Fortnight Publications Ltd.

Invoking a Miracle in the Search for Truth?Author(s): Adrian GuelkeSource: Fortnight, No. 427 (Jul. - Aug., 2004), p. 5Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25561226 .

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IFortnight JULYIAUGUST 2004

political coluimin Adriarn Guelke

INVOKING A MIRACLE IN

SEARCH FOR TRUTH? At the end of May, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy, visited South Africa on a fact-finding mission to study the process South Africa adopted to deal with the country's past. The invoking of South African experience in this area did not come out of the blue. Debate on the issue had previously been prompted by calls

made by both the chairman of the Northern Ireland Police Board, Professor Desmond Rea, and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland,

Hugh Orde, for the creation of a truth and reconciliation mechanism in Northern Ireland. Orde specifically linked his call to the issue of unsolved murders from the era

of the troubles. There are about 1,800 of these - accounting for approximately half of those killed during the troubles. Orde also was very explicit in linking the proposal to the need for amnesty so that the PSNI

would be able to close the books on the troubles. Another advantage for the PSNI is that it might help it to deliver a fresh start to policing and thus secure support for the

PSNI throughout Northern Ireland.

NEGATIVE Reaction to the idea of a Northern Irish TRC has been negative for the most part. The fact that government ministers from Tony Blair down, as well as Orde and senior figures in policing, have continued to push the idea suggests that the government intends to go ahead with some sort of NI

TRC, regardless, and that the government believes it can overcome the main objections. The most important of these include the following: * To grant amnesty to terrorists would be

morally outrageous, according to many unionists.

* The real purpose of amnesty would be to indemnify those in the police, army and government who colluded in loyalist paramilitary violence, according to republicans.

* It would be denial of the justice they are entitled to, according to some victims and victims groups.

* A Northern Irish TRC would be inappropriate at this time, as unlike South Africa after 1994 the conflict is not over.

* There was a consensus in South Africa that apartheid had been wrong. There is no such consensus in Northern Ireland and that would make it difficult for any commission to reach agreement or to secure wide acceptance of its findings.

Paul Murphy has explicitly accepted one of

these points. This is that a NI TRC could only happen once the conflict was clearly seen to be over. Murphy has also argued that there would need to be wide acceptance of the idea if such a commission

were to be established. He has suggested in addition that the operation of such a commission would have to be underpinned by a shared view of the future if its conclusions were to command support.

CONTEXT Murphy's comments make very clear the context in which the government is thinking of setting up a NI TRC. This is as part of a final, overarching deal to complete Northern Ireland's transition to a new political dispensation. This is in line with Blair's frequently stated position since October 2002 that incremental steps will no longer suffice and that the time is past for

making allowances on the grounds that this society is going through a transition. If a NI TRC was set up as part of the big deal, then clearly the government could claim that this meant that the conflict was indeed over.

As part of such a deal, it would also ipsofacto meet the requirement of acceptance by the major parties.

The calculation would be that if the DUP and Sinn Fein were parties to the proposal, they could help sell it to their parties' respective supporters. In particular, the DUP might be expected to explain to supporters outraged at the prospect of terrorists getting away with murder, that there was very little prospect in any event of a significant number of convictions for any of the remaining unsolved crimes of the troubles. Similarly, Sinn Fein could explain that the issue of collusion was being dealt

with in the independent inquiries the government had set up into individual cases, especially if the government finally agreed to an inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane.

Murphy might argue that a big deal involving the DUP and Sinn Fein might inspire an even larger measure of optimism in Northern Ireland than happened in 1998 when the Good Friday Agreement was reached. Consequently, in such an atmosphere it would be credible to speak of a shared view of the future. Lastly, the government would be able to argue that the setting up of a NI TRC was in line with international practice for dealing with the past and because of that would enhance the legitimacy of the big deal itself.

DEAL However, questions remain, besides the obvious one of whether a big deal is actually attainable any time soon. What would a NI

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TRC actually do? In South Africa, the TRC had the important function of processing applications for amnesty. In Northern Ireland, the provision for the early release of paramilitary prisoners has covered most of the cases for which there have been convictions. South African experience does not suggest that those not in gaol or at immediate risk of being sent there would

volunteer to give evidence to the TRC. The storytelling function that Murphy has referred to has already been performed by BBC Legacy series and by the publications such as Lost Lives.

Whatever the spirit inspired by agreement between the parties and the restitution of devolution, it is nearly impossible to imagine that a NI TRC could reach agreement on the causes, nature and extent of the troubles that would command support across the sectarian divide. Further, the rationalisation that was used in South

Africa to excuse all the flaws of its process, that South Africa was a poor Third World country that could not afford a longer and

more costly effort, would not be available to Northern Ireland. Further, little note seems to have been taken of the findings of opinion surveys in South Africa after the publication of the TRC's report that the process had exacerbated racial antagonisms. As Archbishop Tutu acknowledged at the time, the truth hurts rather more than it heals.

But it does not seem to matter how strong a case can be made against the setting up of a NI TRC. Such is the influence of the South African miracle on the government's thinking that the hope some of the magic of that transition might rub off on Northern Ireland seems utterly irresistible. Of course, it may fairly be argued that anything that helps to bring about the big deal is to be welcomed just for that reason. It might also reasonably be claimed that if care were taken with the remit of a NI TRC, no great harm would result from such an initiative. And it can be argued that more unpalatable steps are being considered in connection with the end game, as the controversy in the Republic over the issue of the release of McCabe's killers has underlined.

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