j. jirsa, authenticity of the alcibiades i: some reflections

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225AUTHENTICITY OF THE ALCIBIADES I

Listy filologickÈ CXXXII, 2009, 3ñ4, pp. 225ñ244

AUTHENTICITY OF THE ALCIBIADES I:

SOME REFLECTIONS

JA KU B JI RS A (Praha)

ìI think it an injudicious novelty, introduced by Schleiermacher,to set up a canonical type of Platonism, all deviations from which

are to be rejected as forgeries.î

GEORGE GROTE, Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, II,

London 1888, p. 19.

When the authorship of a book is disputed, how can one prove a con-

crete person X is the author when his name on the back is not enough?

First, supposing that the person does not have any reason to lie or deny

the authorship, one can try to ask him or her. If this is not possible, one

has to gather as much evidence as possible and investigate its credibi-

lity. The closest epistemic testimonies would be the most relevant ñ

someone whom we can trust says he saw X writing it, someone who

knew X well says that it was written by X , or some contemporary or

close fellow refers to the book as being written by X . Then comes per-

haps a further level of epistemic probability ñ several people (perhaps

experts in the given field or subject) agree on the authorship, and later

generations refer to the book as X ís work.None of this is available for the dialogue Alcibiades I, that has its

place in the fourth tetralogy of Platoís books.1 One cannot ask Plato,

and similarly, as with the vast majority of the dialogues, there is no di-

rect evidence from authors of Platoís generation or generation after him

1 Since I do not have anything substantial to say about the Second Alcibiades, fromnow on, I refer to the First Alcibiades just as the Alcibiades. When occasionally refer-ring to the Second Alcibiades, I mark it as the Alcibiades II .



226 JAKUB J IRSA

(i.e. no one writes ìPlato says in the Alcibiadesî or ìPlatoís Alcibiades

saysî).2

If no one ever doubted the authenticity of the Alcibiades, there would

be no need to argue for it. However, since the beginning of the nine-

teenth century this has not been the case. The reputation of the Alci-biades was questioned for the first time by Friedrich Schleiermacher in

his preface to the German translation of the dialogue.3 The subsequent

debate resembles throwing a ball from one side to the other without

much being added every time the ball makes its way. After the initial

debate, which I will treat in more detail in the next section, Schleier-

macherís view was the prevailing one until the late eighties of the twen-

tieth century, when Julia Annas published her article on self-knowledge

arguing vigorously against the doubt. Soon after her article followed the

stylometrical study of Gerard Ledger that classified the Alcibiades

among the authentic works.4 Some ten years later the edition of the text

by Nick Denyer and a new French commented translation by Jean-

FranÁois Pradeau and Chantal Marboeuf appeared without putting the

name of the author into brackets or inserting pseudo- in front of Plato. 5

Far from being the full stop after the debate,6 it rather launched a new

discussion, which so far has not seen firm outcomes.

2 However, several authors try to track some references in Aristotleís writings, cf.JEAN-FRAN«OIS PRADEAU ñ CHANTAL MARBOEUF, Platon: Alcibiade, Paris 1999, p. 76;JULIA ANNAS, Self-knowledge in Early Plato, in: Platonic Investigations, (ed.) DOMINIC

J. OíMEARA, Washington 1985, p. 117, ftn. 23. For critique of their efforts see NICHO-LAS D. SMITH, Did Plato write the Alcibiades I?, in: Apeiron 37, 2004, pp. 97-99.

3 FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, Schleiermacherís Introductions to the Dialogues of

Plato, Cambridge 1936, pp. 328ff. I use the English translation dated 1836, the Ger-man original was published at 1809, cf. JEAN-FRAN«OIS PRADEAU ñ CHANTAL MAR-BOEUF, Platon: Alcibiade, p. 24.

4 JULIA ANNAS, Self-knowledge in Early Plato, pp. 111-138; GERARD R. LEDGER, Re-

counting Plato, A Computer Analysis of Platoís Style, Oxford 1989.5 NICHOLAS DENYER, Plato: Alcibiades, Cambridge 2001; JEAN-FRAN«OIS PRADEAU ñ

CHANTAL MARBOEUF, Platon: Alcibiade.6 That such debates can have a ìfull stopî is demonstrated by Paul Woodruffís

defense of the Hippias Major . Analogically to the Alcibiades, it was Schleiermacherwho first rejected authenticity of the Hippias Major on the grounds of pure philologi-cal and philosophical taste. Further authors added further reasons: there are uniqueterms unparalleled in the rest of the corpus, some passages seem to copy motivesfrom other dialogues, Hippias seems to be rather stupid, the style is too comic to bePlatoís, there are flagrant errors in argumentation, etc. Cf. PAUL WOODRUFF, Plato ñ

Hippias Major , Oxford 1982, pp. 94-103.




Author i t ies ñ Ancient and Modern

Ancient authorities generally regarded the Alcibiades as a genuine work

of Plato.7 It was well known in the Platonist tradition and possibly to thestoic school as well. Carlini cites almost fifty ancient authors quoting or

referring to the text of the dialogue.8 In different periods of Platonism

Albinus and Iamblichus claimed that it was the first dialogue to be read

by anyone entering Platoís philosophy. Plotinus alludes several times to

the work ( Enneads I,1,3,3; IV,4,43,20-1; VI,7,5,24) and we possess ex-

tensive commentaries by Olympiodorus and Proclus. Finally, Cicero

adopts several themes in his Tusculan Disputations I,52 and V,70 as

well.9 However, ancient authors acknowledged Platoís authorship of

nowadays dubious works such as the Theages, Hipparchus or Minos as

well and thus cannot serve as a proof in the discussion.

As I said earlier, the modern debate was launched by the attack of

Friedrich Schleiermacher.10 Schleiermacher declares himself to be one

of the rare experts with such knowledge of Plato that he can state his

claim against the entire tradition so far.11 Although the taste of a great

philologist is no small matter, his arguments beg a number of questions.

The dialogue appears to him: ìvery insignificant and poor, and that to

such a degree, that we cannot ascribe it to Plato.î12

What reasons doeshe have for this claim? There is, according to him, a ìsingular want of

7 The attitude of ancients was not un-critical; several dialogues (e.g. Eryxias or Axiochus) were proclaimed inauthentic already in antiquity, cf. DIOGENES LAERTIUS, Lives III,62 and NICHOLAS DENYER, Plato: Alcibiades, p. 14.

8 ANTONIO CARLINI, Platone: Alcibiade, Alcibiades Secondo, Ipparco, Rivali, To-rino 1964, pp. 401-403; even with possible cross-references between the ancient au-thors themselves, the number is quite high.

9 Cf. JEAN P…PIN, Que líhomme níest rien díautre que son ‚me: observations sur latradition du Premier Alcibiade, in: Revue des …tudes Grecques 82, 1969, pp. 56-70,and JULIA ANNAS, Self-knowledge in Early Plato, pp. 112-114.

10 For the list of authors on each side of the barricade, cf. ROBERT R. WELLMAN, Soc-

rates and Alcibiades: The Alcibiades Major, in: History of Education Quarterly, Win-ter 1966, pp. 18-19 and JEAN-FRAN«OIS PRADEAU ñ CHANTAL MARBOEUF, Platon: Alci-

biade, pp. 219-220. The overviews show that neither of the opinions is prevailing.11 FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, Schleiermacherís Introductions, p. 329.12 FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, Schleiermacherís Introductions, p. 329. On the other

hand, RICHARD S. BLUCK, The origin of the Greater Alcibiades, in: Classical Quarterly,

New Series 3, 1953, p. 51, although being sceptical about authenticity, writes: ìThe



228 JAKUB J IRSA

uniformityî throughout the dialogue, but a couple of lines later he states

that ìparticular passages, very beautiful and genuinely Platonic, may be

found sparingly dispersed, and floating in a mass of worthless matter,

consisting partly of little broken dialogues busied about nothing, partly

of long speeches.î13 Schleiermacher finds several crucial aspects miss-ing: irony, philosophy, and Alcibiadesí love for Socrates.14

Scholarly opinion was not unified even in the nineteenth century it-

self.15 In his Plato and other Companions of Sokrates George Grote

writes that Alcibiades I ìexhibits a very characteristic specimen of the

Sokratico-Platonic methodî.16 Although Grote defends also the smaller

dialogue Alcibiades II , which is nowadays generally agreed to be dubi-

ous, he lays down a thesis that is usually maintained by those who

oppose Schleiermacher: ìwe must look for a large measure of diversity

in the various dialogues ... to admit it as a work by Platoî.17

A century later there still seems to be a similar pattern in the discus-

sion.18 Neither Julia Annas, Jean-FranÁois Pradeau, Chantal Marboeuf

quality of the Alcibiades makes it most unlikely that it was written merely as an exer-cise; the writer was almost certainly a genuine philosopher himself, with a message toconvey, and if so his work is first-hand evidence of an interesting transitional periodin the history of philosophy.î

13

FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, Schleiermacherís Introductions, p. 330.14 FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, Schleiermacherís Introductions, pp. 330, 332, 334.As to the first two points, irony is missing from several other dialogues as well, andthus its absence is not an argument; there are other authors who see the Alcibiades asphilosophically interesting: starting with GEORGE GROTE, Plato and the Other Com-

panions of Sokrates, II, London 1888; PAUL FRIEDLANDER, Der Grosse Alcibiades. Ein

Weg zu Plato and Der Grosse Alcibiades. Kritische Erˆrterung, Bonn 1921, 1923,and more contemporary JULIA ANNAS, Self-knowledge in Early Plato, pp. 111-138;OWEN GOLDIN, Self, Sameness, and Soul in ëAlcibiades Ií and ëTimaeusí in: FreiburgerZeitschrift f¸r Philosophie und Theologie 40, 1993, pp. 5-19, and DAVID M. JOHNSON,God as the True Self: Platoís Alcibiades I , in: Ancient Philosophy 19, 1999, pp. 1-19.The third point, missing Alcibiadesí love for Socrates will be discussed later.

15 The debate up until the eighties of the 19 th century is summarized in GEORGE

GROTE, Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, p. 18. On the side of the oppo-nents of authenticity he cites Schleiermacher and Ast; among the proponents of Pla-toís authorship is Socher, Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, and Susemihl. Lutoslawskiin The Origin and Growth of Platoís Logic (1897), pp. 197-198, later argues againstPlatoís authorship.

16 GEORGE GROTE, Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, p. 7.17 Ibidem, p. 19.18 Apart from FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, Schleiermacherís Introductions and

DAVID GRIBBLE, Alcibiades and Athens, Oxford 1989, the most coherent critiques are




nor Nick Denyer argue for the authenticity of the dialogue. They rather

challenge the arguments against Platoís authorship; they all agree that

the balance of proof is not against the dialogue, but they think the task

of possible disproof must be on those arguing against authenticity. 19

The reviews of the French translation by Pradeau and Marboeuf aswell as the reactions to Denyerís edition are more often than not in fa-

vour of authenticity.20 Joyal in his negative review of Denyerís work

summarizes the most frequent counterargument in the following way:

ìwe are dealing with a dialogue that was intended to be an introduction

to Platoís writings; and this brings us back to the question whether Plato

would have composed such a work.î21

Now the question is whether and how other scholars ñ who do not deal

directly with the Alcibiades but write on different topics from Platoís

philosophy ñ use or do not use the dialogue in their works. As Denyer

noted, The Cambridge Companion to Plato refers to the dialogue only

once and mentions that its authenticity is debated.22 The situation in the

usually triggered by a suggestion to accept the Alcibiades into the family of Platoísgenuine works; thus EMILE DE STRYCKER, Platonica I: líauthenticitÈ du Premier Alci-

biade, in: Les …tudes Classiques 11, 1942, pp. 116-151 is directed against CORNELIS

VINK, Platoís Eerste Alcibiades. Een onderzoek naar zijn authenticiteit , Amsterdam

ñ Paris 1939, and NICHOLAS D. SMITH, Did Plato Write the Alcibiades I?; againstNICHOLAS DENYER, Plato: Alcibiades.19 Cf. JULIA ANNAS, Self-knowledge in Early Plato, pp. 111-115; JEAN-FRAN«OIS

PRADEAU ñ CHANTAL MARBOEUF, Platon: Alcibiade, pp. 27-28, and NICHOLAS DENYER,Plato: Alcibiades, pp. 14-26.

20 Supportive: BETEGH in Classical World 99, 2006, pp. 185-187; KONSTAN in An-cient Philosophy 24, 2004, pp. 461-464; FERRARI in Classical Review 53, 2003, pp.296-298; TODD in Phoenix 57, 2003, pp. 340-341; negative: JOYAL in Bryn MawrClassical Review 2003.01.28 and more or less ROWE in Phronesis 44, 2003, pp. 250-251, as well; purely descriptive: MULHERN in Journal for History of Philosophy 41,2003, pp. 265-266. I did not have access to all the reviews, however, this, I believe, is

a majority of them. An interesting case is MURPHY in Mouseion 46, 2/1, 2001, pp. 86-90, who rejects the authenticity because he is convinced by Denyerís late dating of the dialogue, while most of the reviews that agree with Platoís authorship are hesitantabout Denyerís idea of late dating.

21 MARK JOYAL, Review of Nicholas Denyer, Plato: Alcibiades. Cambridge Greek

and Latin Classics, in: Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2003.01.28, http:// ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/2003/2003-01-28.html, visited 17th January 2009.

22 The Cambridge Companion to Plato, (ed.) RICHARD KRAUT, Cambridge 1992, pp.35 and 543. Similarly, Gail Fine in the widely used Plato, vol. 2, refers to the dialogueonce, commenting: ìthough this work may be spurious, its reasoning may be Pla-

tonicî, Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Plato, II, (ed.) GAIL FINE, Oxford 1999, p. 31.



230 JAKUB J IRSA

last two introductory volumes on Plato differs, but not radically: A Com-

panion to Plato edited by Hugh H. Benson mentions the dialogue only

twice, but without any doubt about its authenticity.23 The Oxford Hand-

book of Plato edited by Gail Fine refers to the dialogue once and ques-

tions its authenticity with a [?] symbol.24 If one looks into the recentbooks that students use nowadays, one similarly finds that although the

Alcibiades is usually rehabilitated from its dubious reputation, it is nev-

ertheless not often used.25 For example, Christopher Rowe refers to it as

ìprobably pseudo-Platonicî, however, he uses it several times in his

recent book;26 Michelle Carpenter and Ronald M. Polansky use the dia-

logue in their essay on Socratic elenchus in Does Socrates Have a Me-

thod?, edited by Gary Alan Scott,27 and Julia Annas confirms her earlier

conviction in The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics edited by Burkhard

Reis.28

Judging solely the current state of the debate, general opinion is split

as it has been ever since Schleiermacher. But fewer authors dismiss the

dialogue without the need to justify their position or at least mention that

the authenticity is a debated issue. Moreover, in contrast to the books

from the eighties or nineties of the 20th century, more and more authors

work with the Alcibiades without explicit doubts about its authorship.

I have tried to sketch the contemporary state of affairs concerning the

authenticity of the Alcibiades in (mostly) Anglo-Saxon scholarship. Inthe following section I will focus on different groups of arguments, and

then in the penultimate section I will ask whether there is any advantage

in taking all these arguments together as a whole.

23

A Companion to Plato, (ed.) HUGH H. BENSON, Malden & Oxford 2006, p. 452;see especially the use of the Alcibiades by DEBORAH K. W. MODRAK at page 133.24 The Oxford Handbook of Plato, (ed.) GAIL FINE, Oxford 2008, p. 581.25 Again, the selection is purely subjective; I chose three fairly recent volumes in

which the library form indicated frequent use.26 CHRISTOPHER ROWE, Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing, Cambridge 2007,

p. 282, see esp. p. 124.27 Does Socrates Have a Method?, (ed.) GARRY A. SCOTT, Pennsylvania 2002, pp.

95-97, authors treat the dialogue as genuinely Platoís.28 The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics, (ed.) BURKHARD REIS, Cambridge 2006, pp.

41-43.




Part icular i t ies

a) Lexica

The first point I will consider is the language of the dialogue and severalunique words which do not occur elsewhere in the Platonic corpus. The

opponents of authenticity listed five problematic terms: krµgyoq(111e1), •xrantoq (114a1), prodromµ (114a2), ≥lxoq (115b9), and

Øpiw°neia (124c10).29 All of these terms are attested before and after

Plato, therefore the question concerns only Platoís own vocabulary and

favour for certain terms. DeStrycker is not correct in listing Øpiw°neiasince it appears in several other places in the corpus and may be thus

crossed from the list.30 Further, I take prodromµ as a metaphorical use

of a term that occurs in masculine form in the Charmides 154a4,31 simi-

larly the term ≥lxoq appears in the Laws X 877a5, and so it does not

seem to be so entirely unique in the corpus.

Thus we are left with krµgyoq and •xrantoq; Denyer argues that

these are poetic terms, and their usage would need explanation whoever

the author is. He rejects the underlying assumption that everything in

Platoís authentic work must have a parallel as unwarranted, and claims

that Plato used these terms with a specific aim in mind. Denyer lists sev-

eral occurrences of krµgyoq that support his interpretation but in thecase of •xrantoq one has to take his word for it, or check the TLG for

oneself to confirm this.32 The parallels for krµgyoq are convincing

enough to believe that Plato was making an allusion to poetic works

where this term occurs.

Of course, Denyer uses the general line of defence that a unique oc-

currence of a term is not a proof of a bogus work.33 For example when

I searched for Øpiw°neia I found that Sophocles uses Øp¯wantoq only

once in his plays ( Antigone 841): are we willing to argue that this casts

29 Cf. WILLIAM A. HEIDEL, Pseudo-Platonica , Baltimore 1896, p. 68; EMILE DESTRYCKER, Platonica I: líauthenticitÈ du Premier Alcibiade, p. 137, and NICHOLAS

DENYER, Plato: Alcibiades, pp. 15-16.30 PLATO, Laches 184b5, Menexenos 246e6 and Øpiwanµq occurs in Laws 629e6

and 829d1.31 Cf. LSJ ad prodrom-e’v.32 NICHOLAS DENYER, Plato: Alcibiades, pp. 16, 126 and 135.33

Ibidem, p. 16.



232 JAKUB J IRSA

any doubts on the authorship of the Antigone? And the occurrence of a

rare word moreover calls for an explanation regardless of who exactly

the author is ñ rare words are rare, and that is what makes them special

in any circumstances. Further, if one looks into Brandwoodís Word

Index to Plato, one finds several terms that occur only once in the cor-pus, yet no one uses them to disprove the authorship of the dialogue in

which they occur.34 Therefore, I do not find this principle on its own

methodologically sound enough to question the authorship of a work.

b) Style , Doctr ine , and Stylometry

The problems with style can be divided into two subgroups: judging the

date of composition of the dialogue on the one hand, and placing it into

the stylistic groups settled by stylometric research on the other.35 To

judge upon similarities and / or dissimilarities in composition and doc-

trines with other dialogues does not seem to be a methodologically

sound process either.36 One methodological objection is summarized by

Annas: ì Both its similarities to, and its differences from, the rest of the

Platonic corpus show that it is not authentic. With these rules, providing

inauthenticity is naturally an easy game.î37 Denyer adds that since ìab-

solutely every feature of the Alcibiades is either a similarity to, or a dif-

ference from, writings agreed to be by Platoî38 everything in the text

could serve to disprove Platoís authorship. Moreover, this method ap-plied to any dialogue gives the same result: inauthenticity.

Some could object that I am being unfair, for it is not necessary to

stick to both parts of this method: either similarity or dissimilarity in

style and doctrine is sufficient proof. But the similarity argument does

34 LEONARD BRANDWOOD, A Word Index of Plato, New York 1976; e.g. §b¯astonat Timaeus 61a7 and ®brÕn at Symposium 204c5 are the two examples from the first

column on the first page of the index.35 On stylometry cf. LEONARD BRANDWOOD, The Chronology of Platoís Dialogues,

Cambridge 1990, and GERARD R. LEDGER, Re-counting Plato. By ìcompositionîI mean larger features of style in which the work is written, i.e. aporetic or protreptic

character, number of interlocutors, using Socrates disavowal of knowledge, presence

or absence of positive doctrines in the text etc.36 WILLIAM A. HEIDEL, Pseudo-Platonica, p. 62 claims that the dialogue is ìtoo Pla-

tonicî to be by Plato, cf. NICHOLAS DENYER, Plato: Alcibiades, p. 16 for further quota-

tions; the most recent similar approach is in DAVID GRIBBLE, Alcibiades and Athens,p. 261: ìit is precisely this closeness that has led many to suspect itî.

37 JULIA ANNAS, Self-knowledge in Early Plato, p. 215.38

NICHOLAS DENYER, Plato: Alcibiades, p. 17.




not work; similarity of style and doctrine is what serves to group the dia-

logues together and thus can hardly serve as a proof of inauthenticity. 39

I will come back to the stylistic and compositional differences later in

this section and to the doctrinal differences in the next section.

Joyal raises another problem concerning the style or rather the genreof the dialogue: ì Alcibiades I was popular in antiquity in large part pre-

cisely because it functioned as an excellent introduction to Platoís writ-

ings and the thought contained therein. Is it demonstrable that Plato

would have written a work that performed this function so well and

seems even to have been written for just this purpose?î40 Great masters

write great works. But do they write only great works? Or do they write

great introductions as well? If the answer is yes, Joyalís objection falls.

Plato established a school and was involved in its educational process

(though this ìschoolî was far from something like our university); for

example, the Meno serves as a great introduction to Platoís epistemo-

logy followed by the more complicated Theaetetus and the Euthyphro

does equally well for beginners in metaphysics. Are those two dialogues

bogus since they are in a way introductory, and Plato would never write

an introductory work?

One could possibly think that stylometry must put an end to the dis-

pute.41 Well, it depends. There are two questions: can stylometry prove

39 I will deal later with more complicated cases when the dialogue combines the

style of one group with a doctrine usually assigned to another group of dialogues.40 MARK JOYAL, Review of Nicholas Denyer ; this point largely covers his second

objection that the dialogue ìaims for and ends in the (temporary) conversion of Alcibiades. Unlike the usual pattern in Platoís Socratic dialogues, its focus is not an

ethical problem whose lack of resolution creates aporia and thereby serves as an im-

plicit protreptic for the reader.î41 Stylometry is a statistical method measuring the stylistic features in the works; it

counts frequency of certain vocabulary or stylistic features, and the similarities and

divergences of results establish stylistic groups of texts. Stylometry became popular

by the end of the nineteenth century; it was a perfect child of its time, a genuine blendof Hegelianism (belief in the development of spirit) and positivism (basing proper

philosophical understanding on scientific, statistical ground). The hope was to estab-

lish a stylistic development of Platoís works that could give us the order of their com-position as well. Cf. LEONARD BRANDWOOD, The Chronology of Platoís Dialogues, his

results are summarized in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, (ed.) RICHARD KRAUT,pp. 90-120, cf. review CHARLES M. YOUNG, Plato and Computer Dating ñ A Discus-

sion of Gerard R. Ledger, Re-counting Plato: A Computer Analysis of Platoís Style

and Leonard Brandwood, The Chronology of Platoís Dialogues, in: Oxford Studies

in Ancient Philosophy 12, 1994, pp. 227-250.



234 JAKUB J IRSA

or disprove authorship? And, further, can it help in establishing a dia-

logueís time of composition? The Alcibiades was not regularly used in

the older stylometric researches since the authors mostly shared the as-

sumption that it is bogus.42 If it occurs in the research, then no feature

makes it exceptional, and it is usually put into the family of the so-calledearly dialogues. The last major stylometric research conducted by Led-

ger shares this opinion on the date of its origin and it presents explicit

statistical arguments for the authenticity of the dialogue.43

Apparently there is a remarkable retreat of stylometry from contem-

porary scholarship.44 While, for example, The Cambridge Companion to

Plato features an essay on stylometry by Leonard Brandwood,45 later in-

troductions such as Blackwellís Companion to Plato or The Oxford

Handbook of Plato are much more reserved. In the former Christopher

Rowe questions the rigidity of a strict developmentalism and T. H. Irwin

in the latter shows several problems of a chronological ordering based

on stylistic features.46 It is generally problematic to make the step from

the stylistic groups (which are more or less well established) to any pre-

diction concerning chronology, i.e. concerning the time of the composi-

42 From twenty-one researches summarized in LEONARD BRANDWOOD, The chronol-

ogy of Platoís Dialogues, it figures only in Campbell, Walbe, and Baron. The overallresult of more than a hundred years of this research in not fascinating either: the

grouping has been generally agreed upon for no more than fourteen works out of the

entire corpus.43 GERARD R. LEDGER, Re-counting Plato, pp. 121, 144, 168. According to Ledger,

the Alcibiades is closest in style to the Gorgias and Meno.44 Its advantages and limitations are summarized in CHARLES H. KAHN, On Platonic

Chronology, in: New Perspectives on Plato, Modern and Ancient , (eds.) JULIA ANNAS

ñ CHRISTOPHER ROWE, Cambridge (MA) 2002, pp. 93-127; criticism of certain aspects

of stylometric methodology are in CHARLES M. YOUNG, Plato and Computer Dating,

pp. 243-250; DEBRA NAILS, Review of G. R. Ledger, Re-counting Plato: A Computer

Analysis of Platoís Style and Holger Thesleff, Studies in Platonic Chronology , in:Bryn Mawr Classical Review 03.04.17., http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/1992/

03.04.17.html visited 17th January 2009; PAUL KEYSER, Review of G. R. Ledger, Re-

counting Plato: A Computer Analysis of Platoís Style, in: Bryn Mawr Classical Re-

view 02.07.03., http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/1991/02.07.03.html visited 17th Janu-

ary 2009; PAUL KEYSER ñ GERARD R. LEDGER, Responses, in: Bryn Mawr Classical Re-view 03.06.19., http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/1992/03.06.19.html visited 17th Janu-

ary 2009.45 In The Cambridge Companion to Plato, (ed.) RICHARD KRAUT, pp. 90-120.46 ROWE in A Companion to Plato, (ed.) HUGH H. BENSON, pp. 17-20; IRWIN in The

Oxford Handbook of Plato, (ed.) GAIL FINE, pp. 81-84.




tion. Further, one has to presuppose that Plato never went back to re-

write certain dialogues or their parts.47 It has to be taken for granted that

the author was incapable of controlling the stylistic features measured,48

and that the examiner selected context independent clusters of text to

examine (which on its own brings the problem of circularity).Another attempt to dispute the authorship of the Alcibiades might be

placing it into certain stylistic / chronological group of the dialogues and

then to claim that it incorporates philosophical or compositional features

of a different group. Therefore, the argument continues, it cannot be

genuine.49 Several other dialogues share the same ìproblemî. There is,

for example, the Charmides and the problem of self-reflexive relations,

and Euthyphro or Hippias Major and the theory of forms. With respect

to composition and style of the dialogue, the obvious example is the

Theaetetus, a dialogue generally supposed to be a mature work of Plato,

yet resembling many of the so-called Socratic dialogues.50

Despite the problems with the relation between style and chronology

described above, I always find some unease in the idea that Plato de-

votes himself to writing the dialogues in one manner of composition for

about fifteen years and then suddenly changes to another. If one believes

in the excellence of Platoís style, as I do, it is then more natural to sup-

pose that Plato uses different stylistic and compositional features to deal

with different philosophical problems or different approaches to theseproblems regardless of the chronology of composition.

47 On the other hand, MALCOLM SCHOFIELD, A Displacement in the Text of the Cra-

tylus, in: Classical Quarterly 22, 1972, pp. 187-196 convincingly shows that Plato re-

wrote or re-edited parts of the Cratylus, and we know about two different prologues

to the Theaetetus as well (cf. ANONYMUS, In Platonis Theatetum 3,28-37; GUIDO

BASTIANINI ñ DAVID SEDLEY, Commentarium in Platonis Theaetetum, in: Corpus dei

Papiri Filosofici, III: Commentari, [ed.] FRANCESCO ADORNO, Firenze 1995, ad loc.).48 The problem is that Plato was obviously extremely skilful in changing style: for

example Lysiasí speech from the Phaedrus is closer to Lysiasí own work than to Pla-

tonic dialogues, similarly, the myth in the Protagoras and the speeches on Eros in the

Symposium, cf. GERARD R. LEDGER, Re-counting Plato, pp. 103-104 and 124-125.

I believe Ledger is immune to this objection since he measures hardly observable sty-

listic data, cf. NICHOLAS DENYER, Plato: Alcibiades, p. 18.49 For example, it belongs among the so-called early dialogues but operates with

doctrines known from middle or later dialogues. DAVID GRIBBLE, Alcibiades and Ath-

ens, p. 260, objection (i), (ii), (iii).50

Cf. DAVID SEDLEY, The Midwife of Platonism, Cambridge 2004, ch. 1 and 5.6.



236 JAKUB J IRSA

c) Al leged Doctr ina l Differences

No one has ever suggested that there was anything un-Platonic in the

Alcibiades;51 cases have been made, that what is said in the dialogue

does not correspond with what is said on the same subject elsewhere inthe corpus. There seems to be a problem in using this argument since

there are opposing views even in the well-attested dialogues. What are

we going to do with two contrasting views on the immortality of the soul

in the Symposium 206a-208b and Phaedrus 245c-e?52 What about sim-

plicity of the soul in the Phaedo and its three parts in the Republic or the

role of self-knowledge as the only human wisdom in the Apology and

the denial of its usefulness and possibility in the Charmides? How

should we distinguish which doctrinal differences are to be accommo-

dated into a single general interpretation, which are a sign of Platoís

philosophical development, and which mark out a bogus work?53

For example, Smith points out that the identification of Socratesí

daimonion with god in the Alcibiades 105d5 is never made explicit else-

where.54 But even Smith himself acknowledges that daimonion is called

ìdivineî in many other places.55 I believe, that ìdivineî (theios) means

simply ìhaving the characteristics of god(s)î.56 The step from calling

some voice or sign ìdivineî to saying that it is the voice of ìgodî then

does not seem so problematic.

51 Cf. JEAN-FRAN«OIS PRADEAU ñ CHANTAL MARBOEUF, Platon: Alcibiade, p. 25.52 Point made by NICHOLAS DENYER, Plato: Alcibiades, p. 25.53 This is exactly the case with Smithís objection (d) and (e), N ICHOLAS D. SMITH,

Did Plato write the Alcibiades I?, p. 103. The Alcibiades seems to be much more infavour of public political life and common morality than other dialogues (esp. Apol-

ogy and Gorgias); but this, I take it, is not because Socrates changes his mind but be-

cause he talks to young Alcibiades who is keen on a political career and, moreover, itseems to be his first philosophical discussion proper. Smithís objection (f) is based on

his misreading of lines 134a4-7 where Socrates says: ìAnd if he doesnít know whatheís doing, wonít he make mistakes?î (ÒO dÆ m∂ e≈d‰q o⁄x ®martµsetai;). He con-siders this in opposition to Socrates claim that due to knowledge of his own ignorance

he avoids being in error. Smith missed that the person in question does something he

does not know. However, this suggests that he is not aware of his ignorance for if heknew he did not know it, he would not start his action in the first place.

54 NICHOLAS D. SMITH, Did Plato write the Alcibiades I?, p. 100, objection (b).55 PLATO, Apology 31c8-d1, 40a4-6, 40c3-4, 41d6; Euthyphron 3b5-6; Euthydemus

272e4; Phaedrus 242b8-9; Republic IV 496c4.56 Cf. I. G. KIDD, Review: Le Sens du Mot THEIOS chez Platon by Jean van Camp,

Paul Canart , in: The Philosophical Quarterly 8, 1958, pp. 377-378, p. 378.




Smith further claims that Socratesí statement in the Apology that no

one ever learned anything from him ( Apology 33b6-8) contrasts with

Alcibiades 105e2-5 where he says that he is the only one to provide

what Alcibiades craves for. Besides understanding this passage as a way

of keeping Alcibiades in the dialogue, one has to ask whether Alcibiadesactually learnt anything from Socrates, and whether Socratesí method of

providing someone with virtue (aretë ) is actually a kind of dogmatic

teaching. I suppose that answers to both questions are negative, and thus

Smithís objection does not work.57

I agree with Smith that non-committal answers are rare in the dia-

logues and violate the Socratic ìsay-what-you-believe ruleî. Alcibiades

gives this non-committal answer at 106c2-3, and Socrates accepts it

without any further worries.58 Is this a sign of bogus work? Alcibiades

answers the question whether he indeed has the intentions Socrates as-

cribes to him; plain agreement would reveal Alcibiadesí weakness: pride

and certain political hybris. His answer ìletís say I do, if you like, so

I can find out what youíre going to sayî allows him to stay in the dis-

cussion without openly admitting his hubristic expectations. It is, I sup-

pose, a convincing answer contemporary readers or listeners to the dia-

logue might accept as coming from Alcibiades, who wants to listen to

Socrates, but does not want to reveal his weakness right at the beginning.

De Strycker further lists several objections concerning the relation of the doctrines and topics discussed in the Alcibiades and its most prob-

able early origin. Socrates is, according to him, too subservient to god

which is a feature of later dialogues; the four cardinal virtues at 121c-

122a presuppose the Republic, and the soul-body distinction pre-

supposes the Phaedo.59 R. S. Bluck adds that mind is considered intelli-

gible first in the Timaeus and a parallel between visual and mental per-

ception (132c-133c) is not used before the Republic.60 But these objec-

tions are absurd; overall, there is no more reason to suppose that the

Alcibiades must presuppose other dialogues rather than that these dia-

57 On Socratesí teaching cf. for example ALEXANDER NEHAMAS, What Did Socrates

Teach and To Whom Did He Teach It?, in: Review of Metaphysics 46, 1992, pp.279-306.

58 NICHOLAS D. SMITH, Did Plato write the Alcibiades I?, p. 102, objection (c).59 EMILE DE STRYCKER, Platonica I , pp. 144-151.60

RICHARD S. BLUCK, The origin of the Greater Alcibiades, pp. 48-49.



238 JAKUB J IRSA

logues must presuppose the Alcibiades.61 It seems that these objections

rest on an unwarranted assumption that whenever Plato introduces a cer-

tain idea, he gives a proper justification and explanation right with it.

Well, if you like this assumption, you find yourself committed to dating

the composition of all the dialogues that discuss justice, Forms, parts of the soul, or opinion and knowledge after the Republic.62

Smithís article ends with three rather peculiar objections.63 First, Soc-

rates calls several students of Zeno of Elea wise despite (i) the impossi-

bility of teaching virtue proclaimed in many dialogues and (ii) the state-

ment of the Delphic oracle that no one is wiser than Socrates, who

actually knows nothing. If one accepts this argument, then one is

obliged to cross out each and every dialogue where anyone except Soc-

rates is called wise or a teacher. Second, Smith complains that the ìself

itselfî at 129b1 is a puzzling form that instead to an individual self re-

fers to something like Forms. I agree that it is puzzling indeed, but ac-

cording to several interpreters perfectly sound in the argument and in

Platoís line of thought as well.64 Again, one has to wonder how many

dialogues would stay in the corpus after cutting out those with puzzling

passages. Finally, there is the objection that despite being a so-called

early dialogue, the Alcibiades at 133b9-10 seems to presuppose a com-

plex soul with different parts. First, it is not clear whether this passage

must be read with a tripartite or bipartite soul in mind,65

and second,there is a similar hint in the Gorgias as well.66 Therefore, if I were

61 Concerning assumptions and presuppositions in the dialogues, cf. CHARLES H.KAHN, Did Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?, in: The Classical Quarterly, New Series

31, 1981, pp. 305-320; IDEM, Platoís Charmides and the Proleptic Reading of So-

cratic Dialogues, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85, 1988, pp. 541-549; IDEM, Plato

and the Socratic Dialogue, Cambridge 1996.62 This idea becomes especially amusing when applied to love and thus to the chro-

nology of Lysis, Symposium and Phaedrus. Further on, it would be hard to establishany of the dialogues as possibly the first, although there has to be one, which Platowrote at the very beginning of his career.

63 NICHOLAS D. SMITH, Did Plato write the Alcibiades I?, p. 105, objections (g), (h),(i). The previous objections were met either in the text above or in footnote 53.

64 Cf. JULIA ANNAS, Self-knowledge in Early Plato, pp. 111-138; OWEN GOLDIN,

Self, Sameness, and Soul in ëAlcibiades Ií and ëTimaeusí, pp. 5-19; DAVID M. JOHN-

SON, God as the True Self: Platoís Alcibiades I , pp. 1-19.65 The term used for ìpartî here is topos, place, which is quite vague and indeter-

minate.66

PLATO, Gorgias 493a3-4: t∑q dÆ cyx∑q to◊to Øn û Øpiuym¯ai e≈s˘.




forced to accept the traditional chronology of composition based on

style of the dialogues, I would be happy with setting the Alcibiades

somewhere around the Gorgias.67

d) Dramat ic Se t t ing and Real i t iesThe last particular group of problems I will discuss are some disagree-

ments between dramatic settings of the Alcibiades and that of other dia-

logues. The supposition behind this possible objection is that Plato

creates the dramatic settings of the dialogue so that they do not conflict

with each other and do not involve obvious historical absurdities.68 Al-

ready Schleiermacher mentions several problems of this kind: when we

compare the Alcibiades with the Protagoras, an incongruity seems to

emerge, for in the Protagoras Pericles is still alive and yet Socrates and

Alcibiades appear as old acquaintances, who must already have con-

versed a lot with one another.69 However, I do not see any disturbing in-

consistency here. Alcibiades in the Protagoras is already somewhat

older to be a proper object of desire for an adult man, but he is still a

pretty young man.70 Within the dialogue he seems to be equal to other

(much older) participants and thus I suppose that he already passed into

early adulthood.71 We know that Alcibiades was born in 451 or 450 BC,

in the Alcibiades he is not yet twenty (123d6-7),72 and Pericles dies in

429 BC. The dramatic date of the Alcibiades might well be 432/1 BC,and thus Plato has at least two years into which to situate the dramatic

date of the Protagoras.

Another sign of a problem might be that we do not find Alcibiadesí

love for Socrates manifested anywhere in the dialogue, whereas in the

Symposium it is an essential part of their relationship.73 True, Alci-

biadesí love, that is so profound in his speech in the Symposium, is miss-

ing, but isnít this due to the fact that it is the first meeting between

67 Cf. JEAN-FRAN«OIS PRADEAU ñ CHANTAL MARBOEUF, Platon: Alcibiade, pp. 9-14and 28-29.

68 Therefore we find that Socrates conversing with Parmenides is quite young, and

there is no dialogue where Socrates would talk, for example, to Homer.69 FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, Schleiermacherís Introductions, p. 334.70 PLATO, Protagoras 309a-b.71 Cf. ibidem, 336b and 347b.72 Twenty was perhaps the usual age to appear in front of the assembly and speak;

cf. XENOPHON, Memorabilia 3,6,1.73

FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, Schleiermacherís Introductions, p. 334.



240 JAKUB J IRSA

them? Moreover, Alcibiades concludes the first philosophical ìdateî ina promising way: ìweíre probably going to change roles, Socrates. Iíllbe playing yours and youíll be playing mine, for from this day forward Iwill never fail to attend on you, and you will always have me as your

attendantî.74 And if love is an essential part of Socratesí role in the Alcibiades, this ìchanging of the rolesî suggests that Alcibiades will bethe lover from now on.75

The remaining problem is in the discrepancy between Socrates fallingin love with Alcibiades some years before first talking to him ( Alci-

biades 103a-b) and Alcibiadesí jealous behaviour, which stops himfrom looking and talking to any other beautiful person from the verymoment Socrates falls in love with him (Symposium 213c6-d1). This, Ibelieve, is the only annoyance. However, I am not convinced of itsstrength and I doubt anyone would like to base his or her claim concern-ing the authenticity of the Alcibiades on it.76

Gribble claims that the Alcibiades depicts Alcibiades himself as toosubmissive and unintelligent. According to Gribble this does not corre-spond to the overall picture of Alcibiades and, moreover, to his depic-tion in the Protagoras.77 It is true that Alcibiades at several places ad-mits that he is lost or does not know what to do further, 78 but evenGribble himself acknowledges in the footnote that Alcibiades shows

some spirit at 114e1 and 119b5-10. Actually, in the second passageGribble lists Alcibiades boasts that he is better in his natural dispositionsthan any Athenian politician. Moreover, there are several passageswhere Alcibiades seems far from being submissive: he claims to antici-pate Socratesí motives,79 and he is even on the verge of being arro-gant;80 the suggestion of changing roles with Socrates by the end of thedialogue does not sound too submissive either.81

74 PLATO, Alcibiades I 135d8-11, transl. Hutschinson.75 Cf. ibidem, 103a1-3, 131e1-4 and 135e1-3.76 DAVID GRIBBLE, Alcibiades and Athens, p. 261, objection (v), he admits that this

is merely a puzzle and not a reason to reject the Alcibiades as a work of Plato. How-ever, NICHOLAS D. SMITH, Did Plato write the Alcibiades I?, pp. 100 lists it again as his

objection (a).77 DAVID GRIBBLE, Alcibiades and Athens, p. 261, objection (iv), he refers to PLATO,

Protagoras 336b-e, 348b-c.78 PLATO, Alcibiades I 109a8, 112d10, 113b12, 116e1-3, 118a1.79 Ibidem, 104d1-6.80 Ibidem, 113e4-5.81

Ibidem, 135d7-11.




Further, Gribble claims that certain anecdotes occur in the dialogue,but actually belong to later tradition.82 However, he does not list anyreasons why these pieces of anecdotal information must be from latertradition and, moreover, the points he lists (cf. footnote 82) are quite

common so that it is unclear why they should not be considered knownalready during Alcibiadesí life. And even if these points were parts of rumours that constituted part of the tradition, Alcibiades died in 404 BCand thus even if we believe that Plato wrote the dialogue early in hiscareer, there has been some time for rumours to spread and some leg-ends to become established (especially taking into consideration how fa-mous Alcibiades was).

Summing Up and the Genealogy of Doubt

What particular reasons survive for disproving the authenticity of thedialogue? If I have counted correctly, it is the unique term •xrantoq at114a1 and the discrepancy between the Alcibiades and the Symposium

concerning Alcibiadesí jealousy long before Socrates actually talked tohim for the first time. And one could add any objections from Smithísarticle or Gribbleís book that one considers were not properly answered

in the text above.It does not seem to be sufficient to rule out the dialogue as a bogusafter all. But if each reason is insufficient on its own, what about takingthem all together? Each particular reason might be wobbly on its ownbut when considered together the force of the whole bundle might begreat enough to deal with the dialogue once and for all. This, I believe,is a justified process for making oneís case stronger. The discussionthen moves from judging particular reasons onto a higher level of judg-ing the reason(s) for these reasons.

However, it is exactly the genealogy of these doubts that does notconvince me about their validity when taken together. The problemslisted above did not originate from unbiased examinations. As I showedin the description of the debate, they are all related to the unfortunate judgement of Schleiermacher from the beginning of the nineteenth cen-

82 DAVID GRIBBLE, Alcibiades and Athens, p. 261, objection (vi); he lists Alcibiadesírefusal to learn to play flute, Pericles being its guardian, location of his estates, name

of his tutor, and mythical genealogy.



242 JAKUB J IRSA

tury. Different reasons (weak on their own) coming from independentepistemic backgrounds might have a greater force when taken together.But when the weak reasons stem from a single motivation to defend anunwarranted belief, I do not think their power grows when considered

all together.83 The case of the Hippias Major (cf. above) clearly showsthat one authoritarian doubt, although arbitrary and unwarranted, initi-ates a sequence of attempts to support this doubt. Were these attemptscorrect and convincing, the arbitrariness of the original doubt might fadeaway. However, if these attempts and arguments are weak and uncon-vincing, then the sum of such reasons with an unwarranted starting pointis no stronger that each of the weak reasons taken on its own.

ConclusionIn the previous chapters I tried to show that the debate concerning theauthenticity of the Alcibiades is far from finished. There does not seemto be anything approaching unified scholarly opinion ñ perhaps apartfrom the obvious fact that the authenticity is a debated issue. However, Ithink that any further attempt to reject the authenticity of the dialoguehas to be done independently of the previous attempts. Some peoplemight be convinced by the objections I have tried to meet above, but

then they have to argue away the methodological problems of the olderarguments.Another question is what will actually change if we accept or deny

Platoís authorship in this case. I mean what will be changed in our un-derstanding of Plato or Socrates? I do not see any dramatically new doc-trines or thoughts proposed in this dialogue that would make us reviseour understanding gained from other dialogues. On the other hand,

83 Let me explain my point: if a certain number of people have a belief for which Ido not find a sufficient reason to accept, I might still be convinced by their multitude;

or I might at least think that there must be something to this belief when such a large

number of people have it. However, if I find that these people have this belief because

one person told them so (and this source-person did not have any better reasons ei-ther), I am no longer impressed by their multitude. Now, even if these people develop

additional (but still weak) reasons for having this belief, I am no longer convinced

about its appropriateness. A sum of weak reasons with the same, questionable episte-mological genealogy cannot increase the argumentative force of the weak claim that

stands as their origin. In order to strengthen the original weak claim the supportive

reasons have to be correct and convincing (at least one of them) and preferably they

should originate from an independent motivation.




I find several passages concerning Platoís view of psychology, söphro-synë and self-knowledge illuminating.84 Accepting the dialogue into thefamily of genuine works would not bring any fresh thoughts differentfrom what we know already. In my own view there are, of course, some

philosophically interesting points: the metaphysics of self connectedwith the enigmatic expression ìthe self itselfî (a⁄tŒ tŒ a⁄tÕ) at 129b1and 130d5; the connection between rationality and divinity in our soulsuggested at the mirror passage (133b7-c7); or the assumption that anyknowledge depends upon self-knowledge (I cannot properly know any-thing if I do not know myself) at 131a2-b6. But these and any others aremerely more-or-less interesting footnotes to the well developed doc-trines. If one imagines Platoís philosophy in the dialogues as a mosaic,these are then single stones ñ they might complete the picture but ac-cording to some they distort it and therefore have to be excluded.

As I have said above, the dispute is not so much about the dialogueísphilosophical content but rather about the incompatibility between itsstyle or doctrines and assumed date of composition. The proof repudiat-ing the dialogue from the genuine works would strengthen the interpre-tative positions that rest heavily on the traditional chronology of com-position. However, if the dialogue is not bogus, its status brings intoquestion the chronological, stylistic and doctrinal unity of the common

dialogue groups.85

Accepting such a troubling dialogue might openquestions as to how useful and how well grounded the usual divisioninto early, middle and late dialogues is. This is, I understand, the mainpoint in the debate of which the actual fate of the Alcibiades is only asmaller part.

If Smith somewhat paternalistically advises others to approach the Alcibiades with ìextreme cautionî, I suggest that unbiased rationality isall that one needs, and careful readers of the dialogues usually have thatanyway.86

84 Cf. again JULIA ANNAS, Self-knowledge in Early Plato, pp. 111-138 and EADEM in

The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics, (ed.) BURKHARD REIS, pp. 41-43; OWEN GOLDIN,

Self, Sameness, and Soul in ëAlcibiades Ií and ëTimaeusí, pp. 5-19, and DAVID M.JOHNSON, God as the True Self: Platoís Alcibiades I , pp. 1-19 for further positive uses

of the Alcibiades in Platonic scholarship.85 Similarly as the Charmides, Euthydemus or in a way the Timaeus as well.86 My research was supported by GACR grant no. 401/08/P135. I would like to

thank Peter de Graaf for proofreading the final draft.



244 JAKUB J IRSA

Summary

This text maps the history of debate on the authenticity of Platoís or

pseudo-Platoís Alcibiades I . The first doubts were raised by FriedrichSchleiermacher at the beginning of nineteenth century and the debatebecame vigorous again after Denyerís and Pradeau-Marboeufís attemptsto argue for Platoís authorship couple of years ago. I discuss several par-ticular points raised against the authenticity (lexical, literary, stylisticand philosophical problems) and I will show that none of them stands onits own. Further, when taken together these points do not prove the dia-logue to be a bogus work. The debate, I conclude, is open; however thetendency in the last decade is in favour of Platoís authorship rather thanagainst it.

Key words: Plato; Alcibiades I ; stylometry; style; authorship

JAKUB JIRSA, ⁄stav filosofie a religionistiky, Filosofick· fakultaUniverzity Karlovy, Praha, [email protected]

j. jirsa, authenticity of the alcibiades i: some reflections

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