io center workshop online barrier and risk monitoring · 2 . presentations • lars bodsberg, io3...

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IO Center Workshop

Online Barrier and Risk monitoring November 25th 2014, Stavanger

Center for Integrated Operations In the Petroleum Industry

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Presentations • Lars Bodsberg, IO3 Area Manger, SINTEF • Stein Hauge, Senior Adviser, SINTEF • Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager, Eni Norge • Dag Eide Etterlid, HSE OC Supervisor Ekofisk Facility Team, ConocoPhillips • Erik Sælen, Consultant, Safety & Asset Risk Management, DNV GL

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Workshop Introduction Lars Bodsberg, IO3 Area Manager IO Center Workshop, Online Barrier and Risk monitoring, November 25th 2014, Stavanger


Objectives of workshop

• Share insights and experiences concerning online barrier and risk monitoring.

• Present and get feedback on the handbook "Guidelines for monitoring of barrier status and associated risk in the operational phase"

We intend to upload brief summary of the workshop on the IO center webpage, with the presentations by the project group and a few highlights from the discussion in an anonymised and generalised form.

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Program 08:30 Welcome, presentation of the participants 08:45 Introduction

• Risk barometer demonstrator for process event case, Nathaniel Edwin,/Stein Hauge, SINTEF

• General introduction of the handbook " Guidelines for monitoring of barrier status and associated risk in the operational phase", Stein Hauge, SINTEF

• Discussion 09:50 Break 10:00 Barrier monitoring – industry status

• Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager, Eni Norge • Dag Eide Etterlid, HSE OC Supervisor Ekofisk Facility Team, ConocoPhillips

Skandinavia • Erik Sælen, Consultant, Safety & Asset Risk Management, DNV GL

11:00 Break 11:10 Concluding reflections 11:30 Lunch

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CENTER FOR INTEGRATED OPERATIONS IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

PHASE I AND II ACTIVITIES (2007-14)

Copyright: Center for Integrated Operations in the Petroleum Industry

IO Center partners

Collaborating research institutions

Industry partners

Research partners

Center for Research Based Innovation

The Research Council of Norway

http://www.iocenter.no/

http://www.iocenter.no/

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IO3: Proactive management of safety and environment


• How can better access to real-time data lead to improved safety? • How can IO solutions provide improved support to onshore/offshore decision-

making processes?

IO3 Deliverables 2014

SW demonstrator for anomaly detection in drilling

Risk barometer handbook/ demonstrator

Robust work practice handbook

http://www.conocophillips.no/NO/

Develop and demonstrate a concept for online monitoring of risk level

Risk barometer

Guideline

Demon-strator

Overall risk and barrier model

Process Collision Drilling

Activity 2014 Activity 2012/13

Deliverables 2014

Sand erosion

http://www.conocophillips.no/NO/

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Technology for a better society 1

IO3 workshop:

"Online Barrier and Risk Monitoring"

Eni Norge, November 25th - 2014


Program 08:30 Welcome, presentation of the participants 08:45 Introduction

• Risk barometer demonstrator for process event case, Nathaniel Edwin / Stein Hauge, SINTEF • General introduction of the handbook " Guidelines for monitoring of barrier status and

associated risk in the operational phase", Stein Hauge, SINTEF • Discussion

09:50 Break 10:00 Barrier monitoring – industry status

• Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager, Eni Norge • Dag Eide Etterlid, HSE OC Supervisor Ekofisk Facility Team, ConocoPhillips Skandinavia • Erik Sælen, Consultant, Safety & Asset Risk Management, DNV GL

11:00 Break 11:10 Concluding reflections 11:30 Lunch


"Online barrier and risk monitoring" – background

• We have tools to monitor the status of the barriers (e.g. barrier panels/dashboards) - at least for the technical barrier elements

• We do not have good tools for monitoring the risk and for identifying important risk contributors in real time

The purpose of the risk barometer is to provide the operators with a tool that relates the status of the safety barriers to the risk level on the installation.

Information box 1

Technology for a better society

The risk barometer approach has been develop with basis in four industry cases: • "Process risk case" for COPSAS (2012-2014) + demonstrator

• "Sand erosion case" for BP (2013-2014) + demonstrator

• "Ship impact case" for COPSAS (2013-2014)

• "Drilling risk case" for COPSAS (2014)

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Risk barometer cases in IO3


PSA: "The methods which have been developed to describe, measure and communicate risk have provided important decision support, particularly in the design phase. In light of the frequent change processes, it is important that the

risk analyses are further developed for the operational phase as well."

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Main premises for developing the risk barometer

The risk barometer approach combines real time information about the safety barriers with knowledge from risk related analyses to make predictions about how the current risk picture may vary over time.

Information box 2


• Personnel participating in the planning process, e.g. Work-Permit (WP) meetings, planning-meetings and SJA meetings to aid decisions concerning ongoing and up-coming work.

• Maintenance supervisors to get an overview of the current risk level and the most critical barrier breaches/deviations to support decisions concerning prioritising of PM and CM tasks

• Other installation lead personnel to get an overview of barrier status and the risk level on the installation including technical integrity and technical safety functions.

• Onshore support personnel and management to get an overview of the barrier status, current risk level and trends.

• CCR / field operators to get an overview of the barrier status and the risk level and the main contributors in the areas.

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Potential risk barometer users and user groups


Approaches for monitoring and aggregating barrier status information

1. Individual status of all barrier elements – no aggregation beyond element level

2: Define simple rules for aggregating element status up to some system, function, area and installation level (no underlying risk models)

3: Develop a limited set of indicators for selected barrier systems/functions, and based on indicator status and an underlying simplified

risk model estimate current risk and trend in risk

4: Develop more detailed probabilistic models (FTA, etc.) for each barrier system / barrier function where all elements are included and link these models together.

Incr

easi

ngly

risk

bas

ed Risk barometer approach


Main steps when establishing a risk barometer


The selection of accident scenario(s) to be represented by the risk barometer should mainly be based on:

i. their estimated contribution towards major accident risk ii. the availability of relevant real time data to support the continuous update of

the barrier system indicators.

Process risk is generally the most obvious candidate; High risk contribution, quite

detailed QRA and often good availability of data

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Step1: Definition of major accident scenarios 1. Define major accident scenarios


Main sources of information typically include: • QRA of the installation(s) under consideration • Qualitative and semi-quantitative barrier analyses • Investigation and event reports • Various qualitative safety analyses • Selected system documentation and relevant procedures • Interviews, discussions and workshops with experts / operational personnel

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Step2: Relevant information sources 2. Identify and review relevant information

sources

No single source of information will provide all the required information to implement the risk barometer. Rather, information from various written sources must be obtained and combined with information from discussions with operational personnel and subject matter experts.

Information box 20


• PSAN requires that the operators shall define critical safety barriers, describe their function and have a system for the continuous follow-up of the condition of these barriers (ref. § 5 in the Management Regulations).

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Step3: Barrier functions and barrier systems

The extent to which barrier functions and barrier systems are well defined varies significantly between installations and also between hazard types. Normally, the barriers to prevent and mitigate process events are well defined, whereas for other hazards, such as ship collisions and well leaks / blowouts, the barriers are not specified in such detail.

3. Identify barrier functions and associated

barrier systems

Information box 21


Step3: Barrier functions and barrier systems 3. Identify barrier functions and associated

barrier systems


Step3: Barrier functions and barrier systems 3. Identify barrier functions and associated

barrier systemsLimit topside leak”Limit the feed of

hydrocarbon on deck / additional well control”

Prevent influx”Well integrity”

Detect influx”Early kick

detection and response”

Stop influx”Primary well

control by mud column”

Prevent topside leak”Secondary well

control, BOP”

Diverter system

Mud gas separator

Manual operation of well control

equipment(BOP equip.)

Top drive(safety valve)

BOP control system

Manual shut-in of well

Mud circulation (regain well

control)

Choke and kill mud system

Pit gain (volumetric control

Flow-in/out(rate control)

Driller / mud logger surveillance

interpretation

Drilling supervisor /

toolpusher / ODC surveillance

interpretation

Mud delivery systems (piping,

valves and pumps)

System interfaces utilities and

controls

Manual mud weight control (derick man)

Casing / liner

Casing cement

Well testing and integrity approval

Cement plug inside tubing

(Sidetrack drilling)

Trip tank (exact volemetric control for tripping, etc.)

Real time monitoring of well

parameters

Mud mixing and bulk capacity (on

rig / standby vessel)

BOP stack, RAMS and preventors

Choke and kill valves on BOP

Bottom hole pressure (MWD)

Density of drill mud return

WR – Influenced by Well planning and Risk assessment

WR

WR

WR

WR

WR


Main sources:

• QRA sensitivities • Review of investigation reports • Barriers and safety analyses reports • Expert opinions and judgements

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Step 4: Relative importance of the barriers 4. Evaluate relative

importance of the barrier systems

A risk related ranking of the barrier systems is performed to facilitate a more targeted selection of barrier system indicators. The ease of performing such a criticality ranking varies between hazards and is easiest for process risk due to the detailed QRA for this particular hazard.

Information box 22


Step 4: Relative importance of the barriers 4. Evaluate relative

importance of the barrier systems

0

10

20

-10

-20

-30

-40-41.8

-16.8

-10.9

-5.2

-2.6 -3.0 -2.7

18.0

7.3 7.85.3

4.6 3.6 3.1 2.3

[%]

Leak frequency (x0.1)

Probability of leakage in neighbor module (x0.4)

Number of drillings and completions (0)

Number of workovers (x0.5)

Probability of hot work (x2)

Probability of ignition due to failure in electrical equipment (x2)

Probability of autoignition (x2)

Probability of ignition due to drive unit (x1.5)

Probability of ignition given leakage and hot work (x1.6)

Probability of ignition due to pumps/compr. (x2)

Probability of blowout (x0.75)

Reduction factor for electrical disconnection of ignition sources (x2)

(x1.75)(x1.7)

(x0.5)

Potential risk increase

Potential risk reduction

0

*0,ΔRR t


Step 4: Relative importance of the barriers

Ensure technical & operational integrity of

visiting vessel

Technical integrity of visiting vessel

Operational preparedness / base

activities

Limit consequences from an impact

Operational integrity of visiting vessel

Vessel / hull design

Contingency measures during loading/

offloading

Installation design / vulnerability

Emergency Bridging Document available, but not

updated and/or provided to vessel.

Procedure for familiarization and vessel specific training was not

followed

Required preparations prior to entering the safety zone not done

in accordance with procedures

The Captain left the steering position upon approaching the

installation

No reaction to the speed alarm when the vessel exceeded the speed limit

at entering the safety zone

The communication protocol including a PA announcement

at the vessel was not used

The Captain and 2nd Officer didnot demonstrate good bridge

resource management

Safeguarding of personnel / emergency

preparedness

Wrong alarm was activated

No general alarm was activated at the installation to muster

personnel and obtain head count

Prevent vessel on collision course

Technical navigation aids

Operational procedures and

restrictions inside safety zone

Operational navigation,

surveillance and communication

Position surveillance

Prevent contact/impact between vessel and

installation

DP & propulsion system

Normalisation of vessel operations

Operational awareness during vessel approach/departure and

loading/unloading

4. Evaluate relative importance of the barrier

systems


Main criteria for selecting indicators for each barrier system are: i. Relevance of indicator (correlation between indicator status and barrier

performance) ii. The possibility of obtaining an objective measure of the indicator iii. The availability of real time data to substantiate the indicator

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Step 5: Establishing barrier indicators 5. Establish barrier performance indicators


Step 5: Establishing barrier indicators 5. Establish barrier performance indicators

Hazard Barrier Function Examples of indicators and associated barrier system(s)

PRO

CE

SS L

EA

KS

BF1: Prevent release

"Design and condition of HC equipment"/ “Containment” Number of open barrier breach notifications in SAP Number of open deviation notifications in SAP

"Work on / disassembling of HC systems" Number of open barrier breach notifications in SAP Number of open deviation notifications in SAP Number of open work permits Number of work permits extended beyond one shift

BF2: Prevent ignition

"Ex Protection" Number of open barrier breach notifications in SAP Number of open deviation notifications in SAP

"Gas Detection" Number of open barrier breach notifications in SAP Number of open deviation notifications in SAP Number of isolations present in the safety system

"Hot work" Number of open barrier breach notifications in SAP Number of open deviation notifications in SAP Number of open work permits – Hot work type A Number of open work permits – Hot work type B

SHIP

IM

PAC

TS

BF1: Ensure technical & operational integrity of

visiting vessel

"Technical integrity of visiting vessel" Fraction of days (during the last year) off-hire due to repair of a safety critical failure

"Operational integrity of visiting vessel" Vessel crew competency: Fraction of officers on bridge that has conducted a BRM course during the last two years

"Operational preparedness / base activities" Fraction of sailings that are regulated by long-term contracts Discrepancies between number of planned arrivals and number of experienced arrivals

BF1: Prevent vessel on collision course

"Technical navigation aids” Total amount of backlog on maintenance of technical-navigation equipment with overdue exceeding two weeks

"Operational procedures & restrictions inside safety zone" Deviations with respect to complying to speed criteria inside pre-safety and safety zone


Step 6: Establish a risk model 6. Establish risk model based on barrier indicators


About the chosen risk model: • A simple hierarchical model based on weighting of barrier systems and functions, and

weights allocated to the associated indicators.

• A simple model is more transparent and therefore easier to understand

• It is important to ensure that although information is aggregated in the model, insight on underlying conditions and causes is never lost. This is easiest obtainable in a simple model that is hierarchically structured.

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The risk model presents relative risk:

• Each indicator can have a max and a min score based on its current value (min score = 0, max score = weight).

• When all indicators are in best state: Total score is 0

• When all indicators are in worst stat: Total score is 100

• No absolute risk presented

An important feature of the risk model is the ability to identify the indicators that give the highest contribution towards the current risk on the installation

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Normal Risk Levels Increased Risk Levels High Risk Levels

<15 <30 >30

Calibration of the individual indicators and the risk barometer itself should be based on judgements made by operational personnel. It is highly desirable to supplement this calibration with historic operational data (if available).


Some main objectives of visualisation:

• Illustrate how the risk dynamically changes as a function of the monitored barrier performance (in terms of barrier functions and barrier systems).

• Provide information at different levels; installation, area, barrier function and barrier system (and also barrier element)

• Better understanding of contributing factors to increased risk levels.

• Provide decision support to planning and prioritizing

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Step 7: Visualisation of the risk 7. Visualize risk picture


Overview Display

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Detailed overview Display (at installation level)

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Drill down at area level – Process Deck

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Drill down at detailed area level

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Drill down to barrier function and system

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Visualization of additional guidance information

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Interfaces towards other systems

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www.eninorge.com

Goliat Barrier Monitoring Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager

Barrier Management Project

Purpose The purpose of the project is to establish the safety and

barrier strategy and performance requirements to all barriers for the operation phase of Goliat based on the specific risk picture on the Goliat FPSO

Participants Eni Norge

Goliat Project Operations HSEQ Dept. D&T Dept.

Professional support: SINTEF Safetec ABB

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The objective of the “In Service Safety and Barrier Strategy” is to establish an overview of all barriers in place to prevent and/or mitigate risk on Goliat FPSO, and thus be able to control risk through barrier management in daily operations.

Barrier Management Project – activity break down

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B0 Review of Pilot Project

B1 Continuos Review and

Evaluation of Main Project

B2 Verification of Detailed Barrier Networks

B3 Concepts and Definitions Related to O&O Barrier Elements

and Performance Infl. Factors

B4 Operational Indicators to Monitor Safe Operational

Envelope

B5 Consistency in Analyses and Documents; Updating of Governing Documents

B6 Method to Determine

Importance of Change in Barrier

Status

B7 Programme for Follow-Up of SIL in

Operation

Special Tasks in Pilot Project(B2, B3, B4, B5)

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Identify barrier functions by «barrier grid» technique

Barrier grids developed for all main areas: • Shows the relationship between the hazards in a specific area (i.e.

the area-specific risk picture ) and the Barrier Functions (BF) needed to prevent or/and mitigate these risks

Barrier sub-functions and barrier elements identified and recorded in spread sheets

Ref. Sintef (K.Øien)

The performance requirements and verification activities are also recorded in the spread sheets

Barrier Panel - Visualisation tool

The Goliat Barrier Panel is currently being developed by ABB (integrated in ACE)

The Barrier Panel will show the status of the barrier functions

(and hence, the barrier elements) In the area they are meant to protect (protected area)

Only the technical barrier elements will be included in the first

phase Barrier Management Project Phase II (2015-2016) will identify

indicators for organisational and operational barrier elements and include these in the panel

The Barrier panel shall be a decision support tool To be use during activity planning

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Barrier Panel – showing barrier status

Barrier status (both for areas and for the FPSO as a whole) will visualised in the Barrier Panel – to be used for planning of operational activities Use of Barrier grids; showing where in the ‘sequence of events’

that barriers are not functioning or degraded Use of area risk charts (‘operationalization’ of QRA (and EPA))

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Barrier elements and data - general

The system should, in so far as is possible, automatically harvest and present updated data

The harvested data needs to have good data quality

The system should also accommodate for some kind of manual input as this may be required for measuring the condition of operational and organisational barrier elements

The selected indicators must reflect whether a specific barrier element is degraded or not functioning

6. Rules for aggregating barrier status information

1. Individual status of all barrier elements – no aggregation beyond element level

2: Implement simple rules of aggregation at system and barrier function level – no criticality evaluations performed

3: Include criticality evaluations of the barrier elements, and define rules for aggregating this information up to system and barrier function level – no normative evaluations.

4: Add normative evaluations of the acceptability of the aggregated status.

5: Perform additional detailed probabilistic risk modelling on system or barrier function level.

Incr

easi

ngly

risk

bas

ed

Ref. Sintef

Aggregation rule set

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Below, a rule set for allocating traffic lights on a barrier element/tag level is presented: On a barrier element/tag level at least one of these observations will give a red light:

• IF PM overdue > ½ PM interval, then red light 1) • IF CM notification open OR overdue, AND priority in SAP = high, then red light • IF condition monitoring alarm = Failure (> 750), then red light • IF safety fault alarm = failure, then red light • IF tag manually blocked (i.e. inhibited) or suppressed2), then red light

On a barrier element/tag level at least one of these observations will give a yellow light:

• IF PM overdue ≤ ½ PM interval, then yellow light 1) • IF CM notification overdue AND priority in SAP = medium, then yellow light • IF fault alarm = degraded, then yellow light

IF none of the above conditions are present, then barrier element/tag has a green light:

Note 1): PM also includes functional testing (FT) of the barrier elements/tags Note 2): Automatic suppression (e.g. of standby equipment) not to be included in barrier panel

www.eninorge.com

Barrier panel – lead to increased risk awareness

Use of the Barrier panel will lead to improved risk management and a joint risk awareness/understanding between the offshore and the onshore organisation: Used offshore in daily activity planning Used by the OSG (Onshore Support Group) in Hammerfest to prepare work

packages and to monitor risk and barrier status Used by TSG (Technical Support Group) and D&T (technical authorities) in

Stavanger to monitor and follow-up technical systems and performance standards

Used by onshore HSEQ to monitor and trend risk and barrier status Used by onshore management to monitor high level risk and barrier status

Training will be comprehensive. User groups identified and training packages are being developed: E-learning: Introduction Classroom; including use of scenarios On the job training, coaching

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Measuring safe operation (and lack of safety)

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Operational indicators for measuring safe operation can provide useful supplement to event indicators and barrier indicators. In addition, disabled, inhibited or otherwise non-functioning barriers may be viewed as unsafe operation.

Control deviation Regain controlPrevent deviation Mitigate accidentMitigate hazard

Lack of control

Normal operation Accident sequence

Barriers(mitigate consequences)

HazardFault/loss of control

Barriers(regain control)

Barriers(mitigate development of DSHAs)

Controls(prevent loss of control)

Accident

Prevention Control Mitigation

Inherent safety

Regular control

Loss

Operational indicators

Outside operational envelopeOperational envelopeBarrier indicators

Non-functioning or impaired barriers

Indicators forimpaired barriers

Event indicators

Summary

The Barrier Management Project has focus on linking barriers to the risk picture on Goliat in order to have more control with majors accident risk

Barrier Panel: Planning & decision-making tool, but also a risk management tool; via monitoring the barrier status over time, we get an indication on how well protected we are against major accidents

Barrier Panel to include indicators on operational and organisational barrier elements (Phase II)

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1


iSee – Visualization of risk related factors

D.E.Etterlid, ConocoPhillips

IO Conference 24.09.13

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Cautionary Statement

The following presentation includes forward-looking statements. These statements relate to future events, such as anticipated revenues, earnings, business strategies, competitive position or other aspects of our operations or operating results. Actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is expressed or forecast in such forward-looking statements. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve certain risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to predict such as oil and gas prices; refining and marketing margins; operational hazards and drilling risks; potential failure to achieve, and potential delays in achieving expected reserves or production levels from existing and future oil and gas development projects; unsuccessful exploratory activities; unexpected cost increases or technical difficulties in constructing, maintaining or modifying company facilities; international monetary conditions and exchange controls; potential liability for remedial actions under existing or future environmental regulations or from pending or future litigation; limited access to capital or significantly higher cost of capital related to illiquidity or uncertainty in the domestic or international financial markets; general domestic and international economic and political conditions, as well as changes in tax, environmental and other laws applicable to ConocoPhillips’ business and other economic, business, competitive and/or regulatory factors affecting ConocoPhillips’ business generally as set forth in ConocoPhillips’ filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Use of non-GAAP financial information - This presentation includes non-GAAP financial measures, which are included to help facilitate comparison of company operating performance across periods and with peer companies. A reconciliation of these non-GAAP measures to the nearest corresponding GAAP measure is included in the appendix.

Cautionary Note to U.S. Investors – The SEC permits oil and gas companies, in their filings with the SEC, to disclose only proved, probable and possible reserves. We use the term "resource" in this presentation that the SEC’s guidelines prohibit us from including in filings with the SEC. U.S. investors are urged to consider closely the oil and gas disclosures in our Form 10-K and other reports and filings with the SEC. Copies are available from the SEC and from the ConocoPhillips website.

What to cover …

About ConocoPhillips

Background

What we set out to do

What we developed

Use and experience

Ongoing work & Further development

Questions

3

http://svgwbip93:800/

Greater Ekofisk Area

Norway UK

Teesside

Emden

Tananger

Tor

Eldfisk

Embla

Ekofisk

Germany

Ekofisk is the largest oil and gas field on the Norwegian shelf Operated by ConocoPhillips

4

6

Ekofisk

Tor Embla Eldfisk

Greater Ekofisk Area Number of people offshore: 1100-1300 Four fields in production Production: approx. 210,000 barrels oil equivalent per day Water injection: 600,000 barrels per day

The Ekofisk licence (PL018): ConocoPhillips 35.112% TOTAL 39.896% Eni 12.388% Statoil 7.604% Petoro 5.000%

Background

Is it reasonable to expect that our personnel understand the overall risk picture?

Do we really understand?

Is there room for improvement?

Objective – create solution for visualization of risk related data to improve understanding and information sharing

enable safer and better operations

Original focus at Operational HSE environment (HSE IO Centre) – currently the development also includes other environments

7

Background

Fast-track internal project – October 2012-March 2013 HSE Norway Operation (vision & spec)

IT (tools & infrastructure)

Operational Excellence (data & data preparation)

iSee was rolled out to HSE Norway Operations in March 2013

Phase 2 of iSee will be rolled out within the next weeks

The solution has been given the name iSee because

the user can see the data in a graphical interface

“iSee” can be understood as “I see” – I understand

the low letter «i» refers to our intention of creating the «iSee» app for smartphones and tablets

The «iSee-eye» represents integrated information put together to see/understand

8

What we set out to do

Create: a Web-based visual graphical interface containing

risk analysis data ongoing and planned work permits overview of barrier and deviation status and development

a system reducing the efforts and knowledge required to gather data from

different sources

a system automatically harvesting and presenting updated data (from our work tools) graphics as basis for showing data

a system having risk indicators, smart agents and tools to follow

development

a system requiring minimum resources for operation/maintenance a system which is intuitive/easy to use a system using latest tools, technology and knowhow

9

What we developed

A web based system: Harvesting data automatically

Locating data automatically on updated graphics

Converting «Current Version» plot plans and safety plot plans from dwg-/dgn- format to a format suitable for visualization automatically

Visualization of QRA data

Boat collisions data

Work Permits level 1 & 2 in real time

Barrier degradations/breaches

Deviations

Compensating measures

Manning

Development based on data shown graphically

Data shown as clickable icons

A hierarchic system where data can be aggregated

12

iSee – Installation level

13

SAP

details

«Click»

«Click»

iSee – «QRA area» level

14

“Fatal accident rate”

for QRA area A2

Other risk data also

available

Use and Experience

System rolled out to HSE IO Centre, safety advisors offshore and operational HSE personnel March 2013

Currently ~300 users – approximately 100 users every day

Used to Get overview on- and offshore

Support during assessments

Support during approval of Work Permits offshore

To be a success: A new tool needs to be better than the existing

tools/methods

Need to be easy to use and efficient

Need to have good data quality

15

Further development

Ongoing work: Develop solution for visualization of barrier

functions/systems

Develop dynamic risk- and barrier performance indicators

Develop and include «Smart agents»

Include 360 degree HD panorama photos

Include real time safety system status

Show self imposed barrier degradations

Show small leaks (below criteria)

Develop solutions showing well integrity status

Future possibilities Include plan data (look ahead)

Include risk «heat maps» connected to plan data

Include maintenance, test, inspection data

Include real time process data

Develop the iSee App

16

Thanks for your attention …

17

1


DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER DNV GL © 2014

Erik Sælen, DNV GL Safety and Asset Risk Management, Trondheim 25 Nov 2014

Dynamic risk and barrier monitoring in an operational risk management context

1

The vision and our road towards it

DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014

2

Risiko vurdering

Etablere kontekst

Fare identifikasjon

Risiko analyse

Risiko evaluering

Risiko håndtering

Monit

orer

ing og

oppfø

lging

Komm

unika

sjon o

g kon

sulta

sjon

Risiko vurdering

Etablere kontekst

Fare identifikasjon

Risiko analyse

Risiko evaluering

Risiko håndtering

Monit

orer

ing og

oppfø

lging

Komm

unika

sjon o

g kon

sulta

sjon

Risiko vurdering

Etablere kontekst

Fare identifikasjon

Risiko analyse

Risiko evaluering

Risiko håndtering

Monit

orer

ing og

oppfø

lging

Komm

unika

sjon o

g kon

sulta

sjon

Risiko vurdering

Etablere kontekst

Fare identifikasjon

Risiko analyse

Risiko evaluering

Risiko håndtering

Monit

orer

ing og

oppfø

lging

Komm

unika

sjon o

g kon

sulta

sjon

Ledelse

Plan

Do

Check

Act

The vision

DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014

The steps to get there

Systems and tools which allows for major accident evaluations

Clearly defined processes for managing major accident risk

Deep major accident risk understanding among crew

3

DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014

Barrier Management and Operational Risk Management Manual

Project example: Barrier Management and Operational Risk Management

4

INPUT USE

Technical barriers

Overdue maintenance

Corrective jobs and compensating measures/

Non-conformances

Inhibited equipment

Incidents

Operational barriers

Formal competence and courses

Emergency preparedness drills

Well control drills

Op

erat

ion

al r

isk

man

agem

ent

Bar

rier

man

agem

ent

Task planning and execution

Specific tasks and PTW/SJA/TBT

Overall work planning

Work coordination - PTW meeting

Maintenance planning

Maintenance planning and optimization onshore

Status meetings

Internal HoD morning meeting

Status meeting with shore

Morning meeting with client

Handovers

Daily drilling instruction meetings

Strategic planning

• Input during senior management planning

DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014

"Ok, we have the system in place, now what?" - A few things to have in mind

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Biased indicators will give biased information

Aggregation of indicators without losing information

False feeling of safety

The focus may shift from safe operation to the indicators themselves

The main success criteria of a KPI system is that the process to monitor, follow and make decisions based on the data is sufficiently defined

DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014

SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER

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Thank you!

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Erik Sælen [email protected] 414 70 186