IntroductionThe present paper advances the literature on the economic determinants and effects of international migrations. We make three main contributions. First, we gather and organize annual data on bilateral immigration flows from 74 countries of origin into 14 OECD countries from 1980 to 2005 and on immigration laws in those OECD countries in order to analyze the economic and legal determinants of migration flows. We first update the data used in Mayda (forthcoming) from the OECD international migration statistics. These data were discontinuedin 1994. For the period 1995-2005 it has been substituted with a new database on immigration flows and stocks in OECD countries.1 We merge these two datasets on flows covering the period 1980-2005 with data on the stock of immigrants residing in the 14 OECD destination countries from the same 74 countries for the period 1990-2000. This also allows us to impute the "net" migration flows to the OECD countriesthat is, immigration net of re-migration out of the country. For the same 14 OECD countries we also collect, organize, and classify information on immigration laws, distinguishing between laws regulating entry, stay, asylum, and a few specificmultilateral treaties with implications for international labor mobility. The richness of our data allows us to control for a very large set of fixed effects when analyzing the determinants of bilateral flows. Furthermore, it allows us to identify the effects of economic variables and immigration laws using variation by destination country over time only.

The second contribution is that we use an empirical generalized gravity equation, derived from a model in which potential migrants maximize utility by choosing where to migrate. We use such a model to estimate the effects of variation in geographic, economic and policy variables in the destination countries on immigration flows. Our empirical model adapts and generalizes the one proposed in Grogger and Hanson (2007, 2008). Incontrast to them, however, we do not focus (as they do, following Borjas, 1987) on the selection of immigrants according to skills but rather on the total size (scale) of bilateral migration flows. On the other hand, we allow for a more general empirical specification that is consistent with several different discrete choice models (simple logit as well as nested logit) and requires only data on bilateral stocks (or flows) of migrants in order to be implemented. Importantly, we allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and nonmigrants. Also, since we have data on bilateral flows over time we can control for unobserved, time-varying, sending-country characteristics and focus mainly on income per person, employment, and immigration policiesin the destination countries as determinants of migrations.

Third, and most importantly, we can identify the aggregate effects of these immigrant flows on the economy of the receiving country, specifically on total employment, total hours worked, physical capital accumulation and total factor productivity. While the recent literature on the impact of immigrants on labor markets (Borjas and Katz 2007, Ottaviano and Peri 2008) acknowledges that the country is the appropriate unit with which to analyze such effects (due to the high degree of mobility of workers and capital within a country) there are extremely few cross-country (or panel) studies of those effects. The reason is that in order to do this one needs to overcome two problems. First, we need to gather consistent, yearly data on hours worked, employment, capital stock for each of the 14 OECD countries of destination, over the period 1980-2005. Second, we need to isolate the impact of immigration on those variables when we know that productivity, investment and employment growth are also determinants of immigration flows (through their effects on income and wages). We address the first issue by employing data from different OECD datasets, while to solve the second issue we use our bilateral migration equation estimated below. Restricting the explanatory variables of the bilateral migration flows to factors specific to the country of origin and to bilateral costs only, we obtain a predicted flow of migrants to OECD countries that can be used as an instrument, since it isolates the push-driven flows. Those flows vary across country of destination due to the different bilateral costs (due to geography and networks) of migrating from one country to another, which are independent of any destination country variable. For instance, a boomin emigrants from Poland due to the opening of its border is more likely to generate large migration to Germany than to Canada (for geographical and historical reasons), while a boom of emigrants from the Philippines is more likely to generate large immigration to Japan (proximity) and the US (previous networks) than to France. Using such push-driven flows we track their effects on the employment, capital and productivity of the receiving countries.

The paper has three main findings. First, confirming previous literature (e.g. Mayda, forthcoming), our regressions consistently show that differences in the level of income per person between the destination and origin country have a positive and significant effect on bilateral migration flows. An increase in the gap by 1000 PPP$ (in 2000 prices) increases bilateral migration flows by about 10% of their initial value. Also, we find that stricter entry laws significantly discourage immigration. Each reform which introduced tighter rules of entryfor immigrants decreased immigration flows by about 6% on average. Second, we find that time-varying push factors specific to countries of origin and interacted with bilateral fixed costs of migration, predict a significant share (between 30 and 40%) of the variation in migration to the OECD receiving countries. Such variation of immigration flows for a receiving country over time can legitimately be consider as "exogenous" to the economic and demographic conditions of the receiving country. Third, consistent with an increase in the labor supply in the neoclassical growth model with endogenous capital adjustment, we find that the exogenous inflowof immigrants increases one for one employment, hours worked and capital stocks in the receiving country, implying no crowding-out of natives and a speedy and full adjustment of capital. Hence, even in the short run (one year), the capital-labor ratio at the national level fully recovers from an immigration shock. We note that in most instances, immigration flows are only a fraction of a percentage point of the labor force of the receiving country. Moreover, the largest part of these flows is easily predictable, implying that full capital adjustment isa very reasonable finding even in the short run. Also, immigration does not seem to have any significant effect on total factor productivity. These effects, taken together, imply no significant effect of immigration on average wages and on the return to capital in the receiving countries. Instead, immigration shocks lead to an increase in total employment and a proportional response of GDP.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the existing literature on the determinants and effects of international migrations and puts the contribution of this paper into perspective. Section 3 describes and presents the data, especially those on migration flows and immigration laws. Section 4 justifies the empirical model used to analyze the determinants of bilateral migrations and estimates the effect of income differences (between sending and receiving country) and immigration laws (in destination countries) on bilateral flows.Section 5 presents the estimates of the effect of immigration on employment, physical capital accumulation and productivity of the receiving country. Using an instrumental variable approach which isolates only the pushdriven part of immigrant flows, exogenous to the economic conditions of destination countries, we can provide a causal interpretation of the estimated effect. Section 6 discusses the main implications of our findings and provides some concluding remarks.

The international system working as one

The global discourse on migration has shifted significantly in recent years with theincrease in knowledge and awareness about the multifaceted nature of human mobilityand its potential to benefit development at the human, social and economic levels.The various players in the international system that are engaged in migration issues the United Nations (UN), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UN andIOM Member States, regional cooperation mechanisms (both formal and informal),civil society and other concerned stakeholders have all contributed to this changingdiscourse.

Since the first UN General Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migrationand Development (HLD) in 2006, there has been growing consensus that migration canbe beneficial for all concerned if managed in ways that facilitate safe and empoweringmobility, while ensuring that migrants human rights are respected and protected.International cooperation and partnership are essential to promoting the developmentpotential of migration, while addressing its negative effects. The second UN HLD, to beheld in October 2013,1 will take stock of the international debate and activities aroundmigration since 2006, and the international system underpinning these.

This showcases the mandates and work of 28 UN organizations and relatedinternational entities engaged with international migration issues, which havesupported the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB)2 in preparingfor the second HLD. They comprise members of the CEB, including the 16-memberGlobal Migration Group (GMG), which includes IOM;3 the Special Rapporteur on theHuman Rights of Migrants; and the NGO Committee on Migration.4 For the purposes ofthe book, these bodies are referred to as HLCPGMG agencies.

1.The second High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD) will be held during the UN General Assemblys sixty-eighth session, from 3 to 4 October 2013. Information on the preparation for the HLD can be found at:

2.The UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), chaired by the UN Secretary General is the main instrument for 29 executive heads of the UN system to coordinate their actions and policies. Its High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) advises on policy, programme and operational matters of system-wide importance and fosters inter-agency cooperation and coordination on behalf of the CEB.

3 . IOM is a founding member of the GMG, but it is not a UN agency and therefore also not a member of the CEB.

4. The HLCPGMG agencies that contributed to this book include: the 16 GMG members, namely, ILO, IOM, The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs (UN DESA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNESCO, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN regional commissions, UN Women, WHO and the World Bank; 10 non-GMG agencies, namely, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), UNAIDS, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN-Habitat, Universal Postal Union (UPU), WIPO and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants; and the NGO Committee on Migration. The Special Representative of the Secretary General for International Migration and Development (SRSG) also contributed to the recommendations and outcomes on migration reflected in this book.

Migration Flows

The data on yearly migration flows come from the International Migration Dataset (IMD) provided by the OECD. Data for the period 1980-1995 relative to 14 OECD destination countries and for close to 80 countries of origin were collected and organized by Mayda (forthcoming)4 . We merged these data with the new data relative to the period 1995-2005 for 25 OECD receiving countries and more than one hundred sending countries, available at OECD (2007). In order to obtain a balanced and consistent panel we select 14 OECD destination countries5 and 74 countries of origin (listed in table A1 of the Appendix). The data on migration flows collectedin the IMD are based on national statistics, gathered and homogenized by the OECD statistical office6. The national data are based on population registers or residence permits. In both cases these are considered to be accurate measures of the entry of legal foreign nationals. We consider the data relative to the total inflow of foreign persons, independently of the reason (immigration, temporary or asylum). While the OECD makes an effort (especially since 1995) to maintain a consistent definition of immigrants across countries, there are some. We refer to Mayda (forthcoming) for specific descriptions of the data relative to the 1980-1995 period. The source (OECD International Migration Data) and the definitions, however, are the same as those provided by the OECD for the statistics relative to the 1995-2005 period. Hence, we simply merged the two series. 5Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. 6More details on the immigration data and their construction is provided in Appendix A. differences between destination country definitions. An important one is that some countries define immigrantson the basis of the place of birth, and others on the basis of nationality. While this inconsistency can make a pure cross-country comparison inaccurate, our analysis focuses on changes within destination countries over time. Therefore it should be exempt from large mis-measurement due to the classification problem. The total inflow of foreign persons each year for each country of destination, as measured by these OECD sources, constitutes what we call total (gross) immigration. We also construct a measure of total net immigration for each receivingcountry. In this measure we try to correct for the outflow of foreign persons, due to re-migration or return migration. 7 Those flows, however, are harder to measure as people are not required to communicate to the registry of population their intention to leave the country. Hence we infer the net immigration flows using the gross immigration data and the data on immigrant stocks (by country of origin) from Docquier (2007) for 29 OECD countries in years around 1990 and around 2000. Therefore, for each of our 14 countries of destination we know the yearly inflow and the stock circa years 1990 and 2000. For each receiving country we impute a yearly out-migration rate of the stock of immigrants that, using the stock in 1990 and the measured yearlyflows between 1990 and 2000, would produce the measured stock in 20008 . We apply this constant, destinationspecific, re-migration rate to all years and obtain the stock of immigrants each year (between 1980 and 2005) and the net immigration rates each year. Panel A1 in the Appendix reports the gross and net immigration rates (i.e. immigration flows as a percentage of the population at the beginning of the year) for our 14 destination countries over the 25 years considered. For most countries gross and net immigration rates are similar and move together over time. We note that our net immigration rates are probably much less precise than ourmeasures of gross immigration. Recall that we assumed constant re-migration rates for all years, while gross immigration flows and re-migration rates are likely to be correlated9 . Second, any difference between stocks and flows could also be due to undocumented immigration, their somewhat different classification systems, or other discrepancies, rather than to re-migration only. Third, for some countries the implied re-migration rate is extremely high and not very plausible10. Hence, while we will use the net immigration flows to check some regression results (see Table 3 and 5) the preferred specifications which analyze the impact of immigration onthe receiving economy will be based on gross inflows of immigrants.

A preliminary look at Panel 1 reveals two facts. First, immigration rates have displayed an increasing trend in many countries but for some countries, such as the US and Germany, they peaked in the middle of the period (corresponding to the regularization of the late 1980s for the US and to immigration from the East in the early 1990s in Germany). Therefore it is hard to establish a common trend of immigration flows over time. Second, This phenomenon can be significantdepending on the country, we estimate that every year between 0.5 and 10% of the existing stock of migrants will migrate out. This procedure is like finding the unknown "depreciation rate" when we have a measure of a stock variable in 1990 and 2000and a measure of yearly flows between them.Coen-Pirani (2008) analyzes migration flows across US states. He finds that gross inflow and outflow rates are strongly,positively correlated.Appendix A reports the calibrated re-migration rates for each country of destination. there is a lot of idiosyncratic fluctuation in immigration rates across countries. Hence, in principle, the variation within country over time is large enough (and independent across countries) to allow us to identify the effects of immigration on employment, capital accumulation and TFP. Table A2 in the Appendix reports the summarystatistics and the data sources for the other economic and demographic variables in the empirical analysis. Note that the average GDP per person was more than double in the receiving countries relative to the countries of origin in each year; furthermore, the employment rate was also consistently higher and income inequality (Gini coefficient) consistently lower in the countries of destination. Countries of destination also typically had a lower share of young persons in their population, reflecting the fact that most international migration is by youngworkers from countries where they are abundant to countries where young workers are scarc..

Determinants of Immigration

This section presents a model of migration choice across multiple locations and derives an estimating equation from the model. Our estimating equation is consistent both with a simple logit model (McFadden, 1974) as well as with a nested logit model (McFadden, 1978). Our migration model extends Grogger and Hanson (2007, 2008) by allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. Potentially, this is an important omission. It is plausible that migrants systematically differ from non-migrants along importantdimensions that are hard to measure, such as ability, risk aversion, or the psychological costs of living far from home. An additional attractive feature of our empirical specification is that it is reminiscent of a generalized gravity equation in which the logarithm of bilateral migration flows is a function of origin and destination 13Three research assistants read the laws and provided us with a brief summary of each law. These summaries were read by thetwo authors and discussed until converging on the sign of the policy change. 9country fixed effects and bilateral migration costs.

Impact of Immigration on OECD countries

In order to evaluate the impact of immigration on the receiving economys income, average wages, and return to capital, we use an aggregate production function framework, akin to the one used in growth accounting (see for instance Chapter 10 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). Suppose that total GDP in each destination country and year, Ydt, is produced using a labor input represented by total hours worked, Ldt (that can be decomposed into Employmentdt times Hours per workerdt ), services of physical capital represented by Kdt and total factor productivity Adt. According to the popular Cobb-Douglas production function

Where is the capital income share and can be approximated for the destination countries in our sample by 0.3324. In such a framework if we intend to analyze how immigration flows affects income or wages (marginal productivity of labor), we need to identify first how immigrations affects the supply of each input and of total factor productivity. Then we can combine the effects of immigration using the implications of the model. Specifically, the percentage changes in total real GDP, Ydt, real GDP per hour, ydt, and the average real wage,wdt, are given, respectively, by:

If we can identify the percentage changes in Adt, Kdt, and Ldt in response to exogenous immigration flows to the country we will be able to evaluate the impact of immigration on total income, labor productivity and average wages. Clearly, immigration flows directly affect labor input Ldt by adding potential workers. However, the increase in employment may be less than one-for-one if immigrants displace native workers (out of the country or out of the labor market). In addition, there may also be composition effects if immigrants employment rates or hoursworked are lower than those of natives. Regarding the capital input, standard models with endogenous capital accumulation imply that immigrationinduced increases in the labor force will generate investment opportunities and greater capital accumulation, up to the point that the marginal product of capital returns to its pre-shock value. However, the short-runresponse of the capital stock to an international immigration flow can be less than complete and it has yet to be quantified empirically. Concerning TFP, on the one hand immigrants may promote specialization/complementarities (Ottaviano and Peri 2008) which increase the set of productive skills (Peri and Sparber, forthcoming) and increase competition in the labor markets, generating efficiency gains that increase TFP. Or there can be positive scale effects onproductivity if immigrants bring new ideas or reinforce agglomeration economies (of the kind measured by Ciccone and Hall, 1996). On the other hand, it is also possible that immigration induces adoption of less productive, unskilled-intensive technologies (as in Lewis 2005) that lead to reductions in measured TFP. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether an immigration shock increases, decreases or does not affect

Effect of Immigration laws on bilateral migration flows

In evaluating the effects of immigration reforms, it is easier to look at the effect on subsequent immigration flows. After all, the immigrant stocks are the long-run accumulation of yearly flows, so the determinants of the first should also determine the second. Hence we simply adopt the specification in (9) and use as the dependent variable the logarithm of the flow of immigrants from country o to country d in year t, adding immigration laws as an explanatory variable.Our data on (M igrant F low)odt are from the OECD International Migration Database, from 74 countries of origin into 14 OECD countries. The variable "Immigration policy tightness" is the measure of tightness of immigration (and asylum) laws described in section 3.221 . The other columns of Table 2 Panel A perform variations and robustness checks on this basic specification. In Panel B of Table 2 we estimate a similar specification but now include a full set of (73x14) country-pair fixed effects, Dod, rather than the four bilateral variables (Distance, Land Border, Colonial, Language) in order to capture any specific time-invariant bilateral costs of migration.Moving from left to right in Table 2 we modify our basic specification (1) by including income on logarithm, rather than in levels, (specification 2), then using a broader measure of tightness (specification 3), or longer lags of the explanatory variables (specification 4). Specification (5) includes extra destination country controls, (6) omits observations with 0 flows and (7) omits the UK data, whose immigration flows recorded before 1990 appear suspiciously small. In all these specifications we include four variables that capture aspects of the immigration laws. The first variable is our constructed measure of "Tightness of entry laws", the second is our measure of"Tightness of asylum laws". Both are described in section 3.2 and their values for each country and year are shown in Panel 2A. We also include dummies for the two most important multilateral treaties affecting several 21Notice that all the explanatory variables (that vary over time) are included with one lag.of the considered countries22.

The "Maastricht" treaty was ratified by most EU countries in 1992. Among other things, it introduced free labor mobility for workers of the member states and it led to the introduction of the Euro, which may have reduced migration costs within the European Union. The corresponding dummy takes a value of one for those countries and years in which the agreement is in place and 0 otherwise. The "Schengen" agreement, adopted in different years by 22 European countries, regulates and coordinates immigration and border policies among thesignatory countries. While it eases intra-EU movement for citizens of the signatory countries, the agreement also implies more restrictive border controls to enter the "Schengen" area. The corresponding dummy takes a value of one for countries and years in which the agreement is in place. Three main results emerge from Table 2. First, income differences between origin and destination country (whether in logs or in levels) have a positive and significant effect on immigration flows to OECD countries in almost every specification. Second, the"Tightness of entry" has a significant negative effect on immigration flows in most specifications. Each reform that introduced less restrictive measures increased, on average, immigration flows by 5 to 9%. For instance, this implies that a country like Canada, whose immigration policy loosened by 6 points between 1985 and 2005 (see Panel 2A), should exhibit an increase in immigration rates of 25 to 54%. The yearly immigration rates, in Canada, went from 0.5% of population in the early eighties to 0.7-0.8% in the early 2000s. That is, the entireincrease in immigration flows can be attributed to the change in the laws. Third, among the other laws the most significant effect is associated with the Maastricht treaty which increased, on average, the immigration of signatories between 50 and 60%. Tightness of asylum laws had a negative (but rarely significant) impact on immigration and Schengen had no effect at all. Interestingly, column (3) in both Panel A and B reveals that combining immigration entry- and stay- laws decreases the precision of the estimated coefficient, suggesting that mainly entry laws had an effect on the actual inflow of immigrants. At the same time the effect of entry lawsis less significant when we include population, income distribution and the share of young among the receiving country variables (specification 5, both in Panel A and B). This may imply that some of those variables affect immigration laws, and indirectly immigration, so that including them reduces the effect of the laws. Finally, omitting the cells with 0 immigration flows (specification 6) reduces drastically the effect of wage differentials,while the effect of entry laws is still significant. Since almost 70% of the cells are zeros, because we are looking at bilateral flows (rather than stocks), it is remarkable that the immigration laws variable maintains its sign and significance. Omitting the UK (column 7) does not change the results much. The estimated effects on the geographic variables (not reported in Table 2 and available only for Panel A) are qualitatively and quantitatively close to the estimates reported in Table 1. In particular, sharing a land border (point estimate -1.6 and standard error 1.3) and sharing a common language (point estimate 0.4, standard error 0.5) have no significant impacton migration flows, while having had colonial ties (point estimate 3.88 and standard error 0.46) and the log of distance (point estimate -2.2 standard error 0.46) are both very significant in their impact on migration flows23. Let us emphasize that the estimates in Table 2 Panel B include 1022 country-pair fixed effects and 1825 country-of-origin by year fixed effects. Hence any variation is identified by the change over time in a specific bilateral migratory flow, after controlling for any country-of-origin by year specific factor. We are not aware of any previous analysis that could run such a demanding specification on bilateral migration panel data. Allin all, our analysis finds statistically and quantitatively significant effects of income differentials on bilateral immigration stocks and flows. These effects are very robust to sample choice, specification and inclusion of controls. We also find strong evidence that the receiving country laws, particularly those relative to the entry of immigrants, significantly affected the size of yearly inflows. The inclusion of income differences in levels or in logs does not produce very different effects.

Inter-agency perspectives on migration and development

The 2013 High-level Dialogue offers a timely opportunity to take stock of the mandatesand work of the United Nations and its partners in the migration (and development)field since the first HLD. It also marks an important occasion to discuss how migrationmay be integrated into the post-2015 United Nations development agenda. To prepare their proposed recommendations and outcomes on migration for the 2013 HLD, as requested by the CEB, the relevant international entities were asked tocomplete a questionnaire covering the following areas:

(a) Their activities to promote the development aspects of international migration,undertaken since the 2006 HLD;

(b) The support they provided to the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD);

(c) Good practices identified in the organizations respective fields;

(d) Challenges in carrying out their work;

(e) Perceived gaps in the field of migration and development;

(f) Recommendations for the 2013 HLD.

The summary of responses to the questionnaire formed the basis of therecommendations and outcomes on migration submitted to the CEB in early 2013 in preparation for the HLD. In their more detailed form, the agency responses provided the substance for the chapters in this book, which are structured in line with the areas surveyed, as listed above.

In their responses to the questionnaire, the contributing agencies pointed to the urgencyof concerted action by all stakeholders in a world where migration and developmentinterconnect in complex, ever-widening and evolving ways. As policymakersincreasingly understand and seek to strengthen these connections, they are looking tofactor migration into other areas of public policy relevant to development. This, in turn,requires better coordinated support from the United Nations and related international entities with relevant mandates in these areas.In the Recommendations and Outcomes paper, the agencies represented in thisbook agreed on the following key elements for improved policies and practices atthe international, regional and local levels to enhance the development outcomes ofmigration for migrants and societies:5

(a) Facilitating orderly and safe mobility, recognizing that greater mobility is inevitableand indeed necessary in the twenty-first century;

(b)Aspiring to make migration a genuine choice, instead of a desperate necessity;

(c) Prioritizing the protection of migrants and their human rights including labour rights; access to asylum, health and decent work; considerations of social protection and well- being; and the rights of all children in the context of migration in rights-based and gender- sensitive policies and practices;

(d) Focusing on the human development potential of migration, including the potentialto improve the lives of individuals and families, as well as migrations contributionto the economic growth and development of countries;

(e) Addressing public perceptions of migrants and migration to counter anti-migrantsentiment, xenophobia and discrimination, and raise awareness of migrants overwhelmingly positive contributions to societies of origin and destination;

(f) Recognizing that forced and voluntary forms of migration are not always easilydistinguishable, and ensuring protection and assistance for the most vulnerable;(g) Committing to cooperation with all partners involved in and affected by migration,while recognizing the sovereign prerogative of States to determine the entry into and stay of non-nationals on their territories, within the limits set by Statesinternational legal obligations;

5 These key elements were cited verbatim from the Executive Summary of the proposed Recommendations andOutcomes for the 2013 UN General Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development,considered and endorsed by the CEB at its first regular session for 2013 on 5 April 2013.

(h) Finding balanced measures to combat harmful forms and effects of migration, including cross-border trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, while protecting human rights.

This ad hoc collaboration among 28 entities in formulating a common set of recommendations and outcomes on migration for the 2013 HLD marked a new stage in the evolution of a more coherent and broad-based framework for dialogue and cooperation on migration, which started with the Programme of Action of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD).

Tracing global cooperation on migration from 1994 to 2013

The year 1994 was a defining moment in the recent history of multilateral cooperation on migration.6 The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo produced the first comprehensive agenda and call for global action to deal with international migration. In particular, Chapter 10 (International Migration) of the ICPD Programme of Action urged States to cooperate on issues ranging from promoting the development potential of migration to respecting the human rights of migrants, combating human trafficking and reducing irregular migration.7 It remains one of the most comprehensive texts on international migration adopted by the international community to date.

Following Cairo, the issue of international migration and development has been a subitemwith biennial periodicity on the agenda of the second Committee of the General Assembly. Major UN conferences and their outcome documents, including the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), the fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), the UN Millennium Declaration (2000),8 the 2001 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance), and the World Summit Outcome (2005) all have addressed relevant aspects of international migration.

Yet throughout the 1990s and early 2000s a basic tension remained between thedesire of some States to retain the sovereign right to determine who may enter andremain in their respective territories and the growing desire of others for rightsbasedand multilateral approaches to migration governance. Repeated calls by some Member States to convene a world conference on international migration remained unanswered, and it took almost a decade before the ICPD recommendations were acted upon within the UN system.

The lack of consensus among Member States about how and whether to move forward on the global migration agenda is in part exemplified by the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW). Adopted in 1990 after more than ten years of discussion, it took another 13 years before the ICRMW entered into force in 2003. As of 3 May 2013, only 46 States were party to the Convention, none of which were high-income destination countries.

At the same time, the need for better dialogue and cooperation on migration issues had become clear, as no State could effectively manage the full complexity of migration on its own. In the 1980s and 1990s, regional groups of governments began creating informal, non-binding regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs) to discuss common, neighbourhood migration challenges, in some cases expanding these to interregional dialogue processes.

A number of further developments occurred at the turn of the millennium, reflectingthe need for more multilateral, interdisciplinary dialogue on migration:9

(a) A global consultative process, the Berne Initiative, was set up in 2001 by Switzerlandto manage cross-border migration through enhanced understanding and inter- State cooperation. Its outcome document, International Agenda for Migration Management, was in some ways a precursor of the GFMD.

(b) In 2001 IOM Member States initiated the International Dialogue on Migration, a multi-stakeholder forum for migration policy dialogue, to allow themselves and IOM Observer States, as well as international and non-governmental actors, to analyse current and emerging issues in migration governance.

(c) In his 2002 report on Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for furtherchange (A/57/387), then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan identified migration as a priority issue for the international community. As a follow-up, Kofi Annan convened a working group which recommended in its final report in 2003 the establishment of the Global Commission on International Migration.

(d) In 2003 the General Assembly agreed to devote a high-level dialogue to internationalmigration and development in 2006. In contrast to a migration conference, which would require negotiations, it was determined that the outcome document of the high-level dialogue would be a non-binding Chairmans Summary.(e) In 2003 the Geneva Migration Group was established by ILO, IOM, OHCHR,UNCTAD, UNHCR and UNODC as an informal consultative body for the heads ofagency on cross-cutting migration issues.

(f) In 2004 the International Labour Conference of the ILO adopted the Plan of Action for Migrant Workers, which is based on international labour standards, including, specifically, for the protection of migrant workers,10 and supports a rights-based approach to labour migration while recognizing labour market needs. The centrepiece of the Plan of Action is the non-binding Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, approved by the ILO Governing Body in 2006. Both address migration and development and provide good examples of multi-stakeholdercooperation at the global level (governments and workers and employers organizations).

(g) In 2005 the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) proposed six global principles for action and the establishment of a high-level group of agencies involved in migration-related activities to guide and implement a more coherent global system of migration governance.11

In response to the recommendations of the GCIM, Kofi Annan appointed Peter Sutherland to be his Special Representative for International Migration and Development (SRSG) and encouraged the Geneva Migration Group to expand into the Global Migration Group (GMG). The new inter-agency group was formed to promote the wider application of international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration and strengthen inter-agency coherence.12

The first UN General Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migration andDevelopment was held on 1415 September 2006. As a result of the UN HLD, the GFMD was created as an informal, non-binding, voluntary and State-led process to move forward the global dialogue and cooperation on migration. The GFMD was to operate outside the UN system, but closely linked to it through the SRSG. The GFMD process assumed a similar model to that of RCPs, which are also informal and voluntary in orientation

Framing the migration debate in the development context has helped reduce some of the heat around migration issues and open the way for more integrated and coherent policymaking. Since 2006, more evidence has been gathered about the potential benefits of migration for both developing and developed countries, which has allowed migration to be seen increasingly as a potential win-win option for all involved. Today,in the global discussions on redefining the global development agenda post-2015, migration is viewed as a potential enabler for equitable, inclusive and sustainable social and economic development, to the mutual benefit of affected countries, and the human development of migrants, their families and communities, if governed and supported appropriately.14

Today, the agency-led GMG and State-led GFMD are two of the most important global mechanisms for multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation on migration and development which can underpin a more coherent global migration governance system. The GFMD is the largest forum for governments outside the United Nations to discuss migration and development issues, while the GMG brings to the table universal principles, the diversity of perspectives and the technical support necessary for such a complex, cross-cutting subject. As such, the GMG is the pre-eminent multilateral partner of the GFMD.

The International Labour Organization

The main aims of the International Labour Organization (ILO)1 are to promote rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance social protection and strengthen the dialogue on work-related issues. The Organizations unique tripartite structure gives an equal voice to governments, workers and employers to ensure that the views of social partners are closely reflected in labour standards and in shaping policies and programmes, including those relating to labour migration. Most international migration today is linked, directly or indirectly, to the world of work and decent employment opportunities. According to ILO estimates, approximately 105 million of the estimated 214 million international migrants globally are economically active,2 many of them women and young people.3 Hence, the relationship betweenmigration and development, and the policies and activities to address it in countries of origin and destination, as well as internationally, cannot be detached from labour issues falling within the mandate of the ILO. Similarly, the identity of the migrant in employment cannot be separated from his or her status as a worker.

The work of the ILO on migration and development occurs in the context of: (a) a rights-based approach to labour migration and mobility; (b) the Decent Work Agenda,4 with attention to the creation of decent work opportunities in both countries of origin and destination; and (c) social dialogue.5 ILO activities also highlight the contributions of migrant workers to the maintenance of social protection and living standards in countries of destination. The rights-based approach is reflected in the Organizations constitutional global mandate to protect migrant workers; international labour standards, including the Organizations fundamental human rights conventions,6 which cover all migrant workers (unless otherwise stated); and those conventions specifically concerned with the governance of labour migration and the protection of migrantworkers, namely, Migration for Employment Convention (revised), 1949 (No. 97) and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143).7 At the 2004 International Labour Conference, the tripartite constituents of the ILO, mindful of the changing dynamics of international labour migration, reached the consensus that a fair deal for all migrant workers requires a rights-based approach which recognizes labour market needs, and adopted the Plan of Action for Migrant Workers to advance this goal.8Support provided to the Global Forum on Migration andDevelopment

IOM has supported the State-led GFMD from its beginning through: (a) the secondmentof a senior migration expert (20072012); (b) substantive inputs into national and regional thematic events and annual summit meetings; (c) preparing round table background papers, identifying experts and case studies and presenting at the meetings; and (d) hosting the GFMD Support Unit since 2009.

Specific examples of IOM expert input to the GFMD and follow-up on recommendationsinclude: (a) co-producing, with ILO and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Compendium of Good Practice Elements in Temporary BilateralLabour Arrangements (2008), sponsored by the Governments of Morocco and Spain; (b) substantial input to the joint European CommissionMauritius Workshop on Creating Development Benefits through Circular Migration (2008); (c) facilitating exchange among RCPs through the above-mentioned global meetings of RCP chairs and secretariats; (d) commissioning an assessment of RCPs in 2010;22 and (e) a comparative review and analysis of IOM migrant resource centres (2010).

In support of the GFMD ad hoc Working Group on Policy Coherence, Data and Research,IOM prepared an information note for its Migration Profiles series, in advance of the 2010 Puerto Vallarta discussions. Also in support of the 2010 GFMD, IOM and Mexicos National Institute of Migration collated good practices and successful partnerships in Mexico: Public Policies Benefiting Migrants. In addition, IOM has contributed to the GFMD Platform for Partnership since 2010, for example, by making available the Migration Profiles Repository, in partnership with the GFMD, in 2011. IOM contributed to 9 out of the 14 GFMD 2011 thematic meetings, including as co-organizer of a workshop entitled Managing International Migration for Development: Policymaking, Assessment and Evaluation, together with the World Bank. In Mauritius in 2012, the IOM Director General opened the Common Space between governments and civil society, during which IOM acted as rapporteur for a number of round tables. In 2012 IOM dedicated the first volume of the new IOMSpringer series, GlobalMigration Issues, entitled Global Perspectives on Migration and Development: GFMDPuerto Vallarta and Beyond, to the GFMD. This first-ever book on the GFMD examinesthe relationship between migration and development and explores fresh strategiesproposed by the GFMD in its fourth year of operations in Mexico.

Key gaps in the global migration and development sphere

Despite progress in dialogue and cooperation at the global level, a balanced appreciationof the interactions between migration and the social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainable development have not been fully realized in either policy or practice. Above all, channels for legal migration remain inadequate and inaccessible, especially at lower skill levels. This mismatch between labour demand and supply gives rise to abusive forms and conditions of migration, including trafficking and smuggling, and reduces the positive potential of migration for development. Linked to this is the fact that migration policies generally do not adequately protect the human rights of all migrants to safe and dignified migration, nor do they allow individuals to realize their human development potential and aspirations through mobility. Specific gaps in seeking to enhance the benefits of migration for development are described below.

(a) Migration remains inadequately reflected in development frameworks and broadersectoral policies at both the national and local levels and in global development agendas, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Given the relevance of migration for sustainable development in economic, social and environmental terms, coherent policy frameworks must consider how migration could be a help or a hindrance in achieving sustainable developmental goals. For instance, migration is insufficiently addressed in health policies, yet being healthy is a pre-condition for migrants to be able to contribute to sustainable development for themselves, their children and families, and the wider communities in both origin and destination countries.

(b) While there is a growing awareness of how migration affects development, theremay be merit in re-focusing the debate on how development, including achieving the MDGs, may in turn impact migration.

(c) There is a lack of understanding of how migration affects sustainable development in developing countries. Given the significance of SouthSouth migration, there needs to be greater focus on data and capacities in destination countries in the global South, as well as on the impacts of intraregional labour mobility on regional economic development.(d) Public perceptions of migrants and migration have not kept pace with the reality of human mobility and remain dangerously negative. Resulting xenophobia and discrimination threaten social cohesion and the overall rights and well-being of migrants.

(e) The impacts of humanitarian crises on migrants and migration are emerging as an important concern and can have implications for development, for example, the loss of employment and income for migrants and their families; the sudden departure of an important labour force from destination countries; and the serious reintegration challenges for countries of origin.

(f) The relationship between human mobility and climate change and environmentalfactors has not been sufficiently factored into policies that aim to bridge disasterpreparedness, climate change adaptation and sustainable development.

Support provided to the Global Forum on Migration and Development

UNESCO held the GMG chairmanship together with UNICEF in the year 2011. Amongthe Organizations chairing responsibilities was the follow-up on key priorities and outcomes of the 2010 GFMD, among others, through the organization of major international events, such as the UN General Assembly informal thematic debate on international migration and development. During its chairmanship, UNESCO proposed that the GMG focus its work on linkages between the environment, human settlement and population movement, and that the GMG members work jointly to identify the displacement and relocation caused by climate change. The factors affecting climate change are multidimensional, and include governance, conflict, human rights, genderand economic development. In line with the GMG chairmanship theme and a round table focus of the GFMD in Mexico, UNESCO published its book on Migration and Climate Change, where it identified the gaps between the perception of environmental migration and the policyresponses.

MAIN TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The analysis of the main trends in international migration is presented in four sections. The first looks at changes in migration movements and in the foreign population of OECD Member countries. The second section considers the position of immigrants and foreigners in the labour market. The following section focuses on two regions, Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, an overview of migration policies is provided. It reviews policies to regulate and control flows and the whole range of measures to promote the integration of immigrants in host countries. It also describes recent moves to enhance co-operation between host countries and countries of origin in the spheres of migration and development. A. MIGRATION AND POPULATION TRENDS Since the mid-1990s, there has been a gradual upturn in migration flows in most OECD Member countries. Owing to regional conflicts, but also to the restrictions placed on other immigration channels, the number of asylum seekers and refugees has risen substantially, particularly in some European countries. Immigration for employment reasons, permanent but in particular temporary, also increased sharply in 1999-2000 in response to economic trends in Member countries and the resulting labour shortages in certain sectors. Nevertheless, immigration for family reasons continues to predominate, especially in the longer-standing countries of immigration. Lastly, the persistence of illegal migration, the volume of which is by definition impossible to determine, indicates clearly the difficulties that host and origin countries are encountering in their attempts to control migration flows. Immigration plays a significant role in the annual population growth of certain OECD countries. They have a high proportion of foreign births in total births, and the foreign or foreign-born population is growing and diversifying. The importance of migration inflows is sometimes emphasised in connection with the ageing of the population. Without denying their potential contribution to reducing demographic imbalances, their impact in this regard should not be overestimated. 1. Trends in migration movements and changes in the foreign population Although the 1980s were characterised by an increase in immigration flows in most OECD countries, a substantial decline in the number of entries was perceptible by 1992-93. This downturn continued until 1997-98, after which immigration started to rise again, particularly in Europe and Japan. Over the entire period 1980-99, there was also a diversification of migration movements and an increase in the range of nationalities involved, although the traditional flows and regional movements persisted. The volume of the foreign population shows a trend similar to that for flows. There is a trend increase in numbers, together with a wider range of countries of origin and greater heterogeneity in demographic terms. a) Upward but contrasting migration trends During the 1980s and above all at the beginning of the 1990s, inflows increased in almost all OECD countries (see Chart I.1). This trend peaked in 1992- 93 for the main immigration countries such as Canada, Germany, Japan and the United States, while in others, notably Australia and the United Kingdom, the peak had come earlier. Since then, as the result of restrictions, the flows of legal entries have fallen sharply. In 1999 they represented around three-quarters of the volume of entries reported for all European Union countries in 1992 and for North America in 1993. The left-hand side of Chart I.1 presents the post-1980 time-series for foreign migrant inflows. The host countries are divided into four groups in

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