is the iron law of oligarchy rusting away in the third world by julie fisher, world development 22...

8/9/2019 Is the Iron Law of Oligarchy Rusting Away in the Third World by Julie Fisher, World Development 22 (2) 1994

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World Development, Vol. 22, No. 2, 129-143, 1994p.Copyright 0 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd

Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved0305-750X/94 $6.00 + 0.00

Is the Iron Law of OligarchyRusting Away in the Third World?

JULIE FISHER*Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

Summary. - This article reexamines Robert Michelss iron law of oligarchy in relation to theproliferation of indigenous nongovemment organizations (NGOs) in the Third World in recent years. Itexplores the characteristics of grassroots organizations (GROs), horizontal networks between GROs,grassroots support organisations (GRSOs) and horizontal GRSO networks that reinforce democraticrather than oligarchic tendencies. Next it examines the vertical relationships between GROs and GRSOsthat mitigate against interorganizational oligarchy. The article concludes that horizontal and vertical tiesbetween NGOs reinforce the democratic characteristics of individual NGOs. The iron law, in otherwords, is not inevitable. This conclusion also has implications for international aid policies.

Nothing grows from the top down.Atherton Martin

1. INTRODUCTIONRobert Michels first defined the iron law of oli-garchy in 1915. Since that time, social scientistshave generally supported the notion that membership

organizations sooner or later evolve from democraticto oligarchic control1 Oligarchy within a particularorganization may be created either by establishedelites within the wider community or by one or moremembers (not necessarily community elites) whoassume control at the expense of other members.Although organizational oligarchy may or may notbe linked to financial corruption, corruption is usual-ly an indicator of oligarchy.In this paper I propose to reexamine the iron lawof oligarchy by using new evidence from the grow-ing nongovernmental movement in the Third World.This movement has been fueled by increases in theaccessibility and supply of foreign assistance (volun-tary as well as official), and by escalating demandsfor attention to human needs.During the last two decades, two types of remark-ably similar nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)have proliferated in Asia, Africa, and Latin Americadespite cultural and historical differences. Grassrootsorganizations (GROs) are locally based membershipgroups that work to improve and develop their owncommunities. Although many have been promotedand stimulated by outsiders, GROs have also becomemore active on their own. Faced with the deteriora-tion of their environment and increasing impoverish-ment, both traditional and newly created GROs aredeveloping horizontal networks among themselves,usually based on geographical proximity.

Grassroots support organizations (GRSOs), the sec-ond type of NGO, are intermediary organizations thatwork with and channel financial support to GROs.More than 30,000 indigenous GRSOs work withGROs in fields as diverse as enterprise development,health, womens rights, population, and environment.2GRSOs are usually staffed by paid professionals,although they may also use middle-class volunteers.Unlike GROs, which may make profits, GRSOs arenonprofit, although some are developing for-profitsupport activities. In contrast to GROs, which grewfrom traditional organizational roots, GRSOs began toemerge in the late 1960s with the increased availabili-ty of foreign assistance. GRSOs, like GROs, are devel-oping horizontal networks among themselves.Some GRSOs, especially those created bywomen, are membership organizations, but a majori-ty are not.3 Although discussions of the iron law ofoligarchy usually pertain to membership organiza-tions, nonmembership organizations can be oli-garchical and interorganizational relationshipsbetween grassroots membership groups and volun-tary service organizations can be based on or evolvetoward increasing domination.

*A portion of this paper was presented at the ARNOVA(Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations andVoluntary Action) Conference at Yale University inOctober 1992. An earlier version was published asWorking Paper No. 189 of the Program on Non-ProfitOrganizations (PONPO) of the Institution for Social andPolicy Studies, Yale University. I would like to thank CarlMilofsky of Bucknell University for early inspiration.Three PONPO colleagues, Brad Gray, Rikki Abzug, andDavid Bronkema, contributed important insights to thefinal draft.Final revision accepted: September 7, 1993.

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GROs, GRSOs and their networks, like thepoverty, environment and population crises thatengendered them, are having a real impact. In 1985,the Club of Rome estimated that Southern NGOsmay involve as many as 60 million people in Asia,25 million in Latin America, and 12 million inAfrica.4 Since then, the environmental movementhas grown rapidly and become involved in sustain-able development, networking has accelerated, andmore traditional voluntary organizations are under-taking grassroots support activities.

Is the remarkable promise of this organizationalrevolution likely to degenerate into self-servingbehavior by the few at the expense of the many?What follows cannot fully answer the question posedin the title. Indeed, my initial answer to the questionis perhaps or maybe. Although there is consider-able evidence that many, if not most NGOs are self-consciously nonhierarchical in their behavior as wellas their rhetoric, the very nature of the iron law ofoligarchy is that it asserts itself gradually. Perhapsthe real question is not whether people can create analternative organizational culture, but whether it canbe passed on or maintained over an extended periodof time. This, in turn, will depend on the relationshipbetween participation and socioeconomic results, atopic covered in Fisher (1993).Even a preliminary answer to the sustainabilityquestion depends on first examining GROs andGRSOs as discrete organizations, and then looking attheir relationships with each other. This paper firstdeals with GROs and then with their horizontalnetworks. It next focuses on GRSOs and theirhorizontal linkages with other GRSOs. The verticalties between GRSOs and GROs are the subject ofthe final section. My working hypothesis is thatthere is evidence that horizontal and vertical link-ages between NGOs tend to reinforce the generallydemocratic organizational culture and behavior ofGROs and GRSOs, and thus fend off the iron law ofoligarchy. This hypothesis recapitulates, at the interor-ganizational level, Lipset, Coleman and Trows( 1962) argument that multiple communication chan-nels within a labor union reinforced democratic deci-sion making.

2. GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS (GROs)GROs can be roughly classified as multipurposelocal development associations (LDAs), interestassociation (IAs) such as womens groups or water

users groups, and cooperatives (including precoop-eratives such as informal work groups or rotatingcredit associations).5 Although thousands of newGROs such as womens organizations have enteredthe scene in the Third World, traditional organiza-tions have also hybridized, blended and built out-

ward . there has been reorganization rather thanorganization at the grassroots.6 Traditional villagecouncils, for example, are increasingly involved indevelopment; water users associations are linkingup with international donors; and rotating creditsocieties are assuming some of the functions of sav-ings and credit cooperatives.One might expect that older organizations with tra-ditional roots would be more likely than newer GROsto be dominated by local elites. Pastoralist societies,however, often have strong nonhierarchical traditions,based on communal pasture ownership, and waterusers associations range from oligarchical to democ-ratic. Uphoff (1986, p. 33) found that local institutionsin communities where traditional norms still predomi-nated were capable of managing natural resourcesequitably and successfully. Stories of developmentassistance benefiting only the few frequently originat-ed from villages where no local organization existedbefore a project began, or where the existing organiza-tion was by-passed by outside donors.Even GROs with ties to government may notalways be controlled through local elites. Despitemany other problems, the government-sponsoredSwanirvar GROs in Bangladesh provided a forumfor the disadvantaged to organize. Esman andUphoffs (1984, pp. 155, 166) broad literature searchrevealed that no locally established organization hadbecome totally dominated or spoiled by govern-ment connections.Local cooperatives, however, are more likely thaninterest associations, local development associations,or even precooperatives to have been organized bygovernments and to become vehicles for local elitedomination as well as government patronage.8Whether cooperatives were originally organized bygovernments or other outsiders, they frequentlyexclude poor or landless farmers and even landedwomen. In Bangladesh, for example, Karim(1985-86) found that wealthier farmers inevitablydominate cooperatives if allowed to join. UnlikeLDAs and IAs, cooperative structures were importedinto the Third World, and this may be one reason whythey are more likely to favor community elites.Uphoff (1986, p. 130) traces corruption in the Kenyancooperatives to the imposition of foreign structures.The mixed evidence on traditional and govern-ment-sponsored GROs also supports the notion thatoligarchy may be reversible. People whose survivalis at stake sometimes gain experience from the fail-ure of elite control. The success of cooperatives pro-moted by the Comila Project in Bangladesh depend-ed on the farmers knowledge gained from the fail-ure of elite-dominated cooperatives. The farmersworking with the Chilalo project in Ethiopia, in con-trast, had no past cooperative experience, and evi-dence of community development or use of agricul-tural extension was almost non-existent.9


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enduring structures supporting the project-initiatedactivities long after project completion.

3. HORIZONTAL NETWORKS BETWEEN GROsAlthough GROs must also deal with issues ofpower and inequality in their horizontal relationshipswith each other, GRO networks tend to decentralizepower.i9 In addition to regional networks of individ-

ual GROs, informal economic networks and moreamorphous protest movements develop regionalgrassroots linkages not based solely on GROs.Although some networks are rooted in traditionallineage systems, new kinds of networks have prolif-erated rapidly in Asia, Latin America and parts ofAfrica in recent years. An NGO directory lists 10 inMexico alone.20

GRO networking is often fueled by a determinedblend of idealism and practicality. After a womensgroup in a village in Burkina Faso received a smallcereal mill from UNICEF, its members decided topay a small amount each time they used it. Thewoman in charge of the mill explained that good for-tune should be shared with even poorer people. Themill that UNICEF has given us is a father-mill: hemust make a son to take his place when he is old andweary, and a daughter to give to the neighboring vil-lage. Set the price of milling so that these childrencan be raised.?The barter arrangements that often emerge fromnetworking can widen local markets, give the poor avested interest in cooperation between villages, by-pass local middlemen, and buy time for microenter-prises to grow stronger before they need to competein wider markets. Informal economic networkssometimes evolve from traditional economic ties. InZimbabwe, for example, there are traditional work-based exchanges of seeds and skills between com-munities.?2 Yet economic interdependency may alsoemerge after regional federations are organized orduring economic emergencies. In Togo theAssociation of Village Enterprises requires that itsmembers produce not only enough for themselvesbut a surplus to share with other villages.23Although the ebb and flow of participation maylead to fluctuation between the poles of democracyand oligarchy, formal cooperative federations, liketheir member organizations, seem to be more proneto corruption or elite dominance than other types ofGRO networks.24 Carrolls (1992) study of 23 LatinAmerican GRSOs and seven GRO networks foundthe GRO networks as a group to be less participatorythan a sample of GRSOs. Four of the seven net-works, however, were cooperative federations, andtwo were Costa Rican regional service organizationspromoted by the government with some cooperativemembers. The remaining network of small farmer

groups in Chile elects male and female representa-tives to a central board, and successfully involvesbeneficiaries in assisting member organizations.Where internally equitable relationships do exist,however, as in one of the cooperative federationsstudied by Carroll (1992, p. 59) federations may pro-vide greater economic benefits to their membercooperatives than other GRO networks. The ElCeibo federation of 35 cocoa cooperatives in Boliviaoperates a small chocolate factory with a staff of100, grosses $1.5 million per year, and controls morethan half of the national harvest. Carroll attributes ElCeibos success to a highly participatory style ofrotating representation on the administrative council,as well as to timely assistance from the Inter-American Foundation. Corrupt or elite-dominatedcooperatives can, of course, be maintained throughoutside subsidy, but are unlikely to provide majoreconomic benefits to their members.

4. GRASSROOTS SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS(GRSOs)

The proliferation of GRSOs that began in the late1960s was fueled by two major interacting forces -an increasing supply of foreign assistance anddemands by unemployed intellectuals for both politi-cal shelter and meaningful work. This worldwidephenomenon has been stronger in Latin America andAsia than in Africa, but its remarkable consistencyand appropriateness to the challenge of poverty andthe failure of politics as usual further fueled itsspread. As young intellectuals occupied the politicalspace left open by ineffective or repressive govem-ments and weak civil societies, they began to createa new nonpartisan politics, committed to learningfrom and with people at the grassroots, rather thanperpetuating past ideologies.Indonesian GRSOs, for example, were formed byex-student activists as an alternative to Marxism.Frustrated at the failure of attempts to overthrow thegovernment in 1974 and 1978, activists began tofocus on the need for bottom-up support from peas-ants and urban workers. Indian activism emergedfrom a long tradition of charitable and Ghandhianvoluntary action, but challenged its welfare deliveryapproach. Brazilian GRSOs were founded by secularand Catholic leftists who challenged the authoritari-an traditions of relations with popular sectors typicalnot only of the dominant social sectors but also ofthe traditional left.25The commitment of GRSO activists to share spe-cific knowledge about microenterprise developmentor resource preservation is almost always coupled toempowerment methodologies such as consciousnessraising. Learning from as well as teaching people atthe grassroots level is also linked to acceptance of


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modest salaries and a commitment to becoming de-professionalized professionals.26Although this philosophical commitment canhelp lessen the likelihood that GRSO leaders willbecome a new elite, GRSOs without even the rhetor-ical commitment to empowerment may not necessar-ily be opportunistic. They may themselves be lessself-conscious or empowered. The late MarioPadron, a Peruvian active in the international NGOmovement, observed that more than half of thehundreds of Peruvian GRSOs did not distinguishthemselves clearly from the GROs with whom theywork. 27

Even an explicit and self-conscious democraticideology is, of course, no guarantee of escaping theiron law of oligarchy, as Koebele (1989) has shownin his comparative study of the Green Party inGermany and the British Social Democratic Party.Moreover, oligarchy may be interorganizational, andtherefore tied to the relationship between GROs andGRSOs. Some GRSOs are headed by outright char-latans, who exploit the availability of foreign fund-ing rather than developing supportive relationshipswith GROs. In Zaire, both a fictitious village groupand a GRSO were promoted by a former minister forhis own gain. There are also less blatant attempts topromote the fortunes of favored groups. PlanterNGOs in the Philippine island of Negros help pre-serve an inequitable land tenure system, whileextending social welfare measures.** In LatinAmerica, GRSOs have sometimes taken over ordiverted for other purposes funds allocated towomens projects.29Other GRSOs are honest service providers whosell their technical services to foreign donors or gov-ernments in the absence of strong grassroots link-ages. A study of 12 Indian GRSOs found only onethat was serious about participation.30 Korten (1990,p. 102) distinguishes between voluntary organiza-tions and public service contractors (both ofwhich may be GRSOs) in terms of their choicebetween social mission and market share.

By most accounts, however, GRSOs committedto empowerment vastly outnumber corrupt or self-serving organizations, if not service contractors.31Corruption was extremely rare in the 19 countryClub of Rome study, and according to Schneider(1985, pp. 188-197) We found attention to the pooralmost everywhere. Twose (1988, p. 240) charac-terized Latin American GRSOs as extremely effec-tive in reaching the poor and in helping communi-ties to rediscover ancient collective work practices.Carroll (1992, pp. 85, 141) argues that LatinAmerican GRSOs have a strong code of ethics, apervading sense of mission and emphasize trans-parencia or open communication. A sample surveyof Thai organizations found that 62% gave priorityto the least developed areas where they were work-

ing, and most Indian GRSOs focus on neglectedareas and socioeconomic groups3* Moens intensive(1991, p. 96) study of GRSOs in Tamil Nadu con-cludes that although challenging local power struc-tures is exceedingly difficult, and GRSOs tend to behierarchically organized, corruption is not wide-spread.Given the dependence of most GRSOs on foreignassistance, these common observations run some-what counter to the notion that intermediaries willsiphon off funds intended for grassroots develop-ment. Korten (1990), for example, argues that manyGRSOs face foreign pressure to become contractors.Large official donors have been criticized, particu-larly in Africa, for linking GROs and GRSOs tomanipulation by their own govemments.33In fact, the behavior of outside donors may eitherreinforce or undermine internal democracy.International NGOs (INGOs) are usually viewed asmore supportive of empowerment and egalitarianrelationships between GRSOs and GROs than offi-cial donors. Yet some official donors made it poss-ible for GRSOs to emerge in the first place. ThePeace Corps, arriving in Latin America in the mid-196Os, brought protection from political oppressionas well as assistance with community development.34In the Philippines and Indonesia, the US Agency forInternational Development has funded some inde-pendent, creative GRSOs that are organizing thou-sands of GROs as well as having an impact on envi-ronmental policy.35 Perhaps more important than theidentity of the donor is whether GRSO organizingand a clear sense of purpose precede donor contacts.The tendency of Latin American GRSO activists toengage in research, writing and reflection has helpedthem maintain their autonomy and the autonomy ofthe GROs with whom they work.

GRSOs sponsored by their own governments areprobably more likely than those sponsored by inter-national donors to engage in patronage and to favorelite groups.36 Yet even governments are not seam-less webs. In Chiapas, Mexico, a professional mem-bership organization of government doctors is spon-soring community pharmacies, researching indige-nous medicine, and planting medical gardens withassistance from UNICEF.37 In addition, some gov-emment-sponsored organizations break away fromofficial sponsorship. When Solidarite Paysanne inZaire achieved autonomy, it shifted from assistingofficially registered cooperatives to supporting 26village units with regional commissions on water, lit-eracy, and agriculture.38

Whatever the impact of ideology, rhetoric orcommitment on maintaining egalitarian relationshipswithin GRSOs, oligarchy is also undermined by therelatively easy access to GRSO employment, and theincreasing diversity of GRSO activists. Access miti-gates against the long-term succession crisis of


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charismatic leadership as new entrants join existingorganizations or help create new ones.The diversity of GRSO activists also diversifiesdevelopment practice. Innovations in developmentare based not only on varied professional back-

grounds, however, but also on three important trends- the spread of grassroots support functions tomany types of nonprofit organizations, the increas-ingly important role of lower class and womenactivists and the growing number of GRSOs orga-nized from below.

Perhaps the most striking overall trend supportingdiversity is the spread of grassroots support func-tions among vastly different types of nonprofit orga-nizations. While the small group of professionalsthat obtains foreign support and then begins to workwith one or more GROs is the most typical pattern,other organizations such as churches, hospitals, char-ities and universities are adding grassroots support totheir repertoire without necessarily giving up otherfunctions. The Eglise du Christ in Zaire, with 12 mil-lion followers out of a population of 33 million, isworking in 62 communities on health promotion, pri-mary schools and tree planting. Theatres are touringrural areas in countries as diverse as Zambia, thePhilippines, Bolivia, Jamaica, India, Botswana andthe Solomon Islands with messages about empower-ment and development.39Interest in participatory research and evaluationpropels nonprofit research institutes and universitiestoward grassroots support. Although B. Smith (1990)found that many Colombian GRSOs avoidconfronting local power brokers, he notes thatapplied research institutes run by social scientistshave educational programs for workers orcampesinos and act as policy advocates for thesegroups.@ Mayan graduates of the western branch ofthe University of San Carlos in Guatemala organizeda network of development organizations and aMayan research organization called CISMA (Centrode Investigaciones Socioculturales Mayas). CISMAunites local organizations with sophisticated researchand computer capabilities. A recent study focused onthe development implications of traditional elderscouncils.+

Democratic political trends in some countrieshave also democratized the human rights move-ment itself, as protecting the human rights of mil-lions of the poor begins to outweigh earlier concernsabout repression against dissident intellectuals. InIndia, human rights groups have been moving awayfrom support for opposition political parties andtoward support for grassroots movements for sometime.42 The other side of the coin is that environ-mental activists are increasingly concerned abouthuman rights, and are committed to the notion thatthe environment cannot be sustained without sustain-ing its human communities. In Asia this has led to

demands for land reform, since Asian environmen-talists contend that people are better guardians ofnatural resources than governments or largelandowners.43This broadening and merging of human rightsorganizations with concern about sustainable devel-opment has, if anything, strengthened the inter-national human rights movement. In addition to theaffiliates of international human rights organizationssuch as Amnesty International, there are now anestimated 4,000-5,000 indigenous human rightsorganizations, increasingly concerned about theaccess of the poor to natural resources. The Africanhuman rights movement has grown particularly fast- human rights organizations have thousands ofmembers, and human rights are preached in schools,pamphlets and on the radio.45 This is beginning toalter the political culture within which GROs andGRSOs develop.

Although the spread of grassroots support func-tions reinforces the diverse professional origins ofthe middle-class founders of GRSOs, not all GRSOorganizers come from the upper middle class.GRSOs are also founded by villagers who leave,obtain an education and return to provide financialand sometimes technical assistance for villagecouncils. These are particularly common in Africa,but also occur in Asia and Latin America. In TamilNadu, six young harijan (untouchable) women col-lege graduates returned to their village and created aGRSO that has built clinics, trained widows as para-professional health workers, and organized a land-less association of thousands in five districts. After alandowner raped an 1 l-year-old girl, the GRSOorganized mass protests that led to his arrest.46

The growth of the womens movement has rein-forced the employment of social organizers from awide background. At a workshop for 33 womenworking for 10 Pakistani GRSOs, One participantwas illiterate, some had a few years of schooling,while others had postgraduate degrees . . almosthalf of them were the main economic providers fortheir families and almost all of them . . . [were] car-rying on their work against tremendous odds, oftendefying societal norms.47

GRSOs organized by women are also more likelythan other GRSOs to be membership organizationswith a large number of active member-volunteers,many of whom are highly trained professionals,unlikely to cede their role to a single leader.481nBangladesh, a national association of womenlawyers organized a project that traveled to 68,000villages to teach millions of women (and men) theirbasic legal rights. They later organized a womenshealth coalition patterned on an international familyplanning program and coordinated their efforts withother development agencies.Yet because some GROs initially reject feminist


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demands, middle-class women have also beenpushed to take account of the survival needs of thepoor. The Second Latin American FeministEncounter held in Peru in 1982 prodded Peruvianfeminists to establish ties to poor urban women, ini-tially by setting up community kitchens and milkdistribution networks. Peru Mujer, one of the organi-zations that grew out of this movement, promotesurban gardens and training in weaving and market-ing as well as legal changes benefiting women.49Unidad Feminina in Colombia has created theAsociacion Colombiana de Promotion Artesanal,which has developed a comprehensive strategy forreviving crafts in low-income areas.*O

Women who organize GRSOs tend to be particu-larly sensitive to the need to simultaneously under-mine gender and class hierarchies. The Kenya Waterfor Health Organization (KWAHO) led by MargaretMwangole, had developed over 100 water-relatedprojects for women by 1987.j A Bolivian organiza-tion called CIMCA (Capacitation Integral de laMujer Campesina) uses pictures for training that aredirected not against men, but against rigid genderroles. As a result of the training, men are sharingresponsibility for gathering firewood. In Querarani,each office of the local Asociacion FamiliarCampesina, is jointly filled by husband and wifeteams, in harmony with the traditional dualism ofAndean culture. Twenty trainees have been electedto leadership councils in provinces where CIMCAhas been working. Four campesinas have beenelected to offices on the executive committee of thedepartmental federation representing several hundredthousand small farmers5*

Increased awareness of the crucial role of womenin development often has a more diluted impact onGRSOs not led by women. GRSOs of all types inTamil Nadu are directing most of their programstoward women, and Moen (1991, pp. 57-58) foundnone that focused solely on men. Moen notes, how-ever, that it is as if male development workers aresaying India will be saved by women in their sparetime. Male development workers have trouble relat-ing to women as professionals and women profes-sionals are often dependent and not assertive.

A final factor reinforcing the heterogeneity ofGRSOs is that many are created from below, eitherby GRO networks that create their own GRSO, to beconsidered in section 6 below, or in reaction to top-down development projects. The Rural WomensAdvancement Society in West Bengal was organizedin 1980 by women in an IL0 (International LabourOffice) camp for environmental refugees from defor-estation. The organizers hired technical assistance,but continued to direct the organization themselves,promoting group enterprises for sustainable forestproducts. They challenged the middlemen and by1982 were represented on a marketing agency board.

The group now owns 350 forested acres, includingtrees for silk worms. They have also organized othergroups like a wave and act as arbiters in villagedisputes within a large area.53

5. HORIZONTAL NETWORKS AMONG GRSOsFormal networks of GRSOs resemble umbrella or

apex organizations in the developed countries. TheGRSOs and other organizations that belong to infor-mal networks, on the other hand, tend to communi-cate directly with each other rather than through acoordinating organization. Formal networks aremore likely to have paid staff and hold annual meet-ings, whereas informal network members generallyinteract in the field or through computers. Both typesof networks may be regional or national, specializedor multisectoral. Informal networks are less commonin Africa than in Asia or Latin America, becauseGRSOs themselves are newer and more likely thantheir Asian or Latin American counterparts to remainclosely tied to voluntary and official foreign donors.International donors tend to concentrate theirassistance on the more formal, easily recognizableGRSO networks, thus strengthening any oligarchicaltendencies that umbrella organizations may have tosiphon off foreign assistance rather than strengthen-ing ties among GRSOs. Informal networks are notalways as visible as formal networks, nor are theirinnovative approaches to coordination always under-stood by outside donors. Informal networking oftenevolves as organizations discover they have goodreasons to cooperate. Informality helps circumventpolice repression and the risk of hegemony whilepreserving diversity and the autonomy of memberorganizations.There are two general types of informal networks- service networks and support movements. Servicenetworks may be large or small, but they are consis-tently homogeneous, involving mainly GRSOs andperhaps one other member of a different type such asa foundation. Service networks decentralize powerand enable GRSOs to exchange and promote eachothers professional capacities. Support movementsare large, heterogeneous, often amorphous systemsof communication including GRSOs, universities,charities, GROs, and some individuals such as jour-nalists or professors interested in grassroots develop-ment.Service networks can help overcome problemssuch as the dilution of the idea of centering develop-ment around women. The women who foundedUnity for Social Action in Bangladesh are trainingthe staff of other GRSOs in gender relationships.54Service networks can also strengthen internalmanagement. In the case of Pradan in India a colle-gial management style not only grew out of previous


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informal networks, it also led to an awareness thatfounding a service network would strengthen otheractivities. With a staff of only 38 professionals,Pradan is able to train new staff members throughthree-year field consultancies with other organiza-tions.55 This training not only provides them withproject skills, it also builds networking into Pradanwhen they return.

Support movements are more likely than formalor even service networks to include GROs and/orGRO networks. Support movements also tend toinclude individual professionals and universitydepartments. Like grassroots movements, supportmovements are generally more amorphous than fed-erations or consortia. Unlike grassroots movements,however, support movements include GRSOs asmembers.

Support movements are often very large and het-erogeneous, making it difficult for any one group tocontrol the others. Lokayan, an Indian support move-ment, holds workshops for its 2,000 individual andorganizational members. Lokayan publications aredesigned to end the isolation of various movementsfor change.56 As a well-established network,Lokayan has some of the characteristics of more for-mal networks, including a paid staff, and regionalcoordinators for those areas not covered by GRSOmembers. In some states new organizations andmovements have come into existence through thenetworks participatory research on topics such asdeforestation. An organizational dialogue with theSelf-Employed Womens Association (SEWA) pro-duced a permanent working group of womenactivists. One observer remarked that

It is through this process that a conventional researcherlike me has been exposed to stirrings at the grass-roots and to collaboration between activity-orientedintellectuals and intellectually-oriented activists.57Other support movements are more specialized.The Centro de Cultura Luiz Freire in Brazil, a

network for GRSOs and other public interestgroups, supports legal aid for the poor, alternativeeducation programs, and a network of human rightsGROs in Northeast Brazil that combat landlordexploitation.Despite their diversity, informal networks thatevolve out of the needs of their member organiza-tions are probably more likely than formal networksto be based on a shared philosophy of participatorydevelopment, identified as important to networksuccess in studies carried out by PACT.58 Yetbecause it is sometimes difficult for informal net-works to obtain foreign assistance, a kind of sur-vival of the fittest may be occurring that insuresthe sustainability of the networking process, if notindividual networks.5yFormal multisectoral consortia, organized and

financially supported from above by governmentsor foreign donors, may be more oligarchical over thelong run6 Individual GRSOs also develop out of theavailability of foreign assistance, yet their directwork with GROs tends to insulate them from thebureaucratic diversion provided by money. Althoughsome formal consortia are organized by GRSOsthemselves, an additional layer of bureaucracy but-tressed by international donors can easily become afinancial funnel without member services or two-way communication with member organizations.Power dispersion from the international to thenational level does not inevitably cascade down tothe GRSO and GRO levels. Outside financial sup-port can also discourage additional networking andlead to competition instead of collaboration betweenGRSOs.

6. VERTICAL NETWORKS: THE TIESBETWEEN GRSOs and GROsAlthough the commitment to bottom-up develop-ment and social heterogeneity help explain howmany GRSOs have generally maintained their demo-

cratic organizational culture for more than a decade,an even more important reinforcing factor is theircontinuing interaction with GROs. This relationship,like other top-down-bottom-up interactions, has beendescribed by McClelland (1970) as influencing peo-ple to build capacity to act on their own behalf andby Korten (1983) as the central paradox of develop-ment. The need to learn-teach-learn from the poorwhile maintaining what Martinez (1987,p. 172) callsthe necessary professional distance in relation to thegrassroots group is a difficult balancing act. Withoutdirecting the process of planning, outsiders cansometimes assist the process by foreseeing conse-quences such as the long-term indebtedness of vil-lagers who decide to build a new water system. Thisadvisory rather than supervisory relationship withGROs has spread to a number of countries in recentyears.Increasingly, this relationship includes processdocumentation that allows GROs to avoid blueprintsdetermined by outsiders and involves them in pro-gressively more autonomous interviewing, data gath-ering and data analysis about their own communities.In Chile, for example, unpaid data gatherers fromGROs tied to two GRSOs helped plan and create apractical manual on revolving loan funds that wasdistributed to 100 other organizations.6There is, of course, evidence that vertical linkagesof all kinds (whatever their function) have an inde-pendent impact on development.h2 In Esman andUphoffs (1984) study, local organizations with hori-zontal and vertical linkages had the highest overall


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performance ratings, although horizontal linkageswere the more powerful of the two explanatory vari-ables .

Field level officials, when confronted with an active[GRO], begin performing their duties better, keepingoffice hours more regularly, making requested visits tothe field, coming up with suggestions of possible higherlevel assistance.63Linkages, in other words, decrease the possibili-ties for hidden corruption, and increase the possibili-

ties for learning.Although linkages can strengthen many types ofgovernmental and nongovernmental organizations,GROs and GRSOs have some particular comparativeadvantages that complement each other. According toan Inter-American Foundation study of the organiza-tions they have funded, GRSOs have the capacity for

organizational, economic or technological innovation,as well as for rapid response to unforeseen opportuni-ties. Yet membership organizations (GROs) have thepotential (albeit often unrealized) to have a muchdeeper, and potentially more far-reaching socialimpact.@GRSOs may have the greatest grassroots devel-opment impact and therefore long-term interest inproviding services that strengthen GROs as member-

ship organizations.GRSOs also ally themselves with GROs againstthe intrenched inequities in the larger society.Bolivian GRSOs have helped unemployed tin minerscope with structural adjustment by organizing foodbuying cooperatives. Stallholder and hawker cooper-atives in Indonesia obtain legal and political protec-tion as well as capital from GRSOS:~~ GRSOs in theDominican Republic help coffee farmers export cof-fee directly and by-pass middle men.66With the protection of middle class outsiders,GROs are more apt to challenge local injustice.BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee)interviewed the landless in 10 Bangladesh villages,and recorded land grabs, unfair loans, and bribes as away of mapping corruption. Single events were notnews to the poor, but as the numbers added up, theybecame intensely interested and BRAC used thisinterest as an organizing vehicle for landless groups.GROs, on the other hand, provide GRSOs withthe principle means of accomplishing their objec-tives, and the raw material of development needed toinsure flexibility and innovation. Linkages withGROs also tend to prevent GRSOs from becomingnarrow and exclusionary service providers.67Although GRSOs provide technical and sometimesfinancial assistance to GROs, what is consistentlystriking about nongovernmental vertical linkages, isthe strong impact that GROs have on the continuousrethinking about development that occurs within

GRSOS.~* GRSOs are, therefore, more likely thanother outsiders to deal successfully with the centralparadox of development. In addition to their wide-spread commitment to participatory development,strengthened by previous contact with GROs, theyseem to be more consistently committed than otheroutsiders to seeking out existing GROS.~~ WhenGRSOs (or other outsiders) work with an establishedGRO, the central paradox may have less validity,at least when linkages are first established.Because GRO empowerment is a core goal ofGRSOs, the central paradox often reasserts itselfas relationships between GROs and GRSOs mature.Indeed, GRSOs can sometimes be quite heavy hand-ed in their pursuit of equality. The Water CouncilMovement, founded by Gram Fourav Pratishthan, aGRSO in a drought-prone area of Maharashtra, onlyprovides assistance for group irrigation plans thatinclude the landless. Because the landless receive thesame water share as members who own land, theyacquire a bargaining chip within the organization.70Where local vested interests are strong and inequali-ty extreme, a GRSO may vastly scale up its programby promoting alternative GROs. BRACs sponsor-ship of landless organizations in Bangladesh is agood example.On the other hand, such initial heavy handednessneed not necessarily undermine communitywide oli-garchies only to replace them with dependency onGRSOs. Practical methods of promoting GRO sus-tainability are beginning to emerge from the commit-ment to local empowerment. The Association ofNew Alchemists (ANAI) in Costa Rica only pro-vides credit to groups after intensive empowermenttraining and the accomplishment of tasks not depen-dent on external input. Success is measured byANAIs own ability to back away. And the Six SAssociation, which works in several countries inWest Africa, only assists GROs that have createdregional networks.72The most powerful innovation sustaining an egal-itarian organizational culture in GRO-GRSO link-ages, however, is the creation of GRSOs from belowby GRO networks. This pattern is surprisingly wide-spread in Mexico, where it has become a rationaldefense against the finely developed art of govem-ment cooption. Some such GRSOs are now over 30years old. In Indonesia, Bina Swadaya, a network ofclose to 20,000 LDAs in eight provinces, grew out ofa horizontal farmers movement organized in the1960s. Bina organizes village cooperatives and pro-motes local savings plans. It has also trained familyplanning workers for the Indonesian govemment.74Among the other examples are a farmers associ-ation among the Tiv in Nigeria built on traditionalrotating credit arrangements. It has created 200 basecenters that provide technical assistance, grouped in


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eight regional and one national council.75 In the east-ern lowlands of Bolivia, an Indian federation(CIDOB) provides organizational and technical sup-port to consumer and credit cooperatives, as well asto subsistence farmers. Although timber companieshave been logging in the region since the 1950s thegroup runs its own logging company which avoidsclear cutting.

When entrepreneurs or managers hire the rightexperts, it is usually assumed to be a top-downprocess. But if GROs federating with each other arethe entrepreneurs, then the notion of hierarchy isstood on its head when they hire their own experts.Since a functional definition of hierarchy is deter-mined by who works for whom, a bottom-up hier-archy, while challenging existing class structures, isnot a contradiction in terms.76 Also challenged bythese patterns is the notion that outside linkagesnecessarily increase GRO dependency.77

Some GRSOs created from below are fully self-supporting. Jatun Pukara in Potosi, Bolivia, unites 17communities producing quinua, wool and wheat;trains community leaders, and uses the profits fromexcess village crops to reinforce and consolidate neworganizations. The Committee for DevelopmentAction. a regional training center in the Bamba-Thaialene area of Senegal, links three different eth-nic groups and 16 villages and is funded by a per-centage of the profits from a communal field.7RBecause of their origins, the simultaneous need tomaintain egalitarian values while creating more for-mal organizations appears to be almost taken forgranted by those who create GRSOs from below.AIDESEP (The Inter-Ethnic Association for theDevelopment of the Peruvian Jungle), organized as agrassroots protest movement in 1980, groups two-thirds of the 300,000 Indians in the PeruvianAmazon, and represents hundreds of GROs.AIDESEP lobbies for land titles, but refuses capitalfor development that could create a potential sourceof power over local communities. Contributions arechanneled directly to local groups.79

7. CONCLUSIONS(a) GROs and their networks

Traditional GROs and those sponsored by gov-ernments may or may not be dominated by elites.Yet they often gain experience from failure, and canreconstitute themselves along democratic lines.Although traditional GROs may or may not be oli-garchically controlled, GROs established morerecently from below tend to be more consistentlydemocratic in their internal behavior.Although the iron law of oligarchy may assertitself over time, several factors reduce its inevitabili-

ty. These include the socioeconomic homogeneity ofsome communities and, paradoxically, the creationof alternative organizations that challenge inequali-ties in other communities. Gender inequality is a par-ticularly important force behind the creation ofGROs, although Western feminist demands are gen-erally less relevant to poor women than urgent sur-vival needs. Survival needs also promote the creationof environmental GROs focusing on commonresources, while pushing individuals to advancethemselves economically through small group soli-darity and support.

Finally, in contrast to Michelss theory, the factthat GROs are membership organizations appears tosupport rather than diminish internal democracy. Notonly can GROs build on the initial enthusiasm andvoluntary activism of their members, they have alsodeveloped creative approaches to combining collec-tive and individual advancement that help sustaingrassroots activism over the long run. Interestinglyenough, outside assistance to GROs through GRSOsin the form of revolving loan funds or entrepreneur-ial grants has helped strengthen this individual/col-lective overlap.8

Although GRO networks do not consistently rein-force democratic relationships, the economic advan-tages of barter among GROs tends to decentralizepower, provide new opportunities for participationand build a vested interest in equitable collaboration.The ability to communicate beyond local boundariesand learn what others have achieved makes accep-tance of elite domination less likely.

(b) GRSOs and their networksDespite some exceptions, GRSOs have a general-ly positive reputation that has not been significantlyundermined by increasing international support. Atthe very least, they contribute to the overall growth

of the voluntary or independent sector and to thestrengthening of civil society. At best, they play amore specific role in strengthening democratic deci-sion making at the grassroots level and in supportingGROs as membership organizations.

A number of factors reinforce the tendency ofGRSOs to continue focusing on empowering thepoor. Among these are the diverse origins of theirfounders, and the important role of women withinthe overall movement. Womens membershipGRSOs seem to be particularly suited to integratingmiddle-class and low-income members and to mobi-lizing women professionals. In addition, the idea andpractice of grassroots support is spreading beyondthe standard GRSO, founded by a small groupof idealistic professionals. GRSOs, in other words,turn up in unexpected places, increasingly benefitfrom member-volunteers, and are challenged to con-


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tinue learning about development by their ties toGROs.Still at issue, however, is the sustainability ofdemocratic practices within GRSOs. Although thethousands of remarkable individuals who createdthem, beginning in the early 197Os, may not be train-ing others to replace them, the lack of formal barriersto GRSO employment and the diversity of newactivists tend to mitigate against the succession cri-sis. The ability of a US NGO called Ashoka to findmostly young public sector entrepreneurs in theThird World suggests the pool of potential talent isample. Whether this potential is being sufficientlylinked to the now middle-aged leaders who createdGRSOs all over the world remains to be seen. On theplus side, informal GRSO networks often supportalternative management styles. They also offer analternative to the tendency of some formal umbrellaorganizations to siphon off donor funding.

The autonomy as well as accountability ofGRSOs ultimately depends on their success inimplementing the philosophy of participatory devel-opment and empowering people at the grassrootslevel. What Uphoff calls this troublesome circulari-ty means that local institutional development is notsomething that can be promoted in neat, sequentialfashion . . increased capacity of intermediate levelinstitutions is to be welcomed so long as they do notstifle local institutions . . (1986, p. 227). The ide-ology of empowerment is often reinforced by theworking relationships with autonomous GROs thatare already organized.

The numerical impact of NGOs as well as theirtotal numbers in many countries, imply that they arebuilding a vested interest that could sustain popularparticipation in development. Since vested interestsusually sustain inequitable institutions for manyyears, creating vested interests among the poor maybe equally sustainable. In addition, most of the orga-nizations with the largest numerical impact on bene-ficiaries focus on income, the core of vested interestsamong any group.What is most striking about the phenomenon ofnetworking is the contrast between authoritarianpolitical superstructures in most countries and innov-ative cooperation among NGOs. Although NGO net-works harken back to traditional, deeply rooted cul-tural practices, they also provide the expandingspace needed to create a new political culture.

Ironically, in the United States, the cultural ethic ofcompetition, so useful in the private economicsphere, may make broad-based cooperation amongsocial change organizations more difficult than in theThird World.Whether oligarchy is an iron law or, as Fox andHernandez (1989) suggest, merely a tendency,there are strong countervailing forces arrayed againstit among Third World NGOs. While there can be nofinal resting point between the poles of democracyand oligarchy, the growing number of relationshipsamong NGOs appear to be strong and complexenough to reinforce nonoligarchical relationshipswithin and between individual organizations.Oligarchy, in other words, is more likely to thrive indarkness, in secret and in isolation.Whatever the long-term sustainability of horizon-tal and vertical NGO networks, or what Brown(1990) calls bridging organizations, their emer-gence necessitates a reexamination of outside assis-tance, even among those international NGOs, officialdonors and governments already attuned to the NGOphenomenon. Outsiders have already managed tosupport innovations that help create intraorganiza-tional democracy. Yet they have been less successfulin recognizing and supporting the very interorganiza-tional linkages that can help sustain intraorganiza-tional democracy over the long run.Despite the remarkable similarities among NGOsin different parts of the Third World, the time forfeel good generalized discussions of North-Southpartnership is past. Country-specific field researchon who is doing what where is an urgent necessity,given the global need for sustainable development.Internationally supported field research on NGOsand their networks that used local consultants wouldhave two important consequences. First, it wouldenhance international appreciation for what isalready occurring in the Third World and lessen thesubtle paternalism that still pervades discussions ofmanagement assistance or capacity building.81Second, it would tend to discourage hasty umbrellafunding and contribute to a creative reexaminationof voluntary and official aid policies. A guiding prin-ciple of this reexamination should be finding ways tostrengthen ties between and among organizationsrather than creating new organizational layers overthem.

NOTES1. Democracy is defined here as broad member 3. Fisher (1993). chapter 4.participation in decision making, and is not, as in

political systems, necessarily dependent on elected represen- 4. Schneider (1985), p. 300. At that time, there weretatives. approximately 3.5 billion people in the low-income andlower middle-income economies, according to the World2. Fisher (1993), chapter 4. Bank (1984, pp. 218-219).


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5. Esman and Uphoff (1984); Uphoff (1986). See Fisher 3 1. See, for example, Langer ( 1985).(1993). chapter 4, for further discussion.6.7.

8.9.

10.11.12.13.

Annis (1988), p. 21.Ali (1986); Esman and Uphoff (1984), p. 91.

Adams (1986).

32. Tongsawate and Tipps (1985), p. 54; Muttreja (1990), p.11; USAID (1989), p. 12.33. Fowler (1990).

34. GRSOs were also protected by the Catholic Church.Reilly (1989), p. 17; Lanim (1987), p. 32.Karim (1985-86). p. 33.35.

See Fisher (1977) and (1984). p. 75.36.

Diaz Albertini (1990), pp. 49,5 1.37.

Ba (1990).38.

Wanyande (1987). This increased from approximately

Cotter (1988).Schneider (1985) and Clark (1991), p. 81.Lopezllera Mendez (1988), p. 132.Rouille DOrfeuille (1984); IFDA (1986), p. 77.Various sources, but see, for example, Malamah,000 groups in 1980. See World Bank (1980), p. 167. This 39.

should be compared to a population of approximately fivemillion women ages 1544 in Kenya as of 1988. Manywomens GROs however have very large memberships.Present estimates are that the number of Kenyan womensgroups exceeds 20,000.14. Presentation given by Amy Baker, University ofIllinois, Association for Women in DevelopmentConference, Washington, DC, 1989.15. Duming (1989a). p. 19.16. Uphoff (1986), p. 276; Uphoff (1992); Messerschmidt(1987). D. 381 and Khan (1991).17.18.19.20.21.22.23.24.

. . .Landim (1992).F. Korten (1983). pp. 193-194.Fox and Hemandez (1989), p. 10.Lopezllera Mendez (1988).Lecomte ( 1986). p. 2 1.Sawadogo (1990), p. 66.IRED (1986), p. 26.Fox and Hemandez (1989, p. 15) focus on the ebb and

flow of participation.25. Landim (1987), p. 34.26. Esteva (1987).27. Interview, Lima, Spring, 1989.28. Goertzen (1991); telephone interview, JosephineAtienzas, International Institute for Rural Reconstruction,June 29.1992.29. Yudelman (1987), p. 182. 56. IFDA (1984), pp. 37-50.

Thomas (1989).

40. B. Smith (1990), p. 243.41. C. Smith (1990), pp. 80-8142. Schneider (1985), p. 178; IFDA (1989a). pp. 69-70;Brundtland Bulletin (1991), p. 34.43, Interview with Philip Gain of the Coordinating Councilfor Human Rights in Bangladesh, April, 1991. See also Rush(1991).44. The estimate is from Thoolen (1990), p. 2. Althoughthese are obviously distributed unevenly in the Third World,their impact on the 80 or more low and low middle-incomecountries is worthy of serious attention.45. Peterson (1991).46. Fatima (1984), p. 47.47. Khan (1987), p. 12.48. Fisher (1993).49. IFDA (1987). pp. 69-7050. Goff (1990)5 1. United Nations, Non-governmental Liaison Service(1987), p. 34.52. Healy(l99l),p. 2653. Talk given by Monoshi Mitra, Association for Womenin Development Conference, Washington, DC., 1989.54. ASHOKA (1989), p. 141.55. Interview with Vijay Mahajan, July, 1989

30. Cited in Fowler (1988). 57. Sheth (1983), p. 11


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58. Stremlau (1987), p. 221. 70. Deshpande et al. (1986).59. Perhaps because GRSOs themselves emerged fairly 71. Carroll (1992), p. 217.recently in Africa, there are fewer informal networks inAfrica than in Asia or Latin America. 72. Six S stands for the French initials of Making use of thedry season in the Savannah and Sahel. It is an international60. Some formal networks such as the Association yet indigenous NGO, founded in Africa, with a fundraisingfor Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB) are branch in Geneva.assisting their member organizations to coordinate fieldactivities. 73. Lopezllera Mendez (1988). p. 34.61.62.63.64.6.5.

66.67.

swartz (1990), p. 12.Montgomery (1972).Esman and Uphoff (1984). p. 259.Fox and Butler (1987), p. 4.Clark (1991), p. 175; Eldridge (1988) p. 17.

74. IFDA (1989b), pp. 15-23.75. Uphoff (1986), p. 216.76. I am indebted to my husband, Richard Peck, for thisidea.77. See, for example, Esman and Uphoff (1984).78. Carroll (1992). p. 26.

Duming (1989b). p. 61; Clark (1991). 79. Rush (1991), p. 55.See Kramers (1981, p. 284) description of US non-

profit organizations.68. Fisher (1993), chapter 8.

80. For a discussion of Trickle Ups entrepreneurial grantssee Leet and Leet (1989).81. David Cooperrider of Ohio State University uses the

69. The strongest GROs may emerge from terrible adver- phrase appreciative inquiry. For a discussion of the needsity and may not necessarily represent the better-off poor. for reciprocal capacity building by using comparativeFisher (1993), chapter 2. advantage see Fisher (forthcoming).

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is the iron law of oligarchy rusting away in the third world by julie fisher, world development 22...

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