46 Japan Railway & Transport Review • January 1997

Japanese Railway History 9

Copyright © 1997 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

Ja p a n ese R a ilw ay Hi sto r y

Dawn ofJapanese National Railways

Mitsuhide Imashiro

War’s End and Railways

After fighting with Germany and Italyagainst the USA, Great Britain and otherAllies, Japan accepted the Allied PotsdamDeclaration and surrendered uncondi-tionally on 15 August 1945.During the war, coastal shipping carry-ing coal and other goods was diverted tomilitary use and these commodities werehandled by railways. The Kanmon un-dersea tunnel was built to connect thecoal mines of Kyushu with mainlandHonshu, illustrating the heavy depen-dence on railways for shipment of do-mestic cargo. Japan imported all itspetroleum, and gasoline for private au-tomobiles was severely rationed withmost diverted to military use. Motortransportation was almost entirely de-stroyed toward the war’s end and wassubstituted by railways.Railways monopolized domestic trans-portation in wartime Japan, while profitswere used by the military. Other thanminimum measures to cope with in-creased cargo, the facilities and cars wereunmaintained and not renewed. Lineswere heavily bombed toward the end,although trains were kept running by thestrong commitment of employees. Airraids killed 4,403 employees, and killedor injured 1,494 passengers. These fig-ures do not include deaths or injuriescaused by the atomic bombs because thenumbers are unknown. People’s moralewas boosted even on 15 August by be-ing able to say, ‘The trains are running’.

MacArthur’s Letter and Start ofJapanese National Railways

The Japanese Government Railways werereorganized as a public corporationcalled Japanese National Railways (JNR)on 1 June 1949. This was a major changein the history of Japan’s railways, and isas important as the nationalization in

1906-7 and the privatization in 1987.Postwar Japan was run by the Allied Oc-cupation Forces from General Headquar-ters (GHQ). Democratic reformsincluded dissolution of financial cliques(zaibatsu) and land reforms aimed at end-ing the landlord system. The railway wasno exception; a letter from General Mac-Arthur dated 22 July 1948 instructed theJapanese government to turn the JapaneseGovernment Railways into a public cor-poration. The letter was written as amove to suppress the growing leftwinglabour movement, which was thriving inthe middle of the inflation-driven eco-nomic confusion, and the growth of com-munism. It instructed the government toreorganize the Japanese GovernmentRailways and other state monopolies intopublic corporations, leading to the birthsof JNR, Nippon Telegraph and TelephonePublic Corporation, and the Japan Tobac-co and Salt Public Corporation. The lat-ter two included ‘public corporation’ intheir titles, but JNR did not due to resis-tance from bureaucrats, who were reluc-tant to change the state railway businessto a public corporation, isolated from thegovernment. In talks with GHQ, they

claimed that labour disputes could be set-tled by measures other than changing toa public corporation, opposing the ideaof the war-damaged railway facilitiesbeing restored by anyone except the gov-ernment. Japan at that time was indirectlyadministered by GHQ, meaning that itsinstructions were implemented by theJapanese government. Naturally, GHQinstructions carried absolute power, andMacArthur’s letter had serious signifi-cance.

Public Corporation

The public corporation concept was newto railway bureaucrats, and they studiedit from examples such as the TennesseeValley Authority (TVA), London Transport,and other public corporations. The con-cept was not easily adaptable to theJapanese tradition of centralized admin-istration. GHQ itself did not fully under-stand public corporations and could notpresent a model that was suitable forpostwar Japan.Today, we know from the history of pub-lic corporations in the UK and Germany,

Soldiers Returning from Battlefronts in 1946 at Moji Station, Northern Kyushu (Transportation Museum)

47Japan Railway & Transport Review • Jaunary 1997Copyright © 1997 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

that the ambiguity of the term createdseveral difficult problems. In the case ofthe JNR, the ambiguity was coupled tothe fact that JNR was not fully autono-mous, meaning that management was notgiven the right to determine fares (thebasic unit of income) and wages (the ba-sic unit of expenditure).The Teito Rapid Transit Authority, estab-lished during the war as a subway sys-tem in Tokyo, was actually a goodexample of a public corporation, but itwent unnoticed. Public corporationswere first established in many countriesbetween World War I and World War II.The Teito Rapid Transit Authority wasone, but because it was formed under thewartime regime, it was not viewed as apublic corporation that was part of thedemocratization measures.Conversion to public corporations in ar-eas such as the railways, telegraph andtelephones, tobacco and salt, was fol-lowed by electric utilities and steel mills.Electric utilities were formed into regionalprivate companies. They were under at-tack by labour, and regionalization aimedto weaken the leftists by dividing a sin-gle large labour organization into sever-al unions. This measure was recognizedby the reformists as a good example whenJNR was privatized into several compa-nies in 1987.

Personnel Cuts

During the war, the Japanese Govern-ment Railways hired employees to re-place those going to fight. After the warended, the total number doubled from300,000 in 1939 to over 600,000 in 1947and 1948 as soldiers returned from bat-tlefields, and as railway employees re-turned from the ex-colonies of Manchuriaand Korea.In May 1949, the government passed a

law to reduce the number of personnelas a tool to reduce the number of publicservants including those in the govern-ment railways. A personnel cut was ex-ecuted under the new law to reduce thenumber by 95,000 and the plan was com-pleted by July.The MacArthur letter prohibited strikesby public servants while rejecting collec-tive bargaining. The National RailwaysWorkers’ Union had been organized inMarch 1946 as a confederation and waslater reorganized as a single organizationin June of that year. Internally, the unionwas divided into two or three camps ofleftists and rightists. An opposition move-ment was organized by the leftist execu-tive of the union against the MacArthurletter and the personnel cuts, but all theleftist executives were fired for leadingan unlawful strike. The dismissal wasfollowed by the ‘Red Purge’, and the left-ists lost power.On 1 June 1949, the Japanese Govern-ment Railways was reorganized as JNR.The cuts in personnel were enforced onthe same day and the first cut was an-nounced on 4 July. On 5 July, Mr Shi-moyama, the new JNR president was

Class-C57 Steam Locomotive Crowded with People Visiting Countryside in Search of Food(Japan National Railways: A Centennial Photo History)

Unexplained Derailment at Matsukawa Station in 1949 (The Mainichi Newspapers)

Due to copyright issues, the original photo cannot be shown.

48 Japan Railway & Transport Review • Jaunary 1997

Japanese Railway History 9

Copyright © 1997 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

found dead under suspicious circum-stances. A second personnel cut wasannounced on 12 July, and it was fol-lowed by a series of accidents; a railcarwent out of control at Mitaka Station on15 July, and a train derailed near Mat-sukawa Station on 17 July. Neither ofthese accidents was solved but they werereported by the media as if they were thework of leftists, who lost public support.The start of the Korean War, and Cold Warchanged GHQ policy from disarmamentand democratization to reconstructing Ja-pan as a member of the Western bloc.

Restoration of Railways

Railway operation in postwar Japan faceda serious dilemma between the fast-grow-ing need for transportation, and a capac-ity that had fallen to less than 30% of thepre-war level. Transportation demandrose rapidly as people flocked to trains;soldiers returning from Manchuria, Ko-rea, etc., schoolchildren evacuees return-ing from the countryside, GIs, foreigners,and hungry people going to farming vil-lages in search of food. A heavy burden

was placed upon railways because mo-tor and coastal transportation was stillunrestored. The burden was made evengraver because railways had been un-maintained during the war. A series ofbad accidents, including a train fire atSakuragicho Station, resulted from worn-out facilities and lack of funds to main-tain them. However, despite the burden,the railway authorities did all they couldto restore services and modernize. Theyresumed limited express train operationsand introduced electric and diesel trains.

The first 5-year plan in 1957 initiatedserious investment in railway facilities.The start of the Korean War in 1950turned Japan into a UN military base.Demand for transport of military suppliesincreased sharply, leading to rapid eco-nomic growth. As the economy gainedmomentum, the capacity of the TokaidoLine soon reached its limit.The Tokaido Line was (and still is) themost important traffic market in Japanever since its completion in 1889. In1950, it represented only 3% of totalroute kilometers, but accounted for about24% of transport volume. The comple-tion of the long-awaited electrification in1956 between Tokyo and Osaka to im-prove capacity did not solve the prob-lems and, so in 1958, the Japanesegovernment and JNR agreed to constructthe Tokaido Shinkansen on the interna-tional standard gauge (1435 mm). Theproject was started with financing fromthe World Bank and was completed 6years later in 1964. The project had beenfirst envisaged in 1938 before the warwhen it was called the Bullet TrainProject. It was supposed to lay new in-ternational-standard tracks from Tokyo toOsaka and Shimonoseki, with an under-sea tunnel between Japan and the Kore-an Peninsula connecting Japan, Koreaand Manchuria. The Project was actual-

Tsubame Limited Express Hauled by Steam Locomotive on Tokaido Line after Post-war Restoration in Early 1950s(Japan National Railways: A Centennial Photo History)

Accidental Train Fire at Sakuragicho in 1951 (Transportation News)

49Japan Railway & Transport Review • January 1997Copyright © 1997 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

Sadanori Shimoyama became the firstPresident of JNR when it was founded in June1949. Born in 1901, he studied mechanical en-gineering at the University of Tokyo and joinedthe Ministry of Railways immediately aftergraduation in 1925. After serving as a high-ranking railway engineer during WWII, he be-came Administrative Vice-Minister of Transportin April 1948 and prepared for the birth of JNR.His first task as President was reducing theworkforce which expanded sharply after the waras railway employees returned from battlefrontsand overseas railways. The government’s pro-posal to cut the workforce caused serious un-rest, and Shimoyama was under strong pres-sure from the Occupation Forces, the Japanesegovernment, and the protesting trade unions.He disappeared suddenly on 5 July1949 andwas found dead the following day on a main-line railway track near Tokyo. It was never clearwhether his death was suicide or murder.

Yukio Kagayama became JNR’s ActingPresident immediately after Shimoyama’sdeath, and was appointed President officiallyin September 1949. Born in 1902, he read lawat the University of Tokyo and joined the Minis-try of Railways in 1927. As President, he faceda number of difficulties including the mysteri-ous train accidents at Mitaka and Matsukawa.He was forced to resign in August 1951 after106 passengers were killed by a train fire atSakuragicho Station in Yokohama.

Sonosuke Nagasaki succeeded Kagayamaas JNR President. Born in 1896, he studiedlaw at the University of Tokyo and joined theMinistry of Railways in 1920. He was purgedfrom public duty shortly after the war, becausehe served as a top civil servant under the WarCabinet. After his return to public life as JNRPresident, he tried hard to reconstruct the ru-ined railways, but he was also forced to resignin May 1955, after a railway ferry sank in theInland Sea of Japan killing 168 people.The tragedies of these three JNR presidentssymbolize the severe post-war conditions of therailways. (Photos: Transportation Museum)

Mitsuhide Imashiro

Professor Mitsuhide Imashiro graduated from the post-graduate school of Seikei University in

1978. He lectures at Daito Bunka University, and has been visiting professor at Stirling University

in Scotland. In 1991, he published Outcome of the Privatization of the Japanese National Rail-

ways.

ly started; land was purchased and tun-nels were built along the route, but theproject was abandoned as the war grewworse.In a way, the Tokaido Shinkansen wasseen as the resumption of the prewarBullet Train Project. After completion, itproduced a much greater economic ef-fect than ever anticipated, deflecting ridi-cule and disproving the notion in ad-vanced countries that the railway wasdeclining. �

Inaugural Run of Tsubame after Full Electrification of Tokaido Line in 1956 (Transportation Museum)

References

Japanese National Railways, A CentennialHistory of Japanese National Railways 1974

Mitsuhide Imashiro, The Formation and Char-acteristic Japanese Features of Public Corpo-ra t ions ; Prospect for A ManagementRevolution in Japan; Institute of Business Re-search, Daito Bunka University 1995

Mitsuhide Imashiro, JNR after The War; De-velopment of Theories on Railway Policies,Hakuto Shobo 1988

� Three Ill-Fated JNR Presidents

Shimoyama

Kagayama

Nagasaki