israeli policy toward syria 2011 - 2019 · page 2 israeli policy toward syria (2011 - 2019) by...

Israeli Policy Toward Syria 2011 - 2019Elizabeth Tsurkov

Center for Middle East Studies


Occasional Paper Series

Paper No. 9June 2019

Cover Image: Al Quneitra by Ed Brambley

Introduction

The confl ict in Syria has generated heated debate and controversy. As a result, it has also produced an enormous amount of analysis and opinion that has sought to describe the roots of the confl ict, its moral and political signifi cance, and to prescribe solutions to its amelioration.

One of the key dimensions of the war in Syria has been the role of outside actors. Much ink has been spilt in examining the intervention of the United States and Russia, along with the role of regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, in shaping the contours and outcome of developments on the ground. There is on e Middle East regional power, however, that has not received suffi cient attention in terms of its role and policy orientation toward the war in Syria—the state of Israel.

In this paper, Elizabeth Tsurkov, a doctoral candidate at Princeton University, seeks to fi ll this void. Based on a close reading of internal Israeli politics, she examines the debate within Israel on Syria, and the national security concerns that inform this debate. She also documents, based on extensive research, the specifi cs of Israeli intervention from 2011 to 2019.

Our Center for Middle East Studies is proud to publish this paper. We have had a longstanding interest in Syria from the inception of the uprising in 2011 until today. Our mandate as a center is to promote new research and understanding on the societies and politics of the Middle East. This paper helps us achieve our goal. We hope readers will benefi t from its publication.

Nader HashemiDirector of the Center for Middle East Studies

Associate Professor of Middle East and Islamic PoliticsJosef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

Email: [email protected]

www.naderhashemi.com

Israeli Policy Toward Syria (2011 - 2019)By Elizabeth Tsurkov

Israeli policy toward Syria underwent changes throughout the Syrian uprising and subsequent civil war. This pertained to the extent of direct Israeli involvement in the war. The principles guiding the

policy, however, remained fixed, focusing on deterring perceived threats to Israel’s security from the Syrian arena as well as exploiting developments in Syria to improve Israel’s international image and to legitimize its occupation and annexation of the Golan Heights.

Israel’s leadership perceives its policy toward Syria as neutral, since Israel did not adopt a position on the outcome of the civil war and did not intervene in the war to ensure a preferred outcome. The warring sides in Syria, however, often perceive Israel as aligned against their interests, and both can point to Israeli decisions and policies to bolster their claims. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of Israeli government policies with regards to Syria from 2011 to 2019, the logic behind them, and their effect on the ground.

Israeli Policies Toward the Baath Regime Prior to the 2011 Uprising

Officially, Israel and Syria have been in a state of war since Israel’s founding in 1948. Despite this, since the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel’s border with Syria was its quietest. While avoiding direct confrontation with Israel, Hafez al-Assad’s regime cultivated a relationship with Iran and allowed the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps to establish the militant Shi’a organization Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982, and subsequently funneled weapons to it. The maintenance of a quiet border with Israel while indirectly supporting Hezbollah led Israeli policy-makers to view the Assad regime as “the devil we know,” a phrase famously coined by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.1

During the 1990s and 2000s, several Israeli prime ministers conducted futile rounds of peace negotiations with the Assad regime. The negotiations failed, in part, due to poor political timing, disagreements over the demarcation of the June 4, 1967 line--to which Israel was expected to withdraw in exchange for peace with Syria--and Syria’s refusal to sever ties with Iran and Hezbollah.2 While conducting negotiations and between negotiation rounds, the indirect--and at times direct, but undeclared--conflict between Israel and Syria persisted. The Assad regime continued to transfer weapons to Hezbollah, and Israel occasionally carried out attacks in Syria, most notably the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, a high-ranking Hezbollah commander, in Damascus in 2008, and the strike on the al-Kibar nuclear facility in Deir Ezzor in 2009.

Israel’s Policies Following the Outbreak of the Syrian Uprising

Fear of an “Islamist Winter”

Following the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, Israel’s conservative political and military leadership adopted a cautious approach, driven by the instinct to preempt threats rather than identify opportunities. The IDF’s Home Front Commander, General Eyal Eisenberg, voiced this position in a September 2011 speech in which he presented the IDF’s assessment that a threat of a regional war has

1 Itamar Rabinovich, ““The Devil We Know” Revisited: Israeli Thinking on the Future of the Assad Regime,” INSS Insight, no. 427, May 19, 2013. Accessible: http://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-devil-we-know-revisited-israeli-thinking-on-the-future-of-the-assad-regime/

2 Marwa Daoudy, “A Missed Chance for Peace: Israel and Syria Negotiations Over the Golan Heights,” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 61, No. 2, 2008, pp. 215-234. Itamar Rabinovich, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington: The Syrian- Israeli Relationship as a U.S. Policy Issue,” Brookings Institution, March 2009. Accessible online: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03_syria_isra-el_rabinovich.pdf Ron Ben Yishai, “The Golan on the Table: What Did Ron Lauder Promise Assad?” Ynet News, May 5, 2009. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3710867,00.html “Former High-Ranking Security Official: Netanyahu Negotiated for the Golan,” Walla!, October 13, 2012. Accessible in Hebrew: https://news.walla.co.il/item/2574998 Itamar Inbari, “Olmert to Assad: Ready for a Full Withdrawal from the Golan,” Maariv, April 23, 2008. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.makorrishon.co.il/nrg/online/1/ART1/725/183.html

increased as a result of the destabilizing effects of the uprisings, stating, “they [the uprisings] are called the Arab Spring, but it may turn into a radical Islamic winter.”3 Brigadier General Itay Brun, head of the IDF’s Intelligence Directorate, the main Israeli body in charge of formulating intelligence assessments, stated in a speech the same month that “it is possible that the political systems that will be instituted in the Arab world will be more open and pluralistic, but there are still significant impediments to the emergence of Western-style democracy” in the Arab world. Brun added that while the protesters across the Arab world do not have a clear political ideology, “hostility toward Israel is already serving as a common denominator” among Arab Spring protesters.4 In March 2012, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also voiced concerns about the rise of Islamists due to uprisings across the Arab world, similar to the events of the 1979 revolution in Iran.5

Driven by this fearful and cautious approach, Israel avoided, throughout the entire Syrian civil war, adopting a position regarding the Assad regime. Netanyahu condemned the regime for its human rights atrocities but he did not call for Assad to step down or for international intervention to remove him from power. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs advocated for adopting such a position, but was overruled by the prime minister’s office, whichargued in internal deliberations that such a statement would serve Assad’s narrative that Israel was among the powers conspiring against the “resistance” regime in Damascus.6

Chemical Weapons

Israel has long perceived Syrian chemical weapon stockpiles as a threat.7 After August 2012, when U.S. President Barack Obama stated that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would be a “red line,” Israel seized on the statement to push for U.S. action against the regime.8 In 2013, as the Assad regime began utilizing chemical weapons in low-casualty attacks that the Obama administration preferred to ignore, Israeli officials leaked intelligence concerning the movement of chemical weapons in Syria and attacks perpetrated by the regime.9

In late August and September 2013, after the Assad regime carried out its deadliest chemical weapons attack, blatantly violating President Obama’s “red line,” Israel supported a limited American retaliation against the Assad regime, seeing the enforcement of American “red lines” as important for deterring Iran from developing nuclear weapons.10 As the Obama administration wavered in its commitment to enforce the red line, Israeli officials quickly sought to exploit the situation to achieve a different

3 Yoav Zeitun, “General Eisenberg: The Likelihood of an All-Out War has Increased,” Ynet, September 5, 2011. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4118216,00.html

4 “Head of IDF’s Intelligence Directorate: The “Arab Fog” Presents a Significant Challenge to the National Intelligence Assessor,” The Center for Intelligence Community Legacy Bulletin no. 10, November 2011. Accessible in Hebrew: https://malam.cet.ac.il/CETHandler.ashx-?n=CetEntities.FileViewer&i=7b6c26a9-ffd0-426d-b508-19d6c9d151f1&id=32734

5 “The PM: ‘The Arab Spring May Turn into an Iranian Winter,” Israel Hayom, March 15, 2015. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.israelha-yom.co.il/article/35996

6 Barak Ravid, “Israeli Government Sharply Divided Over Response to Syria Unrest,” Haaretz, February 16, 2012. Accessible online: https://www.haaretz.com/1.5186386

7 Jeffery Goldberg, “Israel Asked Jordan for Approval to Bomb Syrian WMD Sites,” The Atlantic, December 2, 2012. Accessible online: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/israel-asked-jordan-for-approval-to-bomb-syrian-wmd-sites/265818/

8 The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps,” August 20, 2012. Accessible online: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps

9 Ian Black, “Syria working to secure chemical weapons, say Israeli officials,” The Guardian, July 13, 2012. Accessible online https: www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/13/syria-secure-chemical-weapons-israel?CMP=twt_gu Uzi Mahnaimi, “Is-rael tracks Syria’s chemical arsenal,” The Times, December 9, 2012. Accessible online: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/israel-tracks-syrias-chemical-arsenal-b0kzlwg270q Eli Bardstein, Yohai Ofer, Assad Gavor, “The Statement of the Head of the Intelligence Directorate Embarrassed the White House,” NRG, April 24, 2013. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.ma-korrishon.co.il/nrg/online/1/ART2/463/216.html Peter Baker, Mark Landler, David E. Sanger, Anne Barnard, “Obama’s Vow on Chemical Weapons Puts Him in Tough Spot,” The New York Times, May 4, 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/middleeast/obamas-vow-on-chemical-weapons-puts-him-in-tough-spot.html?smid=tw-share&pagewanted=print

10 Judi Rudoren, “Israel Backs Limited Strike Against Syria,” The New York Times, September 5, 2013. Acccessible online: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/world/middleeast/israel-backs-limited-strike-against-syria.html

Israeli objective: disarming the Assad regime’s chemical weapons threat. Israeli officials differ in their accounts regarding Israel’s role in proposing the solution of supervised disarmament,11 but Israel cautiously welcomed the Russian-brokered deal.12 When it became apparent that the Assad regime did not fully disarm and continued to use chemical weapons, Israeli officials again resorted to leaking the intelligence to Western outlets.13

2013: Israeli Red Lines and Aid

In the first two years of the uprising, Israel maintained a policy of non-intervention in events unfolding in Syria. This policy was predicated on the view that the uprising and subsequent civil war were a domestic affair, unlikely to have direct effects on Israel’s security.14 Israel’s intelligence community initially assessed that Assad would be toppled quickly.15 Past experience in Lebanon, where Israel intervened in an ongoing civil war and failed to shape its desired outcome, also influenced the thinking of Israeli leaders.16 In 2013, as fighting moved closer to the occupied Golan Heights, Israel publicly articulated a series of “red lines” that would lead it to intervene in Syria to protect its interests, namely: cross-fence fire on the Golan Heights or Israel; transfer of “game-changing” weaponry to Lebanese Hezbollah such as precision-guided missiles, anti-aircraft weapons and chemical weapons; and the establishment of offensive infrastructure by the Assad regime and its allies in areas abutting the Golan Heights fence.17

In late 2012, IDF human intelligence unit, known as Unit 504, established initial contact with rebels operating around Breiqa in Quneitra following the personal initiative of an IDF officer to converse with rebels he saw across the fence.18 On February 16, 2013, a rebel commander who had established a relationship with Israeli intelligence asked for the evacuation into Israel of seven of his fighters injured in fighting regime forces. This was the first such evacuation. Under the initial parameters of the deal, rebels provided Israel with intelligence and protected its border in exchange for medical care and limited humanitarian aid to rebel-held villages in Quneitra and limited military assistance to local rebels in southern Syria.19 The assistance was intended to engender goodwill among Syrian civilians and rebels and ensure stability along the border.20 This initial limited medical assistance for fighters only would later turn into a much larger humanitarian project through which almost 12,000 Syrian rebels

11 Eli Lake, “Israel Helped Obama Skirt ‘Red Line’ on Syria,” Bloomberg, June 15, 2015. Accessible online: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-10-13/another-financial-crisis-human-nature-demands-it

12 “Israel backs Russian chemical weapons plan for Syria,” al-Bawaba, September 12, 2013. https://www.albawaba.com/news/israel-syr-ia-chemical-weapons-519980

13 “Assad said to be hoarding chemical weapons,” Times of Israel, February 2, 2014. Accessible online: http://www.timesofisrael.com/as-sad-said-to-be-hoarding-chemical-weapons/ Reuters, “Israeli official: Syria kept ‘significant’ chemical weapons,” September 18, 2014. Accessible online: https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Israeli-official-Syria-kept-significant-chemical-weapons-375756

14 Nir Boms, (2018): Israel’s Policy on the Syrian Civil War: Risks and Opportunities, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/23739770.2017.1430006

15 Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, “Senior IDF Official: Assad’s Fall Will Take Longer than We Had Expected,” Haaretz, April 30, 2012. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/world/1.1696336

16 Udi Dekel, Nir Boms and Ofir Winter, “Syria’s New Map and New Actors: Challenges and Opportunities for Israel,” INSS memorandum no. 156. Accessible online: http://www.inss.org.il/publication/syrias-new-map-and-new-actors-challenges-and-opportunities-for-israel/Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “Chemical Weapons Showdown With Syria Led to Rare Accord,” New York Times, January 7, 2013. Ac-cessible online: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/world/middleeast/chemical-weapons-showdown-with-syria-led-to-rare-accord.html

17 Ahikam Moshe David, “Ya’alon: Inaction in Syria Also Has Ramifications for Us”, NRG, September 8, 2013. Accessible in Hebrew: www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/505/424.html International Crisis Group, “Israel, Hizbollah and Iran: Preventing Another War in Syria,” Feb-ruary 2018. Accessible online: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/182-israel-hizbol-lah-and-iran-preventing-another-war-syria

18 “The Syrian Connection: The True Story,” Uvda, May 23, 2019. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.mako.co.il/tv-ilana_dayan/2019/Arti-cle-f4561d9aad5ea61027.htm

19 Nir Boms, 2018, Israel’s Policy on the Syrian Civil War: Risks and Opportunities, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs; Rory Jones, Noam Raydan and Suha Ma’ayeh, “Israel Gives Secret Aid to Syrian Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2017. Accessible online: https://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-gives-secret-aid-to-syrian-rebels-1497813430

20 Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Israel’s Deepening Involvement with Syria’s Rebels,” War on the Rocks, February 14, 2018. Accessible online: https://war ontherocks.com/2018/02/israels-deepening-involvement-syrias-rebels/

and civilians received medical care in Israeli hospitals and clinics in the Golan Heights.21 Shortly prior to this, in 2012, year, Israel began carrying out airstrikes to disrupt weapon shipments to Hezbollah through Syria.22

Hasbara

Israeli media outlets immediately reported on the initial entry of Syrian patients to Israel and offered sporadic and laconic coverage of additional medical evacuations into Israel.23 Initially, Israeli officials were hesitant about commenting on the operation, but apparently realizing the public relations potential, they began granting media outlets access to the Syrian patients, as long as their identity was concealed, to ensure their safety upon return to Syria.24 As Israel’s aid operations expanded, so did the public relations campaign around them, with the IDF producing materials in multiple languages about the aid brought into Syria through the Golan and the patients treated in Israel.25

Solidifying Control of the Occupied Golan

Another policy objective of Israel’s throughout the war has been to increase international acceptance of the occupation and annexation of the Golan Heights, captured by Israel in 1967. Until 2019, no country has recognized Israeli annexation of the Golan. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, exploiting the tumult in Syria and international pariah status of the Assad regime, Israeli officials made public statements and symbolic steps, such as holding the first cabinet meeting in the occupied Golan, intended to signal that Israel will not relinquish control over the territory.26 Privately, Israel pushed the Obama and Trump administrations to recognize Israel’s annexation.27 These efforts yielded the unprecedented recognition by the Trump administration of the Golan’s annexation in March 2019.28 On the ground in the Golan, Israel increased efforts to integrate the Druze community into Israel by encouraging taking up Israeli citizenship and participating in local elections, held for the first time in Druze Golan communities in October 2018.29

21 Yoav Zitun, “After Two Years: IDF Ends the Humanitarian Assistance to Syrians,” Ynet, September 13, 2018. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5349571,00.html

22 Amos Harel, “Israel Struck Syrian and Hezbollah Arms Convoys Nearly 100 Times in Five Years, Top General Says,” Haaretz, August 17, 2017. Accessible online: https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/israel-struck-syrian-hezbollah-convoys-nearly-100-times-in-5-years-1.5443378

23 Or Heller, “IDF Intends to Establish a Field Hospital in the Golan to Prevent the Entry of Syrian Refugees,” Channel 10 News, Febru-ary 19, 2013. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.10.tv/news/56623 Reut Mishor and Eli Levy, “Injured from Syria Were Transferred for Treatment, Their Injuries Are Somewhat Severe,” Channel 10 News, March 20, 2013. Accessible in Hebrew: http://10tv.nana10.co.il/Arti-cle/?ArticleID=965970

24 One of the first international media reports: Inna Lazareva, “‘I lost consciousness in the blast. When I woke up I was in a hospital in Israel’: Casualties of Syria’s war find salvation in an unlikely place,” The Independent, August 8, 2013. Accessible online: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/i-lost-consciousness-in-the-blast-when-i-woke-up-i-was-in-a-hospital-in-israel-casual-ties-of-syria-s-8752933.html

25 IDF website, “Operation Good Neighbor”. Accessible online: https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/operation-good-neighbor/ IDF web-site, “Operación Buena Vecindad: resumen anual 2017,” January 9, 2018. Accessible in Spanish: https://www.idf.il/es/minisites/op-eraci%C3%B3n-buena-vecindad/operaci%C3%B3n-buena-vecindad-resumen-anual-2017/ IDF website, “Les missions humanitaires de Tsahal au fil des années,” August 21, 2018. Accessible in French: https://www.tsahal.fr/minisites/aide-humanitaire/les-missions-hu-manitaires-de-tsahal-au-fil-des-ann%C3%A9es/

26 Raphael Ahren, “Netanyahu vows Golan Heights will remain part of Israel forever,” Times of Israel, april 17, 2016. Accessible online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-vows-golan-heights-will-remain-part-of-israel-forever/

27 Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu to Obama: Syria Disintegration Allows for ‘Different Thinking’ on Future of Golan Heights,” Haaretz, Novem-ber 10, 2015. Accessible online: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-pm-to-obama-syria-war-allows-for-different-think-ing-on-golan-heights-1.5419951 Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu: I Asked Trump to Recognize Israeli Sovereignty in Golan Heights,” February 16, 2017. Accessible online: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-netanyahu-i-asked-trump-to-recognize-israeli-sovereign-ty-in-golan-1.5436051 Haaretz, “Israel Pushing Trump to Recognize Hold on Golan Heights, Intel Minister Says,” May 24, 2018. Accessi-ble online: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-pushing-trump-to-recognize-hold-on-the-golan-minister-says-1.6115129

28 Vanessa Romo, “Trump Formally Recognizes Israeli Sovereignty Over Golan Heights,” NPR, March 25, 2019. Accessible online: https://www.npr.org/2019/03/25/706588932/trump-formally-recognizes-israeli-sovereignty-over-golan-heights

29 Interview with Druze Golan Heights residents, 2016-2017; Kyle S. Mackie, “An Experiment in Democracy: Torn Between Syria and Israel, Golan Druze Divided Over First Election,” Haaretz, September 6, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premi-um-torn-between-syria-and-israel-golan-druze-divided-over-first-election-1.6459572

Pushing the U.S. to Intervene

In 2013-2015, as Islamist and jihadist groups gained prominence among Syria’s armed opposition and Iran increased its involvement in Syria, disagreements emerged among Israeli policy-makers regarding the preferred outcome of the war. Some inside the IDF and the political establishment saw the jihadist groups as the main threat to Israel and wished to see Assad regain control of Syria. Others saw the regime’s close ties to Iran and Hezbollah and their growing influence in Syria as the main threat.30 These disagreements manifested in contradictory leaks regarding Israel’s positions toward the Assad regime.31

While Israeli officials were largely unified in their belief that it is not Israel’s role to intervene in Syria, some supported a U.S. intervention to back the Syrian rebels or punish the Assad regime for its excesses.32 When Israeli officials expected the Assad regime to be toppled by mid-2013, Israeli officials pushed the U.S. for greater engagement with the armed opposition to allow the Obama administration to shape the outcome of the war.33 With the radicalization of the opposition and growing Iranian involvement in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime, some Israeli officials preferred the war to continue, seeing the as and harmful to the two sides, both of which are antagonistic to Israel.34

In mid-2013, a secret operations’ room comprised of several Western intelligence services including the CIA, Jordanian intelligence, and Arab Gulf intelligence services known as the Military Operations Command (MOC) began funneling aid to Free Syrian Army factions operating in southern Syria.35 In early 2014, the MOC significantly expanded the provision of aid and also began providing training to Free Syrian Army fighters. This qualitative and quantitative expansion in assistance was accompanied by the formation of the Southern Front, which unified dozens of Free Syrian Army factions operating in southern Syria.36 Through control of the disbursement of salaries and weapons, the MOC was able to institute a semblance of unified, but foreign, control over the Southern Front.37 The absence of Salafi or jihadist groups in the Southern Front ranks led Israeli officials to see the grouping as a positive force that should be supported. However, Israeli efforts to convince the Obama administration to increase support for the Southern Front were unsuccessful.38

Protecting the Druze of Hader

From 2014 to mid-2018, only a small sliver of territory along the fence with the occupied Golan remained under the control of the Assad regime. This area included the Druze town of Hader (also written Hadr, Hadher). Unlike Druze in Sweidaa’ who largely evaded military service and chose a policy of neutrality in the civil war, the Druze of Hader joined pro-regime militias in large numbers.39 Hader 30 Ben Caspit, “Israel adjusts to Syrian insurgents on Golan border,” Al-Monitor, May 20, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.al-monitor.

com/pulse/originals/2014/05/israel-syria-rebels-border-zone-golan-assad-elections.html 31 Ben Caspit, “Israel Anticipates ‘Somalization’ of Syria,” Al-Monitor, March 1, 2013. Accessible online: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

originals/2013/03/life-after-assad.html “‘Israel prefers Bashar Assad to Islamist rebels’”, Times of Israel, May 18, 2013. Accessible online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-prefers-assad-to-islamist-rebels/

32 International Crisis Group, “Israel, Hizbollah and Iran: Preventing Another War in Syria,” February 2018. 33 Wall Street Journal, “CIA Expands Role in Syria Fight,” March 22, 2013. Accessible online: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278

87324373204578376591874909434 34 Ben Caspit, “Israeli security chiefs modify assessment on Syrian war,” Al-Monitor, February 11, 2014. Accessible online: https://www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/syria-war-assad-rebbels-hezbollah-iran-lebanon.html Ben Caspit, “Fighting on Golan border puts Israel on the spot,” Al-Monitor, September 2, 2014. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/israel-syria-goln-heights-assad-insurgents-idf-drone.html Judi Rudoren, “Israel Backs Limited Strike Against Syria,” The New York Times, September 5, 2013.

35 International Crisis Group, “New Approach in Southern Syria,” February 2015, p. 10. Accessible online: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloud-front.net/163-new-approach-in-southern-syria.pdf

36 Ibid.37 Thus, for example, the MOC was able to halt the Southern Front’s June 2015 offensive on the al-Tha’ala airbase in Sweida by cutting off

the salaries of combatants. The MOC was also able to prevent most Daraa factions from participating in offensives in Daraa city after mid-2015. Interviews with Daraa rebels and rebel commanders, 2015-2017.

38 International Crisis Group, “Israel, Hizbollah and Iran: Preventing Another War in Syria,” February 2018. Amos Harel, “Israel Is Chang-ing Its Approach to Syria War Amid Assad’s Battleground Advances,” Haaretz, February 21, 2016. Accessible online: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-is-changing-its-approach-to-syria-war-1.5407077

39 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “More On The Druze Militias in Southern Syria,” Syria Comment, November 15, 2013. Accessible online:

became a recruitment and staging ground for Hezbollah networks.40 Samir Kuntar, a Druze Lebanese militant convicted of killing an Israeli family and two Israeli policemen in northern Israel in 1979 and subsequently released in a swap between Israel and Hezbollah, led this network until Israel assassinated him in 2015. At least two attacks against Israeli forces originated from the town.41

Despite the presence of Hezbollah networks in Hader and failed Israeli overtures to its residents,42 Israel warned the Sunni rebels against attacking the town, both in private and in public.43 This decision to protect a town with a Hezbollah presence demonstrates the influence of the Druze community on Israeli decision-making. This influence, to a large extent, stems from the political power of Israel’s Druze community, which includes in its ranks many voters of right-wing (ruling) parties, elected officials, and high-ranking IDF commanders.

Russia Intervenes

Russia’s decision to directly intervene in Syria’s war in September 2015 was initially welcomed by some among Israel’s leadership who hoped that Russia would be able to draw Assad away from Iran’s orbit.44 Assad, however, exploited the intervention to play Iran and Russia off one another to extract as much assistance to achieve his military objectives.45 Shortly before Russia’s intervention, Israel and Russia established a deconfliction mechanism to allow Israeli aircrafts to continue operating in Syria’s airspace.46 The details of the agreement were never disclosed. The Israeli newspaper Maariv published the most comprehensive outline of the deal, referring to S-300 and S-400 batteries operated by Russian personnel in Syria: “Israel will inform Russia ahead of time of its intention to operate in Syria’s skies. The notification will be general and will not include operational details. In exchange, Russia will not scramble its jets toward [Israeli] Air Force jets and will not operate its air defense systems in Syria, including the advanced S-300 and S-400 batteries.”47 Under this deal, Israel could carry out strikes against Iranian targets in Syria, including weapon shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah as they pass through Syria to Lebanon. However, the Kremlin, interested in stabilizing the rule of Bashar al-Assad, warned Israel against attacking Assad regime targets.48

Recognizing Russia’s growing influence in Syria, Israeli officials strove to establish a close working relationship with Russia’s military and political leadership. Israel dispatched dozens of high-level delegations to Russia, including multiple meetings between Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and

http://www.aymennjawad.org/14059/more-on-the-druze-militias-in-southern-syria Mazzen Ezzi, “The Druze of Suwayda: The Embers of Dissent,” al-Jumhuriya, September 22, 2015. Accessible online: https://www.aljumhuriya.net/en/en/sweida/the-druze-of-suwayda-the-embers-of-dissent

40 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel unmasks new Hezbollah commander on Syrian Golan,” Jerusalem Post, October 25, 2017. Accessible online: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israel-unveils-new-Hezbollah-leader-on-Syria-border-508368

41 Amos Harel, “Samir Kuntar Heads a Hezbollah Terrorist Network in the Syrian Golan,” Haaretz, December 24, 2014. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.2520260 Avi Issacaroff, “The Brain Behind the String of Attacks at the Border: Who was Jihad Mughniyeh?” Walla! News, January 18, 2015. Accessible in Hebrew: https://news.walla.co.il/item/2821008

42 Nour Samaha, “Help comes with dangerous strings for Syrian Druze town,” Al-Monitor, April 24, 2017. Accessible online: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/04/syria-druze-golan-heights-regime-opposition-israel.html

43 Adi Hashmonai, “The Druze Village on the Border with Israel that is Surviving the War in Syria,” Walla! News, May 10, 2015. Accessible in Hebrew: https://news.walla.co.il/item/2852689 Dan Williams, “Israel says asked Syrian rebels not to harm Druze,” Reuters, June 29, 2015. Accessible online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-israel-druze-idUSKCN0P91GN20150629 Times of Israel, “In rare step, Israel says it will help Syrian Druze village fend off jihadists,” November 3, 2017. Accessible online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-rare-step-israel-says-it-will-help-syrian-druze-village-fend-off-jihadists/

44 Tal Lev Ram, “Despite the Debt: Assad Will Lose if He Allows Iran to Remain in Syria,” Maariv, January 19, 2018. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/opinions/Article-618561

45 Anne Barnard, “The Scorpion’s Tale: Did Assad Take Putin for a Ride?,” the New York Times, March 22, 2016. Accessible online: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/middleeast/bashar-al-assad-syria-russia-west.html

46 Maria Tsvetkova, “Israel, Russia to coordinate military action on Syria: Netanyahu,” Reuters, September 21, 2015. 47 Yossi Melman, “The Bloody Week in Gaza Marks the End of the Quiet Era Since Pillar of Defense,” Maariv, May 19, 2018. Accessible in

Hebrew: https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/Article-638841 48 Yaniv Kubovich, “Russia Warned Israel Before Downing of Plane: Attacking Syrian Targets Harms Moscow’s Interests,” Haaretz, Sep-

tember 25, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/.premium-russia-warned-israel-before-down-ing-of-plane-attacking-syrian-targets-harms-moscow-s-interests-1.6494420

Russian President Vladimir Putin. In these meetings, held in 2016 and2017, Israeli officials pressed theRussians to protect what the Israeli government perceives as its vital interests in Syria--particularly, preventing the establishment of long-term Iranian presence in Syria and halting weapon transfers to Hezbollah. Israeli officials conducted similar meetings with Obama and Trump administration officials. Russia appeared disinterested or unable to limit Iranian influence in Syria, while the Obama and Trump administrations largely disengaged from Syria.49

Regime Takeover of Southern Syria

Bolstered by military support from Russia and Iran, the Assad regime was able to reverse the course of the war starting in 2016. Multiple rebel-held pockets and ISIS-held areas, including eastern Aleppo, northern Homs, the Qalamoun mountains, Deir Ezzor, eastern Ghouta, and the Wadi Barada region were reclaimed by the Assad regime from 2016 to 2018. In the summer of 2017, it became apparent that the regime would eventually set its sights on southern Syria. Ahead of the looming offensive, Israel attempted to secure its interests, chief among them preventing the presence of Iranian forces and Iranian-backed militias in southern Syria. Israel demanded a 60-kilometer buffer zone in which Iranian forces will not be allowed to operate.50

Growing Involvement

Initially, Russia and the Trump administration appeared unresponsive to Israeli demands to prevent the presence of Iranian forces in southern Syria.51 Sensing that Russia and the U.S. would not protect Israeli interests in Syria, in the summer of 2017, Israel shifted to a more interventionist policy, striking Iranian targets deeper inside Syria and with greater frequency. In addition, Israel increased the provision of humanitarian assistance to communities in southwestern Syria and rebel groups in control of these areas.52

While Israel publicized the humanitarian assistance, its military aid to rebel groups remained covert. The Israeli censor prevented the publication of reports on Israel’s military assistance in Israeli media, unless citing “foreign sources.”53 According to Syrian rebels, journalists, and civilians in southern Syria, Israeli military assistance to the rebels reached at least 12 different groups operating in Quneitra, western Daraa and the southwestern outskirts of the Damascus countryside, which comprised several thousands of fighters. The assistance included the provision of light weapons, vehicles, salaries, cash to purchase weapons on the black market, and medical treatment. Groups that were engaged in the fight against the local ISIS affiliate, Jaysh Khalid bin al-Walid, also received support in the form of Israeli missile and drone strikes against ISIS leaders, vehicles, and fortifications. Groups conducting offensive operations against the Assad regime did not receive similar support.54 At the same time, Israeli officials made it clear that they were not opposed to Assad staying in power, merely his connection to Iran.55

49 Amos Harel, “Israel Is Changing Its Approach to Syria War Amid Assad’s Battleground Advances,” Haaretz, February 21, 2016; Jona-than Spyer, “Israel Is Going to War in Syria to Fight Iran,” Foreign Policy, September 28, 2017. Accessible online: https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/28/israel-is-going-to-war-in-syria-to-fight-iran/ Ronen Bergman, “The Middle East’s Coming War,” the New York Times, February 12, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/opinion/the-middle-easts-coming-war.html

50 Amos Harel, “Israel Demanded 60km Buffer but Russia Let Iranian Forces in Syria Approach the Border,” Haaretz, September 15, 2017. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/russia-allowed-iranian-forces-to-approach-syrian-border-despite-israeli-de-mands-1.5450853

51 Udi Dekel and Zvi Magen, “Israel’s Red Lines on Iran’s Foothold in Syria,” INSS, November 22, 2017. Accessible online: http://www.inss.org.il/publication/israels-red-lines-irans-foothold-syria/

52 Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Israel’s Deepening Involvement with Syria’s Rebels,” War on the Rocks, February 14, 2018.53 Tom O’Connor, “Israel Secretly Armed Syrian Rebels and Then Abandoned Them, Reports Say,” Newsweek, September 6, 2018. Accessi-

ble online: https://www.newsweek.com/israel-secretly-armed-syrian-rebels-then-abandoned-them-reports-say-1109858 54 Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Inside Israel’s Secret Program to Back Syrian Rebels,” Foreign Policy, September 6, 2018. Accessible online: https://

foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/06/in-secret-program-israel-armed-and-funded-rebel-groups-in-southern-syria/ 55 Noa Landau, “Netanyahu: We Have No Problem with Assad, We Will Not Intervene if Agreements Are Upheld,” Haaretz, July 12, 2018.

Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.6268138

Efforts by Syrian opposition activists inside and outside of the country, rebel commanders, and local councils in southern Syria to encourage Israel to expand its involvement in the war in a manner than would shift the balance of power in their favor were unsuccessful. Israeli military and humanitarian assistance, even at its height, was highly limited.56 Rebels in southern Syria described being unable to secure support from Israel. Israeli assistance was geographically limited to Quneitra, western Daraa, and the southwestern outskirts of Damascus. Proposals by locals in Quneitra and Syrian exiled activists to allow for the export of agricultural produce from southern Syria to Israel were rebuffed by the latter. Israel also refused to implement a No-Fly Zone in southern Syria, despite the pleas of Syrians based in Quneitra and Daraa as well as in exile.57

Cutting a Deal

Israel’s more interventionist policy apparently convinced Moscow to promise to prevent the presence of Iranian forces 85 kilometers from the Golan in exchange for Israeli acquiescence with the regime’s takeover of southern Syria.58 The agreement was still being negotiated as the regime, in June 2018, launched its offensive on southern Syria, focusing initially on eastern Daraa, the area most distant from Israel. Iranian-backed forces participated in the offensive, but the majority of forces were Syrian.59 Little fighting occurred on the ground, and the entire rebel-held south was retaken in a month, after rebels realized they would not receive U.S. assistance or Israeli protection.60 Rebels preferred to surrender to the regime to spare their towns, families, and their own lives.61 A minority among the rebels operating in the south preferred to be displaced to the last rebel-held pocket in northern Syria, rather than surrender.62

Internal Debate and Abandoning the Rebels

The decision to reach an agreement with Russia and allow the Assad regime to retake southern Syria was a controversial one inside the Israeli establishment. While all within the establishment shared the view that Assad was winning the war, some thought it would be possible to delay this takeover to achieve a greater concession from Russia and the Assad regime in the form of removing Iranian forces from all of Syria, not just the south.63 Others, and particularly the IDF’s top echelon and the Northern Command involved in the provision of aid to southern Syria, opposed the deal due to fear for the fate of the communities and rebels who relied on Israeli support.64 As part of the negotiations with the

56 Western donors of humanitarian assistance provided much greater quantities of aid, while the MOC, when operational until the end of 2017, provided more materiel. Interviews with rebels in southern Syria, 2017-2018.

57 Interviews with rebel commanders, activists in southern Syria and abroad, and Syrian humanitarian activists, 2015-2018.58 Yoav Zeitoun, “Despite the Proclamations - the Iranians are not Far from Israel’s Border,” Ynet News, August 3, 2018. Accessible in He-

brew: https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5321273,00.html 59 Ahed Fadel, “WATCH: Iranian militia leader appears in video in Daraa,” al-Arabiya English, July 2, 2018. Accessible online: http://en-

glish.alarabiya.net/en/features/2018/07/02/WATCH-Iranian-militia-leader-appears-in-video-in-Daraa-.html 60 Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Inside Israel’s Secret Program to Back Syrian Rebels,” Foreign Policy; “You’re on your own, US tells Syrian rebels, as

Assad goes on offensive,” Reuters, June 23, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/24/youre-on-your-own-us-tells-syrian-rebels-as-assad-goes-on-offensive

61 Interviews with “reconciled” rebels, July 2018.62 A little over 10,000 individuals were displaced from Daraa, including many civilians. The total fighting force of the Southern Front alone

(which excluded jihadist groups) was estimated to be about 30,000. See: “Who are the rebels in southern Syria?”, AFP, June 29, 2016. Accessible online https://www.france24.com/en/20180629-who-are-rebels-southern-syria And “The 5th convoy of Daraa’s displaced people arrives in the outskirts of Idlib province few hours after its departure from Jasim area in the north of Daraa province,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 12, 2018. Accessible online: http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=100235

63 “The Withdrawal of the Iranians from Syria,” Kann News, July 2, 2018. Video accessible in Hebrew: https://twitter.com/Elizrael/sta-tus/1003003914797637632 Netanyahu appeared to have supported this maximalist demand, later changing his position. See: Ra-phael Ahren, “Israel rejects Russian offer to keep Iran 100 km from Syrian border,” Times of Israel, July 23, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-rejects-russian-offer-to-keep-iran-100-km-from-israels-border/; Yael Friedson, “Netanyahu: Removing Iranian forces from Syria ‘is a process’,” Ynet News, October 6, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.ynetnews.com/arti-cles/0,7340,L-5283442,00.html

64 “The Agreement to Remove Iran,” Kann News, July 4, 2018. Video in Hebrew accessible at: https://twitter.com/kann_news/sta-tus/1003328653122514948v; Amos Harel, “The Assad Regime is Preparing to Retake the Syrian Golan, and Israel Will Decide Whether to Intervene in the Fighting,” Haaretz, June 26, 2018. Accessible in Hebrew https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.6217395

Kremlin, Israel requested that those who received its assistance not be punished. Israel also requested that rebels it supported, particularly Forsan al-Jolan, be allowed to remain in their homes and operate as a local force, similar to a deal reached for a rebel group previously supported by Israel in Beit Jinn, near the Hermon Mountain.65 Eventually, the elements within the Israeli establishment supportive of disengaging from southern Syria prevailed, to the disappointment and shock of Syrian rebels and civilians in the south who came to perceive Israel as an ally.66 Israel largely ignored pleas by commanders and fighters supported by Israel to be allowed to cross to safety in Israel, with the exception of eight rebel commanders and their families.67

Narrowing Space to Maneuver

On September 17, 2018, responding to yet another Israeli strike, this one near Lattakia, the regime’s air defenses accidentally shot down a Russian jet, killing the 15 crew members onboard.68 The Kremlin, increasingly concerned about the destabilizing effect on the Assad regime by Israeli air strikes, seized the opportunity to impose new constraints on Israel’s ability to operate in Syria’s skies.69 After years of delay, Russia supplied the Syrian Army with batteries of the advanced S-300 missile defense system, which until September 2018, were only used by Russian forces in Syria. Those Russian forces, as part of the agreement with Israel, would switch off their radars when receiving notification from Israel about a planned Israeli attack. Since the shootdown incident, in a change in policy, Russian forces no longer switch off the radars, but also do not lock them on Israeli jets operating in Syria’s air space.70 Russia has demanded that Israel provide longer notification times ahead of military actions and the general location of operation, a demand Israel fears will allow the Iranians to hide the targets.71

The S-300 systems were scheduled to be handed over to Syrian forces in March 2019, following the completion of training.72 Israeli fighter pilots have trained to evade S-300 systems in Cyprus,73 but thus far have not had to test those skills in the battlefield.

As Israel attempts to navigate the growing Russian-imposed constraints on its freedom to operate in Syria, Iran appears to be shifting its operation in Syria to increasingly rely on Syrian militiamen and fighters and their insertion into regime military structures. Russia’s desire to bolster the Syrian state--at the expense of militias--has led to the dissolution of multiple militias or reductions in their ranks, including ones backed by Iran.74 However, Syrian opposition outlets continue to report about65 Noa Landau, “Netanyahu: We Have No Problem with Assad, We Will Not Intervene if Agreements Are Upheld,” Haaretz, July 12, 2018;

Ron Ben Yishai, “The Card is in the Hands of Netanyahu and Eisenkot: The Israeli Threat Has Been Received in Moscow,” Ynet News, July 23, 2018. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5315266,00.html; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Recon-ciliation in Syria: The case of Beit Jann,” May 22, 2018. Accessible online: http://www.aymennjawad.org/21199/reconciliation-in-syr-ia-the-case-of-beit-jann

66 Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Inside Israel’s Secret Program to Back Syrian Rebels,” Foreign Policy; Elhanan Miller, “Israel’s Failure to Support Syrian Rebels,” Tablet Magazine, September 11, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/270101/israel-syrian-rebels

67 Interviews with rebels supported by Israel, July 2018 and May 2019.68 Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, “Syria accidentally shot down a Russian military plane,” CNN, September 18, 2018. Accessible online:

https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/17/politics/syrian-regime-shoots-down-russian-plane/index.html 69 Yaniv Kubovich, “Russia Warned Israel Before Downing of Plane: Attacking Syrian Targets Harms Moscow’s Interests,” Haaretz,

September 25, 2018; Amos Harel, “Since Spy-plane Downing, Russia Toughens Stance Against Israel in Syria Skies,” Haaretz, October 21, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/.premium-since-downing-of-russian-jet-moscow-toughens-stance-against-israel-in-syria-1.6575789

70 Alon Ben David, “Not Beyond Beyond: A Conflict with Hizbollah would be Bloody from the Start,” Maariv, October 26, 2018. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/Article-667623

71 Dana Weiss, “Putin’s New Demand from Israel,” HaHadashot, October 24, 2018. Accessible in Hebrew: https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/israel-q4_2018/Article-a21ab76ff07a661004.htm; Alon Ben David, “Not Beyond Beyond: A Conflict with Hizbollah would be Bloody from the Start,” Maariv, October 26, 2018.

72 Alon Ben David, “Not Beyond Beyond: A Conflict with Hizbollah would be Bloody from the Start,” Maariv, October 26, 2018.73 Dan Williams and Karolina Tagaris, “Israel trained against Russian-made air defense system in Greece: sources,” Reuters, December 4,

2015. Accessible online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-israel-greece/israel-trained-against-russian-made-air-de-fense-system-in-greece-sources-idUSKBN0TN10G20151204

74 Hazem Mustafa, “Disbanding Iranian Militias on the Syrian Coast,” Syria Untold, October 21, 2018. Accessible online: http://syriauntold.com/2018/10/ndf/; “The Tiger Forces End the Contracts of 6500 Fighters,” Damas Post, September 7, 2018. Accessible in Arabic: https://

recruitment drives by IRGC-backed militias, such as Lebanese Hezbollah and Brigade 313.75 At least some of these forces are embedded in Syrian military units to avoid their detection by Russia, particularly in southern Syria, where Russia has promised to remove Iranian forces.76 This deepening Russian integration with Syrian forces makes it more challenging for Israel to identify and precisely target only Iranian forces in a way that avoids destabilizing the Assad regime and violating Russia’s red lines.

Following the December 2018 announcement by President Trump on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria, which was widely interpreted as a boon for Iran,77 Israeli officials reiterated that Israel will continue to strike Iranian targets in Syria.78 Israeli jets continue to carry out strikes against transfers of weapons to Hezbollah, a policy that predates 2011.79

Conclusion

Throughout the Syrian uprising and civil war, Israel avoided intervening in Syria in a way that could alter the trajectory of the conflict. Even at the height of its intervention, in late 2017 to early 2018, Israeli air strikes on Iranian targets and assistance to various rebel groups did not aim to alter the balance of power in the war, but only to protect Israel’s core national security interests. Israel’s leadership, scarred by the failed attempt to affect the outcome of the Lebanese civil war and achieve a peace treaty with Lebanon, wished to limit its direct involvement in Syria. Efforts by Syrian opposition factions and activists to increase Israeli involvement in the war were repeatedly rebuffed by Israeli policy-makers.

Instead, Israel sought to influence the trajectory of the war indirectly, through dialogue with the United States and the Kremlin. The decision of the Obama and Trump administrations to gradually disengage from Syria limited Israel’s ability to affect the reality on the ground. At the same time, dialogue with Russia achieved only partial results--granting Israel the right to operate against Iranian targets only in Syria, but not in a way that would destabilize the Assad regime.

The main losers of the Syrian war are undoubtedly Syria’s civilians, who have lost their lives, limbs, homes, and sources of livelihood. Israel, however, is emerging as one of the war’s main losers, as the Assad regime reasserts itself, more reliant on Iran than ever, and protected by Russia, whose first priority is to stabilize the Assad regime, not counter Iranian influence in the country. The decision by President Trump to disengage from the Syrian conflict, manifested in the decision to withdraw American troops in late 2018, decreased Israel’s room to maneuver further. Looking ahead, Israel’s involvement in post-war Syria will likely be limited to strikes against Iran assets and diplomatic engagement with Russia. Through strikes on Iranian targets, which are carried out in an increasingly constrained operational environment, Israel is trying to dissuade Iran from investing in the construction of permanent bases in Syria and the maintenance of an active supply route running through Syria. In addition, Israel is engaging with Moscow in the hope that Russia will be interested and able to convince the Assad regime to reduce Iran’s foothold in Syria. Even if those efforts are successful, which appears unlikely, Israel in 2019 is facing a militarily empowered and politically emboldened Hezbollah.

bit.ly/2Q35uJd; Ahed Fadel, “The End of the Operation of a Militia that Guarded the Stronghold of the House of Assad for Seven Years,” al-Arabiya, June 12, 2018. Accessible in Arabic: https://bit.ly/2AywHyb

75 “Iran Sets up Military Base East of Daraa,” al-Souria Net, October 23, 2018. Accessible at: http://syrianobserver.com/EN/Features/34976; “Iranian Incursion into Southern Syria… And Israel is Silent,” Enab Baladi, October 28, 2018. Accessible in Arabic: https://www.enab-baladi.net/archives/259840

76 Sebastian Hamdan, “‘Soft’ Iranian Withdrawal from Daraa and Quneitra,” al-Modon, October 27, 2018. Accessible in Arabic: https://bit.ly/2DeiSY0

77 See review of Iranian reactions to the U.S. decision: Dr. Raz Zimmt, “Iranian Responses to Trump’s Statement and Initial Assessment of the Statement’s Effect on Iranian Policy in Syria,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, December 26, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/iranian-responses-trumps-statement-initial-assessment-statements-effect-iranian-policy-syr-ia-dr-raz-zimmt/

78 “Israel says will study U.S. pullout from Syria, ensure its own security,” Reuters, December 19, 2018. Accessible online: https://www.yahoo.com/news/israel-says-study-u-pullout-syria-ensure-own-172024316.html

79 Josef Federman and Nataliya Vesilyeva, “Israeli official confirms Syria airstrikes as Russia objects,” AP, December 27, 2018 https://www.apnews.com/7a0c14ede245411fb24a90fbc2fb2939

About the Author

Elizabeth Tsurkov is a Research Fellow at the Forum for Regional Thinking, a progressive Israeli think-tank, where her research focuses on Syria, Iraq, sectarianism, confl ict and communal reconciliation in the Middle East. Tsurkov’s research relies on a large network of contacts she has cultivated across the Middle East since 2009 and fi eldwork she has conducted in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Palestine and Turkey, among other places. Tsurkov has over a decade of experience in conducting research in the Middle East and has worked as a consultant for the International Crisis Group, the Atlantic Council and the European Institute for Peace. Tsurkov earned her bachelor’s degree in international relations and communications at the Hebrew University, a master’s degree in Middle Eastern studies at Tel Aviv University and another master’s degree in political science at the University of Chicago. Tsurkov is an incoming doctoral student at the politics department at Princeton University.

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