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The Hague International Model United Nations Singapore 2011 | VII Annual Session

of 47 | Research Report

Forum: General Assembly 1 - Disarmament and International Security

Issue: Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organisation of

the Islamic Cooperation

Student Officer: Khoo Wu Shaun

Position: Chair

Introduction

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation is the second largest international organisation in

the world after the United Nations, with 57 members. It is the concretisation of the Muslim ummah,

which refers to the entire Muslim population in the world. However, the international perspective of

Islam has taken a hit after the 9/11 attacks, where it was perceived to be a global religious war

between Islam and Christianity. This misconception still exists today in countries like the U.S.A.,

where Muslims are subject to stricter immigration checks and are more likely to be jailed under the

Patriot Act. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation has sought to rectify such a distorted public

image of their objectives, and have been relatively successful in doing so.

The impetus for greater cooperation between both organisations comes as the Arab Spring

rings the knell for dictatorships. As more people start campaigning for human rights within those

countries themselves, OIC members will feel the pressure on the contentious parts of Sharia law.

Pressure from the UN on these OIC members will be beneficial for the people and the government

in achieving a suitable compromise regarding Sharia law.

Therefore, the crux of the issue for this committee is how best to resolve issues between

both organisations that are related to global security, given that both sides remain very firm on their

divergent stances.

“Beside all this I think there was something personal, being Muslim myself who lived in the west I felt that it was my obligation my duty to tell the truth about Islam. It is a religion that has a 700 million following, yet it's so little known about it which surprised me.”

-- Moustapha Akkad

“Look at Islam in a rational manner and without demagoguery or emotion. It is the leading religion of the world with 1.5 billion followers.”

-- Zbigniew Brzezinski



Definitions of Key Terms

Cooperation

Being the most vague and tricky term in the issue to define, cooperation can be generically

defined as mutual cordial relations between the two parties involved. Especially on an international

level, we must treat the word differently from how we understand „cooperation‟ in our daily

contexts.

Cooperation should be benchmarked as part of a spectrum. That is, there are policies

which foster greater cooperation, while others go against it. Common government policies, like the

EU, are examples of close cooperation between governments. Regional organisations like the

African Union or Association of South East Asian Nations demonstrate some degree of

cooperation, but not to the extent of the EU.

Considering that this criterion for cooperation might be arbitrary, this issue should focus on

improving cooperation between the United Nations and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

Delegates should still demarcate the extent of cooperation they intend to reach using the

resolution.

United Nations

The United Nations is an international organisation that aims to achieve humanitarian and

global security goals through active negotiation and voting on policies to adopt across countries.

There are a total of 193 member states, with 15 sitting on the Security Council that decides on the

most pertinent of global security issues.

Recently, in the UN Human Rights Council, there is a clear majority of countries that are

also part of the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation. As the committee was established to look

specifically at human rights abuses, the presence of a majority of OIC members has drawn

criticism for blockading efforts to put pressure on Islamic countries to stop inhumane laws and

punishments. Almost a third of the Council are OIC members.

Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

Established on 25 September 1969 in Morocco, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

had the explicit mission of being “the collective voice of the Muslim world and ensuring to

safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international

peace and harmony among various people of the world”.

Aside from representing and protecting the interests of the Muslim community, the OIC

charter also states aims to “strengthen intra-Islamic economic and trade cooperation”, “exert efforts

to achieve sustainable and comprehensive human development and economic well-being in



Member States”, as well as to “enhance and develop science and technology and encourage

research and cooperation among Member States in these fields”.

The level of cooperation that the OIC fosters amongst member states is extensive. The

Islamic Summit, where the most highly ranked officials congregate every three years, is the

supreme authority of the OIC. In the Summit, key policy decisions and the realisation of the

organisation‟s objectives are discussed at length. The Council of Foreign Ministers meet on a

yearly basis, to ensure that the policies of all member states are consistent and in line with the

charter of the OIC. With 11 Islamic Summit Conferences and 38 Councils of Foreign Ministers

held, the degree of dialogue between nations in the OIC is extensive and would have done well in

unifying the bloc together.

Key Issues

Arab Spring and the threat it poses to the OIC

The Arab Spring ushered in an era of uncertainty with regard to the international diplomatic

stance towards Middle Eastern dictatorships. Tunisia‟s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali chose to step down,

Syria‟s Bashir Al-Assad chose to use tanks, while Abdullah of Saudi Arabia chose to appease his

people with $36 billion worth of benefits. Islam monarchies or dictatorships around the world have

become threatened by the unprecedented wave of discontent that has been marshalled into

concrete calls for revolution. The influence of Islam in these countries becomes reduced as the

revolutionaries seek secular constitutions that put an end to Sharia law crimes like apostasy.

As the governments in the OIC have a significant proportion of their population of the

Islamic faith, they have genuine fears of instability that might result from the Arab Spring fanning

up small embers of discontent into huge flames of revolution. Thankfully, most governments have

sought to reassure their Muslim populations through a variety of policy measures, rather than

clamping down harder on them.

However, the OIC has expressed vocal support for the rebels against the dictatorships in

Libya and Syria. The Secretary General, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, “conveyed his

congratulations to the Libyan people for the success of their revolution and for the triumph of their

free will and national options, wishing them success in the realization of their aspirations for

progress and prosperity.” This has been largely attributed to the Secretary General‟s Turkish

nationality. Turkey is one of the few countries with a strong Islam culture yet with an equally strong

secular constitution.

The OIC has demonstrated stewardship and consistency to its charter by choosing to

support the rebels against the most oppressive dictators in the Middle East. However, when the

domino finally falls on the more moderate countries, how OIC would react is still an open question.



Cooperation with West in combating terrorists

Ever since the 9/11 attacks stunned the entire world, there has been extreme international

scrutiny towards the issue of terrorists. Gathering information against terrorists became a top

priority for many intelligence agencies around the world – knowing where they are, what they are

planning to do, and how they are funding themselves were key tenets to preventing the terrorist

threat from materialising.

As majority of the countries where terrorist groups have bases have a significant population

of Muslims, the OIC plays a strategic and crucial role towards curbing the international terror

threat. The OIC has already demonstrated their commitment through their stance on terrorism in

the OIC Ten Year Programme of Action adopted by the Heads of State and Government in 2005.

In their press release regarding the 10th anniversary of 9/11 that the OIC was in the “firm position of

condemning terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and to underscore that terrorism is a

repugnant malady that seeks to destroy the fundamental ethos of humanity.”

Prior to the Arab Spring, the U.S.A. and U.K. governments relied on connections with the

Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon for information regarding the insurgents‟ movements in the

Middle Eastern region. However, as the Arab Spring has toppled previous governments, the

Western world has lost a key source of information regarding the terrorist network in the region.

Additionally, after the death of Osama bin Laden and Atiyah Abd Al-Rahman, Al Qaeda has

struggled having lost their iconic leader and his capable deputy. They have gone even further

underground and have shifted bases to avoid detection.

Members of the OIC that are suspected to have illegal terrorist training camps on their

lands include Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Enlisting the help of the OIC would mean greater

diplomatic pressure on these governments, as well as better synchronisation of border policies of

the countries bordering these afflicted countries. This would contribute to a more cohesive and

effective policy against terrorism. Over and beyond this, sharing of vital intelligence will play a key

role in predicting and eliminating terrorist threats before they fully materialise. Hence, UN

cooperation with OIC with regard to dealing with terrorism is an important issue delegates must

tackle.

Islamophobia and the rising tensions associated with it

Islamophobia is the irrational fear and prejudice against Muslims or the religion of Islam as

a whole. In the U.S.A., the term was widely used after Al Qaeda stepped forward to claim

responsibility for 9/11, and called for a jihad against the Western powers. In the EU, particularly in

Western Europe, the term was used to describe the resentment of the rapidly growing Muslim

population, which was due to both immigration and fertility rates. This resentment has sparked off

several cases of unwarranted suspicion and violence against Muslims.



After the 9/11 attacks, hate crimes in the U.S.A. against immigrants from the Middle East

increased dramatically from 354 attacks in 2000 to 1501 attacks in 2001. In April 2008, 148 Muslim

graves in France‟s biggest WWI cemetery were desecrated, with a pig‟s head and slogans

insulting Islam being drawn on their graves. On 10 July 2005 in the U.K., Kamal Raza Butt went to

purchase cigarettes at a shop, when some youths asked him to give them his cigarettes. When he

refused, they called him „Taliban‟ and punched him onto the ground. He died later due to additional

injuries sustained from falling down from the punch, but this is likely to be directly related to the

assault on him. This was an act of Islamophobia, where the undercurrents of unhappiness swell

and burst out in seemingly isolated incidents of verbal and physical abuse of Muslims living in

other countries.

Delegates must be aware of the increasing trend of Islamophobia in the U.S.A. and Europe,

and this runs contrary to the need for global cohesion. These tensions must be addressed and

mitigated to prevent it from growing and destabilising relations between the Western nations and

the Muslim countries.

Timeline of Major Events

Date Description of Event

October, 1945

United Nations charter was ratified by the 5 permanent members of

the Security Council and a majority of the 46 signatories, signalling the

birth of the United Nations

September, 1969

Leaders of Muslims leaders met in Rabat, Morocco, to sign onto the

Organisation of the Islamic Conference charter, signalling the birth of

the organisation

October, 1975 Resolution 3369 by the 30th United Nations General Assembly grants

the OIC an observer status.

November, 1980

Resolution 35/36 marks the start of collaboration between UN and

OIC, where the General Assembly requests the Secretary General to

report on “ways and means of further strengthening co-operation”

November, 1999

After 27 resolutions passed on promoting cooperation between the

OIC and the UN, the General Assembly passes resolution 54/7 which

recognises the success of the measures promoting cooperation

between both organisations.

July, 2006 The first general meeting on cooperation between representatives of

the secretariats of the UN and OIC was held. Many specific issues



were discussed, including the economy, education, and technology.

May, 2008

The Secretary Generals of the UN and OIC met in Dakar, Senegal.

Both discussed the peace talks between Chad and Sudan, as well as

the Islamophobia issue.

Evaluation of Earlier Attempts at Resolving the Issue

With over 25 resolutions on promoting cooperation between the UN and the OIC passed in

the General Assembly, the degree of cooperation between both organisations are good and well-

supported by the majority of the countries in the UN. This establishes a good foundation for

delegates to build on.

Attention should be paid to the General Meetings on Cooperation that are held biennially,

as these are much extensive forms of cooperation than the earlier resolutions have recommended.

These meetings discuss cooperation on the secretariat level, pushing beyond mere cordial

diplomatic ties and exchanging information and advice over issues like education and the

economy.

However, the primary weakness of these earlier forms of cooperation is there has not been

any real attempt at tackling the meatier issues of cooperation – they have not engaged extensively

in human rights or diplomatic cooperation on terrorism. The OIC still acts very much for Muslim

interests but this may sometimes run counter to global humanitarian and security interests. In

these circumstances, the UN will have to exert pressure on the OIC to mediate its stance.

However, given that both organisations have yet to truly discuss this issue, it is unlikely that this

pressure will be effective in pushing OIC to adopt a more moderate stance.

Possible Solutions

As this is the committee discussing issues of global security and disarmament, delegates

must focus their resolution on high-level talks and discussions that aim to promote such security.

Potential issues between the two organisations regarding global security have been listed earlier

under “Key Issues”.

Cooperation on an international level between competing diplomatic interests often comes

in the form of pacta sunt servada, which is the implicit agreement to follow a certain agreements

despite the fact that it is non-binding. This often comes in the form of treaties and bilateral

agreements signed between governments, where it is in both parties‟ interests to keep to the terms

of the agreement. Trust underpins this practice, but must be built up over time before it can be truly

effective.



Therefore, building trust between the two organisations will be crucial towards breaking

down the barriers. The UN can provide the OIC with a larger role to play in negotiating with the rest

of the world, through observatory status in certain committees. The OIC can work with individual

UN agencies when providing developmental aid to OIC members, which would improve political

goodwill.

Taking a united stance on the three potentially divisive yet crucial issues will also make it

easier for the OIC and UN to align with each together on the international platform. To date, the

OIC has taken a very firm stance towards the issue of Islamophobia, while many Western nations

have derided it as a concealed blasphemy law. The UN can act as a platform to negotiate and

reconcile the differences between the two parties, and forge a plan that will tackle the concerns of

both.

Expanding on the current framework of cooperation between the UN and the OIC will help

to facilitate more opportunities for dialogue between both organisations. Greater recognition of the

OIC and its importance will also go a long way in establishing better relations between the two

organisations. This will also aid international efforts in toppling dictators and ensuring that the

country is allowed to flourish thereafter. The OIC and its extensive influence in these regions will

be vital towards convincing other Muslim countries to support these fledgling countries as they step

out of the shadows of their previous regime.

For this issue to be successfully debated, delegates must thoroughly research their country

stances and stick to it reasonably. Compromises are realistically difficult to achieve in the UN, and

this should not be otherwise in a model UN conference. Striking the right balance between

compromise and self-interest will be crucial for the resolution. Hence, all delegates wishing to write

a resolution on this must strike a deal with both the Western nations and OIC countries before they

can be considered to have been successful. By extension, blocs should seek to further their own

interests as far as it is diplomatically possible.

All delegates, however, should still strive towards achieving a reasonable compromise that

will be a step forward in improving cooperation between the UN and the OIC.



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Issue: Preventing and combating activities related to the illicit brokering

of chemical materials

Student Officer: Annika Winsnes

Position: Deputy Chair

Introduction

The illicit brokering of chemical materials is a perennial threat to global security. When the

brokering of chemical materials is not adequately controlled, international criminal activities related

to arms trafficking are facilitated and conflicts are prolonged. Several investigative reports such as

the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda: Interim Report reveal that weapons-

related proliferation through illicit brokering makes international peace and security, sustainable

development, and humanitarian efforts much more difficult. Some chemical materials can be

extremely unstable and dangerous, and are used as chemical weapons to inflict death or harm to

human beings. Chemical weapons are classified under categories, depending on how they affect

the human body. These include choking, blister, blood, and nerve agents. Chemical weapons are

considered Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and fall under the category of Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) weapons and technologies. Although the general

proliferation of chemical materials is a pressing issue, illicit brokering, specifically, is a key problem

of the international arms trade. Brokers are responsible for the transfer of chemical materials as

they facilitate and conduct their movement. Without the work of the brokers, these materials would

not be able to be accessed by the second party of the trade, as the broker plays the role of the

middleman. Hence, the international trade of chemical materials relies on brokers, whom

contribute to chemical material proliferation, which will cause detrimental consequences.

It has come under the realization of nations that arms brokering must be strictly controlled

in order to prevent illicit weapon proliferation. Through international arms brokering and the

knowledge of brokers, state and non-state actors can illegally acquire weapons, such as chemical

materials. The proliferation of CBRN weapons and technologies, especially chemical materials

used to create such weapons and technologies, to unreliable, unstable, and undemocratic nations

exacerbates the risk that these materials may quickly fall into the wrong hands, such as those of

independent criminal or terrorist organizations. This will jeopardize international peace and security

and lengthen conflicts, which will consequently hinder sustainable development. Currently, the

main challenge with the issue of the illicit brokering of chemical materials is to identify the gaps of



existing national laws, discover effective measures to tackle unregulated or poorly regulated

brokering, and to build collective political will to take action regarding this issue.

Definition of Key Terms

Brokering

Brokering is the activity of facilitating a business transaction between two or more partners.

Brokers may not necessarily be in possession of the goods that they are trading. Brokers ease the

movement of items from one place to another, and provide applicable information and an important

network of contacts. These aspects of brokering make it difficult to clamp down on illicit brokers as

they can avoid regulations related to brokering of chemical materials in foreign nations, and they

are not directly involved in the trade of chemical materials. Brokering allows goods to reach

markets that would have had problems accessing these goods without the action of brokering. This

aspect can thus lead to conflicts as a result of illicit brokering in developing nations that are not

trusted to hold chemical materials.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is a chemical, biological, or radioactive weapon that can

cause major death and destruction. In 1948, the UN defined WMD as “atomic explosive weapons,

radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any other weapons

developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the

atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.”

Dual-use product

A dual-use product is an item that normally has a civilian use, but could also potentially be

used for military purposes. For example, ventilation filters can be used in pharmaceutical

laboratories for the production of life-saving drugs, as well as in the production of biological

weapons. Another example of dual-use products is protective suits, which can be used by

firefighters who battle chemical fires, but also by individuals who produce chemical weapons. Dual-

use products make the issue of illicit brokering much more difficult to combat because the final use

of the good can only be determined by the end-customer.

Chemical weapon (CW)

A chemical weapon (CW) is a device that uses chemicals, and is made to cause death or

harm to human beings. Chemical weapons are classified as WMDs and have been “condemned by

the civilized world.” A chemical weapon is not classified as a conventional weapon, as the main

purpose of a conventional weapon is destruction. Chemical weapons depend solely on the specific

properties of the chemical agent, which has been converted from a chemical material into a



weapon. For example, a lethal substance can be used in warfare to injure an enemy or prevent

use of an area of land. Several nations hold sizable stockpiles of chemical materials converted to

weapons, held for the potential of war use. Once terrorist and criminal organizations acquire

chemical agents, they can easily utilize them to produce explosive devises, without a great amount

of specialist education.

Chemical warfare (CW)

Chemical warfare (CW) is the usage of toxic properties of chemical materials as weapons.

Chemical warfare is separate from nuclear warfare and biological warfare.

History

Use of chemical weapons

Chemical weapons have been used in history for

almost 2,000 years. The first full-scale use of chemical agents

as chemical weapons was during World War I. Official data

states that roughly 1,176,500 non-fatal casualties and 85,000

fatalities were caused specifically because of chemical warfare

substances used during the First World War. Despite the

provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty, chemical weapons

were still used by the Imperial Japanese Army during World

War II. Other occasions of chemical warfare include the Cold

War and the Vietnam War, where Agent Orange was primarily

used. Chemical weapons used by Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, caused vast

Iranian casualties. Firms in the Netherlands, United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom,

and France allegedly aided in developing these chemical weapons.

Commencement of demilitarization

The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other

Gases, and the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, also known as the Geneva

Convention, was signed on June 17, 1925 and implemented into International Law in

Geneva. This treaty declares that biological and chemical weapons are condemned by the

civilized world. Next, was the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, or the Chemical

Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. The CWC prohibits the production, stockpiling, and

use of chemical weapons. Thus, the main obstacle and modern approach to stop the use of

Victims suffering from the effect of herbicide Agent Orange used by American forces in the Vietnam War to expose enemy trails



chemical weapons is to combat activities related to the illicit brokering of chemical

materials.

Key Issues

Weakness of national control

One main issue with ending illicit brokering is the weakness of national control over

brokering of chemical materials. Shockingly, over two-thirds of states, including Egypt, Iraq,

Libya, Syria, and Vietnam, have not established a national legal framework to control forms of

arms brokering. Furthermore, many national controls that already exist are too weak, due to

major loopholes in these regulations. Without monitoring brokers, states become more

vulnerable to the influx of weapons and the potential of violent conflict. The powerless

provisions let arms brokers manipulate gaps in the laws and regulations that restrict their

activities and services. Arms brokering is a difficult activity to control as brokers may not

actually retain the arms themselves, and brokers are not always paid monetarily. Brokering can

also occur from country to country, making it very difficult for governments to implement

policies that prevent export control violations occurring outside of their domestic jurisdiction.

Major loopholes in national regulations

There are several loopholes in national regulations of brokering of chemical materials, and

arms in general. Firstly, several national regulations do not supervise brokers who arrange

trades domestically from one location, but whose actual arms transfers occur in other

countries. National regulations also don‟t ensure that brokers are registered and controlled

by strict requirements and penalties in order to monitor the activities of brokers. Another

issue is that national regulations fail to control brokering in foreign countries that is

conducted domestically by national citizens and licensed companies. National governments

also do not monitor the financial and transport services that are involved in the process of

arms brokering. Lastly, corruption is very detrimental to the implementation of these

national regulations. When national regulations are weak, corrupt government officials are

able acquire authorization to broker arms deals with the aid of independent brokering

companies.

Identification of goods

Another important problem in tackling the illicit brokering of chemical materials is the

identification of goods. The identification of goods relates to the issue of dual-use products. The

monitoring of dual-use brokering of chemical materials presents numerous challenges. Several

countries, as well as major global arms manufacturers have placed regulations on the production

and export of arms, which restricts brokering activities. However, the issue is that a broker of dual-



use goods, such as chemical materials, can evade such regulations because of the dual-use

properties of the traded product. An issue that often arises regarding this aspect of combating the

activities relating to illicit brokering of chemical materials is the argument of a free market.

The general challenge of the controllability of these products is their identification. For

example, chemical materials could be used for industrial solvents or to produce a chemical

weapon. Thus, it is very difficult for governments to regulate the brokering of materials that have

dual purposes, and identifying their real purpose. However, the CWC has set aside some

guidelines differentiating three kinds of chemical materials. The first group is Schedule 1

substances, which are chemicals that can be used in the direct production of chemical weapons,

such as mustard and nerve agents. Schedule 2 substances are the same as Schedule 1

substances, but may be legitimately manufactured in small quantities for purposes not related to

chemical warfare. Schedule 3 substances are different in that they may be legitimately

manufactured in large quantities and have several purposes that are not related to chemical

warfare. Smaller companies who may not have systems in place to monitor the security and safety

concerns of their products may be unaware that their products may be used for other purposes,

such as for military application. Additionally, the broker himself may not even be conscious of the

dual-use of the product he is trading, as he does not engage in its production, does not have much

knowledge of its capacities, and may be working from another country. Thus, the limitation of dual-

use export control is due to lack of knowledge or ignorance.

Examples and cases of dual-use products

There are several chemical materials that

have dual purposes and applications and

are related to the issue of the illicit

brokering of chemical materials. Firstly,

the products: glass-lined reactors, heat

exchangers, and pumps have lawful

commercial uses; they can also be used

in the production of CW agents. For

example, it was revealed on a WikiLeaks

document that the United States had

warned India that Syria was attempting to buy dual-use products from two Indian firms on

December 12, 2008. These products could have been used to make chemical and

biological weapons. These products were glass-lined chemical reactor vessels, heat

exchangers, and pumps, and they were purchased from two Indian firms named, Goel

Scientific Glass Works and Garg Scientific Glass Industries. The document sent to India

The effects of ammonium nitrate at Mumbai Blasts of 2011



stated, “We are concerned that the equipment in question is intended for, or could be

diverted to, Syria‟s CW program.”

Another example and case of a dual-use product is ammonium nitrate. Ammonium

nitrate is a chemical material that can be used as a fertilizer and as an explosive

substance. The Indian government declared fertilizers with more than 45 percent of

ammonium nitrate as explosive substances. Thus, terror groups have often used the

chemical material of ammonium nitrate to make bombs, which have caused destruction in

New Delhi and Mumbai over the past few years. Traces of ammonium nitrate were found

from the bombsites at Zaveri Bazar, Opera House, and Dadar, in 2011. A notification of the

Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) in India said “…the central

government hereby declares that Ammonium Nitrate or any other combination containing

more than 45 percent of Ammonium Nitrate by weight including emulsions, suspensions,

melts, or gels shall be deemed to be an explosive,” Following the 2011 Mumbai Bombings,

the Indian government has resolved to restrict the free movement of ammonium nitrate so

as to prevent the use of the substance as an explosive by terrorist groups. These examples

prove that chemical materials have dual purposes and that the illicit dual brokering of

chemical materials can lead to severe consequences.

Major Parties Involved and Their Views

Australia Group

The Australia Group (AG) is an informal group of countries that was established in 1985 in

order to help member nations to evaluate their exports to prevent the proliferation of chemical and

biological weapons. AG synchronizes national export control measures, which helps its member

nations to fully satisfy its obligations underlined by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as

well as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention as all of its members are parties to these

conventions. The Australia Group holds a meeting every year to discuss methods to improve the

national export licensing measures of its members in order to stop potential proliferators from

gaining access to chemical or biological materials for weapon programs. As AG is an informal

forum; its participants do not have any legally binding obligations to the group, but it works simply

as a collection of nations working towards a common CBW non-proliferation goal. Members of AG

require licenses for the export of particular dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing

facilities, equipment and related technology, and animal and plant pathogens. This list of items is

known as AG‟s “common control lists” that are created during consultations of AG, and they are

regularly updated to guarantee efficiency. Essentially, the creation of these national export-

licensing mechanisms reinforces the non-proliferation goals outlined by the CWC, which the

member nations are obligated to reach. Finally, Australia Group promotes the trade of chemical

materials that have valid and pacific intentions.



United Nations (UN)

Recently, the United Nations has pushed for action against illicit arms brokering. The UN

has demonstrated its support on the issue of illicit brokering of chemical materials through UN

Security Council Resolution 1540 and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/67. Further

UN support on the issue was also shown in December of 2008, when the General Assembly

acknowledged that illicit brokering activities include materials, equipment, and technology that

could play a part in the proliferation of WMD and their transportation, and not only conventional

arms. However, the UN General Assembly also realizes that these efforts to combat illicit brokering

activities should not harm the arms trade that is authorized. Also, international cooperation of

materials, equipment, and technology that is performed for peaceful reasons should not be

undermined. There is an inability of the UN to come up with a sufficient punitive measurement

concerning illicit brokering, and only cooperates with the Organization for the Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons to implement the CWC.

European Union (EU)

The European Union (EU) believes that it is crucial that it creates a consistent program to

help states carry out actions to combat the illicit brokering of international arms transfers. The EU

does not support illicit brokering as it poses security risks and makes it more difficult for the EU to

reach human rights and development goals. Action that the EU has taken to address and combat

this issue includes a Common Position that was adopted in June 2003. The Common Position

focuses on the regulation of arms brokering to create international assistance programs with

suitable laws and practices. The EU Common Position obliges member states to evaluate

applications for brokering transactions according to the guidelines of the EU Code of Conduct on

Arms Exports. Due to inadequacies of the EU Code of Conduct, the EU has engaged in efforts to

improve its criteria, such as including respect for international humanitarian law. Hence, the EU is

on its way to improving its arms control systems and making national systems of other states

coherent with international law.

The EU also has a strict export control regime that facilitates the combating of illicit

brokering of chemical materials. Under this regime, items that are controlled must have an export

authorization in order to leave EU customs territory. Brokering services that trade dual-use items

must also undergo added restrictions. Dual-use items may be transferred freely within the EU,

except for specified controlled dual-use items. This list of controlled items is based on control lists

from international regimes on export control, such as Australia Group and the Wassenaar

Arrangement. The EU is generally strict on export control and realizes the dangers of illicit

brokering of arms and arms-related materials, such as chemical materials.

United States (U.S.)



The United States is very active on the issue of illicit arms brokering of chemical materials.

The U.S. is currently destroying its stockpile of chemical agents, and has already eliminated more

than 25 percent of its supply. Declared in 1996, the law on arms brokering of the U.S. has

widespread conditions to regulate not only arms brokering within the US by foreign nations, legal

residents, and companies, but also to control brokering conducted by US nationals, legal residents

and companies in a foreign area.

The United States Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) is an agency that safely stores,

treats, and disposes of chemical weapons. By doing this, the agency enhances national security,

and ultimately eliminates U.S. chemical warfare material. The CMA demonstrates the support and

cooperation of the U.S. in tackling the issue of illicit brokering of chemical materials.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the body responsible

for the implementation of the CWC. The OPCW is an independent international organization that

has an operational association with the UN, and has 188 member states. This organization‟s

obligations are to achieve the intentions of CWC, monitor the implementation of its conditions, and

to create a forum for member states for collaboration. The OPCW‟s specific divisions conduct

inspections and make decisions on resolving various matters. One main aspect of OPCW‟s work is

demilitarization, as the obliteration of chemical weapons is a key obligation according to the CWC.

Other aspects include non-proliferation, assistance and protection from the threat of chemical

weapons, international cooperation for the peaceful use of chemistry, universal cooperation on the

obligations of the Convention, and national implementation.

Timeline of Relevant Resolutions, Treaties and Events


June 17, 1925 Signing of the Geneva Convention

December 3, 1984 UN SC Resolution 1540

July 12, 1996 Establishment of the Wassenaar Arrangement

April 29, 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (when convention became

effective)

April 29, 1997 Formation of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

May 5, 2009 EC Dual-use Regulation 428/2009

August 22, 2010 UN GA Resolution 63/67



Evaluation of Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue

With regards to international attention, there

have been no major outbreaks concerning arms

brokering. Nevertheless, the international

community has made attempts to address the

issue. Firstly, UN Security Council Resolution 1540

in April 28, 2004 was created to “deter, detect,

prevent, combat illicit trafficking and brokering

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) weapons,

means of delivery and related materials” through

national regulation in alignment with international

law, border controls, improving law enforcement, and international cooperation. However,

subsequent UN SC Resolutions regarding nuclear-non-proliferation have not mentioned brokering.

Resolution 1540 was a step-forward on controlling international export, and it was also the first

time that the brokering of dual-use goods had been addressed in an international forum. The

mandates in Resolution 1540 have forced states to work on their legislations and to implement

export control procedures for WMD-related materials and technologies. Further action against illicit

brokering was taken on the 12th of January 2009 by the United Nations General Assembly in

resolution 63/67. Resolution 63/67 calls on Member States to “establish appropriate national laws

and/or measures to prevent and combat the illicit brokering of conventional arms and of materials,

equipment and technology that could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

and their means of delivery.” Resolution 63/67 was a major breakthrough on this issue as the

concept of brokering was finally internationally addressed.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an agreement among nations regarding the

control of arms, which forbids the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. The CWC

has 188 parties, as of August 2010. The ultimate aim of the Convention is the destruction of all

chemical weapons. The CWC can be viewed as a general success in terms of demilitarization as

around 60% of the stockpile of chemical weapons has been destroyed by July 2010. The

convention requires regular evaluations and investigations on the production and use of chemical

materials and weapons.

The Wassenaar Arrangement is an export control regime for arms and conventional dual-

use products. In December 2002, member states of the Wassenaar Arrangement approved of the

consideration of the registration, licensing, and sharing of information regarding brokers. The

following year, a more comprehensive guide for authorizing arms brokering activities was issued.

Individual member states are responsible for the implementation of the mechanisms of the

States party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) The lighter areas indicate parties that have declared that they possess stockpiles of chemical weapons or if they have known facilities that produce chemical weapons



Wassenaar Arrangement. Therefore, the collective proficiency of the Wassenaar Arrangement is

difficult to observe.

In conclusion, most nations undergo several binding legal obligations related to the

prevention of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and take measures that

promote the security and protection of sensitive materials. These programs, resolutions, and

conventions have addressed the issue of the illicit brokering of chemical materials, but they lack a

unified and international approach to the issue of brokering and dual-use materials.

Possible Solutions

A comprehensive approach to this issue is essential in order to tighten the major loopholes

in systems responsible for controlling illicit brokering of chemical materials. The illegal arms trade

and the brokering of dual-use products have two sides that include the supply side and the

demand side. The supply side is the side that produces these dual-use products, while the demand

side is the side that delivers these products to the illegal destinations or end customers. The most

effective approach to this issue would be to control the final customers of dual-use products.

Controlling the supply side for dual-use products is virtually impossible, as the production of

legitimate goods cannot be prevented, and it is extremely difficult to control the availability of these

products through stockpile management, and marking and tracing to the origins of production.

An important step in controlling the final customers of dual-use products is research.

Background information of potential customers of these products as well as the multiple uses of

these products is essential. Next, an international legal framework is vital in order to fill the gaps in

export control regulations. Thus, a common framework could be imposed internationally, with

minimum and universal requirements. These requirements could include having a consistent

definition and identification of brokers and the activity of brokering. Furthermore, these illegal

brokers should be brought to justice based on a common legal system and this uniform definition.

Furthermore, standardized measures for controlling traders and dealers, as well as common

criteria, should be used when assessing the implementation of these regulations. In order to

ensure effectiveness of these frameworks, sanctions could be imposed on nations if they actively

promote or use chemical weapons.

Ending the illicit brokering of chemical materials is the key step to solving the issue of

proliferation of chemical weapons. However, loopholes in national regulations, as well as dual-use

items are preventing the resolution of this issue. This illicit brokering of chemical materials presents

a great amount of threat to the stability of states that are more vulnerable to the influx of weapons

and the eruption of conflict, made violent through arms brokering. Although there has been an



increase in international attention regarding this issue, it has been insufficient. In order to solve this

issue, legitimate brokers need to be distinguishable from illicit brokers, but there is a lack of an

international framework that has the capability to carry this out. The illicit brokering of chemical

materials is a complicated but necessary aspect of arms proliferation to combat.

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Appendix

I. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/EU_background_papers/EU_BGP_05.pdf

II. http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/conferences/pdf-conf765.pdf

III. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2887.pdf

http://www.unidir.org/pdf/EU_background_papers/EU_BGP_05.pdf

http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/conferences/pdf-conf765.pdf

http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2887.pdf



IV. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2888.pdf

V. http://www.unidir.org/bdd/fiche-activite.php?ref_activite=437

VI. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/cw/cwindex.html


Issue: Creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Indian Ocean

Student Officer: Saahil Bhargava

http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2888.pdf

http://www.unidir.org/bdd/fiche-activite.php?ref_activite=437

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/cw/cwindex.html



Position: Deputy Chair

Introduction

Since the detonation of the first atomic bomb in 1945, nuclear weapons have been the

most ominous threat that nations have had to deal with. Although none have been detonated since

the two bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear deterrence has hung over the world like a

noose around one‟s neck, dominating the Cold War as a frightening yet influential idea which filled

the world with trepidation while it discouraged the usage of nuclear weapons. However, in the

1960s, it dawned upon nations that establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) would be a

progressive step towards decreasing the amount of nuclear weapons being deployed, and from

1961 onwards, different regions of the planet (and beyond) were made NWFZs through signed and

ratified treaties. The establishment of a NWFZ would reduce the chances of the spread of nuclear

weapons, as it would be a region free of being a nuclear threat. In 1970, the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) first came into being, and it advocated for the containment and possible

end to development of nuclear weapons.

Today, 189 nations have signed the NPT, and the establishment of an NWFZ in the Indian

Ocean would be beneficial to the world. The dispute lies between India, Pakistan, the United

States, and a few more South Asian countries, as a compromise has not been reached.


The Indian Ocean (and its boundaries)

The Indian Ocean is located between Africa, Asia and Australia. It is directly below India,

and includes the Arabian Sea, the Andaman Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Gulf of Aden, the Red

Sea, the Strait of Malacca and more. Therefore, an NWFZ created in the Indian Ocean would

cover all islands n the water below India, as well as on either side, potentially extending all the way

to parts of the Middle-East. However, the waters will not be considered NWFZ, as that would be a

violation of freedom of the seas.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ)

Defined by the UN as: “Any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of the

United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has

established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:



a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject,

including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;

b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee

compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.”

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

A treaty implemented on March 5, 1970, that is intended to reduce the spread of nuclear

weapons around the world. It has 189 nation parties adhering to its conditions having signed

and/or ratified it. The four most powerful nations not to have signed or ratified the NPT are India,

Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.

Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear Deterrence is a military policy that stipulates that an enemy will be deterred from

using nuclear weapons as long as he is aware that he can be destroyed as a consequence. In

other words, two opposing nuclear nations will not attack each other in fear that the other has the

means to destroy them. This policy was prevalent throughout the Cold War, and mainly deploys

intimidation and fear in its attempt to ensure that a nuclear war will not take place.

History

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones are an important part of nuclear non-proliferation. In the

1960s, with the Cold War going on, both the USA and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers in

the world, were in a period of trepidation, as a nuclear war seemed imminent. In 1961, the first

treaty was signed to ensure that Antarctica would be a NWFZ. The establishment of a NWFZ

showed that nuclear weapons could someday be diminished as a threat despite all the tension

surrounding the world. In 1967 and 1969, Outer Space, and the Latin American and Caribbean

Islands (respectively), were made NWFZs too. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was enforced

in 1970, thereby showing the UN‟s stance on nuclear weapons and their proliferation. This was

followed by the creation of a NWFZ in the seabed in 1972. At this point, aside from the Latin

American and Caribbean NWFZ, most of the zones were uninhabited.

In 1986, through the treaty of Raratonga, the South Pacific became a NWFZ. This included

Australia and many neighboring islands. By this time, India had conducted its first nuclear weapons

test and had not signed onto the NPT. 11 years later, in 1997, a new NWFZ was created in the

ASEAN region, and this included many countries from South East Asia. In 1998, Pakistan, another

country yet to sign or ratify the NPT, conducted its first nuclear weapons test. In 2000, Mongolia

became a NWFZ; in 2006, Central Asia became a NWFZ while in 2009, Africa became NWFZ.



Since 2009, no new NWFZs have been created, although there have been suggestions

about the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. Iran, a country that has

signed and ratified the NPT, is in favor of the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East, however,

there have been several issues that have prevented the creation of one, most notably the

instability in the Middle East. The creation of a NWFZ in the Indian Ocean was proposed by

Pakistan, but there have been no agreements so far. In addition, with more speculation of an

American nuclear military base in the Indian Ocean, there have been a lot of objections,

specifically from India, who wishes to pursue nuclear research rather than created a NWFZ. The

NWFZ treaty would stipulate that India must discontinue all nuclear weapon research, and would

also call for India to end all development, disarm and remove nuclear weapons from the NWFZ.

This would effectively be denuclearizing India, something that India is unlikely to agree to,

considering its neighbors and its history. A more detailed account of the key issue regarding India

and this NWFZ is in the next section.

Key Issues

The issue that sparked the need for NWFZ was the benefits of nuclear deterrence. As

mentioned before, after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the world entered a period of

trepidation, where nations, specifically the United States and the Soviet Union, were unsure of

whether a nuclear strike was imminent or not. Nuclear deterrence was a frightening concept, that

was prevalent throughout the Cold War, and this still applies today, which is why an NWFZ needs

to be created. A NWFZ would require all nations in the zone to commit to not create, develop,

trade, test or even possess nuclear weapons. It would literally embody a zone without any nuclear

weapons. That brings the next issue of nuclear powers agreeing to the establishment of a NWFZ.

The biggest issue regarding the creation of this NWFZ is the disagreement between the

nations involved. The Indian Ocean borders India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh,

Bhutan and involves Nepal too. Some of these countries are not in favor of an NWFZ.

Pakistan first proposed this NWFZ in the 1970s, following India‟s first nuclear test, called

“Smiling Buddha.” Pakistan is likely to be in favor of this NWFZ as long as India agrees to it.

Pakistan and India have had a long-lasting rivalry, and both will not sign the NPT until the other

does so. Pakistan also possesses nuclear weapons, and first tested its nuclear weapons in 1998,

after it had already proposed the NWFZ, showing that Pakistan is willing to continue its nuclear

endeavors should India not agree to a NWFZ.

India is the biggest nation that is against the creation of this NWFZ. India wants to pursue

its nuclear development, and does not want a NWFZ hindering its efforts and its deployments.

There are many reasons that could be behind this. When the Indo-Chinese War ended, India was

concerned that China might become a powerful foe. India is likely to disagree with a NWFZ that



does not include China in it too. India and China are two of the largest developing economies in

the world, and with territorial disputes still prominent today. Examples of said disputes are Aksai

Chin and parts of Kashmir, making it possible that relations between the two powerful nations

might deteriorate, to the point where even nuclear attacks could become significant threats. Both

countries have a “no first use” policy, which further depicts how nuclear deterrence would come

into play should a conflict ever arise. Moreover, India has repeatedly stressed its inclination to

pursue nuclear research, and will not agree to this NWFZ being made if it were to limit India‟s

ability to develop nuclear weapons. India is also aware of the nuclear threat that Pakistan

possesses, and judging by the frailness of the India-Pakistan relationship, an agreement is

unlikely.

The India-Pakistan conflict is the main reason why this proposed NWFZ is not progressing.

Since the formation of Pakistan in 1947, relations have been sour between the two neighboring

nations. There have been four official wars waged between them (First Kashmir War of 1947, Indo-

Pakistani War of 1965, Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Kargil War of 1998). This has led to a hostile

sentiment between the two countries, with many negative views being displayed and even people

from one country accusing the other of collaborating with terrorists to coordinate attacks. Although

an NWFZ would ultimately benefit all South Asian parties, neither one will yield while the other

hasn‟t, which brings about an unfortunate paradox.

Bhutan, the only other nation against the establishment of this NWFZ, is a supporter of

India, and believes that India has a right to pursue nuclear technology, including weapons.

Although Bhutan borders India and China, it has not shown any sign of developing nuclear

weapons. Bhutan has also signed and ratified the NPT, thereby emphasizing its stance on nuclear

technology. However, with both Bhutan and India disagreeing to the establishment of this NWFZ,

no progress can be made. Ultimately, it is up to India and Pakistan to sort out their differences and

form an agreement, as they are the biggest obstacles in the way of this NWFZ.

Another issue is the alleged presence of American nuclear weapons on an island called

Diego Garcia, located in the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia is a British owned island territory, which

the USA has been using as a military base. The United States has had a similar problem in the

past with the American Samoa Islands dispute, where it was debated whether those islands fell

under the NWFZ in the South Pacific established by the Treaty of Raratonga, or not. Mauritius has

claimed that the United States has placed nuclear warheads and submarines in the island. This

has led to speculation that nuclear warheads and submarines are stationed inside the internal

lagoon which measures 48 square miles and has a depth of 40 feet. Should this speculation prove

to be true, then it is likely that India and China will both object to the US‟s presence in the Indian

Ocean. China has important trade routes going through the Indian Ocean. And India is likely to

highlight the duplicity of the United States for requesting that India forms a NWFZ, while the United

States has placed its own warheads in the domain of the suggested NWFZ.



Major Parties Involved and Their Views

United Nations

The United Nations has defined the NWFZ and has been important in the creation of other

NWFZs. The UN has encouraged the creation of more NWFZs to reduce nuclear proliferation, and

in the past many resolutions have been debated about the creation of a NWFZ in a certain region

in the world, like the resolution debated in the General Assembly in 2004 regarding a Middle-

Eastern NWFZ. The UN has not commented on the alleged nuclear presence of the United States

in the Indian Ocean.

Republic of India

India would be against the creation of a NWFZ in the Indian Ocean because India believes

it should be allowed to pursue its nuclear research and deployments. India has not signed or

ratified the NPT, and has confirmed that it has nuclear weapons. A NWFZ in the Indian Ocean or in

a surrounding region would limit India‟s nuclear capabilities; therefore, it is highly unlikely that India

would favor one. India has, however, placed its warheads under IAEA safeguards, which monitor

India‟s nuclear weapons, although the IAEA safeguard-agreement does not fully cover all of India‟s

nuclear technology, with a lot of the military sector still unsafeguarded.

Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Pakistan would be against the creation of a NWFZ in this region for a similar reason.

Pakistan has openly declared that it would only sign the NPT if India signed it. Pakistan would be

against any form of decreasing nuclear weapons as long as its rivalry with India remains. However,

Pakistan was the first nation to suggest the creation of a NWFZ in South Asia, so if India ever

signs the NPT, and Pakistan follows, it is likely that Pakistan will push for the creation of this

NWFZ.

Kingdom of Bhutan

Bhutan, along with India, is opposed to the creation of this NWFZ as it is in support of

India‟s nuclear policies. Bhutan has not displayed any intention of creating its own nuclear

weapons though.

Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka

All four of these nations would come under the NWFZ in the Indian Ocean, and have

voiced their support of such an establishment in the past.



United States of America

The United States has always been a key player in this issue, being that it possesses one

of the most powerful nuclear arsenals in the world and that it is one of the five nations that has

signed and ratified the NPT while in possession of nuclear weapons. The United States has been

in favor of NWFZs in the past. The United States has, however, contradicted the NPT by placing

nuclear weapons in military bases in parts of the world. For example, it also claimed by Mauritius,

a member of the African Union, that the United States has placed nuclear weapons in its military

base on British Indian Island Territory Diego Garcia, located in the Indian Ocean.

People‟s Republic of China

China has been a key investor in Africa, a NWFZ, and has developed a strategic interest

there. It is likely that China would push for a NWFZ in the Indian Ocean to prevent any strategic

attacks in the event that they are imminent. In addition, with India, a powerful nuclear nation,

bordering it, China would want to diminish any chances of nuclear confrontation. China and India

waged a war against each other in the early 1960s, and China would want to decrease India‟s

nuclear capabilities to decrease any threat. China has also signed NWFZ treaties in the past, such

as the Rarotonga Treaty, and in 2002, the Chinese Foreign Minister issued a statement supporting

the creation of a NWFZ in Central Asia. China is not included in the range of the proposed NWFZ

in the Indian Ocean, but is certainly an important factor in its creation.

Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran would be in favor of NWFZ. Iran has maintained that its stance that the uranium

research facility is strictly peaceful, despite people like Mohamed ElBaradei speculating that Iran

will have nuclear weapons in the future. Iran is in support of the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle

East, and would most likely be in support of the creation of one in the Indian Ocean. However, with

Iran disagreeing with the IAEA‟s inspections, it is likely that it would change its opinion should IAEA

inspections and investigations become part of the NWFZ treaty. Iran is also theoretically under the

“umbrella” of the South Asian NWFZ, however, with a Middle-Eastern NWFZ or WMDFZ being

discussed too, it is likely that it would not be included in the treaty.

Israel

Israel has a deliberate ambiguous stance on nuclear weapons. Israel supports the

establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, and is inclined to support the creation of an NWFZ

in the Indian Ocean. However, Israel has not signed or ratified the NPT, and should speculation of

Israel possessing nuclear weapons be true, then Israel would be in direct violation of an NWFZ. It

cannot be determined what Israel would believe due to Israel‟s ambiguity on its own status on



nuclear weapons. Like Iran, Israel is technically under the “umbrella” of this NWFZ, but is likely to

not be included in the treaty.

Timeline of Relevant Resolutions, Treaties and Events


23 June, 1960 First NWFZ is established in Antarctica.

18 May, 1974 India‟s first successful nuclear test, named “Smiling Buddha.”

1975 Pakistan proposes the creation of a NWFZ in South Asia.

29 December, 1993 Pakistani Prime Minister asserts that both Pakistan and China would

agree to a NWFZ in South Asia if India also agrees.

28 May, 1998 Pakistan conduct its first successful nuclear test through five bombs

detonated in Chagai-I.

24 April, 2000 The 2000 NPT Review Conferences encourages the creation of a

NWFZ in South Asia.

2009

Mauritius claims that the island Diego Garcia, a British Indian Ocean

Territory, is holding American nuclear warheads and submarines in the

internal lagoon. Despite these claims, the United States denies this, and

no further action is taken.

Evaluation of Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue

Due to India‟s reluctance to compromise, attempts to resolve this issue have been scarce.

In 1975, following the “Smiling Buddha” test, Pakistan proposed the creation of a NWFZ. India was

against it, and despite the amount of support this proposal had, ultimately, it was unable to

progress as India, the country that would be the central focus for the NWFZ, disagreed. At that

point in time, India had just defeated Pakistan in the War of 1971, and India was more concerned

with the advancing China, who had defeated India in a war a decade ago. India wanted to pursue

its nuclear weapon research program, and therefore opposed the creation of a South Asian NWFZ.

In 1998, Pakistan became a nuclear power too, displaying this with the five successful

nuclear tests in Chagai-I. However, both Pakistan and China were in favor of a NWFZ in South

Asia. In the 2000 NPT Review Conference, India was encouraged to agree to the establishment of

a NWFZ, but to no avail. Since then, there have not been many attempts to resolve this issue, as



both India and Pakistan have failed to reach an agreement that could help the proposed NWFZ

progress.

In regards to the progression of other NWFZ‟s, there have been many successfully

negotiated treaties, such as the treaty of Raratonga that created the South Pacific NWFZ, or the

treaty of Pelindaba, that made Africa a NWFZ. These treaties were a lot easier to negotiate, as all

of these current NWFZs did not contain countries with nuclear capabilities, bar South Africa who

had actually “denuclearized” by the time this NWFZ was established. Some of the NWFZ‟s

currently proposed, like the Middle-Eastern NWFZ and the Northeast Asian NWFZ, face similar

scenarios, where a powerful country with nuclear weapons, or possible nuclear capabilities, has

hindered the progression of the establishment of a NWFZ. In the former‟s case, countries like Iran

and Israel are in support of a Middle-Eastern NWFZ, but there are disagreements amongst them

which are preventing the progression of a treaty, specifically surrounding Israel not signing and

ratifying the NPT. In the latter‟s case, the NWFZ would pertain to the Republic of Korea (South

Korea), Japan and the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (North Korea). North Korea‟s

creation of nuclear weapons has severely halted the progression of this NWFZ, and has stopped

any form of negotiations between China, Japan and the two Koreas.

Possible Solutions

A solution to this issue would be for India to agree to the creation of the NWFZ. As of now,

India opposes its creation. But if India and Pakistan were to compromise in some way, it could aid

the development of a NWFZ in the Indian Ocean.

One way to do this would be to offer India some form of incentive for agreeing to the

NWFZ. The incentive could be that India can pursue nuclear research for peaceful purposes, much

like Iran‟s uranium research. India has repeatedly stressed its interest in nuclear energy, and

therefore it is possible that if India was guaranteed the opportunity to continue a part of its

research, it could agree. Another important aspect of this issue is China, and its nuclear weapons.

India refuses to create the NWFZ partially because of the proximity of China, and the rivalry that

could spawn between the two in the future, if it has not already. If China was somehow included in

the NWFZ, then India could be persuaded to agree too. If Pakistan and China agreed to disarm,

then India is likely to disarm too.

This issue‟s significance to the world has been growing since India‟s first test in 1974. With

tensions rising between India and Pakistan, as well as a rivalry between India and China looming

ominously on the world‟s horizon, it is imperative that the UN seeks a way to create this NWFZ.

North Korea is an idea example of how a country can defy the UN and create its own nuclear

weapons, and the creation of this NWFZ would help prevent such a scenario from occurring in this

region in the future.



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Issue: Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and

light weapons

Student Officer: Khoo Wu Shaun

Position: Chair

Introduction

Forget the tanks in Syria and the missiles in Libya, because the real weapon that is causing

the most amount of deaths in these modern conflicts are not the big guns. 90 per cent of all civilian

casualties around the world annually are caused by small arms, but we often do not view them as

the largest threat to global peace and security because of their smaller perceived impact.

In countries like Somalia, Rwanda, and the DR Congo, the illicit traffic in small arms has

exacerbated the conflict far beyond its original scale. The very guns that militias in the DR Congo

use to enslave locals to mine for diamonds are the guns that arms dealers around the world are

more than happy to sell to them. Both parties are only interested in the money, and human lives

are only tools that are disposable. With such disregard for the sanctity of the human life, the United

Nations has a duty to intervene to curb the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and to

prevent such militias and dictatorships from staying in power with military oppression.


Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

In generic terms, small arms and light weapons refers to weapons designed for a single

person to use alone. In its most basic definition, rifles, pistols, and sub-machine guns are

considered to be SALW. As illicit brokers attempt to get around this narrow definition, recent

international conventions have extended this to include grenades, rockets, missiles and landmines.

However, this is an unsatisfactory definition that is still too generic and prone to abuse.



This definition is more technical and seeks to close several loopholes in earlier

conventions. Delegates should remember that the problem of definitional loopholes is a key

obstacle towards curbing illegal traffic in SALW, and a more precise, thorough definition should be

adopted as far as possible.

Illicit Traffic

As this issue talks specifically about illicit trafficking of SALW, delegates should not concern

themselves with the problems of illegal production of such weapons. However, there are cleanly

defined legislations that prohibit certain aspects of SALW trade, which the illicit trafficking

contravenes. Delegates should adopt and amend the following definitions of „illicit trafficking‟ as

part of their resolution, with a clear list of the legislations that the „illicit trafficking‟ contravenes.

Assistance to States

In many weak governments, the perennial problem of illicit trafficking stems not from

government nonchalance, but from a noxious combination of middle-management corruption and

lack of expertise. Graft is rife in many civil services in weaker governments, such as those in

Africa, compounding the problem of limited funding. A lack of expertise means that border controls

are not strictly enforced enough with plenty of loopholes for brokers to exploit. Assistance, in the

broadest of terms, must seek to rectify these contributing factors to illegal trafficking and close

loopholes that have been exploited.

“any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique small arms and light weapons or their replicas. Antique small arms and light weapons and their replicas will be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case will antique small arms and light weapons include those manufactured after 1899: (a) “Small arms” are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns; (b) “Light weapons” are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, inter alia, general purpose or universal machine guns, medium machine guns, heavy machine guns, rifle grenades, under-barrel grenade launchers and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, man portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, man portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres;

Taken from International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons

(a) They are considered illicit under the law of the State within whose territorial jurisdiction the small arms or light weapon is found; (b) They are transferred in violation of arms embargoes decided by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; … (e) They are transferred without a licence or authorization by a competent national authority.

Taken from International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons



Key Issues

There is an extensive scope of issues that comes with the question of curbing trafficking in

SALW due to its reliance on international trade and its status as a weapon. Generic solutions

clamping down on border security or weapon tracing alone will not work as these have already

been implemented. Delegates must seek much more detailed and specific solutions and visualise

how these solutions can be brought into the international platform with efficacy.

This section will cover the two largest obstacles to effectively curbing the illicit traffic in

SALW. Delegates will have to tackle both in their resolutions in order to meaningfully approach and

resolve the issue at hand.

The largest obstacle: combating illegal trafficking requires a competent border control

agency as well as a dedicated government. There are three sub-problems faced with regard to

this.

1) Enforcement by governmental agencies is realistically difficult

In order to legally import or export SALW, it must be transferred with a license or

authorisation by the government. The United States of America has the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and the United Kingdom has the UK Border Agency. Many

other countries, including France and Germany, impose strict checks on the illegal trafficking of

weapons through tough border controls.

Despite this, the 1999 UN International Study on Firearm Regulation reported that U.S.A.,

U.K. and France all have moderate levels of illegal firearm and ammunition smuggling. Sweden

had a low level of illegal trafficking while Singapore had a negligible level. Notably, both Sweden

and Singapore have more extensive gun control laws, which makes it more difficult for such

smuggling to take place.

Even with strict border controls adopted by the most developed countries in the world, they

are still unable to keep illegal smuggling of SALW at bay. This highlights that SALW trafficking is a

problem even with competent governments, and this would be an even larger issue for weaker

governments where the problem is most pertinent.

2) Middle-management graft prevents government policy from succeeding

The problem of enforcement is already a huge obstacle faced by a clean and efficient civil

service. In many African and Latin American countries, the civil service is rife with corruption,

redundancies, and incompetent staff.

A good example of this is Mexico, where massive amounts of small arms are smuggled

from the U.S.A. into Mexico, and used to reinforce the power of the drug cartels that have lived in



the country‟s shadows for decades. A source citing a Mexican government official stated that as

many as 2000 weapons enter Mexico from the U.S.A. daily and this fuels the arms race between

the competing drug cartels in Mexico. Despite the strict restrictions on guns imposed by the

government, these cartels often get away with their weapons because of the degree of corruption

that has crept into the civil service of Mexico. Genaro Garcia Luna, the top federal policemen in

Mexico, estimates that the cartels pass out over $100 million a month to local and state policemen.

Some even abet their prisoner‟s escape as in the case of the Durango state prison in July 2010.

Mid-level graft poses a significant obstacle to the successful control of these traffickers, as

they tend to be rich enough to bribe border officials to bypass security protocols that would have

revealed their weapon caches. Hence, even if the government is dedicated towards clamping

down on illegal SALW, the people executing the policy are at risk of compromising on the success

of their country‟s efforts.

3) Border security is expensive and difficult to maintain

The United States of America, which shares the controversial border with Mexico, spent 4

billion dollars in 2010 just to upkeep its border security. The European Union recently pledged to

allocate 370 million Euros to assist member states in protecting their borders. It is expensive to

maintain border security because it has to be thorough enough to prevent illegal trafficking and

immigrants, and has to be kept up non-stop. Both of these add up to the running costs of border

control that have yet to include expansion and upgrading costs to these border controls.

On the contrary, states that do not have the same spending power as the developed

countries will be more prone to arms trafficking and its associated evils. A leaked U.S.A. embassy

cable revealed that Mexico‟s border with Guatemala has only 125 Mexican immigration officials

covering the 577 miles border. To put it into perspective, the U.S.A. has 30,000 border personnel

on the 1926 miles border with Mexico. With majority of the government expenditure being spent on

combating the drug cartels, it is difficult for the government to upkeep expensive border security at

the same time.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, where annual government expenditure is only around

2 billion dollars, it is difficult to expect significant funding into maintaining and improving border

security for over 10,000 kilometres. In fact, the DR Congo has been cited as one of the most

porous in many specialised reports on the DR Congo and its spate of armed violence.

Unsurprisingly, this was one of the largest contributing factors to the length of the two Congo wars

and the Kivu conflict. In 2003, over 200 tonnes of small arms were transferred to a pro-government

armed group in North Kivu – notably this was when the Kivu conflict was ongoing. These small

arms and the porosity of the border have led to the deadliest war since World War II, with over 5.4

million people killed as a result of this war.



In these states, civil unrest continues to plague the country because of the arms that are

able to flow in without proper border control. Greater conflict leads to a greater demand for

weapons, as the individual military groups see a greater need to expand and arm their soldiers

better. This is a degenerative cycle that poses a genuine threat to the long-term peace and

security of the country.

The second largest obstacle: ammunition is the real problem – it is easier to smuggle,

harder to trace, and easily stolen.

1) Ammunition is easier to smuggle

Being smaller in size and less ostentatious in its threat to human lives, ammunition is often

overlooked despite the fact that it plays a key role in the use of SALWs. The Small Arms Survey

2010 done by Cambridge revealed that the “popularity of certain types of weapons among armed

groups corresponds to the availability of their ammunition. Conversely, reports have shown that in

some cases, lack of ammunition has prompted combatants to seek to resolve their disputes

peacefully”.

On July 2000, a seemingly legitimate shipment of five million 7.62mm cartridges left

Ukraine for Ivory Coast. The broker, Aviatrend, not only provided the Ukrainian government with an

authenticated Ivorian End-User certificate, but also allowed a Ukrainian military officer to fly with

ammunition to make sure it was not diverted en route. The plane arrived safely in Ivory Coast and

was unloaded. However, after the ammunition was unloaded, it was loaded back onto another

plane. This ammunition was then flown to Liberia and delivered to Charles Taylor‟s regime, which

was still being embargoed then.

There are two problems that this example highlights. Firstly, this illegal shipment was only

brought to light because the arms dealer handling the deal, Leonid Minin, was arrested on drug

and prostitution charges. They raided his room and found falsified documents relating to the illicit

transfer of ammunition, which sparked off the UN investigation. Despite tough measures taken to

clamp down on illicit trafficking of SALW, ammunition is a lot harder to keep track as people do not

often take them as seriously as the weapons themselves. If it were not for the sheer luck of the

prosecution of the dealer, this illicit deal would have gone unnoticed, and a dictator‟s regime would

have been fortified.

Secondly, in many countries, weapons are not as badly needed as ammunition. Small arms

are often recycled after conflicts, and have life-spans of several decades; their usefulness is

contingent on the availability of ammunition. Notably, the 7.62mm cartridges are used for guns

such as the AK-47, which is one of the most smuggled assault rifles internationally.



2) Ammunition is harder to trace

With a smaller surface area and with a comparatively shorter shelf life, arms factories are

reluctant to add costs by adding unique markings to the ammunition. They often simply provide a

factory code and a production year code. However, this is not enough as ammunition from the

same marked lot can be split up and sold to different customers. This makes it difficult to trace the

illicit broker in the chain of trade deals.

A good example of this is in Afghanistan, where the International Security Assistance

Force, primarily led by the U.S.A., is currently attempting to quell the Taliban forces. After fierce

fighting in the Korangal Valley in 2009, the ISAF soldiers retrieved and examined the ammunition

used by the Taliban fighters. Of the 30 rifle magazines taken, at least 17 contained cartridges

identical to the ammunition that the U.S.A. had provided to the Afghan government forces. Whilst

this cannot be taken to be conclusive evidence, it points to the worrisome fact that ammunition

diversion from government supplies is a huge problem. On top of this, the larger problem is the fact

that tracing this ammunition is extremely difficult especially given the rapid changing nature of such

an underground business.

If the ammunition cannot be traced, then the culprits behind the illicit trafficking of

ammunition cannot be apprehended, leaving them free to continue supplying the world‟s criminals

with ammunition without being afraid of being caught.

3) Ammunition is easily stolen

In the 2008 Small Arms Survey, it was reported that of the 200 million modern military arms

of all the countries‟ armed forces, at least 76 million could be considered surplus to requirements.

These are often stored in warehouses that suffer from weaker security and less attention than

most other military compounds. The 2010 UN Secretary General‟s report on Small Arms notes that

over 50 countries have poorly managed ammunition stockpiles, which result in “high numbers of

casualties, severe destruction to infrastructure and the environment, and disruption of the

livelihoods of entire communities”. Given that these governments cannot even ensure the safety of

their own stockpile facilities, they can hardly be trusted with making sure that the security is tough

enough to repel insurgents from stealing weapons and ammunition.

There are examples of large-scale theft of such ammunition stockpiles. Looting of military

stockpiles in Albania in 1997 occurred after the army completely disintegrated when the

government attempted to use the army to quell the uprisings. Over 520,000 SALW and 900 million

rounds of ammunition were estimated to have been lost during the rebellion. In the aftermath

invasion of Iraq in 2003, over 250,000 tonnes of SALW and ammunition are still unaccounted for.

In both cases, the chaos and pandemonium that ensues during conflicts often leads to lower levels

of security for such stockpiles, leaving them especially vulnerable to looting. With so much



ammunition and weapons at stake, it is a huge problem and oversight on the part of governments

who do not pay much attention to ensuring these stockpiles are secure.

Major Parties

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

UNODA was established in 1998 to coordinate and consolidate the international

disarmament movement. The organisation fosters disarmament measures through dialogue,

transparency and confidence-building on military matters, and encourages regional disarmament

efforts. It also functions as the central source for objective and up-to-date information on the state

of disarmament in various countries and of the world.

UNODA has both expertise and experience on the issue of international trade of arms, and

has sought to improve transparency in this area. Moreover, UNODA has significant clout in the

international community given the significance placed on the commission and the achievements it

has materialised in its short tenure of ten years. Relying on the UNODA and building on its

strengths will serve as a good platform for delegates to curb illicit traffic in SALW even further.

Small Arms Dealers

Whilst countries and international organisations attempt to curb the ever-growing illegal

trade in small arms, these brokers and dealers seek to undermine these efforts by selling more of

their weapons to warlords or dictators. They are paid well for their success in escaping the arm of

the law, but this money often comes from the government coffers that were redirected to the

dictator‟s pockets. Worst still, this money may come from the unfair exploitation of local resources

and labour.

Examples include Victor Anatoliyevich Bout, Monzer Al Kassar, and Arkadi Gaydamak,

whom use many intermediaries to avoid legal responsibility, and ship weapons to embargoed

dictatorships. Blacklisting these dealers, monitoring them more heavily, or freezing their assets

would take the battle to the dealers themselves, and force them to constantly find new ways to

hide themselves from the spotlight and increased restrictions.

Major Arms Exporters

The United States of America is the largest arms exporter in the world. Given that the

United States of America has a very firm stance that favours gun ownership, it is difficult for

authorities to clamp down on illicit trade as these can be easily claimed to be legal weapons.

However, the U.S.A. has been a supporter of curbing the illicit trade in small arms, exemplified in

its active participation and support in the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms

and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. The strength of border control has discouraged illicit brokers



from using U.S.A. as a distribution country, but there remains a severe problem in the inability of

the U.S.A. in preventing the illegal outflow of arms. The harshest criticism comes from Mexico, who

is battling against the drug cartels that are acquiring their weapons from the U.S.A.. These cartels

often send men up to the bordering states of the U.S.A. and purchase ammunition and small arms

before returning to Mexico. The ease of doing so is alarming – cartels often send people on

„shopping trips‟ for about three days to restock ammunition and arms, while a huge number of gun

shops have opened in these border states to cater to this high demand. The U.S.A.‟s reluctance to

clamp down on this issue has been a source of ire between the two countries.

Russia is the second largest exporter of arms in the world, with over $6 billion worth of

military arms and equipment being sold overseas. Majority of the small arms sold are the infamous

AKMs. Greater restrictions on the sale of arms and more regulation will result in higher production

costs for the Russian arms industry, making them reluctant to adopt such measures. However, the

issue of illegal small arms have afflicted Russia as well, and it is more likely that the government

will prioritise national stability over the arms industry. In 2001 alone, over 26,000 were arrested for

smuggling of guns and over 65,000 crimes were committed using illegal arms. Within Russia, the

problem of small arms is prevalent as separatists in Chechnya and illicit brokers are largely

capable of moving arms around in the sparse and large country.

Other significant arms exporters include Germany, France, U.K. and China. Delegates of

these countries should do extensive research into their country‟s dependence on arms exports as

part of their economy and determine the degree of resistance these countries will have against

stricter regulations on arms deals.

Countries Part of Trafficking Routes

The anarchy that has been rife in Somalia since the 1980s have created a conducive

environment for illicit brokers to transport their small arms without much regulation or attention,

making it one of the most ostentatious links in the trafficking routes for small arms. Over the past

decades, these brokers rely on the same trade routes, military supply lines, and corrupt

government officials to deliver their goods to the various dictatorships around Africa. The Gulf of

Aden in particular, often known for its piracy issues, is also a hotbed of illegal arms trading. The

other hotspots include the Bakaara Market in Mogadishu, but because of international attention,

they have shifted away to other areas. Clans that own different areas of the land compete with

each other by offering land or fishing rights to businesses if they supply them with arms to continue

with their internal fracas. The use of Somalia as a stop-over or as a destination for small arms will

continue to perpetuate the same violence and instability that the country has experienced for three

decades, and the curbing of this illicit trade will help to put it back on the right track.



Another example is Colombia. Situated at the top of the continent of South America, it

presents the most obvious land route for the transfer of small arms. However, the government has

been unable to invest and maintain its secure borders, making it an ideal destination for illicit

brokers. More than 75% of the illegal small arms trafficking in Colombia originated from outside the

country. This is commonly attributed to the lack of border control in Central America, especially

Panama, which has led to massive shipments of small arms from Central America to Colombia,

and then to the rest of South America. An estimated 50% of all illegal weapons arriving in

Colombia by sea are trafficked through Panama. These small arms subsequently move to

countries like Venezuela and Peru where they are used to support military groups.

Timeline of Relevant Treaties and Resolutions


December

1991

Resolution 46/36 on "General and Complete Disarmament", was the first

resolution that tackles the issue of illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons to

be discussed and adopted by the General Assembly. It has an extensive and

detailed list of policies that each country should adopt as part of the generic

policy of disarmament to improve global security. It is often cited as the

resolution that concretises the international disarmament movement.

November

1997

The Organisation of American States adopted the 'Inter-American Convention

Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,

Explosives, and Other Related Materials'. The treaty was a step forward as it

clearly recognised the links of such activities with drug trafficking, terrorism,

transnational organized crime, and mercenary and other criminal activities in the

region with the illicit traffic of small arms, providing strong justification and

greater support for harsher measures to clamp down on this illicit traffic.

January 1998 The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was established.

July 1999

The Organisation of African Unity, the predecessor to the African Union, adopts

the 'Decision on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation, and Trafficking of Small Arms

and Light Weapons', highlighting its commitment to combating the problem of

the illicit traffic of SALW through a variety of measures.

July 2001

The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light

Weapons in All Its Aspects culminated in the 'Programme of Action to Prevent,

Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All

its Aspects', which required states to report to the United Nations on the



progress of their implementation of the UN Programme of Action.

August 2001

The South African Development Community, including states such as the DR

Congo and Zimbabwe, agreed on the 'Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and

other related materials in the Southern African Development Community

Region'. The protocol aims to reduce small arms ownership and curb illicit

trafficking in Southern Africa, as well as the destruction of surplus state

weapons. This builds upon the earlier resolution, which highlights African

commitment towards clamping down on this illicit traffic of SALW.

June 2003

The Andean Council of Foreign Ministers adopted a very detailed treaty on the

illicit traffic of SALW called the "Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate

Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects", which includes

Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, which are afflicted by the smuggling of SALW into

their country.

December

2005

The General Assembly adopted the International Instrument to Enable States to

Identify and Trace in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light

Weapons. It is the first resolution to comprehensively and extensively tackle the

issue of identification of illicit weapons, which was a major loophole in earlier

resolutions and treaties.

November

2006

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe adopted Decision No.

7/06, 'Combating the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons by air'.

This was a crucial update to the earlier resolutions as air freight became more

accessible and affordable, causing it to grow as an alternative mode of transport

for illicit brokers. Closing the loopholes using this resolution was timely and

crucial in clamping down on brokers and their means of trafficking SALW

illegally.

August 2009

The Secretary General's report on 'Promoting Development through the

reduction and prevention of armed violence' was published, and reveals that the

illicit traffic in small arms is a significant contributing factor to ongoing conflicts

around the world.

Evaluation of Previous Attempts to Resolve this Issue

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs has been successful in pushing many

countries towards more transparency in accounting for their arms and more stringent measures in

country‟s border checks. Past efforts have already provided tight definitions for Small Arms and



Light Weapons, advised governments on various security measures to adopt, and sought to

improve inter-governmental schemes in clamping down on regional and international illicit

trafficking of small arms. The array of past resolutions will provide delegates with more details

about what has already been done.

As the nature of this issue is to recommend new measures to deal with an existing

problem, this implies that existing measures are insufficient to cope with the ever-changing nature

of the underground illicit world. Examples given in earlier sections such as Leonid Menin, Mexico,

and Afghanistan highlight the problems of small arms trafficking that need to be addressed in

countries where the governments simply cannot deal with it. With an alarmingly high number of

people still being killed in conflicts today by illegal small arms, the United Nations cannot stop until

this trafficking is curbed significantly.

A strong foundation has been already set-up over the past two decades with the work of

dedicated and persuasive UN officials. Delegates must seek to build upon the work of these

officials and combat the new problems to reduce the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons

again.

Possible Solutions

To tackle this issue meaningfully, delegates must attempt to help struggling nations to cope

with illicit trafficking by improving upon the disarmament framework that has been established over

the past two decades. As highlighted in earlier sections, the issue is not with governments refusing

to clamp down on illicit traffic of SALW, but their inability to. Delegates must be aware that funding

is not a panacea to problems – funding has to be well utilised, justifiable, and safeguarded from

graft in order to be effective. Delegates must look beyond merely funding, and do research into

specific solutions in response to the problems outlined in the section “Key Factors”, as well as to

make specific recommendations to the General Assembly as to how these may be implemented on

a larger scale.

All solutions as recommended by delegates in their resolutions must make a concerted

effort to deal with the problems as outlined in the section “Key Factors”. This section will highlight a

few successful small-scale organisations that have various measures to deal with the illicit traffic of

SALW. Delegates can seek to expand these organisations or policies for their resolutions.

The Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group is an organisation that seeks to fulfill

the goals of the UN Programme of Action through providing expert advisory to governments on

stockpile management, disposal of SALW, and the reduction of SALW in circulation. NATO has

established the Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW to tackle the problem of proliferation of weapons

during NATO missions, and to ensure that weapons and ammunition are not lost during the

conflict. The Working Group has also extended its scope to assess and train the personnel in



charge of handling SALWs in other countries to improve overall levels of security, awareness, and

competency. NATO has gone even further to establish the Peace Trust Fund Mechanism which

funds and executes policies on the disarmament of SALWs and curbing of illicit trafficking of

SALWs. To date, the mechanism has destroyed over 100 million rounds of small arms ammunition

and 310,000 SALWs, making it successful for a relatively smaller organisation handling such a

large issue.

Delegates can also look to the UNODA as their platform for reaching out to other

organisations that are involved in the fight against illicit trafficking in SALWs. The UNODA is home

to the UN Disarmament Commission and regularly assists in the organisation of the UN

Disarmament Conference. Utilising UNODA‟s clout and resources to mandate reviews of the

system on a regular basis will help in the fight against the ever-changing underground world.

Given the plethora of organisations that already exist to combat illicit traffic in SALWs,

delegates must seek to reinforce this framework by improving the efficacy of these organisations

and realigning their aims to suit the new problems that have surfaced. Only then will they be

capable and effective in helping the countries combat the illicit traffic in small arms and light

weapons.



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