesdeliveredtotheUNGeneral Assembly onMay 14 and November26,1947,theUSSRDeputyMinisterof ForeignAffairs, Andrei Gromyko, spoke about the

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urgencyof establishinganindependentstatefortheJewishpeople:

“During the last war the Jewishpeople underwent exceptional sorrowand suffering…The fact thatnoWesternEuropeanstatehasbeenabletoensurethe

defense of the elementary rights of theJewishpeople,andtosafeguarditagainstthe violence of the fascist executionersexplains the aspiration of the Jews toestablish their own state. It would beunjustnot to take this intoconsiderationandtodenytherightof theJewishpeopletorealizethisaspiration.3

The representatives of the Arabstatesclaimthatthepartitionof Palestinewould be an historic injustice. But thisviewof thecaseisunacceptable[because]theJewishpeoplehavebeencloselylinedwithPalestineforaconsiderableperiodinhistory…There was not a single countrywhichsucceededinadequatelyprotectingtheinterestsof theJewishpeopleagainstthe arbitrary acts and violence of theHitlerites…The delegation of the USSRmaintains that the decision to partitionPalestine is in keepingwith the principleof the national self-determination of peoples.”4

UponIsrael’sdeclarationof statehood

inMay1948,theSovietUnionwasthefirsttooffer de jure recognition to the state,5 and inNovemberof thesameyearitbecamethefirstdelegate to vote in favor of Israel’s admissiontotheUnitedNations.6 ImmediatelyfollowingIsrael’sproclamationof independence,the1948Arab-IsraeliWar erupted as Arab forces fromEgypt,Syria,Jordan,Iraq,andLebanonattackedthenewly formedstate.DuringaUNSecurityCouncilmeeting,AndreiGromyko denouncedthe military offensive by the Arab states andcondemnedtheirviolationof theMay22SecurityCouncil cease-fire resolution, declaring “thenewJewishstate[as]thevictimof aggression.”7

Similarly, Russian newspaper Pravda observedthat “the operation being conducted by theArab States cannot be defined otherwise thanasanactof aggressioncommittedwithoutanyprovocation.”8 Aside from supporting Israel throughpoliticalrhetoric,theSovietblocalsobackedthenascentstateindemographicandmilitaryterms.Dueto“Sovietassistancetothousandsof JewsfromSovietsatellitestatestocometoPalestine[,]immigrationfromEasternEuropehadplayedacentralroleinthedevelopmentsthathadledtothe establishmentof theStateof Israel.”9 Byfacilitatingthesettlementof EasternEuropeanJewswithin the British PalestineMandate andhelping bolster the Jewish population in theregion, the Soviet regime demonstrated itssponsorship of Jewish statehood. However,it was perhaps Soviet military support duringthe1948Arab-IsraeliWarthatplayedthemostinfluentialroleinsolidifyingitsrelationshipwithIsrael. The Soviet-directed Czech-Israeli armsdeal,10 as well as the training of Israeli pilotsand other troops inEasternEurope,11 playedacriticalroleinIsrael’svictoryinthe1948War.Indeed, “the Soviet-approved Czech-Israeli

“Upon Israel’s declaration of statehood inMay1948,theSovietUnionwasthefirsttoofferdejurerecognitiontothestate.”

Ruben Shimonov

Spring 2011 49

armsdealwascrucial,evendecisive,forIsrael’ssurvivalandvictory[since]itwastheunwaveringsupport of the Soviet Union which enabledIsraelnotonlytoemergeasastatebutalsotosurvive the first challenge to its existence.”12

Appreciation of Soviet assistance during thiscritical time in Israel’s emergence was evidentwhenPrimeMinisterDavidBen-Gurionstatedthat “itwas only theRussians and theCzechswhostoodbyusfromthebeginningtotheendof the 1948 war without wavering.”13 Thus,Soviet assistance during Israel’s incipient yearsprovedessentialfortheembryonicstate. As early as the 1950s, however, tiesbetween the Soviet bloc and Israel startedunraveling. Soviet support for Israel beganto wane, official anti-Israel rhetoric emerged,and the Kremlin’s dealings with various Arabstates in direct conflict with Israel intensified.Less than a decade after the Soviets criticizedArab aggression towards Israel, a Soviet-Arabpact was formed via two pivotal arms deals,one with Egypt in 195514 and the other withSyriain1956.15TheCzech-Egyptianarmsdeal,indicating a clear political and military bondbetween theArabMiddleEast and the Sovietbloc,wasdescribedby IsraeliForeignMinisterMoshe Sharett as an “unprecedented dangerapttobringaboutarevolutionaryandominouschange inIsrael’ssecuritysituation[,]”andasa“deepshadowovertheentiresceneof theState’sforeignanddefenseaffairs.”(16)AddressingtheKnesset,Sharettexclaimedwithdismay:

“Did not [the Soviet] delegates atthepresentsessionof theUnitedNationsAssembly listen to the speech of hatred,poison, and war-mongering delivered bythe Egyptian Foreign Minister [when hestated:] “It is utterly inconceivable that

Egypt should ever consider peace withIsrael or even think of recognizing it…Never will we negotiate with Israel”…Doesitnotrealizethattosupplyplentifuland heavy armaments to Egypt meansletting looseawarof destructionagainstIsrael?”17

FollowingtheSovietmilitarytransactionwith Egypt, Syria received Soviet military aidof over fifty million dollars in 1956.18 Theweaponry dealings between the Soviet bloc,Egypt,andSyria“appearedtobethelaststrawthat broke Soviet-Israeli relations, [becoming]a turningpoint inWestAsianpolitics [as they]openedaneweraof Arab-Sovietrelationship.”19

The Egyptian and Syrian arms deals of 1955and1956were“atangiblemanifestationof [the]basicshift inSovietattitudeandpolicy,”20 thusmarking thebeginningof long-standingSovietmilitary assistance to various Arab states.21

Indeed, the stark shift in Soviet-Middle Eastrelationsthatcrystallizedinthemid-1950ssetinmotionaperiodof strongSoviet-ArabtiesthatprovedtobecataclysmicforIsraelduringsomeof themostcriticalMiddleEastconflictsof the20thcentury:theSuezCrisis,22the1967Six-DayWar,23 theWar of Attrition,24 the 1973 Yom

Kippur War,25 and the discord between IsraelandthePalestineLiberationOrganization.26 Not unlike its former relations with


“...the stark shift in Soviet-Middle Eastrelationsthatcrystallizedinthemid-1950ssetinmotionaperiodof strongSoviet-Arabties.”

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Israel, Soviet military support for Arab stateswascoupledwithpro-Arab—whichwenthand-in-hand with anti-Israel—rhetoric in politicaladdresses,thepress,andmedia.ThenewSovietattitude that emerged in the mid-1950s wasreflected in a speech that Stalin’s successor,NikitaKhrushchev,deliveredinlate1955:

“We understand the aspiration of thepeoples of the Arab countries who arefighting for complete liberation fromforeigndependence.Atthesametimewecondemn the actions of the governmentof Israel,whichfromtheverydaysof itsexistencebegan to threaten itsneighborsandtopursueanunfriendlypolicytowardthem.”27

In conjunction with support for Israel’sneighboring opponents, severe criticism of Israel by Soviet leaders and the press beganto surge.No longer seen in Sovietmedia as arefuge and rightful home for persecuted anddisplaced Jews, Prime Minister Khrushchevclaimed that Israel had been transformed intoan“outpostof Westernimperialismconspiringto resurrect its lost empire.”28 This anti-IsraelrhetoricwasechoedinnationalnewspapersthatdeemedIsraelanaggressiveandimperialiststate.Izvestia,forexample,statedina1956article:

“By challenging Arab peoples and allpeoples struggling against colonialism,Israel is digging its own grave…Fromthe very first days of its appearance ontheinternationalstage,theStateof Israelbegan… following an unfriendly policytoward [its neighbors], and “Socialists”of the Ben Gurion type [have placed]themselves fully at the disposal of

imperialistforces.”29

Throughanti-Israelpoliticaladdressesandstate-sanctioned media, the Soviet bloc “convincedmany Arabs that the Soviet Union was theirconstant ally in theirwar againstZionism andimperialism.”30LendingmilitaryanddiplomaticsupporttoArabstatesinconflictwithIsrael—while simultaneously adopting an antagonisticviewof thestate—theSovietsclearlylaunchedanewchapterintheirpolicytowardstheMiddleEast. What caused, then, the Soviet bloc tosuddenlyhaltitssupportforIsrael?Furthermore,whydiditspatronageshifttothestate’sfoesinthe Middle East? In deciphering this puzzle,wemustfirst look at several specific events inthemiddle of the 20th century, each of whichplayed an integral role in making the Sovietbloc increasingly wary of its relations withIsrael.Theseevents,delineatedinthefollowingsection,shareacommonatheme:theKremlin’sapprehension of perceived Israeli disloyalty totheSovietblocandallegiancetotheWest.

Causes for Soviet Shift, Part 1: An Event-Based Historical Analysis

In the autumn of 1948, Israel’s firstminister to the Soviet Union, Golda Meir,visitedMoscow,engaginginmultipleauspiciousmeetings with Soviet authorities. The visit,however,tookaturnfortheworstacoupleof weekslaterwhen,onOctober16,Meirandherstaff visited the central synagogue inMoscowon the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. Theyweremetwithgreatexcitementbyacrowdof

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tensof thousandsof Jews.Thecreationof theStateof IsraelhadraisedJewishconsciousnesswithin the USSR and even evoked desire tomovetotheJewishstate.BecauseSovietleaderssupportedthefoundingof Israel,RussianJewsconsidereditacceptabletopubliclyexpresstheirenthusiasm for the country.31 The eagerness,however, came as an unpleasant surprise tothe Soviet government; it was astounding tothe Kremlin that their citizens could desireanother homeland.32 Although the Soviet blochad previously facilitated the immigration of EasternEuropeanJews,theybelievedthatIsraelwouldserveasarefugeforJewsprimarilyfromcapitalistcountries.33Therefore,sincetheinitialJewish emigration fromEasternEuropewas aresult of Soviet support for the state, “whentowardtheendof 1948newobstaclestoJewishemigration from Eastern Europe appeared, itwaslogicaltoconcludethatthiswaslinkedwithachangeintheSovietstand.”34 When faced with what appeared tobe a revival of Jewish national consciousness,the Soviet government began to feel anxiousaboutitscloserelationswithIsrael,asithadnotconsidered that “itsown Jewish citizensmightbesignificantlyattractedbytheStateof Israel.”35Consequently, the “Soviet Jewish reaction tothe establishment of the State of Israel andto Soviet support of the Jewish State cast ashadow on the relations between the USSRand Israel.”36 Soviet Deputy Foreign MinisterZorin,forexample,accusedtheIsraeliLegationof “sendingletterstoSovietcitizensof Jewishnationality[,] encouraging them to leave theconfines of the State…and to immigrate toIsrael”—activitiesthattheSovietUnionclaimedwere “illegal and [did] not conform with thestatusof adiplomaticmission.”37AlthoughMeirdeniedtheaccusation,38theseedsof tensionhad

alreadybeenplantedduetoSovietobservationof “Golda Meir’s effect on Moscow Jewry.”39Meir’svisitinitiatedtheSovietbloc’sincreasingwariness of Israel, thus setting the stage forgraverSovietdissatisfactionwiththestateinthecomingyears. InMay1950, threeWesternpowers—the United States, Britain, and France—issued the Tripartite Declaration, a move thatindirectlydroveanevendeeperwedgebetweenthe Eastern bloc and Israel. The declarationannouncedaprogramunderwhichtheWesterncountries would engage in arms rationing tovarious Arab states and Israel.40 The goal wasto preserve stability in the Middle East bycontrollingtheflowof weaponryintotheareaand preventing an arms race.41 Although itplayed no role in the formation of the policy,Israel expressed approval for the declarationbecause, as one Israeli politician expressed, it“signifie[d]theendof thediscriminationwhichha[d] hitherto beenpracticed in the supply of arms and military equipment to the MiddleEastern states.”42 The policy allowed Israelto receive arms equal to those shipped to theArab states, thushelping the countrymaintaina level of security against its Arab neighbors.However, since the declaration was proposedby the Soviet bloc’s ColdWar opponents, theSoviets denounced the plan anddeclared it “athreat to the vital interests and independenceof the peoples of theNearEast.”43 Excludedfrom this coalitional agreement, the KrelminperceivedtheWest’sattempttointerveneintheMiddleEast,anareaclosetotheSovietUnion,as a display of aggression towards the Sovietbloc.44 Consequently, Moscow criticized Israelforembracingtheagreement.45Israel’sstanceontheTripartiteDeclarationcausedtheSovietblocto become more sensitive to, and suspicious


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of, Israel’s seemingly pro-Western potential, asentimentthatwasclearlyreflectedinthe1950PoliticalReportof theUSSRLegation:

“[T]hegovernmentof Israel cannothideitsnegativeattitude to theUSSRand thePeople’s Democracies. However muchit takes cover behind its supposedly“independent policy,” no declaration orstatements by the leaders of Mapai, theruling so-called “workers” party, canconceal the government’s pro-Americanalignment…The State of Israel is abourgeoisstatealongthelinesof theWestEuropean“democratic”states.”46

OnlyamonthafterIsrael’sacceptanceof the Tripartite Declaration, a third event—theeruptionof theKoreanWar—provedtobethefinalnail in thecoffin in regards toSovietspeculation of a Western-leaning Israel. TheKorean War broke out when the communistgovernment of North Korea commenced alarge-scale military invasion of South Korea,withthesupportof theSovietUnion.47Thus,when Israel sided with the United NationsSecurityCouncilincondemningNorthKorea’sactsof aggressionas abreachof peaceunderChapterVIIof theUNCharter,48theKremlinviewed this position as blatantly anti-Soviet.49

Stressing that Israel’s stanceon thewarwas inlinewiththesentimentsof theUnitedNations,ForeignMinisterMosheSharettemphasizedthatthe“IsraeliGovernmentdidnottakesidesinthegreatconflictbetweenEasternEuropeandtheWestern world.”50 According to Sharett, whileIsraelremainedneutralinthebipolarconflictof theColdWar, it “oppose[d] and condemn[ed]aggression wherever it may occur, [thussupporting]theSecurityCouncilinitseffortsto

putanendtothebreachof peaceinKoreaandtorestorepeaceinthearea.”51Yet,totheSovietUnion, criticizing a communist North Koreaimpliedcriticismof theSovietbloc ingeneral,andhence,Soviet-Israelirelationscontinuedtodeteriorate. TheEasternbloc’sgrowingskepticismof Israel’s“loyalty”hadinternalconsequencesaswell, catalyzinggravepolitical suspicionwithinthe bloc. The internal mistrust culminated inthe conspiracy accusations of Russian doctorsin1952andtopSovietbureaucrats in1953.Inthe highly publicized November 1952 SlánskýTrial, fourteen members of the CzechoslovakCommunistParty,elevenof whomwereJewish,were accused of imperialist conspiracy againstthe state.52Under torture, all confessed to thecrimes,andelevenweresubsequentlyexecuted,whiletheotherthreeweregivenlifesentences.53Sanctioned by Moscow, the show trial wasinfluencedbyStalin’spolicyof purgingcitizensthathedeemeddisloyal.54However,“astridentanti-ZionismdistinguishedtheSlánskýtrialfromearlierpurgesinotherEastEuropeancountries,”making it the first distinctly anti-Israel showtrialintheEasternbloc—oneinwhich“Sovietadvisers…encouraged Czech investigators tostressthedangersof apurportedworldZionistconspiracy.”55 With the sensationalist rhetoricof a global Zionist scheme, the orchestratedtrialwasalso“openlyanti-Semitic,”echoingthepropagandainTheProtocolsof theEldersof Zion.56Furthermore,“theJewishoriginof theaccusedwasrepeatedlystressedandtheirallegedcrimesweretracedtothisprimecause.”57 Just a few months later, a similarconspiracy allegation—called the Doctors’Plot—occurred in Moscow and “marked theculmination of state-sponsored anti-SemitismunderJosef Stalin.”58NineprominentRussian

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itself fromthebloc. Golda Meir’s visit to Moscow, theTripartite Declaration, and Israel’s stance ontheKoreanWar all played crucial roles in theSoviet Union’s questioning of Israel’s loyaltyto, and alliancewith, thepower that hadonceoffered it substantial assistance. With eachevent, Soviet attitude towards Israel becamemore hostile. The hostility also producedinternal mistrust, which coalesced in thePrague and Moscow “witch-hunts” of 1952and1953.TheKremlin’s growingdistrust also

catalyzedincreaseddisseminationof anti-Israelpropaganda in theSovietmedia.63As stated inthe Russian New Times, “In the brief periodof timeof itsnominalindependenceIsraelhasbecomeavassalof foreignimperialismineverysense of the word.”64 Such sentiments werefurtherreflectedinacademicliterature.ASovietencyclopedia from 1952, for example, claimedthattheStateof Israel“wasnotthedemocraticand independent state whose formation theSovietdelegationproposedattheUN,”andthatthose who had come to power in Israel were“bourgeois Jewish nationalists-Zionists, whoenjoyed US and British support.”65 Thus, theSovietblocbegananewchapterinitsrelationswith Israel, as it shifted from a role of active

“GoldaMeir’svisittoMoscow,theTripartiteDeclaration, and Israel’s stance on theKoreanWarall played critical roles in theSovietUnion’squestioningof Israel’sloyaltyto,andalliancewith,thepowerthathadonceoffereditsubstantialassistance.”

doctors,sixof whomwereJews,wereaccusedof conspiringwithWesternintelligenceservices,Zionists, and international Jewry to murdertop Soviet officials.59 On January 13, 1953,Pravda stated that the doctors “were recruitedby a branch-office of American intelligence—the international Jewish bourgeois-nationalistorganization called ‘Joint,’” and declared that“thefilthyfaceof thisZionistspyorganization…isnowcompletelyrevealed…[whichhas]struckablowagainst the international JewishZionistorganization.”60Israeliofficialscouldnotstandsilent in the matter. Foreign Minister MosheSharettdeclared:“This time, as in the case of the Praguetrial, the falseness of the indictmentsis inherently demonstrated…It was noaccidentthat11of the14accusedinthePraguetrialwereJews,norisitaccidentalthat at least 7 out of the 9 accusedphysiciansinMoscowandtheirallegedtwoliaisonagentsareJews…Thegovernmentof Israel has regarded friendship withthe USSR as one of the assets of itsinternational position and as a sourceof gratificationfor thewholeJewishpeople.It views with deep sorrow and graveanxiety the pernicious anti-Jewish courseofficialshaveadoptedintheUSSR,whichmust arouse vehement indignation andcondemnation on the part of the stateof Israel and the Jews throughout theworld.”61

The Slánský Trial andDoctors’ Plot debacles,whoseallegationswereultimatelyproventobefabricated,62didnotonlycreateunprecedentedhostilitybetweentheSovietblocandIsrael,butfor thefirst time,sawIsraelactivelydistancing


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supporttofervidcondemnation.

Causes for Soviet Shift, Part 2: Revisiting Soviet-Israeli Relations in the Late 1940s

Although the events discussedheretofore explain the demise in Soviet-Israelirelations,animportantquestionstilllingers:whydidtheSovietblocnotonlyhaltitssupportforIsrael, but also begin to back the state’s Arabopponents? The answer necessitates a criticalanalysis of Soviet intentions during the timein which the Eastern bloc maintained strongrelations with Israel. Revisiting this periodrevealsunderlyingmotivationsthatgovernedtheSovietbloc’sforeignpolicyintheMiddleEast,bothduringitsinitialsupportforIsraelanditslatersupportforArabstates.ViewingtheMiddleEastasaspaceof opportunity,theSovietblochad ambitions to acquire a strategic footholdin the region, while simultaneously mitigatingthepresenceof theWest.Recognitionof thesepoliticalobjectivesrevealsnotonlythereasonsforinitialSovietassistancetoIsrael,butalsoforthesubsequentshiftinMoscow’sforeignpolicytowardstheMiddleEast.Thus,evenwhentheSoviet bloc altered its foreign relations withintheMiddleEast,Iarguethattheshiftwasstillconsistentwith its primarymotivesof gaininginfluenceinthearea. The Soviet bloc’s support for theestablishment of the Israeli state was guidedby its ambition to eliminate the presence

of the strongest Western power in the area,Great Britain, while simultaneously gaining itsown footing in the Middle East.66 Therefore,“what brought the Soviet Union to thesupportof IsraelwerenotRussiansympathiesbut Moscow’s assessment that there was acoincidenceof interestswhichtheSovietscouldusetofostertheirownaims.”67FromtheSovietpoint of view, the Middle East was a “targetof the anti-colonial type in theworld struggleagainstcapitalism.”68Theemerginganti-colonialand nationalist sentiments in the Middle Eastthus facilitated Soviet endeavors in the region.TheSovietsspecificallydecidedtosupporttheestablishment of a Jewish state in Palestinebecause it granted them an opportunity toreduceGreatBritain’sinfluenceintheareawhileconcurrently establishing a Soviet outpost intheMiddleEast.Guidedbypoliciesof Socialistexpansionismandtheunderminingof Westerncolonialism, the Eastern bloc saw in Israel anopportunity to act upon these principles, andthus, “in the circumstances then prevailing,MoscowcoulddonobetterthanbackIsrael.”69 To further develop the claim that theSoviet bloc supported Israel because of ColdWar interests, we must investigate the Sovietattitude towards the region before the 1940s.Duringmost of the PalestineMandate period(1920-1948), Soviet support for Zionism wasessentiallynonexistent,andtheSovietUnioninfactopposedthecreationof aJewishhomelandintheregion.TheSovietsviewedZionismasa“bourgeoisaberration[,]asabastionof reactionthat was separating the Jewish masses fromthe Russian revolution[, and as a] tool of theimperialist,anti-proletarianentente.”70However,after World War II, when the opportunity toweakenanddestabilizeBritain’spresenceintheMiddleEastemerged, theSovietblocchanged

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its policy and supported the establishment of a Jewish state. Noting the aspirations of theJews in British-controlled Palestine for self-determination and independence, the Sovietsdecided to support the Israeli cause—thus“demonstrat[ing] that they would use anyavailable means to weaken the West in theregion”andestablishtheirownpresence.71

Delineatingthenatureof Sovietforeignpolicy,ArnoldKrammerwrites: “As far as theSovietUnionisconcerned,thereisonlyonekindof logicinforeignaffairs:thelogicof whatisbestfortheSovietUnion.”72RegardingitssupportforaJewishstateinPalestine,whatwasbestfortheSovietUnionwastoendBritishcontrol intheterritory“andcreateanindependentstatewhosefutureallegiance,eitherasaresultof gratitudeordiplomaticpressure,mightbedirectedtowardtheEasternbloc.”73However,during theyears

following1948,theSovietsfoundthemselvesinapredicament.SensingwhattheyperceivedtobeIsrael’sattractiontotheWest,theSoviets“begantonotewithdismaythelackof returnontheirdiplomaticinvestment.”74Infact,theiroriginalhopesinassistingIsraelnevercametofruitionas Israel’s independence “worked no miraclefor increased Soviet influence in the MiddleEast.”75 Growing Soviet disenchantment withthenew statewas clearly evident in thePolishDelegate’sspeechatthePlenaryMeetingof the

UNGeneralAssemblyinMay1949,whichwasintendedtoremindIsraelof itsindebtednesstotheSovietbloc:

“Theperiodof sentimental interestin thefateof Israelhascometoanend;an era of cooperation based on mutualinterest is beginning. The Jewish people,advancingalongpeacefulandprogressivelines, could rely on the assistance of Poland, the Soviet Republics and thePeople’s Democracies of Europe. Israelwill doubtless remember that thosecountrieshadbeen its true friendsat thetroubledtimeof itsemergence.Itwasnotlongsince theBritishForeignOfficehadtriedandfailedtopreventthecreationof Israel.”76

The stage was thus set for the Sovietestablishment of new alliances in the MiddleEast—but alliances that would nonethelessallowtheEasternbloctocontinuepursuingitsoriginalgoalsintheregion. An understanding of the Soviets’underlyingintentionsintheirinvolvementwithIsrael in the late1940sconsequentlyelucidatesthe biggest turning point in Soviet-Israelirelations—the successive Egyptian and Syrianarms deals. The withdrawal of British forcesfromEgypt created the right scenario for theSoviets to take a new course of action in theMiddle East. The approach, however, was infact based on the same ideologies that droveSoviet-Israeli relations only a few years earlier.TheSovietblocwasattractedtoEgyptbecauseof the state’s nationalist socialist sentiments,which went hand-in-hand with resistance toWesternimperialism.EspeciallycrucialwastheoppositionbyEgypt’s president,GamalAbdel


“The stage was thus set for the Sovietsto establish new alliances in the MiddleEast—ties that would allow the Easternbloc to continue pursuing its original goalsintheregion.”

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Nasser, to the so-called “Baghdad Pact”—atreaty thatwas advocatedby theUnitedStatesandGreatBritain to combat Soviet expansioninto Middle Eastern states. With Nasser’sresistanceto theWestern-producedagreement,First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev regardedEgypt as an important potential ally.77 WhenEgypt and Syria formed a military pact formutual defense in October 1955, the Sovietsviewedtheallianceasanotheractof resistanceto the US-led Baghdad Pact.78 Consequently,Khrushchev, “anxious to develop a strategyfor challenging the West…began to sell armsto Egypt and Syria in 1955 and 1956.”79 Thesimilarityof theseactionstothetacticsthattheSovietspreviouslyusedonIsraelwasuncanny.As Israeliminister Israel Eliashiv stated: “Theeliminationof Britishinfluenceintheareaistheprincipalgoal,andtoreachthisaim,theSovietUnionwillsupportEgyptineverything,justasitsupportedus,forthesamereason,in1947.”80Walter Laqueur echoes this point, writing that“Soviet leadership thinks in terms of powerpolitics,”andthus,“atthebottomof itsMiddleEastern policy, it’s neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel;itispro-Soviet.”81JustastheSovietbloc,insupportingtheestablishmentof Israel,notedprospects that served its interests, it observed,after its dissatisfaction with the state, similaropportunitiesinotherMiddleEasterncountries. Detecting “Arab regimes that werededicatingtheireffortstorevolutionarychange”andsocialistreform,the“Sovietsexploitedthenew,dynamicArabnationalismanditsdistrustof theWest.”82AstheseregimeswereindirectconflictwithIsrael,thenewalliancesrequiredaneven higher degree of Soviet hostility towardsthestate.ConcludingthatitssupportforIsraelhadprovenfruitless, theSovietblocredirecteditsdiplomacytowardstwootherMiddleEastern

states,EgyptandSyria,bothof whichpossessedstronganti-Israelpolicies.AstheUSSRobserved“the potential of harnessingArab antagonismagainst theWest touse for itsownbenefit,” itrecognizedthatit“couldbeeffectivelyrealizedonlyif theSovietUnionturnedagainstIsrael.”83

Therefore,

“[i]nthehopeof enlargingitsowninfluenceanddestroyingAmerican influence intheArab world, Russia proclaimed itself thepatronandprotectorof theArabcauseinthedisputewithIsraelandadvertisedtheUnitedStatesasthepatronandprotectorof Israel.”84

Shifting alliances, but staying committed to itsprincipal goals in the region, the Soviet blocabandoned its support for Israel and pursuedstrong relations with various Arab states—apolicythatitself necessitatedfurtheroppositionto Israel. From siding with Israel to shiftingits diplomacy to Arab countries, the Sovietstrategy in theMiddleEastwasalwaysoneof opportunism. Recognitionof theconsistentideologiesthat underscored Soviet involvement in theMiddleEastyieldsa logicalexplanationof the

subsequent actions taken by the Eastern bloc.Manyof theeventshavealreadybeendiscussedin the paper’s background section, but it isworthwhiletoreiteratesomeof theseinstancesinordertoshowthelong-termimplicationsof

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“...the Soviet strategy in theMiddle Eastwasalwaysoneof opportunism.”

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thepivotalforeignpolicychangesthatoccurredinthe1950s.Whenthe1956SuezWaroccurred,forexample,Khrushchev“wasabletoposeasthe protector of the Arabs while threateningtopunishtheBritish,FrenchandIsraelis[,andthus] by tying his fate to the nationalist Arabmovement led by Nasser, Khrushchev hadcapitulatedtheSovietUnionintoacentralroleinthearea.”85Moreover, intheyearsfollowingthe1955and1956armsdeals,otherArabstateslikeYemen,IraqandAlgeriareceivedsignificantSoviet military support.86 In summary, thissection has illustrated that the Soviet bloc’sfundamental objectives in the Middle East—extending its influence while underminingthat of the West—remained consistent evenas it redirected its alliances in the region. It ispreciselythesegoalsthatultimatelycatalyzedtheshift in Soviet relations with theMiddle East.In the following section, I will contextualizethe underlying intentions within the broaderdynamicsof ColdWarpolitics.

Two Attitudes in a Two-Pole World: Combining Parts 1 and 2

Thus far, this paper has utilizedtwo analytical approaches to understand thedramatic transformation in Soviet-Israelirelations in themid-20th century. Employing ahistoricallens,Ifirstisolatedfivepivotaleventsthat eachhighlightedMoscow’s speculationof Israeli alignment with the West and disloyaltyto the Soviet bloc. Such a methodologicalapproachallowsforanappreciationof specifichistoricalprocessesinexplainingcriticalpoliticaltransformations. I then revisited the seemingly

amicableSoviet-IsraeliperiodtoarguethattheSovietbloc’sprimarymotivationsintheMiddleEast—whether during its initial support forIsraeloritslateralliancewithArabstates—were

togainastrategicfootholdinthearea.Inlinkingthe historical and critical approaches, we canobservethatSovietinteractionswiththeMiddleEast were driven by two essential rules thatinfluencedColdWarpoliticsingeneral—internalmistrustandexternalexpansion.Understandingthese underlying principles of the Cold War“game”enablesustoviewthetopicathandasamicrocosmof thebroaderbipolarconflict. SovietsupportforIsraelisaninstructiveexample of the bipolar climate that markedinternational politics during theColdWar era.Theendof theSecondWorldWar resulted inthe emergenceof “theUSAand theUSSR astheworld-powerssurpassingallothersintermsof geographicalsize,naturalresources,militarypotential, and manpower.”87 As ideologicaltensions between the two superpowersdeveloped,bothsidesbegantoviewtheotherinpejorativewaysandquestionedactorswithintheirownbordersthatseemeddisloyal.Furthermore,the superpowers were determined to ensuretheirsecurityanddominancebygainingglobalspheresof influenceandattemptingtoremovethe other’s presence in these areas. Therefore,Soviet actions in theMiddleEastweremerelymanifestations of broader Cold War power


“...Soviet interactions with the MiddleEastweredrivenbytwoessentialrulesthatinfluenced ColdWar politics in general—internalmistrustandexternalexpansion.”

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relations, as the Soviet bloc attempted toascertainandexpanditsownglobalhegemony. Thegeostrategiclocationof theMiddle

East must also be stressed. Situated at theintersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa, theregion has long been viewed byworld powersas a nexus for communication, transportation,andtrade.88BecausetheMiddleEastis“locatedat a critical juncture of three continents…notsurprisingly,sinceWorldWarIIthisregionhasbeenthesourceof continuingcompetitionandfrequentfrustrationforthetwosuperpowers.”89

Therefore, the crucial geographic position of theMiddle East furthered the already existingUS-USSR rivalry for power, alliances, andinfluenceintheglobalarena.Boththehistoricaland critical analyses employed in this paperpointtothesebroaderColdWarobjectives,thusexhibitingthat“SovietpolicyintheMiddleEastcannotbeconsideredother than in relation tothe global balance and competition with theUnitedStates.”90Inotherwords,Sovietdealingsin theMiddleEastmust be understood “by acarefulexaminationof Sovietpolicyinitswiderframework as two expressionsof one and thesame objective.”91 Hence, the breakdown of Soviet-Israeli relations in the mid-20th centurymust ultimately be explicated via a broaderunderstandingof ColdWarpolitics. ViewingSoviet-Israelirelationsthroughthe “perspective of Moscow’s global strategiesand policies in this period,”92 a theoretical

paradigmthatcanappropriatelyencapsulatetheactionsandideologiesof theSovietbloctowardsIsrael,andtheMiddleEastingeneral,isrealism.Ininternationalrelations,realismisaframeworkthat views global affairs “as a struggle forpower among self-interested states.”93 Inotherwords,“poweristhecoreconceptof realism,”94

because, according to realists, it serves as “theultimate arbiter…of outcomes.”95 Through arealist lens, all states ultimately seek their owninterestsontheglobalstageandarewaryof themotivesof otherstates.Inturn,duetosuchapessimisticoutlook,hostility,rivalry,andconflictare seen as the inevitable forces directing theinternationalpoliticalarena. TheColdWarisanerathat,formanypolitical theorists, depicts the apex of therealistparadigminaction.StephenM.Walt,forexample,statesthat“realismwasthedominanttheoreticaltraditionthroughouttheColdWar…because it provided a simple but powerfulexplanation for war, alliances, imperialism,obstacles to cooperation…and because itsemphasis on competition was consistent withthe central features of the American-Sovietrivalry.”96Realismthusoffersahighlyappropriatelensthroughwhichtoviewthedeteriorationof Soviet-Israelirelationsinthelate1940sandearly1950s. The paradigm fits with the objectivesthatguidedSovietrelationsintheMiddleEast,whetherduringitsinitialsupportforIsraeloritseventualallianceswiththestate’sfoes. Employing a meta-level of analysisbasedonrealism,97subsequentbehaviorbytheSovietUnionintheMiddleEastcanbefurtherunraveled—especially in regards to the Arab-Israeliconflict.Ihavepreviouslytoucheduponsome examples, like the Arab-Israeli wars of 1953, 1967 and1973. Soviet involvementwiththePalestineLiberationOrganizationisanother

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“...Througharealistlens,allstatesultimatelyseek their own interests on the global stageandarewaryof themotivesof otherstates.”

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informative case in point. The Soviet blocwas relatively late in establishing ties with theorganizationbecauseit“didnotsee...anytacticalvalueinthePLOduringtheorganization’sfirstfewyearsof existence.”98Itisthusevidentthat“theprimarymotivationforSovietinvolvementinthePalestinianissueha[d]beenglobal-regionalrather than ideological considerations.”99ObservingSovietdealingswiththePLO,Golanargues that the “involvement ha[d] been of abasicallytacticalnature”100thatwas“determinedby the broader Soviet-Arab and especiallySoviet-US relationships.”101 In response to thesolidarityof AraballieswiththePLO,andthegrowingUSpresence in Israel andotherpartsof theMiddleEast,“theSovietsemphasizedthePalestinian issue…as a means of discreditingandblockingtheprogressof theUnitedStatesin the area.”102 Strikingly similar to the logicbehindtheSoviets’previoussupportforIsrael,therealtivelysuddensupportforthePalestiniancausewasguidedmainlybyregionalandglobalcircumstances rather than sincere solidarity.103

Soviet-PLO relations thus serve as anotherexample of the premise that Soviet “MiddleEast policywas dictatedfirst and foremost byits position vis-à-vis the United States and itspersistent jostling for advantage points in thebroaderColdWar.”104

The global-realist framework alsohelps explain the simultaneous developmentof US-Israelrelationsduringtheweakeningof Soviet-Israelities.TheUS,liketheSovietUnion,regardedtheMiddleEastasanareaof “political-military strategy” that could be used for“preventing the SovietUnion from expandingitspower.”105Consequently,itisnocoincidencethatasSoviet-Israeli relationsdisintegrated theUS took advantage of the vacuum and begandevelopingastrongrelationshipwiththestate.

The implications of the emerging US-Israelibondduringthedemiseof Soviet-Israelitiesareprofound, as the scenewas set for a powerfullinkagethathaspersistedforoverhalf acentury.Thetopicof American-Israeliforeignpolicyisoutside the realm of this paper and warrantsits own detailed discussion. However, for thepurposeof thisessay,areferencetothematteris sufficient in showing that a global-realistframeworkdoesnotonlyshedlightuponSovietactionsandtheirenduringeffectsintheMiddleEast,butthoseof theUnitedStatesaswell. In Soviet Decision Making in Practice,YaacovRo’istatesthatneithertheregionalnorglobalSovietinterestscanbeignoredinastudyof Soviet-Israelirelations.106Insuch,hesignalsthe importance of viewing specific politicalprocesses from a broader, systemic point of view.Inthecontextof thetimeperiodathand,that broader view is marked by the bipolarpoliticalclimateof theColdWar.Asthissectionhasshown,twokeycharacteristicsof theColdWarwereSovietandAmericanmistrustof theotherandeachsuperpower’sstruggleforglobalinfluence.Bothof theseattitudeswereapparentwithin Soviet-Israeli relations afterWorldWarII, and both are ultimately needed to unravelthe Soviet-Israeli enigma that introduced thispaper.Thefirst attitude––as evidencedby thispaper’s event-based historical analysis––showsthatSoviet-Israelirelationsdeterioratedbecauseof the Soviet bloc’s frustration with what itviewedasanincreasinglyWestern-leaningIsraelthatshowedlittleSovietallegiance.Thesecondoutlook explains both the Soviet bloc’s initialsupport for Israel and subsequent relationswith Arab states in conflict with the country.Consequently, the specific events delineated insection1andthegeneralforeignpolicyoutlookexplainedinsection2areultimatelytwosidesof


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thesamecoin,demonstratinghowbroaderColdWarmentalityaffectedtheactionsof theSovietblocbothwithinandoutsideitsborders.

Conclusion

Thispaperhasattemptedtoshedlighton an often overlooked, but integral, chapterin Soviet and modernMiddle Eastern historyby investigating the rise and dramatic fall of Soviet-Israeli relations in the1940s and1950s.Inthemid-20thcenturySovietsupportforIsraelplayedavitalroleinthestate’searlyhistory.Yet,within several years, the Soviet bloc assumedan antagonistic attitude towards Israel. I haveproposedatwo-foldthesistoexplainthisshift,arguingthatthedemiseinSoviet-Israelirelationsmust be understood via both a delineationof five key historical processes and a criticalanalysis of the underlying motivations duringtheperiodof strongSoviet-Israelirelations.Thetwoapproachespoint to fundamentalattitudesthat governed general Soviet behavior duringtheColdWar—bothintheMiddleEastandonamoreglobal scale.Within sucha framework,the rise and fall of Soviet-Israeli ties becomesjustoneexampleof broaderColdWarpolicies.Comprehending theprincipalSoviet intentionsin the Middle East, we can view the shift inSoviet-Israeli relations in the mid-20th centuryas fully consistent with previous actions bythe Soviet bloc. Thus, in order to properlyunderstand the disintegration of Soviet-Israelirelations, wemust view the demise through alensthatencompassesthebroaderdynamicsof thebi-polarclimatethatmarkedthepost-WorldWar IIperiod.Anawarenessof the ideologiesandobjectives that underscoredSoviet foreignpolicy in theColdWar era in turn has critical

implicationsforourunderstandingof historicalprocesses in the Middle East that extend farbeyondthemid-20thcentury.

1AvigdorDagan,MoscowandJerusalem(NewYork:Abelard-SchumanPress,1970),11.

2LesterSamuelEckman,SovietPolicytowardsJewsandIsrael:1917-1974(NewYorkCity:ShengoldPress,1974),77.

3AndreiGromyko,“SpeechattheFirstSpecialSessionof theUNGeneralAssembly,”May14,1947,inDocumentsonIsraeli-SovietRelations,1941-1953(Portland:FrankCassPublishers,2000).

4Ibid.5M.Mahmood,SovietPolicyTowardstheArab-Israeli

Conflict:1948-1988(NewDelhi:GianPublishingHouse,1989),127.

6Ibid.,22.7AldenH.Voth,MoscowAbandonsIsraelforthe

Arabs:TenCrucialYearsintheMiddleEast(Washington,D.C.:UniversityPressof America,1980),4.

8SurendraBhutani,IsraeliSovietColdWar(NewDelhi:ParnassusPublishers,1975),20.

9YaacovRo’i,SovietDecisionMakinginPractice:theUSSRandIsrael1947-1954(NewBrunswick:TransactionBooks,1980),141.

10Bhutani,20.11Ro’i,980145.12Bhutani,20.13Ibid.14Bhutani,vi.15M.Mahmood,27.16“Textof PrimeMinister’sAddresstoKnesset

Yesterday,”JerusalemPost,Oct.19,1955:2.17Ibid.18Voth,184.19Bhutani,48.20Voth,184.21M.Mahmood,80-81.

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22StevenL.Spiegel,“Soviet-AmericanCompetitionintheMiddleEast:AProfile,”inTheSoviet-AmericanCompetitionintheMiddleEast,ed.StevenL.Spiegel,MarkA.Heller,JacobGoldberg(Lexington:LexingtonBooks,1988),6.

23YaacovRo’i,“SovietPolicytowardtheSixDayWar,”inTheSovietUnionandtheJune1967SixDayWar,ed.YaacovRo’i(Stanford,California:StanfordUniversityPress,2008),20-21.

24MarkA.O’Neill,“AirCombatonthePeriphery:TheSovietAirForceinActionduringtheColdWar,1945-89,”inRussianAviationandAirPowerintheTwentiethCentury,ed.RobinD.S.Higham,JohnT.Greenwood,VonHardesty(Portland,Oregon:FrankCassPublishers,1998),227.

25MalcolmMackintosh.“TheMiddleEast,”inTheSovietImpactonWorldPolitics,ed.KurtLondon(NewYork:HawthornBoos,1974),106.

26GaliaGolan,SovietpoliciesintheMiddleEast:fromWorldWarTwotoGorbachev(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990),111.

37“TheSpeechof ComradeN.S.Khrushchev.”Pravda,30December1955:5.(R.Shimonov,Trans).

28Bhutani,vi.29Voth,241.Quotedfrom:Izvestia,Nov.29,1956:4.30Ibid.31Ro’i,1980,189.32ArnoldKrammer,TheForgottenFriendship:Israeland

theSovietBloc,1947-53(Chicago:Universityof IllinoisPress,1974),124.

33Ro’i,1980,142.34Ibid.,146.35Ibid.,186.36Ibid.,206.37Ibid.,203.38Ibid.,145.39Krammer,129.40Bhutani,29.41Voth,126.

42Voth,127.43Bhutani,29.44M.Mahmood,24-25.45Voth,127.46“Reportof theUSSRMissionintheStateof

IsraelforthePeriodfromtheFormationof theStateinMay1948toDecember1949,”TelAviv,Mar.10,1950,inDocumentsonIsraeli-SovietRelations,1941-1953(Portland:FrankCassPublishers,2000).

47Voth,128.48Ibid.,129.49Bhutani,30.50Voth,130.51Ibid.QuotedfromForeignRadioBroadcasts,

‘DailyReport’,No.129,Jul.5,1950:1.52AvigdorDagan,“SlánskýTrial,”inEncyclopaedia

Judaica.ed.MichaelBerenbaumandFredSkolnik.2nded.Vol.18(Detroit:MacmillanReferenceUSA,2007),665.

53BenjamirFrommer,“SlánskýTrial,”inEuropeSince1914:Encyclopediaof theAgeof WarandReconstruction,ed.JohnMerrimanandJayWinter.Vol.4.(Detroit:CharlesScribner’sSons,2006),2356-2357.

54Ibid.,2356.55MichalFrankl,“SlánskýTrial.”YIVOEncyclopedia

of JewsinEasternEurope.http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Slansky_Trial(accessedDecember6,2010).

56Dagan,2007,665.57Ibid.58DavidBrandenberger,“Doctors’Plot,”in

Encyclopediaof RussianHistory,ed.JamesR.Millar.Vol.1(NewYork:MacmillanReference,2004),404.

59ArnoldKrammer,65.60P.R.Wolfe,trans.,“ViciousSpiesandKillersunder

theMaskof academicPhysicians,”Pravda,Jan.13,1953:1.(accessedfromhttp://www.cyberussr.com/rus/vrach-ubijca-e.html).

61AvigdorDagan,1970,66-68.62JonathanFrankel,“Doctor’sPlot,”inEncyclopaedia

Judaica.ed.MichaelBerenbaumandFred


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Skolnik.2nded.Vol.5(Detroit:MacmillanReferenceUSA,2007),728;Frommer,2357.

63Bhutani,31.64Ibid.65Ibid.,32-33.66Dagan,1970,22.67Dagan,1970,24;emphasismine.68Eckman,79.69Ibid.,77.70IvoJ.LedererandWayneS.Vucinich.The

SovietUnionandtheMiddleEast(Stanford,California:HooverInstitutionPress,1974),9.

71Spiegel,5.72Krammer,39.73Ibid.,40.74Ibid.,200.75Voth,122.76Voth,119.Quotedfrom:PolishRepresentative

Drohojewski,“UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,PlenaryMeetingof theGeneralAssembly,”OfficialRecords,May11,1949.

77Ibid.,194.78Ibid.,204.79Spiegel,6.80ArthurJayKlinghofferandJudithApter

Klinghoffer,IsraelandtheSovietUnion:AlienationorReconciliation?(Boulder:WestviewPress,1985),22.

81WalterZ.Laqueur,“SovietPolicyandJewishFate.”Commentary22no.4(Oct.1956),303-12.

82JohnC.Campbell,“TheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatesintheMiddleEast.”Annalsof theAmericanAcademyof PoliticalandSocialScience401(May1972),127.

83Voth,107.84J.C.Hurewitz,“Originsof theRivalry,”inSoviet

AmericanRivalryintheMiddleEast,ed.J.C.Hurewitz(NewYork:TheAcademyof PoliticalScience,1969),1.

85Spiegel,6.86Hurewitz,10-11;GeoffreyKemp,“Strategyand

ArmsLevels,1945-1967,”inSovietAmerican

RivalryintheMiddleEast,ed.J.C.Hurewitz(NewYork:TheAcademyof PoliticalScience,1969),23.

87M.Mahmood,16.88Bhutani,12.89Spiegel,3.90Campbell,130.91Ro’i,1980,502.92Ibid.,399.93StephenM.Walt,“InternationalRelations:One

World,ManyTheories.”ForeignPolicyno.110(Spring1998),31.

94J.SamuelBarkin,“RealistConstructivism.”InternationalStudiesReview5,no.3(2003),327.

95Ibid.,334.96Walt,31.97Hereafter,thisapproachwillbereferredtoasthe

“global-realistframework.”98GaliaGolan,1990,110.99GaliaGolan,“TheSovietUnionandthePLO

sincetheWarinLebanon,”MiddleEastJournal40,no.2(1986),285.

100Ibid.101Golan,1990,110.102Ibid.103Ibid.104Ro’i,2008,3.105Campbell,127.106Ro’i,1980,145.

Ruben Shimonov is majoring inInternationalStudies,NearEasternStudies,andJewishStudiesattheUniversityof Washington.His research interests include foreign relationsamongMiddleEasternstatesandNearEasternethnic and religiousminorities.He is currentlyapplyingtodoctoralprogramsinNearEasternStudies.This article is a revisedversionof hisJackson School Qualifying Paper, advised byProfessorJoelMigdal.PapereditedbyCharmilaAjmera.

Ruben Shimonov

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Asoneof theworld’smostpopular touristdestinations,Hawaiireceivesaconcentrated

flow of profit and investment from tourismyear-round.Throughout the 20th and into the21st centuries,macroeconomic indicators haveconsistentlydemonstratedthattourism,amongtheagriculturalandtechnologicalindustriesalsooperating on the Islands, is Hawaii’s primarydriver of economic growth.Contributingover$10 billion a year to the state’s Gross StateProduct (GSP), tourism is the state’s foremostsourceof jobsandforeignexchange.ThisleadstothereasonableassumptionthattheHawaiianssupplyingthetourismindustrywithlabor,skills,

and resources reap the financial benefits andpossessafavorableviewof theindustry.Butinreality, the State of Hawaii’s tourism industry,and the settler society that has grownwith it,have encountered opposition and hostility onthepartof NativeHawaiians.Theinconsistencybetween economic gains and Native attitudesin Hawaii begs the question: why do NativeHawaiiansresisttourism?Unswayedbytourism’scommercialbenefits,NativeHawaiianresistancederives from the contradictions of profitrelocation, political neocolonialism, ecologicaldestruction, and cultural commodificationthat the tourism industry inflicts on Native

Abstract Although the Hawaiian tourism industry is the primary source of growth for the state economy, Native Hawaiians generally oppose and in many cases actively protest tourism in Hawaii.The State of Hawaii’s dependence on tourism stifles economic diversification and siphons money out of Hawaii to foreign investors. To some extent, this dictates the state’s political agenda, directing state funds to tourism developments and away from initiatives that would protect the very culture and environment that make Hawaii an attractive tourist destination. For the Native Hawaiian community, these economic and political contradictions manifest themselves in unstable housing, security, and employment. Many Natives, by economic necessity, participate in tourism as employees while simultaneously opposing its destructive effects on Hawaii and Native Hawaiian culture. Ultimately, Native opposition to tourism is part of a larger fight against violations of Native Hawaiian rights to property, self-sufficiency, and self-determination.

Contradiction and CommodificationNative Hawaiian Resistance To Tourism

Genevieve Gebhart

Jackson School Focus

Autumn 2010 67

communities. This paper will explore thesocioeconomic, environmental, and culturalissues surrounding the Native Hawaiianexperienceof tourism.PartIwillprovideabrief background of foreign occupation in Hawaii,toputmodern tourism in a historical context.Part IIwill examine the effectsof tourismonHawaii’s economic and political structures.Part III will highlight specific socioeconomicoutcomesof thisinteractionbetweenHawaiiansociety and the tourist economy, and Part IVwill discuss the conflict between Native ideasregardinglandandtouristiclanduse.PartVwilldiscussNativeHawaiianresistancetotourismaspartof a largerstruggle forself-determinationand Native sovereignty. Finally, Part VI willreflect on the consequences of contradictionandcommodification,andonNativeHawaiianvisionsforHawaii’sfuture.

Part I: Background

Tourists are never the first strangersto penetrate Native societies; explorers,missionaries, and government representativesall precede the tourist influx. These priorencounters determine subsequent indigenousattitudes toward foreign visitors.1 EncountersbetweenNativeHawaiians and foreignvisitorsbegan with Captain James Cook in 1778. Heandhiscrewbroughtdiseasesthatwipedout90percentof thepopulationinlessthan70years.2Externalinfiltrationcontinuedthroughthe19thcentury,whenProtestantmissionariesobtainedNativelandthroughapurchasingprocessknownas the “greatmahele,” or “great division.”ThisprivatizationprocessupendedNativeHawaiiansociety’s system of collective land ownership.

Land privatization led to the establishment of sugar caneplantations, increasing thepresenceof foreign laborerstosuchanextremethatby1900NativeHawaiiansrepresentedonlyhalf theIslands’ totalpopulation. 3 In1920 theUnitedStatespassedalawstrictlydefining“Native”asthose with one-half blood quantum of thoseinhabitingtheIslandsbefore1778.ManyNativesfoundithardtoprovesuchanextendedlineage,resultinginwhatsomerefertoasanexternallyimposed“planneddisappearance”of theNativepeople.4

The Hawaiian tourism industrybegan in themidst of this drastic decrease inthe Native population. In 1901, the MatsonNavigation Company, a shipping company,added several passenger ships to its fleet andestablishedtheMoanaHotelatWaikiki,thefirstin the territory.American interest inHawaiianvacationsgrewthroughoutthe1920s,andbythe1930sHawaiibegantoformatouristeconomy.5

In 1934, promptedby the restrictionof sugarimports imposedby theU.S.SugarAct, settlerplantersbegantopushforstatehoodinordertoachievemoreopentrade.6Inadditiontoafreerflowof goods,statehoodmeantgreatereaseof travel – and, therefore, of tourism – betweenthemainlandandtheIslands.Hawaiiantourismexperienced a boom after World War II, asAmericanlivingstandardsrose,workyearsgrewshorter,andemployeesinindustrializedWesterncountriesreceivedlongerpaidvacations.7Rapidimprovementincommercialtransportationandmarketing strategies also contributed to thisexplosivegrowth.8

By 1982, the number of visitors toHawaii in one year had surpassed the fourmillionmark for the first time.9 At the sametime,foreigninvestmentintourismskyrocketedto$1.5billionin1986,from$70.8millionjust

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fouryearsearlier.10Inthe21stcentury,tourismconsistentlyprovidesuptoone-thirdof Hawaii’sGSP,jobs,andgovernmentrevenueseachyear.11

Visitorsperyearpeakedin2007with7.6millionpeople,and—althoughhighfuelpricesandtheglobal recession in 2008 slowed the flow of

tourists—theIslandsstillsaw6.5millionvisitorsin2009.12Thesenumbersrevealastatemarketinwhichvirtuallyalleconomicactivityrevolvesaroundlocalssupplyinggoodsandservicesforvisitingconsumers.

Part II: Tourism’s Economic and Political Consequences

The ascent of tourism to a globalindustry worth billions of dollars informs theinterests and investments of both Hawaiianand foreign actors. Financially, the system iscontrolled by a combination of national andtransnational investors, from governments,landowners, and banks to speculators andrealtors. Companies dependent on tourism,like airlines and hotel chains, engage in thesystemashorizontally andvertically integrated“growth machines.”13 Private investors, inthis system, have acquired an enormous holdon the development trajectories of Hawaiian

communities.14 International developers bidagainsteachotherforcountyapprovalof landgrants and building projects, and approvalessentially results in complete control of theeconomic stratificationof Hawaiiancounties.15In turn, counties in Hawaii promise taxbreaks, build infrastructure, and bargain withdevelopers to ensure touristic development of their land.16 Increasing dependence on suchcorporateinvestmentshasshapedtheeconomicstructureof everycountyinHawaii.17HonoluluCounty, for example, has profited enormouslyfromtouristicdevelopment:resortspaya largeshare of the county’s tax base, attract affluenttourists,andpavethewayformorerestaurantsand storefronts to absorb spending, renderingHonoluluCountytherichest inthestate.Suchgeographic stratification illustrates the impacttourismdevelopmenthasontheStateof Hawaii. This kind of development hashistorically excluded offshoot growth in, andcontribution to, resident Hawaiian society.At the most basic level, growth in tourismcomesatthecostof otherindustries,primarilyagriculture, aquaculture, and technologicaldevelopment.18 This zero-sum relationshipstifles economic diversification to the pointthat tourism has become “the only game intown.”19UnfortunatelyforNativeHawaiiansinneed of jobs and financial security, tourism isconsistently the lowest-paying industry amongthosementionedabove.Inaddition,itisuniqueamong Hawaiian industries in that profits arealmost without exception repatriated backto developers’ home countries—most oftenJapan, theUnited States,Taiwan,HongKong,Canada, or Australia.20 Thus, the money thattourismseemstobringintoHawaiiisinactualityfunneledawayfromtheIslandstoasmallupper-echelon of foreign investors, leaving the state

“Increasing dependence on corporateinvestmentshasshapedtheeconomicstructureof everycountyinHawaii.”

Genevieve Gebhart

Autumn 2010 69

and its individual residentswith relatively littleprofit to show for their economicdependenceontourism. Politically, such economic siphoningabroadisconsideredaformof neocolonialism.21

This neocolonialism is evident in theNative Hawaiian experience of “control bymultinationalcorporationsof formerterritorialcolonies.”22ColonialcontroloverHawaiiisstillpresent; power has simply been transferredfrom a colonial American government to themultinational corporations powering touristicdevelopment. True Hawaiian independencehasfallenshortof afunctionallyself-sufficienteconomic condition. Indeed, foreign visitorexpenditures supply such a significant fractionof grossstateproductandgovernmentrevenue– about one-third, with some estimates evenattributing up to 43 percent of revenues totourismactivity–that,tosomeextent,corporateinterests dictate the interests of the State of Hawaii.23

Such influence becomes especiallyevident when one compares state spendingon tourism-related agencies to efforts toperpetuate Native culture and support Nativecommunities.24In1991,forexample,whentheGulf Warsetoff adramaticdeclineinvisitorstoHawaii,theHawaiianStateLegislatureallocatedover$6milliontofundtelevisionadvertisementsin the continental U.S. publicizing Hawaiiantourism. Emergency measures to assist hotelemployees laid off in the downturn, however,were not introduced or even considered.25Collectively, Hawaii’s politicians “tend to beunwilling to probe too deeply into [tourism’s]impacts,”withtheresultthatstatepolicyfavorsfurther development at the expense of NativeHawaiians.26Identifiedbythestate’sDepartmentof Business and Economic Development as

the“primarygrowthenginefortheforeseeablefuture,” the tourism industry is often exemptfrom critical examination from the very stateinstitutionsintendedtorestrictitsexcesses.28

Part III: Socioeconomic effects of tourism in Hawaiian society The socioeconomic consequences of thiskindof neocolonialismmanifestthemselvesin vital aspects of Native life, particularlysecurity, housing, and employment. Whiletourismmeansleisureforvisitors,itmeansworkforlocals.Inafurthercontradiction,touristsasagroupwieldbothignoranceof andimmenseeconomic control over their relations withNativeHawaiians.28Thisasymmetrycanescalateintoviolence,bothacute,as inphysicalcrimesagainst people and property, and structural,as in the systematic constraint of a group’sopportunities in society by poverty, inequality,

and exclusion.29 In a stark example of thisviolence, Native Hawaiians, though a mere3 percent of the total population, represent

“...the money that tourism seems to bringintoHawaii is in actuality funneled awayfrom the Islands to a small upper-echelonof foreign investors, leaving the state andits individual residentswith relatively littleprofittoshowfortheireconomicdependenceontourism.”


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the highest percentage of unemployment andwelfarerecipients,andconstituteamajorityof theprisonpopulation.30Theseoutcomesarenotinevitable,butrathercanbeexplainedinpartbytheinteractionbetweenthetouristeconomyandHawaiiansociety. Independent economists andcriminologistsreportthattourismis“thesinglemost powerful factor in Oahu’s crime rate,”providing a particularly disquieting lens ontourism’seffects.31Touristsaremostoftenthevictimsof crimeinHawaii;thestate’sreputationas a “high-crime” state is due to itshigh ratesof larceny,aswellasotheropportunisticcrimes,suchasburglaryandrobbery.32Whilesomearguethat tourism’s boost to the economy dampensthe crime rate, it may also unintentionallycreate environments conducive to crime byperpetuatinganti-touristsentimentamonglocalswith unwelcome development projects andproposals.33Whiletouristsareoftenthetargetsof this tension, they are also inmanyways itscause,astheirpresenceimposesacombinationof physicalandfinancialvulnerabilityonlocals. Throughitsextensivecontroloverlandandlaborresources,thetourismindustryexertsstructural violence against Native Hawaiiansin the form of insecure property rights andjobopportunities.Landuseproposals forgolf coursesorhotelscommonlydisplaceHawaiianswhohavelivedinthesameplaceforgenerations.34Asthecostof livingrisesinHawaiiduetothepresenceof visitorpopulations—aphenomenondiscussed in more detail in Part III—morelocal families find themselves close to losingtheirhomes.Infact,Hawaiihastheworstratioof average family income to average housingcosts of all fifty states,with families spendingan average of 52 percent of gross incomeonhousing.35 Similarly, the tourism industrydoes

notofferNativeHawaiianseffectivemechanismsforeconomicmobility.Withindustrywageslowand advancement rare, tourism employees areat themercy of external factors like changingfashions or worldwide depression.36 Further,the “imperialistic” dominance discussed above

forces labor markets to develop to serve theneeds of primarily American and Japanesevisitors and investors.The problem is less theemployment structureof the tourism industry,andmore tourism’s overwhelming dominationof theHawaiianjobmarket, leavingHawaiianswithfewemploymentalternatives.

Part IV: Conflicts over use of Native land

From American missionaries’ maheleof the 19th century to today’s multinationalcorporations,thelossof Nativerightsamidsttherapidgrowthof tourismispartof alonghistoryof the forced removal of Native Hawaiiansfrom their land.Akeymoment in thishistoryistheannexationof Hawaiiin1898,whentwomillionacresof landinHawaiibecamepartof theUnited Stateswithout any compensation.37

“Colonial control over Hawaii is stillpresent; power has simply been transferredfromacolonialAmericangovernmenttothemultinationalcorporationspoweringtouristicdevelopment.”

Genevieve Gebhart

Autumn 2010 71

Since then,billionsof dollarsof revenuehavebeen generated on that land, primarily thedominanttouristindustry.NativeHawaiiansseethisasatangiblelegaltrespass.Consequently,amain tenant of Native Hawaiian resistance totourismisthereclamationof Nativeland. Atthisissue’scenteristhefundamentalconflict between “land that is collectively heldand land that is individually owned,” that is,betweenNativeHawaiian ideasabout landandthe tourism industry’s use of it.38 For NativeHawaiians,landhasdeepmeaningasasourceof sociallife,spirituality,andculturalidentity.TheHawaiianlanguagereflectsthecentralityof landtoHawaiianidentity:forexample,land(ko’uaina)takes a form of the possessive that indicatesinherency, which establishes land as equal inimportance to one’s body or one’s family.39NativeHawaiiansupholdanobligation to takecareof theland,anditfeedsandsupportsthemin turn; this relationship is thus both “familialandreciprocal.”40Inaculturalsense,noonecanownland,asitisacommunalresourcetowhichallNativeHawaiians have birthright.41Despitethe largely “symbolic acknowledgement” the1920 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act’seffortsmadetorestoreNativestothisbirthright,Native Hawaiians still find themselves deniedaccess to landbecauseof administrative limitsonbloodquantum.Whatlandtheyaregrantedis often incapable of sustaining agriculturaldevelopment or economic diversification, andtenancy is granted instead ownership, leavingNativeshighlydisplaceable.42

To the tourism industry, land is seenas property whose development will enhanceits value and potentially profitable uses. Suchuse has effectively stripped Hawaiians of thisbirthrightandbuilthotelsandresortcomplexesinitsstead.Perhapstheindustry’smostdamaging

act against Hawaiian land, and against theNativecultureitsustains,hasbeentoencouragevisitors to purchase land. The movementto sell permanent real estate in addition totemporary hotel rooms has transformed thevisitor experience into a long-term sales pitch.These tourists-cum-residents have contributedto growing population density; in some partsof Honolulu, density is among the highest intheworld.Evenmorefundamentalthanoverallpopulation increase, however, is the relativeNativepopulationdecrease,asthearrivalof newforeign residents dilutes Native numbers. Thepresence of this new, affluent demographic inHawaiialsobringsdemandformoreexpensivegoodsand,inthelongrun,highercostsof livinganddecreasingpercapitaincomeforindigenouspeople.43

Megaresortdevelopments,whichcreateanall-encompassingtouristexperience,alsohaveseriousdislocationeffects.Lackingplanningorforesight,suchdevelopmentsfrequentlyviolateresourceuseproceduresandimportantculturalsites.44Megaresorts’irresponsibleusesof waterhave historically attracted resident protest: onMolokai, protestors vandalized pipelines thatwere diverting water fromMolokai farms andranchestohotels.Excavationof burialgroundsis an additional common consequence of therush to complete construction. Communityopposition to such excavation and relocationhas led to the creation of the StatewideBurials Council (SBC). The SBC cites theimpact of tourism development on significantarchaeologicalsiteslikethatatKeonaloa,Kauai,and Honokahua, Maui, as a primary concern.Suchinstancesof activismonthepartof NativeHawaiiansillustratestheircontinuingoppositiontothe industrythatdominatestheirstate.Thisdomination,unfortunately,hasmadeitdifficult


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foranythingbutsmall-scaleproteststosucceed. Poorly planned resort installation alsooftenleadstounforeseenenvironmentaleffects,whichtherapidnatureof constructionrendersboth easy and profitable for developers toignore.The list of environmental problems towhichtourismhascontributedisextensiveanddetailed,andthispapercannotclaimthescientificscopetoexaminetheirseverity.Afewexamples,however, illustrate clear trendsof overuse andcontaminationof naturalresources–thesamenaturalresourcesthatareconsideredcommunalbirthright inNativeculture,andattractforeignvisitors.Implicitindevelopers’useof landisthedestructionof thesamepristine,naturalsettingsthat such resorts so successfully advertise.Thoughsewagepollution,diminishedairquality,contaminated watersheds, and the highestnumber of extinct and endangered plants and

animals in theUnitedStateshave led the stateto implementmore environmentally consciousregulations,theStateof Hawaiilacksthecapitalto consistently enforce such rules.45 Ironicallyenough,mostof thefundsthatcouldbedirectedtosuchregulationarecurrentlyusedtosupportstate tourism agencies. Clearly, the competingpriorities of environmental protection andtouristic development have crippled the state’sability to effect pragmatic changes in resourceallocationandmanagement.

Part V: Native resistance and the commodification of culture

Though Hawaiian residents cannotaffordtooptoutof involvementinthetourismagency,neitherhaveNativecommunitiesignoreditsimpacts.Variousactorshavemadetourismapriority in the largerfight forNativeHawaiianrights.GroupsactivetodayincludetheHawaiianEcumenical Coalition on Tourism, which hasspecifically advocated for more responsibletourismviaits1989declarationandinternationalpress releases, and the Office of HawaiianAffairs (OHA),whichwas established in 1978to“workforthebettermentof HawaiiansandNativeHawaiians.”46Sincethen,theOHAhasplayed a crucial role in monitoring the state’sobligationstoNativeHawaiiansandpromotingawiderawarenessof Nativeculture. Opposition to tourism in Nativecommunities is widespread. Nearly three-quarters of Hawaii’s population opposes newhotel construction, and although polls sincethe 1980s have uncovered mixed opinionsregarding the link between tourism andeconomic and environmental realities, themood isoverwhelminglyoneof opposition toenvironmental and cultural abuse.47Hawaiians’perceptions of the central contradictions of tourism–economicgrowthat theexpenseof environmentalandculturalpreservation–reflectfrustrationand,perhaps,areluctantacceptanceof the Islands’ political economy. Ultimately,Nativeoppositiontotourismispartof alargerfight against violations of Native Hawaiianrights to property, self-sufficiency, and self-

“Implicit in developers’ use of land is thedestruction of the same pristine, naturalsettings that such resorts so successfullyadvertise.”

Genevieve Gebhart

Autumn 2010 73

determination.Intheplaceof contradictionandcommodification, Native Hawaiians demandrespect and recognition: respect for Nativeland, and legal recognition of their uniqueindigenousclaimtoit.Historically,thetourismindustryhasfailedtodeliveronbothaccounts.Native Hawaiian scholar Huanani-Kay Trask,in response to this longhistoryof abuses,hascalledforacompleteremovalof visitors fromHawaii,writing that if tourists are thinkingof “visiting[her]homeland,pleasedon’t.Wedon’twantorneedanymoretourists…if youwanttohelpourcause,pleasepass thismessageon toyourfriends.”48

Theeconomicnecessityof participationin tourism as employees rendersNatives bothactors in and witnesses to the degradation of theirlifestyleandculture.Thisprocessisbothacombinationof thecontradictionsinthelong-term tourism model discussed above, and asystematic commodification of Native culture.Tourism turns attractive characteristics of theHawaiianenvironmentand lifestyle intoprofit,and in theprocessdestroys thevery attributeson which its marketing campaigns are based.Resort advertisements and travel brokersadvertise a laid-back, worry-free existence setamongidyllicbeachesandbeautifullandscapes.Their success in attracting paying visitors totheselocales,however,necessarilyresultsinthedestructionof those desirable conditions.The“logicalinconsistenciesof sellingplace”thatareinherenttotourismrenderfinancialsuccessandculturalauthenticitymutuallyexclusive.49 Inreality,tourismdoesnotmarkettheHawaiianculture,butanexplicitlycommodifiedversion.Itisintheindustry’sinteresttomaintaintheillusionof anidealized“Hawaiian”lifestyleandstateof mind;thismeanspackagingHawaiiancultureinawaythatignorestheseverityof the

economic inequalities discussed earlier. Thefunctionof tourism–which,sadlyenough,theStateof Hawaiihasunabashedlysupported–isto turn these cultural commodities intoprofit,operating on the damaging assumption thatNativecultureisonlyasimportantasitsdollarvalue.Thispackagedversionof culturereducestraditional Hawaiian customs to caricatures:plastic leis, cellophane grass skirts, hotel-sponsored luas,andsexualizedhuladancesarejustafewexamples.50Aboveall,thisneocolonialcommercialization further alienatesNatives. Inan actof sobering irony,Natives ground theirresistance to tourism in the same traditionalvalues of land use and communal culture thatthe tourism industry has manipulated to sellHawaiiasaproduct.

Part VI: Conclusion Tourism is a system with significanteconomic, political, ecological, and socialconsequences, and its presence in Hawaiiconstitutes the latest chapter in a long historyof NativeHawaiianmarginalization.51Tourismis not an indigenous practice, but is rathercontrolledbyforeigninvestorswithlittleinterestintheshortorlongtermeffectsof developmenton local environments and culture.52 Foreigncontrol of land results in the socioeconomic,political, and cultural oppression of NativeHawaiian people, and in the degradation of Hawaii’s environment. Resistance movementshave developed because the growth of thetourism industry benefits only a small groupof external actors, negatively affects Nativequality of life, and ignores the significance of Native culture. In this light, Native Hawaiianresistancetotourismreflectsthegreaterissueof


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indigenoussovereignty. Paradoxically, residents both laud thetourism industry for its perceived economicbenefits, and condemn it for the social andenvironmental costs it imposes. This finalcontradiction raises the question: how canall of the stakeholders in Hawaiian tourismplan for optimal tourism development?WhileNative scholars like Trask have called for acomplete halt to tourism, many would arguethattourismissimplytooinherenttoHawaiianeconomic activity to be completely rejected.The significant thing to remember, however,is that in many ways tourism perpetuates theoppressionof NativeHawaiians that began intheearly20thcentury.Eachsuccessivewaveof external infiltration has been characterized bydisregard for traditional culture, environmentalsustainability, and indigenous rights. As thispaper has explored, tourism in particular hasgiven rise to Native resistance. Regardless of the economic presence it may hold, tourismcontinues tobeanunwelcomeforce inNativecommunities.Native resistance is grounded inthedrivetoimaginenewrealitiesforHawaii,adrive stronger than the tourist culture thathastakenholdof theland.

1ErikCohen,“TheSociologyof Tourism:Approaches,Issues,andFindings,”AnnualReviewof Sociology10(1984):381.

2Actsof War:TheOverthrowof theHawaiianNation,videocassette,directedbyPuhipauandJoanLander(Na’alehu,HA:CrossCurrentMedia,1993).

3JohnHeffner,“BetweenAssimilationandRevolt:AThirdOptionforHawaiiasaModelforMinoritiesWorld-Wide,”TexasInternationalLawJournal37,no.3(2002):595.

4Huanani-KayTrask,FromaNativeDaughter:ColonialismandSovereigntyinHawai’i(Honolulu:Universityof Hawai’i,1999),26.

5SusanSmulyan,“LiveFromWaikiki:Colonialism,Race,andRadioinHawaii,1934-1963,”HistoricalJournalof Film,RadioandTelevision27,no.1(2007):62-75.

6Ibid.,69.7Cohen,376.8ManselG.Blackford,“EnvironmentalJustice,

NativeRights,Tourism,andOppositiontoMilitaryControl:TheCaseof Kaho’olawe,”TheJournalof AmericanHistory91,no.2(2004):551.

9JuanitaC.LuiandTurgutVar,“ResidentAttitudesTowardTourismImpactsinHawaii,”Annalsof TourismResearch13(1986):193-214.

10KaleoPatterson,“Tourism’sNegativeImpactonNativeHawaiians,”(speech,InternationalTourismFair,Berlin,1992).

11LukaszDarowski,JordanStrilchuck,JasonSorochuk,andCaseyProvost,“NegativeImpactof TourismonHawaiiNativesandEnvironment,”LethbridgeUndergraduateResearchJournal1,no.2(2006).

12ChadBlair,“Hawaiivisitorarrivalsfell4.5%in2009,”PacificBusinessNews,January26,2010,http://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2010/01/25/daily16.html.

13Ibid.,232.14PenelopeCananandMichaelHennessy,“The

GrowthMachine,Tourism,andtheSellingof Culture,”SociologicalPerspectives32,no.2(1989):227.

15Ibid.,139.16Trask,145.17Patterson.18Ibid.19Trask,140.20Ibid.,139.21Cohen,376.22Ibid.,102.23Patterson.24Darowski.

Genevieve Gebhart

Autumn 2010 75

25Patterson.26JoanConrow,“TooMuchof aGoodThing?

HawaiiActivistsChallengeNewTourismPromotion,”SierraJuly2000:21-22.

27Ibid.28Trask,136.29Uvin,103.30Darowski.31MedaChesney-Lind,“SalientFactorsinHawaii’s

CrimeRate,”NationalCriminalJusticeReferenceService(Manoa:Universityof Hawaii,1983).

32JohnM.KnoxandAssociates,Inc,Effectsof TourismonRatesof SeriousCrimeinHawai’i,(Honolulu:Hawai’iStateDepartmentof theAttorneyGeneral,2004).

33Chesney-Lind,181.34Patterson.35Trask,139.36Cohen,386.37Heffner,596.38Trask,107,Canan232.39Trask,119.40Ibid.,141.41Dinstell,29.Heffner,596.42Ibid.43Canan,229.44Conrow,22.45Blackford,557.46Heffner,598.47Liu,Blair.48Trask,146.49Canan,238.50Ibid.51Walker,593.52Patterson.

Genevieve Gebhart is asophomore in the UW Honors Programand Jackson School of International Studies.ProfessorTonyLucero sparkedher interest instudyingNativeHawaiian sovereignty, and shewrote this paper for his SIS 200 class in the

winterof 2010.SheiscurrentlyresearchingtheSpanish-American War and its relation to theAmericanannexationof Hawaii.

PapereditedbyJulieMendel.


Autumn 2010 77

Expert Insights

For this issue, we feature two graduate students in the Jackson School, Meredith Bauer and Randy Thompson. Both Meredith and Randy have served as Teaching Assistants in Jackson School classes and are currently pursuing their own research for their respective masters theses. They are each featured in an interview, which can be found below. Meredith has also written a piece on her experiences designing field work and research for her masters thesis, including pertinent tips and advice for undergraduate students. Randy has contributed a piece that profiles his research, which focuses on the namesake of our program: Henry M. Jackson. We hope that this section will serve as a source of valuable insights and advice on issues intimate and relevant to us all.


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Jackson School Journal: What does it take to succeed in the SIS 200 series?

Meredith:Writing skills! I think that a lot of undergraduatescomeintotheSIS200-seriesnothaving thewritingskills theyneed tosucceed.I always encourage my students to use theresourcesthatareavailable.Honestly,grammaris still a huge problem for a lot of incomingstudents. This is why I recommend takingpapers to the writing centers for assistance. Idon’tthinkthatyoucansucceedintheprogramwithoutfiguringout how towrite papers thatmakeastrongcentralargumentinaclearvoice.Also,developing theability to thinkandwriteanalytically, as opposed to just descriptively,about international issues and texts is veryimportant. Students that are dedicated andhave a passion forwhat they are studying aregenerallymoresuccessful.Thosethatexhibitawillingnesstodotheirwork inadvance,ordowhateverittakestogetthegradethattheywant,

performwellintheseries.

Jackson School Journal: What advice would you give students that have a difficult time choosing a paper topic for the SIS-200 series?

Meredith: Oftenwetellstudentstostartbypickingalocation.YoumightnotknowanythingaboutCostaRica,butyouhavealwayswantedtotravelthere.Ithinkthatisadecentplacetobegin.Ithelpstothinkaboutissuesthatarerelevanttoyourownlife.Forsome,thismightbegenderissuesorlaborissues.Choosingsomethingthatyoucanpersonallyidentifywith,areinvolvedin,orreallycareaboutisagreatstartingpoint.

Jackson School Journal: In your article for this publication you describe your research project in Kenya. Has your attraction to art been a lifelong passion?

Meredith Bauer is pursuing a dual masters degree in the Jackson School and at the Evans School of Public Affairs. Before moving to Seattle, she completed her bachelors degree in English with a minor in Art History at the College of William and Mary. Meredith is an experienced Teaching Assistant, having taught SIS 201 a total of four times as well as SIS 401 once last fall. She enjoys walking students through the process of developing research questions, writing term papers, and thinking critically about international issues. After graduation, Meredith plans to pursue a PhD in Literature and is interested in studying post-colonial voices as they appear in art and text.

Q&A with Meredith Bauer

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Meredith: Iamawriter,butIhavebeenpassionateabouttheartsmywholelife.Infact,IbrokemyarmintheNationalGalleryof Artattheageof 8becauseIwasdoingpirouettesonthemarblefloor.IhavebeenexposedtoartsinceIwasalittlekidandItooksomeartclassesinhighschoolandcollege,butit’snotreallywheremyskilllies.Iamreallypassionateaboutnarrativeandthewaythatnarrativecanopendoorsbetweendifferentpeopleandcanrepresenttruthinawaythatnonfiction,sometimes,cannot.Ithinkthatnarrativesareinart,music,literature,andotherformsof representation.IfirstdecidedIwantedtominorinarthistoryanddoresearchinartwhenIwasanundergrad.Icametotherealization,whiletakingahistoryclass,of howmuchbetterIunderstoodthingswhenIwaslearningaboutthemthroughimagesorfiction.Ithinkthatarthasgreatpotentialtotellstoriesanddiscussthemesthataren’totherwisenecessarilyviabletopicsof discussion.

Jackson School Journal: What do you plan to study for a PhD?

Meredith:IamapplyingtoPhDprogramsrightnow,tosixdifferentschools:Northwestern,Brown,MichiganState,UPenn,UCSanDiegoandUW.WhatIamreallypassionateaboutispost-colonialstudies,afieldthatfocusesonvoicesfromoutsidethewesternmainstream.Itexamineshowvoicesthataremarginalized,andnotnecessarilyrepresentedinpoliticaldiscourse,canbebetterrepresented.IdidsomeresearchonthatfieldandfoundthatoftenComparativeLiteratureandEnglishdepartmentsarethebestsettingsforthiskindof research,duetofacultyexpertise.SoIam

Meredith BauerreturningtomyliteraryrootsandmypassionfornarrativeformyPhD.

FormyresearchatthePhDlevel,Iwillprobablybeworkingmorewithtextsthanwithpeople,andsofocusingmoreonliteraturediscourseandhowliteraturefromAfricaisrepresentedwithinthatframework.

Jackson School Journal: Can you describe an international experience that was particularly memorable for you?

Meredith: Formyfirstresearchproject,IreceivedascholarshipfromtheCollegeof WilliamandMarytotraveltoFranceandEnglandtoexplorethewaysdifferentmetropolisespresentartingalleriesandmuseums.WhilestayinginParis—withoutknowingaFrenchsyllable—myfriendandImanagedtolockourselvesoutof ourflat.Theflatwasonestoryup,andtheFrenchwindowswereunlocked,soIhadthebrilliantideathatallweneededtodowasfindaladder,andtheevenmorebrilliantplanthatthebestplacetolookforaladderisthefiredepartment.So,wewanderedaimlesslyaroundtheneighborhooduntilwecameacrossone.Wemanagedtoconvinceabouttensweaty,suspenderedfirementherewasnofire.However,wedidnotmanagetoconvincethemthatclimbinginthroughourFrenchwindowsdidnotrequireafiretruck,sirensblaring,staffedwithalltenfiremeninfullgear.Alltenclamberedintoourapartmentandopenedthedoorforus.Ourrelief wasonlytemperedbyourembarrassment.

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Intro: Field Research Isn’t Comfortable!

HereiswhatIhavediscoveredaboutresearchatthegraduatelevel:IalwaysfeellikeIamflyingbytheseatof mypants.Possibly,thisfeelingof beingperpetuallyunpreparedisanelementthatdistinguishesmy“style”of researchfromthatof other,sanerMaster’sstudents.Equallypossibly,this feeling is the best and most educationalelementof myresearch. While the Jackson School requiresevery Master’s student to complete a pieceof original research, not everyone does fieldwork. Foreign field work in particular forcesthe researcher into geographically, culturally,and linguistically unfamiliar situations. Flyingbytheseatof mypantsistherealityof puttingmyself out there to do field research for thefirst time, compounded by being alone in aforeign country. In my case, awkward andunfamiliarsituationshaveresultedinaplethoraof social errors and academicmistakes, a fewrisks,aheftyportionof discomfort,andmanyopportunities to learn first-hand what cross-culturalcommunicationmeansforanAmericanresearcherabroad.Feelingvastlyunderequippedfor certain interactions in the course of my

research has forced me to take initiative, findcreative solutions, and build networks wherenone existed. Unease is sometimes the mostfertile ground for critical thinking. Rememberthiswhenyouhavetogetrabiesshotsforacat

bite, or learn the hardway that themenwhospeaktoyouonthestreetinCairomighthavemotivations other than being a “communitymember”inyourstudy.

Research Questions: A Window into the Art Worlds in Kenya and Egypt

Nairobi,KenyaTheNgechaArtistAssociation’stinygallery,aboveadairyandacrossthestreetfrom thegeneral store in avillageof reddustand free-wheeling goats, houses a myriad of arresting, emotive, andvibrantvisual artworks.Artists have stacked paintings, drawings, andprints of all sizes on tables and around theunfinished floor. Sculptures stand at attentionorleanagainstthewallsatawkwardangles.Theskillandcommitmentobviousfromthequalityof thesepiecesisasurpriseinaplacewherethe

Letter from the Field A Research Summary

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arts are underfunded and under-supported bythestate.Thevillageartistsof Ngecha,Kenyadescribe their art as a means of expressingthemselves and initiatingdiscussionof themesthatareculturallyorpoliticallytaboo.Theyalsobelievethatarthelpsthemdevelopeconomicallyand connect to their broader local and globalcommunities.

Cairo, Egypt Western popular culture oftenemphasizesancientEgyptianartasopposedtothe Egyptian art of today. Representations of EgyptusuallyinvolveCleopatra,Tutankhamen,or at least the Pyramids. However, todaythe streets of Cairo abound with innovativeand international contemporary artists andart dealers. In the space of only five squareblocks downtown, two contemporary galleriesare nestled in alleyways between Lebanesefood vendors, outdoor hookah cafes, andcacophonoustraffic.AttheTownhouseGallery,teenagerefugeesfromSudanandEthiopiaholdaphotographyandgraffitiexhibition.MashrabiaGallery featuresamixof EgyptianandItalianartists.Afewblocksaway,AdelelSiwy,afavoriteof collectors inEuropeandDubai,paints inastudioonaswelteringJulyafternoon. These two communities are livingexamples of the ways artists produce art andcreateandmanipulateartmarketsinpostcolonialAfrica, in the context of a long history of western appropriation and misrepresentation.Theseartistsarepartof artnetworksthatextend

from production in the village of Ngecha ordowntown Cairo to consumption in placesas removed as Seattle, Washington, USA. Mystudyinvestigatesartproductionasadependentvariable,theoutcomeof alongchainof socialinteractions. The interconnections betweenvarious players make up this chain, whichincludesartists,thestate,foreigngovernmentaland non-governmental institutions, and localandforeigncurators,traders,andbuyers.Theseinterconnections,theinteractionsbetweensocialworlds as seeminglydisparate as theAmericanEmbassyinCairo,avillageartassociation,andbusiness professionals in Seattle, Washington,arepiecesof anartworld.Idefineanartworldasamarketforartisticproduction,distribution,and consumption combined with the socialarenathatprovidesthenetworkforthatprocess.Thisstudyseekstoinvestigatewhotheplayersareandhowtheyconnect.

Origins: Why Art?

As a participant in the Kenya StudyAbroadProgramhostedbytheAfricanStudiesdepartment, I lived and worked in Nairobiduringthesummerof 2009.Atthetime,Ididn’thave any cluewhatmy thesismight eventuallylooklike.AndthenIwenttoNgecha. MyfellowstudentsandIfoundagemin theNgecha artists.Not only did they opentheirarms(andeventually,homes)tomeasaninternationalvisitor,buttheyalsorepresentedagreatdealof talentworkinginasocialcollectivethat involved the whole community. At theirannual arts festival, they entertained us withCirque-du-Soleil style acrobats, musiciansranging from traditional choirs to hip-hopartists, a fashion show of Kenyan textiles,

Letter from the Field

“Uneaseissometimesthemostfertilegroundforcriticalthinking.”

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and hundreds of paintings. Over fifty artistsin the vicinityparticipate in theNgechaArtistAssociation(www.ngechaartist.org).Inspiredbytheir community engagement and their skill, acolleagueandIpartneredwiththemtoexposeSeattleites to their art.We took 130 paintingsand sculptures home with us, rolled up andstuffedinassistants,andthecommunityatlarge.Artists exert control over the distribution of their products: they can control whether theyareproducing forquantityorquality, and thuscontrol therarityof theirpieces.The ideologyand identityof the artist’s socialworldof art-making influences these decisions. Availablematerials and community customs as well asindividual routines also influence production.Socialworldsof artistswithoutformaltrainingmaycreatenotonlyart,butalsoitsjustification,standards, and sellability, thereby creating artmarkets. Within the broader social arenas of art in Nairobi and Cairo, the social world of

art-making interactswith,and is influencedby,othersocialworlds(e.g.,thestate,curators,andtraders). For instance,throughacomplexchainof socialinteractions,anartdealermaydeveloparelationshipwithagroupof artistsandagroupof buyersandconnectthesetwosocialworldsby creating an economic market. Such an artdealermay “discover” artists, name them, and

providethem“authenticity”throughbiographyoraesthetics,thusshapingthemarketfortheirworks.Criticsmayfurtherauthenticatecertainartists or styles or destroy their authenticity.The supply chainmodel allowsme toobservehowtheseworldsareorganizedandwhatforces(supplyordemand)drivethem.

In the Field: Methodology and Experiences

I spent three weeks in Egypt and amonth inKenya during the summer of 2010.ForthemostpartIused“snowballsampling,”meaningthatIwould interviewonecuratororartistandthenheorshewouldintroducemetoanotherinterviewee.Thismethodallowedmetobuildmyownnetworks,butmayhaveresultedin a failure to include certain artist groups orgalleries. I conducted qualitative open-endedinterviewsandrecordedobservationsingalleriesand art cafés. I also conducted a focus group,where I asked artists in a meeting to definethe role of art in their community together.Snowball sampling, yet another way of flyingby the seat of my pants, resulted in formingconnectionswithmanydifferentpeople.Iwentto see Inception in an Egyptian theater with awriterof eroticpoetry;drankineb,hibiscustea,on the street with graphic designers; and hada traditionalmeal in thebeautifulhouseof anartist who paints bicycles. I bought enormousbug-eye glasses made out of tin cans froma metal sculptor and threw an artist party inNairobi.Towardstheendof myresearchIspentten days in homestays with artists in Ngecha,whereIobservedthewaytheseartistsworkandlive.Myhomestaysculminatedinafeastwitha

Meredith Bauer

“Social worlds of artists without formaltraining may create not only art, but alsoits justification, standards, and sellability,therebycreatingartmarkets.”

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goodold-fashionedsheepslaughter.

Findings: Pending

I am currently in the process of transcribing interviews and compiling data.Asexpected, theseartmarketsandtheirsocialcomponentsarecomplexanddynamic,andveryglobal in nature. Artists in both Nairobi andCairoseekspacetoproduceandtoexhibit,andseekmoreexpansiveandstrongermarkets.Myresearch experience has broadened the scopeof peopleIknowandcareaboutinadditiontoteachingmeabouttheactorsintheseartworlds.Thenextstepisanalysis,takingastepbacktodeterminewhatitisIamlookingatwhenIlookatthesecommunities,andwhyarthasproventobesuchapowerfulgrassrootsforceinNgecha.

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Jackson School Journal: What does it take to succeed in the SIS 200 series?

Randy: Writing skills are very important.Thishastobesomethingthat isbuiltupoveryears; it’sextremelydifficult to teach.Anotherskill that’s central, but isn’t emphasizedmuchin teaching writing in social studies, is abilityto think creatively. It’s a creative act everytime you come upwith a thesis. You have tomakeconnectionsandsaysomethingnewthathasn’t been said before—at least not in thereadings or by the professor. In addition tocreativity, successful students develop a “big-picture” framework that allows them to putideas, thoughts and episodes in history intoa larger context. Developing this frameworkis an ongoing process. It allows you to stepbackandthinkaboutthingsoutsideof whatitsays on the page orwhat you hear in lecture.That framework, that ability to connect dots

on a larger level, is what international studiesis really all about. It’swhatmakes it differentfromanthropology,sociology,politicalscience,historyandeconomics.You’reintegratingallof them into a single fabricor tapestryof worldhistory.Studentsthatlearntoseeeventsorideaswithinthistapestryarethemostsuccessful.

Jackson School Journal: What makes a compelling paper? How can students improve their writing?

Randy: Makeadraft!Drafting is the thinkingprocess.Usuallystudentswriteafirstdraftandthey have a really good idea at the end of it.That ideaneeds tobebrought to the topandrewritten as a second draft, making sure thewholeessaytiesbacktothatidea.

Also, students who can see the big picturenormally write quality papers. Understanding

Randy Thompson is a Master of Arts Candidate in Comparative Religion within the Jackson School, focusing on religion and American foreign policy. He has served as a Teaching Assistant for the entire SIS 200 series and RELIG 254. Prior to coming to UW, Randy received his bachelors degree in International Relations at the University of Southern California in 2005. He enjoys working with undergraduates, facilitating discussions and introducing students to new ideas that challenge their thinking and spur new interests. Randy ultimately plans to pursue a PhD, but in the meantime he wants to work abroad, teaching in the Middle East and putting his SIS 200 knowledge to work, launching a business importing Moroccan saffron to pay off his student loans.

Q&A with Randy Thompson

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howathreadtiesintothegreaterwhole,pickingupstrandsandcreatingnewpatterns,thisistheartistryof writinginthesocialsciences.

In terms of larger projects, like a thesis orqualifying paper, you have to have a drivinginterestinoneaspectof it.Thisistrueinwriting,but also in life and your career. Successfulstudentsarepersonallyconnectedtowhattheyare researching. Basically, you have to have apassionthatmovesthewholethingforward.

Jackson School Journal: In your own life what do you feel has sparked your academic passion?

Randy: WhenIwasincollege,theinvasionof Iraqwasproceeding. Watching theway itwasportrayed in themedia, the rhetoric used, thereligious support, and the blatant geopoliticsinvolved,Ireallywantedtofigureoutwhatwasgoing on! Witnessing this invasion, coupledwithmystudyabroadexperienceinNicaragua,providedthespark.Itwasseeingtheexerciseof USmilitaryandeconomicpowerabroadandtheway thatpeople affectedby ithad little choicein thematter. This contradicted the vision of thecountryIhadbeentaught inschool,andIwasdriventofigureouthowIcouldreconcilethese views. I’d say it’s still motivating what Iwant tostudy foraPhD,but it changes, that’sfor sure.You start to see the other side of it.Passion is always kind of partisan. There is aquotefromWeberthattheroleof scholarshipistodiscover“inconvenientfacts,”andforeveryposition,thesefactsaremany.Ithinkthehardpartingoingforwardtoacareerininternationalstudies—isseeingallof the inconvenient factsbutretainingthecorevisionthatgotyoustarted.

Jackson School Journal: Can you describe an international experience that was particularly memorable?

Randy: Staying with sharecroppers in thebackcountry of Nicaragua on an SIT studyabroadprogram.IthinkeveryoneshoulddoSITstudy abroad programs. Everybody I’ve evermet who went on an SIT program could nothavebeenhappierwithit.Theydohome-staysandexcursionstodifferentpartsof thecountry.Allof yourclassesarewithpeoplewholiveinthecountryandthedirectorsareresidents.Theyknowwhat speakers to bring in andwhere totakestudentstogivethemadeepandauthenticexperience.Honestly,whattheseprogramsgiveyou, through deeply personal experiences, isan understanding of a country that goes waybeyondanythingyoucanlearnintheclassroom.There is no other way to replicate this kindof understandingandSITdoesagreat jobof fosteringit.

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“The...anti-Christ stalks our world.Organized communism seeks even todethrone God from his central placein the Universe. It attempts to uprooteverywhere it goes the gentle andrestraining influences of the religion of loveandpeace...Longago,weassertedagreatprincipleonthiscontinent:thatmenare,andof rightoughttobe,free.Nowwearecalledupontodefendthatrightagainstthemightiestforcesof evileverassembledunderthesun.”1

If askedtoguesswhichPresidentialcandidatespokethesewords,andwhatpartyhebelongedto,nearlyeverystudentintheJacksonSchoolwouldanswerincorrectly.Firstly,thisisbecausethecandidatequotedwonhisParty’sprimarybutlostthegeneralelection.Secondly,studentswhocameof ageduringthetenureof GeorgeW.Bushwouldlikelyattributeanyappealtotheholypurposeof theUnitedStatestoaRepublican. Intruth,however,thesewordsbelongtoAdlaiStevenson,Democratof Illinois,andthewinnerof hisparty’snominationin1952and1956.ThereligiouspatriotismexpressedbyStevensonwashardlyuncommonforDemocratsinhisday,wholedtheUnitedStatesintotheColdWarinthenameof God.

Expressionsof religiousnationalismandanti-communismweregermanetoDemocraticforeignpolicymakersintheearlydaysof theColdWar.Amongthisgroupof Democratic“hawks”wasHenryM.Jacksonandhissupporters,whocarriedthepro-American,anti-Communistflagintotheaftermathof theWarinVietnam.Inthecourseof theirstruggletoovercomebothnon-violentDemocratsandKissinger’swillingnesstonegotiatewiththeUSSR,JacksonandDr.DorothyFosdick,Stevenson’sformerforeignpolicyadvisorandspeechwriter,recruitedanumberof youngaideswhowouldgoontoillustriouscareersintheReaganandBushAdministrations.AmongtheseaideswasPaulWolfowitzwho,morethananyotherindividualinPresidentBushJr’sWhiteHouseAdministration,wasthearchitectof theUSinvasionof Iraqin2003. Thus, “Jackson Democrats” servedas the link between the religious, liberal anti-Communism of the 1950s and the secular,neoconservativeAmericanismof the1980sand2000s.Thisconnectionthrowsintosharprelief thelegacyof HenryM.Jackson,whichallof us,as students in the school that bears his name,mustrecognize. Among the most importantrelationships to early US Cold War foreignpolicywere those formed by themembers of

The Man Outside the Building:The Legacy of Henry M. Jackson

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the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff,createdbyGeorgeKennan in 1947.2ReinholdNiebuhr, aProtestantminister and theologian,attended themonthlymeetings of the group.3

Niebuhr’s impact went far beyond his merepresence, however, as he provided the logicthat underpinned the policy of Containment,Kennan’sgreatestaccomplishmentasSecretaryof State. As Kennan, speaking for liberalpolicymakers at the start of the Cold War,recognized:“Niebuhristhefatherof usall.”4

AmongKennan’snineinitialrecruitstothePolicyPlanningStaff wasDorothyFosdick,thedaughterof theRev.HarryEmersonFosdick.She had, however, rejected fully the pacifisttheology that her father preached at RiversideBaptist in New York City.5 The theologian inwhomshe foundherguiding lightwas insteadNiebuhr, who had been a childhood neighborin the faculty housing at Union TheologicalSeminar,anda family friend.6TherelationshipcontinuedthroughoutNiebuhr’slife,ashemadeFosdick,whonevermarried,thegodmotherof hisdaughter,Elisabeth.7

Kennan recruited Fosdick becauseof her expertise in international law, especiallyregarding international organizations. She hadbeen appointed to be the Under Secretary of

theLeagueof Nations,butthefailuretoratifytheTreatyof Parisblockedherfromtakingtheposition.Afterastintinacademia,shereturnedto the State Department in 1942, as part of theefforttoplanwhatwouldlaterbecometheUnitedNations.8UnderNiebuhrandKennan’ssupervision, her group crafted the foundingdocumentsof Containment:theMarshallPlan,the TrumanDoctrine, and theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization.9 Kennan believed, as Niebuhr hadarguedinhisclassicbook,TheIronyof AmericanHistory, that what gave the United States themoral authority to fight Communismwas notitsownvirtue,butthemoralpretensionsof theUSSR and the imperial atrocities that resultedfromthem.Asthesoon-to-beSecretaryof Statewroteinhisfamous“LongTelegram”:

“the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will...experience acertaingratitudetoaProvidencewhich,byproviding theAmerican peoplewith thisimplacablechallenge,hasmadetheirentiresecurity as a nation dependent on theirpullingthemselvestogetherandacceptingtheresponsibilitiesof moralandpoliticalleadership that history plainly intendedthemtobear.”10

President Truman shared this opinion, statingthat “Godhas createdus andbrought us intoourpresentpositionof powerandstrengthforsomegreatpurpose.”11

While Fosdick did not leave adocumentary record proving she agreed withthe president she served, she contributedto the formation of policies that reflectedtheir consensus. Moreover, she left the StateDepartmenttoworkonthecampaignof Adlai

The Man Outside the Building

“...what gave the United States the moralauthority to fightCommunism was not itsown virtue, but the moral pretensions of theUSSRand the imperial atrocities thatresultedfromthem..”

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Stevenson, whose religious Americanism hasalready been demonstrated above. Presumably,she shared to some degree the view of internationalrelationsexpressedbyhermentorsandsuperiorsTruman,Kennan,Stevenson,andNiebuhr. Two years after Stevenson’s defeat byEisenhower,FosdicklefttheStateDepartmentand joined the staff of Henry M. Jackson,Senator from Washington State, after thetwo met at a dinner party in the District of Columbia.WhenhehiredFosdick,Jacksonhadalready, as a member of the House, adoptedNitze’s foundational principle that the goalof US foreign policy can, must, and should“foster fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system.”12 Fosdick thus did notfundamentally change Jackson’s view; theircommon “Niebuhrian liberalism” was, rather,largelythereasontheyworkedsowelltogether.WhatFosdickcontributedtoJackson’sgrowingknowledge of foreign affairs was breadth,depth,andrefinement.Throughhernetworkof contactsintheacademicandpolicyworlds,shealso improved theeffectivenessof hismethodof speechwriting by committee, drawing onspecialists for detailed knowledge of technicaldebates,suchasthoseoverarmscontrol.13 Fosdick’s greatest importance toJackson and to the development of militantliberalglobalismintoneoconservativismwasherleadershiproleinateamthatmoreorlessbecameJackson’s private Policy Planning Committee.Thegroupbegantoforminthelate1960s,aftertheWarinVietnamhadshatteredtheAmericanLeft. By that time, Jackson had established anenormous amount of political capital amonghis constituents, primarily through an anti-Communism campaign that drew bipartisansupportandthroughhisexpertiseatchanneling

federal funding intoWashingtonState.Hehadbuilt up his credibility within the DemocraticParty by serving as theChairmanduring JohnKennedy’spresidentialcampaignof 1960,evenafterKennedyhadchosenLyndon Johnsonashis running mate for electoral reasons.14 Hisprestige allowed Jackson the political leewayto disagree with the Kennedy administration’shandlingof severalvitalissues:theUnitedStates’roleintheUnitedNations,theaftermathof theCubanMissileCrisis,andtheNuclearTestBanTreaty.Jacksonbelievedthattheadministrationhad begun to ignore the particular ideologicaldynamicsthatmadetheSovietssodangerous.15

Jackson was thus already separatingfrom the Democratic Party as the 1960sprogressed and the War in Vietnam beganto tear at the fabric of the “vital center” of liberalism, whose last great victory was theelectionof LyndonB.Johnsonin1964.Niebuhr,along-timesupporterof theWar,movedbackbefore his death in 1971.16 New Left groupsemerging fromtheantiwarmovement, suchastheStudentsforaDemocraticSociety,targetedJacksonasafigureheadof themilitary-industrialcomplex,callinghimthe“SenatorfromBoeing.”Democratic Senators Fulbright, Church, andMcGovern attacked US foreign policy as awholeand,inparticular,theviewheldbybothFosdick and Jackson, that Communism wasan immutable evil. Jackson obliged themwithongoingsupportforaUSpresenceinVietnam,andforacontinualadvancementof USnucleararmsanddefense,throughouttheJohnsonandNixonpresidencies.Hewasoneof only threeNorthernDemocratstosupporttheseactions.17

Richard Nixon emerged from theelections of 1968 with a weak mandate,garneringonly43percentof thepopularvoteand triumphing largely due to the breakup of

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the liberal establishment, one wing of whichgatheredbehindJackson.TheSenatorwasthusobliged to duel with both the doves withinhis own party and the détente-minded Nixonadministration,18neitherof whichperceivedtheUnitedStatesasamoralauthorityorforceof anykind.Inshort,theJacksonDemocratsweretheonlypoliticalgroupinUSpoliticsthatcontinuedtocarrytheflameof pro-Americanismandanti-Communism into the 1970s. They continuedto believe thatAmericanism could and shouldbespreadthroughouttheglobe.TheyopposedKissinger’s effort to reach a state of co-existencewiththeUSSRbecauseitresteduponamoral(oranamoral)equivalencebetweenthesuperpowers.19

Itwas in this context that theSenatorandDr.Fosdickbegantorecruityoungforeignpolicyspecialiststoprovidetheintellectualandscientificammunitionnecessarytocontinuetheirfightagainstbothpacifismanddétente.Thefirst

wereRichardPerleandPaulWolfowitz,doctoralstudentsat theUniversityof Chicago.Fosdickmet thepairduringa trip toWashington,DC,in thespringof 1969,andwithindaysofferedbothPerleandWolfowitz jobs intheSenator’soffice. Wolfowitz remained with Jackson foronlyashorttimebeforetakingapositioninthegovernment agency tasked with arms control,

whilePerleremainedonJackson’sstaff forthenext eleven years.20 Jackson and Fosdick actedas “twoNiebuhrian ProtestantMissionaries,”21refining the democratic globalism of theirprotégés, especially regarding the necessityof strong support for Israel as a democraticoutpostinanauthoritarianMiddleEast.22BothWolfowitz and Perle became central to thecampaignagainstdétentethatJacksonbeganafterlosingtheDemocraticnominationforpresidentto George McGovern in 1972, and watchingNixontriumphinthegeneralelection. Jackson viewed McGovern’s defeat asachanceto leadtheDemocraticPartybacktomilitant interventionism,and toend themoralambiguitiesof HenryKissinger’srealistforeignpolicy.23ThetwomainfrontsonwhichJacksonand his staff confronted Kissinger were theSALT arms treaties and the negotiation of aMost FavoredNation (MFN) trade agreementwiththeSovietUnion.Jacksontriumphedfirstregarding the arms treatiesby followingSALTI,whichestablishedaroughparitybetweentheUS and USSR nuclear arsenals. The Senatorintroduced a resolution—drafted by Perle andFosdick—that required all future treaties toprovide for exact numerical parity in all typesof weapons.Sincetheweaponssystemsof thesuperpowers were designed not to mirror oneanother, this made Kissinger’s task virtuallyimpossible.24Wolfowitz,who by this timewaspart of the administration, continued to voicehisoppositiontoitspoliciesandhissupportforJackson.25 TheJacksoncampdefeatedKissinger’sattempts to normalize trade relationswith theUSSR,thistimebyintroducingahumanrightsconcern into the debate. The point-man forthisassaultondétentewasagainRichardPerle,26who drafted the Jackson-Vanik Amendment

“TheSenatorwasthusobligedtoduelwithboththedoveswithinhisownpartyandthedétente-minded Nixon administration,18

neitherof whichperceivedtheUnitedStatesasamoralauthorityorforceof anykind..”


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demandingthattheUSSRallowJewstoemigratefromtheSovietstate inorder toreceiveMFNstatus.TheamendmentwaspoliticallypopularintheUnitedStates,passingtheCongressionalvote easily, butwas absolutely unacceptable tothe Russians.27 Jackson’s amendment doomedthe trade talks, ashe intended, and“destroyedKissinger’shandiwork”of co-existencewiththeUSSR.28 The final defeat of détente occurredwithintheFordadministrationitself andbroughttogetherthemenwhowouldlaterformthecoreof theneoconservativemovement.InOctoberof 1975,duringtheso-calledHalloweenMassacre,Kissinger’sforeignpolicyteamwasejectedfrompower.Unipolarist conservativesDickCheney,DonaldRumsfeld,andGeorgeH.W.Bushcametogetherforthefirsttimeasnearly-simultaneousappointeesintheFordWhiteHouse.Rumsfeldreplaced Kissinger as Chief of Staff, thoughKissingerretainedhisotherpositionasSecretaryof State as a consolation prize.Defense cameunderCheney’s direction, andBush took overtheCIA.29WithJackson’ssupport,CIADirectorBush approved the creation of “Team B,” agroupof policyanalyststaskedwithquestioningthereceivedwisdomonthenuclearwarpoliciesof the USSR. Richard Pipes, who had spentyears writing papers for Jackson, was namedthegroup’schairmanandthroughRichardPerlerecruitedPaulWolfowitz.30PipesandWolfowitzwere still registeredDemocrats at the time of their selection to the team.31 Team B found,predictably, that the USSR was “a toweringdynamothatnotunreasonablybelieveditwouldconquertheworld.”32

This conclusion reinforced Jackson’sconviction that there existed nothing butweakness and danger in the left wing of theDemocratic Party that had nominatedGeorge

McGovern in 1972. Opposing himself to“liberal guilt,” Jackson threw his efforts intotheDemocratic presidential primary campaignin 1976. He was defeated again, this time byJimmyCarter,whotookafarmoreconciliatorystancetowardCommunism.33Jacksonfollowedanother failed campaign for the Democraticnomination in 1980 with a refusal to endorseReagan’s candidacy out of party loyalty. Thisdoomed Jackson’s last and best chance ata cabinet position, despite the fact that thePresidentacknowledgedthatheandthesenatorfromWashingtonheldprecisely thesameview

of theSovietthreat.34

Thepowerof Jackson’sidealscontinuedtogrowandcametodominatejustashispersonalpowerwasfading.HeusedhisinfluencewiththePresidenttoplacealargecontingentof hisalliesandprotégésintheupperreachesof theReaganforeign policy team: JeaneKirkpatrick becamethe ambassador to the United Nations; ElliotAbrams,theassistantsecretaryof state;RichardPipes, Jackson’s favorite Sovietologist withwhomheandFosdickhadlongworked,becametheNationalSecurityAdvisorforSovietaffairs.RichardPerle, after adecadewith theSenator,tookapositionasassistantsecretaryof defense,andbroughtwithhimtwootherJacksonstaffers,DouglasFeithandFrankGaffney.35TheJacksonDemocrats had found a newhomewithin the

“This conclusion reinforced Jackson’sconviction that there existed nothing butweaknessanddangerintheleftwingof theDemocraticParty.”

Randy Thompson

Autumn 2010 91

RepublicanParty.Democraticpartisansbrandedthemwithapairof newnames,whichremainsynonymous: “Jackson Republicans” and“neoconservatives.”36

As part of the ReaganWhite House,the neoconservatives took part in a renewedcampaignof anti-communistintervention.TheirthinkingwasinfluentialprimarilywithregardstoUSpolicyinLatinAmerica,wherethePresidentapprovedmilitaryaidorincursionsinGranada,Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Theintentineverycasewastocarryontheprojectthat Reagan inherited from Jackson and tooppose Communism through the militantadvanceof theAmericanWay.At the coreof theJackson-Reaganvisionof worldhistorywasa belief in the superiority of American idealsandinstitutions,andacertaintythat“therestof theworldawaitedthem.”37 Theelectionof GeorgeW.Bushallowedneoconservativesadegreeof accesstotheupperreachesof thepolicymakingestablishmentthattheyhadnotenjoyedsinceSenatorJacksonhadstockedtheReaganadministrationtwentyyearsearlier.38 Wolfowitz, for example, became theyounger Bush’s Deputy Secretary of Defense,joining twenty other neoconservatives in thatadministration.39Intheaftermathof theattacksof September 11th, 2001, the neoconservativeinfluence became decisive, and led theUnitedStatesarmyintoIraqtwoyearslater.

1WalterJohnson,ed.ThePapersof AdlaiE.Stevenson(Boston:Little,Brown,andCo.,1972)4:128.AsquotedinGunn,SpiritualWeapons,20-21.

2“PolicyPlanningStaff MissionStatement”StateDepartment,accessedOctober20,2010,

http://www.state.gov/s/p/.3PaulMerkley,ReinholdNiebuhr:APoliticalAccount

(Montreal:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,1975),190.FromaninterviewwithNiebuhrin1962.

4GeorgeKennan,AmericanDiplomacy(Chicago:Univof ChicagoUniversityPress,1985).AsquotedinElisabethSifton,“RememberingReinholdNiebuhr”,WorldPolicyJournal10,no.1(Spring,1993):83-90.

5“Fosdick,Dorothy”,NotableAmericanWomen,SusanWare,ed.(Boston:PresidentandFellowsof HarvardCollege,2004),217.

6RobertThomasJr.,“DorothyFosdick,83,AdviseronInternationalPolicy,Dies”.NYTimes,February10,1997.

7ElisabethSifton,TheSerenityPrayer:FaithandPoliticsinTimesof PeaceandWar(NewYork:W.W.Norton,2003),220.

8Thomas,“DorothyFosdick,83”.9Ware,NotableAmericanWomen,217.10GeorgeKennan,“TheSourcesof Soviet

Conduct”,ForeignAffairs(1947),accessedOctober20,2010,http://www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html.

11AsquotedinWalterA.McDougall,PromisedLand,CrusaderState:TheAmericanEncounterwiththeWorldsince1776(NewYork:HoughtonMifflin,1997),171.

12RobertM.Kaufman,HenryMJackson:ALifeinPolitics(Seattle:Universityof WashingtonPress,2000),57.

13Ibid.,81-83.14Ibid.,114-120.15Ibid.,132-9.16Ibid.,207-8.17Ibid.,180-195;212.18Ibid.,212.19JohnLewisGaddis,TheColdWar:ANewHistory

(NewYork:PenguinPress),182.20RichardPerle,interviewwithBenWattenberg,

airedduring“RichardPerle:TheMakingof aNeoconservative,”onThinkTankwithBenWattenberg(2003),accessedOctober


92 Vol. 1 - No. 2

20,2010,http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/transcript1017.html.Perle’sfatherhaddiedyearsearlier,andJacksonbecamesomethingof asurrogate,aswellasthebestmanattheyoungerman’swedding.SeeKaufman,214.

21Kaufman,215.22Perle,interviewwithBenWattenberg.23Kaufman,237-242.24Gaddis,200-203.25GaryDorrien,ImperialDesigns:Neoconservatism

andtheNewPaxAmericana(NewYork:Routledge,2004),48.

26JacobHeilbrunn,TheyKnewTheyWereRight:TheRiseof theNeocons(NewYork:AnchorBooks,2009),127.Perle,alongwiththefuturefounderof theAmerican-IsraelPoliticalActionCommittee,satontheinformalsteeringcommitteethatledthecampaignforJewishemigration.

27GeorgeC.Herring,FromColonytoSuperpower:U.S.ForeignRelationssince1776(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress),803-4.

28Ibid.,826.29SamTenenhaus,“TheHard-Liner”,Boston,

November2,2003,accessedJune2009,http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/11/02/the_hard_liner/.

30PaulWolfowitz,interviewwithSamTannenhaus.Departmentof Defensewebsite,accessedOctober20,2010,http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2594.

31KitOldham,“Jackson,HenryM.‘Scoop’”,Historylink.org:theFreeOnlineEncyclopediaof WashingtonStateHistory,accessedOctober20,2010.

32Dorrein,47.33Kaufman,195.34Ibid.,405-7.35Ibid.,407.36Dorrien,2-7,49.37Herring,864.38Dorrien,74.39NeilSwidey,“TheAnalyst”,Boston,May

18,2003,accessedJune2009,http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/05/18/the_analyst/.

Randy Thompson

Autumn 2010 93


94 Vol. 1 - No. 2

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Avilés,William,andEduardoPosada-Carbó.“AssessingColombia’sPoliticalSystem.”LatinAmericanPerspectives.28.1(2001):165-174.

Avilés,William.“Institutions,MilitaryPolicy,andHumanRightsinColombia.”LatinAmericanPerspectives.28.1(2001):31-55.

Bergquist,Charles,RicardoPenaranda,andGonzaloSanchez.ViolenceinColombia:1990-2000.RowmanandLittlefield,2001.

Bolletino,A.“CrimesAgainstHumanityinColombia:TheInternationalCriminalCourt’sJurisdictionOvertheMay2003AttackontheBetoyesGuahiboIndigenousReserveandColombianAccountability.”HumanRightsReview,Piscataway.9.4(2008):491-511.

Bouvier,VirginiaMarie.Colombia:BuildingPeaceinaTimeof War.Washington,D.C.:UnitedStatesInstituteof Peace,2009.

“Colombia:CountryProfile–September2008MainReport.”EconomistIntelligenceUnit.http://portal.eiu.com.Sept2008.(29April2010).

“Colombia:PresidentSantos’sConflictResolutionOpportunity.”InternationalCrisisGroup.LatinAmericaReport.13October2010.9

EuropaWorldPlus.“Colombia:RecentHistory.”RoutledgeTaylorandFrancisGroup.http://www.europaworld.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/entry/co.is.4.

HumanRightsWatch.Colombia:BeyondNegotiation:InternationalHumanitarianLawandItsApplicationtotheConductof theFARC-EP.NewYork:HumanRightsWatch,2001.

HumanRightsWatch.WarWithoutQuarter:ColombiaandInternationalHumanitarianLaw.NewYork:HumanRightsWatch,1998.

InternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice.Torres,Paula,YanethGihaandSergioJaramillo.“TransitionalJusticeandtheDDR:TheCaseof Colombia.”June2009.http://www.ictj.org/static/Publications/Giha_Torres_Jaramillo_DDR_Colombia_ResearchBrief_RB_2009.pdf.

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1977totheGenevaConventionsof 12August1949.”Eds.Y.Sandozetal.(MartinusNijhoff,Geneva,1987):1345.

InternationalCommitteeof theRedCross.“Convention(III)relativetotheTreatmentof Prisonersof War.Geneva,12August1949.”http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/

InternationalCommitteeof theRedCross.“ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof 12August1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionof Victimsof Non-InternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolII),8June1977.”http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/

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Moser,CarolineO.N.,andCathyMcIlwaine.EncounterswithViolenceinLatinAmerica:UrbanPoorPerceptionsfromColombiaandGuatemala.NewYork:Routledge,2004.

Peceny,Mark,andMichaelDurnan.“TheFARC’sBestFriend:U.S.AntidrugPoliciesandtheDeepeningof Columbia’sCivilWarinthe1990s.”LatinAmericanPolitics&Society.48.2(2006):95-116.

Ruiz,Bert.TheColombianCivilWar.Jefferson,N.C.:McFarland,2001.Toledo,Rebeca.WarinColombia:MadeinU.S.A.NewYork:InternationalActionCenter,2003.UnitedNations,andUnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncil.Reportof theUnitedNationsHigh

CommissionerforHumanRightsontheSituationof HumanRightsinColombia.[Geneva]:UnitedNations,2008:14-17

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SmallStatesinPeacemakingRoles

Beardsley,KyleC.,DavidM.Quinn,BiswasBidisha,andJohnathanWilkenfeld.“MediationStyleandCrisisOutcomes.”Journalof ConflictResolution50,no.1(2006):58-86.

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