iran us preventive strikes

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Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Irans Nuclear Facilities

Rev: September 10th, 2012

1800 K Street, NW Suite 400

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Phone: 1.202.775.3270Fax: 1.202.775.3199

Email:[email protected]

Web:www.csis.org/burke/reports

AnthonyH.Cordesman,Arleigh A.BurkeChairinStrategyand Abdullah Toukan

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ThisreportisbasedonaseriesofreportsbyDr.AnthonyCordesmanonIran,publishedbytheBurkeChair,CSIS.Theycanbefoundat:

IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance PartOne:ConventionalandAsymmetricForces,availableontheCSISwebsiteathttp://csis.org/publication/reassessinggulfmilitarybalancepartoneconventionalandasymmetricforces.

IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalanceII:TheMissileandNuclearDimensions,availableontheCSISwebsiteathttp://csis.org/publication/iranandgulfmilitarybalanceiimissileandnucleardimensions.

[email protected]

Dr.AbdullahToukancanbecontactedat:abdullah.toukan@sagracenter.orgStrategicAnalysisandGlobalRiskAssessment(SAGRA)CenterAbuDhabiUAE

9/10/2012

Page

ExecutiveSummary 4

USPerceptionoftheIranianThreat 10

TheMilitaryOptiontoDealwithIransNuclearProgram 15

IllustrativeU.S.PreventiveMilitaryStrikes 18

CounteringIransAirDefense 29

GCCvsIranAirforceComparison 33

IransMissileForce 44

U.S.&GCC DefenseagainstIranianBallisticMissiles 56

CounteringIranianattacksontheStraitsofHormuz 64

MilitaryStrike Israel:ScenarioI 81

MilitaryStrike Israel:ScenarioII 89

USSimulationResultsontheConsequencesofanIsraeliStrike 92

Appendix 95

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ExecutiveSummary

ExecutiveSummary

Overthepastcoupleofmonths,speculationaboutaU.S.orIsraelistrikeonIransnuclearfacilitieshasmadeheadlinesaroundtheglobe.ThisreportaddresseshowtheU.S.couldtaketheleadincarryingoutapreventiveMilitaryStrikeagainstIranIfallpeacefuloptionshavebeenexhaustedandIranhasleftnoothermeanstoconvinceittostoporchangeitscourseinpursuingnuclearweapons.ItalsoexamineshowtheUScouldprovideadefenseumbrellaagainstanyIranianairandmissileretaliationthatwouldbeaimedatU.S.militarytargetsandalliesintheregion,inparticulartheGCCstates.

Akeyquestionarisesiswhatshouldtheobjectivesofamilitarystrikebe?TohalttheIraniannuclearprogram?Tosetitbackfiveyearsorforoneyear?ThiscriteriaisthekeytodefiningtheforceallocationrequiredtoachieveasuccessfulmissionagainstIransnuclearfacilities.

ThestudyshowsthattheinitialstrikeshouldbeagainstkeyIraniannuclearenrichmentandresearchfacilities,ballisticmissilebasislocatedaroundthecountry,numerousmobileballisticmissilelaunchersdispersedaroundIranandmainballisticmissileproductionfacilities.Atthesametime,itshowsthatthepayloadsrequiredtohitundergroundenrichmentfacilitieswithahighlevelofdamage,tocarryoutthescaleofinitialandfollowupattacks,andprovidingresourcessuchasnearrealtimeintelligencerequiredtodetectanddestroyotherpotentiallylethalIranianmilitaryweapons,forinstanceballisticmissilesthatcouldbeusedinaretaliation,canonlybecarriedoutbytheUnitedStates.

AninitialU.S.strikewillrequirealargeforceallocationconsistingofDefensiveCounterairandOffensiveCounterairOperations,suchasthemainBomberForce,theSuppressionofEnemyAirDefenseSystem,EscortaircraftfortheprotectionoftheBombers,ElectronicWarfarefordetectionandjammingpurposes,FighterSweepandCombatAirPatroltocounteranyairretaliationbyIran.

Whilesuchfirststrikewilltrytobeaseffectiveaspossible,theU.S.wouldbetheonlycountrythathastheairpower,supportcapability,andmixofseaairforcesintheGulftocontinueasustainedcampaignoveraperiodoftimeandrestrikeafteraninitialbattledamageassessmentitisfoundthatfurtherstrikesortiesarerequired.

Severalotherkeypointsaremadeintheanalysis:

TheagingIranianairforcewilldefinitelybenomatchagainsttheU.S.andeventheGCCairforces.InadditiontheIranianAirDefensesystemsdonothavetheCommandControlCommunicationsandIntelligencerequiredtodetect,trackandshootdowntheUSadvancedmilitarycombataircraft.HoweverU.S.plannerswilldefinitelytakealloperationalplanningprecautionsnecessarytoensurethatboththeIranianAirforceandAirDefensesystemareineffectiveandallU.S.combataircrafthaveahighprobabilityofsurvivalthroughout.

U.S.officialsareworkingwithalliesintheGulftodevelopthecapabilitytodefeatthethreatIranposestotheGulf,alliedterritory,andtheflowoftradeandenergyexportsGCCcountriesworrythatduringacrisis,IrancouldtrytopreventtheirshipsfromtraversingtheStraitofHormuz,cuttingofftheiroilexportbusiness.

TheonlyeffectivecounterstrikecapabilityIranhasotherthanasymmetricwarfareintheGulf,andtheuseofproxieslikeHezbollah,istheirBallisticMissileForce.AmassiveretaliationstrikewithwhateverlaunchingsitesthathavesurvivedtheU.S.firststrikecouldstillcausequiteaconsiderabledamagetotheGCCstates,inenergy,financeandvariousothercriticalinfrastructurecenters.

TheU.S.iscurrentlyinvolvedinbuildingaDefensiveShieldagainstamassiveIranianBallisticMissileattacktargetedattheGCCstates.ThedefensiveshieldconsistsofaMultiTierBallisticMissileDefenseSystemconsistingofTerminalHighAltitudeAirDefense(THAAD)andPatriotAdvancedCapability,PAC3,missilesystemssupportedwiththemostadvancedRadarandCommandandControlfacilities.

Ballisticmissiledefense(BMD)systemshavebeenprovidedtoKuwait,theUnitedArabEmirates,QatarandOman,aswellasstationingAegisequippedwarshipsinthewatersoftheArabianGulf.TheU.S.hasbeendevelopinganintegratedearlywarningradarsystemacrosstheGCCstatesthatcouldhelpU.S.andGCCforcestoquicklyrespondtoanIranianmissileattack.

.

IsraeldoesnothavethecapabilitytocarryoutpreventivestrikesthatcoulddomorethandelayIranseffortsforayearortwo.

Finally,thefactthatUShasthecapabilitytocarryoutpreventivestrikesdoesnotmeanitshouldnotseektonegotiateanendtothethreateningaspectsofIransnuclearprograms.ThebriefshowsjusthowdangerousanywarintheGulfcouldbetotheworldseconomy althoughIranismorevulnerablethananyofitsSouthernGulfneighbors.

TheU.S.alsoneedsitsGulfalliesaskeypartnersandmustconsiderthelawofunintendedconsequences.Preventivemilitarystrikescouldpushthepresentlyvolatilemiddleeastregionintoawarwithfarreachingglobalpolitical,military,andeconomicconsequences.

USPreventiveMilitaryStrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesandBallisticMissileBases

Panchin

Fordow

ArakNatanz

Esfahan

BallisticMissileBases

Tabriz

Bakhtaran

ImamAli

SemnanSpace&MissileCenter

MashhadAirbase

BandarAbbas

KuhestakAbuMusaIsland

5MainNuclearFacilities 8BallisticMissileBases 15BallisticMissileProductionFacilities

CombatAircraftStrikeForcecouldbeF18sofftheU.S.5th fleet,andF15ElaunchedfromForwardAreaBases.

TheCombatAircraftcanalsoperformallOffensiveCounterairOperations:FighterSweep,SEAD(suppressionofEnemyAirDefense),InterdictionandEscort.

B2MissionPayloadistheB57A/BMissionOrdnancePenetrator(MOP).

(LocationofFacilitiessource:NTI)

Iran

SaudiArabia

Iraq

UAE Google

NuclearFacilities

Kuwait

Qatar

B2Bombers

StrikeForce

CombatAircraft

StrikeForce

TwoTierTheaterBallisticMissileDefense(TBMD) THAAD&PAC3EndoandExoAtmosphericEngagementsusing

ShootLookShoot&HittoKill

THAADLauncherPAC3Launcher

UpperTier1st Intercept

UpperTier2ndIntercept

ShootLookShoot

LowerTier1st Intercept

LowerTier2nd Intercept

UAEQatar

IRAN

SaudiArabia

TBMDSystem Defense againstTHAAD :UAE SRBMs(

USPerceptionsoftheIranianThreat

TheMilitaryPowerofIran:TheOfficialUSView

AnnualReportonMilitaryPowerofIran ReportbyU.S.DefenseSecretaryLeonPanetta,June2012

IranianGrandStrategy,SecurityStrategy,andMilitaryStrategy

TherehasbeennochangetoIran'sstrategiesoverthepastyear.Iran's grandstrategyremainschallengingU.S.influencewhiledevelopingits domesticcapabilitiestobecomethedominantpowerintheMiddleEast. Iran'ssecuritystrategyremainsfocusedondeterringanattack,andit continuestosupportgovernmentsandgroupsthatopposeU,S.interests. Diplomacy,economicleverage,andactivesponsorshipofterroristandinsurgentgroups,suchasLebaneseHizballah,IraqiShiagroups,andthe Taliban,aretoolsIranusestoincreaseitsregionalpower.Iran's principlesofmilitarystrategyremaindeterrence,asymmetricalretaliation, andattritionwarfare.

IranseekstoincreaseitsstaturebycounteringU.S.influenceand expandingtieswithregionalactorswhileadvocatingIslamicsolidarity. Iranalsodesirestoexpandeconomicandsecurityagreementswithothernations,particularlymembersoftheNonalignedMovementinLatinAmericaandAfrica.

WiththeadventoftheArabSpringin2011,Iransawopportunitiestoincreaseitsinfluencebysupportinggroupsopposedtoregimesinpower,particularlythoseperceivedtosupportU.S.interests.Iranpublicizeditsbeliefthatthesepopular,democraticuprisingswereinspiredbyitsown1979IslamicRevolution.

Source:AnnualReportonMilitaryPowerofIranApril2012,FullUpdateJune29.ReportbyU.S.DefenseSecretaryLeonPanettaforfourcongressionaldefensecommitteestocomplywithafiscal2010directivetoprovideanannualclassifiedandunclassifiedassessmentofIransmilitarypower.]http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/rNnp87SL4Ew8[ProvidedbyBloombergNews:

OutsidetheMiddleEastIran'seffortstoexpandpolitical,economic,andsecuritytieswitharangeofcountriesdemonstrateTehran'sdesiretooffsetsanctionsanddiplomaticisolation.IrancontinuestouseamultiprongedstrategyinIraq,includingengagementwithleadersacrossthepoliticalspectrum,outreachtotheIraqipopulace,andcontinuedsupporttoIraqiShiamilitantsandterrorists,suchasKataibHizballah,AsaibAhlalHaq,andthePromisedDayBrigade,inthewakeoftheU.S.militarywithdrawal.Iranprovidesmoney,weapons,training,andstrategicandoperationalguidancetoShiamilitiasandterroristgroupstoprotectandpreserveIran'ssecurityinterests,includingthreateningtheresidualU.Spresence.Inadditiontoprovidingarmsandsupport,theIslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorpsQodsForce(IRGCQF).isresponsiblefortrainingIraqimilitantsandterroristsinIran,sometimesusingLebaneseHizballahinstructors.

IrancontinuestoinfluenceeventsinAfghanistanthroughamultifacetedapproach,includingsupportfortheKarzaigovernmentwhilealsosupportingvariousinsurgentgroups.TehranmaintainstieswithAfghanleadersacrossthepoliticalspectrumandcontinuestobeinvolvedinanumberofhumanitarian,economic,andculturaloutreachactivitiesamongtheAfghanpopulace.AlthoughTehran'ssupporttotheTalibanisinconsistentwiththeirhistoricenmity,itcomplementsIran'sstrategyofbackingmanygroupstomaximizeitsinfluencewhilealsounderminingU.S.andNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)objectivesbyfomentingviolence.

IranhasbeeninvolvedinLebanonsincetheearlydaysoftheIslamicRepublic,especiallyseekingtoexpandtieswiththecountryslargeShia]population.TheIRGCQFcontinuestoprovidemoney,weapons,training,andlogisticsupporttoLebaneseHizballahandviewstheorganizationasakeytoolinitseffortstopressureIsrael.

SincethebeginningoftheSyrianunrest,IranhassupportedPresidentBasharalAsadwhiledownplayingthedepthofthissupportinpublic.Iran'ssupporttotheAsadregimehasincludedmilitaryequipmentandcommunicationsassistance.IranprobablyhasprovidedmilitarytrainerstoadviseSyriansecurityforces.

Iran'sConventionalForces

Iran'sconventionalmilitarycapabilitiescontinuetoimprove,NavalforcesareaddingnewshipsandsubmarineswhileexpandingbasesontheGulfofOman,thePersianGulf,andtheCaspianSea.Inaddition,Irancontinuestoexpandthebreadthofitsnavaloperations.IrandeploysnavalshipsintotheGulfofAdenandArabianSeaforcounterpiracyoperationsandin2011andearly2012deployedtwoseparatesurfacegroupstotheMediterranean.

Inearly2012,theIslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorpsGroundResistanceForces(IRGCGRF)conductedaseriesofexercisesinnortheasternandcentralIran.Theexercises,MARTYRSOFUNITYinthenortheastandSUPPORTERSOFVELAYATandVALFAJRincentralIran,werethefirstsignificantexercises conductedbytheIRGCGRFsinceitsreorganizationin2008.Thethreeexercisesconsistedofcombinedarmsmaneuversandweremeanttoshowthe!RGCGRF'soffensiveanddefensivecapabilitieswhileofferinglimitedtrainingvaluefortheparticipatingunits.

Iran'sUnconventionalForcesandRelatedActivities

ThroughtheIRGCQF,IranprovidesmaterialsupporttoterroristormilitantgroupssuchasHAMAS,LebaneseHizballah,thePalestinianIslamicJihad,theTaliban,andIraqiShiagroups.

InclosecooperationwithSyria,IranhasprovidedLebaneseHizballahwithincreasinglysophisticatedweapons,includingawidearrayofmissilesandrocketsthatallowHizballahtolaunchweaponsfromdeeperinLebanonortostrikeIsrael.WejudgethattheIranianmilitarytrainsHizballahandPalestinianextremistgroupsatcampsthroughouttheregion.

IranprovidesfundingandpossiblyweaponstoHAMASandotherPalestinianterroristsintheGazaStrip.

IranianCapabilitiesRelatedtoNuclearandMissileForces

Iranisdevelopingarangeoftechnicalcapabilitiesthatcouldbeappliedtotheproductionofnuclearweaponsifthedecisionismadetodoso.ItcontinuestoprogresswithitsuraniumenrichmentatNatanzandthenewlyoperationalQom'EnrichmentFacilitydespiteUNSecurityCouncilsanctions,TheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency's(IAEAs)November2011reportonIranprovidedextensiveevidenceofpastandpossiblyongoingIraniannuclearweapons relatedresearchanddevelopmentwork.IranhasrefusedtoaddressthisevidenceanddeniedrepeatedIAEArequestsforaccesstodocuments,personnel,andfacilities.

AttheNatanzUndergroundFuelEnrichmentPlant,asofFebruary2012,Iranwasproducing3.5percentlowenricheduraniumhexafluoride(LEUF6)withabout8,800ofthe9,150installedIR1lcentrifuges.AttheNatanzAbovegroundPilotFuelEnrichmentPlant,Iranwasproducing20percentLEUF6withoneinterconnectedcascadepair(328centrifuges).About6,200emptyIR1centrifugecasingswereinstalledinthatfacility.AttheQomEnrichmentFacility(akatheFordowFuelEnrichmentPlant),Iranwasproducing2OpercentLEUF6withtwopairsofinterconnectedcascades(about700IR1centrifuges).Iranhadfilledtheremainderofthefacilityscentrifugecapacitywith2,100emptyIR1centrifugecasings.IrandeclaredtheentirefacilitywouldbeusedforproducingLEUF6,abandoningpreviousplanstoconductcentrifugeresearchanddevelopmentthere.

IrancontinuedconstructionattheheavywaterIranNuclearResearchReactor(IR40)atKhondabinviolationofUNresolutions.

RegularIranianballisticmissiletrainingcontinuesthroughoutthecountry.

Irancontinuestodevelopballisticmissilesthatcanrangeregionaladversaries,Israel,andEasternEurope,includinganextendedrangevariantoftheShahab3anda2,0OOkmmediumrangeballisticmissile,theAshura.Beyondsteadygrowthinitsmissileandrocketinventories,Iranhasboostedthelethalityandeffectivenessofexistingsystemswithaccuracyimprovementsandnewsubmunitionpayloads.Iransmissileforceconsistschieflyofmobilemissilelaunchersthatarenottetheredtospecific physicallaunchpositions.Iranmaybetechnicallycapableofflighttestinganintercontinentalballisticmissileby2015.

TheMilitaryOptiontoDealwithIransNuclearProgram

USExtendedDeterrenceagainsttheproliferationofWMDandtheirdeliverysystems.

TheU.S.seesIranwithitsballisticmissilesandpotentialofdevelopinganuclearweaponisadirectthreattotheGCCandalsoposesathreattoallfriendsandalliesintheMiddleeastregion.

IranhasignoredU.S.warnings andhaspressedaheadwithitsuraniumenrichmentprogramandhasrecentlyannouncedthatitisselfsufficientinnucleartechnology.Iranclaimsthatitcandomesticallyproduceitsownrawuraniumforenrichment.

TheU.S.administrationhasstatedthatthefullrangeofU.S.militarycapabilityinbothconventionalandunconventionalweaponswillbeavailableandreadytobecommittedtodefendingitsalliesandfriendsagainstanythreat.TheU.S.hasstartedimplementingastrategytoinfluencethedecisionmakingbodiesinIranastothedevastatingconsequencesiftheGCC,andanyotheralliesareattackedorthreatened.

CitingtheIranianthreat,theObamaadministrationshiftedfromtheBushadministrationsplanstoplacemissiledefensesitesinPolandandradarintheCzechRepublictoanapproachthatwouldinfourphasesplaceclosertoIransomeAegisclassNavymissiledefensevessels,groundradarandeventuallyland basedNavyStandardMissile3interceptors

Shoulddeterrencefail,theU.S.willhavealreadyprovidedtheGCCcountrieswithBallisticMissileDefenseSystems whichhavealltheEarlyWarningandCommandControlfacilities.Thiswilllimitthedamageshouldtheybeattacked,andtoenhancetheconventionaldeterrencecapabilityoftheGCC.Inadditionprovidingmoderntechnologycombataircraftthatcanbelaunchedwithinaveryshortwindowoftimetoblockanyfirstattackwaveandtohavethecapabilitytomovethewarintoenemyterritory,intheshortesttimeperiod,usingbothDefensiveandOffensiveCounterairMissions.

Ballisticmissiledefense(BMD)systemshavebeenprovidedtofourcountriesontheArabianPeninsula.BMDsystemswereprovidedtoKuwait,theUnitedArabEmirates,QatarandOman,aswellasstationingBMDcapable,AegisequippedwarshipsinthewatersoftheArabianGulf.

TheU.S.hasbeendevelopinganintegratedearlywarningradarsystemacrosstheGCCstatesthatcouldhelpU.S.andGCCforcestoquicklyrespondtoanIranianmissileattack.ThemovesareintendedtoreassureGulfcountriesthattheywouldbeprotectedagainstpossibleoffensiveactionfromTehran.U.S.officialsstressedthedefensivenatureoftheactionsbeingtakenthroughouttheregion.

U.S.officialsalsoareworkingwithalliesintheGulftoensurefreedomofnavigationintheregion.Arabcountriesworrythatduringacrisis,IrancouldtrytopreventtheirshipsfromtraversingtheStraitofHormuz,cuttingofftheiroilexportbusiness.USofficialshaverepeatedlyinsistedtheyarekeeping"alloptionsonthetable,"whichincludesamilitarystrikeoption,whenitcomestoIran.SecretaryofStateClintonmadethefollowingremarkswithSaudiArabianForeignMinisteronMarch31,2012(USStateDepartment).

Webelievestronglythat,inadditiontoourbilateralmilitarycooperationbetweentheUnitedStatesandeverymembernationoftheGCC,wecandoevenmoretodefendtheGulfthroughcooperationonballisticmissiledefense.Webeganthatconversationinthisforumtoday.AdmiralFox,thecommanderoftheFifthFleet,madeapresentationoutliningsomeofthechallengesthatwefacewhenitcomestoballisticmissiledefense.ButwearecommittedtodefendingtheGulfnationsandwewantittobeaseffectiveaspossible.

Sowewanttobeginexpertdiscussionswithourfriendsaboutwhatwecandotoenhanceballisticmissiledefense.Therearesomeaspectsofaballisticmissiledefensesystemthatarealreadyavailable,someofwhichhavealreadybeendeployedintheGulf.Butitsthecooperation itswhattheycallinteroperabilitythatwenowneedtoreallyrollupoursleevesandgettoworkon.

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IllustrativeU.S.PreventiveMilitaryStrikes

18

TheU.S.istheonlycountrythatcanlaunchasuccessfulMilitaryStrike,ifallpeacefuloptionshavebeenexhaustedandIranhasleftnoothermeanstoconvinceittostoporchangeitscourseinpursuingNuclearWeapons.TheU.S.shouldalonedeterminewhatthetimelinecouldbeifIrandoespursuethepathtodevelopnuclearweapons.

Thequestionarisesiswhatwouldtheobjectivesofamilitarystrikebe?TopulltheIraniannuclearprogramback5yearsordelayitfor1year?ThiscriteriawilldefinetheforceallocationrequiredtoachieveasuccessfulmissionagainstIransnuclearfacilities.WepointoutthatitisnotasimplemissionofbombersflyinginandoutofIran,thisisacomplicatedOffensiveAirStrikethatwillinvolvemanyaircraft,eachwithitsownrole,suchasCombatAircarftwhoseroleistosuppressenemyairdefensesalongtheway,aircraftthatflyfighterescortwiththebombers,aircraftthatcarryspecializedelectronicwarfareequipmenttojamenemyradarsandcommunications.,plusprobablyairtoairrefuelingalongthewayinandoutofIran.

Dependingontheforcesallocatedanddurationofairstrikes,itisunlikelythatanaircampaignalonecouldaloneterminateIransprogram.Thepossibilityofdispersedfacilitiescomplicatesanyassessmentofapotentialmissionsuccess,makingitunclearwhattheultimateeffectofastrikewouldbeonIransnuclearfacilities.

TheU.S.isawarethattheactionofamilitarystrikecouldbedestabilizingfortheentireMiddleEastregionandpotentiallygenerateanuclearweaponsraceinthatpartoftheworld,"AdmiralMichaelMullen,thechairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,toldCNN."Ithinkanattackwouldalsobe,byusorbyanybodyelse,beverydestabilizing.

MilitaryRisksinStrikeagainstIransNuclearFacilities

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IllustrativeUSStrikeMission

B2bombersoutofDiegoGarcia,eachcarrying2GBU57MOPbombs.

Missioncanbeachievedwithahighsuccessratealsomaintainingasustainedstrikeoveracoupleofdays.

B2bombersescortedbyF18sfromthe5th fleetstationedintheGulfarea,orF15EsandF16Csfromforwardareaairbases.

UnitedStatesandWesternalliesconsideredtobetheonlycountriesinvolved,noGCCoranyArabcountryinvolvementandespeciallynoIsraelidirectinvolvement.

Stillthough,IranmostprobablywillaccuseIsraeltobepartoftheStrikeandwilltrytoretaliate,eitherbylaunchingaBallisticMissileonIsraelcarryingconventionalorWMD(chemical,biological,radiological)andactivatingHezbullahtolaunchcrossborderattacksagainstIsrael.

IranwouldalsotrytoattackanyU.S.militaryairbasesthatareactiveintheGulfeveniftheyarestationedinGCCcountries.

IfIranattacksanyoftheGCCcountries,thentheywillhavetherighttoselfdefense.InadditionthewholeArabMiddleEastwillnotacceptanIranianattackonanyoftheGCCcountries.

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TheB2Bomber

PrimaryFunction Multiroleheavybomber

Engines: FourGEF118GE100engines,eachwithathrustof17,300pounds(7,847kg)

Speed,Cruise: Highsubsonic

Ceiling: 50,000ft(15,000meters)

WeightTakeoff,(typical): 335,500 350,000pounds(152,600 159,000kg)

Weight, Empty(typical): 125,000 160,000pounds

Range: 6,000nmi (9,600km),unrefueledrangeforaHiLoHimissionwith16B61nuclearfreefallbombs10,000mileswithoneaerialrefueling.

Payload: 40,000pounds(18,000 kg)

Crew: Twopilots

CurrentArmament: Nuclear:16B61,16B83Conventional:80MK82(500lb),16MK84(2000lb),3436CBU87,3436CBU89,3436CBU97Precision:216GBU39SDB(250lb),80 GBU30JDAM(500lb),16GBU32JDAM(2000lb),GBU27,GBU28,GBU36,GBU37,AGM154HSOW,816AGM137TSSAM,2MOP/DSHTW/BigBLU

(Source:http://www.GlobalSecurity.org/wmd/systems/b2s[ecs.html)21

GBU57A/BMassiveOrdnancePenetrator(MOP) Specifications

Weight,total 13,600kg(slightlylessthan30,000pounds)

Weight,explosive 2,700kg(6,000lb)

Length 6m/20.5feet

Diameter 31.5indiameter

Control Shortspanwingsandtrellistype tail

Penetration 60meters(200ft)through5,000psireinforcedconcrete40meters(125ft)throughmoderatelyhardrock8meters(25feet)through10,000psireinforcedconcrete

Contractors Boeing,Northrop Grumman

Platforms B52,B2

Guidance GPSaidedInertialNavigationSystem

InJuly2009,verificationofequipmentrequiredtointegratetheMOPontheB2wascomplete thehardwarethatholdstheMOPinsidetheweaponsbay.TheMOPisaGPSguidedweaponcontainingmorethan5,300poundsofconventionalexplosivesinsidea20.5ftlongbombbodyofhardenedsteel.Itisdesignedtopenetratedirt,rockandreinforcedconcretetoreachenemybunkerortunnelinstallations.TheB2willbecapableofcarryingtwoMOPs,oneineachweaponsbay.

TheB2currentlycarriesupto40,000poundsofconventionalordnance.Forexample,itcandeliver80independentlytargeted500lbclassbombsfromitssmartbombrackassembly;orupto162,000lbclassweaponsfromitsrotarylauncher.IntegrationoftheMOPontheB2isthelatestinaseriesofmodernizationprogramsthatNorthropGrummananditssubcontractorshaveundertakenwiththeAirForcetoensurethattheaircraftremainsfullycapableagainstevolvingthreats.

22

(Source:http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/iran/deliverysystems/)

PriorityTargetsinadditiontoIransMainNuclearNuclearFacilities

U.S.MilitaryStrikeForceAllocationagainstIransNuclearandBallisticFacilitiesOffensiveCounterair(OCA)Mission

PerformanceCriteriaandMissionParameters: Adamageperformancecriteriaabove75%foreachtarget,nuclearandmissile,resultinginadelayof

atleast5to10yearsinIransNuclearProgram,andsubstantiallyweakeningIransballisticmissileretaliatorycapability.

TwoaircraftareallocatedtoeachtargettomaximizethedamageonFirstStrike. DestroyingthemaximumnumberofMissileBases,MobileLaunchersandProductionFacilitiesduring(boostPhase)orbeforeLaunch, therebyreducingthenumberofincomingmissiles(warheads)andalsoreducingthenumberofshotsdefenseneedstotakeateachIncomingwarhead.

IranTarget NumberofTargets AircraftAllocated

MainNuclear 5Facilities 2A/C pertargetresultingin10B2Bombers

MissilesBases 8 Bases 2A/Cperbaseresultingin16StrikeA/C

MissileProduction 15Facilities 2A/Cpertargetresultingin30StrikeA/C

MobileMissileLaunchers Assuming22Launchersinvariouslocations2A/Cper mobilelauncherresultingin44A/C

TOTAL 5010B2Bombers90StrikeAircraft=100

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EnRouteSEAD

AttackOperations

OffensiveCounterairMissions(OCA)

CAP

(Source:CounterairOperationsUSAFAFDD21.1October1,2008)

AttackOperations Attackoperationsareintendedtodestroy,disrupt,ordegradecounterairtargetsontheground.Thesemissionsaredirectedagainstenemy:

BallisticMissileSitesAirfieldsCommandControlandtheirsupportinfrastructure:

SuppressionofEnemyAirDefenses(SEAD)SEADisanOCAmissiondesignedtoneutralize,destroy,ordegradeenemysurfacebasedairdefensesbydestructiveordisruptivemeans.

FighterSweep:Anoffensivemissionbyfighteraircrafttoseekanddestroyenemyaircraftortargetsofopportunityinadesignatedarea.

Escorts:Escortsareaircraftassignedtoprotectotheraircraftduringamission.Escortmissionsareflownoverenemyterritorytotargetandengageenemyaircraftandairdefensesystems.

DecreaseinAircraftRequiredinanAirtoGroundStrikeMission: ImprovedWeaponsAccuracy IncreasedSurvivability LargerPayload

AdditionalrequirementstoincreaseMissionEffectiveness

TheeffectivenessofOCAoperationsdependsontheavailabilityofcertainresources.Systemcapabilitiesareinfluencedbythesituation,threats,weather,andavailableintelligence.ThefollowingaresomeoftheresourcesusedtoconductOCA:

Aircraft:FighterandbomberaircraftprovidethebulkoftheweaponsystemsforOCAoperations.Othertypesofaircraftandweaponsystemsareoftencriticalenablersofcounterairoperations(e.g.,electronicattack,electronicprotection,andairrefuelingaircraft).

Missiles:Theseweaponsincludesurfacetosurface,airtosurface,andairtoairmissiles,aswellasair,land,andsealaunchedcruisemissiles.Manyoftheseweaponshavelongrangesandsomehaveveryquickreactiontimes.Theseweaponsystemscaneliminateorreducetheriskofharmtofriendlyforcesbydestroyingenemysystemsintheairandontheground.

ISRSystems:ISRsystemsandresourcesmaybeusedincounterairoperationstoprovideintelligence,surveillance,reconnaissance,deception,andothereffectsagainstenemyforcesandairdefensesystems.Theseactivitiesincludetheuseofairborne,spaceborne,andground(e.g.,humanintelligence)assets.


UnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS):UASmaybeusedincounterairoperationstoprovideISR,deception,jamming,harassment,ordestructionofenemyforcesandairdefensesystems.Thesesystemsmaybepreprogrammedorremotelypiloted.Theyprovidevaluableintelligencetofriendlyforcesandmaynowbeusedtoattacksometargetseithertoodangerousorriskyformannedaircraftorwheremannedaircraftarenotpresentoravailabletorespond.Theymayalsobeusedtohelpprovidepersistentairpresenceoverenemyforcesinsituationswherethismayhaveimportantpsychologicaleffectsuponanadversary(aspartofOCAorotheroperations)ifsynergisticallytaskedtohelpprovidepersistentpresenceoveradversaryforces.

SpecialOperationsForces(SOF):SOFcanconductdirectactionmissions,specialreconnaissance,andprovideterminalguidanceforattacksagainstvaluableenemytargets.PlannersintheAOCcoordinatewiththespecialoperationsliaisonelementtocoordinatetheuseofspecialoperationsassetsinsupportofthecounterairmission.

C2Systems:ThesesystemsenhanceOCAoperationsbyprovidingearlywarning,intelligence,identification,andtargetingdata,aswellasC2offriendlyforces.


USPreventiveMilitaryStrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesandBallisticMissileBases

Panchin

Fordow

ArakNatanz

Esfahan

BallisticMissileBases

Tabriz

Bakhtaran

ImamAli

SemnanSpace&MissileCenter

MashhadAirbase

BandarAbbas

KuhestakAbuMusaIsland

5MainNuclearFacilities 8BallisticMissileBases 15BallisticMissileProductionFacilities

CombatAircraftStrikeForcecouldbeF18sofftheU.S.5th fleet,andF15ElaunchedfromForwardAreaBases.

TheCombatAircraftcanalsoperformallOffensiveCounterairOperations:FighterSweep,SEAD(suppressionofEnemyAirDefense),InterdictionandEscort.

B2MissionPayloadistheB57A/BMissionOrdnancePenetrator(MOP).

(LocationofFacilitiessource:NTI)

Iran

SaudiArabia

Iraq

UAE Google

NuclearFacilities

Kuwait

Qatar

B2Bombers

StrikeForce

CombatAircraft

StrikeForce

CounteringIransAirDefense

IransCurrentLandBasedAirDefenseSystems

Iranhasextensivesurfacetoairmissileassets,butmostareobsoleteorobsolescent.Iranssystemsarepoorlynetted,havesignificantgapsandproblemsintheirradarandsensorcoverageandmodernization,andanumberofitssystemsarevulnerabletoelectronicwarfare

U.S.neverdeliveredintegratedsystembeforefallofShah soIranneverhadafullyfunctioningairdefensesystem.

IranhasmademanystatementsthatithasupgradedandmodernizedmanyofthecomponentsofsuchitsAirDefensesystemsusingRussian,Chinese,US,European,andIraniandesignedandmadeequipment.ButIrandoesnothavethedesignandmanufacturingcapabilitytocreatetrulymodernsystem,onethatisimmunetoelectronicwarfare,andonethatcanfunctionwithoutbecometacticallyvulnerabletoantiradiationweaponsandotherformsofactivesuppressionofenemyairdefense(SEAD)systems.

OnlymodernshortrangepointdefensesystemisTORM.OthershortrangesystemsmixofolderRussiansystem,SHORADs(ShortRangeAirDefense),andaging possibleinactiveBritishandFrenchsystems.

Mediumtolongrangesystemsarelowcapabilityorobsolescent.Iranhassome150HAWKSandIHAWKsdonothavecapableECM.Datebackto1960sand1970s.ItclaimstobeabletoproduceitsownIHAWKmissiles.HasvariousversionsofSA2obsolete.

Radarsensorandbattlemanagement/C4Isystemshavemajorlimitations.

RegardlessofhowmuchIranstatesthatithasmadeprogress,itwillstillbevulnerabletotheadvancedtechnologyU.S.combataircraftaswellastheelectronicwarfareanddefensesuppressionweaponsystems.ThiswillgivetheU.S.StrikeForcethefreedom,ifrequiredafterthefirststrike,toconductasustainedcampaignofstrikesoverafewdays.

(Source:AnthonyCordesmanCSIS) 30

GulfLandBasedAirDefenseSystemsin2008

Country MajorSAM LightSAM AAGun

Bahrain (8)IHAWK (60)RBS70(18)FIM92AStinger(7)Crotale

(26)Guns(15)Orlikon35mm(12)L/7040mm

Iran (16/150)IHAWK(3/10)SA5(45)SA2Guideline

SA7/14/16HQ7(29)SA15;SomeQW1Misaq(29)TORM1;SomeHN5(30)Rapier;SomeFM80(ChCrotale)15Tigercat;SomeFIM92AStinger

(1,700)GunsZSU23423mmZPU2/423mmZU2323mmM193937mmS6057mm

Kuwait (4/24)IHAWKPhaseIII(5)PatriotPAC2

(6/12)Aspide(48)Starbust

12Oerlikon35mm

Oman None Blowpipe;(2)MistralSP(34)SA7;(6)Blindfire(20)Javelin;(40)RapierS713Martello

(26)Guns(4)ZU23223mm(10)GDF(x)5Skyguard35mm(12)L6040mm

Qatar None (10)Blowpipe(12)FIM92AStinger(9)RolandII(24)Mistral(20)SA7

SaudiArabia (16/128)IHAWK(46/1624)Patriot(17/141)ShahineMobile(24/160)PAC2Launchers(17)ANA/FPS117Radar(73/68)CrotaleShahine

(40)Crotale(500)Stinger(ARMY)(500)Mistral(ADF)(500)FIM43Redeye(ARMY)(500)Redeye(ADF)(73141)ShahineStatic(500)FIM92AStinger(ARMY)(400)FIM92AAvenger(ADF)

(1,220)Guns(92)M163Vulcan20mm(30)N167Vulcan20mm(NG)(850)AMX30SA30mm(128)GDFOrlikon35mm(150)L7040mm(store)(130)M290mm(NG)

UAE (2/31)IHAWK 20+Blowpipe(20)MistralSomeRapier/Crotale/RB70/Javelin/SA18

(62)Guns(42)M3VDA20mmSP(20)GCFBM230mm

(Source:IranianWeaponsofMassDestruction.AnthonyCordesmanCSIS)

31

AirDefenseSystem

AssociatedEarlyWarning/AcquisitionRadars

AssociatedTracking&GuidanceRadars

MissileRanges(km)Altitude(ft)

In ServiceDate

SA2 SpoonRestD(P18)FlatFaceA(P15)

FansongA/B Max (km):40Min(km):8Altitude(ft):3,000to90,000

1971Upgraded

SA3 FlatFaceB(P19)SquatEye

LowBlow Max(km):30Min(km):6Altitude(ft): 150to160,000

1971

SA6 LongTrack(P40)HeightFinder:ThinSkinB(PRV9)

StraightFlush Max(km):24Min (km):4Altitude(ft):50to45,000

1973

SA8 FlatFaceB(P19)LongTrack(P40)HeightFinder:ThinSkinB(PRV9)

LandRoll Max(km):15Min(km):0.2Altitude(ft):40to40,000

1982

SA5 BackTrap(P80)TallKingC(P14)Spoon RestD(P18)HeightFinder:Oddpair(PRV13)OddGroup(PRV16)

SquarePair Max(km):250Min(km):20Altitude(ft):1,500to130,000

1983

IHAWK AN/MPQ50AN/MPQ55(PIPII)/62 (PIPIII)RangeonlyRadar

AN/MPQ57(PIPII)/61(PIPIII) Max(km):35Min(km):3Altitude(ft):0to55,000ft

1971

PatriotPAC2 AN/MPQ53PhasedArrayRadarCarriesoutSearch,targetdetection,trackandidentification,missiletrackingandECCMfunctions

AN/MSQ104EngagementControlStation(ECS)

Max(km):70Min(km):3Altitude (ft):80,000

1990

MediumtoLongRangeSurfaceToAirMissileSystems

32(Source:IranianWeaponsofMassDestruction.AnthonyCordesmanCSIS)

GCCvs IranianAirforceComparison

IransmostadvancedfightersconsistofasmallnumberofexportversionsoftheSu24andMiG29,whoseavionicslagfarbehindtheirRussiancounterparts.ItisreportedthatIranhaslessthan30exportversionsofMiG29,somenotoperational.TheselimitstoIransairforceareparticularlyimportantasIranhasairbasesthatareonlyafewminutesflighttimefromcriticaltargetsintheGulfandinthecoastalareasofthesouthernGulfstates.TheyarealsoimportantbecauseIransweaknessesinairtoaircombat,anditsweaknessesinsurfacetoairmissiledefensewhicharedescribedshortly,leaveithighlyvulnerabletoanyUSattack.

Iranclaimstohavemodernizedtheavionicsonsomeoftheseaircraft,andtohaveadapteditsF14stocarrytheHawkairtosurfacemissileasalongrangeairtoairmissiletocompensateforthefactitsF14sweresabotagedduringthefalloftheShahandcannotmakeeffectiveuseofPhoenixmissiles whichinanycasearelongbeyondtheirusefullife.Italsoclaimstohavecreatedelectronicwarfareaircraftandtohavemodernizedtheavionicsonits3PF3OrionmaritimepatrolaircraftwhichareasclosetoanAWACs/airbornewarningandcontrolaircraftasIranhas.Italsohasclaimedtohaveamixofunmannedcombataerialvehicles(UCAVsandUAVs)itcanusetomakeupforsomeofthelimitationinitsaircraft.

TheGCChavebeenplanningtheirdefensessoastoprovideamilitarydeterrentsufficienttomakeanydirectconfrontationascostlyaspossibletoIranoranyotheradversary.ItisinthisdeterrentrolethatliestheultimaterationaleforanyGCCJointDefensePactandCooperation.

TwomainconsiderationsunderlyingthechoiceofaMilitaryDoctrinebytheGCCstateshavebeen:BalanceofForcesandStrategicDepth.InparticularfortheArabianGulffrontlinestatesKuwait,Bahrain,Qatar,UAEandOman,themainconcernwouldbestrategicdepthtoanIranianattack.

(Source:AnthonyCordesmanCSIS)

DefensePerformanceCriteriashouldbea85%Probabilitythatthedefenseshootsdownalltheincomingthreataircraft;thisalsomeansan85%ofzeroleakage.Furthermorea90%ProbabilitythatincomingareincomingthreataircraftaresuccessfullydetectedearlyandtrackedbytheGCCAirDefense.

LackofStrategicDepthresultsinlimitationsontheareaofoperationalmaneuverabilityduringconflict,timetorespond,andanincreaseinthevulnerabilityofvitalstrategiccriticalinfrastructureeconomiccentersduetotheproximitytotheborders.SaudiArabiaisbetheonlystatethathasstrategicdepth,andislookedupontoplayapivotalroleintheSecurityArrangementsoftheGulfandtheArabIsraeliconflict.SaudiArabiasoilresources,populationandstrategicdepthmakeitamajorandessentialparticipantinanyregionalsecurityarrangementsorconflictintheGulfregion.

Whentransformedintoanoperationaldoctrine,theGCCstateswouldbasetheirForceStructurePlanningon:DefensibleBorders.Borderswhichcanbedefendedwithoutapreemptiveinitiative,andtheparallelcapabilitytotakethewartotheenemyandtofightonenemyterritory.

TherequirementwouldbetoenhancetheconventionalmilitaryabilityfortheGCCstatesconsistingoffourmajorcomponents:ForceStructure;Modernization;Readiness;Sustainability.Inadditionitwouldincludedevelopinganasymmetricwarfarecapability.ThetotalGCCAirPoweris428combataircraft,inassumingonly75%areoperationallyready(fullmissioncapable),thetotalavailableforcewillthenbe320andwithasortierateof3peraircraftperdaythetotalnumberofsortiesgeneratedwouldbe960.WhereasforIran,atotalof158aircraftwithanoperationalreadinessrateof60%,theavailablecombatforcewillbe95,andwith2sortiesperaircraftperdaythetotalsortiesgeneratedwillcometo190.The6:1ratioofsortiesgeneratedprojectstheweaknessoftheIranianAirforcevsthethoseoftheGCCcountries.

ByfollowingtheguidelinesoftheUSAFDoctrinemanualsinthemissionsneededforOffensiveCounterair,DefensiveCounterairaswellasCounterlandOperations,the6:1ratioclearlyimpliesthatthereisasubstantialadvantageinfavoroftheGCCAirforcesachievingthespecifiedwartimeobjectiveofwinninganairwarordestroyingatargetset.

IranAirforceTacticalFighterCapabilities 2012

Type No OperationalReadiness(%)Force

AvailableTotalSortiePerDay

PostulatedEmployment

MiG29A 25 60 15 30AirDefense/Escort/FS/BAS

Su25 13 60 8 16 CAS/BI/DeepStrike

SU24 30 60 18 36 CAS/BI/DeepStrike

F14 25 60 15 30 AirDefense/FS

F4E/D 65 69 39 78

CAS/BI/Deep

Strike/SEAD

Total 158 95 190

BAS:BattlefieldAirSuperiority

CAS:CloseAirSupport

BI:BattlefieldInterdiction

DS:DefenseSuppression

FS:FighterSweep

SustainedConditions:12hrOperationalDay18hrMaintenanceDay2SortiesperAircraftperday

37

Type OrderofBattle OperationalReady% ForceAvailableForceTotal

SortiesperDayPostulatedEmployment

TornadoIDS SaudiArabia:25 75 19 57 DeepStrike

Typhoon SaudiArabia:22 75 16 48 FS,BAS,AD,Escort

Mirage2000UAE:62Qatar:12(Total:74)

75UAE:46Qatar:9(Total:55)

UAE:138Qatar:27(Total:165)

FS,BAS,AD,Escort

F18 Kuwait:39 75 29 87

FS,BAS,AD,Escort,CAS,BI,

SEAD

F16C/D

Bahrain:21Oman:12UAE:80

(Total:113)

75

Bahrain:16Oman:9UAE:60(Total:85)

Bahrain:48Oman:27UAE:180(Total:255)

FS,BAS,AD,Escort,CAS,BI

F15C/D SaudiArabia:84 75 63 189 FS,BAS,AD,Escort,CAS,BI

F15S SaudiArabia:71 75 53 160 DeepStrike,FS,AD,Escort,CAS,BI

Total 428 320 960

GCCAirforceTacticalFighterCapabilities 2012

SustainedConditions:12hrOperationalDay18hrMaintenanceDay3Sortiesperaircraftperday

FS:FighterSweep,BAS:BattlefieldAirSuperiority,AD:AirDefense,CAS:CloseAirSupport(AirtoGroundRole),BI:BattleFieldInterdiction(AirtoGroundRole)SEAD:SuppressionofEnemyAirDefense

39

40

DefensiveCounterairOperations

CombatAirPatrol

StripLaunchedIntercept

Mission :DefenseofBorderfromEnemyIntrusion.Objective :Provide AirspaceSurveillanceover

selectedcorridorandIntercept.Assumptions&Conditions:

CorridorWidth&DistancefromBase ThreatOperations DurationofCoverage

AWACS

GroundControlInterceptRadar


CentralFactorsinThreatEngagementAnalysis:

C4I(CommandControlCommunicationsComputingandIntelligence)andthemaximumAirDefenseengagementforce

TheOperationalReadinessoftheforcesresultinginthecombatforcesavailableasFullMissionCapable.

ThemaximumusableGround/StripLaunchedInterceptorforceandCombatAirPatroloperations.TheMaximumStripLaunchedInterceptorsishighlysensitivetotheC4Itimedelayandtheresponsetime.

IntheAlertPhaseofairoperations,thecombatreadyassetsareassignedtotheGroundLaunchedInterceptandCombatAirOperations(CAP).

RadarCoverage

ThreatAircraft

CorridorWidth

TypicalGCCCombatAirPatrolMission

AircraftRequiredonCAPStationsNumberofAircrafttoSupport

EachCAPStation TotalAircraftRequiredx =

(NumberofCAPStations)x2 OperationalDay12hrs(SortieRate)x(LoiterTime)(AircraftRequiredonCAP)x

(AircraftRequiredtoSupportCAP)x =

3x2=6 12/(3x2)=2 6x2=14x =

IRAN

Qatar

UAEOMAN

SaudiArabia

CAP CAPCAP

DecreasingtheNumberofAircraftRequiredEntails: IncreasingAircraftSortieRate&TimeonStation(LoiterTime) IncreasingAircraftRadarRange&TimeonStation(LoiterTime)

42

WhatIranlacksinAirPower:

ThefollowingaresomegeneralcriteriathatwouldberequiredforIrantotryandmaintainatechnologicalandqualitativeedgeovertheGCCAirforces:

Aircraft:Multimissioncapability.HighOperationalReadiness/FullMissionCapablestateandhighsortierates.Allweatherday/nightoperationalcapabilityQuickresponse/groundlaunchedinterceptorsagainstincomingintruders.HighEndurance.AirborneElectronicWarfare(ESM/ECM/ECCM)survivabilityDetecttrackandengagemultiplemobilegroundtargetsaswellasHardandDeeplyBuriedTargets(HDBTs).Rapidlydestroyadvancedairdefensesystems.Capableofcarryingoutdeepstrikemissions.ShortC4IEarlyWarningdelaytimeduetohavingantiquatedSystem,semiautomatedmanintheloop,givingrisetolongResponse/ScrambleTimebyCombatAircraft

AirtoAirMissiles:Aircrafttobecapableofmultipletargetengagement.FireandForget/Launchandleavewithhighsingleshotkillcapability.Goodtargetdiscriminationandenhancedresistancetocountermeasures.Increaseinrangeoffiringmissileatthesametimeshorteningtheflighttimetothetarget.lowLossExchangeRatioinaClosing/BVREnvironmentandVisualEngagementEnvironment.

AirtoGround:Weaponsthatserveasaneffectiveforcemultiplier.Standoffcapability,operatingfromrangesoutsideenemypointdefenses.Lowandhighaltitudelaunches.PreservecrewandaircraftsurvivabilityEffectiveagainstawidearrayoflandandseatargetswithhighsingleshotkillprobability.Weaponsthatemploylaunchandleavewithhighaccuracy(smallCEP).Capableofday/nightandadverseweatherconditions

IransMissileForces

ThereislittledisagreementthatIransactionsposeapotentialthreat,butthereisfarlessagreementoverthenature,scaleandtimingofthisthreat.US,European,Gulf,andIsraelipolicymakersandexpertsagreethatIranpossessesalargeandgrowingmissileforce,withsomemissilescapableofhittingIsrael,andEurope.TheyagreethatIranhasbegundevelopinglongerrangeandsolidfuelmissiles.Atthesametime,theIranianprogramisinfluxandmanyofIransmissilesystemsarestillinadevelopmentphasewheretheirrange,accuracy,warhead,andreliabilityareimpossibletopredict.

IranhasbeendevelopingballisticmissilecapabilitiesbasedonRussian,NorthKorean,andChinesetechnologyorweaponssystemssincetheearly1980s.IrancurrentlypossessesthelargestballisticmissileinventoryintheMiddleEast,andthecountrysmilitaryandscientificestablishmentsareworkingtoincreasethesophistication,scale,andreachofitsmissiles.

Iranseesitsmissilecapabilitiesasawaytocompensateforitsshortcomingsinconventionalforces,aswellasameanstostrikeathighvaluetargetswithlittlewarning,suchaspopulationcenters,andWesternandWesternbackedforcesintheregion,includingUSbasesintheGulf.Assuch,ballisticmissilesplayanintegralroleinIransasymmetricwarfaredoctrine.GiventheemphasisIranplacesonitsmissileprogram,itisclearthatIranconsidersitsballisticmissilearsenalamongitsmostimportantassetsasbothadeterrenttoattackandleverageoverotherregionalplayers.

ThereisnoagreementastowhenIranmayacquiremissileswithhomingwarheadsandthekindofterminalguidancethatcanhitpointtargetseffectivelywithconventionalwarheads.ThereisnoagreementonthereliabilityandaccuracyofIransmissilesunderoperationalconditions,thereisnoagreementonIransabilitytodeploysystemswithcountermeasurestomissiledefenses.ThereisnoagreementonwhenIranmightdeployafullyfunctionnuclearwarhead.And,thereisnoagreementonthefuturesize,character,andbasingmodeofIransmissileforcesonceitslongrangesystemsaredeployedinstrength.

DeterrenceandActiveDefenseRisksIransMissileProgram

(Reference:AnthonyCordesmanandAlexanderWilner.CSISIranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance IandII.) 45

IranMilitaryDoctrine: SinceIranpresentlydoesnothaveaccesstohightechnologymilitaryweaponsystems,itwillneedto

developallrangesofBallisticMissilestocompensateforitsdeficienciesinconventionalforces.

IranhasnoprobleminStrategicDepth,canbeanadvantagefightinginandoverfamiliarterritory.ForceStructurePlanningbasedon:

o Highattritionrateinflictedonadversarycivilians

o Indepthdefenses,asIranhasthestrategicdepth

TacticalBallisticMissilesThreat:

Iransballisticmissilescoverthecompletespectrumrangefrom150kmupto5,500km,theShort,Medium,andIntermediateRangesofBallisticMissiles.IranbelievesthatthesewillcompensateforanydeficienciesinitsAirPower.

BallisticMissilescanbeusedwithsuccessagainstSoftTargets,inopenareasandcitiestoinflictmaximumhumancasualtiesandcreateterror.InessencewhatisconsideredasamajorcomponentinAsymmetricWarfareintheformofhighciviliancasualties.

ThisarsenalofBallisticMissilespossessedbyIranhasbeendeclaredtobefordefensivepurposesagainstanyforeigninvasion,inparticularagainsttheU.S.

However,ithasbecomeveryclearthatitisanarsenalthatisintendedtoinflictmaximumcasualtiesanddamage,inessenceamajorcomponentforAsymmetricWarfareintheformofhighattritionanddefensesindepthandtocompensateforanydeficienciesinitsAirPower.

SRBM:ShortRangeBallisticMissileMRBM:MediumRangeBallisticMissileIRBM:IntermediateRangeBallisticMissileICBM:IntercontinentalBallisticMissile

(Reference:TheodrePostol,ATechnicalAssessmentofIransBallisticMissileProgramMay6,2009.TechnicalAddendumtotheJointThreatAssessmentonIransNuclearAndMissilePotential.)

Shahab1 Shahab2 Shahab3 Shahab4

Class: SRBM SRBM MRBM MRBM

Range(km): 300 500 1,300 2,000

Payload(kg): 1,100 600 650 1,000

IranShahabBallisticMissiles

RangevsPayload

IRAN

(Reference:BallisticMissileDefenseReviewReport.BMDRDoDFebruary2010)

U.S.& GCCDefenseagainstIranianBallisticMissiles

SeaBasedAirDefensesTheU.S.NavysRoleinMissileDefenseNetwork

RoleoftheU.S.NavyAegisSystem:

WillprovideanefficientandhighlymobileseabaseddefenseagainstShortandMedium RangeBallisticMissilesintheirmidcoursephase.

ThesystemwillallowtheBMDCommandtomoveitsdefensecapabilitiesclosetotheenemysites. ThesystemwillhavetheEngagement&LongRangeTrackingCapability InterceptingShorttoMediumRangeBallisticMissilesinthemidcoursephaseoftheflightwithStandardMissile 3. Servesasaforwarddeployedsensor,providingearlywarningandlongrangesearch&trackcapabilitiesforICBMsandIRBMs.

Contributions:

WillextendthebattlespaceoftheBMDsandcontributetoanintegratedlayereddefense.TheNavalAegissystemextendstherangeoftheGroundMissiledefense(GMD)elementbyprovidingreliabletrackdatausedtocalculatefiringsolutions.

AegisBMDwillcoordinateengagementsofshortandmediumrangeballisticmissileswithterminalmissiledefensesystems.

Astrackinginformationissharedamongthesesystems,theBMDSwillhavetheopportunitytofollowtheengagementofatargetduringthemidcoursesegmentwithcoordinatedterminalengagements.

SeaBasedRadar SeaBasedRadar AegisBallisticMissile 3

(Source:MissileDefenseAgency.(MDA)DepartmentofDefense.TestingBuildingConfidence,2009) 58

Country TBMDSystem

UAE TheUAE issofarthefirstGCCcountrytobuytheTerminalHighAltitudeAirDefense(THAAD)missilesystem.

OnDec31,2011PentagonannouncedthattheUAEwillbebuying2fullTHAADbatteries,96missiles,2RaytheonAN/TPY2radars,and30yearsofspareparts.TotalValue$3.34billion.

In2008theUAEorderedPatriotPAC3:10fireunits,172missiles,Firstdelivery2009.

Kuwait July2012,Pentagon informedCongressofaplantosellKuwait$4.2billioninweaponsystems,including60PAC3missiles,20launchingplatformsand4radars.Thiswillbeinadditiontothe350Patriotmissilesboughtbetween2007and2010.In1992,Kuwaitbought210oftheearliergenerationPatriotsand25launchers.Kuwaitboughtafurther140morein2007.

SaudiArabia In2011Saudi Arabiasigneda$1.7billionUScontracttoupgradeitsPatriotantimissilesystem.

Qatar TheU.S.isbuildingaMissileWarningFacilityinQatarthatwouldutilizeanAN/TPY2XBandRadar.

(Source:AnthonyCordesmanandAlexanderWilner,IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance1July11,2012)

TwoTierTheaterBallisticMissileDefense(TBMD) THAAD&PAC3EndoandExoAtmosphericEngagementsusing

ShootLookShootHittoKill

THAADLauncherPAC3Launcher

UpperTier1st Intercept

UpperTier2ndIntercept

ShootLookShoot

LowerTier1st Intercept

LowerTier2nd Intercept

UAEQatar

IRAN

SaudiArabia

TBMDSystem Defense againstTHAAD :UAE SRBMs(

DefensePerformanceCriteria:85%Probabilitythatthedefenseshootsdownalltheincomingmissiles(warheads);85%ofzeroleakage.

99%Probabilitythatincomingmissiles(warheads)aresuccessfullytrackedbythedefense.

Probabilitythatanincomingmissile(warhead)isdestroyed

Num

bero

fsho

tsth

atm

ustb

etakenat

eachincomingmissile

(warhe

ad)toachievethedefensepe

rformance

criteria.

DefenseRequiredtomeetPerformanceCriteria

DestroyingasmanyBallisticMissileLaunchersduring(boostPhase)orbeforeLaunch: Decreasesthenumberofincomingmissiles(warheads)andalso Decreasesnumberofshotsdefenseneedstotakeateach

Incomingwarhead.

THEATERBALLISTICMISSILEDEFENSESYSTEM,C4ISR&BATTLEFIELDMANAGEMENT.

TheChallengefortheGCCStatesistodesignaneffectivemultilayeredTheaterBallisticMissileDefenseSystem(TBMDS)tocountertheShort,MediumandIntermediateBallisticMissiles.

DuetotheveryshorttimewindowinthedefenseagainstBallisticMissiles,theywillhavetobeengagedautomatically,whichrequiresinterceptauthorizationandrulesofengagementtobeagreeduponinadvance.AllpartofaneffectiveC4ISR/BMsysteminbothpeacetimeandwar.ThiswillalsoactasaForceMultiplier.

EvidentthatthekeytoaneffectiveTBMDliesinregionalcooperation,whichcantakearangeofformsfromcoordinationandcooperationbetweencommandcentersanddefensesystemsforTBMDpurposes whileenablingeachstatetocontrolitsowndefenses.

Cooperationtobecomprehensiveinnature,leadingtoanearrealtimesituationawarenessofthemilitarydevelopmentsinthearea,hostileandfriendlymilitarycapabilitiesandtheiroperationallevels.ThiswouldalsobeintheformofcooperationintoTBMDsandNBCthreatassessment.ThisrequiresanC4ISRcapabilityinallitsComponents,suchas,UnmannedAirSystems(UASs)/UnmannedAirVehicles(UAVs).

AstheFrontLinesofaMissileWarwillbeovertheArabianGulfregion,theaMultiTierTBMDsystemswillplaytheleadingroleinAirDefensesandinaTheaterBallisticMissileDefenseNetwork.SeabasedsystemswillprovideanefficientandhighlymobiledefenseagainstTheaterBallisticMissiles.

TheNavalSystem,suchastheU.S.NavyAegissystem,willallowtheTBMDcommandtomoveitsdefensecapabilitiesclosetotheenemysitesandserve asaforwarddeployedsensorandwillhavetheLongRangeEngagementand TrackingCapability.Thiswillextendthe battlespaceoftheBMDsandcontributetoanintegratedlayereddefense.

62

PAC3THAAD

EarlyWarningRadar

AWACS

AirDefense

SeaBasedEW&TerminalDefense

Midcourse&TerminalMissileDefense

EarlyWarning&LongRangeSearch&TrackCapabilitiesagainstIranianMRBMs

BallisticMissileWarBetweenIrantheU.S.andtheGulfStates

IranianShahab3LaunchedagainstIsrael

UAEOMAN

GulfofOman

IRANIRAQ

SAUDIARABIA

KUWAIT

QATAR

BAHRAIN

DefenseSupportPrograminBoostPhase

SpaceSensor

63

CounteringIranianattacksontheStraitsofHormuz

TheIMFinareportWorldEconomicOutlook(update)January24,2012,summarizedtheglobalfinancialsituationasfollows:

Concernsaboutgeopoliticaloilsupplyrisksareincreasingagain.TheoilmarketimpactofintensifiedconcernsaboutanIranrelatedoilsupplyshock(oranactualdisruption)wouldbelarge,givenlimitedinventoryandsparecapacitybuffers,aswellasthestilltightphysicalmarketconditionsexpectedthroughout2012.

OnJanuary25,2012,InaregularnotetotheGroupof20leadingindustrializedcountries,theIMFsaidthatifIrangoesaheadwithathreattoblockadeoilexportsviatheStraitsofHormuzintheGulf,theshockcouldbeevengreater.AblockadeoftheStraitofHormuzwouldconstitute,andbeperceivedbymarketstopresage,sharplyheightenedglobalgeopoliticaltensioninvolvingamuchlargerandunprecedenteddisruption."

EffectsofOilPriceSpikes:

Sharpand/orsustainedoilpriceincreasesplacefurtherpressuresonhighlyoildependentindustriesandconsumers,aswellasraisinggeopoliticaltensions.AccordingtotheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),asustainedUS$10/barrelincreaseinthepriceofoilcouldlowergrowthofglobalGDPby0.5percentagepoints(pctpts)inthesubsequentyear.

Inadditiontoadverseimpactsforgrowtheffects,substantiallyhigheroilpricesgeneratecurrentaccountsurplusesinproducingcountries,whichmayexacerbateglobalmacroeconomicimbalancesandfuelfinancialmarketturbulence.

65

MediterraneanSea

TheSuezCanal/SumedPipeline: OilFlow:4.5millionbbl/d

TheStraitofHormuz: OilFlow:16.5millionbbl/d

BabelMandab: OilFlow:3.3millionbbl/d

OilTransitChokepoints

ThevolumeofGulfoilexportsamountstosome20%ofalltheworldsoilproductionof87millionbarrelsaday.AnymajordisruptionaffectstheentireeconomyofAsiaandallworldoilprices regardlessofwhereoilisproduced.ItcanleadtopanicandhoardingonaglobalbasisandtheUSeconomywillbenomoreexempttotheresultingriseinenergypricesandtheglobalimpactonlimitedexportstotheUSandothermajorindustrialandtradingstatesonthananyothermajoreconomicpower.USandotherenergyimporterenergyindependencemayhappensomeday,buttodayitisfoolish,dangerousmyth.

VirtuallyalloftheGulfsoilmustpassthroughtheGulf,theStraitofHormuz,theGulfofOman,andtheArabianSea andthenthroughtheIndianOcean.Gulfoilproductionandloadingfacilities,andtankertrafficcanbeattackedanywhereintheGulf.Irancanuseamixofmines,submarines,submersibles,drones,antishipmissiles,smallcraft,andassaultforcesanywhereintheGulfregiontothreatentheflowofoilexports.

IrancancherrypickitstargetsinanefforttopressureandintimidatetheUSandSouthernGulfstates.Itcanuselongrangeconventionallyarmedmissilesordronesagainstlargemilitaryorurbantargetsasterrorweapons.ItcanattacksporadicallyandunpredictablyinawarofattritionorattempttoswarmUSandGulfnavalforces.).

GlobalImportanceofGulfEnergyExports

(Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c.

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Atitsnarrowestpoint,theStraitis21mileswide,butthewidthoftheshippinglaneineitherdirectionisonlytwomiles,separatedbyatwomilebufferzone.TheStraitisdeepandwideenoughtohandletheworld'slargestcrudeoiltankers,withabouttwothirdsofoilshipmentscarriedbytankersinexcessof150,000deadweighttons.

FlowsthroughtheStraitin2011wereroughly35percentofallseabornetradedoil,oralmost20percentofoiltradedworldwide.Morethan85percentofthesecrudeoilexportswenttoAsianmarkets,withJapan,India,SouthKorea,andChinarepresentingthelargestdestinations.

Inaddition,Qatarexportsabout2trillioncubicfeetperyearofliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)throughtheStraitofHormuz,accountingforalmost20percentofglobalLNGtrade.Furthermore,KuwaitimportsLNGvolumesthattravelnorthwardthroughthe StraitofHormuz.Theseflowstotaledabout100billioncubicfeetperyearin2010.

StraitofHormuz

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(Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c.

Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c .

VolumeofCrudeOilandPetroleumProductsTransportedThroughWorldChokepoints,20072011inMillionsofBarrelsPerDay

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MostpotentialoptionstobypassHormuzarecurrentlynotoperational.OnlyIraq,SaudiArabia,andtheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)presentlyhavepipelinesabletoshipcrudeoiloutsideoftheGulf,andonlythelattertwocountriescurrentlyhaveadditionalpipelinecapacitytocircumventHormuz.Atthestartof2012,thetotalavailablepipelinecapacityfromthetwocountriescombined,whichisnotutilized,wasapproximately1millionbbl/d.Theamountcouldpotentiallyincreaseto4.3millionbbl/dbytheendofthisyear,asbothcountrieshaverecentlycompletedstepstoincreasestandbypipelinecapacitytobypasstheStrait.

Iraqhasonemajorcrudeoilpipeline,theKirkukCeyhan(IraqTurkey)PipelinethattransportsoilfromthenorthofIraqtotheTurkishMediterraneanportofCeyhan.Thispipelinepumpedabout0.4millionbbl/din2011,farbelowitsnameplatecapacityof1.6millionbbl/dandithasbeenthetargetofsabotageattacks.Moreover,thispipelinecannotsendadditionalvolumestobypasstheStraitofHormuzunlessitreceivesoilfromsouthernIraqviatheStrategicPipeline,whichlinksnorthernandsouthernIraq.Currently,portionsoftheStrategicPipelineareclosed,andrenovationstotheStrategicPipelinecouldtakeseveralyearstocomplete.

SaudiArabiahasthe745milelongPetroline,alsoknownastheEastWestPipeline,whichrunsfromacrossSaudiArabiafromitsAbqaiq complextotheRedSea.ThePetrolinesystemconsistsoftwopipelineswithatotalnameplatecapacityofabout4.8millionbbl/d.The56inchpipelinehasanameplatecapacityof3millionbbl/danditscurrentthroughputisabout2millionbbl/d.

The48inchpipelinehadbeenoperatinginrecentyearsasanaturalgaspipeline,butSaudiArabia.recentlyconverteditbacktoanoilpipeline.TheswitchcouldincreaseSaudiArabia'sspareoilpipelinecapacitytobypasstheStraitofHormuzfrom1millionbbl/dto2.8millionbbl/d,whichisonlyattainableifthesystemisabletooperateatitsfullnameplatecapacity.

AlternativeRoutestotheStraitofHormuz

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Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c .

TheUAEconstructeda1.5millionbbl/dAbuDhabiCrudeOilPipelinethatrunsfromHabshan,acollectionpointforAbuDhabi'sonshoreoilfields,totheportofFujairahontheGulfofOman,allowingcrudeoilshipmentstocircumventHormuz.Thepipelinewasrecentlyopenedandthefirstshipmentof500,000barrelsofoilwassentthroughthepipelinetotheFujairahoilterminalwhereitwasloadedonatankerandsenttothePakArabRefineryinPakistan.

Thepipelinewillbeabletoexportupto1.5millionbb/d,ormorethanhalfofUAE'stotalnetoilexports,onceitreachesfulloperationalcapacityinthenearfuture.However,theUAEdoesnotcurrentlyhavetheabilitytoutilizethispipelinecompletely,untilitrampstofullcapacity.InlateMay,FujairahrulerSheikhHamad binMohammedAlSharqi notedthatthispipelinecapacitycouldrisefurthertoamaximum1.8millionbbl/d.

SaudiArabiaalsohastwoadditionalpipelinesthatrunparalleltothePetrolinesystemandbypasstheStraitofHormuz,butneitherofthemhavetheabilitytotransportadditionalvolumesofoilshouldtheStraitofHormuzbeclosed.TheAbqaiqYanbunaturalgasliquidspipelinehasacapacityof290,000bbl/dandisrunningatcapacity.TheIPSA(IraqiPipelinethroughSaudiArabia)isusedtotransportnaturalgastoSaudiArabia'swesterncoast.Itwasoriginallybuilttocarry1.65millionbbl/dofcrudeoilfromIraqtotheRedSea,butSaudiArabialaterconvertedittocarrynaturalgas,andhasnotannouncedplanstoconvertitbacktotransportcrudeoil.

Otherpipelines,suchastheTransArabianPipeline(TAPLINE)runningfromQaisumah inSaudiArabiatoSidoninLebanon,havebeenoutofserviceforyearsduetowardamage,disuse,orpoliticaldisagreements,andwouldrequireacompleterenovationbeforebeingusable.Relativelysmallquantities,severalhundredthousandbarrelsperdayatmost,couldbetruckedtomitigateclosureoftheStraitofHormuz.

AlternativeRoutestotheStraitofHormuz 2

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CurrentlyOperable CrudeOil Pipelines that Bypassthe StraitofHormuz:

IfwarshouldcomewhilesurpluspipelinecapacityisstilllimitedtothehighEIAestimateof4.3millionbarrelsaday andallpipelineloadingandotherfacilitiesremainedsecurefromattack thiswouldonlyprovide25%percentofthe17millionbarrelsadayflowingthroughtheGulf.

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Notes:AllestimatesareEIAestimatesasofAugust17,2012andexpressedinmillionbarrelsperday(bbl/d).1AlthoughtheKirkukCeyhanPipelinehasanominalnameplatecapacityof1.6millionbbl/d,itseffectivecapacityis0.4millionbbl/dbecauseitcannottransportadditionalvolumesofoiluntiltheStrategicPipelinetowhichitlinkscanberepairedtobringinadditionalvolumesofoilfromthesouthofIraq.2"UnusedCapacity"isdefinedaspipelinecapacitythatisnotcurrentlyutilizedandcanbereadilyavailable.3Allestimatesfor2012areratesaroundthemidyearpoint;nottheforecastaveragefor2012.4The2012throughputratesarebasedoffof2011estimates.

Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c.

(Source:http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Persian_Gulf/images/pg_map.pdf)

OverlandOilSupplyPipelines

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IranianCounterVulnerabilities: Highly populated, state dominated, corrupt economy with high military spending and major state interference.

Halting all oil exports critical to Iran. EIA reports that, Pre-sanctions, Iran exported approximately 2.2 million bbl/d of crude oil. Iranian Heavy Crude Oil is Iran's largest crude export followed by

Iranian Light. In 2011, Iran's net oil export revenues amounted to approximately $95 billion. Oil exports provide half of Iran's government revenues, while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 percent of Iran's total exports.

Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl/d. Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl/d. Other important terminals include Kish Island, Abadan, Bandar Mahshar, and Neka (which helps facilitate imports from the Caspian region).

Iran is the second-largest oil consuming country in the Middle East, second only to Saudi Arabia. Iranian domestic oil demand is mainly for diesel and gasoline. Total oil consumption was approximately 1.8 million bbl/d in 2010, about 10 percent higher than the year before. Iran has limited refinery capacity for the production of light fuels, and consequently imports a sizeable share of its gasoline supply (Imports 300,000 bbbl of gasoline per day.). Iran's total refinery capacity in January 2011 was about 1.5 million bbl/d, with its nine refineries operated by the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), a NIOC subsidiary.

Refineries and gas distribution critical to economy. Are highly vulnerable. Natural gas accounts for 54 percent of Iran's total domestic energy consumption.

Key aspects of transportation and power grid are highly vulnerable. Todays precision strike assets allow to know out key, repairable links or create long term incapacity. They have become weapons of mass effectiveness.

EIA reports Some power plants are running as low as 10 percent of their nameplate capacity as Iran's electricity infrastructure is largely in a state of dilapidation and rolling blackouts become endemic in summer months. The amount of generation lost in distribution is a central indicator of the disrepair of the electricity network, with upwards of 19 percent of total generation lost during transmission.

Limited and vulnerable air defenses with only one modern and very short-range air and cruise missile defense system. Will remain vulnerable to stealth, cruise missiles, and corridor suppression of enemy air defenses unless can get fully modern mixof radars, C4I/BM assets, and S-300/400 equivalent.

Needs imports of food and product.

Rail system vulnerable. Can use smart mines on all ports.

Naval embargo presents issues in maritime law, but can halt all Iranian traffic, inspect all incoming shipping.

No fly zone would affect operations, especially if include helicopters. Warning could affect civil aviation.

KeyTargetsthatIllustrateIransVulnerability

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Criticaldependenceonrefinerieswithhighcost,longleadfacilitiesandonimportsofproduct.

Minimalpowergridthatcanbecrippledordestroyedselectivelyonaregionalornationalbasis.

GasproductionanddistributionfacilitiesneededbyIransdomesticeconomy.

Keybridges,tunnels,overpassesandmountainroutesforroadandrailtraffic.

Gulftankerloadingfacilities,oilstorageandandtankerterminals forminingordirectattack.

Keymilitaryproductionfacilities

Commandandcontrolcenters.

Communicationsgrids.

Airfieldandairbases.

IRGCland,air,andnavalfacilities.

Coastalnavalbasesandportfacilities.

IsraeliPreventiveStrikeOptions

ScenarioI:IsraeliAirforceCombatAircraft

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IsraeliStrike: ItispossiblethatIsraelwillcarryoutastrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilities,iftheU.S.doesnot,withthe

objectiveofeitherdestroyingtheprogramordelayingitforsomeyears.ThesuccessoftheStrikeMissionwillbemeasuredbyhowmuchoftheEnrichmentprogramhasitdestroyed,orthenumberofyearsithasdelayedIranianacquisitionofenoughUraniumorPlutoniumfromtheArakreactortobuildanuclearbomb.

WeconcludethatamilitarystrikebyIsraelagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesispossibleandtheoptimumroutewouldbealongtheSyrianTurkishborderthenoverasmallportionofIraqthenintoIran,andbackthesameroute.However,thenumberofaircraftrequired,refuelingalongthewayandgettingtothetargetswithoutbeingdetectedorinterceptedwouldbecomplexandhighriskandwouldlackanyassurancesthattheoverallmissionwillhaveahighsuccessrate.

TheU.S.wouldcertainlybeperceivedasbeingapartoftheconspiracyandhavingassistedandgivenIsraelthegreenlight,whetheritdidorhadnopartinitwhatsoever.ThiswouldunderminetheU.S.objectivesinincreasingstabilityintheregionandbringingaboutapeacefulsolutiontotheArabIsraeliconflict.ItwillalsoharmforaverylongperiodoftimerelationsbetweentheU.S.anditscloseregionalallies.

AnotherscenarioisinusingLowYieldEarthPenetratingNuclearWeaponsasasubstituteforconventionalweaponstoattackdeeplyburiednuclearfacilitiesinIran.Somebelievethatthesearetheonlyweaponsthatcandestroytargetsdeepundergroundorintunnels.

TheU.S.wouldnotallowanyothercountry,evenastrongallysuchasIsrael,tousethem,unlessanothercountryhadusednuclearweaponsagainsttheU.S.anditsallies.

AstrikebyIsraelonIranwillgiverisetoregionalinstabilityandconflictaswellas terrorism.Theregionalsecurityconsequenceswillbecatastrophic.

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CentralRouteCentralRoute

SouthernRouteSouthernRoute

NorthernRouteNorthernRoute

ARAK:HeavyWaterPlantandFuturePlutoniumProductionReactor

(5,500sqm)

Natanz:UraniumEnrichmentFacility

(65,000sqm)

Esfahan:NuclearResearchCenter.UraniumConversion

Facility(UCF).(10,000sqm)

Qum:EnrichmentFacilitywithTunnel

Entrances

Syria

IraqIran

SaudiArabia

Jordan

Turkey

CaspianSea

IsraeliStrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesMainTargetSet

Tehran

Bushehr:1000MWNuclearPowerPlant

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85

(250 nmi) fromNorth ofIsrael

(440 nmi)

(420 nmi)To Esfahan

MissionAnalysis:

ApproximaterangetothefurthesttargetEsfahanissome1,110nmi.Whenapproachingthe550nmirange,theF15EsandF16IsneedtorefuelonthewaytoIranandonthewayback.

Refuelingcanbedoneinthreeways:o RefuelingfromKC135AandKC10tankers.o BuddyRefuelingbetweenF15EsandF16Iso Atemporarylandingstrip,alongtheSyrian,TurkishandNorthernIraqregion,whereaircraftrefuelingisavailable.

TotalFuelinanF15EfortheHiLoLoHistrikemissionis26,300lbs,whereasthatforanF16Iisabout14,755lbs.Thetotalmaximumstrikepackagewasaround80aircraft,allthe30F15IintheIsraeliAirforceInventory plus55F16I/C.TheF15Ewouldthenneed5to6KC130storefuelfrom,andtheF16Iswouldrequire6to7KC130.

Israelpresentlyhas5KC130Hand4B700(SourceIISS).SoalltheIsraeliTankerswillhavetobeairbornetoservicetheF15EandF16IStrikeForceduringtheoutboundlegandinboundlegsofthemission.Couldbedifficulttofindalocationalongtheroutesuchthatthetankerscouldavoiddetectionandpossibleinterception.

Theseestimatesweredoneassuminga100%aircraftandweaponsoperationalreliabilityandthestrikeforcenotencounteringanyIranianAirandGroundDefense.Soifwegivetheoverallreliabilitytobe90%thenweshouldaddaround9to10moreaircraft,bringingthetotalstrikeforceto95.

Soinessenceover25%ofthehighendcombataircraftofIsraeliAirforceand100%oftheTankerswillhavetobeallocatedforthismission.

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Onestrikewouldnotnecessarilybeenoughtoachievethemissionobjectives.Strikeaircraftneedtoreturnforanotherstrike.ThiswouldputaheavyburdenontheIsraeliAirforce.

WecanconcludethatamilitarystrikebytheIsraeliAirforceagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesispossible,however,itwouldbecomplexandhighriskintheoperationallevelandwouldlackanyassurancesofahighmissionsuccessrate.

Iranianretaliationwillhaveadevastatingregionalconsequences.U.S.expectsIsraeltoberesponsibleandnottocarryoutsuchastrike.

Airtogroundstrikemissioncanbedifficulttoimplementandwouldinvolvesomerisks.Flyingonaverytightroute,practicallyhuggingtheTurkishSyrianborders.AerialrefuelingalongthewayandavoidbeingdetectedbyTurkey,SyriaandtheU.S.FlyingdowntoS/LwheninIranianterritory,avoidbeingdetectedbyflyinglowandapplyingECMalltheway.IfdetectedbyIranianairdefensethestrikeformationshouldbepreparedtoencounterinterceptors,andtoencounteringfiringofgroundbasedSAMs.

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IsraeliPreventiveStrikeOptions

ScenarioII:LowYieldEarthPenetratingNuclearWeapons

88

AnotherscenarioisusingthesewarheadsasasubstituteforconventionalweaponstoattackdeeplyburiednuclearfacilitiesinIran.Somebelievethatnuclearweaponsaretheonlyweaponsthatcandestroytargetsdeepundergroundorintunnels.

TheguntypeUraniumbasednuclearbombdroppedonHiroshimabytheU.S.inAugustof1945wasabout8,000poundsinweight,andcontainedabout60kgofweaponsgradeHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU),ofwhichabout0.7kgunderwentfissionproducingaYieldof12.5kilotons.ThePlutoniumimplosionbombdroppedonNegasakiweighedabout10,800poundsandcontainedabout6.4kgofweaponsgradePlutoniumPU239.Producingayieldof22kilotons.inthesubsequentyearstheU.S.wasabletoproducePlutoniumimplosionnuclearbombsinthesameyieldrangewithweightsdownto2,000lbsandless.

IfBallisticMissilesareusedtocarryoutthemission,IsraelhashaveaBallisticMissileDefenseSystemwhereasIrandoesnothaveone,suchastheRussianS300PMU2Favorit,thatwasdesignedto interceptballisticmissilesaswellascombataircraft.

LowYieldEarthPenetratingNuclearWeapons

89

USSimulationsoftheConsequencesofanIsraeliStrike

91

AclassifiedwarsimulationheldthismonthtoassesstherepercussionsofanIsraeliattackonIranforecaststhatthestrikewouldleadtoawiderregionalwar,whichcoulddrawintheUnitedStatesandleavehundredsofAmericansdead,accordingtoAmericanofficials.

TheofficialssaidthesocalledwargamewasnotdesignedasarehearsalforAmericanmilitaryaction andtheyemphasizedthattheexercisesresultswerenottheonlypossibleoutcomeofarealworldconflict.

ButthegamehasraisedfearsamongtopAmericanplannersthatitmaybeimpossibletoprecludeAmericaninvolvementinanyescalatingconfrontationwithIran,theofficialssaid.InthedebateamongpolicymakersovertheconsequencesofanyIsraeliattack,thatreactionmaygivestrongervoicetothoseintheWhiteHouse,PentagonandintelligencecommunitywhohavewarnedthatastrikecouldproveperilousfortheUnitedStates.

TheresultsofthewargamewereparticularlytroublingtoGen.JamesN.Mattis,whocommandsallAmericanforcesintheMiddleEast,PersianGulfandSouthwestAsia,accordingtoofficialswhoeitherparticipatedintheCentralCommandexerciseorwhowerebriefedontheresultsandspokeonconditionofanonymitybecauseofitsclassifiednature.Whentheexercisehadconcludedearlierthismonth,accordingtotheofficials,GeneralMattistoldaidesthatanIsraelifirststrikewouldbelikelytohavedireconsequencesacrosstheregionandforUnitedStatesforcesthere.

Thetwoweekwargame,calledInternalLook,playedoutanarrativeinwhichtheUnitedStatesfounditwaspulledintotheconflictafterIranianmissilesstruckaNavywarshipinthePersianGulf,killingabout200Americans,accordingtoofficialswithknowledgeoftheexercise.TheUnitedStatesthenretaliatedbycarryingoutitsownstrikesonIraniannuclearfacilities.

TheNewYorkTimes,March19,2012U.S.WarGamesSeesPerilsofIsraeliStrikeAgainstIran

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TheinitialIsraeliattackwasassessedtohavesetbacktheIraniannuclearprogrambyroughlyayear,andthesubsequentAmericanstrikesdidnotslowtheIraniannuclearprogrambymorethananadditionaltwoyears.However,otherPentagonplannershavesaidthatAmericasarsenaloflongrangebombers,refuelingaircraftandprecisionmissilescoulddofarmoredamagetotheIraniannuclearprogram ifPresidentObamaweretodecideonafullscaleretaliation.

TheexercisewasdesignedspecificallytotestinternalmilitarycommunicationsandcoordinationamongbattlestaffsinthePentagon;inTampa,Fla.,wheretheheadquartersoftheCentralCommandislocated;andinthePersianGulfintheaftermathofanIsraelistrike.Buttheexercisewaswrittentoassessapressing,potential,realworldsituation.Intheend,thewargamereinforcedtomilitaryofficialstheunpredictableanduncontrollablenatureofastrikebyIsrael,andacounterstrikebyIran,theofficialssaid.

AmericanandIsraeliintelligenceservicesbroadlyagreeontheprogressIranhasmadetoenrichuranium.ButtheydisagreeonhowmuchtimetherewouldbetopreventIranfrombuildingaweaponifleadersinTehrandecidedtogoaheadwithone.

WiththeIsraelissayingpubliclythatthewindowtopreventIranfrombuildinganuclearbombisclosing,AmericanofficialsseeanIsraeliattackonIranwithinthenextyearasapossibility.TheyhavesaidprivatelythattheybelievethatIsraelwouldprobablygivetheUnitedStateslittleornowarningshouldIsraeliofficialsmakethedecisiontostrikeIraniannuclearsites.

Officialssaidthat,underthechainofeventsinthewargame,IranbelievedthatIsraelandtheUnitedStateswerepartnersinanystrikeagainstIraniannuclearsitesandthereforeconsideredAmericanmilitaryforcesinthePersianGulfascomplicitintheattack.IranianjetschasedIsraeliwarplanesaftertheattack,andIranianslaunchedmissilesatanAmericanwarshipinthePersianGulf,viewedasanactofwarthatallowedanAmericanretaliation.

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Appendix

GBU27 BLU1092000lbclasspenetratingwarhead.Penetrates1.8to2.4metersofconcrete/hardtargetsdependingonangleofattach.Itcarries550lbsofhighexplosives,andcanpenetratemorethan6feetofreinforcedconcrete.

This2000lbweaponwouldbemostlikelyusedagainsttheEsfahanUraniumConversionFacility.InadditiontheGBU10canalsobeused.

GBU28 BLU1135000lbclasspenetratingwarhead.Penetratesatleast6meters(20feet)ofconcrete,presumablyreinforcedconcreteand30meters(100ft)ofearth.

Itisa5,000lblaserguidedconventionalmunitionsthatusesa4,000lbpenetratingwarheadblast/fragmentation,whichcontains630poundsofexplosive.

TheGBU28/BLU1135000lbpenetratorwouldbethemostlikelyweaponofchoiceagainsttheNatanzCentrifugeFacilityaswellastheEsfahanUraniumConversionFacility.

UsedasaBunkerBuster.2properlysequencedGBUswouldmostcertainlypenetratethe30metersofearthandupto6mofconcrete.

TheProbabilityofHit(PH)of2GBUsaimedatthesamepointessentiallyonefollowingtheotheris50%.

Mission Planning Payloads

95

Weapon Warhead(kg) 10psi(ft)

5psi(ft)

3psi(ft)

GBU28 306 62 92 125

GBU27 240 59 89 118

GB10 428 69 105 144

Peak Overpressure Distance

TargetDamageProbabilityEstimates

Wepresentthedestructivecapabilitiesofvariousnuclearweapons:SurfaceBurstsorContactBurstsatthegroundsurfaceThosethatburstafterpenetratingthesurface

TheaboveshowsthattheEarthPenetratorWeapon(EPW)needstobeofsufficientyieldtobeeffectiveagainsttargetsofinterest.Fordeeplyburiedtargets,anEPWismoreeffectivethanacontactburst(surfaceburst)ofthesameyield.Theprobabilityofdamagefora300ktEPWat3metersDepthofBlast(DOB)isequivalenttothatfora5to6MegatonSurfaceBurstofthesameaccuracy.

Ingeneral,fordeeplyburiedtargets,anEPWyieldsintherangeofseveralhundredsofkilotonstoaMegatonareneededtoeffectivelyholdthesetargetsofinterestatriskwithahighprobabilityofdestruction.

(Source:EffectsofNuclearEarthPenetratorandOtherWeapons.NationalResearchCouncil.http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11282.html) 96

EarthPenetratorWeapon(EPW)at3metersdepthofburstwith100metersCEPaccuracy,againstadeeplyburiedtarget.

ForafixedCEP,effectivenessisnotstronglydependentontargethardness.

EarthPenetratorWeapon(EPW)at3metersdepthofburstwith10metersCEPaccuracy,againstadeeplyburiedtarget.

ForafixedCEP,effectivenessisnotstronglydependentontargethardness.

(Source:EffectsofNuclearEarthPenetratorandOtherWeapons.NationalResearchCouncil.http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11282.html)

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iran us preventive strikes

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