iran and the world a foreign policy platform for democracy
TRANSCRIPT
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Foreign poli-
cy issues have
definitely not
appeared among
the priorities,
or the slogans,
of the Green
Movement.1 This
is no surprise, since the focus of popular
grievance against the Iranian regime has been
its brazen denial of the rights of citizens as
voters and subsequently the brutality of therepression against the ensuing mass protest.
But there is another, less explicit but more
substantial reason for the absence of foreign
policy issues in the present discourse of demo-
cratic protesters and dissidents.
The area of international relations can be
easily presented by the regime as an area of
national interest, allowing it to brand criticism
as unpatriotic and as a way of weakening the
nation against its enemies in general those
who do not want to recognize the legitimate
role and place of the great nation on the world
scene. This explains why Green Movement
leaders have so far basically shied away if not
very occasionally and in a very ad hoc fashion
from addressing foreign policy issues. It is
comprehensible, but at the same time wrong
and a sign of weakness, that, by default, they
tacitly concede to the regime the hegemonic
right to define national interest.
Iranian citizens those who have adhered
to the Green Movement and those who arestill standing on the sidelines or still support
the regime need to know more about what
kind of foreign policy a post-regime demo-
cratic Iran would elaborate upon and put into
practice. Iran has the need and the ambition
to be a player in the international arena. This
would be even more the case in a democratic
Iran finally integrated in the global communi-
ty, from which it has been isolated under the
present regime. Besides, if properly handled,
MIDDLE EAST
PROGRAM
Iran and the World: A Foreign PolicyPlatform for Democracy
FALL2011
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
Roberto Toscano,resident, Intercultura Foundation,
aly; former Public Policy Scholar,
Woodrow Wilson Center; and former
alian Ambassador to Iran and India
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2
The Middle East Program was launched in February 1998 in light ofincreased U.S. engagement in the region and the profound changessweeping across many Middle Eastern states. In addition to spotlighting
day-to-day issues, the Program concentrates on long-term economic, social,and political developments, as well as relations with the United States.
The Middle East Program draws on domestic and foreign regional expertsfor its meetings, conferences, and occasional papers. Conferences andmeetings assess the policy implications of all aspects of developmentswithin the region and individual states; the Middle Easts role in the interna-tional arena; American interests in the region; the threat of terrorism; armsproliferation; and strategic threats to and from the regional states.
The Program pays special attention to the role of women, youth, civilsociety institutions, Islam, and democratic and autocratic tendencies. Inaddition, the Middle East Program hosts meetings on cultural issues, includ-ing contemporary art and literature in the region.
Current Affairs: The Middle East Program emphasizes analysis of cur-rent issues and their implications for long-term developments in the region,including: the events surrounding the uprisings of 2011 in the MiddleEast and its effect on economic, political and social life in countries in theregion, the increased use of social media, the role of youth, Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy, Irans political and nuclear ambitions, the drawdownof American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq and their effect on the region,human rights violations, globalization, economic and political partnerships,and U.S. foreign policy in the region.
Gender Issues: The Middle East Program devotes considerable atten-tion to the role of women in advancing civil society and to the attitudesof governments and the clerical community toward womens rights in thefamily and society at large. The Program examines employment patterns,education, legal rights, and political participation of women in the region.The Program also has a keen interest in exploring womens increasing rolesin conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction activities.
Islam, Democracy and Civil Society: The Middle East Program monitorsthe growing demand of people in the region for the transition to democ-ratization, political participation, accountable government, the rule of law,and adherence by their governments to international conventions, human
rights, and womens rights. It continues to examine the role of Islamicmovements and the role of Islamic parties in shaping political and socialdevelopments and the variety of factors that favor or obstruct the expansionof civil society.
DirectorDr. Haleh Esfandiari
AssistantsKendra Heideman
Mona Youssef
Special thanksSpecial thanks to
Kendra Heideman andMona Youssef for
coordinating this publication;Tara Dewan-Czarnecki,
Rachel Peterson, and Laura
Rostad of the Middle EastProgram for their editing
assistance; the Design stafffor designing the Occasional
Paper Series; and DavidHawxhurst for taking
the photograph.
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not
reflect those of the Woodrow Wilson Center. This article is part of a
longer piece written by the author during his stay at the Wilson Center.
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foreign policy issues can be addressed in such a way as to
widen the range of popular grievances against the regime.
Iranian democrats should not behave as if foreign policy were
an area of strength for the regime when actually it is an area
of weakness. Finally, if the democratic movement wants to
graduate from civil society protest to political alternative,it is indispensable for them to start working on the foreign
policy plank of a political platform, looking for consensus or
at least compromise on individual issues.
The only way to challenge the pretense that the regime is
the custodian of national interest and to debunk the myth of
a foreign-directed and foreign-inspired democratic movement
(a myth which still has some efficacy in certain segments of
the population), is to de-construct this preposterous pre-
tense, address it critically, and propose alternative policies. At
the end of this process, it should also become clear to those
who are suspicious or confused that the real patriots in Iran
are the supporters of the Green Movement.
The foreign policy of the present regime can be sche-
matically represented both in terms of actual behavior
and narrative in the form of three concentric circles.2 The
first, the outermost, relates to the religious identity of the
regime, Islamic and Shia; the second reflects an avowed anti-
imperialist identity; the third, the innermost, is comprised of
national interest themes.
The first and probably most important thing that has to be
said is that as one moves outwards, the degree of popular con-sensus decreases, whereas the inner core of national-interest
foreign policy issues reveals a high degree of consensus, in
some cases nearing unanimity. The regime is clearly aware of
this, and it is evident that many of its stands and declarations
related to the first two circles religious and anti-imperialist
are destined for external consumption rather than aimed at
Iranian citizens. This is the case, for instance, of the Islamic
dimension, primarily because after the universalist and
expansionist dreams of the early stage of the Revolution, the
leaders of the Islamic Regime gave up Trotskyite dreams
of exporting the Revolution. They focused more realistically
on the consolidation and the preservation of the regime, thus
promoting, in Stalinist fashion, political Islam elsewhere
only to the extent that it could contribute to the goal of con-
solidation and preservation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The regime is fully aware that the vast majority of Iranians,
including its own supporters, are not ready to risk their secu-
rity or pay financially for the sake of ideologically common,
but substantially alien, causes. This is all the more so when
they concern Arabs, with whom one must say Iranians
have trouble recognizing any true affinity, in spite of the fact
that they belong to the same Islamic community, the ummah.
Regarding one concrete case, that of Hezbollah, we can-
not avoid stressing that most Iranians react in an extremelynegative way when they consider the flow of resources (their
money!) that their regime devotes to supporting this Arab
Shia movement. Hezbollah is for the Iranian regime more of
the exception than the rule in terms of active Shia solidarity;
it can be explained not by religious affinity but rather in terms
of asymmetrical deterrence. Hezbollah is clearly cherished
and supported as an asset that can be instrumental for the
pursuit of Iranian goals and activated in case of an American
or Israeli attack against Iran.
In other cases, those that are not related to the regimes
geopolitical or security interests, Shia solidarity is very generic
and very cautious. The plight of Pakistani Shias, who are the
object of frequent brutal attacks, does not excessively worry
the Iranian regime, which is reluctant to engage in controversy
and polemic with Pakistan. Likewise, Iran has been extremely
cautious in relation to the repression of the Shia majority in
Bahrain. The issue of Israel-Palestine is also a very interesting
case in point. Although the plight of Palestinians raises feel-
ings of solidarity among Iranians and leads them to condemn
Israeli policies, the regime goes much beyond this. It has
turned hostility toward Israel into a necessary component ofits own political identity, as necessary, I would say, as anti-
U.S. hostility, which is even less shared by the population,
and as widespread as another essential identity marker, the
hejab. This exasperated, angrier-than-thou rhetoric against
Israel straddling two circles of foreign policy, the religious
and the anti-imperialist has moved away from the criticism
of specific Israeli policies and actions, such as the settlements,
to military action against Gaza or Lebanon. It has instead
moved toward questioning the existence of the State of Israel
and joining Ahmadinejad in finally crossing the dividing line
between anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli sentiments and anti-
Semitism, as demonstrated by the infamous Holocaust denial
conference held in Tehran in December 2006.3
If we were to pinpoint the place of anti-Semitism in the
circular schema described above, I maintain that it would
belong to the most marginal, most peripheral location, i.e. the
area of most rarefied, weakest popular consensus. Holocaust
denial was definitely a gimmick invented for external con-
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sumption, to prove that Iran, although it is Persian and not
Arab, Shia and not Sunni, is second to none in hostility to the
State of the Jews. As for the merely anti-imperialist dimension
of Iranian foreign policy, it seems clear that the vast major-
ity of Iranian citizens are well aware that being friendly with
anti-imperialist regimes, such as Hugo Chavezs Venezuela,does not compensate, in terms of actual advantages for Irans
security or economic interests, for the hostility and tension
with the United States and Europe.
The Green Movement should explicitly criticize both the
Shia and the anti-imperialist dimensions of the foreign
policy of the Iranian regime and propose a different way of
addressing them that is less provocative, less costly, and more
effective. The present turmoil in the Middle East and North
Africa region offers a perfect opportunity to change foreign
policy and to link up with the popular demand for democ-
racy and human rights in many, if not most, Arab countries.
While the present Iranian regime supports both extremist
movements and dictatorial regimes Shia, Sunni, or even
secular, as in the case of Syria a democratic Iran would focus
on human rights as a guiding principle for support. It has to
be added, incidentally, that solidarity with Assad is definitely
not attributable to religious affinity with the vaguely Shia
Alawis, but rather to geopolitical considerations. Human
rights for Palestinians, including self-determination and the
declaration of a Palestinian state; human and civil rights
for the Shias in Bahrain, not insofar as Shia are supposedlypro-Iranian, but as a majority that has the right not to be
oppressed; and so on.
There is no contradiction between demanding human
rights and a democratic system for yourself and for your
country, and supporting human rights and democratic
freedoms for others. The Green Movement should actually
increase and amplify the support it has already expressed
toward the Arab Spring,4 and take this occasion to trans-
form into explicit and courageous policies the merely rhetori-
cal and self-serving narrative of the regime, fraudulently pre-
senting itself as a paladin of religion and the rights of peoplesagainst imperialist subjugation and exploitation.
Moreover, one should not forget that the contradictions,
the political and economic costs, and the often merely rhe-
torical nature of regime policies in these two dimensions of
foreign policy are also causes of disagreement and division
within the regime itself. When Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei,
President Ahmadinejads chief-of-staff, declared in 2008
friendship toward the Israeli people, he was certainly
expressing a view that many Iranians do not consider outra-
geous, and certainly one that is inconsistent with the anti-
Semitic masquerade organized by his president and mentor.
When Khatami expressed, as President, in 2004 the view that
Iran is in favor of a united democratic Palestine includingArabs, Jews, and Christians, adding that it would accept any
other solution that is freely accepted by Palestinians them-
selves (implicitly referring to the two-state solution), he was
not speaking only as an individual but was expressing a view
that is acceptable to most Iranians, including many within
the present regime.
Especially significant is the American question. Marg
bar Amrika (i.e. Death to America) does not reflect the
sentiments of most Iranians, both pro-regime and anti-
regime. Paradoxically, it is both true that the regime finds
one of the essential elements of its identity in its reciprocated
enmity toward the United States, and that whoever could
bring about the recognition of the Islamic Republic by the
United States would gain invaluable political status and
popular credibility. Unlike the United Kingdom, which faces
popular suspicion and aversion, fed by historical grievances
and persistent (and often rather wild) conspiracy theories, the
United States is considered phenomenological, not onto-
logically hostile, and only hostile in a more recent context
i.e. since the 1953 anti-Mossadeq coup, which, incidentally,
was promoted mainly by the British, whom the United Statesjoined in an act of betrayal of its previous friendship with
Iran. Many in the regime, with the exception of its most radi-
cal members, are not convinced that America is a permanent,
necessary enemy. Great Satan is by now an outdated and
out-fashioned epithet, and I believe that the dream of many in
the regime is to be treated by the Americans in the same way
that the Americans treat the Chinese regime: with respect and
with no idea of regime change, despite political disapproval
regarding lack of democracy and human rights violations.
So far, I have mentioned the two dimensions of the
regimes foreign policy that are relatively easy to criticize andeasy to draft an alternative approach to. The rhetorical nature
of regime policies and the fact that religious and anti-impe-
rialist solidarity are easy to de-construct as rhetorical concoc-
tions for external use make the regime especially vulnerable
to criticism. The Green Movement should not have much
trouble in explicitly addressing religion and anti-imperialism
both for criticizing the regime and for the positive, program-
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matic aspects of its own political mobilization. As we move,
however, toward the innermost circle of the schema the
one comprised of national interest issues things become
more complicated. This area is characterized by a high degree
of consensus, so it is much more difficult to criticize regime
narratives and policies and to articulate alternative policies.Thus, Iranian democrats run the risk of appearing as substan-
tially in agreement with the regime while criticizing it only for
opportunistic reasons.
Something that could not be stressed enough, since unfor-
tunately it seems to escape both the media and the policy-
makers in the United States and Europe, is the fact that the
overwhelming majority of Iranians perceive the nuclear issue
as a national, not a regime, issue. This reality is so evident
that Green Movement leaders, while criticizing the govern-
ments dangerous recklessness for the provocative way in
which they have treated the nuclear issue, have gone so far
as to also criticize Ahmadinejad for being too soft on the
issue at the time when the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
deal sponsored by Turkey and Brazil in May 2010 seemed to
be prospering. Even more significantly, whereas the official
line of the Iranian regime is that nuclear weapons are haram,
or forbidden, for Muslims, those who have lived in Iran, or
visited it in the past few years, have often had the occasion
to hear opponents of the Islamic Republic, including some
nostalgic for the monarchy, say that Iran, an ancient and
proud country, has the right to have nuclear weapons becauseneighboring countries such as Pakistan and Russia, as well as
Israel, have them.
Yet, opponents of the present regime, and in particular the
leaders of the Green Movement, are not obliged to passively
toe the official line on the nuclear issue, nor would it be
wise for them to try to out-nuclear the regime. There are
ways to be critical of official policy and strategies and at the
same time continue challenging the regime on authentically
nationalist grounds.
The reasoning one that does not question Irans national
pride or its right to build a nuclear industry should rely on
costs and priorities, both economic and political. It is true,
and not at all a pretext, that Iran needs nuclear power in spite
of its oil and gas resources. Any expert will tell you that given
growing energy needs in a country with a young popula-
tion and ambitions of industrial development, without the
production of nuclear energy, it would become necessary to
use a growing share of hydrocarbon production for internal
consumption, reducing exports. It is clear that Iran could not
afford to do that without facing economic disaster.
There are, however, many questions that should be raised.
One is about alternatives. In the first place, oil and gas pro-
duction are not a fixed quantity, but could, and should, be
increased to cover a sizeable share of growing internal needs.It would be easy for those who are critical of the government
to point out, for instance, that the decreasing not merely
stagnating production of oil can be explained by the lack
of international technology and investment: a shortfall that
can be explained mainly by the impact of international sanc-
tions prompted by Irans nuclear policy. The question is: how
wise is it to weaken the production of one available kind of
energy (hydrocarbons) in order to pursue another problem-
atic source (nuclear)? Wouldnt it be more rational, and apt
to produce more immediate results, to maximize what Iran
already has instead of betting with so much priority and so
much urgency on a process that can only produce results in
the long term? How can one forget how long it has taken to
build the Bushehr nuclear plant, still not producing energy
after decades?
The second economic consideration relates to the fact that
uranium enrichment, which is indeed one of the rights guar-
anteed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, turns out to be more
expensive than the acquisition of low-enriched uranium from
abroad. The regime talks about the need to escape depen-
dency from politically unreliable sources, but this is exactlywhere the benefits of an international consortium, with all the
necessary guarantees of supply, come in.
Criticism of the nuclear policy of the regime, however,
should be mainly political. Is the cost that the country is pay-
ing in terms of international isolation worth it? One can
legitimately defend what is perceived as a right, but national
interest should be focused on costs and benefits, and not
only on principle. Without challenging Irans rights to enrich
uranium, critics of the regime should talk about the issue
in terms of wisdom and national interest. The vast major-
ity of Iranians, sensitive though they may be to nationalist
emotions, would rather favor an approach focusing on real
benefits and real costs when addressing any issue.
Last but not least, after the March 2011 nuclear catastro-
phe in Japan, it would be strange if the nuclear issue were to
be addressed only in terms of security: economic security (the
need to be able to count on independent sources of energy)
and strategic security (for those who are in favor of acquiring
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nuclear weapons and deterrence against external threats). The
issue today, which should be raised as a part of a platform for
the future of a democratic Iran, should also be one of safety.
In a country such as Iran, with one of the highest risks of
major seismic events, a nuclear option for the production
of energy should be subjected to strict scrutiny in terms ofstructural safety. Probably, the Green Movement should be
green in the environmental sense as well.
Of course this critical approach, focusing on alternatives,
costs, and timing, has a chance of prevailing within Iranian
public opinion only if: (1) a confrontation originating from
the nuclear controversy is not brought to the extreme, (2) there
is a possibility of compromise, and especially (3) if diplomacy
succeeds in identifying formulas in which the right of Iran
to enrich uranium is recognized (the zero centrifuge option
can only be imposed on, and not accepted by, any conceiv-
able Iranian regime, including the most democratic), while at
the same time subjecting the Iranian nuclear program to both
ordinary and special measures of monitoring and inspection.
If this was the case, the nuclear issue could be de-dramatized,
objectively recognized as not urgent, and brought back to
economically rational proportions. If it is true that we want to
assist the strengthening of the democracy movement in Iran,
we should not forget that the nuclear issue, if addressed by us
in an inflexible, intransigent, and worst-case mode, can only
help the regime and embarrass its opponents, who are afraid
of being seen as less patriotic.However, in trying to draft a basic political platform, the
Green Movement should also avoid focusing excessively on
the nuclear issue, but rather should try to contextualize it.
It is very clear to Iranian democrats that the suspicions and
hostilities aroused by the Iranian nuclear program have a lot
to do with the nature of the Iranian regime. Shirin Ebadi,
speaking about the issue, once said to a group of European
ambassadors in Tehran: Nobody worries because France has
nuclear weapons. A less provocative government in Tehran
would go a long way toward de-dramatizing the issue, thus
opening the way to acceptable compromise formulas givingguarantees of non-proliferation and national independence
at the same time.
If we turn to regional matters, we see that the regime and
its opponents share the goal of having Iran recognized, and
being able to act, as a key player. Here too, however, the dis-
course should shift from ideological principles to cost/benefit
analysis, as well as to possible alternative means to pursue the
same widely shared objectives, more effectively and at a lesser
cost. Let us consider Afghanistan, a country whose impor-
tance for Iran cannot be underestimated, where the pursuit
of Iranian influence can be justified both in terms of strategic
security and in relation to the heavy social cost of the influx of
drugs across the border. No Iranian government could ignorethese objective considerations, but definitely there are differ-
ent ways of addressing those goals. When Iran participated in
the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in a constructive way,
after the defeat of the Taliban, it was certainly pursuing its
national interest, while at the same time it was recognized as
an important interlocutor and partner at a multilateral level.
Iranian democrats should make it explicit that they believe
this is the way that Iran should exert its influence in the
country. The same can be said about possible alliances with
different Afghan groups. It seems highly probable that the
Iranian regime, while openly supporting the Karzai govern-
ment, is at the same time hedging its bets by maintaining con-
tacts and providing some assistance to certain groups within
the Taliban camp. This policy, which some could defend
as being realist, should be subjected to criticism for its
ambiguity and for the political cost it involves: raising doubts
and suspicions both in Afghanistan and in the international
community about Tehrans real intentions. A very different
and less counterproductive policy was Iranian support to the
anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, where Tehran was not going
alone, but in strict cooperation and coordination with bothIndia and Russia.
As for Iraq, here too Tehran has been more opportunis-
tic than inspired by a grand plan. Iran has been hedging
its bets, supporting both the government and radical Shia
groups, such as the Sadrist militia, activating and de-activat-
ing them in order to exert influence. No Iranian government,
even the most democratic, could ignore the need to have a
role in Iraq, but it should clearly assess and question the price
to pay for opportunism, ambiguity, and adventurism, which
are often destined to backfire.
The problem is not only opportunism, however. Inaddressing national interest issues, such as Afghanistan and
Iraq, the present Iranian regime is also influenced by the
more ideological, more radical, and less consensual dimen-
sions of its foreign policy concept i.e. the outer circles
I mentioned above. As far as regional issues are concerned,
the Green Movement should also draw a sharp difference
between these different levels, stressing that the pursuit of
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Islamic and anti-imperialist goals interfere with and are
harmful to national interest, by arousing suspicion both in the
countries concerned and internationally and thus incurring
isolation. The link between ideological and radical foreign
policy and isolation is a very powerful one, and one which
should be critically stressed within a foreign policy programof the Iranian opposition. This is also true for another area of
interest to Irans regional policy: the Persian Gulf. It is enough
to compare the present situation, with Gulf governments try-
ing to prod the United States to a tough, uncompromising
policy toward Iran, and the results of the patient and effective
diplomatic work carried out both by President Rafsanjani
and President Khatami in order to build bridges and pursue
dialogue with the Gulf countries. Which option is more in
harmony with national interest, both in terms of security and
of the economy? An August 2011 Zogby poll shows a truly
dramatic decline in Irans public image in the Arab Middle
East since 2006. In 2006, favorable opinions of Iran were
in the 80-90 percent range in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and the UAE. Today, with the exception of Lebanon (where
63 percent of the population approves of Iran) the approval
rates are down to 37 percent in Egypt, 23 percent in the
UAE, and 6 percent in Saudi Arabia. It would be difficult to
describe this as a success for Iranian foreign policy, and the
Green Movement should not miss any occasion to stress how
harmful it is for Iran both in terms of national security and
economic interest.As in the case of the nuclear issue, however, the possibil-
ity for the Green Movement to elaborate upon and propose
a foreign policy program dealing with national interest issues
in the region depends to a large extent on something that
escapes it: U.S. policy toward Iran. Even while being able to
contain and deter any attempt on the part of Iran to become
the unquestioned dominant power in the region, the United
States should operate on a clear and realistic premise: Iranian
hegemony is not acceptable, Iranian exclusion is impossible.
Iranian democrats, it is clear, will be able to propose a
different way of defending national interest without ambi-guities, without extremism and support of extremists, without
provocations only insofar as a real possibility of engagement
and dialogue exists. This, of course, is a sort of Catch-22
predicament. The present Iranian regime knows that by its
intransigent rhetoric and behavior it can sustain enough
international hostility and enough suspicion of its inten-
tions to prevent any real engagement and dialogue, therebyrendering impossible any alternative proposal for the pursuit
of national security and, in general, national interest. If this
perverse vicious circle is not broken, however, the chances of
democracy in Iran will remain slim, in spite of all the protests
and the widespread aspiration to real change.
Late revolutionary regimes tend to replace revolutionary
ideology with nationalism as a tool for consensus. This is
also the case for the Iranian Islamic Regime. Messianism and
apocalyptic scenarios are definitely not what really inspires
the regime, nor what the regime thinks can rally the Iranian
people. Nationalism is; nationalism works. What can be said,
in any case, is that if we are serious when we say that we
want to support Iranian democrats the best way to do it
would be to break the vicious circle, so that Iranian democrats
can seriously hope to be convincing when they say that they,
and not the regime, are the true defenders of national interest,
the true patriots, and that the foreign policy they seek is as
we read in their February 23 Charter one of constructive
engagement with the world.
NOTES
1 The Green Movement is a series of actions starting in 2009
before the contested presidential elections in June which saw the re-
election of President Ahmadinejad.
2 Sariolghalam, Mahmood. The Evolution of the State in Iran:
A Political Culture Perspective, Center for Strategic and Futuristic Stud-
ies, University of Kuwait, Kuwait, 2010, p. 48.
3 President Ahmadinejad first denied the Holocaust in De-
cember 2005 and has done so a number of times since then.
4 The Arab Spring refers to the wave of revolts and demon-
strations in the Middle East which began in December 2010 in Tunisia
and leading to the toppling of President Ben Ali, followed by the col-
lapse of other regimes in the region.
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