iran and tajik is tan and internaitonal politic

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Taj ikistan, Iran, and the internat ional poli t ics of t heIslamic factorMohiaddin Mesbahi

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Central Asian Survey (1997), 16(2), 141-158

Tajikistan, Iran, and theinternational politics of the 'Islamicfactor'MOHIADDIN MESBAHI

IntroductionThe 're-emergence' of Islam as a vital sociopolitical and cultural force anddynamics, and its domestic and international role and impact in Central Asia andthe Caucasus have been the subject of considerable debate both within academicand policy circles, especially in the West, Russia and in the Muslim world sincethe collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 . This new sen se of urgency andattention is in sharp contrast to the Soviet era, when only a few scholars, suchas the late Alexandre Bennigsen, kept the 'issue' alive. Although partially drivenby scholarly interest in studying the dynamics of nation-building in Central Asia,the new focus on the region is to a large extent a function of the symbiosis ofthe re-emergence of the old historical rivalry of great and regional powers overthe geopolitical direction of the region and the political economy of resources,an d the coincidence of the independence of Central Asia with the globalizationof the 'Islamic factor' in world politics. This globalization, though preceding thedemise of the Soviet Union, acquired a new momentum and intensity thanks tothe geocultural and geographical ramifications of the Soviet collapse. Thegeocultural and geopolitical inclusion of the former Soviet South to the Islamicworld, labelled as the 'new Middle East', 1 has, for better or worse, placed thedomestic dynamics of Central Asia, including its Islam, in the midst of across-current of regional and international concerns, thus subjecting Central Asiato external structural constraints and opportunities.

This study will look into Tajikistan and the international politics of the'Islamic factor' in the nexus of the policies and interactions of Iran, Russia,Uzbekistan and the United States. Given the religio-cultural importance attachedto Iran's role in shaping, by design or default, the complex of internationalpolitics of the 'Islamic factor', the paper will focus on Tajik-Iranian relations.Among the newly independent states of Central Asia, Tajikistan occupies aspecial place for Iran. Although Tajikistan lacks the economic significance ofTurkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan's political weight, for the com-Mohiaddln Mesbahi is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University, Miami,Florida.0263-4937/97/020141-18 1997 Society for Central Asian Studies


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MOHIADDIN MESBAHIbined reasons of culture and ideology, its relations with Iran carry a special rolein shaping Iran's overall foreign policy in Central Asia. Of all the new 'Muslim'states, Tajikistan is the only Farsi-speaking state with a strong linkage to theIranian cultural milieu. While Iran continues to claim a cultural/religiousrelevance in the whole of Central Asia, Tajikistan's linguistic connection withIran separates it from others and gives it a certain level of closeness andimportance to Iran that does not exist with other Central Asian states. In fact, itis this cultural element that presents Tajikistan not only as an opportunity but asa 'burden' or 'responsibility' for the Iranian leadership. The intermingling ofculture and religious affinity has created a complex and at times confusingelement in Tajik-Iranian relations and in the long-run, this cultural element mayprove to be the most enduring element in Tajik-Iranian ties. Furthermore, theTajik significance also lies in the fact that it was clearly the bastion of the mostpoliticized or active Islamic tendencies among Central Asian states.

Tajikistan's Islamic movement started in the mid-1970s and grew under theimpact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the gradual indirect influenceof the Iranian revolution through Iranian radio broadcasts to Central Asiathroughout the 1980s.2 Nevertheless, the Tajik Muslims have been separatedfrom the Islamic world for decades, and they and other Muslim societies of theformer Soviet Union have gone through intense anti-Islamic state propagandaand socialization which has resulted in the general ignorance of the public aboutIslam, either in its Orthodox forms or the politicized 'Iranian' version. The factthat the majority of Tajik Muslims, with the exception of the BadakhshanIsmailis and an insignificant number of Ja'fari Shiites, are Sunni Hannafi wasalso not without some significance in relations with Shiite Iran.Moreover, the structure of authority, leadership and relations between thecommunity and religious leaders has generally and historically differed betweenShiite and Sunni Islam. Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, the Qozi Kalan of Tajikistanand key Islamic leader of the Tajik opposition, has on several occasions referredto differences between Iran's Islamic experience and Tajikistan's andsignificantly specified two key obstacles to repeating the Iranian model inTajikistan: first, the general ignorance of the public about Islam and especiallyits role as a well-defined political ideology;3 and second, the general disadvan-tage of a Sunni religious leadership which may not enjoy the position of Imamamong its adherents as is possible for Shiite religious leaders such as AyatollahKhomeini. In an interview with Moscow News in September 1992, during theheyday of the Islamicist surge to power, Turajonzoda warned against thepremature comparison between Iran and Tajikistan and specifically addressedkey differences. Indicating that the Iranian model is not likely to fit Tajikistan,he argued that Iran's Shiite Muslims have a 'unifying factorthe immamatewhich they obey without demur. We, the Sunnis, have no such centralization,and each mullah and parish can exist on their own, not obeying anyone'secclesiastical authority'.4

Turajonzoda's qualification about leadership problems, especially when theIslamic-democratic coalition seemed to be gaining ground against Nabiev's142


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THE ' ISLAMIC FACTOR'government, underlined one of the key problems facing any attempt by Iran orother actors to push for a nationwide Islamic takeover in Tajikistan. Thisstructural impediment in the leadership of the Tajik Muslim community wasfurther complicated by significant political differences rooted in the region/classnature of the distribution of power between the more urbanized and traditionalruling classes from Leninabad and their new Kulobi allies in the south withstrong pro-Communist or secular tendencies, and the more rural and poorinhabitants of the less developed regions, as well as some of the lowersocioeconomic groups in Dushanbe, which largely supported the Islamicistmovement.5It is clear that the idea of establishing an Iranian model never became thefoundation of a political strategy for the Islamicists and democratic allies. Theappearance of more specific Islamic slogans in the critical and bloody daysof September and December of 1992 indicated a definite radicalization ofIslamicists regarding the idea of establishing an Islamic state. This was reflectednot only in the appearance of proto-Iranian slogans in Dushanbe, but in thecreation of some ad hoc revolutionary organizations based on the Iranianmodels. The appearance of slogans such as 'Long Live the Islamic Republic' and'Death to America' was reminiscent of the Iranian revolutionary days of 1979,and the establishment of Nehzat-e Javanaan-e Dushanbe (Dushanbe's YouthMovement) brought to mind the Komiteh, Iran's revolutionary committees, oneof the ad hoc grassroots legacies of the Iranian revolution that played asignificant role in that revolution. The Dushanbe Youth Movement had animportant role in Nabiev's resignation in September 1992, his eventual downfall,and the early defence of Dushanbe in October and December of the same yearagainst the onslaught of the pro-Communist factions of the Jebhe Khalq, thePeople's Front.6

This symbolic or real radicalization of the pro-Iranian Islamic agenda, how-ever, reflected not a shift to a well-thought-out or externally inspired takeoverstrategy, as was claimed by the Communist opposition and their Russian andUzbek supporters, but a haphazard, reactive sloganism of a grassroots nature,largely outside the realm of planning or direction of the coalition leadership. TheIslamic-democratic coalition neither believed in the possibility or desirability ofan Islamic alternative nor was it even united in a preference for an ideologicallytainted political model for Tajikistan.7 The general principles of the coalitionplatform referred to a democratic political system based on a new constitutionand close relations with Iran and Afghanistan as well as other Islamic states.8The role of democratic and nationalist groups and the intelligentsia in shapingthe opposition platform and in defining the role of Islam in it seemed to be rathersignificant, though the intelligentsia and democrats numerically did not, and donot, carry a significant organized weight in comparison to the Islamicists orCommunists. Their significance lies in the fact that they represent the generalpolitical flavour in Tajikistan, which does not support the creation of an Islamicstateat least not in the immediate future. This attitude is either due to a lackof understanding or ignorance of political Islam, or to a preference for a secular

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MOHIADDESf MESBAHITajikistan in which Islam as a religion and culture will have its proper and evenflourishing place.It is important not to confuse this secular tendency with the positions of thepro-Communist factions/clans of the Tajik traditional ruling elite, which, eitherbecause of ideological conviction, the inertia of Soviet socialization, or politicalconvenience, have a definite anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian orientation. The'secular fundamentalists' who fought their way back to power in D ecember1992, and still retain that power, rely on their anti-Islamic posture as a strategynot only for coming to power, but for perpetuating their political hold inTajikistan. In contrast, democratic tendenciesthose active in the oppositionunderground, those in exile in Russia and in Iran, and those now silenced inDushanbegenerally prefer a democratic polity with Islamic Tajik-Iraniancultural substance to a politicized ideological Islam. The theme of cultural Islamor the linkage with Iran on cultural grounds has been, from the initiation ofrelations with Iran in January 1992, a significant elemen t shaping Ira n's relationswith the opposition, the intelligentsia, and even elements in the Tajik govern-ment, especially under Nabiev's rule.9

During most of the Tajik official contacts with Iran, the cultural theme hasbeen emphasized while the issue of political Islam, politely or openly, wasignored or rejected. Nabiev's visit to Tehran in June 1992 was in this regardrather symbolic. This was the president of Tajikistan's first trip to any foreignstate and took place in the midst of a severe political crisis at home and theinitial stages of the armed clashes among the opposition groups. Among thevariety of protocols signed by the two countries, the cultural agreements werethe most extensive and far-reaching.10 These included cooperation in the areas oflanguage, publication of Persian education books for Tajik schools, studentexchanges, scholarships, book exhibitions, and rebroadcasting of Iran's tele-vision programmes.11 In his report to the Tajik Supreme Soviet after the visit toIran, Nabiev was very particular about the cultural emphasis in the shaping ofrelations with Iran, with which 'until the 15th century we lived in a singlestate'.12 In an interview with Narodnaya Gazeta, Nabiev characterized Iran andTajikistan a s two countries closely linked 'by hund reds of threads of join t historyand culture, unity of language and literature'.13 Particularly symbolic wasNabiev's trip to Shiraz, where he 'conversed in the poetical language of Farsi'and 'worshipped at the holy sepulchres of Shaykh Sa'adi and Khaji Hafiz, whoseimmortal works long since conquered the hearts of people of East and West'. 14

Similar emphasis on cultural links was expressed by Khodaberdi Kholik-nazarov, the Tajik Foreign Minister, who argued that while Iran's Islamic modelremains a 'complex issue',15 given Tajikistan's diversity and lack of homogene-ity, Iran as a 'cultural standard' in 'its broadest sense' has captured the.'imagination of the greater part of the Tajik intelligentsia'. 16 The same view wasagain expressed even after the resignation of Nabiev in September 1992 andduring the short-lived government of Akbarsho Iskandarov. At the conclusion ofthe all-world forum of Tajiks, Iskandarov emphasized that 'Islamic fundamental-ism' will not be a determining factor in the domestic and foreign policy of144


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THE ' ISLAMIC FACTOR'Tajikistan.17 Kholiknazarov, reiterated the point that relations with Iran 'will notbe based on religious principles' but on historical 'cultural and spiritual roots'. 18It is important to note that the emphasis on cultural rather than religious/ideological links by the Tajik officials reflected the need to manage the Iranianfactor in a less threatening way by channelling it into the less politicizedcontingencies of the Iranian model. It also signified a genuine need on the partof Tajik officials to deal with critical questions of Tajik national identity and itsrole in defining Tajik sovereignty. This is particularly important in view of thepresence of more than a million Uzbeks in Tajikistan and clear pressure fromUzbekistan on the Tajik cultural life inside Uzbekistan, especially in Bukharaand Samarkhand where attempts at 'cultural cleansing' are being made.19The issue of Iranian culture as a source of linkage and support has survivedto a certain degree even the deterioration of Iranian-Tajik relations after thetakeover of the government by pro-Communist factions in December 1992. Thegovernment has continued to support the teaching of Persian in elementaryschools, and Iran has provided the core of the educational support and facilities,including 250,000 Persian books for elementary and high school students in1993,20 and 400,000 in 1996.21 In addition, 120,000 Persian alphabet books havebeen provided by Iran.22 Several Iranian book exhibits in Dushanbe, a project forthe join t publication of a w eekly jou rna l, and the continuous support of Iran forthe development and progress of the Persian language and annual conferences inPersian literature, are part of the joint cultural protocol signed between theIranian Ministry of Guidance and the Tajik Ministry of Media and News.Muhammadov Bubakhanov Alievich, the Tajik Minister of Media and News,specifically em phasized the imp ortant role of Iran in supporting the solidificationof the Persian languages, especially in view of the Tajik decision to replace theCyrillic with the Persian alphabet in Tajik language training.23 Rajab Amanov,the famous Tajik literary figure, also emphasized the significance of Tajikistan'saccess to 'contemporary Iranian culture'.24

It is worth noting that the issue of cultural linkage with Iran-though still acentral theme in Tajik-Iranian relations, even during the coldest period of therelations in late 1993 to early 1994may still, for political reasons, not bewelcomed by some of the hardliners in Dushanbe. In a somewhat bizarreparliamentary manoeuvre in 1994, the Tajik Supreme Council passed an unusualamendment to the 1989 Language Act. The amendment states that the Tajiklanguage is no longer Farsi (Persian). Put forward by Shukhrat Sultanov, chiefof the Organizational Department of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, 'whohimself speaks Tajik with great difficulty', this amendment was 'clearly playingup to the current anti-Iranian mood'.25 The kidnapping and assassination ofMuhamed Asemi, a leading scholar of Tajik culture and history and a proponentof the revival of the Tajik language, might indicate a continuing political tensionover the issue of language.26

The emphasis on Iran as a cultural link nevertheless has been dialecticallyaffected by the Islamic components of the Iranian model or message. The factthat Iran is an Islamic republic, an Umm ul-qura' (Islamic metropolis), and a145


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self-proclaimed custodian of Islamicism 27 is an inescapable reality and a centralfactor in shaping the relations between the two countries on bilateral (govern-mental and societal), regional (Russia and the Central Asian states), andinternational (primarily the United States) dimensions. The 'Islamic threat' hasaffected these relations in a fundamental way. In Tajikistan, as elsewhere inCentral Asia, the fight against Islamic fundamentalism was the critical factor thatbrought together a variety of domestic, regional, and international actors. Thepro-Communist factions, regional clans, and political and social forces thatfeared losing their historical grip on political power in Tajikistaneither onideological grounds or on purely utilitarian considerationsportrayed the crisisof authority in Tajikistan since 1992 as an externally inspired Islamic takeoverand fought their way back to the top in December 1992 on an anti-Islamicplatform.28 One of the first decrees issued by the new government in Dushanbein December 1992 was to outlaw any Islamic activities and to ban Islamicparties.29Uzbekistan's policy of military and political support for the new governmentwas formulated and supplemented under the notion of concern over the Islamicthreat and the need for its containment. In fact, President Karimov has been themost outspoken of the Central Asian leaders on the threat of Islam and perhapsthe most significant player in the creation of a regional consensus, as might bewitnessed from the Uzbek-Russian intervention in the Tajik civil war. Adiscussion of the Uzbek role in this regard is beyond the scope of this study andhas been dealt with elsewhere.30 What is important to note is that the Uzbekanti-Islamic and anti-Iranian stand in Tajikistan has also become a key factor inshaping Uzbek-Iranian relations and the source of their underlying tension.Karimov's policy toward Tajikistan's civil war is intimately connected with hisconcern over Islamicist-democratic political challenges in Uzbekistan itself,

where the suppression of the Islamic threat has been repeatedly used asa justification to curb political opposition to authoritarian rule; a generalattitude characteristic of other Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan andKyrgyzstan.Among the key players in the Tajik civil war, Russia has played the mostsignificant and decisive role. A detailed discussion of Russia's view of theIslamic factor is beyond the scope of this study, yet an outline of Russia's viewand policy will be useful. In the contemporary Russian approach toward Islam,the old and historical legacy of both the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods is aliveand well. The colonial legacy of the Tsarist period of looking at the region asa legitimate sphere of influence, and the concern over an Islamic threat,'encirclement', in addition to the ambiguous feeling of certain socioculturalcloseness between Russian Orthodoxy and traditional Islam are elements in aparadoxical package which is still present in Russian attitudes, especially amongthe more traditional 'neo-Eurasianist', Russian political elite. This particularstrand in Russia's thinking, shared by ranking officials of the Russian Ministryof Foreign Affairs, prominent among which is Foreign Minister YevgeniePrimakov, and other centrist/conservative Russian political figures, including146


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leaders of Russia's Communist Party, is heavily 'geopolitical' in its view of theIslamic factor. While its concerns are couched also in purely ideological andcultural terms, it is leery of the total alienation of the 'Islamic region' of theformer Soviet Union and is especially concerned with being trapped into analliance with the US in a regional 'anti-Islamic' campaign.The counterbalance to the 'neo-Eurasianist view', the 'Euroatlantist', how-ever, since its early dominance in Russian foreign policy after the collapse of theSoviet Union, has taken a much more ideological and cultural view of theIslamic factor, advocating a significantly more thorough and sustained contain-ment policy. This view, favoured especially by President Yeltsin and moreparticularly personified by former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and otherpro-Western reformers in the Russian establishment, draws heavily from thepredominantly Western, secular and modernist views of Islam as a dangerousgeocultural threat, with serious potential for political challenge to Russia'sinterests. This perspective, which derives its epistemological inspiration from theWest, shares, and cherishes the similarities of its policy prognostication of theIslamic factor with that prevailing in the West. The Euroatlantist view thusallocates to Russia an activist role in the Islamic containment; one not just basedon traditional Russian practices, but more in tune with the current internationalclimate of undifferentiated policy containment of Islam. The proponents of thisview of the Islamic factor have therefore been much more eager to place CentralAsia, and in particular Tajikistan, at the cornerstone of their shared vision of theIslamic post-Cold War threat to regional security and Moscow's readiness toplay its part in its containment on behalf of the civilized world.31 The Western-izers' more ideological view of the Tajik opposition has instrumentally enhancedRu ssia's ability to justify and obtain its de facto support from the West for anever-expanding political-military intervention in Tajikistan since 1992. Russiaplayed a decisive role in shifting the balance of power during the domesticstruggle in Tajikistanespecially in the two turning points of the civil war inSeptember and December 1992. In mid-1996, Russia, through its economic,political and military support and presence, is in reality the sole guarantor of thesurvival of the Emamali Rahmanov regime in Dushanbe, and therefore in virtualcontrol of shaping both the internal and external choices of the Tajik regime. 32

The regional 'anti-Islamic' consensus has been riding on a significant US-ledinternational post-Cold War trend that perceives political Islam as a significantchallenge to international security. While US policy in Central Asia has otherdimensions, including economic interests and concerns over nuclear prolifera-tion,33 containment of the Islamic threat and Iranian influence is the cornerstoneof its policy. It is not an accident that other US considerationsboth traditionaland proclaimedsuch as promotion of democracy, the linkage between foreignaid and trade, and democratization and marketization have at least temporarilytaken a back seat. US regional allies in Central Asia and the Caucasus, namelyIsrael and Turkey, not only share and advocate the same policy but areinstrumental in implementing US-sponsored pilot projects and economic plans inCentral Asia, and more specifically in Tajikistan.34

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Tajikistan was officially included in discussions of US concerns over Islamicfundamentalism and Iranian penetration in January 1994. During a USSenate Intelligence Committee Hearing, James W oolsey, Director of the CentralIntelligence Agency, accused Iran of supporting terrorism in Tajikistan.35The charge was repeated in Woolsey's address in September 1994 to theWashington Institute for Near East Policy, where he again accused Iranof supporting 'terrorist organizations and groups operating today from Algeriato Tajikistan'.36 The inclusion of Tajikistan in the realm of the political worldof Islam, and the fact that it was discussed in the same context as Lebanon,Algeria, and Egypt by the United States, had several significant ramifications.First, it signalled the nature of US policy in Central Asia in general andin particular in Tajikistan. Second, it gave moral and political legitimacy tothose in power in Dushanbe by labelling the opposition as terrorists. Third,it demonstrated a general acquiescence to, if not approval of, Russia's interven-tion in Tajikistan and its participation in the containment of the Islamicthreat.Izvestiya reported the discussion of the Tajik crisis in a Moscow meetingbetween Yevgenie Primakov, then head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence, andJames Woolsey in August 1993.37 Some Russian sources raised concerns aboutthe negative impact of Russian-US collaboration against Islamic movements inTajikistan on the future of Russian relations with the Islamic world.38 SemenBagdasarov, a leading Russian specialist on interethnic relations, argued thatTajikistan was the key to control of Central Asia and that the US prefers to seeRussia as a key player, instead of Iran, and a partner in the containment ofIslamic fundamentalism.39The coincidence of US and Russian objectives in containing the Islamic/Iranian influence helped facilitate Russia's military and political involvement,which was not only geared toward cutting off the opposition from its supportersin Afghanistan, but also toward carrying its military campaign against oppositionforces inside Tajikistan. US reaction to the political repression exercised by theTajik government against the opposition was, thus, understandably subdued. Th eUS policy toward the Dushanbe regime was generally supportive and evenincluded providing some direct aid, which, according to the US ambassador inTajikistan, was in recognition of 'the government's further progress in the areaof democracy and human rights'.40 The opposition groups, especially those withdemocratic credentials, were particularly surprised by and critical of 'theUS indifference' to human rights violations and the tacit support of the pro-Communist regime in Dushanbe by Washington. The passivity of internationalorganizations such as Amnesty International was also perceived by the oppo-sition as a function of US policy.41

The presence of such wide-ranging and formidable regional and internationalconsensus on the issue of the Islamic threat and Iranian influence in Tajikistanhas been a major element in shaping Tehran's attitude toward the Islamicalternative, as well as the relations with the opposition. Thus, Iran's vision of theIslamic factorthat is, the possibility of the emergence of an Islamic state in148


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THE ' ISLAMIC FACTOR'Tajikistanreflects a sceptical optimism , indicating scepticism in practice andsubstance and optimism in the realm of possibilities.Iran's scepticism further reflected the subtle yet important shift in the Iranianforeign policy approach after the war with Iraq, which indicated some adjust-ment in the interbalance and relationship between Iran's national interests and itsinternationalist/Islamic aspirations or obligations. Protecting the Islamic experi-ment in Iran and safeguarding the territorial integrity were to be given moreexplicit emphasis, an emphasis that was clearly reinforced by concerns over thesevere domestic need for post-war economic reconstruction, the change in theinternational balance of power, and increasing instability all around the Iranianborders. While the Iranian post-war (1989-present) policy has reflected thecontinuous tension and difficulty of creating the 'right' mix between principlesof pragmatism and revolution, especially in the Middle East, it has been muchmore consistent in the Central Asian/Caucasian front, and most clearly so in theTajik case.

In Tajikistan, Islamic possibilities clearly existed, yet Iranian policy, es-pecially in the critical months between May and October 1992, when theopposition might have had a chance, was hesitant if not passive. This hesitationnot only reflected Iran's awareness of Central Asian geopolitical realities, butfurther signified the general belief in Tehran that the clash in Tajikistan, aselsewhere in Central Asia, while couched in ideological terms, reflected tribal,regional, and ethnic differences, rather than an immediate receptivity to anIslamic alternative.42 The promotion of an Islamic revolution, given the 'unreadi-ness' of Tajikistan, could have undermined the less threatening and uniqueinstruments of Iranian influence, namely the cultural linkage with Tajikistan. Thepragmatic argument in Tehran was driven by the fact that Iran, through itscultural linkage, is Tajikistan's natural partnera window of opportunity that arisky revolutionary strategy threatened to close.Iran's hesitation regarding revolutionary experimentation was also reflected inthe peculiar absence of a serious attempt at tactical ideological mentoring of theTajik Islamic opposition by its 'Iranian big brother'. While some cosmeticsimilarities in slogans and organizations appeared in the heyday of the crisis inmid-1992, the tactical approaches adopted by the opposition in terms ofobtaining power were anathema to an Iranian model or preference. This wasparticularly evident in the opposition's cooperation with the government during1992 and reliance on the Communist reformers, and especially the calculation ofgetting support from democratic Moscow and the international communityagainst the old Comm unist forces in the repub lic. These were strategically wrongcalculations and mistakes now repeatedly admitted by the leadership of theopposition, both Islamic and democratic, as key contributing factors in theirsetback.43 Cooperation with Communists and reliance on international supportfor 'democracy' might have sounded like a reasonable strategy for the oppo-sition, but not an acceptable and advisable strategy to Iran. Islamic models ofrevolutionary struggle, especially the one practised by Iran itself, have histori-cally been fundamentally based on self-reliance and the assumption of hostility

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of international forces (Russian or American). This strategic mistake indicatedan absence of mentoring, tactical disconnection, and independence of oppositionforces from Iran.Iran's scepticism was also clearly reflected in the tension between theopposition and Tehran in terms of unmet expectations. Iran refused to providearms to the opposition when it mattered most, 44 and was clearly deficient inproviding direct rhetorical support for the opposition through diplomatic means,media coverage, or polemics against the Dushanbe regime. Iran continued toportray the crisis in Tajikistan in non-ideological terms as an internal conflictwith disturbing regional consequences. This absence of ideological supportbecame the subject of continuous open criticism of Iran's Ministry of ForeignAffairs by the more 'radical' Iranian press, which accused the official policy ofbeing defensive, ineffective, and lacking in its moral standing in view of Iran'sIslamic internationalist obligations. The radical press further provided a forumfor the Tajik Islamic opposition to voice its frustration with the lack of adequate

support from Iran. References were made to the ghorbat (an emotionally loadedPersian word for loneliness) of the Islamic opposition and the absence of anysupport from the Islamic countries for their cause.45Iran's lack of support for pushing an Islamic revolution as a strategic choicethus entailed certain costs in further alienating its domestic constituency inaddition to losing credibility with Islamic opposition groups. In fact, the cost incredibility is one of the intricate dilemmas of Iran's pragmatism as a reluctantrevolutionary state. This dilemma is exacerbated by the ambiguity of the rewardstructure of pursuing a pragmatic moderate foreign policy. Pragmatic or revol-utionary, Iran continues to have difficulty in reaping the benefit of the former,while still feeling the overwhelming weight and the baggage of the latter. Apragmatic Iran will still be perceived and treated as revolutionary. This dilemmais driven by the twin factors of the inherent tension between the revolutionarysymbolism of Iranian imageries and the pragmatic substance of its policy on theone hand, and the utility of a threatening Iran as a source of policy justificationfor a host of regional and international actors on the other. The Iranian/Islamicthreat is an instrumental force for building consensus, overcoming differences,and making strange bedfellows a political normalcy.

ConclusionThe crisis in Tajikistan is not a direct byproduct of the presence of the Islamicopposition. The interaction of historical dynamics such as Soviet gerrymanderingin Tajikistan, the long-term Uzbek regional challenge to Tajik national develop-ment, and the resultant localism (mahal'lageroi) as the defining characteristic ofthe Tajik political power structure are organic factors.46 Yet the role of Islam inthe politics of Tajikistan remains significant and detrimental for two reasons.First, while not immune from the 'natural' characteristics of the Tajikistan polityof mahal'lageroi, the Islamic opposition and its democratic coalition representsthe only genuine Tajik political movement with a truly national perspective for150


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nation-building in Tajikistan. The movement now not only incorporates in itsranks representatives from many local 'ethnic' groups, but also Uzbeks. Second,the sensitivity (manufactured or real) of a host of regional and global players toIslamic sociopolitical alternatives for Tajikistan has placed Islam at the core ofnot only Tajik domestic politics, but its regional and international dimensions.The confluence of the domestic viability of the Islamic opposition as a seriouscontender in shaping the future of the new republic and the sensitivity of theexternal actors has given the Islamic factor much prominence in the dynamicsof the Tajik civil war and its eventual political settlement.The political settlement, when and if it comes, will not, however, be the endof the political crisis in Tajikistan as different regions and political groups willengage in political intrigue and infighting for power and security. The bloodyand brutal memory of the civil war will continue to cast its considerable weighton the future development of political alignment in the republic. To the extentthat Islamicist groups remain united and a viable political force, Iran will remainan important political player, either as a mediator or an important source ofexternal support. In a peaceful Tajikistan, Iranian diplomatic relations will beenhanced by a higher level of state-to-state relations, while on the societal plane,in addition to Islamic groups, those socialpolitical forces that value Iran onnon-ideological but cultural grounds will become the source of Iranian attentionand effort.

One of the key obstacles to Iran's further influence in Tajikistan, in additionto challenges from other actors, will continue to be Iran's economic andtechnical limitations. The most tangible economic assistance so far to Tajikistanwas a 50-million-dollar credit that Dushanbe received in 1992.47 This limitedlevel of economic and financial assistance to Tajikistan was driven by bothIran's own financial difficulties, especially in the area of hard currency, and itsunwillingness to provide such assistance to a regime with an opposing, if nothostile, ideology. An effective and influential role by Iran in Tajikistan willcontinue to depend not only on Iran's cultural linkage, but on its ability tobecome a source of material and development support for an impoverished state.A friendlier regime in Dushanbe will facilitate further financial commitment andaid, though the essential weakness of Iranian economic resources is likely toremain a major obstacle for the rest of the 1990s. Iranian officials havecomplained on occasion about the lack of interest among Iranian business circlesto engage in economic trade activities in Tajikistan. In comparison, however,Iran's business community is much more active in other Central Asian republicssuch as Turkmenistan.48 Iran's economic limitations, especially in view of asignificant Russian role in the economic survival of Tajikistan, will be animportant modifier of its influence. In fact, in this regard not only Russia, butother actors such as the US, Uzbekistan and China may play a more significantrole than Iran.

Tehran will thus try to compensate its limitations on bilateral economicassistance by developing trade and through involvement in multilateral projects.In the final analysis, however, Iran's limited material resources are hoped to be151


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compensated for by its unique cultural, linguistic, and religious ties to Tajikistan,a new state in search of not only economic development but an independentnational sense of identity.49 Islam will continue to be an important factoraffecting Iranian-Tajik relations. To the extent that Islam remains a viablepolitical force in Tajikistan, relations with Iran will be affected by a sense ofapprehension. This negativity has proven to be a useful tool in the hands of theTajik leadership to cultivate support from other actors who share concerns overthe Islamic threat; in addition to traditional like-minded players such as Russiaand Uzbekistan, the role of the US in this regard could become increasinglyimportant.The US may not have a particularly significant interest in Tajikistan to justifyan active presence: its determined policy of containment of political Islam inaddition to the ability to provide or facilitate financial assistance, however, willincreasingly make it a distant yet significant player. While Russia shares with theUS a common ground in the ideological threat perception, Moscow will be wary

of US penetration in Russia's historical sphere of influence. It is thus ironic thatRussia will simultaneously look to Iran's anti-Americanism as a base forpolitical cooperation in blocking the expansion of the US presence. 50 The ColdWar ideology might have been buried, but the elements of great powercompetition that have roots in geopolitical calculations have survived in theRussian policy toward the southern region. In fact, Russia's view of the USpresence in Central Asia/the Caucasus and the adjacent regions, like the PersianGulf, does not significantly differ from that held by Iran. 51Under Primakov and his team, the Islamic world will have a much moresignificant place in Russian foreign policy. His appointment signals two import-ant changes on the intellectual and policy levels. Intellectually, Russia will notcompletely share the Western conceptualization of the Islamic movement/Islamic states, i.e. the undifferentiated approach tow ards political Islam and itsreduction to religious extremism and 'rogue states'. Russia will differentiatebetween 'Islamic fundamentalism', and 'Islamic extremism'. 52 The former isperceived as a return to Islamic roots and traditions, a characteristic trend of theIslamic revival in most of the Muslim world. While these movements can posepolitical and security challenges to regional and global powers, including Russia,they can neither be frontally opposed nor isolated, as they represent a 'legit-imate' political phenomenon and can possibly be accommodated. Furthermore,given the hostile relations between the West and these movements, they carry thepotential and characteristics that might create a conduit for rapprochement andcooperation with Russia. This is particularly evident in Russia's critique of theUS concept of 'rogue states', as being ideologically narrow and politicallycounterproductive.53 Russia, according to Primakov, would oppose the USattempts to isolate these countries, i.e. Iran, Sudan, etc.

Given the strategic significance of Iran for Russia, and especially the impactof Russian-Iranian relations on Central Asia and the Caucasus' geopolitical andgeocultural environment, Russia's attempts at theoretical reformulation areindicative of not only a genuine intellectual/philosophical divide with the West152


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over the issue of Islamic movements, but more so of a political flexibility thatsuits Russia's geopolitical needs in its post-Soviet transition to great powerstatus. In view of the growing significance of the Russian-Iranian rapprochementin recent years54 and the continuous hostility between Iran and the US, Tehranmay prefer a Russian rather than a US presence in Tajikistan. Recognition ofMoscow's interests in Central Asia is also shared by the Islamicist oppositionleaders who have been categorical in the necessity of maintaining close relationswith Moscow.55 While Russia is the most significant supporter of the currentregime in Dushanbe, it remains to be seen to what extent this subtle, thoughimportant, shift in Russia's perspective of Islam on a global level will have animpact on Russia's political preference and strategy towards the Tajik Islamicopposition and the political settlement of the crisis. Primakov's intellectualinnovation could well be a more sophisticated neo-Eurasianist view of Islam inwhich the global importance of Islam with its anti-Western connotations wouldbe accommodated while its regional, i.e. anti-Russian, ramifications in CentralAsia and the North Caucasus will be opposed; a reinvention of the policy ofdouble-standard towards external and internal Islam characteristic of the Sovietperiod. Thus, an accommodation of Islamic Iran need not necessarily go hand inhand with an accommodation of the Islamic opposition in Tajikistan. Further-more, Russia's potential change of policy towards the Islamic opposition wouldnot only be a function of an intellectual shift, but perhaps more significantly offactors, such as the extreme vulnerability of the current regime to an openpolitical process (i.e. free elections), which m ight include the Islamic opposition,and Russia's attempt to contain excessive Uzbek influence in the domesticpolitics of Tajikistan.56 Thus, Russia's position is underscored by the dilemma ofsupporting a vulnerable political ally, which cannot on its own deal with theopposition, either politically or militarily, and the eventual necessity of incorpo-rating the Islamic opposition into a comprehensive Tajik national reconciliation.The overall and long-term impact of the Islamic factor in the final analysis,however, in addition to the role of external actors and their preferences, will bethe function of the domestic sociopolitical impact of Islam in shaping Tajiksociety and polity, and whether Islam is a viable political and social force or atransient hype.57 The role of Islam in politics has been categorically rejected andlegally banned by the Tajik government and the ruling elites, as it has been inother Central Asian states. According to Tajik officials, the Islamic leaders ofTajikistan should look to Pope John Paul II and Patriarch Alexy of Russia asmodels for their civic responsibility and not their Iranian counterparts.58 Thepolitical platform of the two presidential candidates in Tajikistan was marked bythe conspicuous absence of direct reference to the word 'Islam'; instead thecandidates made reference to the need for 'spirituality' in personal life. 59As elsewhere in the post-colonial Muslim world, Islam as an ideology willcontinue to have an appeal for those sociopolitical forces in Tajikistan that eitherthrough conviction or convenience look to religion as a principal organizingvehicle for political mobilization. The Iranian revolution and its political modelare to a large extent particular to Iranian history and political culture and may

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MOHIADDIN MESBAHInot be mechanically imported or emulated. The significance of the 'Iranianmodel' for Tajikistan, in this context, should therefore be measured not necess-arily for its direct relevance, but for its atmospheric meaning and implications.The Tajik Islamic movementweak or strongis in general part and parcel ofsimilar trends taking place elsewhere in the Islamic world where authoritariansecularism is under attack by religious activists.In Tajikistan, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, secularismor one might saysecular fundamentalismis in power and there is little indication that in theshort run, especially given external support, its hegemony could be effectivelychallenged. Its long-term domination and control, however, requires more thanjust repressive measures; it calls for breaking out of its authoritarian politicalculture and venturing into risky yet more promising ways of broadening politicalrepresentation. This will be a large task, one that given both distant and recentauthoritarian history (reinforced by the not exactly democratic presidentialelections of 1994 in Tajikistan) has proven to be too challenging for the Tajikruling forces. In the absence of a broadening political base of representation, andunder repressive measures, political Islam, though unproven as a successfulmodel of economic and political development, could be an effective source inpolitical mobilization and change. Iran, pragmatic or not, may be a peripheralfactor in such an eventuality.

The 'politicking' with the Islamic factor in Tajikistan also points to thebroader and deeper global problematique of Islam as a polity, culture, and ideaat the century's end. The 'life processes' of Tajikistan's 'Islamic' opposition,reflect an experience shared with other Islamic movements from North Africa toCentral Asiaa hopeful inception, tragic growth, and ambiguous future. Its birthwas not unexpected. It developed with a sense of urgency and anticipation as aresponse to the internal desires of ordinary people to regain the lost identity andhas grown in the midst of the extremely inhospitable and unforgiving symbiosisof domestic and international environments, and matured into a full fledgedpolitico-military mov ement. It is offered 'future s' by the Tajik governm ent andits external supporters which, like similar Islamic movements elsewhere, onlyrange between physical elimination or a marginalized presence.The opposition's repeated blueprint for national reconciliation, which has beenincreasingly modified and moderated since 1994, includes a commitment to asecular state and is cognizant of the deeply clannish Tajik society as itanticipates the participation of different regions and clans in a coalition govern-ment.60 These proposals have been repeatedly ignored during the numerous andhighly anticipated mediation meetings held from 1994-1996 in Tehran, Moscow,Almaty, Islamabad, and Ashqabad.

The inflexibility of options presented to the Islamic opposition in Tajikistan,more than any other case in the Islamic world, is the direct result of internationalfactors, i.e. balancing dynamics of external actors' preferences, than a viabledomestic challenge put forward by the state (as in the case in Algeria andEgypt). The primacy of the role of external actors and their 'view' of the Islamicfactor plays a significant part in shaping the current and future dynamics of154


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THE ' ISLAMIC FACTOR'Tajikistan in general and the Islamic oppo sition in p articular. In a post-Cold W arand interdependent world, where not only economies, but 'threats', are globallydefined, shared and reacted to, the Central Asian societies, and especiallyTajikistan, face the typical dilemma endemic now to most Islamic countries withviable Islamic oppositions.

Notes and references1. B. Lewis, 'New Middle East' , Foreign Affairs, 1993.2. On the role of Iran's Islamic broadcasts and their impact on Central Asia and Tajikistan, see Ettela'at(Persian), 16 July 1992, pp 23, interview with I ran's ambassador to Tajikistan, A li Muham medShabestari; Al'Alam (Arabic, London) September 1993 interview with leaders of Tajik oppositionincluding Haji Akbar Turajonzoda (partially reproduced in Hamshahri (Persian) 29 September 1993, p 9).3. Al'Alam (Arabic) 7 September 1994, interview with opposition leaders. This point was specificallyreiterated by Shadman Yusef, the leader of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan.4. Moscow News, No. 36, 6-13 September 1992, p 1.5. For background information regarding the regionalism of Tajikistan, see Davlat Khudonazar, 'The conflictin Tajikistan: questions of regionalism', in Roald Z. Sagadeev and Susan Eisenhower, eds, Central Asia:Conflict, Resolution, and Change (Maryland: CPSS Press, 1995).6. For an interesting discussion of the Tajik crisis in September-November of 1992 and comparison betweenthe komiteh and the Dushanbe Youth Movement see 'Tajikistan: uncertain developments and ambiguousfuture', Keyhan Havai (Persian) 11 November 1992, p 22. It is perhaps noteworthy that this weeklypublication usually reflects a much more radical position than that taken by the Iranian official policy.7. This point was made by one of the top leaders of the Tajik opposition, Haj Akbar Turajonzoda (who hasbeen the qozi, or chief Islamic cleric, of the Tajik Muslims since 1988), during an interview with theauthor. New York, 5 February 1995.8. See interviews with Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, Dr Shadman Yusef, and Dr Taher Abduljabbar (head of theRastakhiz Party) in three issues of Hamshahri (Persian) 29 September, 3 October and 4 October 1993.9. During the Nabiev period, Iran's cultural activity flourished very quickly. Some Iranian sources argued thatNabiev's accommodation was due more to his vulnerable political base than to a general interest in culturallinks with Iran. See Salam, 8 October 1993, p 8.10. For coverage of the Nabiev trip to Iran see ITAR-TASS 30 June 1992 in FBIS-Sov, 1 July 1992; IRNA 28

June 1992 in FBIS-Sov, 24 June 1992, pp 28- 29; IRNA 30 June 1992, in FBIS-NES 6 July 1992, pp 66 -67.11 . For issues concerning the cooperation on TV programming and also technical cooperation, see KeyhanHava'i, 29 July 1992, p 3.12. 'We should develop our ties mainly in literary, culture and scientific areas', Narodnaya Gazeta, 18 July1992, pp 1-2.13. Narodnaya Gazeta, 7 July 1992, pp 1, 2.14. Narodnaya Gazeta, 7 July 1992, p 1. Shiraz, a city in the south of Iran, the capital of Fars Province, isone of the most traditional Iranian cities and famous for its romantic and literary traditions and contributionto Iranian culture. Hafiz and Sa'adi are the two greatest Iranian poets with influence not only amongIranians, but in the Iranian cultural milieu of Central Asia and the Asian subcontinentIndia and Pakistan.It is interesting that Nabiev at Hafiz's tomb comp leted his cultural journey by taking a 'fall' (fortunetelling) from the Divan (collection of poems ), where he received a 'goo d sig n' indicating the fruitfulnessof his trip to Iran and a better relationship between the two countries; Narodnaya Gazeta, 7 July 1992,p 2.15 . See his interview with Nezavismaya Gazeta, 11 July 1992, p 3.16. Holos Ukrayiny, 12 August 1992, p 8; FBIS-Sov, 21 August 1992.17. Interfax, 18 September 1992 in FBIS-Sov, 21 September, 1992, p 56.18 . Ibid.19. The U zbek authorities are sensitive to this issue in particular, in view of strong influence of Tajik-Persianculture in Samarkhand and Bukhara where more than a million Tajiks reside. Establishment of Turkishcultural complexes, the prevention of Tajik TV broadcast to Uzbekistan while transmitting Uzbekprogramming to Tajikistan, and other activities signifying the subtle cultural tension between the Uzbeksand Tajiks, a tension which goes beyond limited local cultural conflict and points to the larger picturewhich involves the power relationship between the two ethnic groups, and issues of sovereignty and

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MOHIADDIN MESBAHInation-building. For a reflection of Iranian awareness and sensitivity in this issue see Ettela'at, 16 July1992, p 7.20 . Keyhan (Persian), 25 September 1993.21 . Ettela'at, 19 July 1996, p 2. These books were provided as a result of a Tajik request and have beenprepared with the cooperation of Tajikistan's academics. They will be used at the elementary andsecondary levels in a special language programme entitled Zaban-e Niyakan (the language of theforefathers).22 . Hamshahri (Persian), 20 August 1993, p 10.23 . According to Bubakhanov, the government plan has envisioned a complete 'Persianization' of the alphabet(i.e. conversion to the Arabic alphabet) by 1995-96. See Hamshahri (Persian), 28 August 1993, p 10.24 . Amanov, who made the remarks at a special ceremony of his 70th birthday at Dushanbe, specificallyreiterated the uselessness of the negative 'atmosphere' surrounding Iran in the republic and emphasized thecultural and literary and educational links, especially in the area of children's books. Iranian cultural workin this area also includes the translation of Persian books to Tajik (in Cyrillic) for immediate use. SeeJumhuriyeh Islami (Persian), 29 September 1993. Also see Salam (Persian), 29 August 1993, p 2.25 . Oleg Panfilov, 'Officials are conducting a new experiment with the Tajik language', Nezavisimaya Gazeta,27 July 1994, p 3.26 . Asemi, a former member of the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union, had numerous publications onthe history, culture, and language of Tajikistan, and was head of a Farsi-speaking association and aninternational organization for teaching Central Asian civilization. Ettela'at 30 July 1996, p 1.

27 . For a discussion of the concept of Umm ul-qura' (the Islamic metropolis) see Mohiaddin Mesbahi,'Gorbachev's new thinking and Islamic Iran: from containment to reconciliation', in H. Amirahmadi andN. Entessar, eds, Reconstruction and D iplomacy in the Persian G ulf (London and New York: Routledge,1992).28 . For an early account of this view, especially just before the start of the main stage of the civil war, seeV. Belykh and N. Burbyga, 'Hostages of terror', Izvestiya, 9 September 1992, pp 1-2, which includes aninterview with Sangak Safarov, the leader of the armed groups of the People's Front; and Oleg Blotskiy,'Tajikistan: the Green and the Red', Literaturnaya Gazeta, 4 November 1992, p 11.29 . Keyhan Hava'i (Persian), 16 December 1992, p 4.30 . See Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 'Russian foreign policy and security in Central Asia and the Caucasus', inCentral Asian Survey, Vol 12, No 2, 1993.31 . Ibid.32 . For the Russian policy see ibid.33 . The issue of Tajik uranium and the possible interest of Islamic countries in it was raised in January 1992in the Russian press. Nabiev's government, however, categorically denied the reports of any negotiationswith Pakistan, Iran, Libya, and other countries on selling uranium and reiterated his government's positionin a no-sale policy. Interfax, 7 January 1992, in FBIS-SOV, 8 January 1992, p 70; and A. Komrakov, 'W asthere a bomb?' in Trude, 9 January 1992, p 3.34 . For a good overview of Israeli policy in Central Asia, see A. Ehteshami and E. Murphy, 'The non-ArabMiddle East states and the Caucasus/Central Asian Republics: Iran and Israel', in International Relations,Vol 12, No 1, April 1994. For views of Tajik Islamic and democratic opposition groups, see Al'Alam(Arabic), 7 September 1993, partially reproduced in Hamshahri (Persian), 29 September 1993, p 9; for anIranian commentary on Israel's policy in Tajikistan, see Salam (Persian), 16 October 1993, p 3, andEttela'at, 2 November 1994, p 2.35 . For James Woolsey's testimony, see the Hearing of the Select Intelligence Committee, United StatesSenate, 25 January 1994, cited in Federal News Service (FNS) in Nexus databank.36 . R. James Woolsey, 'Challenge to peace in the Middle East' , in MEES, 38:1, 3 October 1994, pp D2-D 3.37 . Izvestiya, 10 August 1993, p 3.38 . See, for example Russia's former Minister of Justice Nikolai Fedorov's article in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 14May 1993, p 4, which criticizes the use of force against Islamic movements by Russia as counterproduc-tive; also see Vladimir Koznechevskyi, 'Victim of the Islamic roulette desperately wanted', or 'In searchof those threatened by Islamic fundamentalism', Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 6 August 1993, p 1.

39 . Semen Bagdasarov, 'There is a CIS border in Tajikistan. It is a Russian border, too', Rossiyskaya Gazeta,3 September 1994, pp 1, 6.40 . This remark was made by Stanley Escudero, US plenipotentiary and extraordinary ambassador inTajikistan at the ceremony of the signing of the Cooperation Agreement between Tajikistan and the UnitedStates. Dushanbe Radio, Tajikistan Network in Russian, 29 July 1994, in FBIS-SOV, 1 August 1994, p 51.41 . For the opposition groups' position on US policy, especially their critical attitude toward the US, seeAkbar Turajonzoda's, 'Tajikistan: lonely and alien', in Salam (Persian), 22 August 1993, p 12; AkbarTurajonzoda, 'Tajikistan: burning in Bolshevik's fire of animosity', Jehan-e Islam (Persian), 19 August156


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THE ' ISLAMIC FACTOR'1993, p 4; Ajami, 'A letter from a Tajik Muslim to the custodians of human rights', Jumhuriyeh Islami(Persian), 8 August 1993, p 12; and Al'Alam (Arabic) 7 September 1993.42 . For a good elaboration of this view, see the article, 'Ethnic conflict in Central Asia: an inheritance fromblind nationalism', Ettela'at (Persian), 24 August 1993, p 7.43 . For a detailed and interesting elaboration of key mistakes of the opposition in their political strategy, seethe interview with A. Turajonzoda, S. Yusef, T. Abdul Jabbar (head of the Rastakhiz Party) in Hamshahri(Persian), 29 September, 3 October, 4 October, 1994.44 . Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Va'ezi informed the Russian ambassador in Iran, VladimirGudev, that Iran had refused to accept the requests for arms of several opposition groups in Tajikistan;ITAR-TASS, 28 October 1992 in FB1S-SOV, 30 October 1992, p 11.45 . For a sample of this theme see A . Turajonzoda, 'The lonely Tajikistan: burning in the fire of the Bolshevikanimosity', Jehan-e Islam (Persian), 8 August 1993, p 4; Shamso l'haqh, 'The painful diary of a TajikMuslim' , Jumhuriyeh Islami (Persian), 12 August 1993, p 14, Ajami, 'A letter from a Tajik Muslim to thecustodian of human rights'; A. Turajonzoda, 'Tajikistan: lonely and alien', Salam (Persian), 22 August1993, p 12. Turajonzoda's articles are specifically replete with bitter complaints about the absence ofmedia coverage and the lack of 'even humanitarian' support for the Islamic opposition.46 . For a good discussion of this issue see Sergei Gretsky, 'Civil war in Tajikistan: causes, developments, andprospects for peace', in R. Sagadeev and S. Eisenhower, Central Asia: Conflict Resolution and Change(Maryland: CPSS Press, 1995).47 . For a polite expression of Tajik disappointment about the level of economic aid by Iran; see NezavisimayaGazeta, 11 July 1992, p 3, interview with Kholiknazarov.48 . See the interview with Muhammad Shabestari, Iran's ambassador in Tajikistan, in Ettela'at, 8 September1993, p 8.49 . The issue of cultural linkage seemed to have survived the critical political differences between Dushanbeand Tehran. A short yet impressive list of these links included the establishment of three schools to teachthe Persian script, a major cultural centre, providing copies of Persian translations of the Koran, 200language teaching manuals, 7,000 books for Tajik scholars, the opening of a 20,000-volume readinglibrary, and the hosting of more than 70 delegations from Tehran (about 1,200 academics, artists, athletes,and so forth). Interestingly, these cultural activities also include 20,000 copies of Ayatollah Khomeini'sfamous collection of poetry, 'The Wine Goblet and the Confidante'. See Ettela'at, 8 September 1993,p 8.50 . The concern over a US activist role in Tajikistan and the need to court Iran has been expressed in Russiaduring the talks in Islamabad. See Izvestiya, 2 November 1994, p 3.51 . See especially an exclusive and significant interview w ith Tertiyakov, the Russian ambassad or in Iran, withAbrar (Persian), 10 August 1993, pp 2, 4, where the ambassador clearly outlines the common aspects ofRussian-Iranian relations and views about the US military and political presence in the Persian Gulf andthe southern regions of Russia.52 . Primakov has hinted about a shift on Russia's perspective on Islam, Islamic movements and 'rogue states'in several interviews. Primakov criticized some in the West for 'preserving' the 'enemy image' in thepost-Cold War period by 'distorting Russia's policy, erasing the difference between Islamic fundamental-ism and Islamic extremism and deliberately keeping some black-listed countries in the risk zone ... Muchis being done to make sure these countries will never see light at the end of the tunnel'. See, for example,an excerpt of his remarks to an international forum on NATO's expansion, Interfax, 5 April 1996, inFBJS-Central Eurasia, 8 April 1996, pp 13-14.53 . Ibid.54 . Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 'Iran's emerging partnership with Russia: US pressure and Iran's regional role',Middle East Insight, 11:5, July-August, 1995, pp 84-87. Iran's Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati,characterized Russian-Iranian relations as being at their highest level in his visit to Moscow in early March1996. For coverage of Velayati's meeting with Primakov and Yeltsin, see IRNA, 7 March 1996, inFBIS-Central Eurasia, 7 March 1996, p 12, and IRNA, 7 March 1996, in FBIS-Central Eurasia, 8 March1996, pp 13-14. See also the interview with Tertiyakov, Russian ambassador to Iran, in RossiskayaGazeta, 2 March 1996, p 15.

55 . See, in particular, Abdullah Nun's interview with Izvestiya, 18 June 1994, p 4. Nuri argues that Russiacould be a friend as well as the guardian of the Tajik border, but not an actor in the internal affairs ofTajikistan.56 . While Uzbekistan was the key to suppressing the Islamic opposition in the initial stages of the civil warand the coming to power of Emamali Rahmanov's regime, there has been considerable estrangementbetween the current regime, which signifies for the first time in Tajik history a sharing of power by theKulobis (represented by Rahmanov) with the traditional Tajik political elite, the Khujandissupported byUzbekistan. Thus, Russia's support for a Kulobi-dominant regime in Dushanbe represents an intricate157


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MOHIADDIN MESBAHIRussian policy of (a) consolidating its own position within the complex of Tajik regional, local politicsby supporting the Kulobi new comers, and (b) curtailing Uzbekistan's regional ambitions in Tajikistan bydepriving the traditionally pro-Uzbek elite from Khujand from dominating political power. For adiscussion of these issues see Gretsky, 'Civil war in Tajikistan: causes, developments, and prospects forpeace ', pp 232 -236. It is thus not surprising that the Uzbek government, the staunch enemy of the Islamicopposition and the key promoter of 'Islamic threat' in the region, now more recently has tried to promotea rapprochement with the Islamic opposition with the hope of balancing Russian dominance. PresidentKarimov invited Qozi Akbar Turajonzoda for a meeting in Tashkent which took place in April 3, 1995,hoping perhaps to become a mediator between the Islamic opposition and the Khujandis against theKulobis and the Russians.

57 . In this regard, while Tajikistan has its own particularities, the politics of its Islam resemble in general therest of the Islamic world, of which Central Asia is now part and parcel.58 . See Emamali Rahmanov's address to an extraordinary session of the Supreme Council in Dushanbe,Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan, in FBIS-SOV, 8 September 1994, p 48.59 . For Rahmanov's presidential manifesto, see Narodnaya Gazeta, 19 October 1994, p 1. For the views ofthe only other presidential candidate, Abdullojonov, who is Tajikistan's ambassador to Russia, see hiselection manifesto in Narodnaya Gazeta, 19 October 1994, p 1.60 . Turajonzoda discussed in some details the proposal in a lecture at the Council on Foreign Relations (3February 1995), monitored by th e author. The Qozi reiterated the details of the proposal for nationalreconciliation in an interview with the author, New York, 5 February 1995. For a synopsis of his lecture,see Akbar Turajonzoda, 'Tajikistan -politics, religion and peace: a view from the opposition', in Problemsof Post-Communism, July/August, 1995, pp 22-28.

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