interstate relations || interstate relations in nigeria

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Interstate Relations in NigeriaAuthor(s): Eghosa E. OsaghaeSource: Publius, Vol. 24, No. 4, Interstate Relations (Autumn, 1994), pp. 83-98Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330585 .

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Interstate Relations in Nigeria Eghosa E. Osaghae University of lbadan

Interstate relations in Nigeria have tended to be more competitive and conflictual than cooperative. There are several reasons for this, but the emergence of the federal government as the master government, which has virtually reduced interstate relations to how states compete to maximize their shares of the country's resources, provides the key to any meaningful analysis of these relations. By focusing on a number of specific issues, this article shows why and how the distortion of the federal framework ofinterstate relations has made center-inspired competition (and cooperation) theprevalent form of relations.

Interstate relations in Nigeria have received scant attention.1 This may be due to the greater attention given to the so-called "major issues" of Nigerian federalism and to the virtual transformation of states into peripheries of the federal government, but it does not detract from the many dynamic relations of competition, cooperation, and conflict that exist among the states. This article analyzes the patterns of these relations by focusing on a number of specific issues that reflect the trends and demonstrate the need for more attention to interstate relations. Why, for example, is interstate cooperation strongest among states that once belonged to the same region, and why, in the recent past, have newly created states been at loggerheads with older ones? Why is discrimination against "non-indigenes" a major feature of interstate relations? What is the effect of federal revenue allocation, a traditionally sore point of the federation's politics, on interstate relations?

THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

Although interstate relations belong to the category of intergovernmental relations that has been described as horizontal, the forms they take and the factors that influence them are only partly determined by the states. The nature of the federal system, specifically how the constituent units emerged--(1) as creations of the central government (in which case, the rationale for their creation is crucial) or (2)

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers of this article and to John Kincaid for their criticisms and comments.

'Even in the special issue on Nigeria, "Federalism in Nigeria: Toward Federal Democracy,"Publius: The Journal of Federalism 21 (Fall 1991), no article specifically dealt with interstate relations.

Publius: The Journal of Federalism 24 (Fall 1994) 83



84 Publius/Fall 1994

as historically autonomous units--is very important. State relations with the central government, in terms of being relatively autonomous or dependent, consti- tute the underlying framework for interstate relations.

This has certainly been the case in Nigeria, where the states are creations of the central government and are highly dependent on it. In 1990, for example, with the exception of Lagos, which had 57.8 percent of its total revenue from internally generated sources, all the states depended on the federal government for over 70 percent of their revenue needs, with ten of the then nineteen states recording over 90 percent dependence. This highly centralist configuration, which has been accentuated by prolonged military rule and major shifts in the distribution of power between the center and the states,2 provides an important framework for analyzing interstate relations.

The major forms of interstate relations can be broadly classified into three "ideal" types (ideal because they overlap in several ways): competition, cooperation, and conflict. Of the three, competition can be regarded as the most underlying because it is inherent, as it were, in the relations among different governments having different approaches to similar problems in their areas ofjurisdiction. Defined by Daphne Kenyon and John Kincaid as "rivalrous behavior in which each government attempts to win some scarce beneficial resource or to avoid a particular cost,"3 competition is central to interstate relations in federations.

Interstate competition may take one or both of two forms. First, there is horizontal competition, which refers to competition among states acting in their coequal capacities. Rivalries in trade and commerce, which sometimes involve restrictions in cross-boundary movements of goods and services and imposition of tariffs, are probably the most obvious of such competition, but discrimination against citizens of other states in the provision of services, rivalrous replications of institutions, and so on are other forms of horizontal competition.

A second form, which may be referred to as center-inspired competition, involves struggles by the states to influence the determination by the central government of who gets what, when, and how. Center-inspired competition usually arises over the sharing or distribution of pooled resources controlled by the central government: revenue allocation (including federal grants-in-aid), the determination of where a federal industry or establishment is to be built, allocation of state quotas in federations having quota systems, and the like.

The two forms of competition are found in all federations, but in Nigeria where the central government has virtually become the only determinate government, center-inspired competition is quite prevalent. Although Nigeria's old powerful regions engaged in horizontal competition and even carried it to the extremes of maintaining separate diplomatic missions abroad and imposing tariffs on interre-

2Although military governance has moved the country toward a "unitarist federation," the forces of centralization date back to the late 1950s.

3Daphne A. Kenyon and John Kincaid, "Introduction," Competition Among States and Local Governments: Efficiency and Equity in American Federalism, eds. Daphne A. Kenyon and John Kincaid (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press in cooperation with the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1991), p. 1.



Interstate Relations in Nigeria 85

gional trade, the currently weak states have too little relative autonomy to engage in meaningful horizontal competition.

This is not to say that states no longer engage in horizontal competition. Rivalries in education, particularly admissions into higher institutions, have led several states to establish their own universities. Discrimination against non- indigenes can be easily highlighted as well. Horizontal competition increases when civilian politicians who are more assertive of state rights and pursue different political party policies govern the states. However, the greater tendency has been for state governments that, by the rationale for their creation (e.g., bringing government closer to the people, balancing the federation, and even development), see themselves primarily as outlets for the distribution and allocation of the federation's resources (the proverbial "national cake"), to compete to maximize their shares of the federation's resources. The federal character principle and the premium placed on the equality of states in allocating revenues have, amongst others, reinforced this tendency.

Cooperation hinges on collaboration or partnership, and includes those situa- tions in which two or more states take joint action on common problems, operate joint ventures, or establish linkages in various areas. Cooperation could be formal (e.g., interstate pacts or bilateral/multilateral agreements) or informal (e.g., unwrit- ten agreements). Relations of conflict, on the other hand, involve disagreements or rivalry between two or more states (or groups of states) over matters of states' rights, interstate boundaries and trade, revenue sharing, and the like.

Interstate relations in Nigeria have involved all three categories outlined above. In a way, competition, especially center-inspired competition, underlies relations of cooperation and conflict. For example, cooperation among states that formerly belonged to the same unit is partly a way of consolidating old competitive advantages. Also, conflicts over revenue allocation and state boundaries are closely tied to the competition to secure maximum benefits from national resources. These close linkages will become obvious when we analyze the factors that influence interstate relations as well as specific aspects of those relations.

The Creation of States Nigeria is a "disaggregative" federation par excellence, i.e., a federation which

began as a unitary system and was (and continues to be) "disaggregated" into states for the purpose of federalism. Perhaps the greatest structural problem faced by such federations is determining the suitable number of states. In Nigeria's case, between 1954 when a federal constitution was adopted and 1991, the number of states rose from three to thirty. There is every likelihood that more will be created in the future.

The creation of more states has affected interstate relations in a number of ways. To begin with, the "disaggregative" nature of the federation has engendered the "master government" status of the central government that, in turn, has heightened center-inspired competition. In particular, abandonment of the principle of viability as a major criterion for creating new states in 1976 has made it possible to create states that depend almost entirely on the federal government in order to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.




The rationales of even and balanced development-advanced by groups de- manding new states and by the federal authorities each time new states are created-- have, together with nonviability, made center-inspired competition very crucial. The creation of new states also provides an enabling environment for more conflicts: with more states come new boundary problems, problems of assets/ liabilities sharing, and discrimination against new "non-indigenes." However, the creation of more states has not engendered only relations of competition and conflict. Where states created from an erstwhile region or state have been allowed to jointly manage the state's or region's commercial ventures, there has been a basis for forging interstate collaboration, sustaining old regional identities, and building political alliances.4

The Character of the Political Regime Regime character has to do with whether the military or the civilians govern the

federation. The differences between the regimes in relation to federalism and interstate relations are fundamental. Military regimes typically desecrate the constitution and rule instead by decrees, which violate basic federal principles. Under these regimes, state governments are virtually reduced to administrative agencies of the federal government and, with the emphasis usually given to "national integration," they are only allowed to operate within common parameters set by the center. The federal government is the only determinate government both on matters in the exclusive list as well as on matters in the concurrent list of the federal constitution.

The military framework accentuates center-inspired competition, although the absence of political parties which function to divide the states and their policies, such as that of appointing non-indigenes as state governors, have been quite conducive to interstate cooperation. Indeed, successive military governments have tried to promote cooperation among the states by attempting to eradicate the centrifugal forces, especially those that relate to old regionalism, and by formulat- ing common policies for the states.

The accentuation of center-inspired competition and conflict is, therefore, largely an unintended consequence of military rule under which the amelioration of subnational, including interstate, conflicts is taken very seriously.5 The establishment of intergovernmental bodies, which has received the greatest boost under military rule, is one of the institutional manifestations of these efforts. Neverthe- less, even though such designs have had positive effects on interstate relations in certain respects, the centralization of authority and resources has worked in the opposite direction: it has heightened competition and conflict. Increasing discrimination against non-indigenes, boundary disputes, and the controversies over population figures and revenue allocation are distinct consequences of center- inspired competition.

It is important to emphasize that military governance did not create centralization

4See Eghosa E. Osaghae, "Do Ethnic Minorities Still Exist in Nigeria?," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 24 (July 1986): 151-168.

5In 1991, for example, decisions taken on assets-sharing were substantially reviewed to reduce conflicts among states.




or center-inspired competition. Such competition began with the financial ascen- dancy of the federal government following the discovery of crude oil in the late 1950s, which led to central planning and allocation of federal resources under the National Development Plans, both of which predated military rule. Military rule accentuated these tendencies and further reduced the scope of horizontal competition, which still thrived under civilian governance in spite of the centralizing tendencies produced by taking over many of the responsibilities that belonged to the states.

Civilian regimes, by contrast, present a more conflict-prone but more horizon- tally competitive and "federal" environment for interstate relations. Differences in party controls among states, and between them and the center, vigorous assertions of state rights and autonomy, as well as ethnoregional groupings have engendered more conflict than cooperation. In reasserting their autonomy, which several years of military rule had eroded in the Second Republic for example, states made demands and took actions that moved them further apart. The demands included (1) that states be permitted to establish separate police forces; (2) that the uniform national wage and income-tax structure be dismantled to allow each state to determine its own tax structure; and (3) that the right of states to operate autonomous electronic media be recognized.6 The decision by most state governments to restrict the provision of their goods and services only to indigenes oftheir states was consistent with the assertion of their rights. Under the circumstances, the only serious relations of cooperation were those engendered by political party affiliations, old regional ties, and common problems.

Intergovernmental Bodies The major rationale for intergovernmental bodies in federal systems is the need

to promote cooperation among the units of government. Given that competition and conflict are usually perceived as dysfunctional, the major task of such bodies is to mediate conflict and resolve issues that promote unhealthy rivalry. (It must be remembered that competition among units in a federation is functional in certain ways.7) Given the objective of intergovernmental bodies, it is not surprising that they have received a greater boost under military governance.

Even so, until 1992, when the National Council for Intergovernmental Relations (NCIR) was established, there was no agency specifically overseeing intergovernmental relations, especially interstate relations.8 Since its establishment, NCIR has, among other functions, mediated in a number of interstate disputes,9 but it is much too early to undertake any meaningful assessment of the council's work. Besides

6Rotimi T. Suberu, "Problems of Federation in the Second Nigerian Republic and Prospects for the Future," Africa 47 (March 1992): 29-56.

7The late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, perhaps the most avowed federalist Nigeria ever had, always argued that competition which made constituent units struggle autonomously not to be left behind by others is healthy, but that center-inspired competition is unhealthy.

8The idea of an advisory council on intergovernmental relations was first mooted in 1977 at a national conference in Zaria. In 1981, a department of intergovernmental relations was established in the presidency. See Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Study Team on the Management of Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1983).

'Among others, the council was involved in mediating disputes over assets-sharing between Abia and Imo, Oyo and Osun, Taraba and Adamawa, and Kaduna and Katsina.




NCIR and, in fact, long before it was established, several bodies and agencies had played direct and indirect roles in promoting cooperative intergovernmental relations. These bodies are mostly constitutional and statutory, but others have been created to deal with special problems. One such body is the National Boundaries Commission, established in 1987, part of whose function is "to deal with, determine and intervene in any boundary dispute that may arise ... between any two states of the federation with a view to settling such disputes."'" The commission has been quite visible in settling boundary disputes, especially since 1991 when thirty states were created."

Another body is the National Economic Council whose members include state governors; its main function is to "advise the president concerning the economic affairs of the federation and, in particular, on measures necessary for the coordina- tion of the economic planning efforts or economic programs of the various governments of the federation.""2 The Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, which was established in 1988 to deal with matters relating to revenue allocation, includes one representative of each state. It functions, among other things, to review the revenue allocation principles and formulas from time to time to ensure that they conform with changing realities, and to advise the various governments on fiscal efficiency and ways of increasing revenue. Between 1988 and 1993, the revenue allocation formulas were changed five times in response to state and local pressures, though state governments have kept up the struggle for increased shares of the federation account."

There are also regular statutory meetings of state and federal government officials where policies of state governments are harmonized to conform with the national standards usually contained in the National Development Plans. The meetings are organized by the various federal and state ministries. A different kind of intergovernmental body, which has provided a new framework for interstate relations, is the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). This commission was established in 1992 by the federal government to handle special development projects in the oil-producing communities located in Delta, Rivers, Edo, Akwa Ibom, Ondo, and Imo states. In OMPADEC, these states have found a new platform for concerted action as well as for competition and conflicts. Thus far, there have been more conflicts. The focus on developing oil- producing communities means more money for the states where they are located, and this has led to the intensification of disputes over claims to borderline oil- producing communities between Delta and Edo, and Delta and Ondo. There have also been disagreements among the states over production quotas, which is a major criterion for distributing projects, as well as among communities within and across state boundaries over which areas should have more projects and over the represen-

'0Third Schedule, Section E, 1989 Constitution. "Unfortunately, it was not possible to get access to the commission's records. '2Third Schedule, Section G, 1989 Constitution. '3For an overview of the changing structure of revenue allocation in Nigeria up to 1991, see Adedotun

Phillips, "Four Decades of Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria," Publius: The Journal ofFederalism 21 (Fall 1991): 103-111.




tativeness of OMPADEC's staff, which is predominantly from oil-producing communities.'4

ASPECTS OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS

Having examined the major factors that influence interstate relations and the framework within which they take place, we can now analyze selected aspects of these relations. The slant of selection suggests that interstate relations are, on balance, more competitive and conflictual than cooperative, which is actually the case, but to the extent that both kinds of relations derive from the same sources, there are considerable overlaps among them. Nevertheless, an attempt is still made to examine relations of cooperation as a separate category. Unfortunately, the volume and dynamics of interstate trade, which provide one of the best measures of the character of interstate relations, are not one of the aspects considered because of the dearth of statistics.

Discrimination Against Non-Indigenes One problematic aspect of interstate relations in Nigeria today is the entrenched

discrimination against non-indigenes in the provision of social and public goods by state governments. The basis of discrimination is the distinction made between "indigenes," that is, those whose parents or grandparents come from groups indigenous to the state, and "non-indigenes," namely, those whose parents or grandparents come from groups in other states. Non-indigenes are denied employment in state public services or, where they are employed, are given conditions that normally apply to foreigners; their children are denied admission to state-owned schools or are made to pay higher fees; they are discriminated against in state hospitals and in the provision of health-care facilities; and they are denied access to federal privileges and benefits that are routed through states. Non-indigenes are discriminated against regardless of how long they may have resided in the state, whether they pay taxes to the state government, whether they come from the same generic ethnic group as indigenes,'5 or whether their states of origin were previously parts of the new states.

The problem of discrimination has deep historical roots. It arises primarily from the marked unevenness in resources and development among the states, and represents a form of security against economic, political, and psychological deprivation as well as protection against domination by citizens from more developed states. This is largely why discrimination is more pronounced in the relatively less developed states, most of which are in the historically less developed northern region. This is most apparent in the area of education, which is considered the key to economic and social development. As most schools in the northern states are owned by the government and offer free or relatively less costly education, various forms of discrimination have been practiced, ostensibly to prevent citizens

'4Since January 1994, Nigerian newspapers have been inundated with "advertorials" by oil- producing communities over issues related to OMPADEC, many complaining of neglect and reorganization of the body. See, in particular, The Guardian.

"5Osun indigenes are discriminated against in Oyo and vice versa, notwithstanding that the two states are Yoruba-speaking and once formed the old Oyo state.




from other states from exploiting the situation. Indeed, students from southern states, where the cost of education is far higher,

have been known to falsify their names to gain admission to these schools or to enjoy generous bursaries and scholarships offered by the state governments to indigenes in tertiary institutions. In Sokoto state in 1986, hundreds of non-indigene students were discovered when they tried to revert to their real names to register for final examinations. As it is impracticable to deny non-indigenes entry into educational institutions-in part, because most of the non-indigenes are resident or permanently settled in these states-most states have introduced different fees for indigenes and non-indigenes (including those from northern states). Kaduna Polytechnic, which is jointly owned by all the northern states, began this practice in 1982 when it raised tuition fees for non-northern students to 2000 Naira, while that for northern students was 200 Naira. Other institutions followed: Plateau College of Education charged indigenes 150 Naira and non-indigenes 500 Naira, and Kwara State Polytechnic charged indigenes 250 Naira and non-indigenes 1500-3000 Naira.

These practices are not, however, restricted to the North. In the Second Republic, the introduction of free education at all levels in states controlled by the Unity Party of Nigeria-Lagos, Bendel, Ogun, Ondo, and Oyo-led them to adopt all kinds of checks to prevent non-indigenes from "overstretching" their resources. Bendel in particular had to prevent Igbos from neighboring Anambra, where education was very expensive, who claimed to have come from the Igbo-speaking parts of Bendel, from taking advantage of the free-education policy. The state government introduced a number of measures, including a certificate of indigeneity from the local government of origin. The certificate had to be produced for admissions and payment of bursaries to students of institutions of higher learning. Later in 1983, even after the free-education policy was discontinued by the new government in the state, the government still thought ofintroducing special identity cards for Bendelites. Discrimination against non-indigenes in southern states continued, though on a less serious scale, between 1992 and 1993 when states controlled by the Social Democratic Party again introduced free-education programs. One factor that has made discrimination in southern states less troubling than is the case in the North is that although most schools are government owned, there are more private schools in the South to absorb non-indigenes unable to find places in government schools.

Another common area of discrimination against non-indigenes, which follows the same logic of security and protection, is employment. They are denied employment in state public services or they are employed on contract like foreigners. Again, this is more prevalent in the northern states where, because of the dearth of qualified indigenes, there has historically been a need to protect the state services from being taken over by non-indigenes. For this reason, these states prefer foreigners who are less inclined to become permanent residents. Nevertheless, non- indigenes from the South have held key public positions in northern states, though this has been more out of practical necessity than any change in discriminatory practices.'6 In 1987, for example, the Bauchi state government was forced by an

'6A Yoruba from Oyo state was once chief judge of Katsina state, while another was permanent secretary in Borno state in the early 1980s.




acute shortage of manpower to introduce the "Bauchi formula" under which deserving non-indigenes were awarded scholarships in medicine, engineering, science, and technology, provided they agreed to serve the state after graduation. This did not, however, mean a shift from discriminatory practices as even these graduates were to be given contract appointments.

In the southern states, although there are no major manpower shortages (instead there are surpluses in most states), non-indigenes are still discriminated against in the public service. The scope of the problem has expanded with the creation of new states. Indeed, following the creation of new states in 1991, a new dimension was added to the problem of discrimination in southern states because of a federal directive that all civil servants from the newly created states should move to their new states. This led Edo, Oyo, Enugu, and Imo states to summarily dismiss workers from Delta, Osun, Anambra, and Abia states who were in the employ of their states. The majority of those dismissed were teachers, and others whose spouses were federal civil servants. Even those whose spouses were indigenes of these states were dismissed as well. The new states retaliated by also dismissing indigenes of the older states, and thus was started a new kind of conflict that is currently tearing new and old states apart. The conflicts are exacerbated by disputes over the sharing of assets (discussed below).

There are other forms of discrimination, notably in the disbursement of federal services and goods channeled through the states," and in access to land and other economic rights,'" but space does not permit elaborations of these. They have all had the consequence of further separating the states, and with the new dimensions of retaliatory discrimination, indigene/non-indigene distinctions are likely to have even more negative impacts on interstate relations. Problems of discrimination have not been left unattended, however. In 1986, Colonel David Mark, then military governor of Niger state, introduced an indigeneity proposal that sought to confer indigeneship of Niger state on any Nigerian who had lived continually in the state for upwards of twenty-five years, was of good character, spoke one of the indigenous languages in the state, and was sponsored by a prominent citizen of the state. Mark's proposal, which was not implemented, was criticized for its implied notions of dual citizenship and especially its assumption that a non-indigene was not a citizen.19 Although these criticisms are valid, Mark's proposal vividly demonstrates the contradictions in the constitutional provisions on citizenship which have been said to justify the notions of dual citizenship and discrimination against non-indigenes.

While the Constitution makes indigeneity a condition for citizenship and for conferring rights on citizens (Sections 23 and 277 of the 1979 Constitution),

"Examples of such forms of discrimination are national passports, entry forms to federal government institutions, and recruitment into the police and armed forces.

'8Most non-indigenes find it difficult to secure the certificate of occupancy, which is the title deed to land issued by state governments.

"1According to Sola Akinrinsola, an attorney, "Indigeneship has no legal value. Citizenship is larger in legal content because the rights of citizens encompass the rights of an indigene." See African Guardian, 16 January 1986, p. 21.




Chapter II of the Constitution, which spells out the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, prohibits discrimination on grounds ofplace of origin, guarantees free mobility of people, and ensures full residence rights for all citizens in all parts of the federation. Stated in terms of this contradiction, the issue of "non-indigenes" in relations between states, is not peculiar to the Nigerian federation, though the problem of discrimination may not be as acute elsewhere. Every federal system recognizes the problem and tries to deal with it in different ways. The Constitution of the United States, for example, provides that: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States" (Article IV, Section 2). Although this is very ambivalent, federal courts have interpreted it to mean that states may not discriminate against nonresidents regarding fundamental human rights. But even with this, nonresidents are treated differently in some respects, such as paying higher fees in state universities.20

Discrimination against non-indigenes in Nigeria is more profound and deep- rooted because it is not primarily a legal-constitutional issue; remarkably, the law courts have not issued any major judgments on this subject. It is largely a product of the historical legacy of regionalism, center-inspired competition, uneven levels of development, and disparities in resources and revenues, as well as creations of more states and party differences that have reinforced these cleavages. Dwindling state resources have also contributed to the problem because many states barely have enough to serve their "indigenes" and none to spare for "outsiders." An increase in the proportion of the federation account to the states as demanded by them, increased affirmative action to bolster the competitive pedestal of backward and disadvantaged states, and greater collaboration among them in the provision of essential services-such as existed between the old-Mid-West, Benue-Plateau, Kano, and East Central states in the early 1970s in the areas of education and exchange of manpower-are some of the ways to deal with the problem of discrimination.

Boundary Disputes The "disaggregative" character of Nigeria's federation makes boundary disputes

a critical aspect of interstate relations. Boundary problems are multiplied with the creation of each new state. The crux of the problem lies in the marble-cake pattern of ethnolinguistic boundaries, the fact that groups are not always decided or properly consulted (e.g., through plebiscites) on which state they wish to belong, and the fact that state boundaries have sometimes been determined by administrative convenience or so-called "natural" boundaries rather than the wishes of the people. Another major reason for boundary disputes is economic. States have contested ownership of borderline resource-rich (especially oil-producing) areas because they confer considerable advantages for revenue allocation. The use of

20Differential treatment of nonresidents in matters like college tuition and license fees is defended on the ground that nonresidents do not pay taxes to the state governments concerned (which is not the case in Nigeria). See David C. Nice, Federalism: The Politics oflntergovernmental Relations (New York: St. Martin's, 1987), pp. 115-116.




land mass and population as criteria for revenue allocation heightens these disputes as well. Boundary disputes have also arisen from purely local disputes between borderline communities over rights to land, taxation, and other matters.

The more historically entrenched disputes have been over the splitting up of ethnic groups between two or more states. This was quite pronounced in the days of the regions when the Yorubas in the Northern region, Igbos in the Western region, and Ijaws in the Eastern region, all demanded boundary adjustments or separate states. The creation of more states since 1967 has multiplied splits of ethnic groups and brought new forms of dispute. The present thirty-state structure, effected in 1991, has brought with it a wide range of disputes, some of which carry over from the past. The following examples demonstrate the current forms of and issues in boundary disputes.

Edo and Delta States. The two states constituted Bendel state before 1991. There is a dispute over which state has jurisdiction over the borderline communities around Ologbo where huge deposits of crude oil were discovered recently. Complicated by the fact that the Ologbo communities are ethnically mixed, with elements from both states, the dispute has been referred to the Boundaries Commission.

Edo and Ondo States. Here, the dispute is over the Sobe forest reserve. The Sobe local government area was part of the old Bendel state until 1976 when it was transferred to Ondo. In 1991, Sobe was returned to the new Edo state, which then assumed control of the forest reserve. Ondo state is contesting this control on the ground that the reserve was part of the old Ondo province. The case is presently before the federal high court.

Ondo and Delta States. The dispute is over borderline oil fields within the territory of Opuama and Isekelewu communities and Boboruku in Ethiope's local government area in Delta state. Another dispute is likely to ensue over the Arogbo- Ijaw community, an oil-producing area in Ondo state, which has threatened to demand relocation to Delta state on the grounds of neglect and marginalization in the Yoruba-dominated Ondo state. The Arogbo case indicates that the issue of boundary adjustment could also be used by resource-rich border communities as an instrument for seeking redress from their host states.

Bauchi and Plateau States. The dispute is over the Tsayawa community, which became part of the Bauchi state in the 1991 state creation exercise. The community now demands to be relocated to Plateau state, where it formerly belonged, on the grounds of Hausa/Fulani domination and discrimination against them, as evi- denced by selected attacks on members of the group during the Bauchi riots of 1992.21

Oyo and Ogun States. These two states were formerly part of the old Western state, which was split into three in 1976. Since then, ownership of the borderline Egba villages of Indiope, Arigbede, Atakena, Adisa, and Batakari has been in dispute. Oyo state lays claim to the villages on the basis of a 1926 instrument by which the Alake (king) of Egbaland in Ogun state is said to have ceded the villages

21The Tsayawa demand for relocation has been one of several by non-Hausa/Fulani groups in the North since the outbreak of communal and religious strife in the 1980s.




to the Alafin (king) of Oyo. Before the creation of new local government councils in 1991, which put them effectively in Oyo state, the villagers paid their taxes to the Odeda local government council in Ogun state. Attempts by the Iddo and Ibarapa local government councils of Oyo state--the new councils to which they now belong to collect taxes from them--resurrected the disputes once again. An interstate consultative committee, cochaired by the deputy governors ofboth states, in 1993 affirmed the 1991 restructuring that put the villages in Oyo state, but the elders of the Egba community who do not agree with the decision have taken the matter to the National Boundaries Commission.

Benue and Enugu States. Here, a boundary dispute between the Agila community in Benue state and the Ngbo community in Enugu state dates back to the days of the provinces and the regions. In 1954, following the creation ofregions, a buffer forest-reserve was accepted as the boundary between the communities. During the civil war, however, the Ngbo community took over the reserve and parts of Agila's communal lands. This has been the basis of the dispute, first, between the old East Central and Benue-Plateau states and, now, between Benue and Enugu. In 1991, a meeting of affected local government chairmen and traditional rulers affirmed that the old buffer forest-reserve should remain the boundary. If any of the communities fail to honor this agreement, the matter is to be referred to the National Boundaries Commission.

The foregoing cases give insight into the nature of boundary disputes and some of the steps taken to resolve them. The disputes are usually more pronounced in the periods immediately following the creation of new states. In the past, every state creation exercise was accompanied by the setting up of a boundary adjustment panel, which dealt with disputes arising over new boundaries. In 1987, a permanent National Boundaries Commission was established to deal with domestic and international boundary problems. The commission, however, mediates only in disputes referred to it by the states. In resolving disputes, the commission is guided by a broad range of considerations: recommendations by the surveyor-general of the federation, as well as by the surveyors-general of the states in dispute; old provincial and regional boundaries as they are relevant to new state boundaries; historical boundaries dating back to pre-colonial and colonial instruments; and court rulings where relevant. However, given the localized and "familial" nature of disputes that arose from the 1991 restructuring of boundaries, states were encouraged to set up joint boundary committees to resolve the issues. Only disputes that could not be resolved at this level were to be referred to the National Boundaries Commission.

Assets Sharing Each of the thirty states in Nigeria today was, at one time, part of another state.

This means that the issue of sharing assets and liabilities has involved all of them at one time or another. The issue arises when new states are created from an old one, and have to share the assets and liabilities ofthe old state, usually in accordance with guidelines given by the federal government. In the past, commercial, banking, and, in some cases, educational institutions of the old state were placed under joint ownership. Other assets and liabilities were shared according to various criteria,




such as equality, location, and need. When new states were created in 1991, however, the federal government directed that joint ownership be avoided where possible, and that commercial ventures formerly run by groups of states be capitalized and run as public-quoted companies. This, and the bitterness that attended the movements of people, especially workers, to their new states,22 made assets sharing highly controversial.

The federal government appointed assets-sharing committees for the following states that formerly constituted one state: Anambra/Enugu, Abia/Imo, Adamawa/ Taraba, Borno/Yobe, Benue/Kogi and Kwara/Kogi23, Edo/Delta, Kano/Jigawa, Kebbi/Sokoto, and Oyo/Osun. Each committee was composed of representatives of the two states, the presidency, federal ministry of works, and the federal auditor- general, and was headed by a chairperson who was not from any of the states. The guidelines for assets sharing included the following:

1. All noncommercial buildings and administrative offices/residences were to belong to states of location.

2. Joint ownership of ventures was to be avoided as much as possible.

3. All public servants were to be deployed to their states of origin.

4. All commercial, nonadministrative assets and liabilities, motor vehicles, plants, and machinery were to be shared on a formula to be recommended by the sharing committee.

It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the reports of the various committees. It suffices to note that different and sometimes conflicting criteria of sharing were recommended. For example, the Dosunmu committee for Anambra/ Enugu recommended an overall sharing ratio of 54:46 in favor of Anambra, using the criterion of the number of local government units in each state. The Undo- Akagha committee for Delta/Edo recommended a ratio of 52:48 in favor of Delta, based on the following criteria: equality (50 percent), 1963 population figures (25 percent), and primary-school enrollment for 1989, 1990, and 1991 (25 percent). Serious disputes arose over the recommendations of the committees which, in many cases, led to the appointment of review panels comprising representatives of the states concerned and the introduction of new sharing formulas. These were not sufficient to resolve some of the highly contentious issues and bitterness that continue to affect relations among the states concerned. In particular, new states lacking basic infrastructure and resources contest the decision to turn over the economic ventures, mass media, and institutions of higher learning to the older states. The bitterness that attended assets sharing has also lingered in various ways, the most serious being the acrimonies generated by the movement of civil servants (many of whom were retrenched) to their new states of origin.

22In most cases, workers were allowed only a few days to relocate to their new states. 23Kogi was the only state "carved out" of two states.




Interstate Cooperation Compared to the period immediately following the civil war when the then Mid-

Western, East Central, Benue-Plateau, Kano, and North-Eastern states established various joint commercial and educational ventures,24 the 1980s and 1990s have had fewer cases of interstate cooperation, especially of the interregional (North-South) kind. The most notable cases of cooperation are those involving states that have taken the opportunities provided byjoint control of old regional assets to forge close political, economic, and social links, and, sometimes, to formulate common policies. The northern states have clearly taken the lead in this regard, followed by the O'dua states of the former Western region.

Outside of these regional frameworks, interstate cooperation has been mostly pragmatic and fluid, and guided by fleeting party identities and by revenue- allocation matters on which various states, especially the oil-producing states, have formed temporary alliances. Political party affiliations have been very important. In the Second Republic, governors of the states controlled by the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigerian Peoples' Party (NPP), Peoples' Redemption Party (PRP), and Great Nigeria Peoples' Party (GNPP), found a common front in opposing the federal government controlled by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The governors held monthly meetings in rotation among the states where they formulated common positions on national issues, especially those relating to federal-state relations. For example, they rejected the presidential liaison officers whom the president appointed to supervise federal projects and implement presidential directives in the states; opposed the 1981 Revenue Allocation Act and subsequently went to the Supreme Court to have it nullified; and opposed federal encroachment on matters of state competence in such areas as housing, education, and state roads.25 The "progressive front," as this alliance of governors was popularly called, also encouraged interstate visits by governors and informal cooperation, though no concrete collaborative ventures were established by the states.

Between 1992 and 1993, when states were once again controlled by political parties, alliances were also formed along party lines even though military governance at the center gave little room for state assertiveness, as was the case in the Second Republic. Meetings of Social Democratic Party (SDP) governors on the one hand and National Republican Convention (NRC) governors on the other, were devoted largely to planning for how to win the presidential election, which repeatedly ran into problems, and to reviewing the performances of the governors. However, following the annulment of the 12 June presidential election, which was widely believed to have been won by SDP's candidate, strong divergent positions emerged among state factions of the two parties. The SDP governors of the O'dua

24In November 1971, for example, the then East-Central, Mid-West, and Benue-Plateau states jointly established the Niger-Benue transport company. Benue-Plateau and Mid-West also established a joint "intercity transport company and an educational exchange program. Mid-West and Kano states also established a joint timber and wood-treatment company.

2SRotimi T. Suberu, "Political Opposition and Intergovernmental Relations in the Second Nigerian Republic," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 28 (October 1990): 276-277.




states vigorously challenged the annulment and the powers of the federal government in some of its actions, including its proscription of The Daily Sketch, a newspaper jointly owned by the states. The SDP O'dua states even contemplated secession.26 The NRC governors, especially those from the North, supported the annulment and called for fresh elections. The crisis that followed the annulment of the election involved ethno-regional disagreements over power-sharing in the federation. They were so serious that many non-indigenes were forced to flee to their home states from the northern and western states, fearing the outbreak of a civil war.

Another issue that has generated both cooperation and competition/conflict is revenue allocation. Revenue allocation has been a volatile issue in Nigeria, and has become even more so because of state inabilities to meet any significant proportion of their financial needs independently. At the most general level, all the states are bound together by a common desire to increase their share ofthe federation account. They have taken concerted action several times in pursuance of this. In the Second Republic, party differences were put aside when it came to submitting states' memoranda to the Okigbo presidential commission on revenue allocation. Again in 1992, the governors unanimously opposed the revenue-allocation formula because it reduced the states' share of the federation account to only 24 percent. They collectively demanded a reduction in the federal (50 percent) and local (20 percent) shares, and an increase in the states' share to 35 percent on the ground that state governments bear the brunt of providing social services, including primary education. In furtherance of their protest, most state governments refused to pay worker-relief allowances and salary increases awarded by the federal government until the latter gave them a grant of 2 billion Naira from the Federal Stabilization Account.

When it comes to sharing their allocation from the federation account (horizontal allocation), the states are badly divided, with each advancing only those criteria likely to maximize its share. (The criteria have included population, territorial size, equality, need, independent revenue-generation effort, and derivation.) Whatever criteria are used, revenue allocation has winners and losers. This explains the fierce competition and conflicts that attend revenue allocation. Disputes over boundaries and disagreements over population figures, including primary-school enrollment figures, are directly related to revenue allocation.

A fairly peculiar case is that of the oil-producing states, which provide the bulk of the country's wealth. Oil accounts for more than 85 percent of the federation's total revenue. Over the years, these states have agitated for adequate compensation not only for being the source of the country's wealth, but also for the environmental degradation and hazards that follow exploration activities. It is partly in response to this that OMPADEC was established, but the communities are asking for much greater compensation, which has led to insurrectionist movements (e.g., the Ogonis of Rivers state). Oil-producing states also clamor for emphasis to be given to the

26The reaction of the governors was attributed to the fact that Moshood Abiola, who was widely believed to have won the election, was from Ogun, one of the O'dua states.




principle of derivation in the allocation of revenue, and because they are mostly southern minorities states, their governors and leaders have presented their plight (since derivation was used in the past when it favored the majority groups) as evidence of continued minority oppression. They have, however, made modest gains: from 1.5 percent of the federation account given to developing oil-producing areas in 1982, they have secured an increase to 7.5 percent in addition to having OMPADEC , the newly created body charged with developing the oil-producing areas.

CONCLUSION

Interstate relations in Nigeria have, on balance, involved more competition and conflict than cooperation. This is attributable to the centralist configuration of the federation and the subsequent emergence of center-inspired competition as the major framework of interstate relations. This situation has been accentuated by prolonged military rule, which distorts the federal framework for interstate relations, especially horizontal competition, which many observers regard as healthy for the overall development of federations. Thus, even though military governance is more supportive of interstate cooperation, the framework of interstate relations it provides tends to stultify state initiatives in development and matters of revenue. The resulting dependence on the center distorts interstate relations and fosters unhealthy competition, which retards overall development of the federation.



interstate relations || interstate relations in nigeria

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