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CONCEPTUALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES

Volume 39Number 4

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ISSN 1010-9536

339 The Changing Nature of Warfare: Russian Hybrid Warfare in the 21st Century

Mahbubur Rashid Bhuiyan A.S.M. Tarek Hassan Semul

359 Detailed Area Plan (DAP) and Its Impact for Dhaka City Segufta Hossain 375 Myanmar’s Peace Process Under Suu Kyi:

Understanding the Fault Lines Abu Salah Md. Yousuf Gausul Azam 395 Conceptualizing Environmental Refugees: Do They Require Separate Attention? Md. Jahan Shoieb 413 Developing Country in Global Economic Governance: Lessons for Bangladesh Syeda Tanzia Sultana Mohammad Jasim Uddin

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME 39 NUMBER 4 OCTOBER 2018

Mahbubur Rashid BhuiyanA.S.M. Tarek Hassan SemulThe Changing Nature of Warfare: Russian Hybrid Warfare in the 21st Century 339

Segufta HossainDetailed Area Plan (DAP) and Its Impact for Dhaka City 359 Abu Salah Md. YousufGausul AzamMyanmar’s Peace Process Under Suu Kyi: Understanding the Fault Lines 375

Md. Jahan ShoiebConceptualizing Environmental Refugees: Do They Require Separate Attention? 395

Syeda Tanzia Sultana Mohammad Jasim UddinDeveloping Country in Global Economic Governance: Lessons for Bangladesh 413

339

Mahbubur Rashid BhuiyanA.S.M. Tarek Hassan Semul

THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE: RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Abstract

The nature and means of conducting warfare have always been changing. Technology, political realities and ideologies continue to play crucial role in this transformation as witnessed in the two world wars, the Cold War, and in following decades. Non-state actors became more visible and important. Nowadays, many wars involve such actors against state parties, for example, the US global war on terror, Israel-Hezbollah War (2006) and the current war against the Islamic State (ISIL). The term hybrid war involves a combination of traditional and nonconventional means, has become a common subject of discussion. But hybrid war is nothing new and has been practiced since ancient times. Several countries have now resorted to hybrid war: one such country is Russia, who has been blamed by western countries in this regard, e.g., in Georgian War (2008), Crimea (2014), ongoing conflict in eastern and south Ukraine, disinformation campaign against the West and interference in their governance process. Russia similarly, blames them for its destabilization by increased military presence on its borders and inciting revolutions in neighbour countries. Meanwhile, countries are developing hybrid warfare capacities, including plans for deploying military robots. Non-state actors now also use hybrid means like the Hezbollah or ISIL and several ongoing wars are becoming growingly hybrid; besides, the clash of ideologies, i.e., religious radicalism vs. white supremacism can create conflicts, indicating future wars may be even more so. Yet, some old mechanisms and strategies are likely to remain relevant and useful in future wars as well, suggesting their true ever-evolving and hybrid character.

Keywords: Russian Resurgence, Hybrid Warfare, Covert Operations, Gersimov Doctrine

1. Introduction

Warfare has been an integral part of human history. The nature of war has also been constantly changing, from the ancient era to present day: world wars, proxy wars, limited wars, wars between state parties and non-state actors, etc. The last element, like the al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State (ISIL), al-Shabab, Boko Haram, now

BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 39, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2018: 339-357

Mahbubur Rashid Bhuiyan and A.S.M. Tarek Hassan Semul are Research Fellows at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). The authors’ email addresses are: [email protected] and [email protected] respectively.

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2018.

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fight states on more than one battlefield, even globally, and commit acts of random violence against civilians. Before, they did not usually kill civilians in foreign territories, but they now do. Rapid spread and easy availability of information technology have added new dimensions to the changing nature of warfare, e.g., easier acquisition of hi-tech weapons, logistics and countermeasures, indoctrination and recruitment of new combatants, launching vicious attacks through cyberspace and inflicting grave damages equal to battlefield ones are some instances.

The way of conducting warfare has been changing too. Massive manpower, siege, mining, trenching are quite old-fashioned now. New eras began with the advent of firearms and mechanized devices; nuclear weapons brought a quick end to the Second World War, but were limited within verbal threats of use by the United State (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War. Several countries have notably decreased their former huge armed forces and arsenals nowadays, and instead, often use hybrid/irregular warfare, combining conventional and unconventional tools—cyber-attacks, disinformation, misinformation, propaganda, espionage, diplomacy, subversion etc, e.g., the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict (2006),1 the US and Israel’s alleged cyber-attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities with the Stuxnet virus (2010).2 Many countries, besides their regular government agencies, have cyber security/warfare divisions,3 and groups work to purposely spread confusion, disorder and panic capitalizing on fault-lines in societies.4

Russia has in recent times, been accused by the US and its western allies of waging hybrid/irregular warfare. For example, cyber-attacks in Estonia (2007), the Russo-Georgian War (2008), intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea (2014), meddling in US presidential election (2016) and midterm election (2018), in Brexit referendum (2016), supposed linkages with several Trump administration officials and influential people in the US, unidentified poisoning cases (2006, 2018) in Britain, German Bundestag investigation of the US National Security Agency/NSA spying scandal (2014), French President Emmanuel Macron’s email leaks (2017) etc. They say Russia is trying to undermine Western democracies, create split among the EU members and destabilize them by these activities.5 By contrast, Russia also accuses the West of using nonconventional tactics for endangering it. What turned hybrid warfare into a lucrative topic for discussion among academics and policy analysts is

1 Timothy McCulloch and Richard Johnson, Hybrid Warfare, Joint Special Operations University, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, USA, August 2013, p. 19.2 David E. Sanger, “Obama order sped up wave of cyber attacks against Iran”, The New York Times, 01 June, 2012. 3 Jenny Jun, Scott LaFoy, Ethan Sohn, North Korea’s Cyber Operations: Strategy and Responses, Washington D.C., USA: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), December 2015, pp. 4-6. 4 Deliberate Online Falsehoods: Challenges and Implications, Ministry of Communication and Information, Ministry of Law, Singapore, January 2018, pp. 1-3. 5 Kristina Potapova, “How We Have Become an Enemy in the Eyes of Russia”, In Focus, Rue du Commerce, Brussels, Belgium: Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, March 2017, p. 1.

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RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE

not the novelty of the idea, rather the potential threat it poses towards conventional wisdom of state and warcraft. For example, if increasingly hybrid warfare is to gain traction among state and non-state actors who are at feud and asymmetrical relationships with a dominant conventional military power and wish to deflect the overwhelming conventional military superiority, then the modelling and the study of these unconventional tools of warfare are an imperative as they may have important implications for the concept of deterrence, estimations of power, and the significance of defencive military alliances. Based upon these premises, the paper intends to investigate following questions. How has the nature of warfare been changing over time, especially since the First World War? When did hybrid warfare emerge and why do some countries, e.g., Russia, now use it? Will ongoing and future wars be hybrid?

This paper seeks answers to such questions. It is a qualitative research, using different books, newspapers, journals, and online sources, focusing on military conflicts solely, not nonmilitary ones. It has six sections. First is the introduction. The second section focuses on conceptualizing the idea of hybrid war based on current literature; third section discusses the changing nature of warfare since the First World War to limit the scope. The fourth focuses on the emergence of hybrid war and why some countries are nowadays opting for this; it also emphasizes why Russia goes for hybrid war. The fifth tries to examine if present and future wars will be hybrid. The sixth section ends the paper with some remarks.

2. Conceptualizing Hybrid Warfare

Following the invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014, hybrid warfare gained significant traction among academics, military strategists and government policy papers. The term has been representative of the complexities that 21st century warfare poses. By ruining the monopoly of the state, emergence of non-state actors as warring parties means the blurring lines among types of war, armed conflicts and even peace require a new terminology to understand the complexities and gamut of present-day warfare. However, there has been a plethora of definitions and approaches to define and understand hybrid warfare which underlines disagreement among scholars in tackling the term. Besides, as states have divergences in their perception and approaches to deal with hybrid threats, this has added another dimension to the discourse of hybrid warfare. In one approach, hybrid warfare can be seen from a historical perspective. Usage of both conventional and irregular forces in the same military war has been identified as hybrid warfare as Peter R. Mansoor explained, “conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose”.6 This perspective

6 Peter R. Mansoor, “Hybrid War in History,” in Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor (eds.), Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 2.

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questions the novelty of the term and suggests, on numerous occasions, hybrid tactics and approaches have been used at the tactical, operational and strategic levels and the evidences can be found as far as the Peloponnesian War and the writings of the fifth century BC, Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu. Side by side with regular forces, irregular forces have been fighting wars. Under asymmetric condition, huge armies such as Napoleon’s Grande Armée and Hitler’s Wehrmacht struggled in response to irregular fighters. These irregular forces exploited their upper hand over the invading armies in local knowledge regarding human geographical terrain and attacked vulnerable logistic bases and lines of communication. As a result over the years, conventional forces and warfare were significantly shaped and evolved by this guerrilla warfare. The recent counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been glaring examples of how difficult it is to defeat determined irregular forces without committing human rights violations, when they get support and shelter from the local population.

Since the 2000s, especially following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, use of the term “hybrid” became fashionable and convenient to explain the contemporary complexities of modern threats and warfare, in particular, because of the rapid evolution and lethality of violent non-state actors and the growing potential of cyber warfare. However, there is no consensus whether these shifts demand a new definition or even constitute one.7 Despite that, recent attempts to define hybrid warfare stressed on blending conventional and irregular approaches across the full spectrum of conflict. In one such attempt, in 2007, Frank G. Hoffman defined hybrid warfare as “threats that incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder, conducted by both sides and a variety of non-state actors.”8 The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 is one of the instances where ‘hybrid warfare’ made a departure from its previous historical forms in terms of mixing conventional and irregular methods. During this war, Russia used a combination of regular armed forces when South Ossetian and Abkhazian militias fought covertly alongside Russian special operations forces (SOF) as “local defence” troops. Previously, conventional and irregular operations tended to take place concurrently but separately, rather than being integrated. In addition to that, military campaigns used irregular fighters as auxiliaries and their role used to take a secondary form to the conventional and regular armed forces.

On the other hand, conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 was the most frequently used example for contemporary definitions of hybrid warfare. In that conflict, Hezbollah surprised Israel by combining guerrilla and conventional military

7 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Hybrid Warfare, GAO-10-136R, Washington, DC, 2010, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1036R, accessed on 25 September 2018.8 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Arlington, Virginia, USA : Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, p. 8.

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tactics, used weaponry and communication systems that normally are associated with professional armies. They exploited cyberspace and other media for information war and propaganda to attain strategic objectives. Such warfare proved more successful in comparison to Israel’s attempt in influencing global opinion from the start of the conflict. Although hybrid warfare has its lineage in the modern and pre-modern history of warfare, in the cases of Hezbollah, Chechen guerrillas and most recently the Islamic State (ISIL), development and sophistication of modern weapon systems have greatly increased the lethality of non-state actors. The added dimension of these non-state actors is the leverage they get from the unprecedented development of information technology. This has given them the chance not only to preach their ideology and recruit potential financiers, fighters and extend their support base, they are in information warfare with ‘state’ actors in shaping public opinion as well.

The rise of non-state actors such as Hezbollah, ISIL or the al-Qaeda, their innovative ways to fight the disproportionately superior power (usually states) have substantially influenced current warfare research. However, a closer look into the existing research on hybrid warfare indicates that, there is a disconnect among the present day thinking and the traditional understanding of strategy, warfare, and state power. Mainstream academic definitions of hybrid warfare have a narrow lens which highlights the blending of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal organizations and tactics as well as often include supporting (dis)information campaign and cyber warfare. Hybrid warfare has also taken into cognizance both state and non-state actors without considering their position in the global power structure. This simplified inclusion and attribution of actors can be misleading in blurring the obvious differences between a powerful actor who employs select methods in warfare as a matter of choice, whereas a weaker power chooses particular means due to its power limitation. Despite this major disconnect, based on the earlier discussion, those who believe in the vitality of the concept of hybrid warfare, can be divided into two broad schools of thought. The first school maintains that hybrid warfare is a useful concept, although they question the novelty of the concept. They argue that hybrid warfare is simply the combination of regular and irregular forces on the battlefield, whereas they define “irregulars” as militia, guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists. This perspective on hybrid warfare, perceives only the combinations of the military forms of war along with criminal elements and cyber-warfare. Therefore, this perspective can be an interesting tool to the historical study of battles and military campaigns but it has little explanatory value when it comes to explaining the combination of military and non-military tools of power in achieving objectives that were once the exclusive role of the military.9 Consequently, it has also failed to take into account the nature of an actor and the kind of circumstances where the actor avoids overt hostilities or confrontation and chooses criminal networks or cyber-attacks. Like the first school, the second

9 Peter R. Mansoor, op. cit., pp. 1–17.

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school of thought includes both conventional and irregular forces, but unlike the first, gives special priority to the operational reach of terrorism, and then includes a wide variety of innovative approaches to applying technology and resourcefulness to offset opponent’s military superiority in an asymmetric warfare.10

To sum up, the discussion on the literature shows that the components of hybrid warfare are nothing new. Rather, hybrid warfare is a new perspective for an old way of warfare, and its numerous forms have gained recent currency due to globalization, mass communications, and the speed of technological innovation. It is distinct and bigger than the limited means available to a stateless terrorist organization in an asymmetric warfare. Rather, hybrid warfare entails the deliberate choice of a state or non-state actor which can unleash larger degrees of conventional force, but instead attempts to gain some of the objectives of limited war through other than purely conventional military means. Hence, in a hybrid war, there is a significant role for traditional military forces but that may be invisible. Consequently, while the threat and weight of overwhelming conventional force are vital components, traditional military force remains as a subordinate in a hybrid campaign.

3. Changing Nature of Warfare: Since the First World War to Present Day

Although hybrid warfare has been an integral part of the historical landscape since wars in ancient world, only recently many commentators started to categorize these conflicts as unique. Throughout human history, great powers have to contend with weaker opponents who would use conventional and irregular forces to offset the advantage great powers enjoy due to their superior conventional military strength. However, as war in the 21st century evolved into seemingly unfamiliar forms which combine regular and irregular forces on the same battlefields, many defense analysts were rushed to announce the emergence of a new type of war – hybrid war. Hence, this section will engage in a discussion which will try to look into hybrid war from an evolutionary perspective and thereby try to discern the presence of hybrid elements starting from the First World War to present day warfare.

3.1 The First World War

The first global conflict, involved several powerful countries, empires, was fought over land, seas and air, witnessed the introduction of tanks, aircrafts, and aircraft carriers for the first time in history of warfare. The arrival of these three, changed the

10 Timothy McCulloch and Richard Johnson, “Hybrid Warfare,” JSOU Report 13-4, August, 2013; also see, Nathan P. Freier, Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context, Carlisle Barracks, PA, USA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, pp. 8-10.

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nature of and the way warfare would be conducted from then on; the war would also heighten arms race that continues to date.

Tanks and military aircrafts helped soldiers overcome rough terrains, fortifications and long distances, made land warfare more mobile (contrasting the prolonged and bloodier siege/trench wars), aerial firing and scouting with reduced risks to tasked personnel. Belligerents used aircrafts in strategic bombing on each other. Germany launched the first successful chemical attack on 22 April 1915 with 150 tons of chlorine on French forces in Ypres (Belgium).11 Britain launched a similar attack in September 1915 on Germans in France.12 Navies received sonar (Asdic), dreadnought-class warships, destroyers and submarines. But the sonar and depth-charges curtailed submarines’ advantages of surprise attacks. Early aircraft carriers mostly carried seaplanes, biplane fighters or similar torpedo bombers, added ship-borne aerial attacks; naval aircrafts could now strike enemy ships; Japan, then Allied Powers member, from its seaplane carrier Wakamiya, in 1914 in Siege of Qingdao (China), bombed German and Austro-Hungarian bases, and sank a German military ship.13 The Central Powers lacked carriers.

The war was hybrid and first total war of the 20th century. As hybrid war, the combination of new strategies, tactics and equipment with older ones redefined warfare. Warring parties deciphered and interrupted each other’s electronic messages for espionage. European powers assembled massive manpower and logistics from their homelands and colonies; both sides had associates, co-belligerents, and utilized propaganda heavily. As total war, they tried by all means to fully obliterate the other. Besides warfronts, they provoked tensions in enemy territories, e.g., Britain and France in Ottoman Middle East, where the Arab revolt hastened the Ottomans’ fall.14 Germany tried to use pan-Islamism and Indian nationalism against Britain,15 Russia and France.16 Allied Powers blocked German seaports throughout the war, depriving Central Powers including their civilians of essential supplies. Several enemies and allies intervened in the Russian Civil War (1917) for the White Army (monarchists) against Bolsheviks who won and the USSR/Soviet Union emerged; the country would

11 Thomas A. Bundt, “Gas, Mud and Blood at Ypres: The Painful Lessons of Chemical Warfare”, Military Review, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA, Vol. 84, No. 5, July-August 2004, p. 81. 12 Edgar Jones, “Terror Weapons: the British Experience of Gas and its Treatment in the First World War”, War in History, Vol. 21, Issue. 3, July 2014, p. 356. 13 Timothy D. Saxton, “Anglo-Japanese Naval Cooperation 1914-1918”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, Winter 2000, p. 06. 14 Robert Johnson, “The Evolution of Hybrid Threats Through History” in Yücel Özel and Ertan Inaltekin (eds.), Shifting Paradigm of War: Hybrid Warfare, Istanbul, Turkey:Turkish National Defense University, 2017, pp. 4-5. 15 Farish A. Noor, "From Empire to the War on Terror: The 1915 Indian Sepoy Mutiny in Singapore", Working Paper No. 206, Nanyang, Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, July 2010, pp. 9-11. 16 Eugene Rogan, “Rival Jihads: Islam and the Great War in the Middle East”, Journal of the British Academy, Vol. 4, January 2016, pp. 1-3.

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be a major enemy of the Axis Powers in the next World War (from June 1941) and after 1945, the main enemy to the entire West, prompting more monumental changes in the nature and means of warfare in the days to come.

3.2 The Interwar Years

The League of Nations founded as a body to oversee world affairs and prevent further conflicts, seemed ineffective due to ever-growing hostility and aggression among nations. The institution ultimately failed when the Second World War began. Britain and France divided former Ottoman Middle East and new territories were appearing elsewhere as well. In British Mandated Palestine, Jewish migration grew noticeably and created a number of Jewish-Arab riots, laying the basis for modern-day Israel, the Palestinian conflict and Israel-Arab enmity. The Communist USSR, fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany/Third Reich, all wanted to spread their own mode of governance, restore former glory, and possessed ultra-racism, e.g., Italy planned a new Roman Empire,17 Germany sought Lebensraum (expanding into East and Central Europe),18 Aryan/Nordic race theory, virulent anti-Semitism,19 and the USSR propagated global communism. Italy and Germany waged expansionist wars in the Balkans and North Africa, occupied Austria and Czechoslovakia, backed nationalists in the Spanish and Chinese Civil Wars, whereas the USSR backed republicans and communists there. Amid pervasive ruin in the First World War and the Great Depression, European powers developed weapons on large scales. Diverse types of military aircrafts arose during this period: fighters (heavy, light, night, carrier-based, escort etc), bombers (light, medium, heavy, dive, night), fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircrafts including for maritime patrol. The US and Japan were rising as major naval powers surpassing Britain and France. All these would gravely impact the upcoming world war in all aspects.

3.3 The Second World War

The deadliest military conflict so far that claimed about 65-75 million lives,20 changed warfare to a much greater degree: lightning fast war (German Blitzkrieg) by lead role of armoured and aerial wings, obsolescence of fortification/static combat, indication for future dominance of air power aided by aircraft carriers in wars, systematic carnage of Jews (the Holocaust), Slavs, gypsies, communists (forced labour

17 Andrea Giardina, “The Fascist Myth of Romanity”, Estudos Avançados, Vol. 22, No. 62, January/April 2008, Institute of Advanced Studies, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, p. 57. 18 André Mineau, SS Thinking and the Holocaust, Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Rodopi Publishers, April 2012, pp. 64-66. 19 Gerhard L. Weinberg (ed.), Hitler’s Second Book: the Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf, New York, USA: Enigma Books, 2006, pp. 108-234. 20 Milton Leitenberg, “Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century”, Occasional Papers, No. 29, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA, August 2006, p. 9.

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and cruel experiments in concentration camps), wide use of various types of military aircrafts described earlier, the Enigma coding machine and pocket battleships (Germany); nuclear weapons were the decisive instrument invented during this war, which would usher in the eponymous era when the war ended.

Blitzkrieg’s speed, ferocity and efficiency caught most opponents by utter shock. Coordinated land-air onslaughts crushed tough fortifications, rendering fortress warfare useless. But after late-1941, Soviet counterstrikes and harsh winter held Axis members in static/attrition wars, e.g., Battle of Stalingrad,21 the Siege of Leningrad heralding their eventual fall. Axis powers were fighting on multiple fronts: Western, Eastern, Africa, Asia, even in Poles, with much lesser resources than the Allies. In this hybrid and total war, aircrafts often decided victory or defeat. Aircraft carriers now carried more planes. Japan’s capture of vast areas in the Asia-Pacific by successful blend of aerial-naval assaults, can be compared with German feats on land. Germany and Italy lacked aircraft carriers and naval aviation; Japan had both yet lacked industrial ability to replace lost equipment, thus failed in retaining early gains and finally, lost. Ideological clashes, e.g., national socialism/Nazism vs. communism, western vs. eastern imperialism, use of colonial subjects by both parties were common: while Britain and France brought soldiers and logistics from Asian and African colonies, Germany and Japan were actively instigating citizens of some colonies against them. Battles became growingly accompanied by air-navy-army joint operations, unbarred espionage, propaganda and methodical slaughter of certain communities, strategic bombing on Axis powers, especially nuclear bombings on Japan claimed not only military-industrial installations but also numerous civilians, show how warfare was changing.

3.4 The Cold War

It is a watershed in affecting warfare, as proxy wars were fought worldwide based on two rival ideologies upheld by two superpowers—the US-led Western bloc and the USSR-led communist/Eastern bloc.22 Also, two military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact were formed, respectively. United Nations (UN) peacekeeping helped lessen intensity of wars somewhat, enforce ceasefires, thus influenced their nature and outcome. Most third world countries belonged to either bloc. In ex-European colonies, wars commonly involved overt or covert presence of both powers. NATO and the US Marshall Plan offered some security to Western Europe against any probable Soviet military aggression.

21 Andrei A. Kokoshin, “The German Blitzkrieg against the USSR”, Belfer Center Paper, Harvard, Massachusetts, USA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, June 2016, p. 12. 22 Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, June 2013, p. 3.

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The arms race contained conventional and nuclear weapons. Multirole Combat Aircrafts (MCAs) and strategic/heavy bombers (nuclear-armed), nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, submarines and missiles proved critical in demonstration of force by major powers, determining the result of wars and decrease further belligerence in many cases; combat helicopters were brought in for attacks and rescue/evacuation, notably in counterinsurgency/anti-guerrilla wars, like in Vietnam. Spy/reconnaissance satellites were sent to the outer space. The US’ proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for space-based missile defence aroused fear of nuclear war out there.23

All the permanent members of the UN Security Council had nuclear weapons, but never used those in reality except for test-explosions. The two opposing sides did not fight openly, but were behind most proxy wars.24 Arms trade was omnipresent deeply involving the US, USSR and their allies; developing/third world nations in Asia, Africa and South America relied on arms and embargoes or sanctions from either side on any party affected wars severely. Wars mostly were guerrilla or insurgency type where one party tried to topple the other with assistance from any of the two sides for seizing state power, thus causing prolonged, gory wars. Despite regular threats of nuclear violence and constant fear of war erupting between the two blocs, the era did not see global wars, as both sides were virtually equal in strength. Moreover, confidence building measures such as, Moscow-Washington Hotline, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), first strike, nuclear deterrence and Massive Retaliation etc, were put into place to prevent such a calamity.

Importance of non-state actors became more apparent in affecting warfare. In Vietnam, the proxy war had guerrilla, insurgency and attrition features; China, the USSR and other members of the Eastern bloc aided the Vietcong, but internal opposition and external pressures were almost just as crucial in forcing the withdrawal of the US, its allies and the peace process there. Pro-Islamic sentiments were on the rise; Muslim countries, particularly those of the Middle East, after the Six Day War (1967) with Israel and Al-Aqsa Fire (1969), founded the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). They introduced use of oil as a bargaining chip against Israel, its supporters and allies since the 1973 Arab-Israel War. As the Eastern bloc preached no religion and rather resorted to suppression, the US-led Western bloc, in the Soviet-Afghan War, competently utilized Muslim religious sentiments and rallied support from other Muslim nations across the globe. This war, like the Vietnam War, is an ideal example of proxy war, with guerrilla, attrition and insurgency characteristics being prevalent. The USSR fought there from December 1979-February 1989, suffered mammoth losses and lastly, pulled out. The US departure from Vietnam and Soviet defeat in Afghanistan show that even without open warfare, a much powerful enemy can also be taken down, giving the strategies, the nature and means various names and guises.

23 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Soviet Union and the Strategic Defense Initiative, Santa Monica, California, USA: Rand Corporation, June 1986, pp. 04-07. 24 Mark O. Yeisley, “Bipolarity, Proxy Wars and the Rise of China”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 5, Issue. 4, Winter 2011, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, USA, p. 79.

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3.5 The Post-Cold War Era

The USSR’s demise in 1991 ended the Cold War, necessitating reduction of large forces, arsenals and bellicose rhetoric as there was no viable opponent for the West, and thus, no need for large-scale wars. But internal conflicts behind the Iron Curtain were surfacing. The First Yugoslav War (1991) and ensuing disintegration of Yugoslavia paved way for the Bosnian War, the first ethnic conflict in post-Second World War Europe. Vicious crimes, including genocide occurred in the war fuelled by ethno-religious sentiments; Greek volunteers assisted Serbia,25 politicians and Orthodox Church of Russia supported their Orthodox Serbian brethren26 while Muslim fighters from other countries came to fight beside Bosnians.27 This war signalled the gradual return and prominence of jingoistic narratives. NATO ignored Russian opposition, condemnation and took strict actions on Serbia. Many former Soviet countries joined NATO and the European Union (EU) but Russia could not respond strongly to western presence or intervention in its former realm which would bring about new and incessant tensions in the future.

Compared to interstate conflicts of the earlier era, post-Cold War conflicts were more intra-state in nature. The lone superpower, the US and its NATO allies embarked upon promotion of democracy and human rights even through military interventions along with other members. The country’s endeavours in Albania, East Timor, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo and Somalia, etc, involved military intervention as well as civil society organizations. But all efforts were not received positively. The US military intervention in Somalia met violent repercussions, where not only Somali fighters, but also common people became hostile to US forces. Another important factor in affecting warfare was the growing revival of Muslim extremism. The Afghan Mujahedeen, who with Western assistance fought the Soviets previously, became divided in various factions and embroiled in a civil war (1992-96). The Taliban came out victorious and formed the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on ultra-orthodox interpretations of Islam and even stricter implementation.28 They maintained close relations with the far more radical Muslim group, al-Qaeda. These groups became models for future Muslim radicals against their own and Western countries alike. The end of the Cold War intensified longstanding animosities that would become more violent regardless of peace efforts. Various peace accords signed after 1991 could not end the Israel-Palestine conflict which rather increased. Nonmilitary armed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah were becoming influential in Palestine. Indo-Pak hostility also did not go away. Meanwhile, Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons, through

25 Helena Smith, “Greece faces shame of role in Serb massacre”, The Guardian, 05 January 2003. 26 Gerard F. Powers, “Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Peace in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia”, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, Newberg, Oregon, USA: George Fox University, Vol. 16, Issue 5, p. 5. 27 Chris Hedges, “Muslims from afar Joining ‘Holy War’ in Bosnia”, The New York Times, 05 December 1992. 28 Joseph J. Collins, Understanding War in Afghanistan, Washington D.C., USA: National Defense University Press, 2011, pp. 37-40.

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test-explosions in May 1998 against neighbour India who tested some days before Pakistan that same month which added nuclear dimension into their rivalry.

3.6 The 21st Century

The 9/11 attacks on the US soil began the global war on terror led by the US and its allies. Here, besides military/political reasons, objectives and strength, ideas, values, thought processes, ethnic, racial, religious components resurfaced to play prominent roles in impacting wars, their nature and methods. Technology assumed higher attention. Non-state actors became more engaged in full-scale war against state parties. Spread and ever-rising influence of print and electronic media, availability of the internet and social networks resulting in broader communications, access to information and carry out propaganda, brought new aspects to warfare.

Dependence on newer technologies has been a noticeable subject in wars, although older tactics still are valid. For example, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Boko Haram use guerilla and insurgency widely in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Somalia besides improvised explosion devices (IEDs) that inflicted ample casualties to military and civilians alike. Growing use of unmanned vehicles in targeting and killing insurgents, sophisticated surveillance devices, detailed background check etc., have become commonplace.

Often, part of media incites and perpetuates hatred, mistrust and enmity among different communities. After the 9/11 attacks, Muslims in the US faced gross negative stereotypes and began to be viewed with increased suspicion.29 This later reached other countries as well. Media bias in drawing attention to crimes committed by Muslims is a contentious issue compared to portrayal of those by people of other faiths. In addition, misinformation presented can bring debacle: the US invaded Iraq in 2003 under the pretext of destroying Iraqi stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and promoting democracy by removing the Saddam dictatorship. Media played largely negative role for instigating the war. The US, however, found nothing in Iraq, but this invasion opened the path for the more dangerous and infamous ISIL which has successfully used the internet for funding, propaganda and recruitment of combatants.

Rise and spread of right-wing populism and white supremacism in Western nations in parallel with Muslim extremism are deeply impacting warlike discourses even in liberal countries. There are ultra-nationalist leaders and influential groups in many Western countries, e.g., Hungary, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, France, Belgium,

29 Caroline Mala Corbin, “Terrorists are Always Muslim but Never White: At the Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda”, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 86, Issue. 2, New York, USA: Fordham University School of Law, 2017, pp. 458-459.

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Britain and the Netherlands etc. US president Donald Trump’s victory was vocally hailed by many of such groups and people at home and abroad. Before and after becoming president, he has been implied in racist rhetoric and acts. In India and Myanmar, Hindu and Buddhist radicalism and radical people have gained wider acceptance against Muslims and other communities. A sad reality is, radicals now target civilians randomly. Muslim as well as non-Muslim radicals have waged several brutal attacks on civilians in different countries merely on ethnic-racial-religious grounds.

Cyber/virtual warfare has become another preferred mode of combat. Types of attacks may vary in aims, but can impose heavy damage equal to or even greater than real-life attacks as countries depend on computers and internet with close mutual linkages these days. Many countries now possess cyber armies at government and private levels for attack and defence alike. Moreover, there are independent hacker groups for hire. On battlefields, Russia has used cyber warfare in the Russo-Georgian War, the annexation of the Crimea and the ongoing war in Ukraine; other countries that use cyber war are North Korea and China. This type of warfare is likely to attain broader utility by states and non-state actors in coming days.

4. The Emergence of Hybrid Warfare: The Russian Case

Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine in 2014 can be identified as a watershed moment in terms of increased interest in the concept of hybrid warfare. Western strategists and academics found it convenient to describe the blending of various tactics and methods that was exploited and employed by Russia during the annexation of Crimea and support to insurgent groups in eastern Ukraine as ‘hybrid’. On the hand, Russia used a typical combination of conventional and irregular combat operations, and on the other hand, supported and financed the political protests, economic coercion, cyber operations in the form of a disinformation propaganda. Russian tactics were described as ‘hybrid warfare’ by the former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in a July 2014 interview where he defined it as “a combination of military action, covert operations and an aggressive program of disinformation.”30 The 2015 edition of the Military Balance provides a definition that is proved to be comprehensive in nature and which made a departure from the earlier understanding of hybrid war. The report highlights the methods employed in this warfare as it explains facets of hybrid warfare as “the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign, designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure.”31

30 Mark Landler and Michael R. Gordon, “NATO Chief Warns of Duplicity by Putin on Ukraine,” The New York Times, 8 July 2014.31 “Complex Crises Call for Adaptable and Durable Capabilities,” The Military Balance, Vol. 115, Issue 1, 2015, p. 5.

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The substantive distinction that can be made between this particular definition of hybrid warfare from those discussed earlier is the emphasis on nonmilitary methods of war and, in particular, information warfare. The use of coercive information operations is the most glaring difference in the depicting the recent trend of hybrid warfare and enable academic discussion in drawing comparisons between IS’ campaigns in the Middle East and the Russian military campaign in Ukraine. One was waged by a non-state actor and another by a state. Although IS has effectively blended conventional, urban guerrilla warfare and of terrorism, it has also exploited information warfare to an unprecedented level for a non-state actor. Sophisticated social media propaganda and use of pop culture have propagated and glorified its cause and contributed to the group’s ability to recruit thousands of foreign fighters across the globe.

Similarly, in 2014, Russia successfully used information warfare in its military campaign in the Crimea at tactical level; electronic warfare (EW) and cyber attacks neutralized the ability of Ukrainian authorities to respond. While at the broader level, media exploitation techniques blurred the lines between truth and falsehood by constructing an alternative reality for observers who accepted Russian media’s version of the events. Subsequently, Russia’s strategic information campaign in Ukraine tried to exploit already existing societal vulnerabilities in Ukraine, weaken government and state institutions as well as undermining the perceived legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. Hence, similar to IS’ attempt, Russia employed information warfare to influence and shape public opinion and turned information warfare into one of the key dimensions in contemporary armed conflict.

In their defence, many Russian academics and strategists claim that since the 1980s, Russia has been under sustained and effective information attack by the US. Historical events such as perestroika, Colour Revolutions” and Bretton Woods organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are all considered instruments of irregular warfare intended to destabilize and undermine Russian interests.32 Therefore, from a Russian perspective, the annexation of Crimea and operations in eastern Ukraine are strategic defencive campaigns to counter US hybrid warfare in the post-Soviet space that Russia still considers as its sphere of influence.

Another claim that has been made by Russian commentators is that hybrid warfare is a Western term, not a Russian one and they referred the term as “new generation warfare” or “non-linear war.” The term “new generation warfare” was popularized among Western academics and policymakers through a paper published by General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, in February 2013. Hence, often the Russian approach to hybrid war started to be referred inaccurately as

32 Bret Perry, “Non-Linear Warfare in the Ukraine: The Critical Role of Information Operations and Special Operations,” Small Wars Journal, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/non-linear-warfare-in-ukraine-the-critical-role-of-information-operations-and-special-opera, accessed on 08 October 2018.

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the “Gerasimov Doctrine.” Gerasimov explains new generation warfare as, “the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military means … supplemented by civil disorder among the local population and concealed armed forces.”33 He recognizes that many of the methods he describes in his work are not part of traditional wartime procedure. However, these unconventional methods are typical of 21st century warfare and have considerable significance in achieving strategic goals in comparison to military means. These can seriously disrupt the fighting potential of an enemy by creating social unrest and promoting an environment of despair without the overt use of violence.34 Besides, Gerasimov’s concept confirms that the armed forces have an important supplementary role in ‘new generation warfare’. This has been particularly visible in the case with Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) that can be employed under the masquerade of “peacekeeping and crisis regulation” to join forces with the opposition/separatist groups inside a targeted territory.35 Under cover of information operations, the use of SOF was clearly visible in Ukraine in 2014. Covert Spetsnaz (Russian Special Forces) units, the “little green men” were employed to seize government buildings and key infrastructure targets and armed separatist militia, while the Russian government spread doubt and confusion through repeated denials of Russian involvement. In addition to that, other techniques of hybrid or new generation warfare were employed to demoralize and intimidate opposition forces, including military exercises by Russian conventional forces in close proximity to the Ukrainian border, cyber attacks on Ukrainian government and a wider range of diplomatic and media offensive to undermine the legitimacy of the new government of Ukraine. The objective of this type of “warfare” is to put on psychological pressure on the enemy to trigger a collapse of the target country from within so that the political objectives of the conflict can be gained without fighting the war.

5. Will Present and Future Wars be Hybrid?

Increasing reliance on and applications of technology, development of new weaponry, evolving strategies, doctrines and changing surroundings are some important factors that may drive present and future wars into assuming hybrid characteristics. This was true in the two world wars, the Cold War period, and also in the information age warfare in the 21st century. Technological progress has been a driving force behind such transformation since the First World War to present day.

33 General Gerasimov’s article is available in English from Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, 06 July 2014, available at https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war, accessed on 11 March 2018.34 Ibid. pp. 2-3.35 Ibid. pp. 3-4.

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The US global war on terror saw wide-ranging use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) besides regular soldiers and equipment. The war has implicated and been heavily influenced by debates concerning ethno-racial-religious markers that have significantly impacted later conflicts. The Israel-Hezbollah War (2006) is a regularly cited example of hybrid warfare where the non-state actor Hezbollah fought the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) combining a political movement with social, diplomatic and informational elements in urban guerrilla war.36 Both utilized media for psychological warfare and launched cyber-attacks on each other.37 In the Syrian Civil War involving the ISIL and other numerous parties—from home and abroad, state and non-state actors, in response to the militant group’s hybrid tactics, state parties are also resorting to similar methods for eliminating it and affiliated groups.

Russia’s hybrid strategy in the Russo-Georgian War included pressuring Georgian policymaking, especially security and foreign policy, supporting secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, persecuting Georgians living in Russia, using gas supplies as a weapon, espionage etc.38 In the annexation of Crimea, ongoing conflict in eastern and southern Ukraine, accusations of hybrid war continue. Russia sent armed militia groups, organized public agitations, disinformation, and then sent its regular military forces under the excuse of protecting the rights of ethnic Russians living in Crimea etc.39 The country has also been alleged in poisoning of its former spies inside Britain.40 Conversely, it accuses the West of surrounding by admitting several former Soviet nations41 and destabilizing it by provoking Colour Revolutions in those countries.42 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the West was waging irregular warfare on Russia not only to change the country’s policy but also the government.43 The abovementioned wars facing the US and its allies, Russia and other countries, still go on; presence of hybrid features in them suggests they will progressively become more so.

36 Manon van Tienhoven, Identifying Hybrid Warfare, Leiden, the Netherlands: Leiden University, June 2016, p. 7. 37 Ghaydaa Joseph Hdayed, The Psychological Warfare of Hezbollah, Beirut, Lebanon: Lebanese American University, December 2011, p. 20. 38 Niklas Nilsson, Russian Hybrid Tactics in Georgia, Washington D.C., USA: American Foreign Policy Council, January 2018, pp. 5-33. 39 András Rácz, Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist, Helsinki, Finland: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), June 2015, pp. 11-50. 40 Henry Fox, “Accused Litvinenko killers: Skripal case will be used to attack Russia”, The Financial Times, 06 March 2018. 41 Roland Oliphant, “Vladimir Putin blames NATO expansion for rising tension with Europe”, The Daily Telegraph, 11 January 2016. 42 Nicolas Bouchet, “Russia’s ‘Militarization’ of Colour Revolutions”, Policy Perspectives, Vol. 4, Issue. 2, Zurich, Switzerland: Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), p. 1. 43 Andrew Monaghan, Russian State Mobilization: Moving the Country on to a War Footing, London, UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), May 2016, p. 18.

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In addition, there are proposals for battlefield deployment of military robots, equipped with artificial intelligence and autonomous decision-making abilities. Such robots are confined so far to robotic vehicles and robot soldiers (as opposed to humans) are to be used on fronts yet.44 Several UAVs operated by the US have robotic capabilities. Israel’s army is scheduled to receive robot porters on warfronts.45 Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are becoming a reality. It is speculated robot soldiers may outnumber their human counterparts in future.46 With an arms race brewing based on artificial intelligence, countries and non-state actors may put human and robot soldiers together or solely robots to decrease personnel and equipment losses. That may push current and future warfare into assuming more hybrid character.

Racial supremacist ideologies may lead into hybrid warfare like they did in mass killings during the Second World War; the victims’ different identities than their rulers and mainstream population, were first brought forth for establishing extreme dislike and then brutalities were directed against them. Nowadays, social media are used for spreading hateful thinking. There has been no real war up to now in this century based on ethnic, racial or religious affiliations, but these elements are frequently emphasized in discussions, debates or controversies which indicate their growing importance and there may be little wonder if they cause any upcoming war. If there is indeed a war centred on them, that will be hybrid as the means and objectives will be conventional and irregular, simultaneously.

6. Conclusion

The nature and means of conducting warfare have continuously been changing over the centuries owing to diverse phenomena. Invention of technologies and their practical applications have always played a critical role in wars; tough barriers like trench, fortress and rough landscape were conquered with tanks, aircrafts and aircraft carriers in the First World War. Advancements in technology, weaponry, conflicting ideologies and failure of the world body to prevent conflicts in interwar years made the Second World War by far the bloodiest. Aircrafts, carriers and nuclear bombs were decisive weapons that retained importance in later times. Political transformations affect warfare too; from direct war between/among empires and countries, the Cold War period was characterized by the rise of two opposite blocs with their respective ideas and proxy wars being fought throughout the world. The UN nevertheless, helped reduce severity of wars through mediation and peacekeeping.

44 Alice Scarsi, “Russia’s Robot Soldiers: Putin on developing deadly android army”, The Express, 16 March, 2018. 45 Gili Cohen, “Israeli army to use robots instead of llamas to carry equipment on battlefield”, The Daily Haaretz, 10 July 2017. 46 Jon Lockett, “Man vs. Machine: US military will have more robot soldiers than real ones by 2025, top British expert claims”, The Sun, 15 June, 2017.

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The two main players never faced each other physically on battlegrounds. After the USSR’s demise, the US as the lone superpower, tried to resolve conflicts by upholding democratic governance and securing human rights, although did not always succeed.

Ideologies have played crucial role in the Second World War, the Cold War and wars in subsequent periods. An ideology driven war and genocide were unthinkable in post-Second World War Europe but happened in Bosnia. As non-state actors’ involvement and influence have grown in decision making, they now question, even challenge states. This is visible in the power of media, civil society groups and extremist/terrorist groups. Social media also augment expansion of hatred and violence. The 9/11 attacks and following responses have placed faith, thoughts, races, cultures, ethnic identities, one against another and arguments over these issues go on nonstop. After the Al-Qaeda, another Muslim militant group, the ISIL has become a bigger global threat and the war on it involves state and non-state actors alike. Conversely, there has been for some years, a sharp rise of right-wing populism and white supremacy movements in the West which may become nearly as troublesome as Muslim extremism.

Some countries now go for hybrid warfare. But such wars are nothing new and have existed since antiquity. The two world wars were total as well as hybrid. Cold War era proxy conflicts were hybrid. In today’s world, hybrid warfare is gradually gaining acceptance. There are reasons. Such a war can be waged under different covers than merely the military label. The war may seem vague and when opponents realize, that may be too late for adequate response. Tactics and strategies have comparatively high flexibility and adaptability.47 Cyber attacks are a vital part of hybrid war; as reliance on computers and internet for almost all tasks including warfare is inseparable and most networks are interconnected now, a hybrid war can produce serious disasters, in real and virtual domains at the same time.

The West accuses Russia of using hybrid warfare in Georgia, Ukraine and against them in various ways. For Russia, the fall of the USSR resulted in considerable loss of area, manpower and influence with most members joining NATO and the EU. There is no Warsaw Pact now but Russia still considers them as its former provinces and threatens them over their joining these two groups. It also regularly blames NATO for encircling it through these new members. Although the country has a very strong armed force, it lacks a strong economy likewise to engage in full traditional warfare against enemies, in this case, the West or western allies. Russia lacks effective aircraft carriers; the country is also surrounded by seas that remain frigid for most of the year. Amid strict Western sanctions after the Crimean annexation, large-scale developments of newer and powerful weaponary face challenges. The country has immense strategic

47 Ralph D. Thiele, "The New Colour of War—Hybrid Warfare and Partnerships", ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, Issue 383, Berlin, Germany: Institute for Strategy, Political Security and Business Consulting (ISPSW), October 2015, p. 3.

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depth but being surrounded by Western allies can be a major danger in case of a real war. These factors may have driven Russia to choose hybrid warfare.

Existing wars are showing a tendency of becoming hybrid in the future. The US war in Afghanistan, war on ISIL, ongoing war in southern and eastern Ukraine—all have significantly hybrid features in themselves. In addition to state parties, non-state actors make extensive use of these tactics. Nationalistic movements worldwide have not produced real wars in this century to date, but their growing stature has all potentials necessary in that regard, just like Muslim extremism has. Military robots used in wars currently include vehicles, but there are plans for their deployment alongside human soldiers, especially when countries are working towards artificial intelligence in weapons. Such deployment will make future wars really hybrid.

Once some valuable entities have created their mark in warfare, that legacy stays for long and influences future wars. Warfare today relies on technological advantages greatly. Even then, many old mechanisms and devices have not lost their utility or disappeared altogether. Despite the arrival of new fighting machines in the First World War signalling a paradigm shift, did not straightaway displace trench and fortress modes of warfare; rather, these were extensively used then and later, continued in the Second World War. The highly dynamic German Blitzkrieg became deeply stuck against static, attritional strategies of the USSR which brought its eventual failure. In the Cold War era, guerrilla and attrition warfare collapsed the US and the USSR in Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively. In recent times, the Al-Qaeda, Taliban, ISIL etc are also waging guerrilla and insurgency warfare against the US and its allies along with hybrid strategies used by all sides—state and non-state actors. Hamas uses tunnels for attacks in Israel.48 These show strategies or tactics used previously, do not overnight become useless in warfare with the advent of modern ones. Though present wars are becoming increasingly hybrid and future wars are likely to have even more hybrid characteristics, several old methods or instruments will still preserve their relevance and application, thus will reflect the true hybrid nature of war.

48 UN country team in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Gaza, Ten Years Later, The Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Gaza, July 2017, p. 7.

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Segufta Hossain

DETAIlED AREA PlAN (DAP) AND ITS ImPACT FOR DHAkA CITY

Abstract

Dhaka is facing rapid unplanned urbanization with a huge population influx during the last couple of decade. In 1995, Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha (RAJUK) prepared a 20-year plan for Dhaka city called Dhaka Metropolitan Development Plan (DMDP), a three tier plan including Structure Plan, Urban Area Plan and Detailed Area Plan. As the third and last tier, Detailed Area Plan was supposed to implement the provisions of the DMDP Structure Plan and Urban Area Plan policies and recommendations. The major focus of Detailed Area Plan was to put control over all development within RAJUK area through land use zoning and to lay down the framework for the development of future infrastructure and services. Although the first objective has been partially achieved, the second one has been ignored and violated. Powerful land developers and in some cases RAJUK itself has breached the land use zoning policy of Detailed Area Plan (DAP) and filled up the designated wetlands and flood flow zones which are mainly used as water retention zones. As a result, the drainage system of the city is facing obstruction and water congestion is becoming a very common chronic problem in Dhaka city. The water congestion situation of Dhaka city has reached a dangerous magnitude with the rapid unplanned urbanization. The present paper will try to focus on how the failure of Detailed Area Plan has impacted the water congestion scenario of Dhaka city which is increasing day by day as low lying water retention areas of the surrounding areas of Dhaka city are being filled up.

Keywords: Unplanned Urbanization, Rajuk, Dhaka Metropolitan Development Plan, Detailed Area Plan, Flood Flow Zones, Water Congestion

"Since its establishment, Dhaka has grown mostly without adequate planning interventions; substantially organic in nature."1

1. Introduction

The world is becoming urbanized rapidly. The movement of people towards cities has accelerated in the past 40 years, particularly in the less-developed regions and the world’s urban population is now growing by 60 million persons per year, about

Segufta Hossain is Senior Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her e-mail address is: [email protected]


1 Islam 1996 cited in RAJUK, “Draft Plan – Dhaka Structure Plan 2016-2035”, in Dhaka: Past and Present, Dhaka: RAJUK, 2015, p. 35.


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three times the increase in the rural population.2 55 per cent of the world’s population lives in urban areas, a proportion that is expected to increase to 68 per cent by 2050 and the urban population of the world has grown rapidly from 751 million in 1950 to 4.2 billion in 2018.3 Asia, despite its relatively lower level of urbanization, is home to 54 per cent of the world’s urban population.4 South Asia’s urbanization, a messy one as seen in the widespread prevalence of slums, grew by 130 million populations between 2001 and 2011 and is poised to rise by almost 250 million by 2030.5

Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated countries in the world and one of the countries of South Asia which is experiencing very rapid urbanization. The urbanization of Bangladesh is interlinked with the development of Dhaka. The city has become a centre of political, administrative and commercial activities. As a result, Dhaka has experienced the highest rate of physical and population growth in the recent decades which has transformed the city into a megacity. Dhaka alone contains 37 per cent of the total national urban population, conforming to the classic case of primate city in which the population of the largest city is more than the combined total of the three next largest cities of Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi.6

Dhaka has a long history of urbanization. The city became the capital of the then East Pakistan after the partition of the sub-continent in 1947. Although Dhaka is one of the fastest growing megacities in the world, it has grown mostly without planning since its establishment. The city is growing in such an uncontrolled manner which has made the city more congested and overcrowded. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) surveyed 140 cities around the world for its Global Liveability Index 2018, scoring them on over 30 parameters under five categories: healthcare, infrastructure, culture and environment, stability, education and Dhaka becomes the world’s second least liveable city.7

A committee was formed in early 1950s headed by the then minister Hamidul Haque Chowdhury to prepare a development plan for Dhaka.8 The first comprehensive master plan, titled “The Dacca Master Plan 1959” was made by an expatriate firm Minupria & Macfarlane in 1958 and it was prepared over a 20 year planning horizon

2 UNESCO, “Global Trend Towards Urbanisation – UNESCO”, available at http://www.unesco.org/education/tlsf/mods/theme_c/popups/mod13t01s009.html, accessed on 18 February 2019.3 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “68% of the world population projected to live in urban areas by 2050, says UN”, 16 May 2018, New York, available at https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html, accessed on 18 October 2019.4 Ibid.5 Peter Ellis and Mark Roberts, Leveraging Urbanization in South Asia: Managing Spatial Transformation for Prosperity and Livability, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016, p. 2.6 RAJUK, op.cit., p. 36.7 Afrose Jahan Chaity, “What makes Dhaka the second worst city to live in?”, Dhaka Tribune, 17 August 2018.8 Akhter Chaudhury, “A Short History of Urban Planning in Bangladesh”, available at https://www.slideshare.net/AkhterChaudhury/a-short-history-of-urban-planning-in-bangladesh, accessed on 20 October 2018.

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DETAILED AREA PLAN AND ITS IMPACT

(1958–1978) with an estimated population increase by 40 per cent (1.75 per cent per annum).9 The Dacca Master Plan 1959 covered the Dhaka Improvement Trust (DIT) area roughly 220 sq. miles, with a population slightly exceeding 1 million and of this population, approximately 575,000 were in Dhaka City Corporation area.10 After the independence of Bangladesh, Dhaka became the capital and the Master plan failed to cope with the fast expansion of the city. The second Master plan was prepared with a time span of 20 years from 1995–2015 titled ‘Dhaka Metropolitan Development Plan (DMDP)’ covering an area of 590 sq. miles or 1528 sq. km with three components i.e. Structure Plan (SP), Urban Area Plan (UAP) and Detailed Area Plan (DAP). The DMDP SP identified the magnitude and direction of spatial growth within DMDP area and set forth spatial and sectoral policies over a longer period of time (1995–2015), whereas DMDP UAP, the second tier of the three stage DMDP plan package, provided mid-term strategy for ten years from 1995 and it defined the geographic boundary that covered mainly the urban areas.11 As the lowest tier of DMDP, DAP was basically intended to be a local level plan which stipulated proposed land use zoning, infrastructure and utility services.12 DAP was supposed to implement the DMDP SP and DMDP UAP as well as the policies and recommendations and to be prepared and implemented through community participation to make the plan people-oriented.

RAJUK began to formulate DAP in 2004 and completed it in 2007. Government approved DAP under DMDP through a gazette notification issued on 22 June 2010, but within a week of its approval, a high-powered cabinet committee was constituted for finalizing the plan through elaborate reviews.13 But the committee has failed in this endeavour. Instead, it has continuously made amendments to the plan, apparently to serve the interests of the land grabbers and approved as many as 158 changes during the past years, through which they got approval for filling up a large chunk of designated water-bodies and flood-flow areas under the plan.14 The cabinet committee has approved 135 gazette notifications and it has been found that the classification of land has been changed through these without mentioning the previous categorization of the affected lands.15 It was also found that after formation of the cabinet committee, permissions were given for filling up water bodies through 34 amendments and flood-flow areas through 14 amendments, agricultural and rural settlements have been cancelled through 20 amendments.16 Permission has been accorded to non-conforming areas for keeping residences alongside industries

9 Mowtushi Poit, “Summary of Dhaka Master Plan, 1959”, 21 April 2017, available at https://www.academia.edu/32675240/Summary_of_Dacca_Master_Plan_1959, accessed on 16 May 2019.10 Ibid.11 RAJUK, op. cit., pp. 28-29.12 Helal Uddin Ahmed, “Flouting Detailed Area Plan and Dhaka’s Perilous Future”, The Financial Express, 26 April 2018.13 Ibid.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 Ibid.

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through four amendments, which violates relevant provisions and permissions have also been given to changes in the land use categories in overlay zones through 13 amendments, which again contravene the relevant rules.17 It has become obvious that the committee, which was supposed to finalize DAP, has become a committee to amend DAP in favour of the land grabbers and land developers to fulfil their demand.

Against this background, the present paper to focus on the reasons why the Detailed Area Plan (DAP) was not effective and its impact on Dhaka city. The paper is divided into five sections including the introduction and conclusion. Following the introduction, the second section of the paper deals with the history of urbanization and urban planning of Dhaka city. The third section to find out the reasons behind the failure of the DAP and the fourth section will emphasize on the impacts of the failure of the DAP on Dhaka city.

2. Urbanization and Urban Planning in Dhaka City

Urbanization, a process which increases the percentage of population living in cities and peripheries of the cities, is mostly linked with modernization and industrialization. Although the process of urbanization in Bangladesh was relatively slow compared to other Asian countries, the country has experienced a remarkable progress of urbanization and urban growth in terms of increasing proportion of urban population and urban centres since the country’s independence in 1971.18 Dhaka has a long history of more than 400 years in which it has gone through various phases of growth and decline to become the present day megacity. Dhaka is located centrally and surrounded by rivers. Due to its location and connectivity, Dhaka became a hub of all kinds of activities from the past. By the year 2020, on the 50th year of our independence, the total urban population in Bangladesh is estimated to increase up to 50 million (five crores) from 30 million now and around half of them will be attracted or compelled to live in Dhaka and its conurbations alone unless a careful and well-thought-out urbanization policy is undertaken and implemented.19

The history of urban planning of Dhaka city is not a continuous one. The urbanization and urban planning of Dhaka city could be categorized in two periods: Before the independence of Bangladesh i.e. from pre-Mughal era upto 1971; and the Bangladesh period i.e. from 1971 till now.

17 Ibid.18 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Changing Patterns of Urbanization in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Census Data, Population Monograph of Bangladesh, Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 2015, p. xxi.19 Md. Musleh Uddin Hasan, “Town planning for Bangladesh: Vision 2020”, The Daily Star, 08 November 2008.

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2.1 Before the Independence of Bangladesh

Dhaka was the seat of provincial Mughal administration for about one hundred years (from 1608 AD).20 The factor that helped Dhaka to flourish during the Mughal period was the central location of the city. The city’s superior geo-strategic location enabled both the surveillance of the lower Bengal and its geography also provided an administrative advantage in collecting imperial revenues and protecting revenue interests.21 The city rose to prominence in the 17th century as a provincial capital and commercial centre of the Mughal Empire in South Asia. In 1715-16, the capital of Bengal province was shifted from Dhaka to Murshidabad, with which the city lost a part of its population.22 Calcutta became the capital of British India in 1772 as Warren Hastings, the first governor-general, transferred all important offices to the city.23 With the defeat of the Nawab of Bengal, the city formally passed to the control of the British East India Company in 1793.24

The first civic committee created to consider solutions to urban problems in Dhaka was the Committee of Improvement, formed in 1823.25 The British rulers declared Dhaka as a Municipality in 1846. Dhaka became the capital of the newly formed East Bengal-Assam province, during the British colonial period, for a couple of years.26 With the rise of the colonial capital Calcutta, Dhaka saw a sharp decline in its population and the city suffered stagnation and decline during the mid-19th century. British town planner Professor Patrick Geddes first made a plan for Dhaka city in 1917 in the concept of a garden city.27

In 1947, when India was partitioned, Dhaka became the seat of the provincial government of East Pakistan. The arrival of large numbers of Muslim population from India led to a 103 per cent increase of population of the city.28 The city began to experience rapid urbanization from the 1950s. This city is growing primarily in a

20 Adnan Zillur Morshed, “Understanding Mughal Dhaka”, The Daily Star, 11 February 2019.21 Ibid.22 Qazi Azizul Mowla, “Dhaka: A Mega City of Persistence and Change”, in R. P. Misra (ed), Urbanization in South Asia – Focus on Mega Cities, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India Pvt. Ltd., 2013, pp. 341-372.23 Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Capital of British India”, available at https://www.britannica.com/place/Kolkata/Capital-of-British-India, accessed on 05 September 2018.24 David Steven Cohen, "The Jewel in the Crown: Part 1-The British East India Company and the Raj", available at https://www.academia.edu/10071816/The_Jewel_in_the_Crown_Part_1-The_British_East_India_Company_and_the_Raj, accessed on 24 June 2018. 25 Md. Ashiq Ur Rahman, “Coordination of Urban Planning Organizations as a Process of Achieving Effective and Socially Just Planning: A Case of Dhaka City, Bangladesh”, International Journal of Sustainable Built Environment, 4, 2015, pp. 330-340.26 Qazi Azizul Mowla, op.cit.27 Mohammad Atikul Islam, “Setting Planning Standards for Public Facilities in a City: A Case Study of Ward 50 of Dhaka City Corporation”, Journal of Bangladesh Institute of Planners, Vol. 2, December 2009, pp. 169-178.28 Professor Sirajul Islam and Sajahan Miah (eds.), Banglapedia, Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2003, p. 476.

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spontaneous manner. A town planning cell under the Ministry of Public Works used to do the functions of town planning during the 1950s. The Dhaka Improvement Trust (DIT) was established in 1956 to coordinate the city’s development. City level urban planning in Bangladesh began in the late 1950s. The first Master Plan, which was prepared in map form showing proposed land use and infrastructure development for the city was drawn up in 1959. The content of the Master Plan report was comprehensive and sensible and DIT followed the plan quite diligently and developed the transport network, residential, commercial and industrial areas according to the guidelines. The area of Dhaka mega city had expanded 17.88 times from its size in the year 1951, over the same time period population had increased 25.09 folds.29 The population increased from 0.28 million in 1951 to around 1.2 million in 1971.30

Figure 1: Dhaka city evolution of boundary

900 20’E

240 00’

Dhaka Metropolitan Area Development Plan

Dhaka Metropolitan Area (DMA)

Pakistan Period

Mughal Period

British Period

Pre Mughal Period

230 50’

230 40’N

DHAKA CITYEVOLUTION OF

BOUNDARYN

4 40

Kilometer

900 30’

Source: Professor Sirajul Islam and Sajahan Miah (eds.), Banglapedia, Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2003, p. 481.

29 Islam et al. cited in Md. Al Mamun, Md. Ashraf Ali Akhand, “Land use of Dhaka metropolitan development plan area: Past and present scenario”, The Guardian, 02 May 2016. 30 Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha, “History of RAJUK”, available at http://www.rajukdhaka.gov.bd/rajuk/aboutusHome, accessed on 02 October 2018.

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2.2 The Bangladesh Period

Dhaka was declared the national capital by the Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh in 1972. The rapid expansion of Dhaka city began with the end of the Liberation War of Bangladesh In 1971. Although Dhaka is the capital of Bangladesh, the city did not get attention for planning for a long time after the country’s liberation in 1971. Being the capital, Dhaka has become a major source of both formal and informal employment opportunities. Dhaka seems to be the most favourite area and has become the main migration destination in the country because of the concentration of economic and political institutions which attracted migrants from other regions of the country. The proportion of migration varies among divisions. Higher proportions of migrations take place in Dhaka division 25.41 per cent.31 But, the city has grown haphazardly with a huge population and without a proper planning to ensure the basic services such as housing, utility services, transportation, open spaces and recreational facilities, etc. to its population.

In 1987, Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha (RAJUK) was established replacing DIT. Dhaka’s rapid growth necessitated a fresh plan and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) undertook a series of studies for the urban areas of Bangladesh and a joint effort with ADB in 1980 produced an extensive study on Dhaka but the Planning Commission did not approve the report.32 Finally, in 1991 the then newly elected government took up the proposal for a Master Plan. In 1995, RAJUK prepared a 20-year plan for Dhaka city called Dhaka Metropolitan Development Plan that included analysis of potential growth options, a structure plan and detailed area plans and ultimately, almost 30 years after independence, a new Master Plan i.e. Dhaka Metropolitan Development Plan (DMDP) was undertaken and completed in 1995 and approved in 1997.

3. Detailed Area Plan (DAP): Why It was Ineffective

DMDP, a three tier master plan, was approved and provided the planning policy guideline for Dhaka. The DAP is the third and last tier of DMDP. DAP provides more detailed planning proposals for specific sub-areas compliant with the Structure Plan (SP) and Urban Area Plan (UAP). The general objective of DAP is to implement the provisions of the DMDP SP and UAP policies and recommendations. The provisions of DAP is inherent in the DMDP SP with some specific purposes which include:

a. Provide basic infrastructure and services in the study through systematic planning.

31 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Population Distribution and Internal Migration in Bangladesh, Population Monograph: Volume-6, Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Statistics and Informatics Division, Ministry of Planning, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, November 2015, p. 37.32 Salma A. Shafi, “Implementation of Dhaka city Master Plan”, The Daily Star, 23 February 2010.

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b. Create congenial environment to promote economic activities.c. Improve drainage system of the area and protect flood flow from

encroachment.d. Create service centres to enable urban growth.33

Legend

DCC AREA

Residental+Govt. ProjectRural SettlementWaterbodyFlood Flow ZoneAgricultural AreaOther

Proposed Land Use of the Detaled Area Plans, 1995-2015, Source GIS Map, RAJUK 2010

0 5 10 KILOMETERS

N

Figure 2: Proposed Land Use of the Detailed Area Plans, 1995-2015.

Source: GIS Map, RAJUK 2010, available at https://www.google.com.bd/search?q=detailed+area+plan+(dap)+of+dhaka&tbm=isch&source=univ&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjerZ3A2JzhAhVFRo8KHZKEAG8Q7Al6BAgHEBE&biw=1366&bih=654#imgrc=Olc_lAennqudzM:, accessed on 25 March 2019.

DAP aimed to implement the SP and UAP policies and recommendations and the specific objectives of DAP are:

• Datamanagementanddisseminationatmouza dag level• ProvidingaprogrammeforMulti-sectorInvestmentPlan• Providingcontrolforprivatesectordevelopmentandclarityandsecurity

of investment for inhabitants and investors

33 Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha, “Detailed Area Plan DAP”, available at http://www.rajukdhaka.gov.bd/rajuk/dapHome, accessed on 01 October 2018.

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• Providingguidelinefordevelopmentconsideringtheopportunityandconstraints

• Ensureconstraintsenvironment.34

The total area under DAP is 1528 sq. km. or 590 sq. miles which cover the total RAJUK jurisdiction area. The jurisdiction of DAP planning area includes Gazipur Pourashava to the North, Dhaleshawri River to the South, Bangshi and Dhaleshawri River to the west and Shitalakkhya and Meghna River to the East.35

Mostly DAP remained unimplemented due to the strong protests from real estate owners and various interest groups.36 The then Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripkkha (RAJUK) chairman Nurul Huda alleged that an influential quarter was out to bring distortion and deviation to the Detailed Area Plan of Dhaka city. According to him, “An influential vested quarter is hatching conspiracy to twist and distort the already-gazetted DAP so that its implication is thwarted”.37 He also mentioned, “Planning is not a static thing, rather a continuous process. In course of time, planning can be changed in line with the aspirations of the people, but not at the will of a certain quarter”.38 The DAP has been planned to make decisions about land use, but there was no comprehensive implementation plan.

When RAJUK began the process of public hearing on the plan, it was criticized by various professionals, environmentalists and civil society groups. They observed various contradictions in the approach to the proposed plan and found various issues which could jeopardize the environment and social goals of the city. It was found that as the plan has a gross violation of national laws and DMDP, it might create environmental disaster and social unrest. As RAJUK did not conduct any land-use requirement survey, the consultants appointed for preparing DAP failed to get any comprehensive guideline to calculate the actual land-use demand for the people of the city. As a result, the consultants39 focused on their specific location.

Apart from this, as the last tier of DMDP, DAP was supposed to fulfil DMDP, which is a legal document40. DMDP categorizes flood flow zone into two categories, (i) Main flood flow zone and (ii) sub flood flow zone, among which there is no sub flood flow zone in DAP. DAP proposed only 'Agriculture with Rural Homestead'

34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Iqbal Habib, “DHAKA STRUCTURE PLAN 2016-2035-Prioritise people, not coteries”, The Daily Star, 16 September, 2015.37 “Influential Quarter Out to Foil DAP: Says Rajuk Chairman”, New Age, 01 July 2010.38 Ibid.39 RAJUK appointed four consulting firms to prepare DAP.40 Ministry of Housing and Public Works, "S R O No 184-Law/97", Bangladesh Gazette, 04 August, 1997, available at https://www.dpp.gov.bd/bgpress/index.php/document/extraordinary_gazettes_monthly/1997-08-28, accessed on 10 September 2018.

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category which was classified as 'High value agricultural land' and 'Agricultural land' which created scope for the private land developers to encroach the land.

In addition to violating the DMDP policy, DAP also contradicts with the “Water Body Conservation 2000”41, “Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act 1995”42 and violates the “Ramsar Convention”43 which Bangladesh is a signatory. JICA in its report FAP-8A and FAP-8B identified main and sub flood flow zones and DMDP SP also adopted the same divisions. “Structure Plan Policy RS/3 for Flood Flow Zone” mentioned that land development, within the designated flood plain areas of the DMDP Structure plan, will be controlled in order to avoid obstructions to flood flow, which might otherwise result in adverse hydraulic effects, such as, the rise of flood water levels and changes of flow direction.44

DAP contradicts with the Flood Flow Zone policies of DMDP and designated most of the sub flood flow zone as ‘urban residential area’ and ‘agriculture with homestead’ category. Apart from this, ‘urban residential area’ and ‘agriculture with homestead’ category is also found in the main flood flow zones which have paved the way for the developers to grab the land and fill up the low-lying areas of the fringe areas of Dhaka city which are basically used as water retention sites for Dhaka city.

Urban fringe areas are also used for agricultural purposes which used to fulfil the demand of the urban population. DMDP SP classified agricultural land into two categories: ‘High Value Agricultural Land’ and ‘Agricultural Land’. But DAP proposed only one category i.e. ‘Agriculture with Rural Homestead’. As a result, the fertile agricultural lands surrounding the city which were used earlier as agricultural lands have been encroached and converted as residential and mixed development

41 Act is created for conservation, regulation, protection and to reduce the abuse of resources as well as to make them sustainable for future. See for details, Mega city, Divisional Town and District Town’s municipal areas including country’s all the municipal areas’ playground, open space, park and natural water reservoir Conservation Act, 2000, available at https://www.bwdb.gov.bd/archive/pdf/198.pdf, accessed on 20 September 2018.42 In 1995, the Government of Bangladesh adopted a comprehensive environmental law called the “Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act” to provide for conservation of the environment, improvement of environmental standards and control and mitigation of environmental pollution. See for details, The Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act, 1995, available at extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/bgd42272.pdf, accessed on 20 September 2018.43 The Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) is an intergovernmental treaty whose mission is “the conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local, regional and national actions and international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable development throughout the world”. See for details, Ramsar Convention Secretariat, “An Introduction to the Convention on Wetlands, Gland, Switzerland: Ramsar Convention Secretariat”, 2016, available at https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/.../handbook1_5ed_introductiontoconvention_e.pdf, accessed on 20 September 2018. 44 Sohag Chandra Roy, Israt Jahan and Md. Asaduzzaman, “DMDP as a Tool to Safeguard the Flood Flow Zones from Unrestrained Development”, Journal of Bangladesh lnstitute of Planners, Vol. 4, December 2011, pp. 71-79.

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purposes. In some areas, DAP replaced ‘Agricultural Land’ by ‘Urban Residential Use’. Thus, DAP has allocated a huge amount of land for residential use hampering the environmental concerns. The DAP reports do not have any strategy to control and regulate development. There is a shortage of open space in Dhaka city. Although it is necessary to have open spaces in a city, it is also very difficult to designate land for open space in a city with huge population. DAP proposed only 0.328 acres of land/1000 population which is far below than any other densely populated cities of the world.45 The plan proposed only one-third of the land as open space after relocation of Dhaka Central Jail which is very inadequate.

The city development authority RAJUK itself has failed to implement properly any of the city’s development plans including the DAP. Apart from the private land developers, RAJUK itself has become encroacher in several places. RAJUK has taken several projects on flood flow zones and crop lands in adjacent areas of Dhaka city for its housing projects. RAJUK completed feasibility studies for developing a 201 acre residential cum commercial area close to Uttarkhan on the Balu river bank which has been designed to swallow flood flow zone as well as fertile crop lands in seven mouzas of Dhaka districts.46 Similarly, a new 2,209 acre project taken by RAJUK at Keraniganj for providing residential plots mainly to MPs which would also swallow areas designated for conservation in the DAP.47 Apart from these, Jheelmil, Purbachal and Uttara 3rd Phase residential projects which are now being implemented by RAJUK, have already swallowed flood flow zones and crop lands by taking them out of conservation areas as earmarked in the DAP.48 Recently, RAJUK has changed the layout plan of Purbachal Project for the fifth time which has shrunk the open space to accommodate ‘influential people’.49 As RAJUK itself is violating the laws by encroaching the flood flow zones and crop lands, the real estate developers are also following RAJUK by launching new projects in the surrounding low- lying flood flow zones and crop lands of Dhaka city.

45 Bangladesh Institute of Planners, “Detail Area Plan (DAP) of Dhaka: Shattering the vision of DMDP”, The Daily Star, 20 December 2008.46 Mahamudul Hasan, “Rajuk’s violations make DAP useless”, New Age, 04 April 2017.47 Ibid.48 Ibid.49 Tawfique Ali, “Purbachal Project: CONCEPT lost on REVISIONS”, The Daily Star, 24 March 2019.

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Figure 3: The images show how arable land and �ood �ow zones covering over 6,200 acres in Purbachal area on the outskirts of the capital have been turned into a housing project over the years.

Source: Tawfique Ali, Purbachal Project: CONCEPT lost on REVISIONS, The Daily Star, 24 March 2019.

4. Failure of DAP: Its Impact on Dhaka City

RAJUK, responsible for the planning of Dhaka city and implementing the policies, has violated DAP which is creating problems in the urban areas and hampering the city life for its population. The present paper will try to highlight on the water congestion issue of Dhaka city which is increasing day by day as the low lying water retention areas of the surrounding areas of Dhaka city are being filled up by RAJUK itself as well as other developers violating DMDP.

The low-lying areas, canals, lakes and ponds of Dhaka city are used as retention basins and play important roles in the drainage function. The storm water is accumulated in the low-lying areas and lakes, flows through the storm channel i.e. khals and discharged to the surrounding rivers. The Dhaka region has more than 50

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khals that drain 80 per cent storm water of the city to the surrounding rivers.50 The major khal systems are-Degun-Ibrahimur-Kallyanpur khal system that drains to Turag River, Dhanmondi-Paribagh-Gulshan Banani-Mohakhali-Begunbari khal system that drains to Balu River, Segunbagicha-Gerani-Dholai khal system that drains to Balu and Buriganga rivers.51 Major drainage improvement infrastructures include three pumping stations with a combined capacity of 52 cumec, 7 km box culvert, 205 km storm drains (buried pipes of diameter ranging from 450 mm to 3000 mm) and 57 km of open canals which have proved to be inadequate to rid the city of floodwater because many areas of the city experience severe and prolonged flooding, especially during heavy showers in the monsoon season.52 Dhaka’s drainage network was designed to discharge storm water to the surrounding four rivers–Buriganga, Balu, Turag and Shitalakhya-through the existing 26 canals. According to Dhaka Water Supply & Sewerage Authority (DWASA) officials, Dhaka used to have 65 canals but the number has come down to 43 over time and among the existing ones, around 20 canals have also nearly vanished because of encroachment.53 DWASA covers 370 km drains, while the Dhaka North City Corporation (DNCC) and Dhaka South City Corporation (DSCC) together have around 2,000 km and these existing drains are unable to discharge rainwater swiftly as the 26 drainage canals they are connected to have been encroached by land grabbers.54

Rainwater would have gone under the ground naturally, instead of flooding the city streets, if the city had 50 per cent of the surface been open earth. But out of 400 sq. km. area of the capital covered by (DWASA), some 350 sq. km. Of the surface is paved, which prevents the ground to soak up rainwater. The rainwater could easily flow into the canals and ponds if they had not been filled up. The city’s natural drainage system-comprised of a network of 65 canals and four rivers, numerous water retention areas (ponds, ditches), extensive low-lying areas and flood flow zones are consistently being destroyed in the name of development. The low-lying wetlands and flood flow zones assigned in the DAP no longer exist as those were filled up, in many cases with official approval.

Water congestion has become a very common chronic problem in Dhaka city during the monsoon period as well as all the year round. Dhaka has been experiencing a gradual increase in water congestion over the last decade. Moderate to heavy rain causes serious drainage problems in many parts of the city. With rapid urbanization and rapid increase of population, Dhaka city is expanding both horizontally and vertically. The population of Dhaka city is increasing at a very high rate and this increased population is putting tremendous pressure on different utility services.

50 Khan 2006 cited in RAJUK, Public Facilities for Better Urban Living, Chapter 08, p. 154.51 Chowdhury et al. 1998b cited in RAJUK, 2015, Ibid.52 Md. Mafizur Rahman and Shahriar Quayyum, “Sustainable Water Supply In Dhaka City: Present And Future”, paper presented at the Conference of the Japan Science and Technology Agency at Bangkok, Thailand on March 2008.53 Abu Hayat Mahmud, “Can Dhaka’s waterlogging problem really be resolved?”, Dhaka Tribune, 23 July 2017.54 Ibid.

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Drainage system is one of such facilities. As a result of this pressure, problems like drainage congestion have now become a crucial problem for the city. The main canals that drain water to the nearby waterbodies have been grabbed by encroacher. Apart from this, culverts, box culverts and drains have been obstructed due to lack of maintenance. According to experts, the city’s storm-water drainage system is inadequate and is only capable of dealing with 20 mm of rainfall and the streets get waterlogged if the rainfall exceeds 40 mm.55 As a result, there is a lack of outlets for the rainwater to pass. For this, even a little rain causes serious problems in many parts of the city on every occasion and can create water congestion situation for several days which in turn causes huge infrastructural damages.

This problem also has negative financial impact. According to a World Bank study published in November 2015, the potential damages from waterlogging between 2014 and 2050 will be Tk11,000 crore in Dhaka, if climate change is not considered. In a changing climate with more intense rainfalls, the loss will be Tk13,900 crore between 2014 and 2050.56 The drainage system in the capital is dysfunctional due to clogging of the drains. No sustainable initiative has been taken to address the water-logging problem in Dhaka city. This situation normally occurs due to unplanned infrastructure development, insufficient or limited drainage systems, blockage of drains, lack of consciousness of these problems by the inhabitants, unplanned build-up of areas within the city, filling up off the canals, lake and waterbodies in areas which are mainly acquired by housing companies and brick burning industries within the city. Unplanned urbanization is also increasing water congestion. Elimination of local water storage areas by land-filling is one of the major causes of rainfall flooding and drainage congestion in many locations of the Dhaka city. The city development authority RAJUK has failed to implement properly any of the city’s development plans including the DAP. Prof Jamilur Reza Choudhury identified the shortcomings of DAP in 2013 and commented,

“A large number of land developers continue to fill up flood flow zones and grab the banks of four rivers around Dhaka. The DAP remains far from being implemented due to negligence of the authorities concerned. The land developers are using land by violating all RAJUK plans and laws.”57

A large number of drainage channels, water reservoir and flood flow zones inside Dhaka city and its surroundings have been taken over by construction activities. According to the Flood Action Plan and DAP, the city should have 5,523 acres of conserved water retention areas, 20,093 acres of canals and rivers and 74,598 acres of flood flow zones. But according to experts, most of these wetlands have been filled up.58

55 “Waterlogged Dhaka streets”, The Daily Star, 21 June 2017.56 Abu Hayat Mahmud, op. cit.57 Abu Hayat Mahmud, “Dhaka: Four centuries of uncontrolled growth”, Dhaka Tribune, 02 October 2017.58 “Waterlogged Dhaka streets”, op. cit.

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The people of Dhaka city is suffering from water congestion during the monsoon in spite of various plans, projects and programmes taken by the authorities. Extensive water congestion takes place from May to October every year due to the result of rapid and unplanned urbanization in the city and surrounding areas. The drainage networks of Dhaka city are regulated by three local government bodies–DWASA, DNCC and DSCC. RAJUK on the one hand is accused of irregularities and corruption in the implementation of city plans and on the other hand also faces obstructions and constant pressures from developer companies and land grabbers. DWASA, the two city corporations, the deputy commissioner’s office, RAJUK, Water Development Board, Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority (BIWTA) and Dhaka Cantonment Board are involved in resolving water congestion problem in Dhaka city and the surrounding areas. But these authorities have not become successful in solving the problem. According to urban planner Dr. Maksudur Rahman, “If the present trend of city governance continues, all city streets will be flooded during monsoon in a decade, intensifying the suffering of city dwellers, and people will be compelled to leave the city.” He has also predicted that about 50-60 per cent of the city will be inundated in ten years if it experiences even a moderate rainfall.59

The drainage congestion situation of Dhaka city has reached to a dangerous magnitude with the rapid urbanization and increase of infrastructure, reduction of water retention areas inside and outside of the city. DAP prepared a land use zoning plan together with infrastructure development plan, where the land use plan indicated where the future land uses have to be located as a part of development control. Any Developer intending to develop any structure or make any use of any particular land has to obtain a land use clearance from RAJUK consistent with DAP.60 But developments have been observed in many places where land uses are being cropped up ignoring the DAP land use zoning plan. Urban Planner Prof Sarwar Jahan pointed out that a large number of land developers have already filled up most of the DAP designated wetlands and flood flow zones and this land grabbing is behind the constant waterlogging and destruction of ecology around the city.61

5. Conclusion

Dhaka is facing rapid urbanization backed by huge population. In less than 325 sq. km. of area, it supports more than 15 million people which make it one of the most densely populated megacities.62 Although the city has become a megacity from a mere provincial town, the infrastructures and facilities have failed to cope with the current rapid urbanization scenario. Master plans for the city are not a new phenomenon, but the city has grown mostly in an unplanned haphazard manner. The rapid unplanned growth of the

59 Rafiqul Islam, “Value of Water is on the Rise”, Reliefweb, 28 Jul 2017, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/value-water-rise, accessed on 19 October 2018.60 RAJUK , Chapter 08, op. cit., p. 30.61 Abu Hayat Mahmud, 02 October 2017, op. cit.62 Dhrubo Alam and Arfar Razi, “Why Dhaka’s liveability is only worsening”, The Daily Star, 01 January 2018.

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city is creating difficulties in various sectors in the urban life of its population. Increasing number of population in a small area instigates the land developers to make residential planning in the areas designated for environmental purposes. DMDP was prepared in 1995 by RAJUK for its entire 1528 sq. km. to prepare a hierarchical multi-sectoral development plan comprised of Structure Plan, Urban Area Plan and Detailed Area Plan.63 The major focus of DAP was first to put a control over free for all development within RAJUK area through land use zoning and second, to lay down the framework for development of future infrastructure and services. While the first objective has been partially achieved, the second focus has virtually been ignored.64 The powerful land developers have violated the land use zoning policies of DAP, grabbed the lands and hampered the planned spatial development of the city. RAJUK itself has violated its own policies in some occasions. These activities are mainly observed in the fringe areas of the city which are mainly designated as flood flow zones and agricultural purposes. As a result of the development activities in the flood flow zones, the drainage system of the city is obstructed and water congestion is created in the city and which is becoming severe day by day. Management of the drainage system of Dhaka city has become a challenge for the urban authorities.

The Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11 of the United Nations mentioned “Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”.65 The United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) in Quito, Ecuador on 20 October 2016 adopted “The New Urban Agenda” which represents a shared vision for a better and more sustainable future and it also mentions that if well-planned and well-managed, urbanization can be a powerful tool for sustainable development for both developing and developed countries.66 Therefore, it is necessary to have a coordinated urban planning policy with proper implementation mechanism to solve the problem which will bring together all the stakeholders in a single platform.

63 RAJUK, Chapter 08, op. cit., p. 28. 64 Ibid., p. 30.65 Sustainable Development Goals, available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11, accessed on 18 October 2018.66 The United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, “The New Urban Agenda”, Habitat III,17-20 October 2016, available at http://habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda/, accessed on 18 October 2018.

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Abu Salah Md. YousufGausul Azam

mYANmAR’S PEACE PROCESS UNDER SUU kYI: UNDERSTANDING THE FAUlT lINES

Abstract

Before British occupation in Myanmar, the then Burma, the frontier areas of the country enjoyed autonomy under the dynastic rulers. The British colonials consolidated the country under a central rule. When anti-British movement started in Myanmar, the ethnic groups of frontier areas reclaimed their autonomy. The unanimous leader of Myanmar’s independence movement General Aung San desired an integrated Myanmar and reached in an agreement naming Panglong Agreement 1947, where all the stakeholders agreed to secure the identity and status of all ethnic communities and to develop a federal system where every community can get equal status. The assassination of General Aung San and subsequent military takeover of 1962 pushed the country towards a long-term ethnic conflict. The military rulers failed to accommodate demands of the ethnic communities and a policy of segregation undermined the nationality of ethnic groups. After seven decades, Aung San Suu Kyi’s arrival to power in 2015 raised new hope for reconciliation and the elected government of Myanmar started new peace process. But, the longstanding mistrust and conflict between the military and the ethnic groups are making the process difficult. Present study identifies the fault lines of new peace process and finds that the deficit of trust, the point of non-secession principle, disagreements on the incorporation of ethnic soldiers in the national military and debates on constitutional amendments are the main challenges towards a peace agreement between the government and ethnic communities of Myanmar.

Keywords: Myanmar, Peace Process, Panglong Agreement 1947, Aung San Suu Kyi, Military, Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)

1. Introduction

Since independence in 1948, ethnic conflicts remain a major challenge to the national integration of Myanmar. In the pre-colonial Myanmar, the frontier areas of the country were enjoying autonomy under the dynastic rulers. British colonial rulers unified the country under a single administration. When anti-British movement started in Myanmar, ethnic minorities of the frontier areas reclaimed


Abu Salah Md. Yousuf is Senior Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: [email protected]; Gausul Azam was Intern at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: [email protected]


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their autonomy and joined in the movements against British rule. The unanimous leader of the independence movement of Myanmar General Aung San started negotiating with the ethnic leaders desiring an integrated Myanmar and signed Panglong Agreement in 1947, where all the stakeholders agreed to ensure equal status for all sections of the society including ethnic communities in frontier areas. The assassination of General Aung San and the military takeover of 1962 diluted the whole process of peace and the conflict escalated in the frontier regions.

The military promulgated Buddhist chauvinism and initiated military operations in the ethnic areas. Such measures escalated violence and the country entered into a long-term ethnic conflict. The second military government came to power in 1988 and signed several ceasefire agreements with the ethnic armed groups. But these ceasefire agreements were not enough to stop the violence, because the military continued operations against the ethnic armed organizations (EAO). After making the new constitution in 2008, an election was held in 2011 and another military backed government came to power. This government also failed to resolve the ethnic conflicts of the country.

However, after long struggle for democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi won the majority in a historic election held in 2015. The NLD government created a high hope for reconciliation in Myanmar as it committed for resolving ethnic conflicts and declared for constitutional amendment. The NLD government adopted initiatives to restore peace and stability in Myanmar. It has arranged the historic Union Peace Conference- the 21st Century Panglong for three times during its three years of tenure. But, the historic stalemates towards the process are preventing any effective progress to develop a mechanism where all the stakeholders can agree. In this respect, the main objective of present study is to understand what are the main fault lines which are preventing newly initiated peace process under Aung San Suu Kyi.

The article is divided into six sections including introduction and conclusion. Second section discusses how the colonial rulers dealt with the ethnic minority issues of Myanmar. It will explore the genesis of ethnic conflicts in the country. Third section analyses the initiatives of General Aung San for resolving ethnic conflicts and the core principles of the Panglong Agreement of 1947. This section also focuses on the rise of Buddhist chauvinism under the military rulers of the country. Fourth section highlights the peace initiatives under the 21st century Panglong conference initiated by the NLD government. Fifth section identifies the fault lines which are barring the progress of peace process between the government and ethnic minorities.

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MYANMAR’S PEACE PROCESS

2. The Genesis of Ethnic Rivalry

Myanmar, the then Burma, was ruled by a number of dynasties- the Pagan dynasty, the Ava dynasty, the Toungoo dynasty and the Konbaung dynasty. The dynastic rule continued until the British dethroned the last king Thibaw Min in 1886. In the pre-colonial Burma, ethnic Bamars were 69 per cent of the total population living in the Ministerial Burma or Burma proper and the rest were the ethnic minorities living in the frontier areas1 or the scheduled areas.2 There was constant rivalry among the ethnic groups in the pre-colonial Myanmar as Matthew Walton has stated, “[it] is known that throughout the pre-colonial period there were frequent wars between nominally independent kingdoms.”3 The British colonial rulers consolidated Burma proper and frontier areas under same administration. The frontier areas were governed by their usual tribal chieftains.

The British intrusion had brought notable change in the Burmese geo-political and economic ownership. Three major changes happened during the colonial period. Firstly, the British rulers excluded Buddhism and the Buddhists from politics and sponsored Christianity which was accepted by many ethnic communities. The monarchs, from the first ruler Anawrahta of 11th century to the last ruler, Thibaw Min in the 19th century, were from the Buddhist religious community and all of them patronized Buddhism of Theravada tradition and mingled Buddhism with politics to justify monarchic rule. The Monarch formed the Sangha of Buddhist monks which spread the knowledge of the just ruler according to Buddhism and rationalized the importance of religion-based Buddhist society. Buddhist monks were given the highest respect and position in the royal palace as well as in the society. The Sangha of the monks established educational institutions to spread the knowledge of Buddhism. The Ministerial Burma became the hub of Buddhist religion on that time.

The frontiers’ ethnic minorities were the worshippers of natural forces. They practiced different religious rituals and worshipped natural power- “the native spirit, indigenous form of animism.”4 When the British occupied Burma, the Colonials not only divorced Buddhism from politics but also disrespected by replacing the Pagodas with Cathedral and Upper Burma Club for the British officials.5 The British also controlled the movement of the monks and banned the donation for the Monks. The British rulers abandoned Buddhist educational institutions and established

1 Ardeth M. Thawnghmung, “Beyond Armed Resistance: Ethno-national Politics in Burma (Myanmar)”, East-West Center, Policy Studies No. 62, 2011, p. 3.2 David I. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 20.3 Matthew J. Walton, “Ethnicity, Conflict, and History in Burma: The Myths of Panglong”, Asian Survey, Vol. XLVIII, No. 6, 2008, p. 893.4 Francis Wade, Myanmar’s Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim ‘Other’, London: Zed Books Ltd, 2017, p. 22.5 Ibid, p. 23.

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missionary schools to teach Christianity instead of Buddhism. That is how the colonial government intervened into religious sphere of Buddhist people. As a result, the first anti-British protest also came from the Sangha named Young Men’s Buddhist Association in 1920.6 In contrast, ethnic communities embraced British rule and Christianity. The arrival of British resulted in the religion-based division between the people of Ministerial Burma and Frontier Areas. This was the beginning of division and hostility between Bamar and non-Bamar people.

Secondly, after the British arrival, the Burmese economy transferred from the Bamar nationals to the non-Bamar landlords and to the immigrant Indians. The immigrant Indians controlled the Irrawaddy deltaic region which was the main rice producing land of Burma during the time. The South Indians, mainly known as Chettyars, became prominent for lending money and they were treated as the exploiters in the Burmese society.7 Land was grabbed by the Indian cultivators and they provided more rents than their Bamar counterparts.8 Indians entered into the country on an average rate of 250,000 each year in the early nineteenth century.9 It was stated that “[t]here were 212,000 Indians in Yangon alone verses 128,000 Bamar in 1931.”10 Some cities, like Mandalay which was the most important for Shwedagon Pagoda to the Buddhist monks, had more foreigners than the Burmese. The Bamar community was segregated from the economic sphere. They felt that they are exploited by the foreigners and became minorities in their homeland.

Thirdly, the colonial rulers created and maintained the division between the ethnic Bamar and the ethnic minorities as a part of “divide and rule policy”, by recruiting the ethnic people and by excluding the Bamar in the government institutions. Since the British rulers did not trust and had no confidence on the Bamar people, they depended on the ethnic people and sometimes on the Indians for administrative activities.11 The lower-class positions of the government were also occupied by the Indians who spoke English better. The British military excluded ethnic Bamars gradually and was staffed with other ethnic soldiers. The colonial military was formed with 27.8 per cent Karen, 22.9 per cent Kachin, 22.6 per cent Chin, 12.8 per cent ethnic Bamar soldiers and the rest were either from India or from some other small ethnic groups.12 The top military positions were occupied by Karen ethnic soldiers. The Burmese people were segregated from every sectors of the government. The Burmese were ruled by the colonial rulers with the help of foreign administration and ethnic army.

6 Ibid, p. 24.7 Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 10.8 Ibid, p. 10.9 Francis Wade, op. cit., p. 27.10 Ibid, p. 19.11 Kim Jolliffe, “Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar”, Asia Foundation, 2015, p. 9.12 David I. Steinberg, op. cit., p. 29.

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The British rule played a significant role as a genesis of ethnic conflicts for several decades in the modern Burma. The British heightened the existing differences and instigated rivalry. What the British actually did was the construction of categorical ethnic identity and patronized some of them against others. Some ethnic communities benefited disproportionately from the British rule. There was little interaction between the Bamars and the ethnic people. The disparities in the political and economic sectors and in the administration created long-term distrust between the ethnic Bamars and other ethnic minorities in colonial Burma and subsequently it continued in independent Myanmar.

3. The Panglong Conference of 1947 and Its Aftermath

The ongoing peace process under Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor of Myanmar, is the latest episode of a continuous process which started before the independence of Myanmar under the hand of General Aung San, the father of Aung San Suu Kyi. This process started in 1947 when all the parties to the conference agreed to make a federal union in Burma. Through this conference, the long animosity and distrust between the mainland Bamars and the Hill people came to an end for a short period of time. Though the conference failed because of the assassination of General Aung San and other cabinet members of the interim government of that time, it left long lasting impact on the later history of Myanmar. This section will try to shed light on the issues regarding the Panglong Conference of 1947.

There were two conferences held at Panglong, a small valley of Shan state, in 1946 and 1947 respectively, before the independence of the country. The first conference was hosted by the Shan Saophas or the Prince of the Shan state to discuss about the future status of the Shan state after independence. The Saophas invited three other ethnic groups - Kachin, Karen and Chin. The purpose of this conference was to discuss that what would be the future status of the frontier people in independent Burma. They formed “United Frontier Union consisting of Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karenni and Karen territory.”13 Other ethnic groups were frustrated because of not having been invited in the meeting.

The second Panglong Conference became famous in which an agreement between the Burmese interim government and the hill people was signed to establish the Union of Burma based on federalism. All the Saophas of Shan state, Kachin Hill and Chin Hill, and several members of the Executive Council of the Governors of Burma were present there. In this conference, the famous promise stated by General Aung San, which was later used by many parties to argue for federalism in Myanmar, was that “[i]f Burma gets one kyat, you will also get one kyat.”14 He also said that he

13 Matthew J. Walton, op. cit., p. 895.14 “Beyond Panglong: Myanmar’s National Peace and Reform Dilemma”, Myanmar Policy Briefing, Transnational Institute, No. 21, September 2017, p. 4.

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would establish “unity in diversity”15. The delegates signed an agreement on some important issues:

• The Supreme Council of the United Hill People would be established;• This Supreme Council would recommend appointing one Councillor

for frontier areas and two Deputy Councillors from different three races. The Councillor would be a member of the Governor’s Executive Council so that he could bring the issues of Hill people “within the purview of Executive Council”.16 The Deputies were responsible for their respective areas while the Councillor was responsible for whole frontier areas;

• Fundamental democratic “Rights and Privileges”17 would be ensured for the frontier people;

• “Full autonomy in internal administration for the frontier areas was accepted in principle;”18

• A future Kachin and Shan state were proposed to be established.

The Panglong agreement was a remarkable event in the political history of Myanmar. But, the assassination of General Aung San made the agreement irrelevant. However, Matthew Walton identified three important limitations of the agreement. Firstly, the agreement at Panglong was not inclusive but was dominated and dictated by the Bamar ethnic leaders.19 It was because that only three ethnic groups were invited at the Panglong who agreed to the given policy of the interim government. Mon, Arakanese, Karenni, Wa, Naga and some others were not even invited to participate at Panglong because of their inhabitants within the territory of the Ministerial Burma. Secondly, the constitution rewritten in 1947 did not upheld the spirit of the Panglong. Instead of a federal government, the new constitution formed a unitary state or at least semi-unitary state that was conflicting to the Panglong promise. The new constitution “limited the sovereignty of ethnic minorities”20 and diminished the rights of them. As a result, the ethnic minorities came up with arms and started fighting against the Bamar dominated government. Thirdly, the ethnic minorities did not agree on the Panglong agreement unanimously and harmoniously.21 Some ethnic representatives were challenged by other factions of its own community and some ethnic groups were not even invited. Kachin Youth League and Shan States Freedom League challenged the agreement signed by their representatives at the conference. Some ethnic groups like Karen and Karenni were determined to get full independence, not to be an autonomous state. The Chin representatives committed to be a part of the union

15 Ibid, p. 5.16 “Panglong Agreement Paper”, Article No. 2, 12 February 1947.17 Ibid, Article No. 4.18 Ibid, Article No. 6.19 Matthew J. Walton, op.cit., p. 90420 Ibid, p. 905.21 Ibid, p. 906.

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without even understanding the colonial concept of federalism.22 There were no such unity on political structure and mechanism for the future state among the parties to the conference. This conference generated hope among the ethnic minorities, but failed to fulfil their demands. However, the impact of the conference was significent because it upheld the wish of all the stakeholders. Walton argued that disregarding the limitations, “contemporary ethnic identity in Burma has been fundamentally shaped by the legacies of Panglong.”23

The outcome of the Panglong conference was not long-lasting. It delayed the civil war for some days but was not enough to stop it forever. The constitution of 1947 did not shape the state as federal but a unitary, may be a semi-unitary state. Internal autonomy and the political rights of the frontier people were not safeguarded. Some nationals like the Mon, Arakanese, Wa, Naga, Kokang, Pa-O and the Muslim community was not recognized. New laws and regulations were adopted by the parliament to ensure more control on the frontier areas. Failing to attain their goals, Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Union (KNU), Shan State Army (SSA), Arakan Army (AA), People Volunteer Army (PVA) in the Ministerial Burma and some other nationals like Mon, Pao, Rakhine and other pro-communist groups resorted to armed struggle. The newly independent country engulfed into conflict. This conflict increased and spread to different areas with the course of time.

The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) government under U Nu’s leadership signed ceasefire agreement with some groups like KNU, Mon, Pao, Rakhine, CPB, who promised to stop war in return of political reform, under the ‘Arms for Democracy’ initiative in 1958.24 The national leaders or the ethnic leaders formed the ‘All States Unity Organization’ with Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mon and Shan members in 1961 and agreed to the ‘Shan State Proposal’ consisting the provision of equal rights of all states in the union.25 It also proposed to divide the country into eight federal states- Arakan, Bamar, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan.26

In 1962, the military carried out a coup led by General Ne Win who was against federalism because he believed that federalism could disintegrate the Union. He came to power to prevent territorial disintegration. He established socialism and formed Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). From 1962 to 1988, the military signed some ceasefires by forceful means like the ‘four cuts strategy’.27 But

22 Ibid.23 Ibid, p. 907.24 "Beyond Panglong: Myanmar’s National Peace and Reform Dilemma", op. cit., p. 6.25 Ibid, p. 7.26 Ibid.27 ‘Four Cuts’ policy is such policy which purposes to cut off the supply of food, funds, intelligence and popular support for armed resistance groups in the conflicting areas.

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those ceasefires did not last long. The military centralized the power by abandoning autonomy of the states and divisions and took control of the economy and politics through the “Burmese Way to Socialization” process.28 The military intensified the conflict in Arakan, Chin and Kachin by enacting the Citizenship Law of 1982. Through a mass demonstration in 1988, military government was forced to leave the power. Another military government under the banner of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) came to power.

After taking power, the SLORC initiated the process of a new election with a view of drafting a new constitution. It signed the ceasefire agreement (actually verbal agreement) with sixteen groups.29 But, the ceasefire was failed because the military was continuing its operations. The SLORC held an election in 1990 and the NLD won the election with large majority under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. The military did not hand over power and took Suu Kyi under house arrest. It also arrested thousands of opposition members and some of the elected members of the parliament. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), successor of the SLORC, held a national convention consisting of 702 delegates from the NLD, ethnic leaders from different communities, the military, and experts etc., to form a new constitution in 1998.30 The NLD and some other groups boycotted the convention claiming the lack of the freedom of expression. Some ethnic groups allied with the SPDC and some ethnic groups became close to the NLD which was approaching democracy and federalism. The military intensified operations against the non-signatory ethnic groups of the ceasefire agreement and pro-democracy groups until 2008 when the constitution was finally ratified.

A new election was held under the new constitution in 2011 and the Union Solidarity and Development Party led by U Thein Sein won the majority in the parliament. The NLD boycotted the election. The Thein Sein government “extended the olive branch”31 to the EAOs for a lasting peace in the country. Thein Sein government convened nationwide ceasefire agreement process and signed written agreements with seventeen groups including Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon etc.32 The government offered a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) to be signed by all the armed groups. After eighteen months and nine rounds of formal negotiations, eight of the sixteen armed groups signed the agreement on 15 October 2015.33 Other groups refrained from signing the agreement because some new clashes were reported to be happened against Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the AA and Ta’an National Liberation Army (TNLA). These groups were not present in the dialogue

28 David I. Steinberg, op. cit., p. 64-65.29 "Beyond Panglong: Myanmar’s National Peace and Reform Dilemma", op. cit., p. 13.30 “Human Rights Yearbook 1996: Burma”, National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, 1997, p. 33.31 “Perspectives on the Myanmar Peace Process 2011– 2015”, Swisspeace, 2016, p. 5.32 Ibid, p. 5.33 Ibid, pp. 6-7.

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and their absence was the opposite to the agreed principle of ‘inclusivity’ by both the government and the ethnic groups.34 It was the highest form of political development in last six decades in Myanmar. The new peace initiative of the NLD government was also based on the NCA drafted by the Thein Sein government.

4. Peace Process under Suu Kyi

All Myanmar citizens did burst into joy when the NLD under Suu Kyi got the majority in the parliament in the historic election held in 2015. For her family background, her own sacrifices such as passing one and half decades of house arrest alone leaving her husband and children abroad, Suu Kyi established her image as uncompromising character for democracy and human rights. She has emerged as the last hope in Myanmar who could make the country peaceful, democratic and prosperous. After winning the election of 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi declared, “The peace process is the first thing the new government will work on. We will try for the all-inclusive ceasefire agreement. We can do nothing without peace in our country”.35 After taking power, Suu Kyi government initiated some institutional re/arrangement and policies for conflict resolution. The government also arranged the Union Peace Conference to talk with all the ethnic armed groups. This section highlights what policies and initiatives are taken by Suu Kyi government to bring the conflict to an end.

The new government of Suu Kyi understood that the existing institutions were not effective enough for conflict resolution and reconciliation. Suu Kyi replaced the “Myanmar Peace Center” (MPC) with the “National Reconciliation and Peace Restoration Center” (NRPC) consisting of eleven members and put it under the office of the State Counsellor.36 The government established it as the “first track decision” making institution. The purpose of this institution was to make policies for national reconciliation process; to lead the guidelines paving the way for participation of all the stakeholders; and to work for establishing a democratic federal union in Myanmar. The government reformed the existing Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) that was responsible for holding political dialogue with the ethnic groups and Suu Kyi became the chair of the committee. It was formed with the representatives of the NCA signatory ethnic groups and the government. The objective of the committee is to find out policy and mechanism for building a democratic federal union in Myanmar.

The most important attempt by Suu Kyi to restore peace and stability was the Union Peace Conference- 21st Century Panglong. It was first national conference after Suu Kyi’s ascendancy to power. There had been three conferences on that banner

34 Ibid, p. 7.35 “Myanmar’s Suu Kyi says peace process will be government’s priority”, The Reuters, 04 January 2016. 36 “MPC to Be Renamed ‘National Reconciliation and Peace Center'”, The Irrawaddy, 28 April 2016.

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since 2016 and all that three were arranged under the guidance of the UPDJC. In the opening day of the first conference, there were representatives from the government, the Parliament, the Tatmadaw, seventeen ethnic armed groups (Signatory and Non-signatory), foreign diplomats and the then UN General Secretary, Ban Ki Moon. Only three ethnic armed groups, the TNLA, the AA and the MNDAA were denied to invite in the conference because of their continuous fighting against the Tatmadaw and appeal for new NCA draft.37 The UWSA walked out of the conference because they were allowed only observer status rather than delegate status.38 No concrete decision was made at the first conference. The success lies on the gathering of different groups under the one umbrella and the interactions among the different stakeholders. Though no decision was made, every delegate talked about their grievances and desires. Most of the delegates urged for federal democratic country except the Tatmadaw. In this conference, it was promised that this type of conference will be held after every six months. Suu Kyi envisioned the year of 2017 as the “Year of Peace”.39

Following the first peace conference, the government has published a “roadmap for national reconciliation and union peace”, which showed the future framework for working to bring peace. This roadmap articulated with a view to review and amend the political dialogue framework; convening the Union Peace Conference- the 21st Century Panglong; amending the constitution; holding the multi-party democratic general elections and lastly building a democratic federal union in accordance with the results of the multiparty democratic general elections.40 This was the most robust and exhausted planning for peace in the history of Myanmar. The second and the third conference was held in accordance with the roadmap.

The second Panglong conference was held on 24-29 May, 2017 after being postponed for several times. This conference produced a mixed result like Frontier of Myanmar reported, “[i]t began with a good-cop, bad-cop routine: State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s optimistic speech followed by a threat from the Commander-in-Chief towards armed groups rejecting the NCA.”41 About 700 delegates participated in the conference from the government, the Tatmadaw, eight signatory EAOs and some non-signatory groups. The Tatmadaw barred the presence of the non-signatory ethnic groups earlier but they were invited later as guest status. A new coalition of EAOs, the Union Political Negotiation Dialogue Committee (UPNDC), emerged before the second conference. The existing coalition, United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), lost its key member KIA. The UNFC wanted to refrain from participating

37 “Mixed results at latest Panglong peace conference”, The Frontier Myanmar, 30 May 2017. 38 “UWSA pulls out of Panglong”, The Myanmar Times, 10 September 2016. 39 “Mixed results at latest Panglong peace conference”, op. cit. 40 “The government’s roadmap for national reconciliation and union peace”, The Global New Light of Myanmar, 16 October 2016. 41 “Mixed results at latest Panglong peace conference”, op. cit.

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in the conference because of the absence of inclusivity.42 They attended the first conference and declined from the second one. But the TNLA, the AA and some others were invited as observer status. The UPNDC which included the KIA and the UWSA attended the conference as guest status. It was a major blow for the hope of most inclusive conference ever.

The stakeholders discussed on five sectors- political, security, economic, social and natural resource and environment. All the stakeholders agreed on all the principles of political, economic, social and natural resource sectors.43 In this conference, 37 points agreement paper, known as the Union Accord, was signed by the parties. Only they disagreed on security sector including “the existence of a sole Tatmadaw and the fate of the EAOs.”44 The second conference faced a deadlock on the principle of non-secession and the integration of the ethnic armed groups into the Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw demanded the non-secession principle from the EAOs.45 The ethnic leaders frequently recalled the constitution of 1947 which had a provision stating “... every State shall have the right to secede from the Union”.46 The Tatmadaw defined the principle of secession as the threat to the territorial integration of Myanmar. The EAOs tried to uphold the spirit of the Panglong conference of 1947 and the military upheld the spirit of territorial integration. These uncompromising issues halted the discussion of the second Panglong conference.

The third conference was held in Nay Phi Taw from 11-16 July 2018. The aim of the conference was written as follows: “to establish a Union based on democracy and federal system that assures democracy, national equality and self-determination rights, founded according to the outcomes of the political discussions.”47 There were delegates from the ten signatory EAOs, four non-signatory groups that have previously signed bilateral ceasefire agreements: UWSA, KIA, the Mongla-based National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) and three non-signatory groups that have never signed bilateral ceasefire agreements: TNLA, AA and the Kokang-based MNDAA. The Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing urged the non-signatory ethnic groups to sign the NCA. He emphasized that not signing the NCA is “against the current democratic ethics.”48

The third conference experienced many stalemates during the negotiations. The delegates signed 14 points accord which is known as the Union Accord II. Out of the fourteen points, seven points were on social matters, four points were on

42 “Second 21st Century Panglong Conference”, Burma Bulletin, Issue. 125, p. 2.43 Ibid.44 Ibid.45 Ibid.46 The Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947, Chapter-X.47 “14 points signed as Part II of Union Accord”, The Global New Light of Myanmar, 17 July 2018. 48 “Controversy, progress at the third Panglong conference”, The Frontier Myanmar, 16 July 2018.

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political sector, two points were on land and environment related and one point was on economic equalities.49 It was the second time when the parties to the conference overlooked the security sector which includes the principle of secession and the integration of the ethnic army into the Tatmadaw. The EAOs and the Tatmadaw confronted on the name of the state. The Tatmadaw proposed the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the EAOs proposed the Union. The UPDJC, the coordinating body, negotiated the solution on the “Union of Myanmar”.50

Any success of the negotiations is not yet visible. Fighting is still going on in Kachin state after breaking the ceasefire agreement of 2011. The second quarter of 2018 saw the conflict being intensified for using heavy weapons, artillery and aerial bombing by the Tatmadaw displacing thousands of civilians.51 The Shan state also witnessed intra-ethnic violence between the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSN) (NCA signatory) and the SSA (non-signatory) for territorial control.52 The TNLA also fought against the Tatmadaw in Shan state.53 In Karen state, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) clashed with the Tatmadaw. Mon State Liberation Army (MSLA) also clashed with the military which has displaced about 2,400 people in the early part of 2018. The NLD government under Suu Kyi could not change the situation. The escalation of violence increased the concern about the success of the peace process. However, the peace initiative has facilitated a new opportunity for interactions among the conflicting groups and the government.

5. Understanding the Fault Lines

The Panglong agreement of 1947 was the last resort to peace in the independent Myanmar. General Aung San is still respected for his tremendous contribution in the formation of the agreement. After assassination of Aung San, the country lost its destination and fought for last seven decades to find a solution of the ethnic conflicts in the country. Aung San Suu Kyi’s arrival to power have increased the hope that she might took strong and effective measures to resolve the crisis and unite the country in line with the vision of Aung San. Therefore, Suu Kyi government initiated 21st Century Peace Process. But, when the stakeholders come to table, they find further progression of negotiation difficult. Present section identifies major stumbling blocks in the process of a successful negotiation between the government and ethnic minorities of Myanmar.

49 Ibid.50 Ibid.51 “Myanmar army killing civilians in escalating conflict in Kachin, warns UN”, The Guardian, 01 May 2018. 52 “Myanmar: 19 die in fresh clashes between army and rebels in Shan state”, The Guardian, 12 May 2018.53 Ibid.

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Longstanding Mistrust

The peace process is obstructed due to mutual distrust and suspicion among the social and political stakeholders, mainly between the Tatmadaw and the ethnic groups. Such mistrust and rivalry have a long history. During the colonial period, the ethnic minorities and the Bamar community did not enjoy a good relation, even they had hardly engaged and interacted politically as a result of the “divide and rule” policy of the British colonial rulers. The frontier people collaborated with the British and enjoyed more autonomy. After independence, all the groups from different ethnic backgrounds agreed for the first time at Panglong to establish a federal union in Myanmar. But the military intervention of 1962 hampered the state building process and closed the political interaction among the ethnic leaders. The military dictated the fate of the nation for last seven decades. The “four cuts policy” critically paralyzed the lives of all ethnic armed and civilian people. The frontier people always supported a non-military rule in the country desiring that it will help to protect their identity and rights.

The Tatmadaw was formed mainly by Bamar ethnic people and the Bamar nationalism is the core value of it. During the independence in 1948, the top three position of Tatmadaw were held by Karen ethnic soldiers. In today’s Tatmadaw, there is no ethnic soldier serving the Tatmadaw as Brigadier General position.54 Most ethnic soldiers join the Tatmadaw as foot-soldier or junior officer.55 The Bamar dominated military controls the executive, the judiciary and the legislature and other important institutions of the government such as the Defence Ministry, Home Affairs Ministry and Border Affairs Ministry, the Police Force, the Border Guard Force and other paramilitary forces, Intelligence Department etc.56 The Frontier people have systematically been excluded from the government institutions. The Bamar dominated military controlled economy and military patronizes religious hatred against the non-Bamar ethnic minorities.57 As a result of Bamar domination and huge concentrated power of the Tatmadaw, the ethnic people do not trust that any government can end the conflict and bring peace without the consent of the military.

The military did not counter hate speeches and hate crimes in the society and divided the society based on religious and racial lines. The Buddhist Bamar has alienated other religious cults like Muslims and Christians. The Bamar ethnic dominated government has alienated other races like Kachin, Mon, Shan, Karen, Karenni etc. This polarization has been deepened by the military in two ways- by enacting some laws and through patronizing Buddhist extremism. The first attempt

54 “Why Ethnic Armed Groups Cannot Accept the Burma Army’s Demand for a Single Army”, The Karen News, 07 November 2018. 55 Ibid.56 The Constitution of Myanmar 2008, Chapter- I, Article No. 20.57 Francis Wade, op. cit., p. 165-190.

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of polarization was from the U Nu government when Buddhism was recognized as state religion by enacting the State Religion Promotion Act-1961 to get political allegiance from the Buddhist Bamar people.58 This act created unrest in the Christian dominated Kachin state and the Muslim dominated Rakhine state. The second attempt was from the Ne Win government when it endorsed the Citizenship Act-1982, which categorized all the citizens of Myanmar into three classes- Citizen, Associate Citizen and Naturalised Citizen.59 This act disqualified Rohingyas from the citizenship rights. It also shattered the relations among the Buddhist and the Muslim community in Rakhine state. Another law which polarized Myanmar society is the Protection of Race and Religion Law-2014, which barred inter-religious marriage and robbed the rights of women to choose their spouses. It also empowered the local government to control reproductive rights to ensure Buddhist demographic status-quo. These kinds of polarization have generated mistrust and wariness among the ethnic minorities.

Another way of spreading communal hatred in Myanmar is the activities of the extremist Buddhist monks. U Wirathu and R K Narayana are the two most hardliner figures in Myanmar who operated to spread violent activities in Rakhine state and other parts of the country. They are spreading not only religious extremism but also Bamar centric ultra-nationalistic and chauvinistic sentiment. Ma Ba Tha, the Association for Protection of Race and Religion, is such an organization which comprised of thousands of ultranationalist Buddhist monks and is led by famous extremist, Ashin Wirathu.60 It ran the 969 Movement which motivated the people to boycott the Muslims in all spheres of life in 2012.61 The military led USDP government supported its development. The Protection of Race and Religion Act-2014 was also promoted by Ma Ba Tha. Though this organization has been banned in 2017, it rebranded its name to the Buddha Dhamma Charity Foundation. These chauvinist groups spread propaganda and misinformation about the peace process and create racial and ethnic tension.62 These distrust, suspicion and lack of confidence are preventing a successful negotiation for peace.

The Issue of Non-secession Principle

The reconciliation process has been pushed back by the issue of non-secession principle. The basic 41 principles drafted for discussion included, “no part or territory of the Union shall ever secede.”63 But the ethnic groups, mainly Shan state, raised the issue of the right to secede from the federation. It argued that the

58 “Nationalists mark anniversary of divisive state religion bill”, The Myanmar Times, 01 September 2015. 59 “Citizens of Myanmar”, The Myanmar Times, 22 September 2017. 60 Matthew J. Walton and Susan Hayward, “Contesting Buddhist Narratives: Democratization, Nationalism, and Communal Violence in Myanmar”, East-West Center, Policy Studies, No. 71, 2014, pp. 12-16.61 Ibid.62 “Can Anyone Stop Burma’s Hardline Buddhist Monks?”, The Atlantic, 06 September 2017. 63 “Panglong spirit and the right to secession”, The Frontier Myanmar, 25 September 2017.

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constitution of 1947 stated, “… every State shall have the right to secede from the Union”64 after ten years of independence. During the drafting of the 1947 constitution, there were only four ethnic groups demographically and politically significant- Bamar, Chin, Shan and Kachin. Bamar ethnic community was the nucleus and other three were the clusters. Chin was given the status of Special Division. Only Kachin and Shan state were given the right to secede.65 But now there are many ethnic groups which are demographically significant and has the power to secede. The Tatmadaw fears that if the right to secession is assimilated in the constitution, they can secede and eventually Myanmar will be divided. The military drafted constitution of 2008 stated, “[n]o part of the territory constituted in the Union such as Regions, States, Union Territories and Self-Administered Areas shall ever secede from the Union.”66

The provision of the right to secede came to an end in 1958 when Shan state was going to secede and firmly in 1961 when General Ne Win occupied the power and ruled the country with iron-fist until 1988. The military constitution of 1974 and 2008 incorporated the non-secession clause, but these two constitutions were as unacceptable to the Bamar community as to the ethnic minorities. Now, the military is against the secession principle and the NLD government also feels discomfort with this provision. The military’s commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, repeatedly said, “no part of the territory...ever secede from the Union.”67 It seems to be a threat to the political actors to agree on such peace deal which is embracing a coercive means for cooperation.

The EAOs, mainly Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, argued that they had signed the NCA which upholds “non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty.”68 The relations between the union and federation must be based on trust and confidence not by domination and power. But there is immense distrust and lack of respect between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs. The EAOs argued that the provision was opposite to the spirit of the 1947 Panglong, as the right to secede was the promise of independence.69 The leader of the 1947 Panglong, General Aung Sun, was more liberal or he handled the matter politically. The Tatmadaw has fought a long war against the EAOs to keep the territory integrated and it defined the principle as a threat to territorial integration. Some EAOs have also proposed alternative wording instead of non-secession like conditional secession principle. There is no such example of including non-secession principle in the constitution of a federal union. There are several examples of federalism like the United States, Canada and India, but none of the countries included such

64 The Constitution of Myanmar 1947, Chapter-X.65 “Secession in a democratic system?”, The Myanmar Times, 27 June 2016. 66 The Constitution of Myanmar 2008, Chapter- I, Article No. 10.67 “Persons & Issues in the News in 2018”, The Irrawaddy, 22 December 2018. 68 The Constitution of Myanmar-2008, Chapter- III, Article No. 65.69 “Secession in a democratic system?”, op. cit.

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principles in the constitution. Therefore, the issue of secession remains a challenge towards the peace process.

Accommodating Ethnic Soldiers in Tatmadaw

Another important building block is the concept of federal army of the EAOs. The EAOs want to keep their forces under their own control so that it can protect their lives and properties from external and internal threat. But the Tatmadaw wants to incorporate the ethnic forces to form only one military for the union. There are many reasons for which the EAOs are reluctant to merge their forces. The ethnic forces have fought the war for nearly seven decades against the Tatmadaw.70 Thousands of ethnic soldiers died in this war. It is difficult for the ethnic minorities to cooperate with such a military that had long time rivalry with them.

The Tatmadaw was also accused of ethnic cleansing in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. Some higher ranked military officers have been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.71 It has been accused of using child soldiers, forced labour and torture as a means of war against the ethnic people.72 The constitution of 2008 has given immunity to these kinds of crimes of the Tatmadaw.73 There is an accusation of discrimination and racism against the Tatmadaw. The military did not allow ethnic candidates to take training at National Defence Service Academy, most prestigious military training school in Myanmar.74 It has segregated the non-Bamar soldiers from the forces and has taken the Bamar nationalism as its core value. Another significant matter is that civilian control of the military is absence in Myanmar. The Tatmadaw itself makes all kinds of decision regarding how to lead the force where to run an operation and when it will stop.75

Although the ethnic armies did not fulfil the expectations, they protected the lives and livelihood in the ethnic areas and the ethnic people respect them as their national hero. They attained the support of ethnic people against the threat of Tatmadaw.76 Therefore, people have trust and confidence on the ethnic forces. The Tatmadaw has deployed its ten thousand soldiers in the ethnic areas to control and to suppress ethnic armed struggle. It is claimed that if the EAOs disband the ethnic armies, they can be suppressed by the Tatmadaw. There is a fear of suppression among the

70 “Why Ethnic Armed Groups Cannot Accept the Burma Army’s Demand for a Single Army”, The Karen News, 7 November 2018. 71 Ibid.72 “Impunity Prolonged: Burma and its 2008 Constitution”, International Center for Transitional Justice, September 2009, pp. 10-30.73 Ibid.74 “Why Ethnic Armed Groups Cannot Accept the Burma Army’s Demand for a Single Army”, op. cit. 75 The Constitution of Myanmar 2008, Chapter- VII, Article No. 343.76 “Why Ethnic Armed Groups Cannot Accept the Burma Army’s Demand for a Single Army”, op. cit.

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ethnic people for their past experience. For them, there is no point to join the national army. The EAOs are not ready to lay down their arms to that force which has killed their fellow citizens and exploited their resources.

The EAOs argued that during the independence period, “the national armed forces were still organized largely along ethnic lines. For example, there were the Burma Rifles, Karen Rifles, Chin Rifles, and Kachin Rifles, all of which were part of the Union armed forces but led by their respective ethnic commanders”77 to safeguard their respective borders after the British had left. The ethnic minorities proposed to reform the armed forces based on the ethnic lines so that no threat exists there. They also proposed that the government has to demilitarize the ethnic regions and withdraw its troops stationed in those areas. But the Tatmadaw thinks that the existence of federal armies will pose threat to the union integration. Hence, reaching in an agreement on the issue of accommodating the ethnic forces in the national military is difficult.

Amendment of the 2008 Constitution

The NLD led government has not made it clear that how it will amend the constitution of Myanmar drafted in 2008. The government is yet to develop a mechanism to enhance the confidence of the EAOs about bringing the constitutional amendment for final reconciliation. It is not clear when and how the NLD will amend or how it will convince the Tatmadaw to amend the 2008 constitution. The Tatmadaw possesses strong constitutional power in Myanmar. According to the constitution of 2008, 25 per cent of the parliamentary seats would be reserved for the serving military officers both in the House of Representative and in the House of Nationalities78 and then the constitution has required having the support of 75 per cent members of the parliament and to hold a nationwide referendum on which about more than half votes have to be positive to amend the constitution.79 For the amendment of the constitution, a national referendum is compulsory.

The military appoints six of the eleven members of the most powerful National Defence and Security Council, which dictates the state’s security matters. The Tatmadaw is not under the control of the president. The executive is also dominated by the military. In this respect, the amendment of the constitution is difficult. The military is the most powerful actor in Myanmar politics. The NLD government first took attempt to amend the constitution in 2015. However, the military blocked the attempt. The bill was voted by 70 per cent of the members of the parliament affirmatively, but it needed 75 per cent of the total vote. The NLD blamed the military for halting the reform of the constitution.

77 Ibid.78 The Constitution of Myanmar 2008, Chapter- IV, Article No. 109 & 141.79 The Constitution of Myanmar 2008, Chapter- XII, Article No. 436.

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The NLD spokesperson Dr Myo Nyunt once said, “We are waiting for the right time.”80 The NLD government has prioritized the peace building process instead of amending the constitution. Aung San Suu Kyi said that the constitutional amendments and the peace process are interconnected.81 But the problem is that who will decide what is more important than the other to accomplish. It is thought that the NLD government is not interested to make any confrontation with military on the issue of amending the constitution at this moment.

The NLD government has to cooperate and compromise with the military to bring any change to the constitution. The question is how much compromise both the military and the NLD government will do to make an end to the long-standing conflict. Therefore, the whole peace process will be in danger if the NLD government fails to amend the constitution. The military wants the Union Accord to be signed first, but the EAOs emphasize on the amendment of the constitution. The NLD government have not developed any framework yet to engage all the stakeholders how to progress on the issue of constitutional amendment.

Inclusion of All Armed Groups in the Negotiation Process

The peace process has been hindered for non-participation of more than half of the EAOs who have not signed the NCA. The Tatmadaw has barred them from participating in the peace process though they have attended the third Panglong conference as observer or guest status. The newly formed Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FNPCC), known as the Northern Alliance, has not attended the Panglong conference.82 The FNPCC is formed with AA, KIA, MNDAA, and TNLA, UWSA, SSA, and the Shan State East National Democratic Alliance Association (SSENDAA). Only ten out of twenty-one EAOs has signed the NCA. The rest of them have demanded a new draft of the NCA with new provision but the Tatmadaw has rejected it. If all the EAOs do not participate and agree to leave violent activities, the progress of peace process will be difficult. The Tatmadaw has not agreed yet to include all the stakeholders including the non-signatory groups in the negotiation process.

Besides, the ongoing conflicts between the EAOs and the Tatmadaw are also an important challenge to the peace. The Tatmadaw is fighting in Kachin, Arakan and Shan states against the Northern Alliance. It is using its extreme military power to force the EAOs to come to the table. The EAOs are not so powerful as they have no such institutional arrangements and modern weapon supply. The policy of the Tatmadaw is to capture as much as land and natural resources of the ethnic areas to cripple the EAOs

80 “NLD ‘Waiting for the Right Time’ to Amend Constitution”, The Irrawaddy, 9 May 2018. 81 “Aung San Suu Kyi amends her stand on constitutional reform”, The Frontier Myanmar, 28 May 2018. 82 “China’s Stake in the Myanmar Peace Process”, The Diplomat, 15 August 2018.

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fighting capability so that they become bound to join the peace process. Such policies of the military are complicating the negotiation process.

The ethnic conflicts are connected with the business interest of the military. It controls all the big conglomerates of Myanmar. The military is benefited from the extracted natural resources from the periphery, home of the ethnic people. A report by Global Witness estimated, “the military, its cronies and the major drug lord control tens of billions of dollars from the jade trade in war-torn northern Kachin State.”83 It was also reported, “the military has seized land for agri-business and for hydroelectric dams which produce electricity sold to neighbouring China.”84 It extracted rubies, gold, timber and other natural resources by exploiting the ethnic people. It has used the ceasefire agreement to extract resources. The ongoing conflicts benefit the military economically. Therefore, they are not always eager to resolve the crisis.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s arrival to power raised new hope among the people of Myanmar for the resolution of long-standing rivalry between military and ethnic groups. Most of the EAOs are engaged in the process. But the long-term mistrust among the stakeholders is preventing any substantive progress in the process. Constitutionally, Tatmadaw has strong influence in the executive and legislative, and in the policy making process. When the issue of constitutional amendments comes to the front, the NLD government cannot avoid the influence of the military. Moreover, the inclusion of ethnic soldiers in the national military remains a major issue of debate. On the other hand, without engaging all the arms groups in the negotiation process, any fruitful discussion for the solution to the conflict would be difficult to achieve. While the EAOs are focusing on the constitutional amendment, the military wants to observe the developments of negotiation. In addition, the business interest of the military is also connected with the control of the frontier areas of Myanmar. Therefore, the success of the NLD’s new peace process depends on how it can minimise the existing rivalry and mistrust between the military and the EAOs.

6. Conclusion

The colonial rule changed socio-political and economic character of Myanmar. While the dynastic rulers offered autonomy in the frontier areas, the British rulers adopted a central administration. The colonial rulers divided the country on the basis of ethnic identity to strengthen their control and to exploit the resources of the country. The British rulers instigated rivalry among the ethnic communities and facilitated some of the ethnic minority groups in favour of them. While the anti-British movement incepted in the country, the frontier areas started reclaiming their autonomy what they had enjoyed

83 “For Myanmar’s Army, Ethnic Bloodletting Is Key to Power and Riches”, The New York Times, 27 January 2018. 84 Ibid.

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before British rule. General Aung San communicated with all the ethnic minorities and engaged them in a negotiation process to prevent any disintegration of the country. He signed Panglong agreement in 1947 with ethnic minorities. On that agreement, it was agreed that the equal rights for all ethnic minorities would be protected and, the religious and cultural integrity of all the communities would be preserved. But, the assassination of General Aung San demised the hopes of any kind of peace in Myanmar. The military coup of 1962 changed the trajectory of the country and the principles of the Panglong agreement were denied. The military rulers declared the supremacy of Buddhism and adopted policies to segregate ethnic minorities from the mainstream society. Such kinds of policies led the country towards a long-term conflict and violence.

The leader of democratic movement of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi, was always vocal about the rights of the ethnic minorities in the country and promised that she would start new peace process again. Therefore, her arrival to power in 2015 raised new hopes among the people about the resolution of seven-decade long conflict between the military and the ethnic minorities. The NLD government initiated new peace process terming it as 21st century peace process. The government declared new road map for reconciliation in the country. A number of institutions were also established by the government to engage all the stakeholders in the negotiation process. There are already three conferences held to discuss the issues of debate among the stakeholders.

A number of critical issues are making obstacles to make Aung San Suu Kyi’s peace process successful. For long times, the military and the ethnic minorities are fighting against each other, therefore, a deep mistrust is prevailing between them. The military drafted the present constitution in 2008 which has provided unprecedented power to the military and it has made the amendment process of the constitution complicated. When the NLD government takes any initiative for amending the constitution, the military can easily halt the initiative. The EAOs are demanding for the amendment of the constitution to accommodate the equal rights for all the ethnic minorities, but the NLD government has little to do without the consent of the military. In the negotiation process, the issue of non-secession principle remains a major concern for the stakeholders. In the Panglong agreement of 1947, there was a provision that if any frontier region desires to leave the federation, the union would allow it. The military is vehemently opposing any such provision at present. This remains a critical point of stalemate. The EAOs are not interested to integrate their armed forces into the national military. On the other hand, it is difficult for military to accept the presence of federal army within the country’s geographical boundary. Nevertheless, the military has business interests in the frontier areas. It is benefited from the natural resources of the frontier areas. Therefore, reaching in an agreement for which the military may lose control over the politics, economy and resources of frontier area would be difficult. Such kinds of fault lines are preventing any visible progress in the peace process initiated by the NLD government.

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Md. Jahan Shoieb

CONCEPTUAlIzING ENvIRONmENTAl REFUGEES: DO THEY REqUIRE SEPARATE ATTENTION?

Abstract

Global climate change is responsible for creating various types of security threats over the years. This incident also has posed major challenges to the natural resources aggravating socio-economic crises and triggering different level of inter-state and intra-state conflict. Various climatic hazards tend to induce migration both within a country and beyond national border which might exacerbate social instability and disorder among the international community, particularly in the conflict prone areas. The nexus between environmental change and resultant displacement remains one of the most debated and controversial issues of contemporary international affairs. Till date, the issue of involuntary or forced migration is yet to receive attention from the policy-makers. Identification of the environmentally displaced people is a big challenge mainly because migration is a complex, and to a large extent, context-specific issue. However, without paying due attention, the miseries of environmentally displaced people will only aggravate. This paper is an endeavour to explore the scenario of environmentally displaced people in both of the contexts of contemporary international relations and mainstream refugee regime. With the same token, it also tries to assess whether any separate mechanism or special attention is needed to provide protection to the environment-induced refugees.

keywords: Climate Change, Migration, Environmentally Displaced People, Environmental Refugees, Security

1. Introduction

From the time immemorial, climate often influences human migration. In 1999, Chairman of the World Water Council argued that more people flee from their homes due to environmental problems than due to war.1 In some circumstances, the change is so direct and obvious that people flee from their habitual residence in the wake of sudden climate-related catastrophes and do not return. Sometimes its influence is more slow and subtle that after a couple of dry seasons, an aging farmer

Md. Jahan Shoieb is Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: [email protected].


1 Laura Story Johnson, “Environment, Security and Environmental Refugees”, ResearchGate, January 2009, p. 222, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/238069794_Environment_Security_and_Environmental_Refugees, accessed on 15 October 2018.


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decides to sell his farmland to a younger farmer and move to town. In contemporary international relations (IR), the issue of climate induced migration or environmental displacement has become a major challenge for the global community. Considering the intensity of the problem, in a project report of the Government Office for Science, London, it is stated, “No migration is not an option in the context of future environmental change: migration will continue to occur in the future and can either be well managed and regular, or, if efforts are made to prevent it, unmanaged, unplanned and forced.”2 Through empirical research, Zorzeta Bakaki has proved that there is a strong possibility that if the global temperature continues to rise at the current rate, migration is not only going to occur within the border of a country, but across different countries. He further mentioned that given the consequences of migration at larger scales, many countries will face problems and one of the indirect reasons for migration will be global climate change.3

In 1985 Essam El-Hinnawi first coined the term ‘environmental refugee’. While identifying environmental refugees, El-Hinnawi focused on the possibility of returning home for a displaced person. With this notion, he primarily identified three main categories of environmental refugees: a) persons who are displaced for environmental causes but can return to their homes of origin when environmental damage is repaired; b) persons who become permanently displaced and resettle in other places; and c) persons who migrate from their traditional place of residence in search of a better place when their original habitat is degraded and can no longer meet their basic needs.4 Climate change is a highly complex issue and also is a long-term phenomenon, which to some extent hard to grasp by the ordinary people. Neither everybody is affected equally by climate change, nor its consequences are easily observed from one day to another. There are two different types of debates regarding climate change. One group in the literature known as neo-Malthusian argues that climate change is a direct threat to international security. On the other hand, a group of scholars who are known as Cornucopians argue that human being has the capability to adapt to the challenges of climate change through different types of technological innovation.5

Although climate change is not a new phenomenon, after the end of the cold war this issue received much attention as one of the major non-traditional security challenges. Notably, the end of the cold war is marked by profound changes in international relations: the rise of non-traditional security threats primarily of

2 Government Office for Science, London, “Migration and Global Environmental Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities”, 2011, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/287717/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmental-change.pdf, accessed on 15 October 2018. 3 Zorzeta Bakaki, “Environmental Refugees: The Impact of Climate Change on Emigration”, Paper presented at the 2016 Meeting of ENCoRe in Geneva.4 Essam El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 1985. 5 Zorzeta Bakaki, op. cit.

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transnational character, which replaced the traditional security issues dominated by concepts like arms race, national interests, and state borders. The rise of non-traditional security issues demonstrated both vertical and horizontal widening and deepening of the concept of security encompassing a broad range of issues. The horizontal broadening of the term refers to the non-military security threats like economic, environmental, demographic, information, health, immigration and terrorist, while vertical widening of the concept refers to other security threats where the referent object of security are non-state actors including individuals, groups having a common religious, ethnic, or ideological traits and local or global communities. In recent years, climate change has emerged as one of the major security threats in global politics. It also threatens to aggravate socio-economic crises, instability, and interstate or intrastate conflicts. Climate change also influences human migration. Sometimes, the impact is so obvious and direct that people flee their home of origin ruined in a beautiful morning devastated in the wake of an earthquake or tornado and never return. Sometimes it is very subtle, such as when a couple of flood years prompt a farmer decide to sell his land and move to town for a better future for his family.

During the past years, various authorities produced reports warning that global climate change and sea level rise will compel millions of people to become environmental refugees in the coming years. According to such a report, in 2005 it was estimated that by 2010, global climate change would create 50 million environmental refugees. Although the prediction proved wrong, still the issue has prompted scholars, refugee activists and international organizations to advocate for new types of policies and laws for those people who might be displaced due to climate change.6

Existing studies in the field suggests that environmental displacement issue has become one of the important aspects of contemporary security paradox. Scholars emphasized widening and deepening of our understandings on environmental refugees by focusing on the root causes. They urged not only to focus on the climate change related aspects but also associated problems, and the interplay of the two forces.7 The literature on environmental refugee reveals that the linkage between environmental events and human migration is not a new revelation. In fact, from the beginning of Homo sapiens on this planet, climate and other environmental processes have played a major role in shaping human population numbers, densities, distribution, and wellbeing. Until ten to fifteen thousand years ago, environmental forces started to create direct and indirect influences on human migration.8 Nowadays, the existential threat of climate change and the environmental refugee is quite relevant to the contemporary global context. As climate change and environmental

6 Robert A. McLeman, Climate and Human Migration: Past Experiences, Future Challenges, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. xi. 7 Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, Vol. 357, No. 1420, 2002, p. 612.8 Robert A. McLeman, op. cit., p. 3.

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issues are increasingly becoming important in the realm of international relations, it is important to view the subject-matter from international relations’ perspective.

Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to view whether the environmental refugees are a separate category and whether they need separate regime to provide them support to restore their basic needs. The key research questions of this paper are: who are the environmental refugees? What is the current state of the field? What are the international relations theories’ and existing academic perspectives regarding environmental refugees? Do they need special mechanisms to mitigate their problems? What are the challenges in this regard and what should be the best possible options to resolve their problems?

In order to address the research questions, there are six sections in the paper. After the Introduction, the second section elaborates climate change and migration nexus and discusses major issues in the current topic. The third section of the paper sheds light on the perspective of current international relations in the field. While chapter four discusses whether environmental refugees are excluded from mainstream refugee regime. Chapter five sheds light on the possible solutions of the problem and chapter six concludes the paper. This paper is a qualitative research work based on various secondary data sources, including books, journals, magazines, newspapers, reports, seminar papers and online resources.

2. Climate Change-Migration Nexus

To begin the discussion and debates on the topic, it is important to properly identify the environmental refugees. Some core questions in the contemporary debates on environmental refugees are: who are the environmental refugees or how can we define the environmental refugees? Do environmental refugees fall into the traditional concepts of refugees? And what is the number of this category?

It is to note that in this contemporary world, the global community can no longer ignore the issue of environmental refugees. There is some empirical research on the relationship between environmental change and migration. The results of those studies robustly and strongly suggest that if the global temperature continues to rise, migration will not only occur at the domestic level but also at the international level. The following table gives a brief picture of the relationship between climate change and resultant displacement:

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Table 1: Major climatic incidents of recent years and their impacts on human migration

Type of climate event

Region/ Country

Time Frame Major Impacts on Migration

Drought/ Soil Erosion

Kenya 2004 and 2007 Increase of the temporary labour migration from the country

Heat Stress Pakistan 1991-2012 Increase in long-term migration of men

Forest fires United States 2010 Increased intention to migration

Drought Syria 2006-2014 Increase in rural-urban migration

Cyclone/Flooding Bangladesh 2009 Increase in male rural-urban migration

Flooding Pakistan 2011-2012 Increase in rural-urban migration

Drought/water salinity

Western Sahel 2005-present Increase in labour related migration of pastoralists

Desertification Nigeria 1993-2013 Increase in labour-related migration of farmers

Droughts Peru & Bolivia 1996-present Increase in labour-related migration of farmers due to increasingly devastating droughts

Source: Kate Burrows and Patrick L. Kinney, “Exploring the Climate Change, Migration and Conflict Nexus”, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, Vol. 13, No. 4, April 2016, pp. 1-17.

From the above-mentioned table, it becomes evident that in the last few decades different climatic events impacted migration in different levels. In most of the cases, low-income people become victims of climate change and are compelled to migrate from one place to another for a better livelihood. Although in many cases it happened in African countries, the most powerful global actor, the United States (US) is also not immune from this acute global event. The next few paragraphs focus on different issues elaborating climate change and migration nexus.

2.1 Defining Environmental Refugees

Any kind of definition and discussion related to refugee issue can begin with the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its

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1967 Additional Protocol. Notably the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention was enacted to remove the restriction limiting the treaty only to those persons fleeing persecution before 1951 within Europe would only be counted as refugee and receive assistance. According to Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, a person can be termed as a refugee who, “As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951, and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his (sic) nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself (sic) of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his (sic) former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”9 From this definition, it is evident that environmental refugees are excluded from this definition.

Among the scholars, El-Hinnawi for the first time defined environmental refugees as “those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.” 10 Quite in a similar tone, Professor Norman Myers defines environmental refugees as,

“people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation and other environmental problems, together with associated problems of population pressures and profound poverty. In their desperation, these people feel they have no alternative but to seek sanctuary elsewhere, however hazardous the attempt. Not all of them have fled their countries, many being internally displaced. But all have abandoned their homelands on a semi-permanent if not permanent basis, with little hope of a foreseeable return.” 11

Among the practitioners, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) defines “Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.” 12

9 United Nations, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva: UNHCR, 1951.10 Essam El-Hinnawi, op. cit. Generally, it is believed and accepted that the term was first coined by El-Hinnawi in this seminal publication. 11 Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century”, available at http://www.envirosecurity.org/conference/working/EnvironmentalRefugees.pdf, accessed on 30 September 2018. 12 Kimberly Kurtis, “Climate Refugees Explained”, UN Dispatch, 24 April 2017, available at https://www.undispatch.com/climate-refugees-explained/, accessed on 28 April 2018.

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2.2 Do Environmental Refugees Correspond to Traditional Concepts of Refugees/Legal Categories of The Refugees Defined By The United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR)?

The 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 additional protocol define refugees as people who are outside of their country of origin owing to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social or political group or political opinion”.13 This definition demonstrates that people who fall under the above-mentioned criteria are known as refugees while others are voluntary migrants. Moreover, it becomes evident that environment as one of the factors behind the creation of refugees has not been taken into consideration and therefore, it lacks legal status of refugees.14

The definition of the 1951 Convention has four key attributes. First, if a person wants to claim the refugee status s/he must remain outside of his/her nationality or former habitual residence. Second, the person must have some sort of fear of persecution. Third, that fear of persecution must be on the grounds of ‘race’, ‘nationality’, ‘membership of a particular social group’, ‘religion’ or ‘political opinion’. Fourth, the fear of that person must be well founded. It is also evident that the definition and any of its components does not include individuals who leave their home of origin because of environmental changes. With the same token, there is no compulsion for a signatory state to the UN Refugee Convention recognize environmentally displaced persons as refugees and provide them asylum which the former receives.15

However, from another point of view, the environmental refugees still can fit within the 1951 refugee paradigm. With empirical evidence, Jessica B. demonstrated that in some cases governments create environmental crises and its resulting population displacements can be labelled as a form of persecution. This segment of the refugees meets the requirements of a refugee since they are persecuted for reasons of their membership to a particular social group who are politically powerless and incapable to protect the environment. 16 This argument proves that environmental refugees are entitled to have official refugee status and as well as the international protection provided to the refugees.

13 Jessica B. Cooper, “Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition”, New York University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, 1998, p. 480.14 Debasree Chatterjee. “Understanding the Linkages between Climate Change and Migration from Bangladesh to India”, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2011, pp. 111-112.15 Karen Elizabeth McNamara, “Conceptualizing Discourses on Environmental Refugees at the United Nations”, Population and Environment, Vol. 29, pp. 12-24, 2007. 16 Jessica B. Cooper, op. cit., pp. 486-487.

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2.3 What is the Number of Environmental Refugees?

Migration generally includes both short and long-term movements. Available estimates of the numbers of people who may be displaced due to various climatic reasons by 2050 range from 50 million to 1 billion people.17 Among the scholars, Norman Myers projected the number 200 million.18 Although, this projection is not rigorously tested, but is generally agreed upon as it is consistent with conservative estimates of climate impacts. However, Myers himself has acknowledged that there is uncertainty in his estimates and necessary extrapolations were made due to lack of available empirical data. A Christian Aid report projected large number; 1 billion people will be displaced by 2050. Moreover, this particular report further breaks the estimates into certain categories: approximately, 250 million people displaced by climate change related incidents, 50 million people to be displaced by various natural disasters, 50 million people displaced by conflict, 5 million for fleeing their countries and becoming refugees and majority of the number, 645 million people will be displaced by various development projects.19 It is evident that there is a large range in different estimates regarding the environmental refugees which illustrates that there is enormous uncertainty surrounding the causal impacts of climate change induced migration. Next chapter makes an endeavour to view the environmental refugees from the international relations’ and existing academic perspectives.

3. Environmental Refugees from International Relations and Existing Academic Perspective

Climate change and environmental issues are becoming increasingly important in the subject matter of international relations. Due to the universal nature of climate change and responsibilities for it, that the international level provides the most effective solutions to the mitigation and adaptation. Furthermore, the multifaceted complexities of climate change make it a difficult phenomenon for international politics and governance. However, actions at the international level continue to provide the best solutions to tackle the spectre of climate change and issues emanated from it. Even the war in Syria and resultant refugee crisis can be linked with prolonged drought in the country which forced people to move to the cities where they find their future and dreams limited by authoritarian rule and inaction.20 Scholars

17 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.18 Norman Myers, Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena, Washington D.C., USA: Climate Institute: 1995.19 Christian Aid, Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis, May 2007, available at https://www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-08/human-tide-the-real-migration-crisis-may-2007.pdf, accessed on 30 April 2018. 20 Gustavo Sosa-Nunez and Ed Atkins, Environment, Climate Change and International Relations, Bristol: England, 2016.

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of international security often tend to conceptualize environmental problems as an international security threat-with an increasing focus on climate change. Keeping these in mind, this chapter tries to view the position of contemporary international relations theories with regard to the environmental refugee issue and see whether mainstream theories of international relations added it to their subject matter.

Among the contemporary International Relations theories, the realist’s explanation of climate related aspect is relatively narrow, as they perceive that the global order and politics is usually shaped by the military and economic power of different states. Hans J. Morgenthau once noted, “The desire to dominate is a constitutive element of all human association”.21 According to the realist viewpoint, struggle for power and position is at the centre of global politics.22 From the realist’s point of view, power and interests are at the core of the problem presented by global climate change and the environmental refugees. Realists’ perceive that states are not cooperative and, on several occasions, this non-cooperative nature of the states has been reflected in global climate change related negotiations. The realists often put more emphasis on relative gains.23 This signifies that even when cooperation among states would head towards absolute gain among the states, it might be impeded by unequal dissemination of such gains. Therefore, over the years the relative gains have become the centrepiece within a realist paradigm to the climate change related issues.24 Realism, therefore, provides an explanation for the failure of global climate change related negotiation. Although liberal democratic theory acknowledges that various types of forced migration pose challenge to the international system, it has great difficulties in incorporating such normative components to the policy responses, which has been reflected in the approach of the liberal democratic countries with regard to environmental refugees. However, the rationalist thinkers could not give a possible solution to the problem.

Constructivism, on the contrary, has posed challenges to the rationalist theories of IR in many aspects of international security, including the aspects related to global climate change. Constructivist theory acknowledges that both material and normative features of the international system are important and both are complexly ‘interwoven and interdependent’.25 This attribute demonstrates a fundamental difference between constructivism and other positivist theories of IR. Another difference between the two groups is constructivism does not treat structure in the same manner the conventional theories of IR do. Constructivism posits that global climate change is a social process.26

21 Tim Pfefferle, “Climate Change Politics through a Constructivist Prism”, E-International Relations Students, 18 June 2014, available at https://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/18/climate-change-politics-through-a-constructivist-prism/, accessed on 13 February 2018. 22 Ibid.23 Gustavo Sosa-Nunez and Ed Atkins, op. cit. 24 Ibid.25 Tim Pfefferle, op. cit.26 Ibid.

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One of the major strengths of existing literature on the environmental refugees is most of the literature gives importance to constructivist ideas offering criticisms to the rational theories. Both realism and neorealism are being criticized because of their use of power in analyzing different issues including climate change. The realists and neorealists consider both military and economic power are crucial for a hegemonic state to maintain stability at the systemic level. Both theories narrated power as a currency of a hegemonic actor in IR. It is difficult to apply such a concept of power in the realm of global climate change migration.

At the organizational or institutional level, constructivism emphasizes the constitutive functions of international institutions and their rules, which surpass the rationalists’ focus on their functions, which contributed to taking a dynamic and transformative agenda for the UNHCR for forced migrations. This segment is well explained, because it helps us to understand the role of different organisations and particularly the UNHCR on forced migration related aspects. The role of institutions in mitigating the adverse impact of climate change is also well supported by neoliberal institutionalism. Since institution like the UNHCR plays a big role in global climate change politics, the inclusion of the neoliberal institutionalist notion is therefore imperative. Moreover, this institutionalist framework of IR creates the conditions, which are congenial for international cooperation. This is one of the key features of climate change related negotiations.27 However, there are also some shortcomings in the neoliberal perspective on explaining climate-induced migration. The neoliberal institutionalism is primarily based on approaches to the game theory and broadly follows a positivist methodology. The ahistorical nature of the theory prevents it from analyzing the core puzzles of international relations.28 Like other rational theories, neoliberal institutionalism also subscribes the notion that in the anarchic global order states react in a similar and predictable way. It is unable to determine whether state decision makers understand issues differently or hold divergent stands on climate change politics.29 This can lead to misunderstanding, which in the end might spoil a prospective negotiation.

Although there are some similar attributes between constructivist and liberal institutionalist theories with regard to the role and effectiveness of institutions, there is a subtle difference between the two theories. The constructivists evaluate institutions for their capability of creating new norms and the liberal institutionalists evaluate institutions for their role in providing a forum for interstate cooperation and negotiation. Most of the authors agreed that there is a possibility of a high volume of rural-urban migration in underdeveloped countries because of endemic poverty and other social factors. They also agree that the situation will be aggravated by climate change and its impacts. Thousands of poor people already have become

27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 Ibid.

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environmental Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in third world countries and usually the IDPs live in the slums of big cities without access to basic amenities. The people who migrate to the city slum areas for a better life, perceive that the migration may bring new economic opportunities for them and they will get a better life than they were in their environmentally degraded situation.

Although scholars broadly agree on the consequences of climate change, they could not reach a consensus regarding the identification and defining the environmental refugees. Thus, there is a definitional debate among scholars on identifying environmental refugees. In fact, among those refugees, fewer people migrated for reasons directly linked to climate. If people are asked about the root causes of their migration, most of them would likely answer because of family reasons, or to search for new jobs or opportunities in a new place. Some of them might respond that they had to because they were struggling to support their household, which had grown too big to support. Only 20 per cent of them perhaps would answer that they had no other option than migration because they were forced to do so because of persecution, violence or natural disasters.30 As climate change is so rare to be a proximate source of migration, scholars in migration research have shown little interest to consider it as a prime source of human displacement.31 In fact, some scholars challenged the use of the term ‘environmental refugees’. The opposite argument is although climate has a major role in human movements, migration is not the only policy option for people.32 Due to this definitional debate, it is still ambiguous to proper identification of the environmental refugees.

However, since the 1980s, scientists started to accumulate convincing evidence to demonstrate that the human being has entered into another phase where the activities of the human being caused unprecedented changes to the environment and thus, the global community have entered an era of ever-growing human-induced climate change.33

The existing literature on climate change and migration have drawn mixed conclusions on the linkage between climate change and migration. One group of scholars believes that the impacts of climate change are sudden or gradual, such as prolonged droughts, will likely cause mass migration, while others oppose the claim or doubt the predicted outcome, referring the adaptive capacity of people and some empirical evidence on the relationship between climatic events and human displacement. The lack of consensus among scholars on the number of environmental refugees is also evident. The next chapter examines whether environmental refugees are excluded from mainstream refugee regime.

30 Robert A. McLeman, op. cit., p. 1.31 Ibid. 32 Debasree Chatterjee, op. cit., pp. 111-112. 33 Robert A. McLeman, op. cit., p. 1.

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4. Are the Environmentally Displaced Persons Excluded from Mainstream Refugee Regime?

Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, environmental refugees are not covered by the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which is primarily designed to protect the persons fleeing due to persecution, violence or war. In addition to that, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) agreed not to use the term “refugees” to describe those people who are displaced due to environmental reasons. Probably, the main reason behind this is the UNHCR already face difficulties to provide support for the world’s 22.5 million existing refugees.34 And it is unsure if the UNHCR incorporates a new category, the donor groups will extend support to those people. So, the environmentally displaced people are devoid of any kind of juridical or institutional support.

There are a few challenges in creating a separate normative framework for environmental refugees. First, although climate change affects migration in different ways, it is not possible to isolate the sole cause of human movement. Rather it interacts with and overlays other social, political and economic drives. Second, climate change related movement is a part of global migration dynamics, rather than an independent or discrete category and therefore, it needs to be discussed in a wider development context, not just a humanitarian context.35 Third, while adaptation can help reduce vulnerabilities, and enhance resilience, it is unlikely to stop the need for some migration. Ultimately, migration can be a form of adaptation and a rational coping strategy. Fourth, climate-induced displacement has the possibility to take different forms and will require a mixed type of responses at the local, national, regional and international level.36

From community based empirical research, have shown that people will move away from the areas that climate change gradually renders uninhabitable, such as many parts of the small island states in the Pacific affected mainly by sea level rise and some parts of the South East Asia dealing with coastal erosion.37 In 1998, Francis M. Deng, the United Nations Secretary General’s representative for displaced persons noted that,

"Displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of

34 “The Economist Explains: Why Climate Migrants Do Not Have Refugee Status”, The Economist, 06 March 2018. 35 Asian Development Bank, Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific: Final Report, Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012, p. viii.36 Jane McAdam, “Creating New Norms on Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Displacement: International Development 2013-2013”, Refugee, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2014, pp. 11-26.37 Andre Milan, Benjamin Schraven, Koko Warner and Noemi Cascone (eds.), Migration, Risk Management and Climate Change: Evidence and Policy Responses, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016, p. viii.

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generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”38

Due to the limited scope of protection for forced refugees in existing international law, it is somehow acknowledged that neither human rights law nor refugee law covers those people who are forced to cross borders to escape the effects of climate change. Therefore, states do not have the responsibility to regulate their entry and similarly cannot guarantee that they will not be expelled. This is primarily because the danger these people face is not directly caused by human actors and as seen in the refugee law, the harm is generalized and not targeted to some people because of their ethnicity, religion or other protected characteristics.39

The term “environmental refugee” itself is seriously criticized for the ambiguity of its legal meaning. If the international community wishes to prevent the influx of huge number of refugees, it must prevent the causes which create the environmental refugees. The 1994 “Almeria Declaration” of the UN stated that:

“The number of migrants in the world, already at very high levels, nonetheless continues to increase by about 3 million each year. Approximately, half of these originate in Africa. These increases are largely of rural origin and related to land degradation. It is estimated that over 135 million people may be at risk of being displaced as a consequence severe desertification.” 40

In response to the growing voice in favour of the environmentally displaced people, in 2010 Cancun Climate Change Conference invited all state parties primarily to enhance action on adaptation by undertaking “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels.”41 Walter Kälin argues that the provision is quite significant because first, it explicitly recognizes the humanitarian consequences of forced migration due to global climate change; second, it expects that displacement issue will become part of national adaptation plans; and third, it includes cross-border human movement and not just internal displacement on the international agenda.42

38 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”, available at https://drc.ngo/media/1217434/guiding-principles-on-internal-displacement.pdf, accessed on 13 April 2019. 39 Kate Jastram, “Warm World, Cold Reception: Climate Change, National Security and Forced Migration”, Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2014, pp. 752-765. 40 Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on a Convention to Combat Desertification (INCED), quoted in Geography and Refugees, supra note 45, at 13.41 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Report on its 16th Session”, 29 November-10 December 2010, available at https://undocs.org/FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, accessed on 17 April 2018.42 Walter Kälin, “From the Nansen Principles to the Nansen Initiative”, Forced Migration Review, Issue 41, December 2012, pp. 48-49.

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Although many scholars indicate that migration occurs due to climate change, the decision to migrate depends on several factors. The classical theories of migration narrate two different aspects ‘push’ factors and ‘pull’ factors work combinedly while taking final decision of migration. However, ‘opportunity’ and ‘willingness’ also work as a catalyst for people’s decision of moving from their home of origin. People thus do not only think of the necessity of moving away but also, they try to take into account the conditions they are going to face in their new destination. Hence, people decide to move to other places if they feel there are some potential better living conditions there. McAdam and Loughry gave empirical examples of migration in the small islands of Tuvalu and Kiribati and noted that in those two islands climate change along with other socio-economic issues has forced people to migrate from their traditional habitat. Due to the sea-level rise, people of these islands are not only migrating one area to another but also people are looking for new destinations, non-island states to emigrate.43 Hence, the solution of the problem are discussed briefly in the next chapter.

5. How to Overcome the Challenges

From the previous discussion, it is evident that there are different challenges with regard to the issue of environmental refugees. Hence, the probable solution to the problem should encompass multi-dimensional aspects. Mutual cooperation at the systemic level appears to be the best way to mitigate the problems evolving from the environmental refugees.44 The universal nature of the problem requires cooperation among the states. This can best be explained by the liberal internationalism. However, one of the primary questions in this regard is who will take the key responsibility of the environmental refugees and who will bear the short, medium, and long-term costs associated with them. Hence, constructivism gives a better prescription than the traditional IR theories. According to constructivism, global climate change is a man-made construction. And state identity and interests most of the time dictate the pattern of global climate change related negotiations. Hence, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a particular state should be the primary parameter as it is also a social construction. The experience of the impacts on climate change for the developing countries should be viewed in light of those countries’ historical experience of domination by the rich countries. The proponents of this theory perceive that normative consensus among states on carbon trade is the core issue shaping global climate change politics.45

Migration is not a problem to be avoided, rather, individuals and concerned communities often find it as a means of solution. On the contrary, the concept of

43 Jane McAdam and M. Loughry, “We aren’t Refugees”, Inside Story, 30 June 2009, available at http://insidestory.org.au/we-arent-refugees/, accessed on 25 April 2018.44 Tim Pfefferle, op. cit.45 Ibid.

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displacement has negative connotations which indicate involuntary departure and vulnerability, which result in enormous hardship for the displaced people as well as their receiving community. Some scholars perceive that the environmental refugee is a special category, therefore, distinct mechanisms should be established to assist them in a sustainable manner. Existing literature suggests that in the state of simple displacement by causes such as flood or drought, which is primarily not linked with any kind of political violence, strategies should be implemented through the concerned state. The governing authority of the particular area where the disaster took place must play a key role in determining whether the displacement occurred within the particular country or across an international border. This is the most common and standard practice to mitigate the problem of this kind of refugees. Usually, in the aftermath of any natural disasters, relief and rehabilitation programme is usually jointly conducted by the state government, along with national and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and by major foreign governments. While the causes of population displacement are linked to global economic and environmental structure, it is convenient to deal with national development policies. Because of the international nature of the problem and the volume of the expense involved, a good instance can be made for attracting international cooperation with the national development policies.

Amidst the complex situation, the policy response also should be different. For persons who are forced to cross borders mainly because of the dual effects of environmental degradation and war, such as in some countries of the Horn of Africa, immediate assistance cannot be channeled through the government of the state of origin. This kind of displacement can be covered by the existing mandate of the UNHCR, which deals with the refugees. Similarly, it also covers the minority groups who are forced to cross the international borders because of ethnic conflicts and competition for scarce resources. One of the most problematic dimensions of the international humanitarian assistance is to get access to the IDPs. It is even more difficult to establish special international mechanisms to help internally displaced environmental refugees. From an academic perspective there are a few ways to address the problem.

First, scholars and policymakers could incorporate the role of identity in the climate induced migration issue. In fact, the incorporation of state identity could pose a fundamental challenge to the rational theories. As the rationalist theories are very much state centric in nature without proper focus on state identity a state behaviour. According to the identity theory, divergent views on the impacts of climate change is mainly due to the divergent identity. Identity is very important from the constructivist viewpoint because it plays a vital role in both interpersonal and international interactions.46 Alexander Wendt narrated identity as a ‘subjective property of

46 Maysam Beharvesh, “The Thrust of Wendtian Constructivism”, E-International Relations Student, March 2011, available at https://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/09/the-thrust-of-wendtian-constructivism/, accessed on 30 March 2018.

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international actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions’ and that is rooted in their ‘self-understanding’.47 The understanding and internalizing of identity are underpinned in the fact of knowing ‘self’ as well as ‘others’. In global climate change and environmental refugees related negotiations, a particular state’s identity plays a vital role in determining that state’s behaviour or moral position on a particular issue. Cultural aspects of a particular state usually shape the identity formation of a particular state. Therefore, knowing the cultural background of a state can help in understanding that states’ behaviour. As identities help in identifying or determining actors, interests of that actor designate its behavioural motivations. According to Alexander Wendt interests of a particular actor usually, presuppose identities because it is not possible for an actor to know what it wants prior to knowing who it is. By taking these non-material factors as analytical tools constructivist tries to give unaddressed questions of the rationalist theories. Thus, state identity and interests are important tools in understanding the political nature of the environmental refugee issue.48 The historical and social context of the climate change and the resultant environmental refugee issue also becomes clear by the constructivist theory.

Secondly, it is to note that the ideas and norms that are shaping the contemporary global climate regime are mainly a reflection of the national interests, which are heavily predisposed against the notion of incorporating population displacement because of climate change. Therefore, one of the best ways to mitigate the consequences of climate change and environmental refugees is norm creation. However, prior to the norm creation, it is important to understand a couple of issues. It is evident that climate change affects the decision of migration, but it cannot be isolated as the sole cause of migration. Similar to the first one, environmental migration needs to be counted as a part of global migration dynamics rather than just a humanitarian one. Next, policies regarding the environmental refugees need to be proactive, not just remedial and it must be linked with sufficient budget source on a long-term basis. Finally, the affected people must be included in the policy implementation through a participatory process.

These conditions assert that climate-induced refugees are a different form and which will require a different set of responses at the local, national, regional, and international levels. With the same token, the task of migration management should be coordinated with other objectives, including disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, sustainable development and humanitarian responses.49 Norms of mutual gain or benefit might be a good option to mitigate the problems emanated from the environmental refugees. The norm “all for one, one for all” can ensure collective cooperation-based solution.50 This norm is a

47 Ibid. 48 Tim Pfefferle, op. cit.49 Jane McAdam, op. cit.50 Maysam Behravesh, op. cit.

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symbol of “generalized reciprocity” and if the norm functions well in a system, then multilateralism will be the guiding principles of the system undermining the “self-help” attitude.51

Much of the conventional literature claims that international institutes can play a vital role in norm setting. In recent years, the international community has taken a concerted effort to develop a new normative framework for the environmental refugees. The UNHCR has to play the biggest role along with the IOM on norm creation. These two organizations can provide analytical input to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and advocate that cross-border migration due to climate change is addressed properly in this type of forum.52 The relevant stakeholders in this regard need to be informed that a different set of tools will be required to mitigate the problem of environmental refugees. Hence, a new norm creation will be the most effective method to mitigate the misery of the environmental refugees. However, while the norm creation it must be ensured that the victims are well informed and their voice is present in policy formulation. The goodwill of the relevant stakeholders to share knowledge, listen, and trust building will assist the international community to advance forward on building a normative framework effective to protect the environment-induced migrants.

Thirdly, key stakeholders may consider including the role of emotion while viewing the environmental refugees. It is evident from the literature that the environmental refugees are one of the worst sufferers they need proper attention and care. Moreover, until the date the environment induced refugees are deprived of traditional refugee status and fall short of legal status provided to the refugees. Thus, there is a protection gap involving the environmental refugees. More alarming part is the number of environmental refugees is huge and in every second one person is becoming displaced due to the natural disasters. People who want to declare themselves as a refugee because of climate change or natural disaster have no opportunity to receive help. In recent times, a New Zealand court has annulled the case of a Kiribati person who fought to get the refugee status as a victim of climate change and later the person was deported to his home country. There is a strong consensus among the scientists that the number and frequency of the extreme weather conditions may become more frequent and more intense in the coming days. The unstable weather patterns and increasing global temperature could make more areas of the world uninhabitable, which will possibly displace millions and might shatter the dreams of many of having a home, an impossibility.

51 Ibid.52 Jane McAdam, op. cit., p. 12.

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6. Conclusion

Global climate change is responsible for creating multifaceted problems. It is evident that in the past few decades, the number of environmental refugees increased significantly. However, still the plights of the environmental refugees are unresolved mainly because they are excluded from mainstream refugee regime. The key international instrument on refugees, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its additional protocol did not incorporate environmental refugees, and so, they are not treated equally by key stakeholders dealing with refugees. However, from the above discussion it appears that environmental refugees fulfil necessary conditions to be counted as refugees, so, they need to be incorporated and treated in a similar way as other categories of refugees. From the international relations perspective, it appears that traditional theories of IR did not include environmentally displaced persons to their subject matter. Moreover, there are differences among scholars on the relationship between climate change and resultant migration. There are also contradictory opinions on the exact number of environmental refugees. First of all, it is important to clearly define the environmental refugees, because it will help individuals and groups of individuals to access better protection and treatment. It is possible to treat them separately. But it will be worth if they are incorporated into the existing refugee regime and provided with proper treatment and care.

Review of literature on climate change induced displacement suggests that scholars in this arena primarily agree that climate change has the capability to create an increased number of refugees and as well as the risk of rivalry. It is revealed that there is an increasing complexity in linking environmental disasters or climate change with migration. Most of the cases it is very much location dependent. Further research in the field can help us to understand more of the contexts where climate change can lead to migration. However, it is very unlikely that a theory will emerge soon which can successfully predict the places wherein future climate change can lead to large-scale migration. However, it can be expected that more place-based research in this field might mitigate the losses from climate change and environmental refugees.

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Syeda Tanzia Sultana Mohammad Jasim Uddin

DEvElOPING COUNTRY IN GlOBAl ECONOmIC GOvERNANCE: lESSONS FOR BANGlADESH

Abstract

Since the end of World War II, Bretton Woods system remains in the midst of Global Economic Governance (GEG). International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created to regulate monetary policy, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), then World Bank (WB) was formed to look into financial aid and lending, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), then World Trade Organization (WTO) was established to regulate trade. These institutions are yet to provide much space for effective participation of developing states and are dominated by developed world like United States (US), European Union (EU), etc. Hence, a vital target of Goal 16 of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is to broaden and strengthen the participation of developing states in global governance institutions. Global financial crisis and economic rise of China and India have resulted in large-scale participation of developing states in global economic governance. Being a developing country, Bangladesh will be benefitted and able to broaden its participation from exercising practices of China and India in the institutions of global economic governance.

Keywords: Global Economic Governance, Developing Country, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

With the establishment of Bretton Woods system, e.g., International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) i.e., World Bank (WB) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) i.e., World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995, the institutions of Global Economic Governance (GEG) emerged.1 These institutions have a direct involvement in the regulation and navigation of global economic activities.2 IMF and WB, through the advent

Syeda Tanzia Sultana is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her e-mail address is: [email protected]; Mohammad Jasim Uddin, PhD is Senior Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: [email protected]


1 Martin Westergren, The Political Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions: A Justice-Based Account, Malmö: Stockholm University, 2016, pp. 198-221.2 Ibid.


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of conditionality, enforce their stronghold. IMF functions through development financing accompanied by Structural Reform and Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). WB functions through increasing its role in providing loans for balance of payments support to the developing countries, including specific conditions concerning policy reform.3 Together with the expansion of the domains of the IMF and WB, the WTO has been an authority in international trade affairs and it reinforces its function of setting and regulating a code of international trade conduct.4 Till the 20th century, these institutions were dominated by developed countries. Since the 21st century, developing countries especially India and China have become powerful players and started to participate in the institutions of GEG due to their rapid economic growth and the ability to deal with the problems of global economic disturbances.5

Throughout the last two decades, the change in GEG happened, and it was for two important reasons: the economic rise of China and India and economic recession in 2008-2009. The rise of China and India resulted in large-scale intervention of both countries in GEG arena. According to the estimation of IMF and WB, China’s average contribution rate to the global economy from 2013 to 2016 reached 31.6 per cent which outpaced the total contribution rates of the United States (US), the Euro zone and Japan combined.6 On the other hand, IMF estimated that India’s share in world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from an average of 4.8 per cent during 2001-07 to 6.1 per cent during 2008-13 and further to an average of 7.0 per cent during 2014 to 2015 in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).7 However, for both the countries, the economic crisis in 2008-2009 was a game changer as they proved themselves quite capable of dealing with global economic disturbances. They came out from the crisis and also helped other developed and developing countries to tide over it.8 Thus, the importance of India and China within the GEG structure has increased.

Active participation of developing countries is crucial to build a just and fair system of GEG. Some developing countries like China and India have taken new places at the tables of discussion and rule making. They are asking for more representation and voice in GEG arena and also introducing new arrangements to complement the

3 Ariel Buira, Reforming the Governance of the IMF and the World Bank, London: Anthem Press, 2005, pp. 45-50. 4 Bernard Hoekman and Michel Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 288-290. 5 Ann Florini, “Rising Asian Powers and Changing Global Governance”, International Studies Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2011, pp. 24-33.6 Chen Qiqing, “China’s Growth Powers World Economy China’s development creates opportunities for the world”, Beijing Review, 22 October 2017, available at http://www.bjreview.com/Business/201710/t20171022_800107939.html, accessed on 19 June 2018. 7 Debasish Roy, “India’s share in world economy steadily growing”, The Economic Times, 07 March 2016, available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/managementmusings/indias-share-in-world-economy-steadily-growing/, accessed on 19 June 2018. 8 John Humphrey and Dirk Messner, “China and India as Emerging Global Governance Actors: Challenges for Developing and Developed Countries”, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2006, pp. 107-114.

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existing institutions. On the other hand, participation of most other developing countries like Bangladesh is very negligible in GEG. Bangladesh’s current share in IMF is 0.245 per cent9 and in IBRD is 0.30 per cent.10 Indeed, a country’s economic power is key to have a say in these institutions’ governance. The size of the economy of Bangladesh is far too small compared to the big economics. However, as Bangladesh is still an insignificant player, it needs to follow someone to move forward. In this respect, the paper argues that the increasing participation of developing countries, e.g., India and China certainly provides valuable lessons for other developing countries like Bangladesh to learn from their best practices in the long run. As Bangladesh is still an Least Developed Country (LDC)11, hopefully it will graduate by 2024 to become a developing country thus, the recommendations on following Indian and Chinese path in the GEG will hold water in the near future for Bangladesh.

Over the last thirty years the number of Global Economic Governance Institution (GEGI) has grown significantly, to include organizations such as the G8, the G20, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), New Development Bank (NDB), etc. However, to assess the participation of the developing country in GEG, the paper takes account of IMF, WB and WTO due to several reasons. First, these three are pioneer institutions of GEG, established following the end of the Second World War. Secondly, due to the rising criticism, these institutions have already made different reforms, and continue to find themselves at the forefront of setting multilateral trading rules, global economic crisis management, economic development and poverty reduction. Thirdly, these institutions usually established by intergovernmental agreement and expanding their reach deep into the regulatory structure of almost all United Nations (UN) member states, are considered major players in the field of GEG.

The paper limits its scope to analyze the intervention of India and China in IMF, World Bank and WTO. With increasing significant role in the institutions of GEG, both China and India are Asian neighbours, geographically proximate to Bangladesh, important trade partners and development partners of the country. Lessons from India and China are likely to be practiced through collaborating closely with the two.

The paper is qualitative in nature. It examines existing literatures on GEG, and the participation of India and China in the institutions of GEG. Literatures are taken from different sources, e.g., government and non-government documents, academic

9 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power”, available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx, accessed on 27 September 2018. 10 The World Bank, “Voting Powers”, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/votingpowers, accessed on 27 September 2018.11 A graduating country must meet eligibility criteria at two consecutive triennial reviews. In March 2018, the Committee for Development Policy (CDP) found that Bangladesh met the graduation criteria for the first time. If Bangladesh meets the graduation criteria for a second time, at the next triennial review in 2021, the CDP will recommend it for graduation from the LDC category in 2024.

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journals, books and newspaper articles. It also relies on semi-structured interviews. The interviewees from academic and practitioners backgrounds are purposively selected based on their expertise. For the convenience of discussion, the paper is divided into five sections, including introduction and conclusion. The second section explores definitional debates on GEG. The third section discusses the participation of India and China in IMF, WB and WTO. The fourth section draws some lessons for Bangladesh. The fifth section concludes the paper.

2. Debates on GEG

The use of the term ‘global governance’ has gained momentum in the mid 20th century. It is being used with different meanings and implications.12 Global governance is the way of managing global affairs, involving a range of actors including states as well as regional and international organizations. Dirk Messner and John Humphrey define global governance as the “development of a system of institutions and rules as well as of new mechanisms of international cooperation that make it possible to deal on a continuous basis with the problems posed by global challenges and trans-boundary phenomena.”13 According to James Rosenau, “global governance is a world order for managing interdependence in the absence of a state”.14 Global governance can be used for several contexts, e.g., global economic governance, global environmental governance, global migration governance, global governance of peace, security and conflict resolution.15

Contemporary GEG is defined in different contexts. Daniel D. Bradlow defines GEG “as a set of institutional actors to oversee the complex and integrated global financial system”. Though for GEG no obvious “governing law” is available, it refers to the extent in which actors in GEG uphold economic policies and practices that allow all stakeholders, including the weakest societies and the poorest individuals, to share in the benefits of the global economic system. Daniel argues that till now GEG is an effective and efficient collective action for solving a crisis in global economic domain undertaken by global institutions.16 Richard Higgott states that GEG is fundamental for macroeconomic management of global economic stability, formulating policies/rules for global and domestic economic exchanges.17 Jean-Claude Trichet defines GEG as the set of supranational

12 Jon Pierre and Guy Peters, Governance, Politics and the State, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 1.13 Ibid.14 Sabina Tuca, “Global Governance vs. National Sovereignty in a Globalized World”, CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Vol. 7, No.1, 2015, pp. 193-201.15 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, “What is Governance?”, available at https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf, accessed on 12 February 2018. 16 Daniel D. Bradlow, “A Framework for Assessing Global Economic Governance”, Boston College Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2013, pp. 971-1003. 17 Richard Higgott, “The Theory and Practice of Global Economic Governance in the Early Twenty-First Century: The Limits of Multilateralism”, in Wyn Grant and Graham K. Wilson (eds.), The Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis: The Rhetoric of Reform and Regulation, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 16-19.

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institutions and laws that have an effect on cross-border economic and financial transactions.18 According to Arno J Van Niekerk, GEG refers to the institutions, norms, practices and decision-making processes from which rules, guidelines, standards and codes arise in order to manage the global economy. 19 It seems that GEG aims at providing governance to economic globalization, operating within a framework of the global system.

The contentious nature of GEG makes debates often triggered by rapid changes in the contemporary world economy. Definitional debates regarding GEG are surrounded by three critical arguments: the role of nation-states in GEG, forms of GEG, and the way to prevent global economic inequality. The debates are mainly divided into two schools of thoughts holding almost diametrically opposed views: the globalists and the sceptics.

Sceptics view that as the world economic order is dominated by nation-states, a greater degree of emphasis by institutions like the IMF, the WB and the WTO are essential for providing support to the government’s efforts in order to govern cross-border economic activities efficiently.20 On the contrary, the globalists view that a lesser role for the states and a greater role for the institutions of GEG as the global economic activities are seemingly beyond the control and regulation of government.21 On the forms of GEG, sceptics say there is no need for new forms of supranational governance.22 However, the globalists argue that pre-1914 era was structurally different from the contemporary era. It was characterized by Pax Britannica system and it was a world of unilateral and discretionary policies. The contemporary world is a world of multilateral and institutionalized policy.23 The globalists thus perceive the existing world order to be maintained by new forms of economic governance. On preventing global economic inequality, the sceptics view that inequality is a vital ingredient of world order and the basis for effective global governance. An important way to eradicate inequality is to make strong cooperation among stakeholders including governments, multinational corporations, international institutions and the transnational civil society.24 On the other hand, the globalists are critical of the current system of multi-layered GEG. Lack of democratic credentials and legitimacy are the serious flaws of the GEG system. By reforming the existing system, global inequality

18 Jean-Claude Trichet, “Shaping a New World: The Crisis and Global Economic Governance”, speech delivered at Bocconi University, Aula Magna Milano, 09 April 2010. 19 Arno J van Niekerk, “Globalisation and Global Economic Governance: Contextualising the Interpretations and Debate”, South African Journal of Economic and Management Science, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2007, pp. 544-555. 20 Ibid.21 Ibid. 22 Arno J van Niekerk, op. cit. 23 Philippe Legrain, Open World: The Truth about Globalization, Ivan R. Dee: Chicago, 2004, p. 113. 24 Ngaire Woods, “Order, Globalization, and Inequality in World Politics”, in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds.), Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics, Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 53.

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can be minimized. There is a need to make it accountable to the contemporary principles of democratic governance.25

This paper by and large agrees with the assertion of globalists’ view. Contemporary global economy differs from the 20th century’s economy to a great extent. Moreover, it is evident that there is a democratic deficit as the institutions of GEG are yet to fully represent the voice of the world community. This paper acknowledges that the responsibility relies largely on the shoulders of the developing world to become more proactive in the institutions of GEG. For this paper, a working definition is thus set. GEG refers to a set of institutions by which global economic affairs are managed. Additionally, these institutions purport to be multilateral in form and global in scope. IMF, WB and WTO were created to oversee the course and nature of global economic policy over the years. These institutions have been central parts of GEG. Participation of developing countries in these institutions is essential to play a greater role in the GEG. In this respect, the following section evaluates the participation of India and China in the WB, IMF and WTO.

3. Participation of India and China in GEG

For the last one decade, global economic development has been experiencing new issues and so is the case with GEG. In the passage of time, willingness and ability of both India and China to participate in GEG have increased. Increasing economic development of the two has been a contribution to overall global economic development and will be a vital factor for effective GEG. India and China are striving to become important contributors to GEG in terms of reforms, new complementary arrangements and proposals, decision making etc.

3.1 Participation in WB and IMF

WB and IMF are key players in GEG. Initially, they were established to stabilize fixed exchange rates providing conditional monetary support. Basic idea of IMF, providing global public good of financial stability, remains the same today. Specifically, IMF continues to provide a forum for cooperation on international monetary problems, facilitate global trade growth, promote exchange rate stability and an open system of global payments, and lend countries foreign exchange when looked for. In contrast, WB initially was to provide loans to rebuild states. After that, it began financing socio-economic development of developing countries. WB now provides low-interest loans, zero to low-interest credits and grants to developing countries. It touches nearly every sector that is important in fighting poverty, supporting

25 Fred Halliday, “Global Governance: Prospects and Problems”, in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, pp. 483-485.

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economic growth and ensuring sustainable gains in the quality of people’s lives. Both IMF and WB also support developing countries through policy advice, research and technical assistance.

Four-fifths of IMF and WB members are developing countries. India was one of 17 countries that prepared the agenda for the Bretton Woods Conference. It was also one of 44 countries which signed the final agreement for establishing WB. Even, the name IBRD was first suggested by India.26 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not join the IMF and WB until 1980. The Republic of China (ROC) originally joined the IBRD in 1945 and represented China in the two financial institutions. However, PRC replaced ROC position in 1980 as China. The article identifies three indicators: a) participating in the discussion and mitigation of global financial crisis, b) reforming the financial institutions, and 3) providing new ideas and arrangements to analyze the influence of India and China in the WB and IMF.

India and China, with their strong economic growth, are in a position to contribute notably to the discussion and mitigation of the global financial crisis. During the global financial crisis in 2008, India and China in addition with Brazil were called upon to provide emergency backstop lines of credit to IMF. Economic growth in China and India and other developing economies led global recovery after 2009. China pledged US$ 43 billion and India pledged US$ 10 billion in 2012 to support to the response of IMF to the European crisis.27 Besides, India and China added their values in different G20 summits. For example, India joined other rising powers in G20 summit for expanding capitalization of multilateral lenders, while China offered several proposals to respond to the crisis, e.g., advancing reforms of global financial institutions, growing representation of the developing countries, improving the international currency system and steadily promoting diversity of global monetary system.28

Since the financial crisis in 2008, rising economies came up with an idea of reforming institutions of GEG. Voting power in IMF is calculated having 50 per cent weight on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 30 per cent weight on the openness. Thus, developed countries are over-represented and developing countries are under-represented. Under the BRICS, India and China demanded existing structure of IMF to be more representative. In 2009 and 2010 BRICS summits, India and China urged for

26 Gadde Omprasad, “India and World Bank Relations: an Evaluation of India’s Role in the Evolution of the World Bank”, International Journal of Current Research, Vol. 7, No. 8, 2015, pp.197-198. 27 Jason A. Kirk, “India and International Financial Institutions”, in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 609-615.28 Wang Xiaodongl, “China’s Status and Influence in the Multilateral Trading System”, in Scott Kennedy and Shuaihua Cheng (eds.), From Rule Takers to Rule Makers: The Growing Role of Chinese in Global Governance, Shanghai, China: Research Center for Chinese Politics & Business, Indiana University International Centre for Trade & Sustainable Development, 2012. pp. 31-40.

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greater voting power and quota for developing countries.29 IMF reforms were agreed upon in 2010. In different meetings and forums, China and India repeatedly called for ratification of the reforms. In 2012 BRICS summit, they called global community to expedite 2010 governance and quota reforms before 2012 IMF Annual Meeting. The long-pending reforms came into effect in 2016. India’s voting rights increases to 2.6 per cent from 2.3 per cent, and China’s to 6 per cent from 3.8.30

WB reform was discussed in the 2009 G20 meeting, where India and China participated actively. There was a long debate on the creation of voting power. Developed countries led by the US demanded voting power based on weight in the global economy as measured by GDP at market exchange rate. Developing states led by India, China and Brazil demanded voting power to be consisted of a country’s share in global GDP in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). There was a consensus that voting power will be as the GDP weighted 60 per cent at market exchange rate and 40 per cent at PPP exchange rate.31

Table 1: Share in Voting Power and Quota of India and China in IMF and WB in 2018

India China

IMF (%) WB (%) IMF (%) WB (%)

Share in Voting Power 2.64 2.93 6.09 4.45

Share in Quota 2.76 2.44 6.41 4.00Source: Compiled by authors.

Besides reforming IMF and WB through increasing voting power and quota, an aspect that China and India have demanded is changing criteria of selection process of leaders of the governing bodies of these two institutions. Since their inception, Managing Director of IMF has always been the American and President of WB has been the European. India and China wish for leaders to be chosen based on merit, not on candidate’s nationality.32

The third indicator India and China is practising to deal with IMF and WB is putting new ideas and arrangements into action. Idea of establishing and now functioning of BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) agreeing to a one country one vote governance structure, selecting location of headquarter and agreeing on the presidency is an arrangement to support infrastructure projects and social

29 Raosaheb G Bawaskar, “BRICS: The Voice of Global South in Multilateral Forums”, paper presented in the 2nd Global South (ISA) Conference, ISA Global South Caucus (GSCIS) and Singapore Management University, Singapore, 08-10 January 2015. 30 Varghese K George, “India gets more voting rights in IMF reforms”, The Hindu, 23 September 2016, available at https://www.thehindu.com/business/India-gets-more-voting-rights-in-IMF-reforms/article14024758.ece, accessed on 16 September 2018. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid.

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development initiatives in developing countries. With initial subscribed capital of US$ 50 billion and authorized capital of US$ 100 billion, NDB has begun its journey.33 Chinese idea of creating Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is also an arrangement to support building of infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region.34 These ideas are thought of as long standing resentment of developing nations about conditionality tied with loans provided by WB and IMF, the lack of movement for reforms in the institutions and lack of capacity to handle the financial crisis aroused in 2008. Both ideas are also thought of as complementing the IMF and WB as they have similar scope.

3.2 Participation in WTO

Three indicators show the level of Indian and Chinese intervention in WTO: 1) participation in Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), 2) participation in negotiation process, and 3) blocking negotiation through building coalition until their interests are met.

Both India and China have participated in DSM as a - defendant, respondent and third party. Until 2006, China was involved in four cases as defendant and just one as respondent. Its strategy is to listen and learn and then use the learning to improve negotiating capacity. From 1995 to 2018, it brought 20 cases as complainant and was respondent in 43 cases and participated in 152 cases as third party.35 China has won 66.7 per cent of cases it has initiated before WTO since 1995. As third party, China has been involved in about half of all WTO cases. Such involvement has mainly been in two categories. One is dispute in which China has substantial trade interest and the result of the case will have direct impact on China. The other is where there is no obvious effect on China but the dispute has significance for WTO regime, so that China’s interest will be affected indirectly.36 China wishes to resuscitate WTO as its survival is in jeopardy. And so, it seeks to work on WTO reform. Like China, India has participated in DSM. Until 1994, only one panel report was adopted involving India.37 Since then, it brought 24 cases as complainant and was respondent in 25 cases and participated in 136 cases as third party.38

On WTO reform, DSM in particular, China has demanded changes how it works. Being concerned about delays in panel proceedings, technical and

33 Jason A. Kirk, op. cit. 34 “China says new bank to complement existing institutions”, The Washington Post, 21 March 2015.35 World Trade Organization, “India and the WTO”, available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/india_e.htm, accessed on 11 October 2018.36 Jing Gu, John Humphrey and Dirk Messner, “Global Governance and Developing Countries: The Implications of the Rise of China”, World Development, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2008, pp. 274-292. 37 Humayun Rasheed Khan, “Participation of India in Dispute Settlement System of World Trade Organization”, International Journal of Law and Policy Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2016, pp. 36-58. 38 “World Trade Organization”, op. cit.

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administrative difficulties faced by developing members, China has proposed specific amendments: a) developed members will be allowed to bring two cases at best to the body of dispute settlement in a year, however, such restriction will not be placed for developing members; b) if a case is filed against a developing member by a developed country and if the case is not supported by proper authority, all costs of the developing member will be paid by the developed member.39 The case of India, indeed its participation regarding DSM has not been as active as China’s. But, Indian support to enhance third party rights, e.g., as proposed by developing member Costa Rica, has been evident.40 Third party rights include access to all proceedings, hearings and information provided to a panel, and right to intervene in an appeal process.

The 2nd approach how India and China have been active in WTO is participation in negotiation process. Active participation and submitting proposals are two vital ways of participating in the process. India and China have been regular invitees and active members of WTO meetings, including small-group decision-making meetings. For example, India was an active party to the consultations of Group of Six. It made an effort to address a stalemate on agriculture.41 It is to note that China joined the group and it was renamed as G7 in 2008. Not only through such active participation but also through submitting several proposals in different meetings of WTO, both China and India have been able to have their mark on WTO governance. Statistics show that by July 2008, China made more than 100 submissions to different trade negotiations42, while India, particularly at the 7th session of WTO ministerial conference, submitted a set of five proposals.43 Jointly India and China in 2017 submitted a proposal to eliminate the most trade-distorting form of farm subsidies.44 On the whole, the submissions and the proposals wished for betterment of global trade community.

Building coalition until interests are met is another indicator to evaluate participation of developing states in WTO. Trade negotiations in WTO are dominated by developed world and so at times in different negotiations participation and opinions of developing states are minimized.45 India and China are building coalition as a key

39 Jing Gu, John Humphrey and Dirk Messner, op. cit. 40 Faisal A S A Albashar and A F M Maniruzzaman, “Reforming the WTO Dispute Settlement System: A Rethink of the Third Party Right of Access to Panel and Appeal Processes from Developing Countries’ Perspectives”, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2010. pp. 313-316.41 Amrita Narlikar, “India and World Trade Organisation”, in Kanti P. Bajpai and Harsh V. Pant (eds.), India’s Foreign Policy: A Reader, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 415-435. 42 Henry Gao, “From the Periphery to the Centre: China’s Participation in WTO Negotiations”, China Perspectives, Vol. 1, 2012, pp. 63-64. 43 Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, “India & World Trade Organization (WTO)”, available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/india_e.htm, accessed on 21 October 2018. 44 Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India, “Joint Proposal by India & China in WTO on Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS)”, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=170392, accessed on 21 October 2018. 45 Amrita Bahri, Public Private Partnership for WTO Dispute Settlement: Enabling Developing Countries,

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way of improving representation in WTO. For instance, “as a leader of G10 in the run-up to the launch of Uruguay Round and as a leader of Like Minded Group in the run-up to Doha Development Agenda, India took efforts to hold up the negotiations”.46 Equally, China being a part of G33, praised Indian claim in mini-ministerial meeting held in 2008 that developing states must be allowed for “a list of special products that needs exemption from tariff cuts and a special mechanism that can deal with a surge in particular agricultural imports”.47 Also, China joined G20 after its inception and played a vital role. On the other hand, India at the Cancun ministerial conference led low-income states’ coalition and faced EU and US’s pressure.48 Table 2 shows some coalitions involving India and China in WTO.

Table 2: Coalitions of India and China in WTO

Coalitions Membership Agenda

Like MindedGroup 1996

Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, with Jamaica and Mauritius as observers

Implementation issues, institutional reform and opposition to Singapore issues

Friends ofGeographicalIndications (1998)

Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand

Extension of geographi-cal indications to ad-ditionalproducts besides wines and spirits, in TRIPS regulation

Core Groupon SingaporeIssues (2001)

Bangladesh, Cuba, Egypt, Kenya, India, Indo-nesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Emerged in position to the treatment of the four Singapore issues as a single basket

G20(Cancun, 2003)

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe

Opening up of the agricultural markets of developed countries.

RAMs(2003)

Albania, Armenia, China, Croatia, Ecuador, FYR Macedonia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Oman, Panama, Saudi Arabia and Chinese Taipei.

To ensure the differential treatment of Recently-Acceded-Members (RAMs) within the Doha Round

Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2018, pp. 13-33.46 Amrita Narlikar, op. cit., p. 422.47 Wang Xiaodongl, op. cit., p. 38. 48 Henry Gao, op. cit.

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Friends of Anti-DumpingNegotiations (2003)

Brazil, Chile, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and Hong Kong, China

To tighten rules on the application of anti-dump-ing measures

G-33(preparationsfor Cancun, 2003)

Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hondu-ras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozam-bique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Sen-egal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Strategic product and special safeguard mecha-nism for developing countries

NAMA-11(preparations for Hong Kong, 2005)

Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Namibia, Philippines, South Africa, Tunisia and Venezuela

Supports the mainte-nance of developing country flexibilities with regard to the application of the formula for NAMA tariff reductions, while curbing tariff peaks and escalation in developed countries

Asian Developing Members(2012)

Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indone-sia, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Viet Nam

Agricultural negotiations

Source: Compiled by Authors.

Table 2 is an example of how India and China by forming and maintaining coalitions have influenced WTO negotiations. This is evident from different results of WTO ministerial conferences and negotiations since Seattle, e.g., breakdown of Cancun ministerial conference, conclusion of Hong Kong ministerial conference, deferral of WTO Doha negotiations, etc.49

49 “Comparative Assessment of Developing Country Participation in the Governance of Global Economic Institutions”, Geneva, Switzerland: South Centre, 2006; Charles Grant, Russia, China and Global Governance, London: Centre for European Reform, 2012, pp. 72-80.

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4. Lessons for Bangladesh

With existing organizational structure of GEG institutions, developed countries’ economic power, capability and influence have offered a privilege to rule the institutions. Changing global financial situation, rapid economic growth of India and China, their active participation and practical intervention have forced the institutions to consider different proposals of the two. Bangladesh can learn from the tactics of India and China to broaden its participation in GEG.

Sustained economic growth, qualitative and quantitative growth of external trade are necessary conditions, while negotiating and mitigating global financial crisis, and thereby, increasing participation of developing world in GEG institutions. Bangladesh, by increasing its subscription, submitting viable lone/joint proposal to promote developing states’ interest, has to be pro-active while participating and creating pressures on the agenda of developed countries in several negotiations of IMF and WB. Building politico-economic image and increasing representation in organizational arrangement of IMF and WB are critical. Image can be built through ensuring good governance and generating knowledge. If governance system is questioned, Bangladesh cannot expect respect globally. There is a necessity for reformation. If Bangladesh does that, its reputation, credibility and influence will increase in IMF and WB. These institutions will also pay heed to Bangladesh if it generates knowledge. Scholars need to research and write in international journals for enhancing its global image. For increasing representation, a crucial way is to compete for and grab job opportunities in IMF or WB.

India and China has been increasing their influence in WB and IMF by taking the issue of reforming such financial institutions forefront. The larger the import and export scale of an economy, the greater power and the right to speak. Also GDP growth rate plays a vital role. These are material foundations to assess China and India’s status in WB and IMF, and have helped the two to increase their quota and voting power, and the level of intervention in the institutions. Increasing economic growth, trade volume and foreign currency reserves to contribute to global economic growth rates and fund fiscal deficits of developed economies are crucial for Bangladesh to increase its quota and voting power and to have a key role in GEG institutions while pushing for reform, and asking for greater representation and finding herself to core stage of WB and IMF.

Bangladesh can intervene in GEG by providing new arrangements and ideas. In different global arena it has provided new ideas, e.g., Global Compacts on Refugee and Migration, and Global Peace Model. Being partner with South Asian states under South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Bangladesh can propose activating windows (social, economic and infrastructure) of SAARC Development Fund (SDF). Only social window is active, other windows are yet to be opened due to

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small capital base. WB estimates that South Asia needs to invest more than two and half trillion to meet its infrastructure gap.50 Opening of economic and infrastructure windows will provide new options. The windows need to be functional and can start providing concessional loans. Besides, several financial mechanisms under different regional cooperation initiatives like Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN), Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), etc., can be on board, which will be complementary to WB and IMF.

Intervention in WTO through participating in DSM is a vital mechanism. From 1995 to 2016, Bangladesh as a complainant participated in one case and as a third party it was involved in one case. With small market size and absolute trading stakes it faces poor economies of scale and high cost of mobilizing resources. It is less likely to participate in DSM repeatedly. With low participation rate, it has little incentive to enhance its in-house dispute settlement capacity. It carries high start-up costs to hire foreign lawyers, consultants, purchase information and evidences. High cost of WTO litigation cuts expected benefits coming from removing a trade barrier. These substantiate negligible participation in DSM. For that, Bangladesh may undertake two strategies. First, participation in various cases as a third party with particular litigation strategy; it will help taking legal advice, acquiring legal skill, gathering information, improving ability to handle and participate as a single party. Second, increasing domestic legal expertise to reduce high litigation cost; for that, necessary steps are: providing WTO-focused education and training, making dedicated laws, institutions and procedures to manage WTO disputes, creating in-house monitoring capacity to identify and monitor foreign trade barriers with the help of voluntary sector and local law firms. Bangladesh can set up National Council leading group on WTO affairs. Moreover, it can provide training on WTO-related issues to relevant officials, arrange particular course on WTO at the universities, establish WTO Research Centre, increase participation in WTO DSM, etc. Developing negotiation capacity and inter-ministerial coordination are also important.

As a third party, Bangladesh can be involved in two categories of disputes: one, in which it has trade interest, and the other, in which its stake will be affected in some way. Participation as a third party will enhance influence in some ways. Participation in trails of cases means participation in rule-making as judges have a role in interpreting law during dispute settlement process. Bangladesh can be involved in making and applying WTO rules. Again, participation as a third party will draw attention of others and exhibit Bangladesh’s strength and will. It is costly to participate as a third party. Thus, crucial is participating in other bodies, e.g., Special Trade Concern (STC), besides DSM, because it is free of cost.

50 “SAARC Development Fund plans to tap markets; become regional bank”, Business Standard, 03 July 2018, available at https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/saarc-development-fund-plans-to-tap-markets-become-regional-bank-118070300731_1.html, accessed on 20 Septembr 2018.

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Participation in negotiation process is a tool through which Bangladesh can intervene in WTO. It has played active role in Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Doha Declaration and succeeding decisions of council of TRIPS which allowed LDCs to have pharmaceutical patents immune from ambit of patentability till 2016. Later, the patent waiver period was extended up to 2033. Bangladesh has also raised issue of granting Duty Free Quota Free (DFQF) arrangement. With evolving multiparty approach, trade negotiation in a wide variety of areas involving a growing number of committees, special negotiating sessions and working groups is now a very technical matter, needs specialized expertise, effective bargaining in negotiation and coherent negotiable position.51 For Bangladesh, with limited number of officials and limitation in negotiation, it is difficult to participate in several area-based negotiations that occur simultaneously. At times, it hampers quality participation in WTO.

Engaging in the different arrangements of WTO and growing involvement in various coalitions and building new coalitions seem to be important tools to intervene in WTO affairs. Several arrangements within the WTO like Special and Differential Treatments (S&DT) and flexibilities in all the agreements, Aid for Trade and the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) are designed to accommodate interests of the LDCs and recently graduated LDCs to improve their share in global trade and GDP growth. Bangladesh, a member of EIF, can benefit from EIF of WTO as it is the only multilateral partnership dedicated exclusively to assisting LDCs in their use of trade as an engine for growth, sustainable development and poverty reduction. In Bangladesh, EIF is working with the government and the public and private sector to support the country’s trade efforts and to enhance export competitiveness. The EIF partnership offers a platform for local officials and development partners to discuss trade, as well as providing a coordination forum to prioritize trade in policy and practices. Moreover, the ministerial conferences are generally held in every two years for having negotiations and taking decisions on issues having immense importance. Hence, in the various discussion of EIF, Bangladesh should put forward strong arguments in order to get meaningful benefits.

In addition, there are different coalitions: larger coalition e.g., African Group, LDCs Group that addresses broad issues, whereas some, e.g., G-20, G-33, Cotton-4 and G-11 focus on a particular issue, i.e., agriculture, and NAMA-11 is to negotiate on non agricultural market access. Bangladesh is a member of several coalitions, e.g., Group of LDCs, Asian Developing Members, G90, Core Group on Trade Facilitation, etc. The country needs to be engaged in other coalitions on trade and monetary affairs like NAMA-11, G20, G33, G11, G24, etc. Bangladesh can also think of building new coalitions,

51 Mayur Patel, “New Faces in the Green Room: Developing Country Coalitions and Decision-Making in the WTO”, paper presented in the Seminar on WTO reform organized by Global Trade Governance Project, South Centre and the Graduate Institute of International Studies and financial support from the Geneva International Academic Network, 26 April 2007.

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issue-based or hybrid, to gain its interests. In issue-based coalitions Bangladesh can select one issue and ally with states interested on that issue. When issue is resolved, such coalition will be abolished. Bangladesh can also build hybrid coalition. It will combine features of two different sets of coalitions of the past, e.g., issue-based and bloc-type. To focus on a particular issue, it will often limit membership to a subset of developing states. Careful selection of membership and coherent agenda are key steps to avoid fragmentation of coalitions.

Capacity building to strengthen Bangladesh’s mission in Geneva is essential. It is also necessary to set up a separate mission to attend different meetings at WTO concurrently. Capacity building of a larger number of people is vital, as one team of negotiators is responsible for a particular tenure, meanwhile, another team will remain prepared. Such team cannot participate in actual negotiations but they do negotiations related works from the back.

5. Conclusion

The objective of this article was to analyze developing country’s participation in the institutions of GEG, e.g., IMF, WB and WTO. Until the 20th century, the role of developed countries in the institutions remained at the center and developing countries at the periphery. Since 2002, developing countries especially, India and China have been more powerful player in GEG due to their rapid economic growth and ability to deal with the problems of global economic crisis. India and China are intervening in the IMF and WB through: a) participating in discussion and mitigation of global financial crisis; b) suggesting different proposals for reforming financial institutions like IMF and WB; and c) providing new ideas and arrangements. In WTO, their interventions are more visible through: a) participation in DSM, b) participation in the negotiation process, and c) blocking negotiations through building coalitions. Tactics of India and China could be the guiding lessons for Bangladesh.

In order to broaden participation in the WB and IMF, Bangladesh needs to: a) increase its subscription, b) submit viable lone/joint proposal, c) create pressure on the agenda of developed country, d) build politico-economic image through good governance and knowledge generation, and e) increase representation at the administrative structure. It is necessary for Bangladesh to accelerate economic growth, trade volume and foreign currency reserves to increase its quota and voting power while pushing for reform and asking for greater representation in WB and IMF. Besides, by activating windows of SDF and initiating financial arrangements under BBIN, BCIM-EC, BIMSTEC, Bangladesh can provide new ideas complementing IMF and WB.

Intervention in WTO through participating in DSM is a vital mechanism. Bangladesh may undertake two strategies: a) participation in various cases as a third

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party with particular litigation strategy, and b) increasing domestic legal expertise to reduce high litigation cost. As a third party, Bangladesh can be involved in two categories of disputes: one, in which it has trade interest, and the other, in which its stake will be affected in some way. Participation as a third party will draw attention of others and exhibit Bangladesh’s strength. It is costly to participate as a third party. Crucial is participating in other bodies, e.g., STC. Bangladesh can also intervene in WTO through participation in negotiation process. Limited number of officials and limitation in negotiation hamper quality participation in WTO. This needs to be taken care of. To intervene in different WTO negotiations, Bangladesh can increase its involvement in various coalitions and build new coalitions. In addition, Bangladesh needs to enrich its capacity to participate in a wide range of meetings of WTO.

Bangladesh does not feature in the landscape of GEG institutions prominently. Thus, while following the lessons from India and China, Bangladesh needs to keep in mind that along with economic growth and trade volume influence in the institutions of GEG also depends on non-material capacity of the country. Therefore, Bangladesh can and should improve its negotiating, institutional and ideational capacity for better deals in these GEG institutions.

• BIISS Journal (Quarterly)• Bangladesh Foreign Policy Survey (Quarterly)• BIISS Papers (Monograph series) The Assam Tangle: Outlook for the Future (1984) The Crisis in Lebanon: Multi-dimensional Aspects and Outlook for the Future (1985) India's Policy Fundamentals, Neighbours and Post-Indira Developments (1985) Strategic Aspects of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations (1986) Indo-Bangladesh Common Rivers and Water Diplomacy (1986) Gulf War: The Issues Revisited (1987) The SAARC in Progress: A Hesitant Course of South Asian Transition (1988) Post-Brezhnev Soviet Policy Towards the Third World (1988) Changing Faces of Socialism (1989) Sino-Indian Quest for Rapprochement: Implications for South Asia (1989) Intifada: The New Dimension to Palestinian Struggle (1990) Bangladesh: Towards National Consensus (in Bangla, 1990) Environmental Challenges to Bangladesh (1991) The Gulf War and the New World Order: Implication for the Third World (1992) Challenges of Governance in India: Fundamentals under Threat (1995) Bangladesh in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1998) Nuclearisation of South Asia: Challenges and Options for Bangladesh (1998) The Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinian Statehood (2000) Pakistan and Bangladesh: From Con�ict to Cooperation (2003) Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Bangladesh: A Case for People's Management (2003) WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing Countries: A Neorealist Critique (2004) State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention: Does One Negate the Other? (2006) Unipolarity and Weak States: The Case of Bangladesh (2009) Japan's Strategic Rise (2010) The Fallacy of Fragile States Indices: Is There a 'Fragility Trap'? (2017)

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