interstate water dispute

8/19/2019 interstate water dispute

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NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

2015

seminar paper: natural resources and energy law

On the topic:

"Dispute over sharing of water"

Submitted to: Submitted by:

Mrs. Shakuntla Sangam Saurabh Singh

Asstt. Professor of law B.A.LL.B (Hons.)

Dr. RMLNL! Lu"know. Semester#$th

Roll no. %%& (Se"tion#B)

Submitted for the project work undertaken in the partial

fulllment of B! B #$ons% & years integrated course of Dr

'am (anohar ohiya )*+ ucknow

,age - .


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/!B0 O1 2O)/0)/S

S)O /O,32 ,!40 )O

%. !bstract '

. 3ntroduction

'. 3ndia5s 06perience *

. Bargaining and 3nvestment %

+. ,roperty 'ights+ ,olitics and 3nformation %'

*. 7ater and 3ndian 1ederalism %&

$. 'ecommendations %,

,. 2onclusion +

%-. Bibliography *

,age - 8


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!bstract

n this /a/er argue that n0ian water#0is/ute settlement me"hanisms are ambiguous an0

o/a1ue. 0istinguish anal2ti"all2 between situations where "oo/eration is /ossible! an0

situations of /ure "onfli"t! where the initial allo"ation of rights is at stake. n the latter "ase! a

sear"h for a negotiate0 solution ma2 be futile! an0 1ui"k mo3ement to arbitration or

a04u0i"ation ma2 be more effi"ient. Howe3er! in n0ia! the /ro"ess is slow! an0 effe"ti3el2

bin0ing arbitration 0oes not e5ist. 6he entanglement of inter#state water 0is/utes with more

general "enter#state "onfli"ts an0 /oliti"al issues "om/oun0s /roblems. argue that these

im/a"ts "an be re0u"e0 b2 a more effi"ient 0esign of me"hanisms for negotiating inter#state

water 0is/utes7 some of the /ossibilities in"lu0e a national water "ommission in0e/en0ent of

0ail2 /oliti"al /ressures! a fe0erate0 stru"ture in"or/orating ri3er basin authorities an0 water

user asso"iations! an0 fi5e0 time /erio0s for negotiation an0 a04u0i"ation.

3)/'OD*2/3O),age - 9


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Be"ause large areas of n0ia are relati3el2 ari0! me"hanisms for allo"ating s"ar"e water are

"riti"all2 im/ortant to the welfare of the "ountr28s "iti9ens. :ater "ontributes to welfare in

se3eral wa2s7 health (e.g. "lean 0rinking water)! agri"ulture (e.g.! irrigation)! an0 in0ustr2

(e.g.! h20roele"tri" /ower). Be"ause n0ia is a fe0eral 0emo"ra"2! an0 be"ause ri3ers "ross

state boun0aries! "onstru"ting effi"ient an0 e1uitable me"hanisms for allo"ating ri3er flows

has long been an im/ortant legal an0 "onstitutional issue. Numerous inter#state ri3er#water

0is/utes ha3e eru/te0 sin"e in0e/en0en"e. A re"ent 0is/ute o3er use of the ;amuna Ri3er

among the states of Delhi! Har2ana an0 ttar Pra0esh! was resol3e0 b2 "onferen"es in3ol3ing

three state ul2! New Delhi7 N:DA.

8 Singh! Nir3ikar! (%,,*)! ?@o3ernan"e an0 Reform in n0ia?! Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, >une.

,age -


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e5ternalities! merit goo0 features! an0 signifi"ant transa"tions "osts. 6he /resen"e of these

fa"tors means that although in"rease0 relian"e on market for"es (e.g.! one state selling water

to another) "an "ontribute signifi"antl2 to resol3ing water issues! there is no es"a/ing from

the nee0 for /arties to agree u/on a set of rules! an enfor"ement me"hanism! an0 a /rior

0istribution of /ro/ert2 rights. Pro/ert2 rights ha3e been "laime0 on the basis of histori"al

use! as well as on the basis of the ?Harmon Do"trine?! that ?what falls on our roof is ours to

use! without regar0 to an2 /otential harm to 0ownstream /arties?. Histori"al use "an work

against tra0ing water rights! while the Harmon 0o"trine ignores e5ternalities as well as /ast

in3estments "onne"te0 with water use. A thir0 a//roa"h! that of the so"ial "ontra"t a la

6homas Hobbes! hol0s more /romise. A 0eal must be stru"k among the e5isting 0e"ision#

making entities! su"h as n0ian states! whi"h %) 0e"i0es on an initial allo"ation of /ro/ert2

rights an0 ) "reates a me"hanism to tra0e these rights! to regulate uses that generate

e5ternalities! et".


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India's Federal Water Institutions:

6he rele3ant /ro3isions of the n0ian ammu an0 =ashmir! Ra4asthan! an0 Pun4ab! "entral inter3ention! too! has been unsu""essful$.

; 2er! R.R.! (%,,b) ?n0ian Fe0eralism an0 :ater Resour"es?! Water Resources Development ! %-! !

%,%#-G 2er R.R.! nter#State :ater Dis/utes A"t %,&+7 Diffi"ulties an0 Solutions! CP:! ol. '*!

No. $ (>ul. %'#%,! --)! //. ,-*#,%-.


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n summar2! an unambiguous institutional me"hanism for settling inter#state water 0is/utes

0oes not e5ist. Ne3ertheless! water 0is/utes are sometimes settle0. C"onomi" anal2sis is

ne"essar2 to illuminate whether an0 how water 0is/utes get resol3e0 in n0ia.

3ndia5s 06perience

6he nter#State :ater Dis/utes A"t seems to /ro3i0e fairl2 "lear /ro"e0ures for han0ling

0is/utes. At the same time! howe3er! the law /ermits "onsi0erable 0is"retion! an0 0ifferent

0is/utes ha3e followe0 0i3erse /aths to settlement! or in a few "ases! "ontinue0 0isagreement.

n this se"tion! 0is"uss some of the ma4or 0is/utes.

6he "entral go3ernment has gi3en substantial attention to water 0is/utes! whi"h beganto emerge soon after the framing of the =.>. Biksham @u44a! Suhas Paran4a/e an0 Shruti is/ute !:ater


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be"ame an autonomous regional ri3er 3alle2 0e3elo/ment "or/oration. 6his la"k of "lear

0elegation of authorit2! awa2 from /oliti"ians! is another theme to whi"h we shall return.

n or0er to gi3e a better fla3or for the nature of the bargaining /ro"ess! we briefl2 0is"uss

three "ases7

(%) 6he =rishna#@o0a3ari water 0is/ute

() 6he


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6here has been a basi" 0ifferen"e between 6amil Na0u on the one han0 an0 the

"entral go3ernment an0 =arnataka on the other in their a//roa"h towar0s sharing of u0i"ial Falla"2! Mr. Naresh Pareek! Manu/atra.

.; bi0.

,age - .?


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0ifferent nion Ministers of irrigation. So! "onse"uti3e o""asions when the same set of

ministers from the same state an0 the "enter met were rare.

) 6he ministerial meetings were hel0 at regular inter3als! but no attem/t was ma0e to

generate te"hni"al o/tions to the sharing of


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Bargaining and 3nvestment

:hen the essential /roblem fa"e0 b2 states or grou/s within a state is that the initial

allo"ation of water is subo/timal 0ue to "hanging "ir"umstan"es! "oo/erati3e bargaining will

lea0 to an o/timal allo"ation. 6he out"ome of bargaining is not ne"essaril2 the same as the

out"ome of market tra0ing of water! but the e5isten"e of "om/etiti3e markets ma2 re1uire

more stringent "on0itions to be satisfie0%,. A bargaining solution will 0e/en0 on threat /oints

or 0isagreement /a2offs. :ith multi/le la2ers of 0e"ision#makers! bargaining ma2 ha3e to

o""ur at 0ifferent le3els7 states bargain with ea"h other! an0 grou/s within a state also

bargain. t is /ossible in some "ases to rea"h the same out"ome regar0less of the se1uen"ing

of the bargaining.

A signifi"ant "om/li"ation is that the /ro0u"ti3it2 of a gi3en 1uantit2 of water 0e/en0s on

the le3el of "om/lementar2 in3estments. 6hese ma2 be 0ams! irrigation /ro4e"ts! or e3en

more general "om/lementar2 in3estments in agri"ulture. 6he first thing to note is that as long

as the benefit from a gi3en amount of water is 0e/en0ent on the amount of in3estment! it

im/lies that the o/timal allo"ation of water 0e/en0s on the in3estments in !oth states-

.

Hen"e! e3en though there are no 0ire"t e5ternalities as a result of the in3estment! the

"on0itional o/timum of water allo"ation in3ol3es a linkage of both states. :hat state A 0oes

with its in3estment will affe"t the o/timal amount of water that state B shoul0 re"ei3e.

.> :ater @o3ernan"e for Sustainable De3elo/ment! C0ite0 b2 S2l3ain Perret! Stefano Farolfi an0

Rashi0 Hasan! Publishe0 b2 Carths"an in the = an0 SA! --*.

8? :aters an0 :ater Rights b2 Farnham! Publishe0 b2 6he Lawbook e5"hange Lt0.! --+

,age - .8


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Now su//ose that both in3estments an0 the allo"ation of water is the sub4e"t of interstate

negotiations. 6he out"ome of the negotiations will in"lu0e a 4oint agreement on the allo"ation

of water between the states! as well as a 4oint agreement on the le3els of in3estment within

the two states%. 6his /art of the out"ome will be in3ariant to the s/e"ifi" form of the

negotiations! as long as the "oo/eration on both 0imensions is /ossible. :hile in3estments

su"h as 0ams ma2 /lausibl2 be the sub4e"t of inter#state negotiation! it is less likel2 that states

are willing or able to negotiate broa0l2 o3er general in3estments that affe"t the utilit2 or

/ro0u"ti3it2 of water in the state e"onom2. f in3estments are "hosen non"oo/erati3el2!

e5ternalities an0 strategi" "onsi0erations both "reate nono/timalities.

6he strategi" moti3e for in3estment to affe"t subse1uent bargaining im/lies that there is a

strong "ase for a3oi0ing 0ela2s in negotiations an0 agreements! as well as for making

agreements /ermanent! or not sub4e"t to re3iew! /ro3i0e0 that the information is a3ailable is

relati3el2 "om/lete. 6his will ten0 to for"e effi"ient in3estments. nforeseen "hanges in "osts

an0 benefits "an then be 0ealt with b2 tra0ing water! rather than reallo"ating 1uantities de

novo.

,roperty 'ights+ ,olitics and

3nformationne "an 3iew mu"h of the "onfli"t or 0isagreement o3er inter#state ri3er waters in n0ia as an

attem/t to influen"e or 0etermine the initial allo"ation of /ro/ert2 rights o3er water! b2

metho0s su"h as lobb2ing. 6he initial 1uantities of water are not gi3en! but are /re"isel2 the

main sub4e"t of negotiations. n man2 "ases! there is some de facto allo"ation of rights base0

on histori"al usage! but there is a sur/lus of "urrentl2 unutili9e0 water that "an be use0 (often

onl2 if a//ro/riate in3estments are ma0e) on"e it is unambiguousl2 allo"ate0. t is im/ortant

to re"ogni9e that in su"h "ases! the situation is one of /ure "onfli"t7 more for one /art2 means

less for another when there is a gi3en total amount of the resour"e'. t is "on"e/tuall2

im/ortant to se/arate out this sort of situation! therefore! from one where initial /ro/ert2

8. bi0.

88 n0ian Ri3er an0 Ri3er S2stems# 6he @enesis of Arti"le + of the


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rights are well 0efine0! an0 "oo/eration is /otentiall2 feasible. n /arti"ular! there is no

/resum/tion that negotiation among the /arties attem/ting to share water from a /arti"ular

ri3er basin will lea0 to an agreement! an0 there is a "lear role for a higher#le3el authorit2.

6hus the suggestion b2 some anal2sts of n0ian "ases that tribunals or "ourts "reate an

a03ersarial situation seems to miss the /oint7 tribunals be"ome ne"essar2 when the situation

is inherentl2 a03ersarial.


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a//ointe0&. Howe3er! this is 0one at the 0is"retion of the "enter an0! in the abo3e situationG

the "enter woul0 a"tuall2 /refer a /oliti"al solution! where it barters an awar0 for /oliti"al

su//ort. Re0u"ing 0is"retion! su"h as s/e"if2ing short time limits for negotiation! with a

tribunal to take o3er thereafter! is essential in su"h a situation. Su"h a re"ommen0ation is an

ol0 one7 m2 anal2sis hel/s to make a more formal an0 trans/arent "ase for it.

6he abo3e framework "an be use0 to anal29e some a00itional /roblems with the /oliti"al

bargaining "ase! e3en in the absen"e of a tribunal as an alternati3e. 6hese /roblems arise 0ue

to the un"ertaint2 of /oliti"al regimes (Ri"har0s an0 Singh! %,,+). :hile water agreements

are t2/i"all2 3er2 long term! or shoul0 be! to /ermit effi"ient in3estments! go3ernments

"hange e3er2 few 2ears. 6he relati3e 3alue of /oliti"al su//ort from the two states be"omes

an im/ortant /arameter! sin"e one of the states ma2 /refer to /ost/one the agreement+

.

Incomlete information7 An im/ortant issue in water negotiations in /ra"ti"e ma2 be that

ea"h /art2 has /ri3ate information. 6here are /otentiall2 two kin0s of information7 te"hni"al

an0 sub4e"ti3e. n /rin"i/le! te"hni"al information ma2 be share0 an0 3erifie0! but in /ra"ti"e

this "an be an ar0uous task! as the length2 /ro"ee0ings of n0ian water tribunals seem to

in0i"ate*.

Cstimates of "osts an0 benefits in general! as the2 enter the utilit2 fun"tions /ri3atel2 an0sub4e"ti3el2! ma2 not be ob4e"ti3el2 3erifiable. 6his "om/li"ates matters further.

7ater and 3ndian 1ederalism

State go3ernments 0ominate the allo"ation of ri3er waters. Sin"e ri3ers "ross state

boun0aries! 0is/utes are ine3itable. 6he nter#State :ater Dis/utes A"t of %,&+ was legislate0

to 0eal with "onfli"ts! an0 in"lu0e0 /ro3isions for the establishment of tribunals to a04u0i"ate

8& Ri3ers of


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where 0ire"t negotiations ha3e faile0. Howe3er! states ha3e sometimes refuse0 to a""e/t the

0e"isions of tribunals. 6herefore! arbitration is not bin0ing. Signifi"antl2! the "ourts ha3e also

been ignore0 on o""asion. Finall2! the "enter has sometimes inter3ene0 0ire"tl2 as well! but

in the most intra"table "ases! su"h as the sharing of the Ra3i#Beas waters among Har2ana!

>ammu an0 =ashmir! Ra4asthan! an0 Pun4ab! "entral inter3ention! too! has been unsu""essful.

An unambiguous institutional me"hanism for settling inter#state water 0is/utes 0oes not e5ist.

n the other han0! water 0is/utes are sometimes settle0. C"onomi" anal2sis is ne"essar2 to

illuminate whether an0 how water 0is/utes get resol3e0 in n0ia$.

6he main features of n0ia8s legislation with res/e"t to the inter#state allo"ation of water were

re3iewe0 in se"tion %. n se"tion ! e5amine0 how 0is/utes ha0 /rogresse0 in /ra"ti"e!

in"lu0ing some "ase stu0ies. Some of the /roblems with 0is/ute resolution in these "ases

were illuminate0 b2 the anal2ti"al 0is"ussion in se"tions ' an0 . Howe3er! before turning to

m2 "on"lusions! it is useful to 0is"uss the issue of water 0is/utes in the larger "onte5t of

n0ian fe0eralism. 6he issue of inter#state water allo"ation! while it in3ol3es s/e"ial legal an0

te"hni"al features! has been "lou0e0 b2 some of the general /roblems of n0ian fe0eralism.

"onsi0er these issues here! but also will suggest that the sub4e"t is s/e"ifi" enough for more

effe"ti3e institutions to be 0e3elo/e0! without getting bogge0 0own in the more general

0iffi"ulties. f "ourse! inter#state ri3er water 0is/utes in n0ia ha3e long been re"ogni9e0 asan im/ortant fe0eral issue. 6he Sarkaria ul2! New Delhi7 N:DA.

8> Sarkaria


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enhan"e0 b2 a /arti"ular institutional stru"ture! namel2! the "entral Finan"e ul2 %,$! to ?"arr2 out the water balan"e an0 other stu0ies...for o/timum

9? n0ian Ri3er an0 Ri3er S2stems# 6he @enesis of Arti"le + of the


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utili9ation of water resour"es...? (National :ater De3elo/ment Agen"2! %,,) '. 6his agen"2

is a @o3ernment of n0ia So"iet2 in the Ministr2 of :ater Resour"es! an0 not a bo02 with

an2 statutor2 ba"king.

Furthermore! its s"o/e is te"hni"al! an0 se/arate from the institutional realities of water

allo"ation. n %,$'! the National :ater Resour"es

9& @o3ernment of n0ia! %,$$!


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6he "ommission8s re/ort goes on to suggest that the "enter "annot enfor"e the tribunal

awar0 if a state go3ernment refuses to im/lement the awar0. t notes that the amen0ment of

the a"t in %,$-! inserting se"tion +A! whi"h /ro3i0es for an agen"2 to im/lement a tribunal

awar0! is not suffi"ient be"ause su"h an agen"2 "annot fun"tion without the "oo/eration of

the states "on"erne0. 6he Sarkaria


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2er! R.R.! (%,,b) ?n0ian Fe0eralism an0 :ater Resour"es?! Water Resources Development ! %-!! %,%#-.

,age - 8?


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an0 me0iation b2 a thir0 /art2) ma2 be as /roblemati" as unassiste0 negotiations. He

em/hasi9es the im/ortan"e of goo0will! an0 willingness to a""e/t an ?ob4e"ti3e settlement?!

but 0oes not reall2 "ome to gri/s with the stru"tural issues. em/hasi9e the 0ifferen"e

between situations where /ro/ert2 rights are well 0efine0 (/ossibl2 de facto rather than b2

formal legal me"hanisms)! an0 situations where the 0is/ute is o3er the /ro/ert2 rights

themsel3es. n the former "ase! there is room for a mutuall2 benefi"ial e5"hange! an0 one "an

think of se3eral 0ifferent wa2s of im/lementing or fa"ilitating a "oo/erati3e out"ome through

bargaining! whi"h also in"or/orate some elements of fairness! a ma4or "om/onent of

?ob4e"ti3e settlements?. n the other han0! legal a04u0i"ation un0er the S:D A"t! is a non#

3oluntar2 im/ose0 /ro"e0ure! but it! or some similar e5ternall2 im/ose0 /ro"e0ure! ma2 be

ne"essar2 in situations where the 0is/ute is "onfli"tual in nature! an0 not o3er sharing the

/otential gains of a mutuall2 benefi"ial e5"hange-. 6he real issue in su"h "ases is setting u/

a04u0i"ator2 /ro"esses or institutions that all /arties "an agree e" ante to be boun0 b2 e" post G

in these "ases! fo"using on 3oluntar2 negotiations ma2 be somewhat misgui0e0.

A ke2 insight of m2 anal2sis an0 0is"ussion is that the e5isting /ro"esses an0 institutions for

resol3ing inter#state ri3er 0is/utes are not suffi"ientl2 well 0efine0 or 0efinite. 6here are too

man2 o/tions! an0 there is too mu"h 0is"retion at too man2 stages of the /ro"ess. Sin"e water

is being more an0 more full2 utili9e0! the /ossibilit2 of 0is/utes of the "onfli"tual naturearising in"reases. t is therefore "ru"ial that the 0is/ute resolution me"hanism be better

0efine0! in terms of the or0er of the ste/s to be taken. f "ourse! /arties to a negotiation "an

"ontinue to bargain in su"h "ases! an0 e3en rea"h an agreement! as has ha//ene0 in the "ase

of the @o0a3ari 0is/ute. n fa"t! the e5isten"e of an e5/e"te0 out"ome from a04u0i"ation ma2

/ro3i0e a somewhat 0efinite 0isagreement /oint! an0 hel/ to "on3ert a "onfli"tual situation to

one of bargaining o3er (e5/e"te0) mutual gains. @i3en this o/tion! a /ossible

re"ommen0ation woul0 be the automati" an0 imme0iate referral of an2 0is/ute to a tribunal if

re1ueste0 b2 the "enter or an2 /art2 to the 0is/ute! with the tribunal boun0 to ratif2 an2

agreement rea"he0 b2 negotiation before it ha0 0eli3ere0 its 0e"ision.

&elays C5treme 0ela2s ha3e been a 3er2 "ostl2 feature of the /ro"ess of resol3ing

inter#state water 0is/utes in n0ia. 6here ha3e been three "om/onents or 0imensions of 0ela2.

? Ministr2 of :ater Resour"es! -%%. ?Note on Allo"ation of Natural Resour"es? (Note for0is"ussion! Feb -%%! New Delhi).

,age - 8.


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%) 6here has been e5treme 0ela2 in "onstituting tribunals. n0er Se"tion of the

S:D A"t! the nion go3ernment is re1uire0 to set u/ a tribunal onl2 when it is satisfie0 that

the 0is/ute "annot be settle0 b2 negotiations. 6he "enter "an thus in0efinitel2 withhol0 the

0e"ision to set u/ a tribunal on the groun0 that it is not 2et satisfie0 that negotiations ha3e

faile0. C5am/les of 0ela2 in"lu0e all the ma4or 0is/utes. 6he Narma0a 6ribunal was

"onstitute0 in %,+, while @u4arat ha0 lo0ge0 a "om/laint in %,+$ but the 0is/ute itself 0ates

ba"k to %,+'. 6he @o0a3ari an0 =rishna 0is/utes starte0 aroun0 %,&+. 6he states began

formal re1uests for referen"e from %,+ onwar0s. ltimatel2 the @o0a3ari an0 =rishna

0is/utes were referre0 to tribunals in %,+,%.

n the "ase of ose/h :. Della/enna! >o2eeta @u/ta! S/ringer

Publi"ations! --,

,age - 88


23/29

/res"ribe0 time (for e5am/le! three or fi3e 2ears). nlike the Sarkaria


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Institutions

; bi0.

,age - 8


25/29

Murra2 Ri3er


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influen"e a"ti3ities an0 asso"iate0 "osts will e5ist7 am suggesting that these "an be re0u"e0

b2 the "reation of s/e"iali9e0 institutions! with "learl2 0efine0 limits of authorit2$.

en3isage a national le3el water institution as in"or/orating the tasks of 0is/ute resolution!

/ers/e"ti3e /lanning! an0 information gathering an0 maintenan"e. 6hese tasks are "urrentl2

s"attere0 among tribunals! the N:R< an0 the N:DA. 6he last of these organi9ations seems

to be /arti"ularl2 isolate0 an0 relati3el2 unsu//orte0. 6he a03antages of integrating

information "olle"tion an0 storage with long#range /lanning an0 0is/ute resolution seem

manifest. ne stumbling blo"k will! of "ourse! be the relu"tan"e of ministries! in"lu0ing

/oliti"ians an0 bureau"rats! to gi3e u/ /ower o3er 0e"ision#making'. t is here! /erha/s! that

ultimatel2 goo0will! em/hasi9e0 b2 se3eral anal2sts of n0ian ri3er water 0is/utes! will ha3e

to "ome into /la2,

. 6he /ossibilit2 of signifi"ant! /otentiall2 /ositi3e institutional "hange in

n0ia is illustrate0 b2 re"ent legislation strengthening lo"al go3ernments. 6he allo"ation of

water is another as/e"t of n0ia8s fe0eral institutions that "an be im/ro3e0&-.

2onclusionn summar2! "urrent n0ian water#0is/ute settlement me"hanisms are ambiguous an0 o/a1ue.

A "oo/erati3e bargaining framework suggests that water "an be share0 effi"ientl2! with

"om/ensating transfers as ne"essar2! if initial water rights are well#0efine0! an0 if institutions

to fa"ilitate an0 im/lement "oo/erati3e agreements are in /la"e. M2 anal2sis also em/hasi9es

the role of "om/lementar2 in3estments! an0 the nee0 to e5/an0 the s"o/e of bargaining to

in"lu0e these where feasible. Furthermore! 0ela2 in the 0imension of agreement o3er water

"an en"ourage ineffi"ient! non#"oo/erati3e in3estments in 0ams! irrigation! et".

= Seer3ai! H. M. %,$. %onstitutional la# of India& ' critical commentary ! 3olume %.Bomba27 NM

6ri/athi.

> :aters an0 :ater Rights b2 Farnham! Publishe0 b2 6he Lawbook e5"hange Lt0.! --+

&? N


27/29

A00itionall2! 0raw the 0istin"tion between situations where "oo/eration is /ossible! an0

situations where the initial allo"ation of rights is at stake! where "onse1uentl2 the /arties fa"e

a situation of /ure "onfli"t rather than one of /otential gains from tra0e. n the /ure "onfli"t

situation! whi"h seems 3er2 rele3ant for n0ian inter#state 0is/utes! a sear"h for a negotiate0

solution ma2 be futile! an0 1ui"k mo3ement to arbitration or a04u0i"ation ma2 be more

effi"ient.

Howe3er! in the n0ian "ase! not onl2 is this /ro"ess slow! but also effe"ti3e bin0ing

arbitration 0oes not e5ist. 6he threat /oint of no agreement has been the out"ome in se3eral

ma4or 0is/utes (e.g.! . Biksham @u44a!

Suhas Paran4a/e an0 Shruti is/ute! Publishe0 b2 Routle0ge! New Delhi! --$

• :ater @o3ernan"e for Sustainable De3elo/ment! C0ite0 b2 S2l3ain Perret! Stefano

Farolfi an0 Rashi0 Hasan! Publishe0 b2 Carths"an in the = an0 SA! --*

,age - 8


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• :ater! Pea"e an0 :ar :ritten b2 Brahma


29/29

• htt/7KKassets.wwfin0ia.orgK0ownloa0sKinterstatewater0is/utesinin0ia./0f (Last

a""esse0 on *K-K-%&).

• htt/7KKwww.n0t3."omKto/i"Ktamil#na0u#karnataka#0is/ute (Last a""esse0 on -&K-'K-%&).

• htt/7KKen.wiki/e0ia.orgKwikiKSharingthewaterofthe@anges (Last a""esse0 on

-&K-'K-%&).

interstate water dispute

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