israel: public diplomacy

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The Hebrew University

Rothberg International School

Division of Graduate Studies

Media and Public Diplomacy (01961)

Prof. Tamir Sheafer

Final Exam Spring 2011

Israels Mediated Public Diplomacy: Strengths & Weaknesses

Kimberly Seifert

Student ID: 777030826

July 2, 2011

Israels Mediated Public Diplomacy: Strengths & Weaknesses Seifert, 1


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In the modern era of globalization and ever-converging nations, it is of critical

importance that governments actively engage one another so that each nation may promote a

friendly environment for its unique interests. This engagement is known as public diplomacy

(PD). PD is characterized by the effective use of soft power (Nye, 2004), which can generally

be described as governmental efforts of one nation to influence public or elite opinion in a

second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign policy of the target nation to

advantage (Manheim, 1994; see also Davidson, 1974; Gilboa, 2000, 2006; Kunczik, 1997;

Leonard, 2002; Livingston, 1997).

With rapidly increasing access to the internet and the democratization of information

across the globe, media have become the primary medium for public diplomacy. Mediated PD is

defined as the intentional efforts of a government (especially its leader) to exert as much control

as possible over the framing of the countrys policies in foreign media (Entman, 2008). Entman

(2008) notes that mediated PD represents more targeted endeavors which typically involve

shorter time frames than that required for classic PD initiatives. Furthermore, Entman (2008)

emphasizes that all PD strategies are aimed at affecting elite action and opinion, as the effect of

mass opinion on the decision makers of various countries is arguable at best. Indeed, Entmans

(2008) cascading network of activation model asserts that a nations leader and his

administration have the greatest influence on the frame that will ultimately be adopted bydomestic media.

Mediated PD is often the first step in a larger PD strategy and involves a nations

domination of a target countrys media attention. Media attention is the most important limited

resource in the political communications arena (Sheafer &Gabay, 2009). Mueller (1973) defines

domination as the advantage of access to this limited resource. The competition for media

attention has two dimensions, agenda building (i.e., receiving media attention) and media

framing (i.e., control of the selected version of reality presented by the media) (Cook, 1998;Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). Content provided by media is dependent on these two dimensions.

A nations ability to gain access to agenda building in a target nation is first determined

by the extent to which the acting nation is able to convince the target nation of shared or similar

political-cultural values. These values represent an ideological system that comprises the



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symbolic center of the nation: the consensus. The closer issues, events or political actors are

deemed to this consensus, the more important they are considered, and the better chance they

have of receiving media attention (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009; Ericson et al., 1989; Shoemaker &

Reese, 1996). Secondly, access to agenda building is determined by a nations ability to appeal to

the medias professional values and needs. Media tend to seek entertaining stories that will

please readers and lead to profits; hence, nations must present a skilled performance that appeals

to these values (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009).

Entman (2004) defines media framing, the second element of media attention, as

selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them

so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution. The emphasis here is on

theprocess that leads journalists to apply a particular frame. Nations must strategically address

frame building and recognize that communication and political acts are nearly indistinguishable

in the process. Like agenda building, the success or failure of a nations impact on frame

building , and thus policy promotion, depends largely upon the perception of shared political-

cultural values and the medias professional values and needs (Sheafer 2001, Sheafer & Gabay

2009).

Strengths & Weaknesses of Israels Mediated Public Diplomacy EffortsAppealing to the Medias Professional Values and Needs

To determine the strengths and weaknesses of Israels mediated public diplomacy, we will

first examine Israels ability to appeal to the medias professional values and needs. Keeping in

mind that journalists seek to write about dramatic events that will sell, Israel has little difficulty

staying in the headlines as it is frequently involved in conflict. According to East-West

Communications, Israel ranked in the top-10 for the number of global press mentions in the years2008, 2009 and 2010.1 In fact, Yigal Palmer a spokesman from the Foreign Ministry notes that

approximately one thousand foreign correspondents are based out of Jerusalem on a daily basis,

illustrating the disproportionate coverage that Israel receives at any given time.



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Furthermore, Sheafer and Gabay (2009) showed that, in times of conflict, an events

initiator (Israel, in this case) is much more able to lead other foreign players to favor its agenda.

This knowledge could be very useful to Israeli officials, though it is unclear if they are aware of

it. In spite of the initiators advantage occasionally enjoyed by Israel, Sheafer and Gabay

affirm the clear correlation between the agendas of a countrys government and its media, as

asserted by Bennetts (1990)Indexing Hypothesis.

Obviously, however, remaining in the news due to involvement in conflict is not a

desirable position. Nonetheless, Israel has only recently changed its position from the reactive

stance of Hasbara, or explanation and advocacy, to one of proactive public diplomacy (Gilboa,

2006). Until recently, Israel seemed to still be following Shimon Peress seriously flawed opinion

that good policies do not require good public relations (Gilboa, 2006). The updated, current

strategy involves taking the battle to the enemy, and increasing relations with the right

people (Schneeweiss) 2 . A highly relevant example from June 2011 is Prime Minister

Netanyahus rather theatrical speech to the United States Congress. Not only was the speech

attended by a packed house of lawmakers and met with approximately 29 standing ovations

within 45 minutes, but PM Netanyahu displayed the skill and finesse required to proactively

solicit media attention. This is a clear illustration of Entmans cascading model of activation. The

head of the Israeli government made an explicit effort to establish a direct relationship with elitesand decision makers in a target nation, the United States. Netanyahu was also charismatic and

showed a clear understanding of the American medias professional needs.

Additionally, Donny Sonnshein, Head of Media and Public Affairs at the Foreign

Ministry, emphasizes the Ministrys increased effort to reach out to non-state actors, such as

journalists who have written on topics related to Israel other than conflict, tourists, universities

and the like.

Unfortunately Israels very slow realization of the importance of mediated publicdiplomacy has led to a consistent lack of resources for these efforts (Gilboa, 2006). The bottom

line is that Israels attempts to appeal to the medias agenda and receive the necessary attention

remains a weakness, but is heading in the right direction.



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Political-Cultural Proximity

The second aspect of successful mediated public diplomacy hinges on the extent of

perceived or real political and cultural similarity felt between an acting nation and its target

audience. While this does play a role in the domination of agenda building, political-cultural

proximity is more heavily influential in the contest over framing.

One significant obstacle Israel faces in this respect is a growing disconnect between

Israels self-perception and how the world perceives it. According to D.J. Schneeweiss from the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, how Israel knows itself is no longer how the world knows it.

Surely it is very difficult for Israel to espouse shared values with a target nation if it is unaware

of the distance between its self-perception and how it is perceived by the target audience.

Although the US perceives strong cultural resonance with Israel (Page & Bouton, 2006), Israel

has not yet determined what exactly its values are, which of these it shares with other important

target nations and how best to assert them.

Another factor which illustrates Israels lack of a strategic approach to promoting shared

values is the extreme level of transparency present in Israeli society. Earlier this monthHaaretz

reportedthe former head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, blatantly criticizing the Prime Ministers

thoughts about an attack on Iran and warned of the imminent vacuum of strong voices willingand able to speak out against Netanyahus potentially reckless decisions. 3 Though no longer in

office, Dagan is doing a significant disservice to his country by displaying for the world the acute

internal dissent that exists within Israel.

Dagan is not only undermining his governments power to present a unified narrative to

foreign audiences, but more importantly, he is undermining Israels legitimacy on the global

stage. Although one can reasonably assume that Dagan is expressing sincere sentiments, it is

incorrect to assume that better or more factual information necessarily persuades or leads toincreased support for a nations policies (Entman, 2008). The political-cultural value of

illegitimacy is surely not something that Israel can claim to share with any nation.

Additionally, Israel must cope with the fact that information today is transmitted instantaneously,



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therefore any slip-up or crack in the facade is immediately dispersed, creating irreversible

damage.

Recalling that soft power is a necessary tool for successful PD implementation, it is

important to point out that soft power arises from the attractiveness of a nations values, culture

and policies and causes people to act out of cooperation (Gilboa, 2006). Thus, soft power

relies on a nations moral authority or legitimacy, not only for the sake of legitimacy itself but

also for the basis legitimacy provides for other espoused values. For example, Israels claim to be

democratic is incoherent and difficult to maintain if the state simultaneously appears to be

illegitimate. A foreign nation that may consider itself to be democratic may nonetheless fail to

claim that this is a shared value between itself and Israel.

Outside of the US, Israel significantly struggles to influence frame building. On one

hand, this relates to the aforementioned discrepancy between Israels self-image and its image to

foreign audiences. If Israel tends to view itself as the moral victim in a conflict (and the world

does not view it this way), it has very little chance of promoting its preferred definition of a

problem. Without a desired definition as a basis for the story, there is no way Israel can

successfully control a foreign medias identification of causes, moral judgement or proposed

remedies. Moreover, no nation can disregard that at best it can hope to achieve command of

frame building equal to that of some other foreign nation (or nations) or to the frame promotedby the target government itself.

To deal with this discrepancy of images, Sonnshein describes Israels focus on re-

branding itself in the national arena. Schneeweiss characterizes this as a re-telling of the Israeli

strategy. Zaharna (2009) defines nation-branding as the use of multiple modes of

communication to deliver a strategically designed, simple, coherent, and compelling message,

with the goal of differentiating and positioning an entity within a target audiences mind.

Referring back to the East-Wests Nation Brand Perception Index, Israels brand over the lasthas fluctuated from a low of 192 to the current high of 173 (out of 200) since 2008. For a country

consistently in the top-10 for number of mentions in international media, this negative perception

leaves much to be desired. Clearly whichever version of Israel is making it to the media in not



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one which is received favorably or with which foreign nations claim political or cultural

proximity.

Conclusion

Israels mediated public diplomacy efforts can best be described as a series of weaknesses

with a few examples to the contrary. The one potential strength is Israels unwavering ability to

enter the medias agenda and consistently gain coverage. However, this coverage is more

frequently driven by conflict involving Israel as opposed to pro-active efforts by the Israeli

government to enter the medias agenda.

Israels success in promoting political and/or cultural proximity between itself and other

nations is pitiful, at best. Though Israel is able to claim continual success in American media,

much of this can be attributed to the pre-existing agendas of the US government and US media.

Otherwise, Israels critical lack of legitimacy renders it largely unable to promote political-

cultural values that it can present as being shared between itself and target audiences.

D.J. Schneeweiss promotes the 4-pronged strategy of taking the battle to the enemy,

increasing relations with the right actors (including non-state actors), re-branding Israel and not

losing themselves in the fight. According to Sonnshein, Israel must streamline its message,decrease the number of messengers and increase coordination. Gilboa (2006) suggests more

centralized leadership, better training for PD officials, focus on internet PD approaches,

increased funding and increased use of non-governmental soft power initiatives. Though it is

unfortunate to state that Israels mediated public diplomacy displays no certain strengths, it is the

persistent reality today.

NOTES1. All such data is from the East-West Global Index 200: Nation Branding Perception Index,

East-West Communications. http://eastwestcoms.com/global_volume.htm (accessed 16 June

2011).

2. Quotes from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) representatives, D.J. Schneeweiss, Yigal

Palmer and Donny Sonnshein were gathered at a meeting to discuss Israels public diplomacy

efforts on May 3, 2011 at the offices of the MFA.

http://eastwestcoms.com/global_volume.htmhttp://eastwestcoms.com/global_volume.htm


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3. Haaretz, June 3, 2011, Translated by Haaretz online English edition http://www.haaretz.com/

print-edition/news/dagan-warns-of-netanyahu-s-poor-judgment-1.365616 (access 16 June

2011).

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http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/dagan-warns-of-netanyahu-s-poor-judgment-1.365616http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/dagan-warns-of-netanyahu-s-poor-judgment-1.365616http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/dagan-warns-of-netanyahu-s-poor-judgment-1.365616http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/dagan-warns-of-netanyahu-s-poor-judgment-1.365616

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