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InterpretationA JOURNAL A OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Fall 1991

Elliott BartkyVolume 19 Number 1

Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and theGods

Thomas S. Engeman William Dean Howells' "Poor Real L ife":The Royal Road to the American Character

Laurence Berns

Discussion

The Relation Between Philosophy and Religion

Stanley C. Brubaker The Tempting of America,: The PoliticalMatthew J. Franck Seduction of the Law, by Robert H. BorkKen Masugi

Book ReviewsWill Morrisey

Patrick CobyDiana Schaub

Frank Schalow

Winston S. Churchill on Empire, by KirkEmmert

Socrates in the Apology, by C.D.C. ReeveNatural Right and the American Imagination,

by Catherine H. ZuckertKant and the Problem ofMetaphysics, byMartin Heidegger


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InterpretationFall 1991 A Volume 19 Number 1Elliot Bartky Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the

Gods 3Thomas S. Engeman William Dean Howells' "Poor Real Life":

The Royal Road to the American Character 29Laurence Berns The Rela tion Between Philosophy and Religion 43Discussion

Stanley C. BrubakerMatthew J. FranckKen Masugi

The Tempting o f America: The PoliticalSeduction of the Law, by Robert H. Bork

61

Book ReviewsWill Morrisey Winston S. Churchill on Empire, by Kirk

Emmert 95Patrick Coby Socrates in th e Apology, by C.D.C. Reeve 101Diana Schaub Natural Right and the American Imagination,

by Catherine H. Zuckert 105Frank Schalow Kant and th e Problem ofMetaphysics, by

Martin Heidegger

Copyright 1991 interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

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Marx on Self-Consciousness,the City and the GodsElliot BartkyIndiana UniversityPurdue University at Fort Wayne

In his doctoral thesis on th e Difference Between th e Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature Marx sought to demonstrate that Epicurus' mostsignificant contribution to the history of philosophy was his transformation ofatomistic physics into a critique of Greek theology and philosophy. Marxpraised Epicurus for freeing philosophy from its servitude to theology, and fo rshowing th at th e highest human good, ataraxia (tranquility), depended on freeing man from fear of th e gods.1 Marx further praised Epicurus fo r his claim thatin order to free man from fear of th e gods, self-consciousness must be liberatedfrom the city. My reading of th e dissertation and th e notebooks written inpreparation fo r it leads me to suggest that th e motivation fo r Marx's interest inexplicating Epicurus' attempt to free man from the city and th e gods may befound in his belief that Epicurus' critique of Greek philosophy established th efoundation fo r the critique of th e philosophy of transcendence in th e modernstate. By exposing th e political-religious myths of Greek philosophy Epicurusprovided th e basis fo r an alternative to the political-religious myths developedby Christianity and Hegel.

The significance of Marx's explication and defense of Epicurus' attempt tofree man from th e city and the gods may be somewhat doubtful, however, sincehis doctoral thesis cast him into th e midst of a war that seemed to have beenlong over. Epicureanism, having launched th e most devastating attack on th eteachings of Plato and Aristotle in antiquity, found new vitality in th e seventeenth- and eighteenth-century attacks on an orthodox tradition which sought tocombine th e teachings of Christianity with those of Plato and Aristotle. Certainly, as one scholar recently observed, Epicurus and Lucretius, his greatestexponent, were "widely read in th e seventeenth and eighteenth centuries andwere a source of inspiration in many ways fo r the new philosophic-scientificenterprise"(Nichols, 181-82). Yet by th e close of th e eighteenth century th eEnlightenment seemed to have assured th e place of th e materialist and mechanistic spirit of Epicureanism and the consequent view that humans are naturally

I would like to thank Professor Walter Nicgorski fo r his helpful comments on an earlier draft ofthis paper.

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4 Interpretationindividual bein gs. Most significantly, th e Enlightenment had come to acceptth e Epicurean teachings that humans are not by nature political animals and thatreligion has no place in th e political order. Why then did Marx choose torekindle th e flames of battle when there was no war to be fought, no victory tobe won?

Marx, knowing that his contemporaries were familiar with Epicureanism,sought to resurrect the political-theological teachings of Epicurus because th efull significance of his critique of theology and philosophy was lost to them .Their readings were biased by th e commentaries of Cicero and Plutarch, andmore recently, by Gassendi.2 Gassendi was often cited by Enlightenmentthinkers fo r his seventeenth-century attempt to supplant Aristotelianism with anew reading of Epicurus. According to Marx, however, Gassendi only hadth e effect of furthering th e servitude of philosophy to theology. Two problemsissued from this misunderstanding of Epicurus. First, Epicurus' critique ofGreek thought, and thereby a complete understanding of that thought, had beenlost. Second, an incomplete understanding of Epicurus' critique of Greekthought meant that Marx's contemporaries were unable to reach a proper understanding of th e place of philosophy and theology in th e modem state. Thecontinued subordination of philosophy to both theology and th e city kept th e"highest divinity," human self-consciousness, in chains.

Marx's interest in the relationship of philosophy to th e city and th e gods hasbeen neglected in favor of three other issues which address th e place of religionin Marx's thought. The most general issue which has been addressed is thequestion of whether Marx's thought is, as Tucker contends, religious-mythicalor, as Bottomore argues, devoid of any religious overtones (Tucker; Marx1964, xii). Whether Marx relies, albeit in secular form, on any remnant oftradit ional political-theological ideas, or rejects them in favor of a radically newphilosophy is a longstanding controversy (Wessel). Another controversy hasdeveloped over th e allegation that Marx abandoned an early interest in religiononly in his later work. Sidney Hook argues that th e concept of alienation in th eearly writings "is originally and primarily religious in nature,"but in th e laterwritings Marx constructed an economic approach freed of "poetic fantasy"(Hook, 5). Lobkowitz argues, to the contrary, that Marx never took religionseriously and that his "view on religion and atheism did not change as th e yearspassed"(Lobkowitz, 306). Still a third area of disagreement concerns th e origins of Marx's radical break with Hegelian "theology." For many years it wasassumed that Feuerbach was the determining influence on Marx's early breakwith Hegel. More recently it has become fashionable to see Bauer as th e primary influence (Lobkowitz; McLellan; Rosen). The relative significance of th eYoung Hegelians is assumed to be crucial fo r th e development of Marx's political philosophy. Bauer's rejection of theology is different from that of Feuerbach, and the distinction, th e argument goes , is essential to grasp th e development of Marx's thought properly.


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods 5The question of the alleged religiosity or religious slant in Marx's thought,

whether found in his early work or throughout his writings, must come to term swith the fact that even his earliest effort clearly rejects any semblance of religious imagery or theology. One may even go a step further and suggest thatMarx's rejection of religion may not even be an issue of any particular importance since it is a commonplace of nineteenth-century thought . Moreover, because religious matters are irrelevant in Marx's later work, except insofar ashe continued to maintain that religion is a reflection of th e alienation whichmasks th e material contradictions of th e modern state, there is some justification fo r concluding that religion is of little importance in both his early andlater writings.

To trivialize or ignore Marx's early struggle with th e relationship betweenreligion and politics is as problematic as th e attempt to find a religious dimensions to his writings, however. Marx sought to expose th e mythical foundationof the modern state precisely because he appreciated th e importance of religion.He believed that religion is a false consciousness which expresses th e separation and withdrawal of man from man. Yet religion has its own truth. Marxrejected Kant's critique of religion for merely denying the existence of Godbecause Marx recognized the significance of th e multiplicity of religious belief."All gods,"he wrote , "the pagan as well as th e Christian ones, have a realexistence"(1976a, 104). On th e one hand, Marx did not doubt that "religion isonly th e illusory sun about which man revolves so long as he does not revolveabout himsel f (1970, 132). On th e other hand, he considered religion, giventhat man has yet to revolve around himself, th e most crucial development ofhuman consciousness. The existence of religious belief is proof "of th e existence of essential human self-consciousness"(1976a, 104).

The above statement typifies both Bauer's and Feuerbach's inversion ofwhat had long been accepted as proof of the existence of God: th e multiplicityof religious belief demonstrates not th e presence of God in th e world, but ofmen who create gods in their own image. In admitting Marx's indebtedness toBauer and Feuerbach we run th e risk of being directed away from Marx'sargument. Whatever truth he found in religion remained a limited truth, however, he went beyond his teachers by recognizing th at th e critique of religion isthe prerequisite to th e critique of politics.3 For Marx, it was not enough to pointto the falsity of religious doctrine. The limits of th e religious mind revealed th elimits of a human consciousness not wholly freed from th e bonds of the state.The political-theological quest ion, that is, is it both possible and desirable tofree man from th e city and the gods, is so significant to the history of politicalphilosophy that I consider it to be th e most significant religious issue whichMarx raises.

The motivation for Marx's study of Epicurus was not an interest in antiquityas such , but his desire to expose th e mythic origins of th e modern philosophyof transcendence. In returning to Epicurus, Marx sought to expose th e root of


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6 Interpretationth e tradition which culminated in Hegel, the philosopher and theologian of th emodern state. Accordingly, this study begins with Marx's understanding of th etheological-mythical character of Hegel's philosophy.

Following a discussion of Marx's confrontation with the modern philosophyof transcendence, I shall return to th e subject of Epicurus' attack. Here I am notso much interested in Marx's defense of Epicurus as I am in Marx's argumentwith th e originators of th e philosophy of t ranscendence. In part, this is anattack on Aristotle, but even more it is an assault on Platonic political philosophy. Marx well understood that Plato and Aristotle, each fo r his own reasons,failed to free philosophy from th e gods and the city. In discussing th e notebooks and th e dissertation itself, I shall address tw o issues which Marx raisedin his discussion of the limits of Platonic political philosophy. Marx thoughtthat he had uncovered th e limits of Plato's approach to the political-theologicalquestion both in his account of th e life and death of Socrates and in his use ofmyth. In both matters I shall compare Marx's approach to Plato's account ofSocrates with that of Hegel. Marx's t reatment of Socrates borrows much fromHegel, yet where he turns from Hegel, we are better able to appreciate th esignificance of Marx's approach to both th e ancient and modern struggle withreligion and politics. In Hegel's view, th e Platonic Socrates, in seeking to freeself-consciousness from th e city at th e same t ime as confronting the city, wasth e first to pose th e problem of self-consciousness correctly. However, Hegelalso insisted that Socrates' and Plato's understanding of self-consciousness waslimited by their denial that philosophy could lead to absolute knowledge, orwisdom, in this world. Whereas Socrates had posed th e right question by introducing th e quest fo r self-consciousness, it was left to himself, Hegel thought,to show that self-consciousness could be fully realized by mortal men in thestate.

Marx th ough t th at Hegel had started from th e same point as Socrates whenhe supposed that self-consciousness necessarily "tends to extend itself, to expand, to spread through th e whole domain of th e reality given to man and inman"(Kojeve, 82). Yet Marx denied that Hegel had gone beyond Plato indemonstrating that philosophy had in theory, and in fact, extended self-consciousness to the point of absolute wisdom, a wisdom that comprehended th etotality of being. Marx denied, in other words, that Hegel's restatement of th ePlatonic problem of self-consciousness led to its successful resolution. Marxmade it clear that Hegel had only repeated, albeit in a more sophisticated manner, th e same mistake made by Plato. For similar reasons Marx returned toAristotle . Hegel had recognized Aristotle as th e first to offer a solution to th eSocratic quest by suggesting that self-consciousness could be realized in thestate. Hegel saw this as a step toward th e realization of self-consciousness,albeit a step within th e Platonic mold. Marx, however, saw in Aristotle onlyth e development of th e Platonic doctrine which was later to emerge in Hegel.

I shall conclude my discussion with a presentation of Marx's account of the


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City an d the Gods 7relationship between Epicurean physics and th e Epicurean attempt to free philosophy from its dependence on th e gods and th e city. I shall consider that partof Marx's detailed discussion of th e distinction between Epicurean and De -mocritean physics which allows us to reach th e m o re s ig n if ic an t matter , Epicurus'cr it iq ue o f Greek theology a nd p h il os op h y. Epicurean philosophy founded th e basic distinction between science and theology, Marx argued, in orderto establish th e principles fo r the "natural science of self-consciousne(Marx1976a, 73). In th e concluding chapter of the dissertation, Marx argued thatthe natural science of self-consciousness did more than overcome th e limitations o f Democritean physics. Most significantly, Epicurus rescued philosophyfrom th e city and th e gods to which it had been chained by his predecessors. Indefending Epicurus, Marx assumed that he had successfully answered th e political-theological questions w hic h w ere raised by Aristotle and Plato. He furtherassumed th at th at answer provided the basis fo r understanding th e political-theological issue of th e modern age.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRANSCENDENCE

In his study of Epicurus Marx sought to expose th e origin of th e myth of th ephilosophy of t ranscendence in order to free consciousness from the city andreligion. In th e foreword to his doctoral thesis Marx identified his task as onewith that of Prometheus who , in reply to th e gods, said: "Better to be th eservant of this rock / Than faithful boy to Father Zeus." Better, in other words,to suffer the consequences fo r shattering th e omniscience of th e gods in bringing forth th e tru th to mank ind , than to be like "those poor March hares wh or ej oi ce o ve r th e apparently worsened civil position ofphilosoor Marx,breaking th e hold of the state a nd r el ig i on over philosophy wa s necessary in th efight against "all heavenly and earthly gods wh o do n ot a ck no wl ed ge humanself-consciousness as the highest divinity."

The inability of modern philosophy to recognize self-consciousness as the"highest divinity" wa s n ow here m ore evident to Marx than in its failure torecognize th e great paradox posed by the place of religion in the modern state.As th e m o d e m state became free from the grip of religion, religion assum ed aplace as significant as any it had achieved in th e past. The failure of philosophyto understand th e practical significance of religion was a ss oc ia te d w it h another

issue of even greater importance. Philosophy, rather than recognize the t ruesignificance of religion in th e modern state, abandoned th e critique of th e stateand religion and instead remained firmly entrenched in th e tr an scenden t tradition which derived from Platonic political philosophy and Christianity. Philosophy, rather than having freed man, continued to justify his dependence on th ecity an d th e gods.Hegel, the greatest philosopher of transcendence, provided a justification fo r


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8 Interpretationthe illusions which continued man's dependence on politics and religion. Feuerbach confirmed Marx's view that "the secret of speculative philosophy is theology."Indeed, Hegel was limited by his inability to break fully with th e verytradition which he sought to supplant. Hegel only turned theological demonstrations upside down in order to justify them (Marx 1976a, 103).

In characterizing Hegel's method as "theological," Marx knew that Hegel'ssolution to th e problem of wisdom could hardly be associated with tradit ionalreligious concepts. Hegel could not accept the earlier systems since they required th e existence of a t ranscendent God, and in so doing denied th e abilityof self-consciousness to return fully to itself. What was th e reason, then, forMarx having characterized Hegel's method as theological? Hegel's idea thatself-consciousness could only be realized by a mortal man at a particular moment in history, that is, by th e philosopher in the modem state who knows thathe is fully self-conscious, had dis tinguished his from earlier theological syst ems . Yet Hegel's belief that self-consciousness was, in fact, realized in th emodem state did no more to solve th e problem of self-consciousness than th ePla tonic idea that wisdom or self-consciousness could not be realized by manand th e Christian idea th at th e "synthesis of th e Particular and th e Universal, iseffected only in and by th e beyond, after man's death" (Kojeve, 67). Marxrejected Hegel, then, fo r he committed th e same mistake as past "theologians"by having held that th e state had solved the problem of self-consciousness intheory and fact.

Marx called Hegel's idea that th e state overcame the particularity of civilsociety th e "theological notion of th e political state"(1970, 119).4 As Christians are equal in heaven and unequal on earth, so to o individuals are equal "inthe heaven of their political world yet unequal in the earthly existence of civilsociety"(1970, 80). Christianity mystified reality by inverting th e relationshipbetween man and God; man created God, not God man. So, too, Hegel mystified th e modem state; th e constitution was a creation of people , not as Hegelargued, the people a creation of th e constitution. Just as religion establishedGod as th e creator in order to escape th e pain and suffering of existence, sotoo, th e constitution, in order to overcome th e conflict within civil society,established the modem state. The idea of unity in th e modem state belied th eindependent existence and alienation of th e private sphere. Marx argued thatth e content of civil society (property, contract, marriage) lay outside th e constitution. As "the actual man is th e private man,"civil society "is the accomplished principle of individualism" (1970, 81-82). The state did not overcometh e individuality of civil society. Political life was , fo r Hegel, only in th e air,th e ethereal region of civil society. Hegel's state was th us th e spirit; it transcended th e conflict rooted in civil society just as Christ transcends the flesh of thisworld.

Marx rejected Hegel for following in th e tradit ion initiated by Plato andt ransformed by Christianity into a philosophy of transcendence. In the disserta-


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods 9tion Marx suggested that Hegel's failure to break with th e philosophy of transcendence derived from his failure to grasp th e significance of myth in Pla tonicphilosophy. Although Hegel understood that Christianity, "the consummatephilosophy of

transcendence,"

bore a profound resemblance to Platonic philosophy, "the heartbeat of th e philosophy of transcendence," he was unable toestablish properly th e cause of and relationship between th e respective t ranscendent doctrines (Marx 1976b, 498). Certainly Hegel distinguished Platonic philosophy from Christianity in the following way: th e Platonic method begins withdialectic turning man inward toward his own consciousness, while Christianityproceeds with Christ as th e beginning of consciousness, fo r where grace isbestowed th e subject is brought to consciousness of sin. Moreover, Hegel wasaware that th e distinction between consciousness of self and consciousness ofsin required distinguishing between Socratic irony and grace, and that neitherth e Platonic nor th e Christian ideal solved th e problem of self-consciousness.The last great philosopher of modernity, as well as its last great theologian,Hegel remained firmly entrenched in th e speculative tradition which had originated in Greece, however. Having failed to realize th e significance of Platonicmyth , he continued down th e path of t ranscendence which Plato had openedand which Christianity blazed.

In arguing that Marx's struggle with Hegel led him to attack th e Platonicroot of Hegelian philosophy, I may draw support from Sidney Hook's claimthat "in repudiating Hegel, Marx is also repudiating Plato and th e whole Platonic tradition" (1971, 35). Hook insisted that Marx, in opposition to th e Platonic tradition, returned to Aristotle's naturalism fo r th e basis of his dialecticalmaterialism. There is, however, a significant problem in Hook's reading ofMarx's relationship to Hegel, Plato and Aristo tle . We may assume that Marxknew that Hegel himself had clearly accepted the superiority of Aristotle,whom he considered "excels Plato in speculative depth" (Hegel 1983, 2:119).Indeed, Marx had considered that Aristotle, even as he had turned from histeacher, was firmly planted in th e tr ad ition which Plato had originated. Thesignificant stmggle for th e history of philosophy was not so much that whichobtained between Plato and Aristotle as th e one between the tr ad i ti on foundedby Socrates and developed by Plato and Aristotle and th e tradition developedby Epicurus. Perhaps it is more correct to say that th e critical struggle was , asHegel had sought to demonstrate, one between philosophy and theology.

Epicurus directed Marx back to Plato's account of Socrates, which warranted

Socrates'

designation as the founder of both the philosophy of self-consciousness and th e philosophy of t ranscendence. In Platonic philosophy Socrates is presented as the first to break with t he teach ings of th e city and th e godsby turning man to himself . Because he was the first to show that th e tme sourceof self-consciousness was neither the city nor th e gods, he was th e first tosuggest th e philosophy of self-consciousness. Yet because he was unable tobreak entirely from the city and the gods, he sought refuge in myth and laid th e


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10 Interpretationfoundation for th e philosophy of transcendence. Marx, holding that it was Platonic philosophy itself which , in turning man away from th e city and th e gods,sowed th e seeds fo r th e destruction of th e philosophy of transcendence, recognized Epicurus as th e first to expose th e myth of transcendence in P latonicphilosophy.

In th e notebooks prepared fo r his study of Epicurus Marx, following Hegel,argued that " the firs t Greek wise men are th e real spirit, th e embodied knowledge of substance"(1976b, 436 ). Marx meant by this that these first wise menwere only capable of mimicking the laws and moral life of th e city. These pre-Socratic wise men "are only th e vessels, th e Pythia, from which th e substanceresounds in general, single precepts, their language is as yet only that of th esubstance become vocal, th e simple forces of moral life which are revealed."The first wise men were unable to take a critical stance against the city becausethey "extol state life as real reason."For these first wise men philosophy wastherefore impossible, since their consciousness was merely a reflection of th eexisting moral and political climate obtaining in Greece at that t ime.

Marx attributed th e fall of the first sophos , and thu s th e rise of philosophy,to th e teachings "embodied in Socrates as its demiurge" and in Platonic philosophy (1976a, 36). H e wrote that th e "the reason why Socrates is so important isthat th e relation of Greek philosophy to th e Greek spirit, and therefore its innerlimit, is expressed in

him"(1976b, 438-39) . With Socrates th e relationshipbetween th e sophos and th e city is forever changed. The principle of philoso

phy becomes, in the embodiment of th e sophos, th e subjective spirit of his ownconsciousness. The subjective spirit is now th e vessel of substance which"knows that it has th e ideality in itself, is th e judgment of th e concept."InSocrates, th e subjective spirit of consciousness is bom of the city, but it takes asubjective striving, a leap, a falling away from th e city. The subjective spirit isa force internal to spirit itself, it is Socrates' daemon. Socrates' wisdom is hisconsciousness "that he carries th e daemon in himself." His philosophy is th e"abstract determination of th e good"which brings man to himself, just as itseparates him from th e city. Socrates' philosophy is therefore "essentially hisown wisdom, his owngoodness"1976b, 439).

Yet the daemon of Socrates, even as it detached him from th e city, directedhim toward th e city. Socrates did not withdraw from th e city, nor did he wraphis relationship with th e city in mystery; he was not a seer, "but a sociableman"(1976b, 436). Socrates' purpose was "in practice th e determination of th eindividual spirits, education and teaching" (1976b, 438). His calling was toteach about th e world. Marx, citing Hegel as his authority, wrote that Socrates'method was a "dialectic trap through which human common sense is precipitated out of its motley ossification . . . into th e tmth immanent in humancommon sense itself (1976b, 494). Socrates' teaching is a practical activity"by which he leads single individuals out of th e determination of substantialityto determination in themselves." Thus while Socrates leads men away from th e


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods 1 1city, he never abandons it. Instead, he confronted citizens in an effort to provide the city with a new foundation.

Socrates, Marx argued, remained rooted in th e life of th e state, as he insisted that he owed "his right to exist only to the laws of th e state to which hebelongs, to its religion," which appeared to him as his own nature. Socrates'refusal to break with th e laws and religion of th e city was th e cause of hisdeath. Thus in the Apology Socrates himself is presented as saying that hecannot cease from th e practice of philosophy, even though it may mean hisdeath, since he was attached to the city by th e god (30b-e). Because Socratesinsisted that he owed his existence to th e city and th e god he was unable , inboth thought and action, to free consciousness from th e city and its myths.

In Marx's estimation th e death of Socrates provided th e evidence of th elimits of Socrates' teaching. The true free spirit, contrary to Socrates, "enduresand overcomes all contradictions and . . . need not recognize any natural conditions as such"(1976b, 438). The tme free spirit is a self-determined individual,who will act according to his own consciousness, unencumbered by th e laws ofth e city. Socrates, by his own admission, owed too much to Athens to separatehimself radically from the city and thereby survive. Socrates' death proved th edeficiency of his daemon and th us th e limits of his self-consciousness.

Marx recognized that Socratic dialectic was, in part, an expression of Socrates'love which turned him to w ard th e city. Yet at the same t ime the "practical motion"of dialectic led him to collide with th e city, and this, in turn, led tohis death. Embodied in Socrates' life are both love and death, creativity anddestruction, which return man to himself at th e same t ime as tying him to thecity. Even though he was th e judge of his state he must perish "precisely because he is bom of th e substantial"from which he could not escape.

Marx's approach to the death of Socrates may be attributed to the influenceof Bauer's insistence on the necessity of radically separating self-consciousnessfrom all material concerns. However, if th e point was Bauer's radical self-consciousness, would M arx have ignored another possible interpretation, fo rexample, a promethean one which would have seen in Socrates' death a radicalseparation from Athenian life? Marx, in other words, could have seen in th edeath of Socrates a radical step toward th e fulfillment of th e idea of self-consciousness and a turning away from th e laws and religion of th e city. This is, infact, what Hegel said in regard to th e death of Socrates.

Marx, contrary to Hegel, was unwilling to see in Socrates' death, as opposed to his life, any resemblance to a promethean act. Marx saw little more inSocrates' death than his failure to break from the city and fully express his self-consciousness. Socrates offered a critique of th e city, but a critique which wasnecessarily limited inasmuch as it was bound to the city. Socrates must die, andPlato can do no more than create an Ideal, never comprehending th e limits ofth e city or his philosophy.

Plato, according to Marx, used myth to justify Socrates' commitment to a


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12 Interpretationlife of philosophy because he was unable to give an adequate justification fo rSocrates' account of th e philosophical life as a preparation for death (Phaedo64a). Socrates himself is presented in th e Platonic dialogues as having admittedthat his account of the immortality of th e soul is no more than a myth necessitated by philosophy's inability to demonstrate that "there is no escape from evilor salvation fo r it (the soul) except by becoming as good and wise asposs(Phaedo 107d; Republic 614b-21d). Platonic myth , as Marx understood it, wasa literary way out of th e dilemma posed by Socrates' philosophical life necessarily having culminated in his being put to death by th e city. Platonic philosophy required that Socrates provide a mythic account of th e philosophic lifebecause it was unable to overcome th e fact that Socrates' dependence on thecity and th e gods led to his death.

The question one should ask when reading Plato is, according to Marx:"why is this mythologizing to be found in those dialogues which mainly expound moral and religious truths" (1976b, 497)? Consider th e fact, Marxwrote , that th e Parmenides is free from myth. Plato's use of myth was no morethan an admission of his inability to free self-consciousness from th e cityand th e gods. On th e one hand, this demonstrated that Plato's recourse to mythwas an admission of the limits of his philosophy. On th e other hand, Marxrecognized this as further proof that tme knowledge is human, sociable andattainable.

In turning the life of Socrates into a "comprehensive, world embracing philosophy" Plato had been accused of creating a philosophy with the character ofreligion. Marx, in opposition to this, considered Plato's literary use of myth.By insisting that myth is no more than a Platonic device necessitated by th einability of the dialectic form to account fo r Socrates' death, Marx sought torescue him from th e Christian cast to which he had been reduced. In th e notebooks written in preparation for the dissertation Marx compared Christianity, or"personified religion,"with Platonic philosophy, or "personified philosophy,"and concluded "that th e philosopher Socrates is related to Christ as a philosopher to a teacher of religion"(1976b, 493). The philosopher and teacher ofreligion are both concerned with psyche (the soul). The relationship betweenPlatonic philosophy and Christianity may be found in th e "relationship of Platonic ideas to th e Christian logos, th e relationship of th e Platonic recollection toth e Christian restoration of man to his original image" (1976b, 495). In recognizing that both Platonic philosophy and Christianity sought to transform th ehuman psyche through myth, Marx did not intend to equate th e doctr ines . ThePlatonic myth of recollection was an attempt to overcome th e inability ofSocratic dialectic to provide a reasoned argument fo r choosing th e philosophical life over any other life. The mythical presentation of th e rewards and punishments in th e world to come was an educational device to supplement Socrates'inability to demonstrate that th e just life was good fo r its own sake. Marxbelieved that a proper understanding of Platonic myth revealed th e implicitatheism of th e Platonic philosophy.


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods 13Christianity went further than Platonic philosophy because it took Socrates'

mythological claims about life after death and transformed them, through anaccount of th e death and resurrection of Christ, into a philosophy of transcendence. Just as Christianity turned th e Platonic quest fo r self-knowledge into ananswer, Platonic myth became th e Christian tmth . Christianity, as Marx understood it, adopted th e myth of life after death because it denied th e possibilitythat a psyche could be directed to its "original image" in this world. Christianity, having abandoned this world altogether, sought to lead men by convincing them of th e tmth of th e immortality of souls.

In rescuing Plato from th e weight of th e Christian tradition Marx was notabout to abandon th e Platonic origins of Christianity. In distinguishing Plato'srecourse to myth from th e Christian doctrine of transcendence Marx was able toexpose th e origin of th e philosophy of t ranscendence. According to Marx, however much Platonic and Christian teachings differed, they both sought recourseto myth because of their inability to overcome th e attachment of self-consciousness to the city and god(s). The tme significance of discovering the origin ofth e philosophy of transcendence was, of course, that it enabled Marx to uncover the origin of Hegel's "theology."

It seems ironic that Marx found the origin of Hegel's "theology" in Plato'suse of myth. I say this because Hegel was th e source of Marx's view thatSocrates was th e originator of th e principle "that man has to find from himselfboth th e end of his actions and the end of th e world, and must attain to tmththrough himself (Hegel 1983, 1:386). Marx learned from Hegel, in otherwords, that Socrates was th e first to return man to himself as th e originatingpoint of consciousness. Marx also followed Hegel in holding that Socrates'method, even as it drew men into themselves, was "no withdrawal from existence,"since his philosophical teaching required social intercourse. Socrates'wisdom, according to both Hegel and Marx, was human and sociable. 5 Why,then, did Marx begin to abandon Hegel's approach to the problem of consciousness? Perhaps a further consideration of Hegel's t reatment of Socrateswill be of some help. Hegel, contrary to Marx, considered it important to discuss that side of Socratic irony which taught th e limits of consciousness; that is,consciousness is surprised when it is led to doubt. Socrates' own wisdom is that"he knew nothing and th e re fo re taught nothing"(Hegel 1983, 1:404). In conversation with Socrates one comes to the conclusion "that what we knew hasrefuted itself." Hegel considered th e limits which were implied by th edaemonic urge to self-consciousness as fundamental to th e teaching of Socraticirony.

I cannot attempt to explicate th e Socratic teaching. However, it is importantto raise th e question of why Marx refused to consider seriously even so basic atenet of Socratic irony as Socrates' insistence that his daemon only instructedhim in what not to do and never told him what action to take (Apology 3 Id).Because Marx broke with Hegel on this matter , we must assume that he wasaware of that side of the Socratic teaching whose significance he denied. Why,


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14 Interpretationthen, did he reject that side of th e Socratic teaching which insisted on thenecessary limits of human wisdom? Perhaps we may begin to understand th ereason fo r Marx's position by pairing it with another issue where he broke withHegel. Hegel recognized that it wa s precisely Socrates' attachment to the cityw h ic h e na bl ed him to begin to free self-consciousness from the city. By refusing to escape from the city and save his life, Socrates pointed to th e dependence of c o ns ci o us n es s o n th e city, but at th e same t ime he pointed to that whichis beyond the life of any p a rt ic u la r c it y . In pointing to the nature of the wholeof which th e self and the city were only parts, Socrates suggested the possibility fo r self-consciousness to attain absolute w is do m e ve n though, in th e end,he held that human wisdom was limited by nature.

Hegel, of course, in his critique of the limits of th e Socratic teaching, standsas a modem thinker in opposition to Socrates. For Hegel, Socrates' genius "isnot Socrates himself, not his opinions and conviction, but an oracle which ,however, is not external, but is subjective, his oracle"(1983, 1:422). Hegelconsidered this a historical leap toward self-consciousness but limited in thatSocrates' genius remained , in part, unconscious rather than a p u re e xp re ss io nof self-consciousness. Socrates knew, as Kojeve points out all philosophersmust know, that "that ma n is Wise wh o is capable of answering in a comprehensible or satisfactory m an ne r all questions that can be asked him concerninghis acts, an d c ap ab le of answering in such fashion that th e entirety of his answers form a coherent discourse" (Kojeve, 75). Hegel, wh o thought he hadproved that he had demonstrated this wisdom, rejected Socrates for denying th epossibility that philosophy could result in this wisdom. Hegel wa s willing torecognize th e limit of human knowledge as Socrates presented it, ye t he stillmaintained that this wa s a limit conditioned by history, rather than one inherentin man's nature. Hegel attributed Plato's inability to see th e unity amid th ediversity of th e speculative project to his historical situation. Only in th e mo dem world ca n absolute independence return into th e unity of th e idea.Hegel's discussion of Plato's limited understanding of freedom is particularly interesting, given Marx's later perspective, when he reviewed Plato's"suppression of th e principle of individuality" in considering the abolition ofprivate property in the Republic. Hegel argued that we may see in Plato's abolition of private property "the very limit of the Platonic Idea to emerge as anabstract idea" (1983, 2:113). By abstract, he also meant that Plato was notidealistic enough in his onesided presentation of individual freedom. Plato wasonly capable of seeing th e opposition between individuality and the unity of th estate. Concrete individuality in private property, or th e family, as it is a possession and stands in a living relation with th e person "in which my person assuch comes into existence, into reality"is destroyed in Plato's Republic.There are no private persons, only man as th e universal individual in th e state."But Being to Philosophy," Hegel objected, "is no abstraction, but th e unity ofthe universal and reality, or its content."Instead of destroying th e individual


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City an d the Gods 15conscience, as Plato does, philosophy sees th at the individual "connects itselfwith th e whole, chooses a position fo r itself, and thus makes itself a moral fact"(1983, 2:109). Hegel, in opposition to Plato, chose to side w ith Aristotle, wh ohe considered had recognized the same mistake in Plato.

Yet Hegel also held that Plato "sometimes ignored" subjective freedom "because it proved itself to be what wrought th e mi n of Greece" (1983, 2:109).Hegel understood, for example, that Plato's abolition of private property isevidence that he knew and taught that the unfolding of self-consciousnessthreatened to undermine the city. The abstract idea of th e city is not , as Marxwould have it, only an admission of an inability to elevate self-consciousnessbeyond the confines of th e polis. The abstract idea is, as is myth , a means toelevate me n from particular to universal understanding. Hegel w ar ne d a ga in stth e mistaken belief which sees in th e myth itself a simple presentation of whatis mo st e xc elle nt in Platonic philosophy. The tm e meaning of Platonic myth isnot revealed in th e simple representations in th e dialogues.

Hegel d id hold, as Marx wa s to hold later, that Plato's doctrine of th e immortality of the psyche was, in a sense, no more than popular philosophyw h ic h p e rm i tt ed him to present Socrates in heroic form (1983, 2:1-48; 1:443).Yet, as we have seen, Hegel observed in Plato and Socrates a deeper teachingwhich Marx either denied or ignored. Plato's use of myth is, fo r Hegel, adevice to teach that "the tmth lies w ith in us an d the spiritual content w ith in usmust be brought intoconsciousness"Hegel 1984, 413). He did not believe thatPlato's myth of the immortality of th e psyche should be understood in a theological sense, that is, in terms of the soul's existence before birth and afterdeath. Hegel's view of Platonic myth is thus n ei th er w ha t Marx took it to be, apopular answer to a wrong question, no r what Christian theologians took it tobe, a tme answer to the fundamental question. Hegel, instead, argued thatPlato's myth of r ec o ll ec ti on a nd immortality is Plato's tmth that "consciousnessin th e individual is in reason th e divine reality and life; that m an perceives andrecognizes it in pure thought, and that this knowledge is itself th e heavenlyabode andmovement"1983, 2:41). Although Socrates wa s wrong in supposing that self-consciousness could not be obtained by mortal man, he at leastposed th e right question by directing man to all that which constituted self-consciousness.

Plato's account of Socrates' death is, fo r Hegel, a contribution to the historyof consciousness. The mythic view of immortality provided, as did Socrates'death itself, fo r th e return of consciousness to th e city at th e same tim e th at itpointed consciusness away from th e city. Hegel to ok th e judgment of Socratesby Athens and Aristophanes' account of Socrates' teaching to have shownPlato's contribution. Aristophanes understood that Socratic philosophy posed athreat to th e city, since "the idea of law had been shaken"(1983, 1:426).Having summarized th e exaggerated and humorous account of Socrates in th eClouds, Hegel observed that Aristophanes was correct in suggesting that Soc-


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16 Interpretationrates'reflecting consciousness was a threat to the city. In considering th eaccount of Socrates' trial in Plato's Apology and Xenophon's Memorabilia,Hegel concluded that th e charges were tme. Socrates both denied the city'steaching on the gods and he led th e youth astray. The justice of both chargesfollowed from his placing "the contingency of judgment in himself, since hehad his D aemon in his own consciousness, (and) thereby abolished the externaluniversal Daemon from which the Greeks obtained their judgments." Hegelwas not persuaded that Socrates' apology was intended as a defense. Instead,Hegel argued that Socrates in his very trial still refused to accept the laws of th ecity. By refusing to recommend a punishment fo r himself, he denied the authority of th e guilty verdict and thus the authority of the laws. Indeed, Socrates'stmggle fo r self-conscious spirit brought about his death, but by forcing hisdeath, he furthered the cause of self-consciousness, in Hegel's view.

Now we may assume that Marx knew, both from his own reading of Plato'sdialogues and from Hegel's commentary , that Socrates' insistence on the necessary limits of his wisdom was a considerable element of Socra tic irony . In terestingly, Marx chose not to comment on this aspect of dialectic and insteadconsidered only that part of Socratic irony which taught th e positive side ofself-consciousness. Marx's failure to discuss anything other than the power orpositive side of self-consciousness leads us to conclude that he was unimpressed by whatever purpose Socrates might have had in confronting us withth e limits of human knowledge.

Marx, of course, could not accept th a t th ere was a nature which ordered th ewhole any more than he could accept that human knowledge was subject toanything other than material and thus temporal limits. He never seriously considered Socrates' discussion of the limits of human wisdom because he rejectedboth th e dependence of consciousness on th e city and the natural order in whichhuman wisdom was capable only of sharing in a glimpse of th e parts. Marx,then, saw in Plato's account of Socrates only an implicit acknowledgment ofth e limits, not of nature, but of th e Socratic teaching.

I shall not consider the adequacy of Marx's account of Socratic dialectic.For our purpose it is enough to recognize that what Marx takes to be th e essential element of dialectic, that it returns man to himself by recognizing "the tmthimmanent in common sense itself," may rightly be considered only one part ofSocratic irony. In crediting Socrates with making a significant contribution toth e development of self-consciousness, Marx only valued Socrates' daemon fo rshowing that self-consciousness was an activity emanating from th e individual.Having identified Socrates' wisdom as human and sociable, Marx held that thatpart of th e Socratic teaching which taught th e limits of human wisdom merelyreflected Socrates' inability to free consciousness from the gods and th e city.Plato's metaphysical doctrines, such as th e transmigration of souls and theoryof forms were, in Marx's view, merely attempts to overcome, in speech, Socrates'inability to free consciousness from th e gods and th e city. As such, Plato


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods 17mystified Socrates' teaching because he could provide a satisfactory accountneither fo r Socrates' pursuit of philosophy no r fo r his death.

Marx's onesided approach to Socrates has been attributed to the influence ofFeuerbach's insistence on th e divinity of man, Bauer's power of self-consciousness, or th e thought of both. It seems certain that during the writing of hisdissertation, Marx was not fully exposed to Feuerbach's position, and it wouldthus be difficult to make the case in regard to his thought (see McLellan, 8 5-116). We may accept the notion that Marx was, to a certain extent, influencedby Bauer's thought . But this position, even if correct, does not explain th esignificance of Marx's position. The most interesting q ue st io n a bo ut this position concerns his refusal to consider that part of th e Socratic teaching regardingth e limits of wisdom. The answer does, in part, point to th e influence not onlyof Bauer, or any particular thinker, but also to Marx's stand on th e side of th eEnlightenment in opposition to Platonic philosophy. Indeed, Marx's attractionto Epicurus is in itself to be expected, as many children of the Enlightenmentsought to return to his teachings. Jefferson, fo r example, called him "our master Epicurus," to whom we may return to save philosophy (including th e teachings of Jesus) from the mysteries of Platonism (Jefferson, 14:386, 15:219).Marx, in common with late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century thinkers,wa s in large part attracted to Epicums because he taught that that portion of th ePlatonic teaching which addressed th e limits of man's w isdom ou ght to bedisregarded.

There is, however, another reason fo r Marx's approach to Socrates and fo rhis denial of Hegel's account of Socrates' contribution to th e history of self-consciousness. In rejecting th e significance of Socrates' view of th e limits ofself-knowledge, he sought to lay bare th e origin of Hegel's mistaken assumptio n th at he had answered th e problem of self-consciousness. Marx agreed withHegel's assertion that Plato wa s wrong in supposing that man's quest fo rknowledge must always remain just that, a quest. Marx accepted, in principle,Hegel's proposition that self-consciousness could be fully realized by mortalmen. Let us put it this way: Marx understood what was at stake in Hegel'sassertion that it wa s both necessary that self-consciousness be attained in history, and that he, Hegel, had attained self-consciousness in his philosophy ofth e modem state. Having asserted that Hegel had failed to show th at th e abstract Idea had become Concrete (that th e idea had not been realized with th estate), Marx returned to the root of t ranscendence in order to expose Hegel'sfailure. Having shown the reason fo r Plato's recourse to myth, and havingidentified it as th e origin of Hegel's

"theology,"Marx sought, in returning to

Epicums, to reopen th e case which Hegel thought he had closed.I have not developed Marx's understanding of Epicums' break with Platonic

philosophy. I have only stated Marx's contention that Epicums e st ab li sh ed a nalternative to the philosophy of transcendence which originated in Platonic philosophy, and I have sought to show that Marx returned to Plato as th e begin-


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18 Interpretationning point of his critique of th e philosophy of transcendence. How had Epicums , according to Marx, undermined Platonic philosophy? In order to answerthis question we must first recognize that Epicums' critique of Platonic philosophy is not confined to Plato. In fact, Marx's observations on Epicums' contribution to the critique of th e philosophy of transcendence which originated withPlato are most explicit when directed toward Aristotle. Before addressingMarx's discussion of Epicums' critique of Aristotle, I shall turn briefly toHegel. Like Marx, he considered that Aristotle had remained within the speculative tradit ion which Plato had originated. Hegel, fo r example , thought that itwas particularly significant that we understand "how fa r Aristotle carried outwhat in th e Platonic principle had been begun" (1983, 2:117). But there isanother reason fo r examining Hegel's approach to Aristotle. What Hegel tookto be Aristotle's contribution to political philosophy was exactly what Marx hadidentified as the reason fo r Epicums' rejection of Aristotle in particular andPlatonic philosophy in general. In considering th e difference between Marx'sand Hegel's understanding of Aristotle, we are better prepared to appreciateMarx's purpose fo r returning to Epicums. In returning to Epicums' critique ofAristotle, Marx was able to expose the limits of th e philosopher closest toHegel and thereby to criticize Hegel himself.

First, I shall consider th e grounds fo r Hegel's assertion that Aristotle carriedout what Plato had begun . Hegel had warned against committing th e kind oferror which Hook committed in distinguishing Plato's speculative philosophyfrom Aristot le 's naturalism. Yet Hegel also suggested that it was quite easy tomake th e mistaken distinction between Aristotle's "realism" and Plato's "idealism." Aristotle's method encouraged th e error, since he "a lways seems to havephilosophized only respecting th e individual and particular"and seems to havehad no unifying principle which accounted fo r th e Absolute in its totality(1983, 2:1 17, 137, 229). The form of Aristotle's philosophy gave it th e appearance of denying th e totality of speculative philosophy. Moreover, since Aristotl e had rejected both abstract Platonic ideas (including th e immortality ofsouls), and th e principle that wisdom cannot be achieved by man in this world,it was easy to see his turning from Plato as a radical departure from his Platonicorigins. Nevertheless, th e subjects of Aristotle's method "still form a totality oftruly speculative philosophy," since through contemplation the philosopher isable to absorb all particular subjects of philosophical inquiry (1983, 2:118,228). Aristotle understood in thought, at least, that absolute wisdom was possible and that its comprehension of totality was opposed to th e destruction of th eindividual and particular. In contemplation one was able to know that totalitycomprised th e individuality of substances which, in their self-determination,ultimately pointed to the universal end, or to th e one Absolute, the idea of God.It is interesting to note here that Hegel concluded th e Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy with a quotation from Aristotle's Metaphysics in which he set forth his ideaof a God who , having no involvement in the world, is th e essence of pure


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods 19contemplation. Now while it would be wrong to equate Hegel's idea of Godwith that of Plato or Aristotle, it is revealing that Hegel had thought that Aristotle's "theology" had gone a long way toward developing th e proper understanding of th e Absolute. Although Aristotle's method was l imited insofar as he wasunable to develop a "unifying principle"which made concrete th e particularconceptions of knowledge, he went further than Plato in recognizing that mancould attain self-consciousness through divine contemplation.

In Hegel's treatment of Aristotle's political philosophy we find a discussionof th e extent and limit of Aristotle's contribution to th e development of self-consciousness. The limits of Aristotle's speculative power could be seen in hisapproach to individual freedom. Although Aristotle recognized, as Plato hadnot, that individuality was not destroyed in th e concept of th e state, he wasunable to conceive of the freedom of individuals in its highest sense. In commenting on Aristotle's Politics, Hegel observed that Aristotle could have noknowledge of natural right, since "the idea of abstract man outside of anyactual relation to others"could not yet be known (1983, 2:208). Aristotle'scharacterization of man as a "political animal"prevented him from understanding that th e whole of which th e individuals were parts did not lessen th e independence of each particular individual. Because Aristotle was unable to see th ecomplete independence of th e parts he, too, was unable to see th e nature of thatwhich bound the whole together.

Yet Hegel did admit that, in part , Aristotle's treatment of th e citizen wassuperior to th at of many thinkers of his own era who were unable to see beyondth e isolated individual to th e spirit which holds the parts together (1983,2:209). Aristotle knew that th e individual and state shared, at least in potentiality, a common end (Ethics, 1094b 1-10). In th e Ethics Aristotle said th at th eend fo r man is eudaimonia (happiness), and that in its highest form eudaimoniais divine theoria (contemplation) (Ethics, 1 178b3 1 179a). In th e Politics Aristotle, according to Hegel, recognized that th e perfection of th e individual isobtained in th e state as a whole , and th at th e object of th e science of politics istherefore the eudaimonia of th e individual brought to its greatest perfection.Aristotle, even though he was incapable of seeing th e abstract independence ofth e individual in relation to th e state, realized that divine theoria, or th e individual's attainment of self-consciousness, was potentially realized in th e state. Inso doing Aristotle, to the extent that it was historically possible, prefiguredHegel's own realization that self-consciousness was realized in th e state.6

Marx accepted a good deal of Hegel's account of Aristotle, but unlikeHegel, who had praised Aristotle as th e first to realize that self-consciousnesswas made absolute in th e state, Marx tu rn ed to Epicums to demonstrate thatAristotle only contributed to the dependence of self-consciousness on th e cityand th e gods. I shall turn now to Marx's account of Epicums' critique of Greekphilosophy. As Marx understood it, Epicums took th e first step in freeing consciousness from the chains of Platonic philosophy in his critique of Aristotle.


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20 InterpretationEPICURUS AND THE CRITIQUE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

In th e first part of th e dissertation Marx sought to establish that a properunderstanding of Epicums was necessary if philosophy was to comprehend itsorigins in Greek philosophy. The first part is, in large measure, an attempt torefute the accepted opinion that Epicums had little to contribute to the historyof philosophy other than that which he took from Democritus. Here Marx'sgoal was to show that Epicums was diametrically opposed to Democritus because he, unlike Democritus, went beyond physics to a critique of philosophyand theology. When Epicums denied any relevance to the gods, abolished th eidea of immortality and saw in th e heavens no more than accident and chance,he exposed the myth of the city and th e gods (Epicums 1926a, 58-81).The most important distinction between Epicums and Democritus was to befound, Marx observed, in their respective treatments of the "contradiction in

th e concept of th e atom between essence and existence."The greatest part ofth e dissertation is, in fact, an analysis of their respective approaches to the contradiction between form and matter in atomistic physics. That Marx's dissertation is meant to be more than a defense of th e superiority of Epicurean physicsbecomes more apparent , however, when we consider th e argument of th e second part of th e dissertation. The four chapters leading up to the concludingchapter on "The Meteors" show that Democritus' reduction of th e contradictionbetween th e existence and essence of th e atom to a matter of necessity deniedth e possibility of science while holding to abstract theological explanations.Below I shall discuss tw o of th e four topics which Marx considered in order

to clarify th e distinction between th e Epicurean and Democritean philosophiesof nature. I shall then consider th e concluding chapter, where Marx argued thatEpicums' discussion of "The Meteors" is th e culmination of his attempt tooverturn Greek theology and philosophy.In th e first chapter of th e second part of the dissertation Marx drew a distinc

tion between Epicums and Democritus by considering their accounts of motion.Marx argued that Democritus was aware that th e first principle of motion , thatatoms fall in straight lines, contradicted th e second principle of motion , thatatoms are repulsed. If atoms fall in straight lines, they will never collide andthus will never be repulsed. Yet without th e repulsion of atoms they wouldnever meet , and th e world would never have been created. In order to escapefrom this contradiction Democritus argued that atoms are forced to collide bynecessity, that is, by a force external to the concept of th e atom. Democritus'recourse to necessity, Marx argued, leaves th e contradiction between the principles of motion and th e world of appearance intact. Democritus simply ignoredth e contradiction by positing an external principle of necessity.Epicums, contrary to Democritus, posited a third principle of motion which

allowed him to argue that the cause of repulsion is within the atom itself andnot due to external necessity. According to Epicums, the atom deviates from


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods 21th e straight line due to an internal principle of declination. This swerving fromthe straight line frees th e atom from the determination of th e line and allows th econcept of th e atom to be completed in repulsion. In repulsion th e atom "abstracts from the opposing being and withdraws itself from it" (1976a, 51).Because th e principle of repulsion is within th e atom itself, it is th e "soul of th eatom."Epicums, in contrast to Democritus, transformed necessity into self-determination.

Epicums' primary motive fo r resolving th e contradiction between th e essence and existence of th e atom was not simply to establish th e self-determination of the atom. Rather, th e purpose was to reach th e concept of abstractindividuality which "appears in its highest freedom and independence" inswerving away from pain and confusion, in attaining ataraxia (1976a, 51).Marx apparently did not believe that it was necessary to criticize

Epicums'

claim th at th e pursuit of ataraxia was th e motivating principle behind both Epicums'physical and ethical philosophy. Marx had no need to offer such a critique, since th e very purpose of his dissertation was to show that Epicums'dogmatic insistence on the unity of the ends of physical and ethical philosophycreated the possibility for th e critique of Greek philosophy and theology. Thisseems to explain why Marx may conclude a chapter on Epicums' principles ofmotion by commenting on what would otherwise seem to be misplaced observations. He asks that we "consider th e consequence that follows directly fromth e declination of th e atom."The realization of the atom in Epicums' highestbeings, th e gods, who swerve away from th e world and do not bother with it,also meant that th e chief human good, a ta ra xia , is to be pursued without th egods. Epicums' doctrine is also more than an attempt to free man from th egods. Just as the concept of th e atom is realized in repulsion, so too, "repulsionis th e first form ofself-consciousneuman desire leads to the initial meeting and then repulsion of men which, in turn, culminates in their recognitionthat they are not merely products of nature, but conscious beings.7 This consciousness "conceives of itself as immediate-being, as abstractly individual."Man first comes to consciousness, then, in recognizing his alienation from th egods and other men. In recognizing abstract individual consciousness, Epicumswas the first to recognize natural right. Marx, having assumed that Epicums'doctrine culminated in an attack on both Pla tonic and Aristotelian philosophy,concluded th e chapter with th e remark that th e declination of the atoms becomes in th e "political domain" the covenant, and in th e "social domain"friendship (1976a, 53). What seemed to be extraneous comments , or perhapsafterthoughts, are, for Marx, th e necessary outcome of Epicurean physics. Ishall return to th e political-theological question raised by Epicurean physics inmy discussion of th e last chapter of th e dissertation.

In the second chapter Marx considered Epicums' and Democritus' respectivetreatments of the contradiction between th e immutable essence of the atom andth e necessarily variable material properties which atoms acquire in existence. If


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22 Interpretationin essence th e atom is unchangeable, how can it possess qualities size, shapeand weight which are subject to change in th e world of appearance? How, inother words, can that which is unchangeable be subject to change? Accordingto Marx, Democritus simply ignored th e necessary contradiction between th econcept of an unchanging atom and th e changing atom of "concrete nature."Instead, Democritus considered the properties of th e atom "only in relation tothe formation of th e world of appearances, and not in relation to the atomitself (1976a, 55). By limiting his investigation to th e world of appearances,Democritus was forced to conclude that th e material qualities of th e atom wereattributable only to necessity. Democritus' inability to explain th e contradictionbetween th e essence and existence of the atom led him to abandon philosophyfo r empiricism. He wa s thus left to conclude that everything which is, is ofnecessity. In attributing everything to necessity Democritus was unable to offera critique of existence.

The material properties o f th e atom were, fo r Epicums, "differences whichthe atom in itself possesses"(1976a, 55). Epicums did not doubt that th e ideathat atoms possess size, shape a nd w e ig ht c on tr ad ic te d th e very concept of theatom. Moreover, according to Marx, Epicums recognized th at th e qualities ofth e atom were themselves negated in their very existence. Epicums acceptedth e contradiction, because to deny it w ou ld m ean abandoning th e abstract individuality in the concept of th e atom, and/or th e self-determination of th e atomin th e world of appearance.

Instead of a sim ple resolution o f th e contradiction Epicums gave new meaning to the material appearance of the atom by asserting that "the world ofappearance can only emerge from the atom which is complete a nd a li en ate dfrom its concept."picums' attention to th e world of appearance followed fromhis position that "all senses are heralds of th e tme." Here, too, Marx arguedthat Epicums surpassed Democritus, fo r although he maintained that knowledgeis derived from th e senses, he insisted th at th e subjectivity of knowledge doesnot reduce "sensuous qualities to th in gs of mere opinion."The sensuous worldis "objective appearance."Because Epicums "takes a dogmatic, not a skepticalposition,"he "w as th e first to grasp appearance as appearance, that is, as alienation of th e essence, activating itself in reality as such an alienation"(1976a,39, 64). Epicums, rather than seek to overcome the a li en a ti on e it he r throughrecourse to necessity or th e gods, preserves self-consciousness by maintainingits willingness to live with th e contradiction.

Although I have chosen not to discuss the third and fourth chapters of thispart of the dissertation, they to o are intended to prove that Epicurean philosophy is superior to Democritean philosophy because by refusing to attribute allcontradiction to necessity, th e precondition fo r th e science of sel f-consciousness is established. Marx clearly established th e relationship between atom isticp hy si cs a nd self-consciousness when he stated that "what appears theoreticallyin th e account given of matter , appears practically in the definition of th e Wise


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods 23man"(1976b, 432). This may be observed in th e second part of th e dissertationin considering th e resemblance of Marx's account of atomistic physics to hisdiscussion of Socrates' role in freeing self-consciousness. The first wise menwere similar to th e Democritean account of matter, that is, their appearanceseemed to be a necessary reflection of th e substance of Greek life. Epicureanatoms are like Socrates in that their principle is developed in collision. Just asth e atom comes to reflect upon itself after colliding with other atoms, so to oSocrates' self-consciousness is the result of colliding with men.

Yet self-consciousness was no more completed by the collision of atomsthan by Socratic dialectic. In th e concluding chapter on "The Meteors" Marxcompleted his argument that Epicums' dogmatism allowed him to tak e a criticalstance toward Greek religion and philosophy and that in so doing he establishedth e natural science of self-consciousness. Here Marx considered Epicums' doctrine that th e theological account of th e heavens prevented access to the tm eknowledge of causes by attributing the movement of th e heavens to the gods. Indenying th e immortality of th e heavenly bodies Epicums argued that theheavens may be explained by a multiplicity of causes. Epicums thus arguedth at th e proper observation of th e heavens and earth demonstrates that there is"more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensation(1926a, 59). Single explanations, such as that which religion teaches, contradict our sensations and thus disturb our peace of mind. By disturbing our peaceof mind religion makes men fearful and unable to achieve th e highest humangoal. The importance of th e primary goal of ataraxia becomes especially clearin light of Epicums' statement that "if we were not troubled by our suspicionsof th e phenomena of the sky and about death ... we should have no need ofnatural science"(1926b, 97).

In rejecting all attempts to attribute immortality to the heavens Epicumscarried atomistics to its final conclusion and, in so doing, founded th e naturalscience of self-consciousness. Marx considered this of no small moment , sincein establishing th e principle of absolute individual self-consciousness Epicumswas forced to deny not only popular belief in th e gods but th e account offeredby th e philosophers. Moreover, he was forced to reject th e conclusion whichhis own method seemed to suggest. Epicums had admitted that th e heavenlybodies were atoms which had become real. He also admitted that if th e essenceof th e atom (which is unchangeable) had becom e concrete in th e heavenlybodies (had assumed th e qualities apparent in existence), those bodies werenecessarily immortal. Yet if this was so , if the contradiction between the formand matter of the atom was resolved in immortal heavenly bodies, then anotherproblem arose. If th e contradiction between th e form and matter of th e atom isovercome in th e heavenly bodies, then abstract individuality was negated by th euniversal atom. The existence of the universal required the destruction of abstract individual sel f-consciousness , and this, in turn, resulted in man's anxietyand confusion. Because Epicums believed that anxiety and confusion result


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24 Interpretationfrom a belief in th e universal, he was forced to deny, against the normalmethod of his theory, th e immortality of th e heavens. Marx argued that Epicums'dogmatic insistence on abstract individual self-consciousness was "thesoul of th e Epicurean philosophy of nature"(1976a, 72). It was the soul of th eEpicurean doctrine because here Epicums maintained the commitment to abstract self-consciousness at all costs.

The natural science of which Epicums spoke, a science devoid of theological obfuscat ions, constituted tme theoria. This contemplation was not necessaryin and of itself, but only in order to overcome the fears perpetuated by religionand philosophy. Just as there are no gods guiding th e heavens, there is nodivine theoria (a contemplation good in and of itself) which men should seek toemulate. Theoria served only to further the possibility that ataraxia could beachieved when men were freed from th e city and the gods.

Aristotle is the immediate object of Epicums' critique of Greek theology.Marx observed that Epicums' opposition to th e idea th at th e heavenly bodiesare gods led him to hold Aristotle in th e same contempt as he held traditionalGreek religious teachings (1976a, 67). Certainly Aristotle had distinguished th emythic teachings on the gods which are useful fo r law and life from what heto ok to be tm e knowledge, derived from principles of motion which show only"that th e heavenly bodies are gods and that th e divine encompasses all nature"(Metaphysics. 12:1074a-b34; On the Heavens. 1:270). Aristotle correctly asserted th at th e opinion of the many , that th e gods intervene in human affairs,serves only a political purpose (1976a, 67). Yet he also denied access to thecorrect knowledge of causes because, rather than rejecting popular judgment onthe gods, he accepted the opinion of th e many to th e extent that it comportedwith his physics. Aristotle was not willing to separate the philosopher from th ecity and the gods. He had tied self-consciousness to th e city and its gods whenhe suggested that th e best eudamonia was one with divine theoria, and that thatdivine theoria was perfected in th e best city. Moreover, since Aristotle considered dikaiosyne (justice) and philia (friendship) both necessary and good fo r th ecity, dikaiosyne and philia were essential to th e life of the philosopher. Aristotle's teaching was therefore no better than th e religious beliefs of th e many,because in accepting the interdependence of philosophy, theology and politics,in accepting the dependence of self-consciousness on the city and gods, menwere left confused and fearful. Epicums furthered the cause of self-consciousness because he was willing to blame those who believe that man needs heavenand th e city (1976a, 68).

Epicums held that it was both possible and necessary to free man from th ecity and the gods. Just as the chief human good, ataraxia, is to be pursuedwithout th e gods who swerve away from th e world and do not bother with it,so, too, th e philosopher was most happy when he withdrew from politics. Politics was nothing more than a social contract which could, at best, provide th econditions fo r th e pursuit of ataraxia. For Epicums "there is no profit in secur-


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods 25ing protection in relation to men, if things above and things beneath th e earthand indeed all in th e boundless universe remain matters of suspicion" (1926b,99). Dikaiosyne exists in order to free man of suspicion and is thus nothingmore than "a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming oneanother and save them from being harmed" so that they may pursue naturalscience, a science whose goal was ataraxia (1926b, 103). And as dikaiosynewas reduced to a covenant which creates th e condition fo r men to retire fromth e world in the pursuit of ataraxia, so too, philia (friendship) was reduced to aprivate matter. For Epicums, philia was necessary to th e education of th e philosopher and thus to the complete life. Aristotle, too, had urged th e necessity ofphilia fo r th e education of the philosopher (Ethics, 1 155a3 1 1 63b 1 8) . But fo rAristotle philia was also necessary fo r th e life of th e city. Epicums completedthe destruction of Aristotelian political philosophy, because in reducing philiaand education in private matters and politics to a covenant, he ta ugh t th at self-consciousness must not depend on th e city. Aristotle was no more able thanPlato to free man from the city and the gods. Therefore, he had only developedth e mythological character of Platonic philosophy by chaining self-consciousness to the city and th e gods.

CONCLUSION

Epicums was the first to expose th e political-theological myth of Platonicphilosophy by showing that it was both possible and desirable to free man fromth e city and th e gods. In considering th e political-theological question Marx,like many Enlightenment thinkers, was drawn to Epicums because Epicums,th e most formidable opponent of Plato and Aristotle in antiquity, provided th emeans fo r attacking their intellectual heirs in later political thought .

Marx recognized that Epicums was closer to Aristotle and Plato than tohimself, however. While he was attracted to Epicums' attempt to overcome th efear which led alienated men to believe in th e gods, he recognized that Epicums only resolved th e alienation in theoria. For Epicums, th e tm e knowledgeof causes produced ataraxia. For Marx, fear and alienation could not be overcome through theoria alone. Regardless of Marx's fascination with Epicums,th e least one may say is that he takes a modem stance in opposition to th eancients. Marx, as a modem, considered Epicums only one step, albeit a critical one, in the march of progress. Epicums, by contrast, had no interest in th efuture, for he was not fearful of death (Marx 1976b, 444).

In seeking to free consciousness from th e city and th e gods Marx assumedthat he understood Plato, the originator of th e philosophy of transcendence,better than Plato understood himself. Marx differs from modem social scientistswho assume that they may grasp the essential political-theological questionswithout seriously attending to those arguments which they have rejected be-


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26 Interpretationcause he, at least, understood th e significance of Platonic philosophy. Nevertheless, he arrived at th e conclusion that man must be freed from the city andthe gods without having attended to the complexities of the arguments presented in th e Platonic dialogues. Perhaps this was so because Marx was moreinterested in overcoming the perplexity which Platonic philosophy induced thanhe was in the problem of philosophy as Plato understood it . If M arx's willingness to pass on to what he perceived to be the greater issue, unmasking th ematerial basis of religious belief and the modem state, leaves th e Platonic quest ions unanswered , it is because his motive may be, after all, similar to that ofEpicums. This seems plausible, since Marx admitted that his admiration forEpicums was due in no small part to the fact Epicums considered philosophy ameans to ataraxia.

NOTES

1 . Ataraxia, according to Epicurus, is a state of tranquility or peace of mind which th e philosopher may attain when he is f reed f rom fear and confusion.

2. Brundell argues that Gassendi sought to replace Aristotelianism with Epicureanism, but anEpicureanism acceptable to Christianity.

3. See Marx's early comments on th e difference in th e relationship between philosophy and th estate and religion and th e state in 'The Leading Artic le in No. 179 of th e Kolnische Zeitung," inth e Collected Works, 1:184-202.

4. See Marx's Critique of Hegel 's Philosophy of Right, where he used religious analogies tocriticize Hegel's idea th at the conflicts between th e state and civil society are overcome in aconstitutional monarchy ("the monarch as th e actual 'God' man") and through bureaucrats ("Jesuitsand theologians of th e state") (1970, 24, 46).

5. Compare this with Rosen's assertion (1977) that Marx's view of Socrates, as does th e wholedissertation, derives from Bauer's approach to self-consciousness.

6. Hegel's view of Aristotle is highly problematic, since it is not at all clear that Aristotle reallymeant that eudaimonia fo r th e individual and th e state were at all th e same. In th e NicomacheanEthics (177all-1179a32) Aristotle appears to argue that divine theoria brings th e greatest eudaimonia, and that this eudaimonia , by virtue of its divine quali ty, was best in itself, bu t notnecessarily as such for man. Elsewhere in th e Ethics and th e Politics Aristotle collapses th e distinction between what is best and what is best fo r man. One possible explanation for this contradictionmay be Aristotle's recognition of th e tension between th e philosopher who contemplates for th esake of theoria and th e citizen who serves th e city. Because th e eudaimonia of th e philosopher andth e eudaimonia of th e city are th e same only in th e best city, th e divine city, it does not seem likelythat Aristotle is so facile in reaching th e point which Hegel attributes to him. In fact, Aristotle maybe even closer to Plato than Hegel knew in admitting of th e ten sion between philosophy and th ecity.

7. The background fo r Marx's presentation of th e initial state of self-consciousness as th ebattleground of human desire seems to be Hegel's Phenomenology.

REFERENCES

Aristotle. 1985. The Complete Works of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation. Editedby Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.


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Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods 27Brundell, Barry, 1987. Pierre Gassendi: From Aristotelianism to a New Natural Philos

ophy. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co.Epicurus. 1926a. "Letter to Pythocles." In Epicurus: The Extant Remains. Translated by

Cyril Bailey. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Epicurus. 1926a. "Principal

Doctrines."In Epicurus: The Extant Remains.Hegel, G.W.F . 1961. The Phenomenology of the Mind. Translated by J.B. Baillie. New

York: The Macmillan Company.1983. Lectures on th e History of Philosophy. Translated by E.S. Haldane and

Frances H. Simson. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.1984. Lectures on th e Philosophy of Religion. Edited by Peter C. Hodgson.

Berkeley: University of California Press.Hook, Sidney. 1971. From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of

Karl Marx. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Jefferson, Thomas. 1904. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Andrew A.Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh. Washington, D.C.: Jefferson Memorial Associa

t ion.Kojeve, Alexandre. 1969. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phe

nomenology of Spirit. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Lobkowicz, Nicholas. 1967. "Marx's Attitude Toward Religion." In Marx and the

Weste rn World . Edited by Nicholas Lobkowicz. South Bend: University of NotreDame Press.

Marx, Karl. 1964. Early Writings. Edited by T.B. Bottomore. New York: McGraw-Hill.

1967. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. New York: International Publishers.

1970. Critique ofHegel's Philosophy ofRight. Translated by Joseph O'Malley.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1973. Grundrisse. Translated by Martin Nicolaus. New York: Vintage Books... 1976a. Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Na

ture. In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works. Vol. 1 . New York: International Publishers.

1976b. Notebooks. In Collected Works.McLellan, David. 1969. The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx. New York: The Mac

millan Company.Nichols, James H., Jr. 1976. Epicurean Political Philosophy: The De Rerum Natura of

Lucretius. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Plato. 1968. The Republic of Plato. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic

Books.1988. Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo. Translated

by G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett.Rosen, Zvi. 1977. Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx: The Influence of Bruno Bauer on

Marx's Thought . The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff .Tucker, Robert C. 1964. Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. Cambridge : Cambridge

University Press.Wessel, Leonard P., Jr. 1984. Prometheus Bound: The Myth ic Structure of Karl Marx's

Scientific Thinking. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.


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William Dean Howells' "Poor Real Life":The Royal Road to the American Character

Thomas S. EngemanLoyola University Chicago

Alex is de Tocqueville forecast the danger of modem individualism when hewarned of th e American withdrawing from society until he became, simply,self-concerned. "They form th e habit of thinking of themselves in isolation andimagine that their whole destiny is in their ow n hands .... Each man isforever thrown back on himself alone, and there is danger that he may be shutup in th e solitude of his ow n heart" (p . 508). In th e extended Tocquevilleansociology of Habits of the Heart, this apparent isolation of American existencehas been elaborately chronicled (Bellah, pp. vii-viii, 306, 353).

How accurate is this view? What life is actually lived in the American polity? The a bs tr ac t n at ur e of modem political thought which equates th e "goodlife" with degrees o f freedom, per capita income, popular consent, worker participation, or social equality, seems less able even than a Tocquevillean-in-spired social science such as Robert Bellah 's much less a merely quantitativeone to characterize American ethics properly. For example, th e numerousAmerican divorces suggest the end of th e family or of its influence, although,looking at American society, there appears to be little basis of social experience, and particularly social ideal, absent th e family.1

Confronting Hector St. John de Crevecoeur's original question, "Who is thisnew man , this American?", one recognizes again th e longstanding associationbetween political theory and literature. Literature in m os t case s realizes classical political ethics in depicting characters produced by different types of political regimes or principles of th e human good. Especially in th e modem era, th econtrast is most frequently drawn between th e aristocratic gentleman and themiddle-class or "mass man."

Literature, however, may be said to "complete" c la ss ic al e th ic al r eg im e th eory politically by transcending classical typology to r oo t c ha ra ct er s in recognizable political or social situations. If in th e m o d e m era th e most importantnexus of human experience (next to th e regime) is th e nation the reality ofbeing an American, a Frenchman, or a Russian where speech and deed areinextricably interwoven to make th e fabric of life, then th e nation is th e signifi-

INTERPRETATION, Fall 1991, Vol. 19, No. 1


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30 Interpretationcant historical variable shaping human character. Thus as long as the regimeand the nation exist together, its citizens' characters remain recognizable overgenerations.

This study will concentrate on th e writings of William Dean Howells (18371920), an American author who attempted with a uniquely intell igent seriousness to present realistic American characters within a realistic American framework. Howells was the founder and chief supporter (as th e editor of The Atlantic Monthly and la

interpretation, vol 19-1

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