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TRANSCRIPT
Contributed Papers
International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources:
Towards a Global System for the Continuous
Control of Sources throughout their Life Cycle
27 June – 1 July, 2005
Bordeaux, France
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Foreword
The International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Towards a Global System for the Continuous Control of Sources throughout their Life Cycle was held at Bordeaux, France, 27 June – 1 July, 2005. This conference was held in cooperation with the following organizations:
• European Commission (EC)
• European Police Office (Europol)
• International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol)
• International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
• International Labour Organization
• International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA)
• World Customs Organization (WCO)
• World Health Organization (WHO)
Under the auspices of the Group of Eight (G-8) Countries, and hosted by the Government of France.
This volume contains the 72 contributed papers of that conference, grouped by topic. Papers that did not correspond closely to a session topic are found in Technical Session 2. The papers in this volume have been reformatted according to Agency guidelines, but not edited. For a few papers only an abstract is available. An author index is provided at the end of this volume.
The invited papers, discussions, and Findings of the Conference President will be published separately in the Conference Proceedings.
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Table of Contents
Foreword
Panel 1: Working Together for Continuous Control of Sources Throughout their Life Cycle
NRC INITIATIVES ON NATIONAL SOURCE TRACKING...................................................... 2 P. K. Holahan, M. L. Horn, and W.R. Ward .2 SUPERVISION OF THE OPERATIONS INCLUDING WORK WITH RADIOACTIVE
SOURCES IN KOZLODUY NPP, PLC. ........................................................................................ 5 Ivailo Petkov
A FULLY COMPUTERISED SYSTEM OF CENTRAL AND LOCAL REGISTRIES OF
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS...................................................................................................... 9 Á. Pető, J. Huszti
THE SYSTEM OF THE CONTROL OF THE RADIOACTIVE SOURCES THROUGHOUT
THEIR LIFE CYCLE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC ................................................................... 14 Karla Petrová
DYNAMIC INFORMATION SYSTEM OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCE ................................... 20 Zhou Qifu, Yang Chun, Huang Chaoyun, Liu Hua, Zhang Jiali, Zhao Yongming, Zhang
Zhigang, Ge Lixi
Technical Session 1: Working Toward Implementing the Code of Conduct
STATUS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SAFETY AND SECURITY IN SAUDI ARABIA
AND PROPOSED EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS ................................................................................................................................ 27 Khalid Aleissa, Abdulrahman Alarfaj
ESTABLISHMENT OF REGULATORY CONTROL OVER RADIATION SOURCES IN
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA.......................................................................................................... 32 Armen Amirjanyan.
SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN MADAGASCAR.................. 37 Raoelina Andriambololona, J.L.R. Zafimanjato, W.C. Solofoarisina, J.F. Ratovonjanahary, H.F.
Randriantseheno
SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN INDONESIA.................... 42 A. Azhar
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN SECURING AND MANAGING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES46 E.R. Bariev, G.F. Novikov, L.F. Rozdyalouskaya RADIOACTIVE SOURCES MANAGEMENT IN TUNISIA..................................................... 51 N. Chahed, L. Ben Omrane, N. Slimane, A. Hammou, S. Mtimet NRC’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND
SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES .............................................................................. 55 S. Dembek and S. Schuyler-Hayes SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEM OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN POLAND ............. 59 T. Dziubiak STRENGHTENING OF SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES ............ 63 M. El Messaoudi, H. Essadki, A. Chouak, M. Lferde and R. El Moursli , Cherkaoui IMPACT OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF
RADIOACTIVE SOURCES ON THE BRAZILIAN CONTROL SYSTEM OF IMPORT AND
EXPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES .................................................................................. 65 Gutterres R.F., Souza A. L., Maréchal M.H UKRAINIAN REGULATORY AUTHORITY POLICY IN SPHERE OF REDUCING OF
QUANTITY OF RADIATION SOURCES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO PROCESSING,
STORAGE AND DISPOSAL IN UKRAINE............................................................................... 70 V. Holubiev and O.Makarovska TOWARDS THE INVENTORY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN MONTENEGRO........... 74 S. Jovanovic IMPLEMENTING THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF
RADIOACTIVE SOURCES......................................................................................................... 76 John Loy REGULATORY CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN FINLAND ........................... 82 Mika Markkanen, Eero Oksanen, Eero Kettunen STATUS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN LITHUANIA .. 87 Albinas Mastauskas NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN
TANZANIA .................................................................................................................................. 92 W.E.Muhogora and F.P.Banzi
UPGRADING THE NATIONAL REGULATORY INFRASTRUCTURE. A WAY TO
ACHIEVE THE CONTINUOUS CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES URUGUAY
STRATEGY .................................................................................................................................. 97 Alejandro V. Nader
PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND
SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES ............................................................................ 102 I. Okhotina, L. Andreeva-Andrievskaya, B. Lobach
REGULATORY CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN LATVIA............................ 106 U. Sprule, A. Salmins
SECURITY OF THE SOURCES OF IONIZING RADIATIONS IN EL SALVADOR............ 111 Torres Gomez R. E
REVISED PHILIPPINE ACTION PLAN FOR THE SAFETY & SECURITY OF
RADIOACTIVE SOURCES....................................................................................................... 114 E.M.Valdezco, J.E. Seguis, E.S. Caseria and T.G de Jesus
Technical Session 2: National Strategies and Experience for Regaining and Maintaining
Control
SAFETY AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT FOR RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AT
UNIVERSITY’S SCIENCE LABORATORIES......................................................................... 121 Subbiah Annamalai and Lim Tit Meng
SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF HIGH ACTIVITY IRS MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIA WITHIN THE
U.S.-RF COOPERATION........................................................................................................... 126 R.V. Arutyunyan, I.A. Osipyants, L.G. Shpinkova, S.N. Brykin, I.S. Serebryakov, V.N.
Ershov, N.S. Glushak
GERMAN ACT ON THE CONTROL OF HIGH-ACTIVITY RADIOACTIVE SOURCES ... 130 R. Czarwinski, R. Sefzig, W. Weiss
REGULATORY INSPECTION: A POWERFUL TOOL TO CONTROL INDUSTRIAL
RADIOACTIVE SOURCES....................................................................................................... 134 Francisco Cesar Augusto da Silva, João Carlos Leocadio, Adriana Teixeira Ramalho
STRENGTHENING CONTROL OVER RADIOACTIVE SOURCES..................................... 139 I.E. Daian, V. Simionov
ACTIONS TO RECOVER A SET OF ORPHAN SOURCES ................................................... 146 C.N. Dulama, Al. Toma, I.V. Popescu, C. Paunoiu
THE USE OF THE AIRBORNE GAMMA SYSTEM HELINUC FOR ORPHAN SOURCES
SEARCH ..................................................................................................................................... 150 L.Guillot, Ch.Bourgeois
THE IAEA’S CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE
SOURCES: MOVING TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.. 154 P. K. Holohan, T. E. Essig, C. R. Cox, J. W. N. Hickey
ATTEMPT AT CATEGORIZING THE SEALED SOURCES HELD IN FRANCE ................ 158 A.Hoorelbeke
AN EXAMPLE OF DISCOVERING MAN-MADE RADIOACTIVE HOTSPOT 152EU BY
THE AIRBORNE SURVEY....................................................................................................... 163 Hu Mingkao, Shen Zhengxin, Gu Renkang, HouZhenrong
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RADIOISOTOPE DEPARTMENT OF IFIN-HH, ROMANIA, IN
PRODUCTION, TESTING, DELIVERY, TRANSPORT AND EVIDENCE OF RADIOACTIVE
SOURCES................................................................................................................................... 169 C.Ivan, M.Sahagia, A.Luca, E.L.Grigorescu
KAZAKHSTANI EFFORTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
ORPHAN SOURCES RECOVERY STRATEGY ..................................................................... 174 A. Kim, T. Prokhodtseva
REGULATION OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF
RADIATION SOURCES IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION........................................................... 178 Valery Bezzubtsez, Boris Krupchatnikov
SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN KAZAKHSTAN ................. 183 Ch. T. Massenov, S.Y. Chelnokov
SEARCH, LOCATION, IDENTIFICATION, AND DISPOSITION OF RADIOACTIVE
SOURCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN................................................................... 187 Ulmas Mirsaidov, Jamshed Kamolov
SAFETY OF FIXED RADIOGRAPHY BUNKERS ................................................................. 190 A.E. Moore, R.B. Jammal, E.R. McCabe CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS: STATUS
AND PERSPECTIVES ............................................................................................................... 194 V.Paliukhovich, V.Piotukh
SYSTEM OF LICENSING, INSPECTION AND REGISTRATION ASSURING SAFETY AND
SECURITY OF RADIATION SOURCES IN HUNGARY ....................................................... 198 S. Pellet, A. Kerekes, L. Hidasi, A. Temesi and L. Koblinger
EVALUATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR REGAINING CONTROL OVER
RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA ......................... 200 Didas Shao
REGULATORY SUPERVISION OF THE RECOVERY, DECOMMISSIONING AND
DISPOSAL OF RTGS IN NORTH-WEST RUSSIA ................................................................. 205 Malgorzata K. Sneve
MANAGEMENT AND PRACTICE OF SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE
SOURCES IN CHINA ................................................................................................................ 209 Wucheng Xie
SAFETY REGULATION ON RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN CHINA .................................. 213 Zhao Yongming, Liu hua, Zhang Jiali, Zhou Qifu SPECIAL ACTION TO CHECK THE RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN CHINA ..................... 215 Zhou Qifu, Zhao Yongming, Liu Hua, Zhang Zhigang, Zhang Jiali, Yang Chun, Huang
Chaoyun
Technical Session 3: Regional and International Efforts to Regain Control
DECOMMISSIONING OF RTGS IN NORTHWEST RUSSIA: THE NORWEGIAN
APPROACH FOCUSING ON RISK AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS.221 I. Amundsen, I. E. Finne, W.J.F. Standring, P.E. Fiskebeck
GERMAN SUPPORT TO SECURE RADIOISOTOPE GENERATOR SOURCES IN RUSSIA
..................................................................................................................................................... 225 P. Bogorinski, G. Pretzsch
REPATRIATION IN FRANCE OF THE IRRADIATION DEVICE LISA3 FROM THE
COCODY UNIVERSITY IN ABIDJAN (IVORY COAST)...................................................... 229 Patrice Charbonneau, Bernard Crabol, Jean François Mousseigne
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE SECURING RADIOACTIVE
SOURCES IN AZERBAIJAN .................................................................................................... 233 Ibrahim Gabulov
THE S-E ASIA REGIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR SOURCE SECURITY............................. 237 C Maloney and A Murray
AN APPROACH TO THE CONTROL AND FOLLOW-UP OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN
AFRICA ...................................................................................................................................... 239
Jean-Paul Montmayeul
Panel 2: Inadvertent Movement and Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Sources ................. 246 EXPERIENCE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE “SPANISH PROTOCOL” FOR THE
RADIOLOGICAL SURVELLANCE AND CONTROL OF SCRAP AND THE METALIC
PRODUCTS RESULTING FROM ITS PROCESSING ............................................................ 247 Pedro Carboneras, José Ignacio Serrano
DETECTION OF UNAUTHORIZED MOVEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR REGAINING CONTROL ON ORPHAN SOURCES - SYSTEMS
AND FEASIBILITY ................................................................................................................... 259 Harikumar M, Vaishali M Thakur, Amit Kumar Verma, Krishnamachari G, Sharma D. N
POLISH EFFORTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN RADIOACTIVE
SOURCES................................................................................................................................... 264 G. Smagala
COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
IN SLOVAKIA ........................................................................................................................... 269 Juraj Václav
Technical Session 4: Strengthening Controls over Imports and Exports
IMPLEMENTING IMPORT AND EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CATEGORY 1 AND 2
RADIOACTIVE SOURCES....................................................................................................... 275 P.M. Lord, A. Thibert
Technical Session 5: Strategies for the Management of Disused Sources
CHARACTERIZATION AND CONTROL OF DISUSED SEALED RADIOACTIVE
SOURCES AT THE WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES IN CUBA................................ 280 C. Benitez Navarro, M. Salgado Mojena
RELEVANT DATA ON THE SPENT SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES INVENTORY IN
ROMANIA.................................................................................................................................. 285
D.M. Dogaru
POLICY OF SRS MANAGEMENT IN EGYPT........................................................................ 289 M.R.EI-Sourougy SOLUTIONS FOR DISUSED SEALED RADIATION SOURCES: LEGISLATIVE AND
TECHNICAL BASIS. ................................................................................................................. 294 Zhiwen Fan
BASIC DESIGN OF AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE HANDLING OF SPENT HIGH
ACTIVITY SOURCES. .............................................................................................................. 295 E. Maphisa, M. Al-Mughrabi, M. Smith
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SAFE AND SECURE MANAGEMENT OF DISUSED
SEALED SOURCES IN I.R. OF IRAN...................................................................................... 301 S. Momenzadeh, M. Ettehadian, A. Maleki, M. Akbarzadeh
MANAGEMENT OF THE RADIOACTIVE LIGHTNING CONDUCTORS: THE POLICY
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN CROATIA......................................................................... 306 Novakovic M., Nikolic V., Kozuh D., Posedel D
PRELIMINARY SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED SHARS FACILITY.......... 310 A. J. Ramlakan, M. Al-Mughrabi, L. Hordijk, M. Smith, E. Maphisa
RADIUM 226 SOURCES: A DEMANDING TASK UNDERTAKEN BY THE ISTITUTO
SUPERIORE DI SANITÀ TO PREVENT THEM FROM BECOMING ORPHAN SOURCES
..................................................................................................................................................... 315 S. Risica, A. Grisanti, G. Grisanti COBALT 60 TELETHERAPY SOURCES - CONTINUOUS CONTROL THROUGHOUT
THEIR LIFE CYCLE.................................................................................................................. 320 Konakanchi V. S. Sastri
Technical Session 6: Management of Radiological Emergencies Involving Radioactive
Sources
EXPERIENCE OF PAST RADIATION ACCIDENTS AND PROBLEMS OF RESPONSE TO
POSSIBLE DISPERSION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN URBAN CONDITIONS... 325 A.M. Agapov, R.V.Arutyunyan, A.Yu.Kudrin, A.M.Eliseev
Author Index................................................................................................................................ 331
Panel 1: Working Together for Continuous Control of Sources Throughout their Life Cycle
NRC INITIATIVES ON NATIONAL SOURCE TRACKING
P. K. Holahan, M. L. Horn, and W.R. Ward Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, USA
Abstract. The terrorist events of 11 September 2001 caused the United States to review the nuclear security requirements for the use of radioactive material for industrial and medical purposes. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has pursued several domestic initiatives in the area of safety and security. One of the initiatives involved working with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in a joint study on Radiological Dispersion Devices. This study identified radionuclides and quantities of concern with recommendations for improvements in tracking and inventory of high-risk sealed sources. To meet the recommendations from the joint study and the U.S. commitments in the Code of Conduct, the NRC is developing a national source tracking system. The NRC has also developed an interim database as precursor to a national source tracking system. The interim database is being updated periodically until the national source tracking system is in place. The national source tracking system will ultimately provide a “cradle-to-grave” account for all high-risk sealed sources.
Key Words: IAEA, NRC, source tracking
1. Introduction As a result of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has undertaken a comprehensive review of nuclear security requirements for the use of radioactive materials for industrial and medical purposes. The NRC’s review takes into consideration the changing domestic and international initiatives in the nuclear security area.
In June 2002, the Secretary of Energy and the NRC Chairman met to discuss the nation’s ability to adequately protect inventories of nuclear materials that could be used in a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). At the June meeting, the Secretary of Energy and the NRC Chairman agreed to convene an Interagency Working Group on Radiological Dispersal Devices to address security concerns. In May 2003, the joint DOE/NRC report was issued. The report, entitled, "Radiological Dispersal Devices: An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive Materials of Greatest Concern and Approaches to Their Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition," contained a recommendation that a national source tracking system be developed to better understand and monitor the location and movement of sources of interest.
NRC also participated in the development of the IAEA “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources” (Code of Conduct) and the IAEA-TECDOC-1344, “Categorization of Radioactive Sources.” Annex I to the Code of Conduct, “List of Sources Covered by the Code,” identified the top three categories from TECDOC-1344 as high risk sources. The recommendation for a national source registry only applies to those Category 1 and Category 2 radionuclides identified above the dashed line in Table I to Annex I. The work on the
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DOE/NRC joint report was done in parallel with the Code of Conduct and the work on TECDOC-1344. As it turned out, the quantities of concern identified in the DOE/NRC joint report were similar to the TECDOC-1344 Category 2 values, so the NRC adopted the IAEA values to allow alignment between the domestic and international efforts to increase the safety and security of radioactive sources.
While NRC and the Agreement States previously concentrated on ensuring the safe and effective use of sealed sources, we now increasingly consider how to prevent terrorists from obtaining and using the material. Efforts to improve controls over sealed sources involve significant challenges, especially balancing the need to secure the materials without discouraging their beneficial use in academic, medical, and industrial applications. The NRC has begun efforts to meet the commitments made by the U. S. Government’s endorsement of the Code of Conduct and implement recommendations from the DOE/NRC joint report. These efforts have resulted in an interim database and work towards the development of the National Source Tracking System.
2. Interim Database Currently, there is no single U.S. source of information to verify the authorized users, locations, quantities, and movement of high-risk sealed sources. Separate NRC and Agreement State systems track licensees and the maximum amounts of materials they are authorized to possess but do not record actual sources or their movements.
To address this lack of information on actual material possessed, the NRC, with the cooperation of the Agreement States, began working on an interim database of high-risk sealed sources. In November 2003, both NRC and Agreement State licensees were contacted and requested to voluntarily provide some basic information on the IAEA Category I and Category 2 sources located at their facilities. This database was intended to be a “snap shot” of material actually possessed at the time compared with licensed authorizations. Of the approximately 2600 licensees contacted, 1313 licensees reported possessing over 5000 high-risk sealed sources at the IAEA Category 1 or Category 2 level. The interim database will be updated in 2005 and again in 2006 and will ultimately be replaced by the National Source Tracking System. The database is currently being used to inform NRC efforts to improve security and better track high-risk sealed sources. The interim database will serve to meet the U.S. commitment for a national source registry until the National Source Tracking System is operable, beginning in late 2006.
3. National Source Tracking System While the interim database provides a snapshot in time, the National Source Tracking System will provide information on an ongoing basis. Development of the National Source Tracking System is a two-part activity that includes both a rulemaking and information technology development. The rulemaking will establish the regulatory foundation for the National Source Tracking System. The information technology development aspect will develop the actual system. When completely operational, the National Source Tracking System will be a web-based system that would allow licensees to meet the reporting requirements on-line with ease. The system will contain information on NRC licensees, Agreement State licensees, and DOE facilities.
The rule would require licensees to report information on the manufacture, transfer, receipt, and disposal of high-risk sealed sources. The thresholds for reporting will be the list of radionuclides that the U.S. Government endorsed in the IAEA Code of Conduct at Categories 1 and 2 with seven other radionuclides added at the direction of the Commission. The information to be captured by the system includes the origins of each high-risk sealed source (manufacture, recycling, or import), all transfers to other licensees, all receipts of high-risk sealed sources, and endpoints of each high-risk sealed source (decay, disposal, or export). Information on the
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companies involved in the transactions will also be collected. Ultimately, the National Source Tracking System will provide a “cradle-to-grave” account for all high-risk sealed sources.
A system of this type will need continuous updating to be useful and accurate. In order to capture information as soon as possible, licensees will be required to report information on high-risk sealed source transactions by the close of the next business day. To ease the burden on licensees, the NRC is planning to establish a secure Internet-based interface to the National Source Tracking System. This interface would permit licensees access to the system using an Internet browser. Licensees would log on to the system and enter the required information by filling out a form on-line. Licensees will only be able to view their own information. While on-line access should be fast, accurate, and convenient for licensees, the NRC would also allow licensees the option of completing and mailing or faxing paper forms.
The proposed schedule for implementing the National Source Tracking System reflects the need for a rulemaking and the development of the system itself. The proposed rulemaking should be provided to the Commission by Spring of 2005, and the final rule should be in place July of 2006. After issuance of the final rule, there will be a phased implementation of the tracking system beginning in the Fall of 2006.
4. Conclusion National Source Tracking is part of a comprehensive radioactive source control program for radioactive materials of greatest concern. Although neither a source tracking system or source registry can insure the physical protection of sources, it will provide greater source accountability. A national source tracking system in conjunction with other controls will result in improved security and accountability for high-risk sealed sources. This paper has presented the NRC’s efforts on developing a national source tracking system. Significant progress has been and continues to be made domestically. The efforts include development of an interim database, a rulemaking, and the development of the National Source Tracking System. The tracking system is expected to be implemented in late 2006, early 2007.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, IAEA, Vienna (2004).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Categorization of Radioactive Sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1344, Vienna (2003).
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY/UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, The DOE/NRC Interagency Working Group on Radiological Dispersal Devices. Radiological Dispersal Devices: An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive Materials of Greatest Concern and Approaches To Their Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition, Washington DC, May 2003, http://www.doe.gov/engine/doe/files/dynamic/9620039919_RDDRPTF14MAY.pdf.
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SUPERVISION OF THE OPERATIONS INCLUDING WORK WITH RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN KOZLODUY NPP, PLC.
Ivailo Petkov Department of Metrology, Kozloduy NPP. Plc., Kozloduy, Bulgaria
Abstract. The purpose of this article is to describe the operations with radioactive sources, their movement, transport and the methods of control during the work. Control during their usage is described in company instructions and include all stages of sources life: needs and requires, buying, transport and receive, storage, work, their leave off exploitation and transfer to long term source-storage. Radioactive sources in Kozloduy NPP, Plc are used for metrology assurance of devices for radiation protection measurements and quality control of measurements. Tats why we pay attention mainly on this kind of sources. In article is described also requirements to qualification of people who do this work and the radiation protection control during the operations. In article take place operations with sources with short half life, liquid and gaseous, and sources for single use.
1. Introduction The main purpose of nuclear power plant is to ensure a safety production of electricity. For effective monitoring of measurements in radiation protection, dosimetry measurements, environment control and also for technical parameters of units, devices which are used must be calibrated and verified (quality control of measurements, primary and periodical tests). This require to use a radioactive sources traceable to the national standards of Bulgaria or other European countries. This use is regulate by the national and international laws and norms for metrology assurance of measurements.
Work with radioactive sources requires to observe a strong norms to ensure a safety work. The factory instructions that we use is harmonized with national and international official documents and requirements.
2. Necessity of radioactive sources The radioactive sources are used to ensure a measurements of 80 various types of different devices for radiation control measurements whose total number is about 3000. Main purpose is to obtain a necessary conditions very close to the real measurements. That’s why is used a radioactive sources for calibration, verification and for periodical check control. This sources have various metrological and technical characteristics: activity, shape, state, nuclide, statement. This suppose a continuous effective control during their use. This control is realized in every one stage of source life cycle.
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3. Control Basic purpose of control is to trace the movement of sources with all enclosed documents for identification. During the exploitation main part take monitoring of package and corps of sources, their physical statement and metrological characteristics.
The control of radioactive sources contain all stages of work:
- needs and requirements,
- buying,
- transport,
- put into operation,
- work;
- preparation of second level sources,
- discard,
- transfer to long term storage,
- certify for exhaust,
This control is carried out based on actual official affirmed documents. Every year we make a inspection to determine the status of works and operations, and protocol from inspection is sent to authority regulatory agency.
During the operations with radioactive sources is carried out a continuous radiation protection control. For this control we use a devices which correspond to technical and metrological requirements for this performance, passed a calibration or verification in accredited laboratory and have certificates. A personnel who work whit sources have a requisite qualification and permission for this work. They have a good experience and have passed a periodical instructions and training courses.
4. Buying When we intend to buy a source, this must be concerted with responsible people in factory to specify the characteristic and necessity of source and not to allow duplication of sources with a same characteristics and use. Chosen source must be exactly appropriate (shape, nuclide, activity) for specific purpose. Preference for deal are manufacturers with a good practice in design and preparation of sources and related equipment.
5. Transport Transport of radioactive sources is made with a specialized car with a necessity license from regulatory agency with observance of the official requirements. The car is equipped appropriately and the operators have a required qualification. There are instructions that gives directions to an actions during the transport and to ensure an effective radiation protection and dosimetric control. On the result of this control is made a protocol for regulatory agency. In protocol is described: car, route, time of transport, type of package, characteristics of source, surface contamination of package, doses received from workers, and the responsible for the current transport people.
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6. Source characteristics After arriving in the factory the source is placed for storage under control of person responsible for the sources. He check the all documents which is necessary for using the sources - certificate which must consist all parameters of source.
Before beginning the use it is very important to make a measurements to confirm the declared characteristics. The result of this measurements is recorded in the file of source and they mast be possible to verify during all source live.
In Kozloduy NPP exist data base of files including all available sources and this make easier to discover them and to observe the situation. Every file include: source, nuclide, type, activity, certificate number, half live period, traceability, position...
Every new source is involved in data base system to trace its movement during the exploitation period in factory.
7. Measurements with radioactive sources To take a source for work must be observed a given requirements:
- in the laboratory where source will be taken mast have a safe box for storage,
- people which will take a part in the action must have a qualification to work with sources, and to observe requirements for radiation protection control and to have available instructions for work.
- these people must be given in a order.
To receive a permission from the responsible person about the source movement, he must assure that all things written above are realized.
During the period of exploitation it is very important to look after carefully using of sources. For their physical protection from damage and protection from surface contamination. For work is used a special appliances which task is to protect the activity surface and not to change their metrological characteristics. This appliances ensured a fixed geometry during different periodical measurements. During the work with them is impossible to brake a corps of sources. If the measurements should be made to the place of devices the source is transferred with a special box with appropriate mark. The sources with high activity used for dosimetry tests, are placed in a special physical defence which decrease emissions and ensure a background values of radiation. Irradiators are oriented to safe directions.
A list for movement of sources is filled up daily and a date for activity and other characteristics necessary for measurements are periodically renovate.
8. Special sources In some cases we have to buy a basic radioactive source in solution and to make a secondary standards. This is made on a base of confirmed procedures. This secondary standard sources are often for single use or with a short half live period. After their use begin a procedure to removing from exploitation and classing as a useless according to their activities. All actions with these sources is carried out in a special laboratories.
When is used a radioactive gaseous mixture main attention is on the hermetic of the devices and connecting pipes. When devices are clearing from gasses is important to control the volume activity of gaseous mixture. The basic gas is under pressure so it is very important to mix it
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carefully and not to allow to leave the volume of device. The work finished with the same protocol for exhaust.
9. Discarding A sources with a short half live period after several decays become useless. For them is prepared protocol for exhausting. They are removed from data base and the protocol is sent to regulatory agency.
The sources for single use, after finishing their task are classified and separated to groups according to their activity and state (liquid or solid) and responsible person must take a decision to the way of storage.
10. Storage Sources which at a present moment are out of use are placed in isolated secure store with a strong physical protection and corresponding to the requirements for radiation protection control. Exist a order for responsible people with their duties of process of storage. They have a current information about available sources in the store, their positions, activity (primary and actual), and physical state.
The radioactive sources are separated according their types and are put in different safes and boxes. This gives the maximum radiation security. The storage have a installed fire alarm.
The sources which are out of use or have a physical damage and are ineffective for use are given to the factory store. Periodically this sources are transferred a long term storage in the national source-store and take off from data base of factory.
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A FULLY COMPUTERISED SYSTEM OF CENTRAL AND LOCAL REGISTRIES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS Cradle to grave control of sealed sources in Hungary
Á. Petőa, J. Husztib a Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority, H-1539 Budapest, P. O. Box 676, Hungary b Institute of Isotopes of the HAS, H-1525 Budapest, P. O. Box 77, Hungary
Abstract. Since the very beginning in the 60’s, the applications of radioactive materials were subject to licensing and all radioactive materials were registered in a central national registry. Over the decades the system was carefully maintained and gradually improved. However the drastic changes in the economic environment over the last decade and the obviously increasing public concern about the safety and security experienced in recent years seriously challenged the old system. To answer these new challenges, the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority recently undertook a major project to strengthen the regulatory control, to improve the quality and efficiency of the central and local registries and to enhance the awareness of users. The paper gives a brief overview of the main features of the new system and reports on the experiences learned during the first year of its operation.
1. Introduction The application of radioactive materials in Hungary began in the '60s. At that time, the import and distribution of radioisotopes was fully centralised and overviewed by the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission. As the demand for artificially produced radioisotopes rapidly increased, the domestic production of radioactive materials started. Realising the serious health issues involved and building on the features of a fully centralised system, a nation-wide central registry of all imported and manufactured radioactive products was established at a very early stage. Over the years the licensing and registration system went through many changes, but the basic requirement that all applications were subject to licensing and materials had to be registered was always maintained. Due to this continuity, the central registry had an almost complete inventory and history of all radioactive materials ever used in Hungary. During the 90’s the Hungarian economy – including the market of radioactive materials – was fully liberalised which resulted in a rapid transformation of companies producing, distributing exporting/importing and using radioactive materials. The recent accession of Hungary to the European Union significantly widened the market and also required the harmonisation of the Hungarian regulatory system with EU requirements [1, 2]. At the same time the public concern over the safety and security of radioactive materials continuously increased. As a consequence, gradually it became obvious, that minor amendments to the old system can not provide an efficient solution for the new challenges. Therefore the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) has decided to introduce a completely new, fully computerised registration and reporting system of radioactive materials.
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2. Regulatory Framework According to the current regulations, all practices involving radioactive materials are subject to licensing [3]. Licences are issued by the State Public Health and Medical Officer Services (SPHAMOS) for a fixed period of 3-5 years. The licences specify the type of application, the nuclides and the maximum activities and when applicable, list the actual sealed sources which are covered by the licence. The licensees are regularly inspected by SPHAMOS. Licence holders should maintain a local registry of all radioactive materials in their possession. The requirements for local registries and the central registry are set out in a separate regulation [4, 5]. The regulation also defines the obligations for reporting and communication between the central and local registries. The supervision of the registry and reporting system is the responsibility of the HAEA. HAEA is also responsible for the management and supervision of the central registry, which is operated by the Institute of Isotopes. To ensure the integrity of the system, HAEA is entitled to conduct independent inspections at the licensees, related to their registries and inventories.
SPHAMOS and HAEA works in close co-operation. SPHAMOS reports all licences issued, modified or withdrawn to HAEA, while HAEA provides regular reports for SPHAMOS on the actual inventories of radioactive materials of the licensees. Both organisations are requested to notify each other on any anomalies discovered during their inspection activities. In case of serious or continued anomalies, both SPHAMOS and HAEA may impose a fine, or may initiate the withdrawal of the licence.
3. The system of fully computerized central and local registries The previous registry system featured a computerised central registry and conventional local registries based on paper documents. Communication between the central registry and the licensees used traditional methods (mail, fax). Careful analysis of the deficiencies of the old system revealed that most of the discrepancies and problems with maintaining the central registry were due to insufficient communication between the central registry and the licensees, and due to the inadequate level of awareness on the side of licensees (i.e. licensees often forgot to report changes and there was a tendency to forget about old, unused radioactive sources). Therefore at designing the new system HAEA focused on addressing these issues.
A new document, the Passport was introduced as a visible instrument of “cradle to grave” control. The Passport is issued by the central registry (HAEA) for each sealed radioactive source. It has a unique identification number and lists all relevant data of the source (nuclide, activity, dates, manufacturer, identification number, owner, etc.). It is issued directly to the licensee and should be sent back to the central registry when the licensee transfers the source. The new owner receives a new Passport with the same identification number but indicating the new owner. Thus the Passport follows the source throughout its whole life time from its first application till final disposal.
The major requirements under the new registry system are briefly summarised below:
• The central registry records the following data:
o licensees (company names, addresses, contact persons, etc.),
o licences (licence holder, issuing authority, scope of licence, expiration date),
o radioactive sources (Passport numbers, nuclide, activity, dates, manufactures, etc.).
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• The licensees should register themselves with the central registry. Upon registration they receive a unique registration number and they should provide their relevant data (company name, addresses, phone numbers, responsible person, etc.). Any change in these data should be reported without delay.
• The licensees should maintain a local registry and record the following data:
o the licences (licence number and issuing authority) and the scope of the licences (sources, nuclides, maximum activities covered by the licence, expiration date, etc.),
o the list of radioactive sources, based on the Passport number as the unique identifier and including all relevant data (nuclide, activity, dates, physical form, etc.),
o all increases and decreases (transfers of sources) in their inventories, the partners involved in the transactions (shippers or receivers) and their licence numbers,
o all applications of radioactive sources (purpose, place and date of application, responsible person, etc.).
• The licensees should perform a physical inventory taking annually and record the results in the local registry. A physical inventory taking should also be performed upon the request of the regulatory authorities or before the termination of practices (before the withdrawal of the licence).
• The licensees should report to the central registry
o all changes in the inventories without delay (Inventory Change Reports, ICRs),
o the results of annual physical inventory takings (Physical Inventory Listings, PILs),
o all applications of the radioactive sources during the inventory period (annually, together with the inventory report).
• The central registry immediately acknowledges the receipt of all reports. After processing the reports the licensees are informed about the results: the acceptance of the report or the found discrepancies. The processing of the various types of reports includes the following:
o ICRs:
check if a matching transaction was reported by the partner (shipment/receipt) within an acceptable timeframe,
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check if the new inventories are covered by the licence(s).
o PILs:
check if the previous PIL and the ICRs since the previous PIL are consistent with the current PIL, and whether the current inventories are covered by the licence(s),
check the reported applications to identify unused sources or negligence of record keeping.
In order to help the licensees to meet the requirements of the new regulation without imposing any new burdens on them, the HAEA developed new local registry software. The software is distributed free of charge and is designed to fully support all recording and reporting requirements, and also provides a lot of convenience features ranging from the obvious to the most sophisticated, including automatic calculation of daily activities, notification of reporting deadlines and generation and dispatch of all requested reports, support for a variety of electronic communication (floppy disk, E-mail, FTP), producing all necessary hard copy documents and a fully flexible, customisable query system. To promote the use of the new registry software the HAEA also organised training courses for the users.
Of course the central registry software system was also upgraded to fit to the new system and to minimise the human resources needed to the timely and efficient processing of the increased frequency and amount of information exchange. Since the new system is fully computerised both at the central and the local registry level and builds on an automatic electronic communication (E-mail and FTP) between the two, it provides the possibility for a wide range of automatic or semi automatic controls and checks at both levels. Although not all of the numerous possibilities are fully used in the current implementation of the system, several examples are listed below.
Typical controls generating automatic notification at the central registry level:
• Unregistered licensee: when SPHAMOS reports a new licence and the licensee does not register with the central registry within a given timeframe.
• Unregistered source: when a PIL lists a source previously not recorded in the central registry.
• Unmatched transfer: when a reported transfer (shipment/receipt) is not reported by the other party involved in the transfer.
Typical controls generating automatic notification at the central and at the local registry level as well:
• Unauthorised possession: when either of the partners involved in a transaction does not hold a valid licence covering the source involved, or the inventory is not be covered by the licence.
• Failure to report: when a licensee fails to send the annual PIL.
• Expired licence: when a licensee fails to renew its licence.
• Unused source: when no application of a source is reported in the inventory period.
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Finally, it may be worth to emphasize that the only paper document in the new system is the Passport which is sent by traditional mail.
4. Experiences There are approximately 1000 workplaces where radioactive materials are being used regularly. By now, the vast majority of them use the new local registry software without problems. The registration of the licensees proved to be an efficient way of establishing and maintaining contacts and refreshing and keeping up-to-date the licensees’ contact information. The collection, processing and evaluation of the first electronic annual inventory report (covering over 10,000 sealed radioactive sources) was a tedious task where frequent human intervention was necessary. In a large number of cases minor discrepancies were found between the records of the local and central registries but these problems were easily solved. In many cases the local inventories indicated missing or surplus radioactive sources as compared to the central registry, but most of these cases were due to the lack of proper reporting of transfers. However, in several cases previously unregistered sources were identified and recorded in the local and central registry, and on one occasion an unreported loss of a radioactive source was discovered. These major anomalies triggered further investigations and regulatory authority actions. These early experiences already indicate that the new, strengthened system fulfils the expectations.
5. Conclusions The Hungarian example demonstrates that the extensive and efficient use of modern computer and communication technology can greatly enhance the reliability of the “cradle to grave” regulatory control of radioactive materials. The new Hungarian system of central and local registries fully meets the requirements set out in international recommendations [6]. It does not only improve the quality and reliability of inventories but also provides a valuable help in the efficient planning and minimises the need for on-site inspections.
REFERENCES
[1] 2003/122 Euratom Directive – On the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources, December 22, 2003
[2] 1493/93 Euratom Regulation – On the transport of radioactive materials between member states of the European Union, June 8, 2003
[3] 16/2000 EüM Regulation – On the implementation of the provisions of the Atomic Law with regards to the application of ionising radiation, 2000
[4] 25/1997 IKIM Regulation – On the central and local registries of radioactive sources and other radioactive substances, 1997 (the old regulation in force till June 26, 2004)
[5] 33/2004 BM Regulation – On the central and local registries of radioactive materials, 2004 (the new regulation in force since June 26, 2004
[6] Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, IAEA, 2004
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THE SYSTEM OF THE CONTROL OF THE RADIOACTIVE SOURCES THROUGHOUT THEIR LIFE CYCLE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Karla Petrová State Office for Nuclear Safety, Czech Republic
1. Infrastructure of the Regulatory Control The regulatory/supervisory bodies controlling nuclear safety and radiation protection have been by the governmental decision and in accordance with the Act No. 85/1995 in the 1995 year integrated into one Office - The State Office for Nuclear Safety (SÚJB). Thus the SÚJB became an integrated central agency of the Czech Republic state administration, with an independent budget and clear declared competences.
SÚJB ensures in the field of health and environmental protection against the adverse effects of ionizing radiation the following:
State administration and surveillance in the field of radiation protection at all workplaces with ionizing radiation sources,
Control and regulation of all kind of exposure to public, workers and patients, including exposure in emergency situations;
Management of activities of the countrywide radiation monitoring network including assurance of international data exchange on the radiation situation;
Countrywide records of ionizing radiation sources (hereinafter referred to as IRS) and countrywide records of professional exposure;
Enforcement of radiation protection measures including enforcing corrective measures and imposing penalties.
2. Legislation The Act No.18/1997 Coll. on peaceful use of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation (Atomic Act) as well as all related Decrees are based on the internationally adopted principles of nuclear safety and radiation protection, which are implemented in recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (SS No.115/1994), International Commission for Radiological Protection (Report No. 60/1990) and World Health Organization, etc. This new legislation complex was harmonized with the similar legislation of the European Union countries (Council Directives Nos. 96/29/EURATOM, 97/43/EURATOM, etc.)during the 2000 – 2002 years.
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3. Authorization The authorisation granted by the SUJB is among others required for following principal activities and practices:
• sitting, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installation or workplace with ionizing radiation sources
• handling of ionizing radiation sources, nuclear material, radioactive waste management
• transportation of nuclear material and specified radionuclide sources
• professional training of selected personnel
During licensing process following documents should be approved by the SUJB:
• Monitoring programme
• (On-site) emergency plan
• Controlled zone, control areas
• QA programme
Following documentation should be also submitted during licensing process to the SUJB:
• Justification and optimisation of the practice
• Specification of practice and sources
• Description of workplace (shielding, ventilation, sewerage,…)
• Operational radiation protection programme
• Limits & Conditions for nuclear facilities
• Expected releases and/or radioactive waste
• Method of decommissioning of sources
• The certificate of person responsible for radiation protection
4. Categorisation of sources and categorisation of workplaces Pursuant to Atomic Act ionizing radiation sources are classified according to the increasing degree of possible personal health hazards and environmental hazards into five classes – unimportant sources, minor sources, simple sources, important sources and very important sources. For the higher class of the sources, the more rigid and extensive requirements are defined for assurance of radiation protection; the licensing procedure is more sophisticated and requires a thorough professional knowledge. Inspections are primarily focused to the management of the potentially most hazardous sources and relevant inspections are more frequent, extensive and detailed. In a similar way, the workplaces with such sources are classified into 4 categories, from the workplaces of the 1st category (the least hazardous) to the 4th category (potentially the most hazardous). The categorization of sources is not recently fully compatible with the categorization used in the Code and in TECDOC – 1344, however the parameters registered in the central
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register of sources enable us to introduce also this categorization into the system and use recommended D-values. This will be done during the 2005 year altogether with the implementation of the requirements of EU Directive on High Activity Sealed Sources (HASS).
5. Central Register of Ionizing Radiation Sources (CRIRS) CRIRS is a part of the complex information system of SUJB which includes the register of licensees, sources, licences and controls.
CRIRS registers sealed IRS, devices with sealed IRS, generators and specification of workplaces with unsealed IRS. Users are obliged to report information on new source in use which are specified by Decree on radiation protection within one months. They shall report also all changes of registered data including the transfer of source to another user or to final disposal. Manufacturers, distributors, exporters, importers shall report twice per year the list of all SIR handled and distributed by them.
The registration of the source is based on the registration of its type and serial number.
Special registration cards are distributed by SÚJB and filled directly by users. They send filled cards to SUJB and data are introduced into the register. Manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors report to SÚJB once per half year the list of the sources delivered. This system serves as a control of the completeness of the register and enables monitoring of the movement of the source during its whole life.
CRIRS is applied for registration of individual sources used in the Czech Republic and monitoring of their movement, statistical evaluation based on the selected parameters of source, information on the placement of sources for fire rescue brigades, information on possible producer of the radioactive waste. Recently CRIRS registers 7 600 generators and altogether 6 500 sealed IRS. About 200 workplaces dealing with unsealed sources are registered too. Approximately 4600 sources from the total number are classified as important sources in accordance with the categorisation scheme given in legislation.
The methods of handling of IRS requiring a licence under the Atomic Act shall include:
5.1. Manufacturing A licence to manufacture IRS entitles the manufacturer to store them and to carry out necessary testing and verification of the parameters of IRS produced, but it does not replace any other licence needed for the intended use of sources. Produced radionuclide sources shall be stored safely in accordance with the special provisions for storage of IRS. The manufacturer shall only deliver the IRS to a person with the appropriate authorisation.
5.2. Import Imported radionuclide sources shall be transported and stored safely under the special provisions of Atomic Act. The importer shall ensure that during import only authorised persons will handle IRS and that the IRS will only be delivered to a person with the appropriate authorisation.
5.3. Export Exported radionuclide sources shall be transported and stored safely under the special provisions of Atomic Act. The exporter shall ensure that during export only authorised persons will handle IRS and that the IRS will only be delivered to a person with the appropriate authorisation. A certificate stating that the recipient is authorised for handling IRS confirmed by a competent body of the recipient's country shall be required for radionuclide source export.
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5.4. Distribution The IRS may only be introduced in the market after their type-approval where required and if conditions have been created for verification and evaluation of parameters of individual manufactured IRS and giving evidence that individual IRS conform to the type approved. The distributor shall ensure that the documentation for IRS distributed includes their classification, proposed scope of acceptance tests and status tests set out in Decree307, the safe conduct document for unsealed sources, the valid certificate of sealed source issued by an authorised person. The distributed radionuclide sources shall be transported and stored safely under the special provisions of Atomic Act. The distributor shall ensure that during export only authorised persons will handle IRS and that the IRS will only be delivered to a person with the appropriate authorisation.
A licence is required also for such a specific way of IRS management as IRS installation or commissioning, storage of radionuclide sources and usage of IRS, testing of IRS (performance test, long term stability test, acceptance test) and repairs of IRS.
If explicitly stated in a licence, the IRS for the usage whereof a licence is required may be used also at previously unspecified workplaces designed for work with IRS for a short period of time not longer than 30 days (hereinafter referred to as the "temporary workplace"). SÚJB shall be notified in writing, by telefax or by e-mail, no later than one day in advance of the date of work start-up, of the anticipated period of time of work at a temporary workplace, of its location, of work duties description and an overview of the IRS used. Working teams at temporary workplaces shall comprise at least two members, while at least one person shall have a special professional competence. SÚJB shall be notified without any delay of work termination at the temporary workplace.
Such IRS for the usage whereof a licence is required may only be used at such workplaces that meet the technical and organisational conditions of safe operation set out by Decree and ensuring that IRS are secured against theft and handling by unauthorised persons, including the time when the sources are not directly in use and are only used or switched on to perform the work tasks.
6. Security of sources -- Management of the radioactive material seizure or orphan sources
A licensee secures sources for which he has the licence against burglary, damage, or destruction. In addition he secures that:
- no unauthorised person handle the source;
- any lost control over the source, its theft, loss, disappearing, or destruction is with no delay notified to the SÚJB and Police of the Czech Republic; the stipulation of the immediate notification does not apply to insignificant sources;
- the source is not distributed or anyhow handed over, unless the person taking over the source has the relevant licence to handle such source; this provision does not apply to insignificant and minor sources;
- the source has controlled its location, movement, consumption, security against burglary, loss, disappearing, or destruction by physical inventory on a regular basis each six months.
SÚJB investigates carefully all events with IRS seen as unusual events paying attention to the evaluation of root causation and presentation of lessons learned.
Based on collaboration of SÚJB with the Czech Police, the General Customs Directorate, Fire Rescue Brigade (and the other responsible bodies) ad hoc Inter-Ministerial Expert Working
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Group (IMWG) to prevent illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, to prevent losses of IRS and to find lost sources was established. The IMWG:
- prepared the technical recommendation for creation of the sophisticated measuring system (including of personal detectors for estimation of exposure of check-points staff) which should be established for detection of radioactive material that can be illicitly moved based on three types of instruments – pocket sized, handheld and mobile, and fixed measuring devices;
- designed the system of notification to the responsible authorities – the SONS, the Customs Offices, the Czech Republic Police, the representatives of the metal industry, and the other relevant bodies involved in situation when illicit trafficking of radioactive material is detected,
- suggested the decision making scheme for different types of illicit trafficking of IRS or radionuclides contaminated material, going out from the following steps which shall be done :
confirmation of alarm, identification of the source of the alarm;
regaining of the control of illicit trafficking material;
detection, measurement and based on results of these measurements the implementation of a stipulated procedures or measures, using pre-defined reference levels:
decision whether the radioactive material or IRS will be:
sent back to the sender,
careful unloaded, separated from the load with the aim of localising and removing the source of contamination,
transported with the aim of storage, recycling, melting down, deposition;
implementation of appropriate radiation protection measures to mitigate hazards to health and bring the situation under appropriate radiation protection control,
providing of any medical treatment if are needed;
application of penalties in accordance with legislation;
registration and evaluation – reporting of relating radiation protection consequences of event; enlightenment and feedbacks for future.
During the year 2002 SUJB issued the special recommendation on the procedure in the case of the radioactive materials seizure. It contains the procedure in case of a suspicion on radioactive materials presence for different scenarios. It contains also very valuable charts of decision procedures and pictures of many objects potentially radioactive or containing radioactive material which could be find. This material has been distributed to all involved parties and serves as very useful tool in the system. All events evaluated as unusual are reported to SÚJB throughout the liaison on the permanent standby duty. This contact person is a part of national rescue system which includes fire rescue brigade and police and he/she ensures the activity of relevant regional mobile monitoring team if necessary – e.g. in the case of the suspicious object finding. These mobile teams are operated by SÚJB, SÚRO and SÚJCHBO. They are equipped with necessary
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monitoring devices and equipment and they are able to evaluate the situation on the place and to manage further steps for identification of found object and for its safe storage. They participate also in periodical exercises.
7. Conclusions The system of radiation protection in the Czech Republic is now after the complete reorganisation fully reflecting the international standards for radiation protection including most of the requirements of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The National Central Registration System of all Ionizing Radiation Sources has been created and it is now fully in routine operation. Some additional modifications will be introduced into the legislation and practice during the 2005 -2006 years.
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DYNAMIC INFORMATION SYSTEM OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCE
Zhou Qifua, Yang Chuna, Huang Chaoyuna, Liu Hua, Zhang Jialib, Zhao Yongmingb, Zhang Zhigangb, Ge Lixib
a Nuclear Safety Centre, State Environment Protection Administration, P. R. China b National Nuclear Safety Administration State Environmental Protection
Administration P. R. China
Abstract. This paper mainly discusses the supervision of radioactive source in china from the aspect of technique. To strength the supervision of radioactive source in china, we decided to establish a dynamical information system based on RAIS-3. We introduced some processes of establishing the system including origin of data, localization of RAIS-3, code of radioactive source etc. And we also discuss how the system can serve for the supervision of radioactive source well.
1. Introduction With the continuous development of nuclear industry and nuclear technology in china, radioactive sources and radiation generators have been utilized through industry, agriculture, medicine, scientific research and teaching and contributed to economic development and social progress significantly.
Now, there are more than 14000 facilities nationwide with more than 102000 sources in china. Meanwhile, there are 26300 more waste radioactive sources to be disposed, among which 2000 ones are orphans.
2. The actuality of supervision of radioactive source In china, State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA) exercise unified regulation on radioactive pollution prevention and control work for the whole country [1]. But because of some reasons, for example, a vast territory or imbalance of economic development, hierarchy is carried out inside the environment protection administrative department. SEPA is mainly in charge of issuing authorizations of production, import and export while provincial authorities take charge of the issue of other authorizations. The supervision system of hierarchy is suitable to the current background of our country, but because we haven’t unified regulatory information system, there are many hidden troubles existing in this country with respect to radioactive source safety management as follows:
(1). Provincial authorities don’t share the data sufficiently. For example, facilities without the authorization maybe purchase radioactive sources or assorted equipments from other provinces and neither authority was acquainted.
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(2). Lack of communication between SEPA and provincial authority. So SEPA are not aware of the real information of radioactive sources throughout the country.
(3). Authorities don’t master the transfer of radioactive sources absolutely. When sources were transferred from one unit to another, even to more units, some get out of control and lost.
(4). Document is not integrated. Regulatory authority doesn’t have the integrated document about the facilities and their sources, even none.
(5). With the development of foreign trade, illegal radioactive material entry events happen frequently as well. But it is hard to distinguish these sources because there is no identity information system of sources.
An incomplete statistics shows 30 events happened on average every year recently. And it has been proved that among these events, stolen and lost of radioactive source were principal. Some of these stolen and lost sources haven't been found so far [2].
3. Establish the national dynamic information system To resolve these problems and to normalize the supervision of radioactive source, we decided to establish the national dynamic information system of radioactive source.
3.1.Origins of data Data of the dynamic information system mainly come from three parts:
(1) Every province’s archives of radioactive sources
In 2003, Chinese Central Schedule Department adjust the system of radioactive source safety supervision and put the function of unified supervision of radioactive source under the department of environment protection administration (nuclear safety administration), and then the previous regulatory authority -- Ministry of Health began to hand over the records of facilities and sources to SEPA, these records are important parts of each province’s archives.
When the facilities want to buy the radioactive source, they should apply to the provincial environment protection administrations and provide the information of the source, this information would be noted. Also, when one facility transfer radioactive source to another facility, these two facilities should both register to the provincial authority.
So these archives are mainly about the sources of the facilities, including the amount, nuclide, activity, etc.
(2). Data of production and import/export
In china, state regulatory authority take charge of the issue of authorization of production�import and export.
The production units should report the amount�nuclides and activities of radioactive sources they produced to the SEPA and register. The source not registered can not be sold. When they sold sources, they should first check the authorization of the purchaser and input the information of purchaser into the system.
Meanwhile, any facility which wants to import/export radioactive source should apply to the SEPA for the authorization and list the information of sources.
By these means, SEPA can keep the grip on the origin of the sources.
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(3) Special action
From April to November, 2004, SEPA, Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Public Health organized a special action entitled “Check the radioactive sources to set civilian’s heart at rest”. The main purposes of the joint enforcement are to investigate all radioactive sources in China, to register all radioactive sources with identification number and establish national inventory.
During the period of the special action, we check the sources of all facilities by diversified means. First, facilities should declare and register the sources they owned, and then we go to verify. For lost and theft sources, we put on record and search. For spent and orphan sources, we store them compulsively.
By the special action, we gather the latest information about the amount, category, distributing of the radioactive source countrywide. This is the foundation to establish the national dynamic information system.
3.2.Regulatory Authority Information System (RAIS) RAIS is designed by the IAEA as a tool for the management of information related to the regulatory control of radioactive sources [3].
In July 2004, just after received the 3rd version of the RAIS, we analysed and tested the program. After serious study, we felt it has many advantages and decided to apply it in our country.
First, we translated all documents into Chinese. After we got the source code in Aug 2004, we organized some technicians to get it localized. And we also made some modulations to adapt it to the Chinese situations.
In Sep 2004, the training course of RAIS-3 was given to the assorted personnel from regulatory authorities and manufacture units nationwide. And we taught participator all operations of the software including installation, input, query, statistics and consolidation, etc. Immediately after this training course, they start to input data of radioactive sources into each system.
SEPA is establishing a National Data Centre of Radioactive Source to gather the data from provincial regulatory authorities and manufacture units. These data would be consolidated to national inventory. Furthermore, it can backup all data to guarantee the safety of the data. Also we can find out the origin of data from it.
3.3.Code for radioactive source of china [4] In order to control the radioactive source throughout their life, also to identify the source in the information system, we compiled the coding rule for radioactive sources, It means that identity supervision system for radioactive sources is going to be implemented.
(1) Each source will be given a unique lifetime identity code unless the half life of the radioisotope is less than 60 days.
(2) For all sources produced or imported before Dec.31, 2004, provincial regulatory authorities compiled the code according to the coding rule.
(3) From Jan.1, 2005, it is forbidden to produce, import, export, sell, use and reserve radioactive sources without identities.
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(4) After Jan.1, 2005, manufacture units and import/export units should compile the code for every source and report to SEPA to register.
(5) Code for radioactive source is constituted by twelve numbers and denominators, respectively represent manufacture unit, production time, code for nuclide, serial numbers,category etc.
No.1~2 is code for manufacture units if radioactive source was produced inside the country, expressed by two numbers. Else, it is code for country.
No.3~4 indicates the year of production, expressed by final two numbers of the year. For example, if one source is produced in 2004, then input “04”.
No.5~6 is code of radioisotope.
No.7~11 is the serial number of the radioactive source.
No.12 is the category of radioactive source. Source are divided into five categories respectively expressed by 1,2,3,4,5.
3.4.Code for facilities and authorizations We also strength the supervision of facilities, and compiled the code for them and authorization. Also this is the need of the information system.
Code for radioactive source is constituted by six numbers and denominators.
No.1 is the abbreviation of the provinces. For examples, JiangSu is abbreviated to JS.
No.2 is the code for district or city. It’s compiled by every province respectively.
No.3~6 is the serial number of the facilities.
Because the code for facilities does not change during its existence, so the code mainly reveals the geographic location of the facility.
Code for authorizations is also constituted by six numbers and denominators.
No.1 is the same as the code for facilities. But if the authorization is issued by SEPA, then input “national”.
No.2~3 indicates the year to issue the authorization, expressed by final two numbers of the year. For example, if one authorization was issued in 2004, then input “04”.
No.4~6 is the serial number of the authorizations.
For different types of the authorizations, we use different denominators to indicate. ‘M’ indicates manufacture, ‘X’ indicates sale, ‘U’ indicates use, ‘I’ indicates import, ‘E’ indicates export, ‘S’ indicates store.
For authorizations, it will expire after 5 years, so it is important to show the issue time.
3.5.Introduce the international guide Category the radioactive source is an important theory basis to supervise the radioactive source scientifically, so we put the category of radioactive source into practice in the information system. IAEA revised the (Category of radioactive source) (IAEA-TECDOC-1344) recently, the new
categorization of sources is based upon the potential for sources to cause deterministic health effects [5].
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We plan to introduce it next year and get it localized. A safety guide (Categorization of Radioactive Sources) would be issued at the beginning of next year.
Meanwhile we also prepare to introduce the technical document (safety of radioactive source) (IAEA-TECDOC-1355) compiled by IAEA.
4. Achieve the dynamic management
4.1 Comparison of data Just as mentioned at the beginning, we now have two copies of data about the radioactive source.
Archives of provincial regulatory authority (database A) are mainly about the user, including the information of facilities and sources owned by these facilities. Records of production and import/export (database B) are reported to SEPA directly. Two databases should accord with each other absolutely. Any error means the problems of supervision on radioactive source and also provides clue to future action.
If the quantity of data in A is greater than that in B, then it means:
(a) Some sources in A are orphan sources;
(b) Some facilities had bought radioactive sources illegally or smuggled sources into our country;
(c) Manufacture units or import units didn’t report to SEPA some sources they sold to register. So based on data A, we can find out the origin of radioactive sources and dispose the illegal sale units.
If the quantity of data in B is greater than that in A, then it means:
(a) Some sources have been lost or stolen. Then we should take measures to track and search them.
(b) Facilities didn’t register sources they possess to authorities. So based on data in B, we can find out and dispose these facilities.
(c) Manufacture units had sold radioactive source to facilities without authorization, so we can’t find record of these sources in database A.
However, we can not just give our attentions to the quantity of data. We also should check whether the records of two databases are corresponding. If one source appears just in one database, we also can find out the problem.
By this dynamic information system we can master all procedures from production to sale, to use, to dispose. So we can achieve the continuous control of sources throughout their life cycle.
4.2 Transfer of radioactive source Some facilities did not register when they transferred radioactive source, so many sources had been out of control and caused radiological incidents and accidents.
To strength the supervision on transfer of radioactive source, we have compiled some regulations and transfer registration sheet. It is regulated that transfer can just happen between two facilities both have authorizations and it is forbidden to sale radioactive source to the facility without authorization.
In dynamic information system, we record every transfer of source detailed. When source is transferred from facility C to facility D, we first find the item of this source in system, write off
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facility C in source state and note the reason. Then we add new state for this source, input the facility D and time, meanwhile note the origin of source.
These records are very important for us to master the transfer of radioactive source. It is an important part to achieve continuous control of sources throughout their life cycle.
4.3 Update of data After the application of this dynamic information system, every movement of source would be recorded into the system. Meanwhile, supervision on facilities including issue, change, withdraw the authorization would be recorded too. To guarantee the validity of the system, it is important to update the data timely.
Every regulatory authority should send their data file to superior authority periodically and finally to the national data centre. Then these data would be consolidated to national inventory. Just as so, the dynamic information system can operate effectively and steady.
According to our work plan, after the National Data Centre of Radioactive Source is established, we would establish a FTP server. So every provincial authority can update their data to the data centre and download the national inventory directly.
5. Conclusions We hope this system can improve the supervision of radioactive source. And we can imagine, after the dynamic information system go in operation, supervision of radioactive source in china would become more effectively and scientifically.
REFERENCES
[1] People’s Republic of China Law on the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution, 2003
[2] National Nuclear Safety Administration, Supervision of radioactive source in china, 2004
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Rais 3.0 Administrator’s Guide, 2004
[4] STATE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION ADMINISTRATION, Code for radioactive source,
2004
[5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, (Category of radioactive source), IAEA-
TECDOC-1344, 2003
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Technical Session 1: Working Toward Implementing the Code of Conduct
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STATUS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SAFETY AND SECURITY IN SAUDI ARABIA AND PROPOSED EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Khalid Aleissa, Abdulrahman Alarfaj Atomic Energy Research Institute, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Abstract. This paper presents a brief description of the general procedures for Security of Radioactive Sources in Saudi Arabia. The present status of the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive materials in Saudi Arabia is reviewed in details. Hazards and potential threat, material control and responsible parties, in addition to management and the technical requirements, are the main topics that are discussed. Some interest is given to the responsibilities of the regulatory authority, with special emphasis on the role of King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology as a national competent authority.
Against the backdrop of the fight against global terrorism, the issue of the safety and security of radioactive sources has been in recent years the focus of increasing international attention. There is concern, firstly, that terrorists could gain access to highly radioactive sources and build so-called dirty bombs and, secondly, that orphan sources - i.e. sources no longer under control - could constitute a serious threat worldwide to public health.
Saudi Arabia has a very strict regulatory regime, that guarantees the safety and security of radioactive sources. However, different solutions on national and international scales are proposed to improve the safety and security of radioactive materials.
1. Introduction The uses of radioactive sources are widespread and still growing in different fields. The benefits gained due to these uses of nuclear technology in these fields determines the extent of risk acceptance by the society. Radiation safety standards, such as the I.A.E.A’s International Basic Safety Standards (BSS) for protection against ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources[1] have been developed and issued to restrict radiation risks and to ensure radiological safety. When the safety requirements of these standards are properly met, risks and radiological hazards are strongly eliminated. However, there are number of illegal movements of radioactive materials through and across States and State borders, that create the threat of terrorist actions and potentially serious hazards to public health. Many serious and fatal consequences have occurred as a result of unauthorized receipt, possession, use, transport or disposal of radioactive materials. In many instances, loss of control of radioactive materials has lead to serious fatalities[2].
System for safety and security of Radioactive sources in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established and are considered as a basic requirement for protection against ionizing radiation. This paper presents the present status in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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2. Hazards and Potential Threat in Saudi Arabia In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, radioactive Sources are manufactured, exported, imported, transported and used in industry, medicine, research, teaching activities and other fields. Some radioisotopes and radio-pharmaceuticals are produced at the research center of the King Faisal Specialist Hospital at Riyadh using the 28 MeV variable energy cyclotron. Part of these radioisotopes is used locally while the other part is exported. Moreover, different radiation sources are imported and widely used in different techniques. Several hundreds of different radioactive sources, such as Co-60 Tc-99m, Cs-137, Ir-192, Am-Be neutron sources and others with different activities are imported annually and used in different applications.
3. Basic Obligation and Responsibilities of Principal Parties In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, any radioactive source or material should be authorized in accordance with the basic obligation of the BSS for protection against ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. This obligation requires that no practice shall be adopted, introduced, conducted, discontinued or ceased and no source within a practice shall, as applicable, be mined, milled, processed, designed, manufactured, constructed, assembled, acquired, imported, exported, sold, loaned, hired, received, sited, located, commissioned, possessed, used, operated, maintained, repaired, transferred, decommissioned, disassembled, transported, stored or disposed off, except in accordance with the appropriate requirements of the standards, unless the exposure from such practice or source is excluded from the standards or the practice or source is exempted from the requirements of the standards. The Principal parties that are responsible for the adoption of the requirement of the BSS are; the competent authority, the licensee, the consignor, the carrier, and the local authorities. The general responsibilities of principal parties, within the requirements specified by the Regulatory Authority, are:
3.1 The Competent Authority: The Competent Authority has been firstly nominated in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1986, where, the Regulatory Authority has been divided in two main bodies. The Technical authority, which includes all technical and scientific aspects of radiation protection and safety of radioactive Sources, together with preparation of regulations and instructions, was deligated to King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), where the most qualified personnel exist in the Institute of Atomic Energy Research. The enforcement authority has been deligated to the Ministry of Interior. Other authorities have been distributed among others. For example, the Saudi Arabian Authority for Standardization is responsible for issuing different limits concerning radiation aspects. The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for monitoring detection of radioactivity in imported foodstuffs and consumer products. However, for effective regulations, it is hoped that the new act on radiation protection against ionizing radiation in the Kingdom will nominate a single regulatory authority, that will be supported by sufficient power and resources for effective regulation and will be independent of any other governmental institutions or agencies being regulated.
Recently, KACST as a national competent authority, has updated the regulations for protection against ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources, which are in harmony with the international BSS issued in 1996.
3.2 The licensee The licensee has the primary responsibility for the safe use, control and security of the licensed radioactive Sources. It is his responsibility to prepare and maintain a detailed accountability
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system that includes complete records for all the licensed sources. The record should include description of each source or radioactive material for which he is responsible, such as its activity, quantity and form, its use location and movement and all measures that have undertaken to ensure security of the source.
3.3 The Consignor and the Carrier For the safe transport of radioactive Sources consignor and carrier bears safety responsibilities during transport. The consignor is responsible for complying with the national regulations related to the safe transport of radioactive Sources. He should supply the carrier with all appropriate emergency instructions and schedules, and be ready to offer all needed assistance in an emergency involving the consignment. The carrier is responsible for complying with the national regulations, being informed of different response procedures along the route, and getting the proper emergency instructions on boarding the source.
4. Radioactive Sources’ Control in Saudi Arabia The main elements required for control of radioactive material and sources in Saudi Arabia includes authorization for receipt, possession, use, transport, import, export and disposal of radioactive Sources.
4.1 Authorization to possess radioactive sources According to the new Saudi regulations, possession, receipt or delivery of any amount of radioactive material should be authorized by the regulatory authority of the country. Up to now there is no exclusion from this requirement even for any small amount of radioactive material. Clearance of any radioactive material is done by the national regulatory authority. In the country, the term notification is not applied in that sense given in the international BSS. However, terms registration and licensing are both applied and require that authorization has to be obtained prior to receipt, possession, use and transport of radioactive material and sources. An application for clearance of a radioactive material should include all information such as, i) type of the radioactive material and its quantity, ii) a description of the equipment and the type of practice in which the material will be used, iii) the location for use and storage and the identity of the individuals responsible for security and safety of the material.
4.2 Authorization to transport radioactive material According to the new Saudi regulations, transport of any radioactive material or waste should be subjected to the requirements of the safe transport of radioactive material, which is in complete harmony with the IAEA’s regulations for safe transport of radioactive material. Appropriate packaging, adequate documentation and prior notifications by the producer and consignors are required to assure that the carrier takes appropriate precautions and to secure the arrival of the material.
4.3 Import or export of radioactive sources No radioactive material will be shipped by carrier to any port prior approval from the port authority, which is based on the issuance of the radioactive materials permit from the competent authority. When radioactive material or sources are imported from abroad they are subjected to the custom’s inspections. In Saudi Arabia, there is a complete coordination between the customs authority and the regulatory authority. Any amount of radioactive material or sources will not be cleared from the custom’s authority unless prior notification to this authority has been issued by the regulatory authority. The regulatory authority has issued a complete instructions to the
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radioactive material producers to stop any supply with radioactive material unless the receiver has a valid authorization.
4.4 Authorization to dispose of radioactive Sources According to the national regulations for handling of spent radioactive sources that are no longer in use, these sources should be returned back to the producer. If this is not possible, the sources should be collected by the licensee, conditioned for storage and safely and securely stored until a national authorized disposal facility will be available in the country. Soluble liquid radioactive waste may be disposed of to the common sanitary system under certain circumstances, which are dedicated to environmental protection and prevention of loss of control of radioactive material. The regulatory authority verifies periodically through inspections that users are properly disposing their radioactive waste.
5. Regulations for the Security of the Radioactive Sources Some elements that are used to regulate radioactive sources and to assure their security and safety in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are :
5.1 Physical Security of Radioactive Material Physical control of radioactive material which is in use or stored starts from the existence of; a) a clearly designated place for handling and storage, b) notices, signals or other warning means to identify the presence of radioactive Sources, c) It should also include, controlled access to the place of usage and storage, d) guards or electric surveillance. Regular audits and assessments to check the security arrangements, warning notices, and safety systems, measurement of dose rates and contamination levels, etc. Particular effort is needed for radioactive Sources in medicine, industry and research, where many such Sources are used and stored and there are many individuals handling of the material.
5.2 Accountability for Sources and Records The licensees authorized to possess, use, transport, import and export radioactive sources bear full responsibility for the radioactive sources and Sources handled by them, and should maintain an accountability system, including records for each source. The record include; name, technical qualification, movement, physical and chemical state, serial number, location, and all other details including any activities in which the radioactive source or Sources are used. Other records for shipments, receipt, physical inventory, operation losses and final disposition should be maintained.
5.3 Location of Sources The selection of a site for a source that holds a large inventory of radioactive Sources or has the potential for release of large amounts of such radioactive Sources must take into account any features that might affect the safety of the source or might be affected by the source. The feasibility of off-site intervention, including carrying out emergency plans and protective actions as foregoing factors in engineering design must also be considered.
5.4 Inspection Inspection is one of the major aspects that strongly affect safety and security of radioactive sources and Sources. So, the regulatory authority reserves all rights to inspect all practices and actions that include radioactive sources or Sources in periodic or sudden manner to ensure the compliance with requirements, and regulations of radiation protection. This includes inspection of followed procedures for carrying out actions, all workers, all locations that may be affected by
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these actions or may affect them, and all documents and records relevant to the actions, radioactive material and sources or persons and their radiation exposure.
5.5 Periodic Checks of Inventories and Notification of Loss of Control Inventory of radioactive material should be checked periodically to confirm that the Sources are in their assigned locations and are secure. Records of the inventory and findings should also be maintained. The appropriate intervals for conducting inventories depend on considerations similar to those for security. The regulatory authority should be notified of the loss of control of radioactive material. The notification should include a description of the radioactive material and any associated equipment, its last location and the circumstances. The timings and means of notification will depend on the nature of hazard. In any case, initial notification should be prompt, so that the actions to regain control and reduce risk are most effective if started quickly. The regulatory authority have sufficient enforcement policy to correct non-compliance of requirements.
6. Conclusion and Recommendations: The growing amount of disused radioactive materials requires a national an international efforts to improve the control of there sources, on national level, interim disused radioactive sources in considered and believed it will help to provide further control of radioactive materials, hence, improve their safety and security. The inigrity of the disused radioactive material is an essential condition to consider the secure of the source.
On international level, the international bodies such as IAEA is believed to play a major role arranging for collecting and recycling the disused sources from different countries. This will maintain a better control of the radioactive materials. It is believed that radioactive materials producers are the first nominees to accept and recycle disused sources that could not be secured in the countries by its conditions. Countries with well established radioactive waste program are hoped to participate in solving this issue with countries with less developed radioactive waste programs. IAEA can, also play a major role in promoting regional or sub-regional radioactive waste program for countries in a region or sub-region that do not have enough radioactive waste to establish a national radioactive waste program.
REFERENCES
[1] Basic Regulations for Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation sources in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. Regulations prepared by Institute of Atomic Energy Research ( IAER ) ,1996.
[2] International basic safety standards(BSS) for radiation protection against ionizing radiation and
the safety of radiation sources. International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA),Safety Series No.115-1.1995.
[3] International Atomic Energy Agency, Recommendations for the Safe Use and Regulation of
Radiation Sources, Safety Series No. 102, IAEA, 1990.
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ESTABLISHMENT OF REGULATORY CONTROL OVER RADIATION SOURCES IN REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
Armen Amirjanyan Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Armenia, Nuclear & Radiation Safety Center,
Armenia, ASTM, USA
Abstract. Since 2002, the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ANRA), with support from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has worked to achieve and maintain a high level of regulatory oversight and control of safety and security of radiation sources in Armenia. The principle goal of this effort is to reduce the likelihood of the use of radiological dispersal device (an RDD or “dirty bomb”) or radiological exposure device (RED). One mechanism by which Armenia intends to achieve this goal is through aggressive implementation of IAEA-sponsored Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources. Specifically ANRA has completed development and implementation of their national radioactive source database (registry). ANRA now has current information (type, owner, use, etc.) on the approximately 1,300 radioactive sources in use in Armenia. Disposition of these sources has been verified by ANRA through actual on-site inspections. ANRA developed an amendment to the Armenia’s basic nuclear law which among other endorses provisions of the Code of Conduct. The amendment has been signed into law by the President of Armenia in December of 2004. ANRA has also prepared and is moving forward to adopt several new regulatory requirements (rules and regulations) that identify safety and security requirements applicable to the use of radioactive sources in Armenia. ANRA is currently in the process of developing procedures to authorize (license) the use and handling of radioactive sources. In 2004 ANRA has established two regional offices in the city of Goris and Vanadzor from which it will conduct inspection and enforcement activities relative to radiation sources. Lastly, ANRA has conducted several workshops to familiarize users of radioactive sources with these new safety and security requirements.
1. Legislation and Regulation The Code of Conduct establishes a need for each State to have legislation and regulations that prescribe and assign government responsibilities for the safe and secure use of radioactive sources, that provide for the effective control of radioactive sources, that specify the requirements for protection against exposure to ionizing radiation, and that specify the requirements for the safety and security of radioactive sources.
To accomplish this need ANRA has developed an Amendment to existing Law, Standards and Regulation on radiation protection and safe use of the radiation sources and is currently in the process of developing procedures to license operation of radiation sources, radiation generators and associated equipment.
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2. Amendment to Nuclear Law Amendment to the Law of Republic of Armenia on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes (1999) was prepared by ANRA in 2003, approved by the National Assembly in November 2004 and signed into law by the President of Armenia in December of 2004.
The Amendment addressed the status i.e. independence of ANRA, clarified basic ANRA’s responsibilities and authorities and specifically authorized ANRA to conclude international agreements. The Amendment obligated the utility organization to allocate a normative quantity of revenue to safety improvement, physical protection, fuel storage and decommissioning.
The Amendment introduced, extended and clarified existing Law consistent with the Basic Principles of the Code of Conduct. The following specific changes affecting radiation sources were introduced:
• Explicitly identified “ionizing radiation sources” as the subject and objective of the Law
• Required “compliance with requirements of safety standards of the IAEA” when developing or adopting legal acts
• Required recognition and application of the IAEA safety standards with the purpose to bring the safety level in compliance with international criteria
• Provided extended definition of Regulatory Authority to include “licensing and authorization in the field of atomic energy utilization “and“ regulation of safety of … radioactive materials”
• Clarified the definition of the state regulation of safety in atomic energy utilization field to include:
o Safety of radioactive materials and radiation generators
o Import and export of radioactive materials and radiation generators and associated equipment
o Accounting and control of radioactive materials, radiation generators and equipment containing radioactive material
• Obligated Regulatory Authority to:
o conduct state register for ionizing sources
o coordinate the IAEA national and regional programs in technical cooperation framework i.e. including the model project
o cooperate with other international organizations and regulatory authorities of other countries on exchange of information and safety related issues
• Allowed for involvement of international organizations and experts in regulatory supervision
• Defined a place of technical support organizations in the providing technical support in practices with account, control and conduction of register on radiation sources
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• Issue licenses on import and export of radiation sources and associated equipment and radiation generators
3. Standards and Regulation The following documents were developed to support regulation of ionizing sources in Armenia:
• Standards on ionizing radiation protection and
• safety of ionizing radiation sources
• Regulation on ionizing radiation protection and safety of ionizing source
The standard defines the radiation protection principles, provides definitions and methods of calculating exposure, establishes dose limits for professional staff categories under normal conditions and emergency situations, establishes requirements for exposure of members of the public to man-made sources under normal conditions, to natural radiation sources, to medical exposure, to exposure under radiological emergencies. The STANDARD was developed in accordance with requirements existing in Armenia and consistent with international practice and IAEA recommendation in this area.
The regulation establishes requirements for practices that handle ionizing radiation sources. These identify the requirements for licensing and authorization for handling sources above exemption threshold. The regulation establishes requirements for siting, design, safe operation, and decommissioning of facilities that handle sealed and unsealed sources and radiation generators. The regulation defines processes associated with purchase, accounting, transport, and transfer of radiation sources and associated equipment . It provides requirements for monitoring of work places and personnel exposure, radiation protection measures for professional staff and patients and for protection of members of the public. The regulation establishes the requirements for radiation protection plan and emergency procedures.
4. National Registry of Radiation Sources Consistent with the Basic Principle of the Code of Conduct, ANRA has established a National Registry of radiation sources. Development of this registry is described below. This process include administrative (paper records) search, inspection verification, and development of the registry as part of the ANRA Regulatory Information System (ARIS)
Effective control over radiation sources in Armenia has been lost after the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 2002 ANRA was given the responsibility for regulatory control of the radiation sources by the government of Armenia. The first priority was to reestablish with some confidence the knowledge on the disposition of the sources in Armenia i.e. to perform initial inventorization.
5. Inventorization Process During administrative(records) search ANRA obtained records from the Ministry of Health and contacted local municipalities and regional offices of the Ministry of Health to obtain information on the organizations that currently use (or have used in the past) radiation sources and generators. To facilitate this process ANRA has developed a form that was mailed to these organizations requesting an up-to-date information.
ANRA received and analyzed information on radiation sources and concluded that on-site inspections will be required to confirm the data obtained thus far. During the next phase of the project ANRA has inspected all of the organizations in Armenia last known to possess radiation sources. This activity allowed to verify information on the sources disposition. The inspections
34 33
identified approximately 2000 radiation sources of which about 2/3 were in active use and the remainder were sent for long term storage at RADON facility.
Of 1257 radiation sources located at 285 facilities there are 4 Co-60 sources of Category 1 (by activity), 42 Co-60 sources of Category 2 and 8 sources of Category 3. All of the data was entered into ARIS which serves as a National Register for radiation system as well as performs a number of other functions described below.
6. ANRA Regulatory Information System ANRA is in the process of developing an information system. The system is designed to perform Process Control and Contain Informational Database. Process Control includes ANRA’s activities such as Authorization, Licensing, and Inspection of all facilities subject to ANRA oversight including that for radiation sources. The Information Database includes the following modules: NUCMAD (nuclear materials), RASOD (radiation sources), OCUDOS (occupational doses) and the Technical Library. Of these RASOD has been developed and Licensing module is under development with the anticipated completion date in early 2005.
RASOD provides a capability of storing essential information on the radiation sources in Armenia, tracking disposition of the radiation sources and generators over their lifetime, maintaining an accurate inventory, recording any changes, and providing a recoverable history of all transactions. Functionally it serves two main purposes: a National Register and (in the future) a source of information for licensing and inspection activities. Consistent with the Code of Conduct requirement to harmonize the format of State’s registers, RASOD has internal record structure that is fully compatible with latest version of RAIS software.
7. Licensing of radiation sources ANRA will begin formal licensing in 2005. To prepare for this activity ANRA is in the process of developing four licensing procedures for operations with radioactive materials, devices containing radioactive materials, and radiation generators for use, transport, storage, and export/import activities. This effort will be completed in early 2005.
To facilitate this activity ANRA developed guidance on standard form and content that will be used for development of the licensing procedures. This guide covers the essential elements of the licensing procedure including application submittal and review, license conditions, license issuance and amendments, suspension / revocation provisions. This guidance is based on experience gained in countries in central/eastern Europe as well as IAEA recommendations.
8. ANRA infrastructure development To provide for effective control over radiation sources ANRA has established two regional offices located Goris and Vandazor in Armenia. The initial and main activity foreseen is to provide control on a local level over operations with radiation sources by means of inspections and enforcement of safe utilization of radiation sources consistent with conditions stipulated in the license. The office will contributes to frequent interaction with the licensees and is expected to foster ongoing communication between the regulatory body and users as stipulated in the Code of Conduct. In the future the office may provide additional functions in support of environmental monitoring and in support of “Additional protocol” to Safeguards Treaty.
The offices are furnished and equipped with the office and radiological equipment. It provides office space as well as living quarters for visiting personnel from Yerevan. The offices have their own staff that reports to headquarters in Yerevan. It is noteworthy that ANRA is taking a different approach compared to that implemented in other countries of the Former Soviet Union
35 34
where local control over radiation sources continues to be the responsibility of the regional offices of the Ministry of Health.
9. Training There continues to be a strong need for training in the area of radiation protection and safe use of radiation sources. ANRA recognizes these needs and have arranged for a number of seminars where domestic requirements and international practice are shared with the licensees in Armenia. These seminars conducted by IAEA under national and regional programs as well as by USNRC on a by-lateral basis. In 2002 a seminar for medical practitioners addressed the radiation protection and safety issues. A new seminar is planned to disseminate information and assist the users in licensing procedures. Separately, additional training is required for new ANRA inspection staff at the regional offices. Fellowships are contemplated at the regulatory authorities in countries with successful record of handling radiation sources.
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IAEA-CN-134
SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN MADAGASCAR
Raoelina Andriambololona, J.L.R. Zafimanjato, W.C. Solofoarisina, J.F. Ratovonjanahary, H.F. Randriantseheno Institut National des Sciences et Techniques Nucléaires (Madagascar-INSTN), Antananarivo, Madagascar
Abstract. Radioactive sources are widely used in medicine, industry, research and education in Madagascar. Safety and security of these sources are the main statutory functions of the Regulatory Authority as defined by the former and the new regulations in Radiation Protection in Madagascar. These functions are carried out through the process of regulations and guidance, authorization, oversight functions and emergency preparedness. After terrorist attacks of September 2001, many countries have implemented programmes dealing with problems of nuclear terrorism, illicit trafficking and malevolent use of radioactive sources. In the case of Madagascar, facing these new challenges is among the main priorities of the implementation of the various measures aimed by the AFRA project RAF/0/021 “Strengthening National and Regional Capacity of AFRA Member States in Nuclear Security” and prevention of unauthorized access or damage of radioactive sources. A comprehensive inventory of radioactive sources and users is also in progress and has proved to be a necessary condition for an effective control of sources in the country, which in turn will enhance safety and security. This paper gives an overview of the programmes carried in Madagascar that would be pursued to complement international efforts for moving towards sustainable and effective radiation sources safety and security.
1. Introduction While Madagascar has no programme in nuclear power, a number of national institutions, research centres, laboratories and industries utilize nuclear techniques. Applications of nuclear techniques are extended to various sectors of development. Nuclear instrumentations were installed in different locations. Radioactive sources are in use for different purposes in various laboratories and R&D institutions. Sources and isotopes are in general imported.
According to 2004 data, more than 120 radioactive sources and 6 high radioactive sources of first IAEA categorisation have been used.
A convention between Madagascar-INSTN as the technical body and the Ministry in charge of the custom services was established in 1997 for monitoring of imported radioactive sources. In the framework of this initiative the regulatory body of Madagascar began to pay special attention to illicit trafficking and safe management of radioactive sources that have high risk to become orphan. After terrorist attacks of September 2001 particular concern raised about malevolent use of radioactive sources.
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IAEA-CN-134
2. Legal framework of safety and security nuclear in Madagascar The law no 97-041 on protection against harmful effects of ionizing radiation and radioactive waste management in Madagascar was promulgated on 2nd of January 1998. Four decrees to implement the law were approved by the government in 2002:
- Decree n° 2002-569 on 4th July 2002 related to designation, roles and functions of the “Autorité Nationale de Protection et de Sûreté Radiologique (ANPSR)”, the “Organe Technique the Radioprotection (OTR) and the “Office Central de Gestion des Déchets Radioactifs (OCGDR)”.
- Decree n° 2002-1199 on 7th October 2002 related to the basic principles of protection against ionising radiation.
- Decree n° 2002-1274 on 16th October 2002 related to the basic principles of radioactive waste management.
Decree n° 2002-1161 on 9th October 2002 related to the detention and utilisation of ionising radiation sources in medical field.
These Decrees were established to meet the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for radiation protection against ionizing radiation and for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources (BSS, IAEA Safety Series n° 115) and to be commensurate with the use of ionizing radiation in Madagascar.
The first decree appointed the ANPSR to be the regulatory Authority. The latter establishes the OTR as the technical body of the regulatory Authority in charge of radiation protection and the OCGDR as the technical body in charge of radioactive waste management. The ANPSR is not operational, although the members have been appointed by their respective ministry. According to this decree, the department of Radiation Protection and the department of Radioactive Waste Management of the Institute National of Sciences Nuclear Technologies (Madagascar-INSTN) will ensure the provisional functions of OTR and OCGDR.
In 2003 the law n° 2003-012 on 08th September 2003 on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Facilities and other Radiation Sources was promulgated. This law is extended to the conception of Physical Protection of Radioactive Sources
3. National Inventory of Radioactive Sources In Madagascar, a non-exhaustive inventory of radioactive sources for safety and security reasons was initiated in 1995 by the Madagascar-INSTN.
Madagascar-INSTN started with the capital city, Antananarivo, and then extended its activities to other regions. Customs officers have been also trained by Madagascar-INSTN to identify radioactive packages, and such action has helped to improve the capability of Madagascar to control the entry of radioactive sources.
Hence the inventory has been regularly updated and currently about 95 % of the radioactive sources in the country have been recorded. Madagascar-INSTN has now fully implemented RAIS 3.0, which will be instrumental to enhance the effectiveness of the regulatory system. The total number of registered sealed radioactive sources currently stands as 120. There are also different unsealed sources mainly used in research and nuclear medicine in five institutions
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IAEA-CN-134
Table 1. Inventories of Users and Radioactive Sources in Madagascar
N
N
6
2
9
in industry
4. StThereestablsourceHospiconditlocatiodisuseunlesslocateAntanof 185shipya
38
inventory of users
Group type Number of institutes
Radiotherapy 1 Brachytherapy 1 uclear medicine 1 Gammagraphy 2 Nuclear gauge 10
Research 5
Nuclide Number Application 60Co* 5 (sealed) level gauge 85Kr 1(sealed) thickness gauge90Sr 5 (sealed) thickness gauge
241Am-Be 1 (sealed) density gauge 192Ir 2(sealed) gammagraphy
241Am 1 (sealed) level gauge 241Am-137Cs 10 (sealed) Moisture/density
gauge 241Am 5 (sealed) smoke detector
uclide Number Application 60
Co 1(sealed) radiotherapy 0Co* 1(sealed) radiotherapy
26Ra* 64needles brachytherapy 137Cs 1(sealed) brachytherapy
131I unsealed medical unsealed
9mTc unsealed medical unsealed
60Co
137Cs60
Co241Am-
63Ni90Sr55Fe
3H 14C3H 125I
e
*Disused sources
atus of Disused Sources management is no radioactive waste repository in Madagascar, but tishment of a national centralized waste management fas. At present, a provisional waste storage bunker is pltalier Universitaire de Befelatanana, Antananarivo. Thioned with the Agency’s assistance in 2000, and a spenn of the bunker is not appropriate for this purpose. Mod sources, identified in the inventory operated by Mad provision has been made to return disused sources to td in various end-user institutions and industrial compananarivo. Two disused nuclear gauges containing 60Co s MBq), have been stored for more than 25 years in an rd company in Antsiranana; 1000 km northward from
39
Nuclide
Number Application
1(sealed) calibration 1(sealed) calibration
* 1(sealed) irradiator Be
1(sealed) gauge
1(sealed) chromatography 1 (sealed) calibration 1 (sealed) X ray fluorescence
analyzers 1 unsealed) LSC-calibration
1 (unsealed) LSC-calibration1 (unsealed) labelling of cells1(unsealed) Research
in medicin
in researchhe new law considers the cility for spent and disused sealed aced at the premise of the Centre e bunker contains 226Ra needles, t 60Co source. It was noted that the reover, there are a number of
agascar-INSTN. Consequently, he supplier, the sources are presently ies outside the capital city, ources (each of the original activity inappropriate room at the SECREN Antananarivo and three other disused
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nuclear gauges containing 60Co sources (the original activities are respectively 85 MBq, 96 MBq and 122 MBq) used at the GALANA petroleum company have been stored for over 14 years in Toamasina; 350 km westward from Antananarivo. These companies have requested Madagascar-INSTN to remove these sources. Action could not be taken due to the lack of space storage bunker. For the same reason, a 35 years old gamma irradiator device, containing the 8.5kCi original 60Co source, is stored at the backyard of the Laboratoire des Radioisotopes, Antananarivo.
5. Preparedness and response to a radiological emergency The OTR is responsible for establishing the emergency plan which has to be approved by the appropriate authorities. Intervention levels are determined by ministerial by law and have to comply with the BSS 115.
Madagascar has not yet designated the Nuclear Emergency Planning Co-ordinator (NEPC), however, the interim national contact person has been designated in 2001.
Presently, an interim working group is composed of the interim national contact person and the national responsible for technical aspect of the IAEA project RAF9/029. This group has to be strengthened by involving more representatives from all parties involved. with the process of implement ting the national emergency response and preparedness infrastructure.
In February 2003, this group organised a seminar which aimed to sensitize the decision makers. This was an opportunity to initiate the preparation of the emergency response plan.
6. Conclusion It was agreed that the matter required urgent action leading to the establishment of a centralized radioactive waste management facility. Such action could be initiated by the newly established ANPSR, with the support of Madagascar-INSTN. For facility building, IAEA’s assistance, in terms of expertise in site selection and design, could be requested under RAF/9/029 project. However, Madagascar makes efforts towards maintaining safety and security of radioactive sources, preventing theft, loss, damage, unauthorized access and unauthorized transfer of radioactive sources, by ensuring that:
- a periodic inventory of movable sources be conducted at appropriate intervals to confirm that they are in their assigned location and secure;
- a source must be managed and controlled within legal regulatory framework;
- acquisition of radioactive sources with malevolent intent should be prevented;
- a source is not transferred unless the receiver holds a valid authorization;
- an emergency preparedness, regarding any decontrolled, lost stolen or missing source is planned.
REFERENCES
[1] AGENCE INTERNATIONALE DE L’ENERGIE ATOMIQUE, VIENNE 1997, BASIC SAFETY STANDARD 115
[2] AIEA, VENNE, 2003, TECDOC-1191: CATEGORISATION OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
[3] IAEA, VIENNA, 2003, TECDOC-1355: SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
[4] IAEA, TECDOC-1388, VIENNA 2004
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SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN INDONESIA
A. Azhar Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency, Jakarta-Indonesia
Abstract. The use of radiation sources and radioactive materials in Indonesia is regulated and controlled by BAPETEN (Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency). Until now there are 1800 hospitals/clinics, and 274 industries including research centres use radiation sources. In medicine there are 24 hospitals using radiation sources for therapy. We have 18 units of Co-60, 2 units of Cs-137, 6 units of LINAC, 7 units of afterloading Cs-137, 11 units of afterloading Ir-192 and 138 units of Ra-226 that are still in use. Radioactive sources from radiotherapy machines that no longer in use will make problems in controlling and securing them. There are also 177 spent sources , mostly from gauges becoming radioactive wastes. BAPETEN has recommended the licensees that the radioactive sources be returned to the manufacturers or transferred to BATAN (National Nuclear Energy Agency- the promoting body) for interim storage, but the licensee have difficulties to do it especially because of funding reasons. To reduce spent sources and radioactive wastes, and to avoid radiation risks, BAPETEN requires the licensees or applicants when applying a license to have an agreement with vendors or manufacturers in returning spent sources. To strengthen control over radioactive sources we have taken actions – enhancing the security system in the radiation facilities, transferring disused radioactive sources from hospitals to BATAN’s facility. Besides, we are in the process of developing new regulations and guides concerning safety and security of radiation sources and making intense coordination with customs and police to combat illicit trafficking.
1. Introduction Radiation sources are used in various applications in industry, medicine, research and also education. Since April 10, 1997 the Indonesian Government has enacted the new Law, Act No.10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy. This new Act, which supersedes the Basic Stipulations of Atomic Energy Act Year 1964, separates the authority in executing/promoting and controlling of nuclear energy into two different bodies, National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) and Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN). The Act stipulates several key requirements for successful conduct of nuclear energy. According to Article 16 of the Act, any activity related to the utilization of nuclear energy shall maintain the safety, security, peace, health of the workers and the public, and the protection of the environment. It also sets out basic principles for regulating practices in the application of nuclear energy, basic arrangements for managing and disposing of radioactive wastes. The Act is implemented through the application of government regulations. Being an independent body BAPETEN has the power to control the use of radiation sources through regulation, licensing and inspection. In Indonesia there are 1800 hospitals/clinics and 274 industries including research centres use radiation sources. In medicine, there are 24 hospitals using radiation sources for therapy. We have 18 units of Co-60, 2 units of Cs-137, 6 units of LINAC, 7 units of afterloading Cs-137, 11 units of afterloading Ir-192 and 138 units of Ra-226 that are still in use.
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In addition there are 1 Co-60, 2 Cs-137 teletherapy units, 7 afterloading units of Cs-137, 1 blood-irradiator unit of Cs-137 and 68 brachytherapy units of Ra-226 which are not used and stored in hospitals. There are also 177 spent sources mostly from gauges becoming radioactive wastes. This, of course, will make problems in controlling and securing them. BAPETEN has recommended the licensees that the radioactive sources be returned to the manufacturers or transferred to BATAN (National Nuclear Energy Agency- the promoting body) for interim storage, but the licensees have difficulties to do it especially because of funding reasons.
2. Regulatory Control As stated earlier Act No. 10 fully separates the promotional and regulatory functions and establishes the regulatory body for the control of the utilization of all nuclear energy including radiation and radioactive materials. The regulatory body, BAPETEN or Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency was then established by the Presidential Decree No. 76/1998 in May 1998 and is now in full operation.
To implement the Nuclear Energy Act Number 10 Year 1997, several Government Regulations and Chairman Decrees relating to licensing procedures, radiation safety standards, transportation of radioactive materials and radioactive waste management have been issued. Government Regulation No. 63/2000 stipulates all the requirements for dose limitation system, radiation safety management system, calibration, preparedness and countermeasures for radiological accident. Dose limitation system should apply three principles-justification, optimization and limitation- as described in the IAEA Basic Safety Standard. The owner shall establish radiation safety management system which includes radiation protection organization, radioactivity and radiation dose monitoring, radiation protection instrument, health examination of workers, records keeping, quality assurance and training of radiation workers. The requirements and procedures for licensing of the utilization of radioisotopes and radiation sources are detailed in Government Regulation No. 64 /2000. The applicants have to meet several requirements before a license is granted. One of the requirements is that the applicant has to appoint a radiation safety officer. The radiation safety officer has to pass an examination to obtain a working license. Other requirements such as design of facility with adequate shielding, calibrated monitoring instrument, personnel dosimeters, and standard operating procedures have to be fulfilled. The applications for license are carefully evaluated and the standard operating procedures submitted are thoroughly reviewed. To import radioactive materials it is necessary that the importer must obtain license from BAPETEN. The import permission is granted after the company submits document of procurement or importation, technical specifications of the radioisotopes and/or radiation sources, proforma invoice, sources certificates and other relevant shipping documents.
The Act also contains some provisions on radioactive waste management. Radioactive wastes management shall be conducted to mitigate radiation hazards to the workers, the public and the environment. Radioactive wastes management shall be accomplished by the Executing Body, National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) which may designate state or private company or cooperative to conduct commercial waste management activities. The Act obliges all users generating low and intermediate level of radioactive wastes to collect, segregate, or treat and temporarily store the wastes before its transfer to the Executing Body, BATAN.
Periodically, BAPETEN sends its inspectors to facilities using radiation sources to ensure all the radiation safety regulations and requirements have been met and the procedures have been followed properly. BAPETEN with its authority can suspend or revoke the license if the licensees violate the regulations. Now BAPETEN has around 40 inspectors mostly with background in physics and nuclear engineering .
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3. Disused Sealed Sources in Indonesia There are hundreds of disused sealed sources which are still temporarily stored in hospitals and industrial facilities. From hospitals there are one Co-60, 2 Cs-137 teletherapy units, 1 blood irradiator unit of Cs-137, 7 afterloading units of Cs-137 and 407 Ra-226. From industries there are 177 spent sources mostly from gauges becoming radioactive wastes. For radioisotopes which are not used for any reason, the licensee is advised to obtain license from BAPETEN to transfer the waste to Waste Management Facility of BATAN for disposing. Because of the fee, many users prefer to keep unused radiation sources at their facilities. To reduce the number of disused sealed sources and radioactive wastes, and to avoid radiation risks, BAPETEN requires the licensees and applicants when applying a license to have an agreement with vendors or manufacturers in returning spent and unused sources.
After Bangkok Workshop there are some actions which have been taken by BAPETEN. First we conducted a coordination meeting with the management of all hospitals which have radiotherapy units in May 2002. And the second, we also conducted a similar meeting with management of industrial facilities in October 2002. We discussed the problems encountered by the users, from hospitals and industries, dealing with the disused sources. The waste management fee was also part of the problems that have been discussed. All the users are committed to transfer the unused sources to Radioactive Waste Facility of BATAN. The users are advised to prepare the budget for disposal fee and negotiate with BATAN regarding this matter. Before disposal the users are allowed to keep the unused sources in their storage facility under license from BAPETEN. In 2002 the Government issued new regulations, Government Regulations No. 26 Year 2002 on Safety of Transport of Radioactive Materials and No. 27 Year 2002 on Management of Radioactive Wastes. The responsibility of the users for management of unused sources and radioactive wastes are clearly defined in these regulations.
To strengthen control over radioactive sources we have taken actions – enhancing the security system in the radiation facilities, transferring disused radioactive sources from hospitals to BATAN’s facility. Besides, we are in the process of developing new regulations and guides concerning safety and security of radiation sources and making intense coordination with customs and police to combat illicit trafficking.
4. Lesson learned Shortly after the Chernobyl disaster we recalled that there was a teletherapy unit of Co-60 in one Cancer hospital located in Jakarta. The hospital was abandoned for some reason. At that time the authority was Atomic Energy Control Bureau of BATAN. Considering that the situation could rise the possibility to cause harm to the public, then we decided to remove the source from the hospital. We sent our inspectors and qualified personnel from BATAN to the abandoned hospital. We realized that someone had tried to enter the irradiation room and we found that an AC was stolen. Fortunately, the radiation source was still there. We removed the source and transferred it to BATAN's Radioactive Waste Management Facility.
Not long later, we were reported that an irradiator facility was in danger because the water pump was stolen. We went to the irradiator facility to check and see what had happened. The company had not run business after a fire which was caused by a jam in the source rack. The facility had been abandoned for several years. The irradiator was a pool-type with 48 pencils of Co-60. We recognized that the water in the pool was too much decreased. We transferred the sources to irradiator facility of BATAN in Pasar Jum'at, Jakarta.
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5. Missing Radioisotopes In October 2000, there are 25 Co-60 and 1 Am-241 stolen from one company's storage. Having been reported, BAPETEN then sent its staffs to assist the licensee find the sources. After three weeks, seeking trials were stopped and only three of the missing sources were found. The seeking trials and investigations have involved police and other authority institutions. There were no radiation injuries reported but BAPETEN required the licensee to make some corrections in securing the sources and performing inventory control regularly. The licensee has built a new storage facility with a redundant security system and performed routine check and inventory control.
REFERENCES
[1] Act No.10/1997 on Nuclear Energy, BAPETEN PPN-0100.0059
[2] Government Regulation No.63/2000 on Radiation Safety, BAPETEN
[3] Government Regulation No.64/2000 on Licensing Process, BAPETEN
[4] RIDWAN, M, Control of Radioisotopes and Radiation Sources in Indonesia (2000) [5] AZHAR, A, Present Status of Radiological Services in Indonesia, Jakarta (2001)
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NATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN SECURING AND MANAGING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
E.R. Bariev, G.F. Novikov, L.F. Rozdyalouskaya Ministry of Emergencies, Minsk, Republic of Belarus
Abstract. It is clear that the key issues to be solved for ensuring safety management and security of radioactive sources and their unavailability to terrorists include: establishing an effective regulatory control, accounting and supervision of all radioactive sources during the whole their life cycle, from source import to a country (or manufacture) until its disposal (or export out of country); upgrading security measures to prevent possible source theft or diversion; establishing proper regulation and adequate safety procedures for management of disused and spent sources (re-use, storage, disposal); creating proper emergency procedures to response threats, thefts, detection, incidents and accidents involving radioactive sources. The paper presents a brief overview of the national experience of Belarus in solution of the above mentioned issues with a special emphasis on the recent actions taken to implement provisions of the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
1. Introduction Belarus has been using sealed radioactive sources (RS) for many decades in various sectors of national economy, research and medicine. The national regulatory system over their control has been in place for nearly 15 years and constantly upgraded. To implement Resolution GC(47)/RES/7B of the IAEA General Conference Belarus has written to the Director General that it fully supports the IAEA’s efforts to enhance safety and security of RS and is working towards following guidance contained in the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. This paper focuses on main topics related to this activity.
2. Belarus national regulatory system The Belarus regulatory system for RS was established late in 1991 when Gostekhnadzor of Belarus was transformed into the Committee for Supervision of Industrial and Nuclear Safety (Promatomnadzor). In 2000 by special decree of the Government, the Promatomnadzor was incorporated in the structure of the Ministry of Emergencies that was empowered to be a responsible government for radiation safety issues in Belarus. Some functions in the field, in particular those related to protection of workers and public from radiation risks, rest with the Ministry of Health Care.
There are five main features of the Belarus regulatory system:
(1) Authorization regime which is established for:
purchase of RS by user and remove of RS from one institution to another one,
all kinds of work with RS including RS applications in medicine and research,
movement (import, export, transit) of RS as well as devices, comprising RS across the customs border of the Republic of Belarus;
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(2) Effective border control and monitoring,
(3) Inventory of RS at two – local and state – levels,
(4) Inspection regime to check up observance of radiation safety and security requirements and license conditions at user’s premises,
(5) Administrative and criminal proceedings for offenses related with safety and security of RS.
2.1. Authorization regime The regulatory system provides that any activity dealing with manufacturing, supplying, possessing, use, transportation, storage, processing and disposal of RS is realized only on the basis of special authorizations (licenses), issued by the Ministry of Emergencies (Department Promatomnadzor). To start the above-mentioned activity, enterprises and institutions must also get the permission from the Ministry of Health Care, namely - a sanitary passport. This permission is an obligatory condition for starting further licensing procedure in the Ministry of Emergencies.
To clear crossing RS through the custom border of the Republic of Belarus (while import/export) a carrier must present an authorization issued by the Promatomnadzor. The permission for the transit or export of RS to another country can be issued, provided the state of destination has agreed to the receipt of the specified sources and has the appropriate administrative and technical capabilities (it is to be confirmed with appropriate documents).
2.2. Border monitoring and control The Law “On the State Border of the Belarus” empowered custom borders with the responsibility to exercise radiation control at border crossings and transit hubs.
Belarus was one of the first European countries that started installing stationary equipment for radiation control at border crossings. The experience has shown that use of portal monitors is the most effective tool for this purpose. Now transport portal monitors are used at 8 (of 32) road border crossings and 1 (of 19) railway custom checkpoints.
Currently equipment manufactured by national producers is getting a preferred option because certification and maintenance procedures are much easier in this case. In 2003 the checkpoints on the borders with Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine were equipped with monitors manufactured by Belarus firm “Polymasters” and all the check points were provided with the search devices developed by the afore stated firm. To increase the monitoring efficiency a centralised automatic system for collection, processing and exchange of data is being created. It should connect the existing radiation monitoring points into the united network, with direct transfer of the information to the State Custom Committee. The measures taken to improve border control and monitoring have been actively supported by international co-operation, in particular within the IAEA Illicit Trafficking and Radiation Assessment Program (ITRAP).
2.3. Drawing up an inventory Belarus took cardinal measures to set proper system for notification and registration of RS. In 1991 all the Ministries and agencies were prescribed to make inventories of RS and submit information about the stock of radioactive materials to the Promatomnadzor. At the same time
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very detailed investigations of the premises belonging to potential RS users were conducted. In case the owner of the premises had no certificate (passport) for RS, revealed in his facilities, he was prescribed to apply to a specially created certification body for making this document. The percentage of RS believed to be included in the final inventory list by this manner is about 85 %.
Since late 1999, registration of sources has been carried out in accordance with the Governmental regulation “On the unified state system of registration and control of ionizing radiation sources”. The regulation establishes registration and control of sources on two levels: local level, where the responsibility for RS inventory and control lies with a source user, and state level, which is implemented by the Department Promatomnadzor. RS owners must send a special registration form to the Promatomnadzor within 10 days of the purchase of sources and annually make RS inventory to ensure that no source has been lost or stolen.
2.4. Inspections and enforcement
Inspections of enterprises and facilities are conducted by state inspectors of the Ministry of Emergencies and the Ministry of Health Care. Complex inspections are conducted jointly with Ministry of Interior and other Authorities concerned.
When visiting facility inspectors check up observance of technical, radiation safety and security requirements. An inspector may propose that persons responsible for violating regulations should be made answerable under administrative (fine, discharge from office) or criminal liability. In case of serious violations the license may be withdrawn and/or the work suspended. For example, in 2003 the Promatomnadzor’s inspectors issued prescriptions for suspension of work at 448 facilities.
3. Measures to ensure security of radioactive sources Belarus attaches great importance to the security of RS and, since 1992 has successfully used a series of administrative rules and provisions that prescribe to RS owners to take all necessary measures to guarantee security of their sources. Ministry of Interior jointly with the Ministry of Emergencies exercise control over measures taken by means of periodical inspections of the premises dedicated for use and storage of RS.
Starting from November 2003 Belarus has been involved in the implementation of the IAEA/RF-MINATOM/US-DOE Initiative on Securing and Managing Radioactive Sources and DOE’s Radiological Threat Reduction (RTR) Program. Within framework of these activities the physical security upgrades are planed to be undertaken at facilities using high risk sources to provide additional barriers for terrorists. These facilities include: three industrial and research irradiators, two hospitals and the centralised storage/disposal facility Ekores.
4. National provisions for the management of disused and spent radioactive sources
The regulations prohibit the use of sealed RS if their hermeticity is broken or their service life is expired. The service life is normally specified in a source passport and, according to the rules, can be extended by decision taken by special commission on the basis of the results of certification tests. The latter procedure is very frequently used nowadays, because users of RS have no funds to purchase new sources.
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Radioactive sources not suitable for further use are regarded as radioactive waste. Regulations require that within six months such sources must be decommissioned and transferred to the specialized facility ‘Ekores’ for centralized storage or disposal. A new storage for spent RS has been commissioned at the Ekores facility this year. It is equipped with eleven bore-hall repositories, each intended for storage of 40 kg-ekv Ra activity.
5. Dealing with orphan sources and emergencies The existing regulatory system works effectively to prevent both new-coming and registered sources from becoming “orphan sources” but it can not set an effective barrier against abnormal events connected with finding orphan sources from past activities or with burglary of registered RS. In the last 9 years about 20 incidents of such kind occurred in Belarus.
To respond such events special regulation “ On Interaction of State Authorities and other organizations in case of orphan source finding” has been developed by the Ministry of Emergencies following a resolution of the Commission for Emergency Situations under Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus. The regulation defines that any organization or person who finds an object suspected to contain RS (or get information of its location) shall contact the notification point of the Ministry of Emergencies through phone 01. The emergency response team promptly comes to the place of the incident to assess situation and make necessary arrangements to protect public from possible negative consequences.
Depending upon circumstances the team activates actions of the appropriate organizations having responsibilities in the event of such incident: Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health Care, Academy of Science, Ministry for Environment, Security Committee, Disposal/Storage Facility Ekores, etc.
Co-ordination of all the actions on RS recovery and control rests with the Ministry of Emergencies.
5.1 Finding a solution to situation with former military RS repositories In the territory of Belarus there are several bore-hole RS repositories used in past by the USSR military units. No documents concerning their design or radioisotope content are available. To understand radioecological risks associated with these sites two repositories were equipped with monitoring bore holes and after that soil and water samples from the bore-holes were analyzed. The analysis results led to the conclusion that migration of radionuclides 137Cs and 90Sr from the repositories has occurred.
Military RS repositories may pose risks also from the point of view of threat of a malevolent act because no safeguard is provided for most of them. Therefore a special programme on searching, assessment and liquidation of the “military repositories” is under developing.
6. Steps towards following guidance of the revised Code of Conduct Along with many other countries Belarus has signaled to the IAEA Director General its desire to work towards implementing the requirements of the Code of Conduct. Draft Plan for implementation of the Code provisions in the regulatory infrastructure of Belarus is focused on the following main components:
(a) Improvement of the normative and legal basis regulating aspects of physical protection and export/import of RS used in various spheres of national economy,
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(b) Upgrading procedure for collection, analysis and dissemination of information on illicit trafficking and emergencies involving RS,
(c) Installation of RS detectors at most crowded public places, landfills and enterprises for processing of scrap metals (step by step approach),
(d) Improvement of detection and alarm systems at premises where high risk sources are located and providing for direct alarm connection with notification points of local emergency divisions,
(e) Realization of specific program to assure radiological safety and security of the RS repositories used in past by the USSR military units,
(f) Modernization of the existing preparedness and response system for the purpose of protection of public in the event of radiological emergency (within framework of the IAEA Technical co-operation Project).
7. Conclusion Belarus has sufficient regulatory system to realize cradle to grave approach for the relevant RS. Although it has been working effectively for many years, in new conditions there is a need for further upgrades and developments. The changes will concern most components of the regulatory infrastructure, and prevention of possible terrorist use of RS is getting a new fundamental element of the system. Particular attention will be drawn to the enhancing mechanism of emergency preparedness and response in the event of radiological incident or malevolent act involving RS.
Belarus development policy heavily relies on the IAEA’s recommendations and actions of international initiatives relating to the implementation of the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. It seems highly advisable to broaden exchange of experience gained by the Member-States in the applying the relevant Code requirements to their national regulatory processes.
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RADIOACTIVE SOURCES MANAGEMENT IN TUNISIA
N. Chahed, L. Ben Omrane, N. Slimane, A. Hammou, S. Mtimet Centre National de Radio-Protection,Tunis, Tunisia
Abstract. In Tunisia, there is no research nor power reactor. All radioactive sources are imported. In order to ensure radiation protection and sources safety, a legal infrastructure and a regulatory authority have been implemented since 1981. The National Center of Radiation Protection (CNRP) is entitled to authorize import, use and returning radioactive sources. Administrative and technical procedures regulate the sources management.
Since 1986 a national register of radioactive sources has been established and regularly updated.
The increasing of practices involving radioactive sources leads up to review and to strength the existing system by an appropriate program oriented towards safety and security of sources during their management. The strengthening concerns regulation as well as technical and training aspects.
1. Introduction During the past twenty years, the devices number using radioactive sources increased : it is a result of social economic development, standard of living elevation, need in term of health and introduction of new technology using radioactive sources for purposes in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and education. Moreover, the liberalization policy conducts to many participants in different fields.
All these radioactive sources are imported, because Tunisia has neither power reactor nor research reactor.
After their use, these sources become disused and return to country of origin. Import, use and returning of radioactive sources constitute the main steps of their regulatory management.
We present the established mechanisms and their strengthening in order to ensure that radioactive sources within our territory are safely managed and securely protected during their useful lives and at the end of their useful lives.
2. Mechanisms of Sources Safety and Security Since 1981, Tunisia has in place legislation and regulation that prescribe the responsabilities to ensure the safety of radioactive sources and specify measures and requierements for sources security and protection against exposure to ionizing radiation [1] [2] [3] [4]
This legal framework is completed by :
– a regulatory body “Centre National de Radio-Protection (CNRP)” established by law [5 ]. The CNRP has authority to regulate and conduct any practices involving radiation sources and to enforce regulatory requirements, to take enforcement actions as appropriate to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
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– and a set of administrative and technical procedures (authorizations and inspections).
Purchase of radioactive sources in order to commercialize or to use, requires import authorization issued beforehand by CNRP ; there is not exemption.
Transfert and transport of radioactive sources need also an authorization .
The applicant for an authorization provides all relevant informations relating to responsabilities, sufficient competencies of individuals involved in the use of radioactive sources, characteristics of the source, protection sytems used to ensure their safety and facility in which they are stored.
Any change in the conditions of use, requires the amendment of the authorization.
For sealed sources, the authorization is issued subject to include agreements regarding the return of disused sources to a supplier [6].
The CNRP undertakes a first inspection before starting, for verification of compliance with regulatory and technical requirements.
Inspections are carried out also by CNRP, when there is modification of facility and in case of surexposure notified by our dosimetry service.
Another type of inspection is made by the users for control function and maintenance of the device in which the source is incorporated.
The CNRP provides training courses to all bodies involved in the management of radioactive sources : users, agents of civil protection, custom officers, scrap merchant etc.
Exercices of simulated radiological accident are organized.
The staff of CNRP participate to the exercices prepared by IAEA Emergency Response Centre (JINEX, CONVEX).
Since 1986, the CNRP conducted two investigations throughout the country, to establish national register of radioactive sources including informations about radioactive source characteristics, functionnel or disused source, purpose, location, storage local etc.
Made investigations and system of notifications and authorizations for regulatory control over sources, served as a substantial part of the data base for national register[7]. This register is regularly updated and contains informations appropriately protected by CNRP. There are not orphan sources of categories 1 and 2.
The register allows us to establish inventory of radioactive sources at the end of their useful lives which form a big part of our radioactive waste.
These data are submitted to IAEA Network Waste Management Data Base (NEWMDB).
To undertake these functions in effective maner, CNRP has financial resources, qualified staff, facilities and equipment. Personnel’s competency has been assured by training courses, organized at national level or with cooperation of International Organizations such as, International Atomic Energy Agency, World Health Organization, Arabic Atomic Energy Agency and French Institutions such as Institut de la Radioprotection et de la Sûreté Nucléaire, Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique, Agence Nationale des Déchets Radioactifs and Organisme National des Déchets Radioactifs et des Fissiles in Belgium.
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3. Strengthening of radiological protection structures National legislative and regulatory system in place since 1981, for control over the management and protection of radioactive sources represent an essential basis of safety. However, the rapidity of progress induced the use of a bigger number of radioactive sources throughout the country, for a wide variety of application. This involve an increasing of accident risks.
We are aware of radioactive sources controls strengthening, to achieve a high level of safety and security. To face up to our system lacks we established an action plan related to regulation as well as technical and training aspect
3.1 Regulation For a better control of risk resulting from the radioactive sources management, we devote appropriate attention to regulation
We elaborate a decree relative to the transport of radioactive materials consistent with existing relevant international standards. The decree regulates in particular the radioactive sources movement on tunisian territory ; this will resolve the “portable sources” transport, used in industrial radiography.
Their portability may make them susceptible to loss and/or stole ; they become out of control and potentially dangerous.
A specific regulation relative to radioactive waste was also elaborated. The decree includes the management of the disused sources which can’t return to origin country.
We review and update the regulation relating to protection against ionizing radiation sources. The decree enlarges the scope and take into account the occupational and public exposure to the whole ionizing radiations ; natural and artificial sources. It strengths regulation in radiation protection and emphasizes requirements related to sources security by strengthening of measures necessary to ensure the physic protection of radioactive sources.This will minimize the likelihood of a loss of sources control or malvolent acts.
This decree includes requierements in emergency situation. A project of intervention plan in event of an accident or malicious act involving a radioactive source was prepared. This plan will be intergrated into general emergency plan “ORSEC plan” which organizes assistance in major disaster at local, regional and national level.
3.2 Technical ad Training Aspect For an environmental monitoring, we set up a national network with twenty one gamma probes located throughout the counrty and three alpha, béta detection stations.
Regulatory control systems of radioactive sources may be limited in case of illicit traffic. We think about a second way of control consisting to set detectors at the whole border traffic points (airports, seaports and land borders).This will help us to detect radioactive sources without notification or damaged packages of radioactive sources.
In abnormal situation, correctives actions will be taken, to minimize the radiological consequences.
The project includes the implementation of monitoring, with detection systems, at the scrap metal recycling facilities where orphan sources could be found.
We realized with the co-operation of Environmental Ministry a program for collecting of the whole of disused sources which are imported before regulation and stored in their users,
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conditionning and storage them in a centralized facility appropriate for that purpose. This will avoid the loss of radioactive sources control and will ensure their traceability.
The action plan contains promotion of safety and security culture among all bodies involved in the management of radioactive sources.
A long term program of training related to radiological protection and to safety and security sources has been established with the responsibles of custom, police and civil protection. It concerns a continuous and adequate training.
4. Conclusion The radioactive sources are used throughout the country for a wide beneficial applications in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and education.
Their use is made in frame of regulation. However their safety and security are always worrying.
The action plan established by the CNRP, for strength radiological structures and to face up to security problems, needs more human and financial resources.
REFERENCES
[1] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE n°42, Tunis (1981), 471-
1472 : Loi n°81-51 133 du 18 Juin 1981 relative à la protection contre les rayonnements
[2] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE n°24, Tunis (1986), 492-497 : Décret d’application n°86-433 du 26 mars 1986 relatif à la protection contre les rayonnements.
[3] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE n°49, Tunis (1996), 1192-1196 : Loi n°96-41 du 10 juin 1996 relative aux déchets et au contrôle de leur gestion et de leur élimination.
[4] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE n°45, Tunis (1997), 1020-1021 : Loi n°97-37 du 2 juin 1997 relative au transport par route des matières dangereuses.
[5] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE n°84, Tunis (1981), 3046 : Loi 81-100 du 31 décembre 1981 portant création du Centre National de Radio-Protection – article 95.
[6] CHAHED, N., MAHJOUBI, H., BEN SALEM, A., BEN OMRANE, L., MTIMET, S., Etat actuel et programme de mise à niveau des mécanismes de sûreté des sources en Tunisie (Proc. Conf. safety of radiation sources and security of radioactive materials) Dijon, 14-18 Sept. 1998. IAEA-TECDOC-1045.
[7] CHAHED, N., and all., Radioactive sources inventory in Tunisia : (Proc. Int. Conf. On National infrastructures for radiation safety : towards effective and sustainable systems) Rabat, 1-5 Sept. 2003.
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NRC’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES Revision to NRC’s Export/Import Regulations
S. Dembek and S. Schuyler-Hayes
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of International Programs
Abstract. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) regulations governing the export and import of radioactive material are contained in Title 10, Part 110 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The NRC is amending its export/import regulations in 10 CFR Part 110 (Part 110) to reflect recent changes to the nuclear and radioactive material security policies of the Commission and the Executive Branch, and to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code), for the import and export of radioactive material. The revisions to Part 110 include enhanced tracking of certain exports and imports of radioactive materials through new requirements for specific licenses, advanced notification procedures prior to shipment, verification of the recipient facility’s licensing status, and review of the adequacy of the receiving country’s controls on radioactive sources.
The proposed changes to the Commission's export/import regulations in Part 110 apply to radioactive materials when exported or imported in amounts exceeding clearly defined limits. The NRC’s limits are based on those contained in the Code of Conduct, but also include bulk radioactive material. The regulation changes also provide the Commission with flexibility to treat each export and import license application on a case-by-case basis, with the ability to accommodate the still evolving domestic and international security measures for radioactive material. The implementation date of this rule would allow a period of six months for exporters and importers to apply for and receive required specific export and import licenses.
1. Introduction On September 16, 2004, the NRC published a proposed rule for public comment that would amend NRC’s export/import regulations contained in 10 CFR Part 110. The public comment period expired on November 30, 2004. The NRC staff is currently considering the comments received and plans to address the comments in a final rule which will be published in 2005. The rule implements the guidance on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code), for the import and export of radioactive material, which the U.S. and many other countries have committed to support and implement. Paragraphs 23-29 of the Code are intended to guide countries in the development and harmonization of policies and laws on certain exports and imports of radioactive sources, which, if handled improperly, pose a safety and security risk to individuals, society, and the environment. The Code ensures that such sources are only exported to authorized end-users in countries with adequate regulatory controls, and that they are not diverted for illicit use.
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2. Discussion The proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 110 would require NRC authorization of certain exports and imports of radioactive material by specific license. Exports and imports of such radioactive sources would take place with the awareness of and prior notification of the NRC and the importing country authority. Exports of the Code’s Category 1 quantities of such material would require the prior consent of the importing country. While prior notification to the importing government authority may originate from either the exporting licensee or exporting government authority, consents to the import of Category 1 sources are to be provided on a government to government basis. In cases of exceptional circumstance, such as a health or medical need, the import or export of Code Category 1 and 2 radioactive material would be authorized by the NRC only if the Commission is satisfied that the recipient is authorized to receive and possess the radioactive material and the importing country has the technical and administrative capability, resources, and regulatory structure needed to ensure that the radioactive source will be managed in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Code.
The specific radioactive material and amounts that would be covered by this proposed rule include sealed sources and bulk radioactive material (e.g., spent nuclear fuel shipments which contain quantities of radioactive material covered by this rule). The materials and amounts are listed in a new Appendix P, Table 1, to Part 110. Appendix P, Table 1, is essentially identical to the list of radioactive materials in Categories 1 and 2 in Table 1 of the Code. The threshold amounts are specified by terabequerels (Tbq), the regulatory standard. Curie values are provided by the NRC for informational purposes only, since the values have been rounded after conversion. With the exception of plutonium, the radioactive materials listed in Appendix P are categorized as byproduct material as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Although Radium-226 is encompassed by the Code, it is not listed in Appendix P or covered by the proposed regulation because radium, as a naturally occurring radioactive material, is subject to export/import controls administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Yttrium-90 has been added to Appendix P as a decay product of Strontium-90, consistent with Table 1 of the Code. Appendix P also prescribes the methodology, “sum of fractions,” to be used for calculating the shipment of multiple radionuclides. This methodology is used in 10 CFR Part 71, Appendix A, for calculating the transport of multiple radionuclides.
3. Exports Under the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 110, the principal criterion for approving exports of the materials listed in Appendix P is a finding that the export is not inimical to the common defense and security of the United States. The non-inimicality finding is relevant to both the nuclear proliferation significance of exports and the related security concerns of high-risk radioactive material falling into the hands of non-state organizations, including terrorist groups. In making its inimicality determination, the Commission will, consistent with the Code’s guidance, consider whether the importing country has the technical and administrative capability and the resources and regulatory structure to manage the radioactive material in a safe and secure manner, and has authorized the recipient to receive and possess this material. Under the rule, the Commission will require the applicant for the export license to provide the NRC with pertinent documentation demonstrating that the recipient of the radioactive material has the necessary authorization under the laws and regulations of the importing country to import, receive, and possess the material. For proposed exports of Category 1 amounts of radioactive material listed in Appendix P, the Commission will also assess whether the government of the importing country has provided its consent to the import. Imports. For imports, the licensing criteria are non-inimicality to the U.S. common defense and security and a finding that the import does not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. Since all recipients in the U.S.
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must be properly authorized by the NRC, an Agreement State, or the Department of Energy to possess such radioactive material, imports under NRC’s licensing authority of radioactive material will simply require: (1) that the U.S. recipient is authorized to receive and possess the radioactive material, and (2) prior notification to the NRC of individual shipments. The Commission will expect the applicant for the import license to provide pertinent documentation that each recipient of the radioactive material has the necessary authorization to receive and possess this material. For proposed imports into the U.S. of Category 1 amounts of radioactive material, specified in Appendix P to the proposed rule, and for proposed imports allowed under provisions for exceptional circumstances, the Commission will be responsible for providing the necessary formal U.S. Government consent to the export authority of the exporting country.
4. Flexibility The revised Part 110 will provide the Commission with the necessary flexibility to process each application on a case by case basis. For example, the Commission may wish to limit exports to new recipients or to a country/destination with limited experience with its regulatory infrastructure to single shipments of radioactive material. On the other hand, in States with mature regulatory infrastructures with known and competent recipients, the Commission intends to use the provisions of §110.31(e) by issuing broad specific export and import licenses for multiple radionuclides, shipments, destinations, and authorizations for up to five years or more. The duration of the import or export authorization will be consistent with the expiration date of the recipient’s authorization to possess or use the radioactive material. In examining these and other factors that may be pertinent to assessing whether the proposed export will be inimical to the U.S. common defense and security, the Commission may seek the advice of the Executive Branch and will take into account information it receives as part of regular interactions with its foreign regulatory counterparts, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Executive Branch. If, after considering the above information, the Commission authorizes the export, then export licensees will be required to provide prior notification to the importing country authority and to the NRC of individual shipments.
5. Public Comments The most significant public comments received thus far fall into one of the following areas:
Specific licenses will adversely affect short turnaround requests that are currently done under general licenses.
Response: This concern can be accommodated by the NRC’s willingness to issue broad specific export licenses to actual and potential users abroad. Depending on the importing countries involved, such licenses could be valid for several years.
The NRC’s proposed rule goes behind the requirements of the Code by including bulk radioactive material and not just radioactive sources.
Response: Bulk material, if left out of NRC’s export/import regulations, would create a major loophole with significant security concerns. While international guidelines to do not, as yet, cover such exports or imports, NRC does not anticipate any difficulty in processing such export or import requests since they are likely to be rare (compared to radioactive source exports and imports) and each request can be handled on a case-by-case basis with appropriate interaction between NRC and the foreign importing State and recipient facility.
The ability of the receiving countries to upgrade their capability to meet the proposed new export licensing criteria in a timely manner may cause supply disruptions.
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Response: The NRC recognizes this uncertainty and plans to address this in two ways: (1) by initiating contact with NRC’s foreign regulatory counterparts in several key countries in the effort to obtain information on their capabilities in handling high-risk material, and (2) by anticipating the initial use of the authority to rely on “exceptional circumstances,” to issue any necessary specific export or import licences in order to avoid supply disruptions. However, NRC will insist that these alternate arrangements must satisfy international security concerns.
Certain information required by NRC in connection with the processing of high-risk material export and import licences should be withheld from the public due to security or business proprietary concerns.
Response: Business confidentiality and security requirements will be the same under the proposed high-risk material regulations as under the current Part 110 requirements. Exporters can request to withhold proprietary information from the public under the revised rule. The NRC staff will ensure sensitive security information is not available to the public.
The NRC’s regulations need to be implemented in a harmonized international manner in order to avoid confusion and maintain fair trade for radioactive materials.
Response: NRC is working closely with the IAEA and our counterparts in other countries to develop harmonized procedures that would avoid unfair trade issues. Furthermore, NRC intends to use the provisions for “exceptional circumstances,” where warranted, to maintain a level playing field among foreign and domestic companies.
6. Coordination with Major Trading Partners The NRC will send letters to the U.S.’s major nuclear material trading partners, the IAEA, and the NEA informing them of the NRC’s progress made to date. The letters will also request initiation of dialogue between the NRC and our trading partners on implementation of the Code of Conduct. The NRC is interested in knowing more about complementary activities which are being undertaken in other countries that have been identified as either an importer of U.S. high-risk sources, or an exporter to the U.S. To allow for the least impact on ongoing commerce in high-risk sources while continuing to enhance security controls, the NRC will request to receive information on relevant policies and procedures before June 2005.
7. Current Status The NRC is currently considering and developing responses to the comments received on the proposed rule. The NRC plans to resolve the comments and publish a final rule before June 2005. This will allow for a six month implementation period before December 2005 goal for having the rule fully effective. This will allow licenses to apply for licenses well in advance of the rule becoming effective. The NRC will hold public meetings, as necessary, to ensure the exporters, importers and other stakeholders are aware of the requirements of the revised Part 110.
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SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEM OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN POLAND
T. Dziubiak National Atomic Energy Agency , Warsaw, Poland
Abstract. Poland has national System of Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that fulfil International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionising Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. It includes all main principles of protection against exposure to ionising radiation and for the safety and security of radioactive sources, of the Code of Conduct. All activities related to the exposure to ionising radiation are under control of the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency (NAEA) according to the Polish Atomic Law and Executive Regulations. The radioactive sources in Poland are under a sustainable supervision. The President of NAEA, as the national regulatory authority based on a legal system originating from the Atomic Law, is competent in and responsible for nuclear safety and nuclear security as well as for radiological protection of workers and of public in general. That means that the NAEA licences and controls (from the point of view of nuclear safety and radiation protection) all activities involving each source of ionising radiation (other than excepted source), registers all the nuclear materials and controls their physical protection. NAEA keeps registers of sealed radioactive sources and individual radiation doses of workers. NAEA also supervises (within its competence) all activities undertaken in case of radiation emergency. There are implementing procedures for strengthening controls of exports, imports and other transfers of radioactive sources, national safety and security cultures, particularly through the training of workers and the provision of appropriate information. Keeping records of all activities concerning nuclear materials and sealed radioactive sources has been applied in Poland since 1957. At present, NAEA has effective access to information collected in its own electronic databases, which histories go back to 1986.
First step to ensure safety is to keep records of radioactive sources. This action in Poland was started in 1957. All activities related to exposure to ionising radiation have been also on the records. In 1986 first computers were bought to create electronic databases. Nowadays existing NAEA’s databases are built and are functioning on the basis of MS Access 97, which is part of the Microsoft Office Professional suite. Records include both hard copy and electronic records.
In Poland the users of radioactive sources are subject to regular control. The President of NAEA, being the national regulatory authority based on a legal system originating from the Atomic Law, is competent in and responsible for nuclear safety and nuclear security as well as for radiological protection of professionals and of public in general. That means that the NAEA licences and controls (from the point of view of nuclear safety and radiation protection) all activities involving any sources of ionising radiation, registers all the nuclear materials and controls their physical protection. Frequency of planned inspections of radioactive sources depends on potential radiation hazard resulting from running activities.
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PRESIDENT of National Atomic
Energy Agency and Chief Inspector
for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety
Department of Regulatory Control of Radiation Application
Department of Radiation and Nuclear Safety
(Division of Assessment and Inspection of Nuclear
Installations)
Military Institute for Hygiene and Epidemiology
LICENSEE –
– nuclear installation
LICENSEE – - radiation sources user
NPT activities
inspections and recommendations
inspections and recommendation
copies of inspection reports
request for regular or unscheduled inspections
inspection reports
inspection reports
Control procedure
Regional Sanitary-Epidemiological
Stations
Figure 1. Control procedure.
Chief Inspector imposes a high penalty on the head of the organisational entity, which inter alia does not fulfil his responsibilities concerning nuclear safety and radiological protection in work involving nuclear materials, ionising radiation sources, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel and during the preparation of those materials for transport and disposal, loses or leaves without proper protection nuclear material, ionising radiation source, radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel consigned to his care, does not fulfil the requirements concerning dosimetric control or the inventory of nuclear materials, ionising radioactive sources, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.
NAEA keeps registers of sealed radioactive sources and individual radiation doses of workers. According to the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 17 December 2002 on detailed safety requirements for work involving ionising radiation sources (Official Journal No 239, item 2029) the head of a company, which operations are subject to the licensing requirement, at the end of each year (31 December) forwards the registration cards of all held sealed radioactive sources to the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency by 31 January of the following year. The
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manager is also obliged to store those cards for a period of 5 years after termination of operations involving radioactive sources.
The State-owned public utility named “Radioactive Waste Management Plant” established for conducting the activities involving radioactive waste management and spent nuclear fuel management, and - above all – aiming at ensuring permanent feasibility of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel disposal. The Plant receives from the national budget an allocated subsidy for radioactive waste management and spent nuclear fuel management and recovered radioactive sources management.
Polish national System of Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources corresponds with International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionising Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. It includes all main principles of protection against exposure to ionising radiation and for the safety and security of radioactive sources, of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
To ensure full compatibility of the Atomic Law with the European Union legislations, in 2003 the President of NAEA initiated the work aimed at amending this Act of Parliament and subsequently, where needed, the executive regulations. The purpose of these activities was, on one hand, to supplement or correct the existing regulations, and on the other – to eliminate the regulations transposing the EU provisions contained in EU regulations. This is done in view of the fact that subsequent to the EU membership by Poland, the EU regulations will be binding directly within the domestic legal framework.
According to the amended Atomic Law, which entered into force on 1 May 2004 the President of NAEA has legal authority to require users, manufacturers, distributors or importers to notify him when such sources are shipped into the country. Chapter 8 of Atomic Law entitled “Transport of nuclear materials, ionizing radiation sources, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel” formulates the requirements for safe transport of such materials and regulates the questions of their import, export and transit through the Polish territory as well as the reporting of these activities to the NAEA President. Electronic databases being developed for more effective control of transport of radioactive materials.
NAEA President also supervises (within its competence) all activities undertaken in case of radiation emergency. NAEA cooperates with government departments and local administration authorities with the aim to deal in urgent situations and for regaining control over radioactive sources. The President of NAEA established within the NAEA the Radiological Emergency Center “CEZAR” for management and oversight of the NAEA President’s response to nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies. “CEZAR” operates 24h per day and serves also as the National Contact Point for exchange of information between Poland and other countries.
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Figure 2. Radiological Emergency Center “CEZAR”.
Poland strives for increase effectiveness of the national infrastructure for the safe and secure management of vulnerable and dangerous radioactive sources that is essential for ensuring the long-term security and control of such sources.
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STRENGHTENING OF SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES New regulatory challenges
M. El Messaoudi, H. Essadki, A. Chouak, M. Lferde and R. El Moursli , Cherkaoui Laboratoire de Physique Nucléaire,Département de Physique,Faculté des Sciences, Avenue Ibn Battouta, Rabat, Maroc.
Abstract. The answer to these new regulatory challenges was given by implementation of divers measures aimed at strengthening of safety and security of radioactive sources and to prevent the malevolent use of radioactive sources. The international basic safety standards for protection against ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources (BSS) require the establishment and implementation of security measures of radioactive sources to ensure that protection and safety requirements are met. The IAEA has engaged in an extensive effort to establish and/or strengthen national radiation protection and radiological safety infrastructure, including legislation and regulation, a regulatory authority empowered to authorize and inspect regulated activities, an adequate number of trained personnel and technical services that are beyond the capabilities required of the authorized legal persons. The Moroccan authority makes steady efforts to strengthen national radiation safety infrastructure by participating in IAEA model project for upgrading radiation protection infrastructure, to implement the revised version of code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources. Indeed, Morocco expressed its adhesion with the technical assistance project of the IAEA in 2001, carrying on the reinforcement of the national infrastructure of regulation and control of the radioactive materials. The control over radioactive sources is an essential element for maintaining high level of security and safety of radioactive sources. The IAEA TEC-DOC-1388 serves as reference document to implement the control culture.
The security problems with which the world is confronted showed that the uses of radioactive sources should subject reinforcements of safety, of control and of security of the radioactive sources. For this purpose, the IAEA launched an action plan for the safety and security of radioactive sources. The IAEA guide “Security of radioactive sources” will help the national authority in creating a security strategy. Also it is important to disseminate the security culture to prevent the malicious use of radioactive sources. The IAEA in its categorization of the radiation sources published in 2003 recognized that the improvements of security should carry in priority on the radioactive sources which present the greatest risks. The national authority must place the accent on the improvement of the security of the radioactive sources versus an increasing risk of radiological terrorism.
Our authority gives a great importance to detect and interdict illicit trafficking in high risk radioactive sources by implementing a series of measures as mentioned in the corresponding IAEA documents. The possibility of the malevolent use of high risk radioactive sources obliges the states to elaborate plans of intervention in the event of radiological emergency. The
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Moroccan Nuclear Safety Authority (NSA) in its new structure ensures the responsibility relating to safety and security during all stages of the life-cycle of radioactive sources.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Normes de Sûreté: Normes Fondamentales Internationales de Protection Contre Les Rayonnements Ionisants et de Sûreté des Sources de Rayonnements, Collection Sécurité No.115, AIEA,Vienne (1996).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Code de Conduite sur la Sûreté et la Sécurité des Sources Radioactives, AIEA, Vienne(2003).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Strenghtening Control over Radioactive Sources in Authorized Use and Regaining Control over Orphan Sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1388, Vienna (2004).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Security of Radioactive Sources, Interm Guidance for Coment: IAEA-TECDOC-1355, Vienna (2003).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Categorization of Radioactives Sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1344, Vienna (2004).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Prévention des Mouvements Fortuits et du Trafic illicite de matières radioactives, IAEA-TECDOC-1311/F, Vienne (2002).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Détection de Matières Radioactives aux Frontières, IAEA-TECDOC-1312/F, Vienne (2003).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Intervention en cas de Détection de Mouvements Fortuits ou de Trafic Illicite de Matières Radioactives, IAEA-TECDOC-1313/F, Vienne (2002).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Préparation et Intervention en cas de Situation d’Urgence Nucléaire ou Radiologique, Collection Normes de Sûreté de l’AIEA No. GS-R-2,Vienne (2004).
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IMPACT OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES ON THE BRAZILIAN CONTROL SYSTEM OF IMPORT AND EXPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
Gutterres R.F., Souza A. L., Maréchal M.H. Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear – CNEN
Abstract. This work presents an evaluation of the impact of the requirements of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the ones of its associated document, the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, on the Brazilian control system of the import and export of radioactive sources. An overview of the current control procedures adopted in Brazil on the import and export of material or equipment capable of producing ionizing radiation is also presented. The compatibility of the mentioned control system with the new requirements is discussed. New procedures are considered in order to implement an improved control system for the import and export of radioactive sources, which would be completely harmonized with the requirements of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
1. Introduction Safety and security of radioactive sources has been the theme of several studies and the necessity of an increasing control over these sources is commonly pointed out (see for example [1-3]). The development of new legislation, standards, regulations and procedures in this field has been one of the major actions of the regulatory bodies of many States and strongly supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These control actions embrace several domains, including the control on the export and import of radioactive sources.
The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [4] (the Code) and its associated document, the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources [5] (the Guidance), can be considered a milestone of the control actions. In the domain of the control on the export and import of radioactive sources they introduce important requirements for the authorization of import or export of a radioactive source or an aggregation of sources. The present work does not have the intention of describing in details the Code and the Guidance, nevertheless we will treat some main points of these documents. In a few words, all export or import of the sources of Categories 1 or 2, within the scope of the Code, should be authorized by both the exporting and importing State. For the export of the Category 1 sources, the exporting State should present a request for consent to the importing State. In order to take the final decision on authorizing the export, the exporting State should:
Satisfy itself that the recipient is authorized by the importing State to receive and possess the source;
Satisfy itself that the importing State has established a regulatory framework robust enough to cover, at least, sources of Category 1;
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Consider available information on a possible break of security of the exported source or the risk of malicious act involving the source.
The request for consent should be done as established in the Guidance. Also the evaluation on the regulatory framework should be done in accordance with the Code and the Guidance. The IAEA will play an important role at this moment by informing the contact point of the importing State and providing the importing State with the answers of the State Self-Assessment Questionnaire, present in the Guidance, which will contribute to the evaluation of the regulatory framework established by the importing State. Following the Guidance, the shipment of the Categories 1 and 2 should be notified at least seven calendar days prior to the export.
In the case of the export of Category 2 sources, the request for consent is not necessary a priori, but the exporting State should verify if the recipient is authorized to receive and possess the requested source by the importing State, if the importing State has established a regulatory framework covering Category 2 sources, and consider available information on a possible break of security of the exported source or the risk of malicious act involving the source.
The authorization of import should be given only if the recipient has satisfied the requirements established in the Code and in the Guidance. These requirements include evaluating if the recipient is licensed or authorized to possess and operate the source, if there is a risk of break of security conditions or malicious act involving the source, and if the transport will be conducted in a consistent manner with the relevant international standards in the field of transport of radioactive material. The importing State should also provide a copy of the emitted authorization if it is requested by the exporting State.
2. Overview of the Brazilian Control System of Import and Export of Radioactive Sources
The Brazilian control system of the import and export of radioactive sources (and equipments capable of producing ionizing radiation) is based on a joint action between the Brazilian regulatory body and the Brazilian Customs. Any imported and exported product is registered and in some cases taxed by the Brazilian Customs, which uses an on-line control system of foreign trade, the integrated foreign trade system – SISCOMEX (Sistema Integrado de Comércio Exterior) [6]. The materials or equipments registered in the SISCOMEX are classified following the Mercosul Common Nomenclature for Tariff Item Descriptions – NCM (Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul) [7], consistent with the Harmonized System (HS) for tariff classification [8-9]. Several governmental organizations require the blockage by default of the import or export of a number of products described by specific NCM items. The import or export operation of these products is authorized by the Customs only after the end of a parallel authorization process in the governmental organization, which has requested the blockage of the specific NCM item, and is able to unblock, on-line, the import or export operation in the SISCOMEX.
The Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission - CNEN (Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear), is the Brazilian nuclear and radioactive regulatory body and it requests the blockage of a number of NCM items which cover all radioactive (and nuclear) sources and equipments capable of producing ionizing radiation. CNEN implements an import or export authorization process parallel to the one of the Customs. The process ends in authorization or denial of the import or export operation, or is left open until the user fulfills the specific exigencies required by CNEN.
In case of import, the CNEN’s authorization process starts with the presentation of a request for a specific import of material or equipment capable of producing ionizing radiation, which includes the following information:
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Firm, Company or Business Name and legal address of the user and importer;
Register number in CNEN of the user and the importer;
Radionuclide(s), radioactivity, aggregate activity level and uses;
Register number of the import in the SISCOMEX.
All requests are evaluated taking into account the user’s situation in the licensing process, as well as the relevance of the request itself. In other words, an import is authorized only if the user is authorized to transport, operate and store the source (or sources) presented in the request of import. The licensing process of radioactive facilities is conducted by CNEN considering the Brazilian Norm of licensing of radioactive facilities [10], which is consistent with the IAEA standard [11] in the field. Also the transportation conditions are evaluated according to the established Brazilian Norm of transport of radioactive materials [12], consistent with the IAEA standard [13] in the field.
In case of export, the process is slightly different. Currently there are no requirements presented by CNEN concerning the evaluation of the importing State regulatory framework or requiring authorization of the facility receiving the exported radioactive material; only the transport conditions in Brazil are evaluated. The request, which is now in use for a specific exportation of radioactive source (or sources), includes the following main information:
Firm, Company or Business Name and legal address of the user and exporter;
Register number in CNEN of the user and exporter;
Firm, Company or Business Name and legal address of the foreign facility which will receive the exported radioactive material;
Radionuclide(s), radioactivity, aggregate activity level and uses.
3. New Procedures The present system of control of foreign trade of radioactive materials, operated by CNEN and described above, ensures that most of the recommendations of the Code and the Guidance have already been applied in Brazil. The system already includes specific import and export authorizations established in the Code, and the requests of CNEN already provide the information allowing the accomplishment by CNEN of almost all requirements of the Code and the Guidance. Nevertheless, in order to completely satisfy the requirements of the Code and the Guidance, some modifications should be considered and incorporated in the procedures adopted in Brazil.
In case of import of radioactive material, the adopted procedure, which already includes the specific authorization for the import of radioactive sources, should be maintained. CNEN should be able to inform, as fast as possible, the regulatory bodies of the exporting States about the emitted authorizations for Category 2 sources, or answer the request of consent for Category 1 sources. In case there is not yet any importation request but there is already an exportation request in the exporting State, CNEN must inform that the licensed radioactive facility will be able to import the specific source. It should be noted that the information about the authorization to operate, including the expiration date, of all radioactive facilities licensed by CNEN is public and available on the homepage of the CNEN.
In case of export of radioactive sources, some information shall be incorporated in the request adopted by CNEN for a specific exportation of radioactive source (or sources). The information includes the Classification of the source (or sources), within the scope of the Code and, in the cases of sources of the Categories 1 or 2, the estimated date of export. With this information it
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will be possible to present a request of consent to the importing State for Category 1 sources, or verify the emitted import authorization for Category 2 sources, and notify the shipment priorly.
New internal procedures are also being adopted in order to ensure that the exports are authorized only after verifying that the recipient is authorized to receive the requested source and that the importing State ensures the accomplishment of the contents of the Code and the Guidance. In this case the State Self-Assessment Questionnaire answers should be considered as well as any information which indicates a possible break of security of the source to be exported or a risk of malicious act involving the source. In order to take the decision to authorize or not the export, the new procedures should include not only the agreement of the CNEN’s Transport Licensing Department but also the agreement of the CNEN’s Department responsible for the combat of illicit traffic of radioactive and nuclear material.
4. Conclusion Brazil fully supports and has endorsed the IAEA’s efforts to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources. CNEN believes that the implementation of the Code and the Guidance recommendations is an important step towards a better control of these sources. The recommendations shall be implemented in a harmonized way with the Code objective of not impeding the international cooperation and the commerce of radioactive sources.
CNEN has answered systematically the demands of information on the emitted import authorization and is introducing upgrades and improvements in the Brazilian inventory of radioactive sources and radioactive facilities in order to provide this information within a reasonable timeframe. We also believe that future work should be done in order to implement common channels of communication and multilateral agreements, which should include a unique request of consent and prior notification pattern, allowing a better and more agile control of import and export of radioactive material.
REFERENCES
[1] Gonzales, A.J., Strengthening the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive material: Timely action. IAEA Bulletin 41, Vienna (1999) 2-19.
[2] Gonzales, A.J., Securing radioactive sources against terrorism: an international perspective. Health Physics Society News-Letters 30, (2002) 3-5.
[3] Lubenau, O.J., et al., Safety and security of radiation sources in the aftermath of 11 September 2001.Health Physics 83(2), (2002)
[4] International Atomic Energy Agency, Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Vienna (2004).
[5] International Atomic Energy Agency, Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, GOV/2004/62-GC(48)/13, Vienna (2004).
[6] Secretaria Da Receita Federal – “Sistema Integrado de Comércio Exterior (SISCOMEX)” - Lei nº 9.716, de 26 de novembro de 1998 – “Dá nova redação aos artigos 1º, 2º, 3º e 4º do Decreto-Lei nº 1.578, de 11 de outubro de 1977, que dispõe sobre o imposto de exportação, e dá outras providências”, Brasília (1998).
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[7] Secretaria Da Receita Federal – Instrução Normativa SRF nº 281, de 10 de janeiro de 2003 – “Aprova o texto consolidado da Coletânea de Pareceres de Classificação da OMA - Organização Mundial das Alfândegas”, Brasília (2003).
[8] United Nations – Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 3 Series: M, No.34/Rev.3, New York (1986)
[9] Secretaria Da Receita Federal - Instrução Normativa SRF nº 99, de 19 de Dezembro de 2001 – “Aprova a nova versão, em português, do Sistema Harmonizado de Designação e de Codificação de Mercadorias”, Brasília (2001).
[10] Comissão Nacional De Energia Nuclear, Licenciamento de Instalações Radiativas NE-6.02, Brasília (1998).
[11] International Atomic Energy Agency, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series No. 115, Vienna (1996).
[12] Comissão Nacional De Energia Nuclear, Transporte de Materiais Radioativos NE-5.01, Brasília (1988).
[13] International Atomic Energy Agency, Regulation for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, Safety Standards Series No. ST-1, IAEA, Vienna (1996).
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UKRAINIAN REGULATORY AUTHORITY POLICY IN SPHERE OF REDUCING OF QUANTITY OF RADIATION SOURCES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO PROCESSING, STORAGE AND DISPOSAL IN UKRAINE.
V. Holubiev and O.Makarovska State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine,Kyiv, Ukraine
Abstract. The problem of safe management of disused radiation sources generated from the use of radionuclides in industry, research and medicine is very important for Ukraine. This paper discusses some methods to solve this problem. These methods could be named preventive and are aimed to work out and implement appropriate national regulatory policy in the sphere of activities with sealed sources. This policy includes the wide spectrum of measures: from political steps to creation of State computerized inventory system, and leads to reducing of quantity of radiation sources, which are subject to processing, storage and disposal in Ukraine. The content, reason and phases of realization of each issue of this policy in Ukraine are discussed.
1. Introduction According to estimations of Ukrainian regulatory authorities more than 80 000 sealed radiation sources are used in the country. The overwhelming majority of them is produced in Russia and is in operation from 5 till 20 years. Since technical specifications for sources that are produced in Russia establish utmost term of their operation independently of their technical condition, thousands of such sources annually should be withdrawn from operation and be transferred to the disposal facilities or to production plants for reprocessing of these sources. Ukraine has no enterprises for producing of sources, therefore opportunity of reprocessing of disused sources by own strength is excluded. Now Russian manufacturers do not accept disused sources for reprocessing from abroad, owing to the amount of sources that should be disposed at Ukrainian disposal facilities has appreciably increased.
2. The main issues of Regulatory Policy in Sphere of Reducing of Quantity of Radiation Sources which are subject to Processing, Storage and Disposal in Ukraine.
Taking into account that the projects and technologies of disposals for disused sources in Ukraine are out-of-date and that their modernization will require significant time and capital financing, the regulatory authority should form new policy concerning activities with radiation sources.
The basic components of this policy are following:
(a) Creation of an effective inventory system for radiation sources, their location and technical state.
(b) Licensing of activities with sources.
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(c) Conclusion of the bilateral agreements with the States that are basic suppliers of sources to provide legal basis for return of sources to the enterprises - manufacturers.
(d) An establishment of restrictions for import into Ukraine of sources without the obligation of the supplier (factory - manufacturer) to take back the sources on demand of the user.
(e) Improvement of efficiency of use of sources, that are already in use in Ukraine, by means of creation of database, which will be accessible for the potential consumers. Such database should contain the information on sources, which are not used by their today's owners, but can be used in future.
(f) Creation of system for re-examination of sources in order to extend the terms of sources using.
This policy does not include replacement of radioactive sources by radiation generators where it is possible, though for Ukraine this is more financial problem than regulatory one.
3. Regulatory Measures Content
3.1 Creation of State computerized inventory system One of the important elements that allow regulatory authority to plan and to carry out the policy that is directed to reduce of amount of disused sources, is the system for accounting of radiation sources and checking up of their location. According to governmental decision such system is developing now in Ukraine in the form of the State register of sources [1]. It is planned that this system will allow the supervision for location of each registered source. Besides, if the registered number of a source is known this system will allow to define the owner of the source in the case of discovery this source in illicit traffic.
This system will provide account of sources, which are in a working order, but are not used more by their owners and these sources may be sold to other enterprises. Such inland exchange of sources will contribute to reduce of new entrance of radioactive substances in Ukraine. Besides, the register of sources is intended to promote reduction of quantity of orphan sources and sources which are in an illicit traffic [2].
The planning of amount of sources, which will be transferred to disposal facilities in the future, will be possible too by means of using of a database of the register. This prognosis is important for planning of construction of new facilities for conditioning and disposal of spent sources.
3.2 Bilateral Agreements Conclusion In order to restrict disused sources accumulation in Ukraine it will be logically to conclude with Russia the special agreement about returning of disused sources to the enterprises, which produce and reprocess such sources. Government has given this commission to the Ministry of Industry and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time Regulatory authority should work out requirements for the Ukrainian suppliers of radioactive sources about conclusion of contracts for import of sources into the country only with obligation of the foreign enterprise (supplier) to accept disused sources back. It is proposed to apply such requirement to the 1 and 2 category sources according to the categorization in Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [3]. Requirement coincides with Code of Conduct principles concerning:
- Encouraging of reuse and recycling of radioactive sources, when practicable and consistent with considerations of safety and security (#14 of Code of Conduct)
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- Allowing re-entry into its territory of disused radioactive sources if, in the framework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned to a manufacturer authorized to manage the disused sources (#27 of Code of Conduct).
3.3 Extension of Sealed Sources Term of Use Other way for reduction of amount of sources subject to disposal is extension of term of their use. The sources, radiation characteristics of that allow their further use in the devices or technological processes, can be put to the test to check their tightness (absence of leakage) and another properties that are important for confirmation of the safety of the further use of the source. Now regulatory authority elaborate the appropriate procedure based on Ukrainian standards that are suitable for certification of production. According to this procedure in order to make the decision about extension of working life of a source the realization of the following measures is supposed:
(a) Assignation of the service centers, which will carry out all complexes of tests for re-certification of sources.
(b) Test of source tightness (leakage test).
(c) Test of another characteristics of sources according to full schedule that is stipulated by technical specifications of manufacturer.
(d) Test of tightness (leakage test) of source after each kind of tests.
(e) Setting for sources, characteristics of which meet the accepted safety requirements, new term of operation, which should not be larger than half of term, which was established by the manufacturer originally.
(f) Issuing of the certificate for the source.
(g) Providing of periodic technical supervision of sources in situ.
Such procedure, despite of its relative complexity and necessity of equipping of the service centers by special protective outfit, will allow to regulatory authority to be sure that, if provided periodic leakage testing of sources is situ, such sources can be used with a acceptable level of safety.
4. Conclusion Implementation of all mentioned measures will give to regulatory authority the possibility to realize the policy, which will prevent import to the country of redundant quantity of sources, as well as reduce number of sources that will be subject to disposal.
REFERENCE
[1] HOLUBIEV, V, “Inventory of Radiation Sources in Ukraine”, Regional Seminar on
Approaches and Practices in Strengthening Radiation Protection and Waste Management Infrastructure in Countries of Eastern Europe and the Former USSR, Bratislava, Slovakia, 28 September – 2 October 1998, IAEA-SR-202/17.
[2] The Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials (GOV/1999/16, 25 February 1999).
[3] Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (IAEA/CODEOC/2004, January 2004).
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TOWARDS THE INVENTORY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN MONTENEGRO
S. Jovanovic
Centre for Eco-toxicological Research of Montenegro, Put Radomira Ivanovica 2, 81000 Podgorica, Serbia and Montenegro
Abstract. After major constitutional changes in 2003, which redefined Serbia and Montenegro as (de facto) a loose confederation of the two constituent states, all nuclear related issues went separately to the portfolios of the Republic of Serbia and of the Republic of Montenegro. Within the establishing of nuclear regulatory framework, and towards meeting the international requirements (like IAEA's Basic Safety Standards and the Code of Conduct on the safety and Security of Radioactive Sources), the need for the inventory of radioactive sources in Montenegro, as the very basic step towards the effective control of the sources, is discussed.
1. Establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Framework in the Republic of Montenegro
Following the decision of its Assembly from 4 February 2003, former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) transformed into a new entity, called State Union of Serbia and Montenegro - a loose confederation, in effect, of the two constituent states: the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.
Only very few competences remained at the level of the Union, including mainly defence and foreign affairs&trading issues. These competences are conducted on the parity-of-the-two principle. It is agreed that within three years the constituent states will decide whether to go on together or to continue separately.
Among the vast majority of competences which passed from ex-federal level to the constituent republics, as a consequence of the above political change, are radiation&nuclear related issues - to start with the creation of the regulatory framework for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety.
While in Serbia there is quite a long tradition, as well as the experience and expertize in the field (originating mainly from "Vinca" nuclear research institute in Belgrade), that is not the case with Montenegro. Therefore, the transition of competences is not being felt so drastically in Serbia, as it is the case in Montenegro.
In Serbia, ex-federal legal and governmental nuclear safety infrastructure will likely continue to operate without much change, just under the new administrative umbrella (i.e. within the Ministry od Science and Environment).
In Montenegro, however, a similar transition was not possible. Therefore, an informal group of professionals in the field, being aware of the legal and institutional vacuum created after the
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above constitutional changes, initiated formation of an adequate framework for the radiation protection and for the security and safety of radiation sources. With the help of IAEA experts, a draft of the law [1] was written. The draft is now subject of discussion and reviewing at the official level, and will likely be passed into procedure by the beginning of the year 2005.
2. Radioactive Sources in Montenegro: Past, Present and Prediction for the Future - the need for the Inventory of the Sources as the basis for their effective control
The first article of the Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro (from 1992) defines the country as an "Ecological State". This means that special care about environmentally friendly and sustainable developement should be taken at all levels of regulating and deciding.
A fortunate fact in this sense is that there are no nuclear installations in the country (Uranium mines, enrichment facilities or other fuel cycle elements, power or research reactors, high level waste repositories or disposals). Sources of ionizing radiation at past and at present are limited to medical, industial and very few scientific&educational applications [2]. It is realistic to assume that such situation will remain, at least in the foreseeable future.
Besides the X-ray machines, there are radiology and radio-therapy departments at the Clinical Centre in Podgorica, using the radiopharmaceuticals imported from import (formerly from the Vinca institute in Belgrade). A teletherapy unit used to employ Co-60 sources, but is currently out of operation, with plans to continue within months. There is also a 6 MeV linear accelerator at the Oncology department of the same centre.
Industrial applications are for the most part confined within two large smelters: Aluminum plant in Podgorica and Steel plant in Niksic. The sources in use are mostly Co-60 and Ir-192 and are exploited either in radiography or as gauges for level, density, thicknes, etc. control.
For completeness one should mention radioactive lightning rods (unknown number left after the official ban in 1996) and an estimated number of 60.000 smoke detectors, most of them old type ones.
The actual situation concerning security and safety of radioactive sources in Montenegro is far from being satisfactory. The law on radiation protection is expected to be promulgated only by the first half of 2005, and the establishment of the regulatory authority (as specified by the Law) by the end of 2005. Only after that one can expect that the inventory of radioactive sources will be produced - as the very basic step towards the effective control of the latter.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
O. Jankowitsch, S. Jovanovic, Radiation Protection Law for the Republic of Montenegro (draft, in Montenegrin), Vienna-Podgorica, 2003.
Sanitary Inspection, Ministry of Health of Montenegro - Internal Communication, 2004.
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IMPLEMENTING THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AUSTRALIA’S EXPERIENCE AND PROGRESS
John Loy Australian Radiation Protection & Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA)
1. Infrastructure for Regulatory Control
1.1 Implementation Acquisition, use, storage, transfer and disposal of radioactive material in all States or Territories within Australia are regulated by specialist units within either a Department of Health (4 States and 2 Territories) or an Environmental Protection Authority (2 States). The same activities at the national level are regulated by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (the ARPANS Act) and its Regulations.
The legislation across Australia is not uniform due, in the main, to the age of the enabling legislation and assorted policy issues. It is evident from a recent study that, amongst other things, the levels of penalty for illegal possession and use of radioactive material should be made uniform across Australia.
One of the functions of the CEO of ARPANSA is ‘to promote uniformity of radiation protection and nuclear safety policy and practices’ The Radiation Health Committee (RHC), established under the ARPANS Act also has functions in support of national uniformity. The Committee includes the CEO of ARPANSA and representatives from each State and Territory radiation control authority.
In August 1999, a Ministerial meeting endorsed the development of a National Directory for Radiation Protection as a means of achieving uniformity in radiation protection practices between jurisdictions. The meeting agreed that upon consideration and approval of the provisions of the Directory by the Radiation Health Committee, the regulatory elements shall be adopted in each jurisdiction as soon as possible, using the existing regulatory framework of each jurisdiction.
The first version of the National Directory was accepted by Ministers on 29 July 2004 and by adopting the National Directory each jurisdiction then has an agreed set of terms and definitions to be embedded into legislation, thus providing a mechanism for uniform adoption of an approach to radioactive source security.
To address the security requirements of the Code of Conduct, the Radiation Health Committee has endorsed the development of a ‘Code of Practice for the Security and Physical Protection of Radioactive Sources’. The intention is that version 2 of the National Directory will refer to this code and hence provide uniform legislated source security requirements in all jurisdictions. A first draft of the Code of Practice has been completed.
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1.2 Lessons learned: The draft ‘Code of Practice for the Security and Physical Protection of Radioactive Sources’ contains requirements for a security plan, an information security plan, procedural and access controls and background checks as well as both detailed physical protection requirements and/performance based security.
The existing radiation protection legislation in Australia is predominately safety legislation, and some of the proposed security provisions proposed (such as background checks on individuals having access to high activity radioactive sources) may require amendments to existing safety orientated radiation protection legislation.
The draft Code of Practice seeks to have security provisions in place commensurate with the current national risk assessment and arrangements to increase security should the threat level be assessed to rise. This runs the risk of making the Code of Practice quite complex.
2. Facilities and Services available to Manage Sources
2.1 Implementation
2.1.1 Searching For Missing Sources And Securing Found Sources In the event of a missing or uncontrolled radioactive source, current processes require the authorised person to notify the regulatory authority. In the case of theft, the Police would also be notified. The timescales for this notification and the systems available for locating and securing missing sources varies across the regulatory jurisdictions within Australia. Portable vehicle mounted radiation search systems are available at the national level and commercial aerial radiometric survey systems are available but are not configured for searching for missing sources.
The deployment of these additional systems and any assessment of the potential use for malevolent purposes requires an effective reporting system to ARPANSA and to the intelligence networks. The development of these processes and links, that will ensure that a missing or stolen source is located and secured, is being progressed through consultation and agreement between the relevant agencies.
2.1.2 Intervention in the Event of an Accident or Malicious act involving a Radioactive Source The responsibility for emergency response and the implementation of protective measures following an accident or the malicious use of radioactive material rests with each State jurisdiction. First responders now have significant training and equipment to deal with a range of CBR incidents including those involving radiation. The radiation protection framework to assist in the decision for interventions is provided in an ARPANSA document published in December 2005: Recommendations on Interventions in Emergency Situations Involving Radiation Exposure, RPS7).
2.1.3 Personal Dosimetry And Environmental Monitoring; And The Calibration Of Radiation Monitoring Equipment There are a number of suppliers of personal dosimetry for external radiation exposure and calibration services for radiation monitoring equipment within Australia. The capacity for environmental monitoring exists both for routine monitoring of facilities using radioactive materials and for radiation emergency response. Australia is developing trained environmental
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monitoring teams, with equipment and procedures that are consistent with IAEA methods and compliant with the requirements of the IAEA ERNET.
2.2 Lessons learned: Ensuring efficient and timely reporting of missing sources is a slow process. For regulatory authorities, the development of a security perspective and better links with police, security and intelligence agencies takes time. For the police and intelligence agencies, radiation presents a new and technically complex area to be dealt with.
The development of the radiation emergency monitoring and the supporting radiation protection intervention framework is complex, with the elements derived from a range of guidance documents, including IAEA Safety Standards, TecDocs and training material. There is currently no “one stop shop” or roadmap, and this has slowed progress
3. Training: Regulatory Body, Law Enforcement Agencies and Emergency Services
3.1 Implementation: Staff within Australian regulatory bodies typically have appropriate radiation protection and scientific training to ensure the safe use of radioactive materials. The training of these staff on security issues has not been addressed at the national level at this stage, but is planned for 2005/2006.
As part of national programmes for CBR emergency response enhancement, law enforcement agencies, fire hazmat and ambulance service personnel have developed and delivered training on radiation emergency response in conjunction with organizations offering radiation protection training. The training varies between jurisdictions but is coordinated nationally.
3.2 Lessons learned: Preparation of emergency personnel for radiation incident is a significant task, both due to the number of personnel and the technical nature of the training. The familiarization with radiation and radiation protection needs to occur across all levels of the response agencies, including the decision makers.
4. National Register of Sources
4.1 Implementation ARPANSA, working with the States and Territories, has agreed to establish a national register of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources. The register will eventually be in a ‘virtual’ electronic form drawing on the existing registers in each jurisdiction and take account of the need for confidentiality. Currently ARPANSA is trialling the IAEA’s RAIS database for use as a national register of sources. Arrangements to ensure prompt reporting of changes to the national register are to be put in place.
As the Australian national register matures, it is planned be extended to the lower categories of radioactive source. First, this is because it is possible to accumulate Category 3 sources to have an equivalent to a Category 2 source and without adequate tracking of the Category 3 sources this accumulation may not be evident. Second, the chemical and physical composition of some sources, even at the Category 3 level, means that they may be able to be effectively used to expose humans to large doses of radiation.
As an interim measure, some jurisdictions are endeavouring to monitor the locations and movements of Category 3 and 4 radioactive sources under existing radiation safety legislation.
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4.2 Lessons learned: The challenge of a national register is to ensure that it is frequently and regularly updated. When the register itself is not a part of the regulatory process, there needs to be particular attention paid to the updating mechanism.
ARPANSA, working with the Australian Customs Service, is intending to review the approach to detection of the illegal entry of radioactive sources at various entry points into Australia. This would mainly involve an evaluation of the effectiveness of electronic monitoring under a range of conditions and would best be undertaken as some form of government funded scientific study.
5. National Strategies: Gaining or Regaining Control Over Sources
5.1 Implementation Australia has a mature radiation regulation system with the infrastructure in place to facilitate the safe use of radioactive material. The additional security requirements will build on this safety infrastructure, but there are significant difficulties in the transition to a security culture. The systems for the reporting of uncontrolled sources currently operate within the local jurisdiction, but a national source reporting system is under development, in parallel with the development of a national database of radioactive sources. This national system will provide links into the intelligence networks and will provide additional specialized source search teams if required.
Orphan or uncontrolled radioactive sources are uncommon in Australia and there are currently national programmes to promote awareness of the additional security issues across the broader community. With the increased focus on security there is a need for interaction between many different agencies to extend existing infrastructure to deal with the security requirements. There has been extensive consultation between relevant agencies to establish priorities and strategies.
5.2 Lessons learned: In conjunction with the national register of sources, a national emergency hotline where reports of lost or stolen radioactive material can be reported is being developed which will allow persons to report such activities directly to the relevant regulatory body.
6. Managing end of Life Cycle Sources
6.1 Implementation The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) is the only organisation in Australia that manufactures sealed sources and all such sources are able to be returned to ANSTO at the end of their useful life. ANSTO is not able to store radioactive sources of other origins. In the case of radioactive material manufactured and distributed by ANSTO, under its licence, ANSTO is required to account for its inventory to ARPANSA, as the regulatory body, on a quarterly basis.
Some States do allow individuals to re-seal used radioactive sources that are then useful to industry. This recycling of unwanted radioactive sources reduces the amount of radioactive waste stored in Australia. The manufacture and recycling of radioactive sources is controlled in Australia under the existing radiation safety legislation which typically requires a specific licence allowing such activity.
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6.2 Lessons learned Only one State has an ultimate disposal option for radioactive sources; all other States and Territories, and the Australian Government, rely on some form of storage.
Thus disused and unwanted radioactive sources are stored in numerous locations. The condition of these stores, the knowledge of their contents, and the risk associated with their location and security measures varies widely. It is generally agreed that the storage of radioactive sources is an issue that needs to be systematically addressed across Australia to ensure that, amongst other things, adequate security provisions exist.
Under the source categorisation adopted by the IAEA in its Code of Conduct the accumulation of many small sources is to be regarded as being equivalent to a single (larger) source for security purposes. Thus many radioactive waste stores throughout Australia may require higher levels of security than currently provided using this accumulation rule.
The Australian jurisdictions are taking steps to ensure that adequate inventories of radioactive waste exist, that proper waste stores are constructed in each jurisdiction, and comprehensive waste management plans are prepared and implemented to ensure the number of radioactive sources available for malicious use is minimised.
The record keeping and reporting requirements associated with the manufacture and re-cycling of radioactive sources in Australia needs to be made uniform. Although relatively well controlled within each jurisdiction, the control of radioactive sources as they move across State and Territory borders, or into the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, varies markedly.
7. Import and Export of Sources
7.1 Implementation Radiation protection legislation in all jurisdictions prohibits a person from receiving and possessing radioactive material without prior authorisation from the regulatory body. In Australia an authorisation from the regulatory body does not include the right to import or export radioactive material. An importer must obtain approval from the Australian Government under customs laws to import the goods prior to importation.
Australia is currently reviewing its customs laws with a view to:
• amending the laws to introduce a requirement that a person wishing to export radioactive material obtain permission to do so from the Australian Government prior to exporting the goods;
• applying the procedures contained in the Guidance in the assessment of applications to import and export Category 1 and 2 sources;
• implementing amendments to the laws by 31 December 2005.
7.2 Lessons learned Laws relating to the transfer of radioactive sources may already exist, be numerous (for example in a federal system) and complex. Making amendments to implement the Code of Conduct in these circumstances can prove complex and time consuming.
Procedures in the Code and the Guidance may require information and types of expertise and resources not usually found in a regulatory body responsible for the safe management of sources. The Code may require the regulatory body to form partnerships with other entities in order to perform these actions.
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Neither the Code nor the Guidance specify the nature of the authorisation a recipient is to have in order to receive and possess an imported source. Requirements in the nature of such documents may vary between regulatory bodies and lead to one body accepting the authorisation and the other not accepting it.
As early as practicable, a country should identify the countries with whom it trades sources and initiate a dialogue in order to minimise administrative or technical misunderstandings or oversights in the implementation of the guidance in the Code and Guidance. In some instances the exporting facility may be performing some of the procedures in the Guidance in place of the regulatory body. It may be useful to extend the dialogue to those bodies.
Implementing the Guidance will have an impact on businesses that import and export radioactive sources. ARPANSA intends to consult with affected business as early as possible prior to implementing new legislation.
It is important to link records relating to the transfer of sources to the national register mentioned in the Code in order to clarify which sources should be residing and under regulatory control in a particular jurisdiction.
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REGULATORY CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN FINLAND
Mika Markkanen, Eero Oksanen, Eero Kettunen STUK - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Helsinki, Finland
1. Introduction Regulatory control of radioactive sources in Finland is based on national radiation safety legislation, which has always evolved, starting from the very first Radiation Act of 1957, considering internationally recognised recommendations on radiation safety. A latest major revision of the Act considering also the ICRP 1990 recommendations took effect in 1992.
Finland became a Member of the European Union in 1995 and since then the legislation has evolved under the EURATOM framework. The latest step of this development is the currently ongoing implementation of the HASS Directive (1) into national legislation by 31.12.2005. In conjunction with this process, some provisions in the Finnish legislation on the import and export of radioactive sources are being particularised to reflect better the Articles 23–29 of the Code of Conduct (2), as well as, the supporting guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources (3). In all other respects, Finland already broadly follows the Code of Conduct.
2. Infrastructure for regulatory control
2.1. Legislation The Finnish radiation safety legislation has a hierarchy of three levels. The Radiation Act (2) is enacted by the parliament and it establishes basic structures for radiation protection, radiation safety and regulatory control of the use of radiation. These include e.g. the system of licensing and the system of protection of workers. It also defines the regulatory authorities and supervisory rights, mechanisms of enforcement and appealing, as well as, it sets general obligations of a responsible party and general requirements for different types of practices.
The second level is composed of the Radiation Decree (3), which is issued by the President of the Republic at a proposal of the Minister of Social Affairs and Health. The Radiation Decree establishes, inter alia, numerical values for dose limits and it sets more detailed provisions on monitoring of exposure, licensing system, radioactive waste and exposures to natural radiation.
The Radiation Act authorises the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (abbreviation STUK) to issue general instructions on how to attain the level of safety defined by the Act. The third level in the hierarchy of legal instruments is thus composed of a set of Radiation Safety Guides (abbreviation ST-guides), which include both practice specific, as well as, generally applicable thematic guides. The full list of the ST-guides (as well as most of the Guides) currently in force are available at: http://www.stuk.fi/english/regulations/st-guides.html.
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2.2. Regulatory authority The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is the supreme authority on compliance with the Radiation Act, except that in matters concerning commercial manufacture of, trade in, and import and export of radiation sources, the supreme authority is the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
The Radiation Act defines STUK as the regulatory authority overseeing adherence to the Act and other regulations issued in accordance with it. Within STUK, all functions relating to regulating radiation practices are placed in one department called “Radiation Practices Regulation” whose core processes include preparation of ST-guides, authorisation, inspection, enforcement and maintaining records of these activities (including records of sources) and maintaining a national dose register.
Concerning import outside the European Union, the Finnish Customs is responsible for controlling that importers of radioactive substances hold a safety licence issued by STUK. Within the EU, shipments of radioactive substances are controlled according to the Council Regulation 1493/93/Euratom (4). STUK is the competent authority in the meaning of the regulation.
The control of nuclear material is based on the Nuclear Energy Act, international treaties (IAEA and EU) and contractual arrangements and is not discussed further in this paper. Transport of radioactive substances are regulated in accordance with the legislation for transportation of dangerous materials. Nor are issues on transport discussed here further.
2.3. Regulatory staff training The qualification and training requirements of the staff participating in regulatory functions are defined in an internal guide on staff competences and in individual job descriptions. The STUK quality management system includes an ongoing process where the skills and know-how needed for conducting successfully all the functions of each section, and the department as a whole, are being assessed in order to identify possible gaps in know-how, either now or in the near future. The results of this assessment are then turned into specific training plans.
2.4. Authorisation and inspection Prior authorisation is required for the use1 of radioactive sources. A licence is granted by STUK upon written application. General conditions for granting a licence are laid down in the Radiation Act and the licensing procedure is prescribed in more detail in the Radiation Decree. The applicant shall provide STUK various information, depending on the nature and extent of the practice. These include:
− a description of the user's organisation defining responsibilities related to radiation protection and safety, as well as, competences of involved personnel,
− purpose for using a radioactive source,
− places where radioactive sources are employed,
− protective and safety systems to be used,
− systems for monitoring radiation exposure,
− plans for rendering harmless disused sources and other radioactive waste,
− any other information concerning arrangements ensuring radiation safety.
1 The Act defines the word “use” in its broadest meaning covering also holding, storing, importing, exporting, handling etc.
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The name of a radiation safety officer responsible for the safe use of radiation shall be included in the description of organisation. The officer shall have undergone radiation safety training, including a qualifying examination acceptable to STUK. The curricula of such training is subject to approval by STUK. In addition of being qualified in this manner, a radiation safety officer shall have sufficient authority within the licensees organisation for taking care of his/her duties.
Whenever major changes are planned within a practice, the licensee must apply for an amendment to the safety licence. Typical changes requiring an amendment are:
− a new radioactive source is to be taken into use or a source will be taken out of use,
− a fixed radioactive source is relocated,
− the legal name of the licensee has changed,
− a new radiation officer will be appointed.
Normally a licence is granted until further notice. A licence will expire when the licensee states in writing that the use of radioactive sources has ceased and it provides sufficient evidence that radioactive sources or waste have been transferred to an other licensee, returned to the manufacturer or delivered to an installation authorised for long term storage or for final disposal.
All premises where radioactive sources are employed are inspected by STUK regularly, every 1−5 years, depending to the type and extent of the practice. The main objective of an inspection is to validate that radioactive sources are used safely and in accordance with legislation and conditions set in the licence. Amongst other verifications, the inspector shall locate and identify each sealed source. Any discrepancies to licensing information concerning placing of sources, new sources and sources taken out of use, are recorded for amending the licence correspondingly.
2.5 Database of radioactive sources Licensing information is stored in a database maintained by STUK, including also source-specific information on all sealed radioactive sources in licensee’s possession. Source-specific information is updated continuously according to licensees notifications and observations made during inspections. Statistics on the licenses, uses, devices and sources, as well as imports and exports, are published regularly in STUK's Annual Reports on Radiation Practices.
The reports (in English) can be found at: http://www.stuk.fi/english/publications/list.php?series=STUK-B-STO
3. Service avialable to users
3.1 Training Various universities, educational institutes and training organisations provide training in radiation protection and safety. STUK has provided guidance on appropriate radiation protection training for professionals in health care (Guide ST 1.7, available in English at: http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/normit/17536-ST1-7e.pdf). Although not being legally binding because universities and educational institutes have autonomy in deciding on their curricula, the guide was prepared in close co-operation with them and the Ministry of Education and thus is now widely accepted.
The requirements for radiation protection training for radiation safety officers are defined in Guide ST 1.8 (http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/normit/20016-ST1-8e.pdf). In addition, the guide defines requirements for regular updating training for all personnel involved in the use of radiation including the radiation safety officer. Various organisations having STUK’s approval provide
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training and qualification examinations as defined by the Guide. A complete list of approved training organisations is published regularly as an annex to STUK's Annual Reports on Radiation Practices (http://www.stuk.fi/english/publications/list.php?series=STUK-B-STO).
3.2 Dosimetry and calibration At the moment personal dosimeters are provided to the users of radiation by one approved dosimetric service (Doseco Oy). Another dosimetric service is operated by a nuclear power company but that provides services only to the nuclear facilities. STUK operates a SSDL laboratory which provides also calibration services.
4. Management of disused sources By definition of the Radiation Act, radioactive sources that have no use and must be rendered harmless owing to their radioactivity, are radioactive waste. The licensee is required to take all the measures needed to render harmless radioactive wastes arising from its operations. Should the licensee not meet the requirement, or if the origin of the waste is unknown, the State has a secondary obligation to render the radioactive waste harmless. In such a case, the licensee or other party who has taken part in producing or handling the waste shall compensate the State for the costs incurred in such action.
Despite of the requirement in place that disused sources shall not be stored unnecessarily, it is sometimes difficult to define whether a stored source might have some use in the future. The annual fee for holding a licence depends on the sources in licensee’s possession and all storages are being inspected regularly, therefore, there is some financial incentive to dispose of disused sources.
There is a national long term storage for disused sealed sources located at the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant site. Effectively, the storage is a side tunnel in an under ground disposal facility for Low and Intermediate Level Nuclear Waste. The plan is that, in practice, the storage will be also the place of final disposal for almost all of the sources stored there, except for some alpha-emitters whose activities exceed the limits set for the final disposal. The destiny of these sources will be reconsidered at the time of final closing of the facility (after some tens of years.
5. Orphan sources The cornerstone for maintaining radioactive sources under control in Finland is that that all practices involving sources are subject to authorisation and all licensing information, including information on each individual source, are entered to a register which is continuously updated based on applications and notifications received from licensees. The correctness of the data is being continuously validated by regular inspections at places of use, as well as other means such as comparison of information received from different sources (especially suppliers). The licensing system has been in operation since 1957, but source-specific information was inserted into a database only since the beginning of 1980's. Therefore, the likelihood of having lost control over sources was much higher some twenty years ago or earlier than today.
The Finnish Customs and the metal recycling industry intensified significantly radiation monitoring of scrap metal after the Chernobyl accident and due to a rapid increase in import of scrap metals from the former eastern block countries in the early 1990's. Fixed monitors for vehicles and railway traffic have been installed to all major crossing points at the Finnish - Russian border and at Helsinki harbour. Other crossing points have hand held monitors at their disposal. All important users of scrap metal have installed fixed monitors at the gates of their installations. In addition, STUK has provided information to scrap yards on how to identify an orphan source and on procedures if one is suspected to be found. STUK co-operates with the
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Customs and the metal industry in questions such as measurement arrangements and training of personnel. STUK also provides expert help in cases where exceptional radiation is detected.
So far, in the order of ten sealed radioactive sources have been found among scrap metal. In most cases the origin of the source was unclear; either it originated from some other country or it was an old source probably used over twenty years ago. The number of lost registered sources (i.e. sources registered after early 1980's), is very little; only a few exceptional cases. Orphan sources whose owner can not be identified are delivered to the long-term storage at Olkiluoto.
Experiences during the past twenty years have shown that source-specific records of sources combined with regular inspections at the places of use have prevented efficiently loosing control over sealed radioactive sources.
REFERENCES
1. Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom of 22 December 2003 on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources. OJ, L-346, 2003.
2. Code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources. IAEA/CODEOC/2004, IAEA 2004.
3. Code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources: Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.
4. Radiation Act (592/1991) and its amendments, Statutes of Finland. Available in English at: http://www.stuk.fi/saannosto/19910592e.html
5. Radiation Decree (1512/1991) and its amendments, Statutes of Finland. Available in English at: http://www.stuk.fi/saannosto/19911512e.html
6. Council Regulation 93/1493/Euratom of 8 June 1993 on shipments of radioactive substances between the Member States. OJ L-268, 1993.
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STATUS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN LITHUANIA
Albinas Mastauskas Radiation Protection Centre, Kalvariju str., Vilnius, Lithuania
Abstract. The Radiation Protection Centre of the Ministry of Health is the regulatory authority responsible for radiation protection in Lithuania. One of responsibilities is connected with control of radioactive sources: keeping of the registry, investigation of arrested illegal radioactive material, decision making, control of users of radioactive sources. In connection with recommendations laid out in the ICRP-60 publication and IAEA recommendations [1], [2], [3], [4] and requirements of legislation of European Community the new laws, namely: the Law on Radiation Protection, the Law on Nuclear Energy, the Law on Radioactive Waste Management and different regulations were approved. Lithuania is well known as a country using the biggest relative part of electricity made in a nuclear power plant. Lithuania has few nuclear facilities. There are two nuclear reactors of RBMK-1500 series with liquid and solid radioactive waste treatment and temporary storage facilities, on-site dry spent nuclear fuel interim storage facility at Ignalina NPP. However, when considering problems of radiation protection and safety of sources it should be emphasized that we have more than 900 users that use more than 40000 of radioactive sources with higher or lower activity .Potentially most dangerous sources of therapy and industry are also available. The problems connected with regulatory control of safety and security of radioactive sources in Lithuania are presented and their solution is discussed.
1. Discussion The radiation protection infrastructure in Lithuania has been created according to the IAEA recommendations and requirements of legislation of European Commission. It allows us to presume that the necessary level of radiation protection is achieved in Lithuania.
1.1. International treaties The international treaties, which are ratified by the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, form an integral part of the national legal system.
In the area of nuclear safety, radiation protection, physical safety and security and radioactive waste management, Lithuania has acceded to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Joint Protocol relating to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third Part Liability in the Field of Nuclear Power, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of the Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Protocol of amendment to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.
1.2 Legislative provisions The laws adopted and the legislative, administrative and criminal measures implemented in Lithuania allow for effective implementation of physical safety and security control and
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preventive activities for prohibiting the trafficking, carriage, loss, theft and storage of illicit and prohibited goods and materials.
There are three main laws that, inter alia, that also give the provisions for regulation of physical safety and security issues:
The Law on Nuclear Energy of 1996 ensures nuclear safety and prevents any illegal disposition of nuclear materials, including nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. Establishes provisions for the physical protection systems of nuclear facilities.
The Law on the Management of Radioactive Waste of 1999 established the grounds for managing radioactive waste.
The Law on Radiation Protection of 1999 regulates relation of legal persons, enterprises without the status of a legal person, and natural persons arising from activities involving sources of ionising radiation and radioactive waste management. According to Article 7, the Radiation Protection Centre is a body co – ordinating the activities of executive and other bodies of public administration and local government in the field of radiation protection, exercising state supervision and control of radiation protection, monitoring and expert examination of public exposure.
A number of Government resolutions, regulatory documents (hygiene regulations and orders by the Minister of Health) are the legal basis for radiation protection in Lithuania. The Basic Radiation Protection Standards [8] have been prepared by the Radiation Protection Centre for implementation of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS) [1] and Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM.
1.3 Registry of radioactive sources According to the IAEA recommendations and requirements of the Lithuanian Law on Radiation Protection and the Governmental Resolution “On Establishment of the State Register of the Sources of Ionizing Radiation and Exposure of Workers”, the Radiation Protection Centre is a body responsible for the State Register of the Sources of Ionizing Radiation and Exposure of Workers. According to the Order (1999) by the Minister of Health, all users performing their activities with sources of ionizing radiation have to present all necessary data to the Radiation Protection Centre after: i)annual inventory of the sources, ii) installation of new sources, iii) decommissioning of sources, and iv) disposal of the used sources. The information about all sources of ionizing radiation imported to or exported from Lithuania, and the information on the companies carrying out these procedures has to be presented by the Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance to the Radiation Protection Centre on a weekly basis.
The main sealed sources used in medicine (oncology) are: 60Co, 226Ra and 252Cf. There are industrial enterprises using gamma radiographs (radionuclide 192Ir, maximum activity 3,1 ⋅ 1012 Bq). Other applications of sealed sources: 388 various gauges with radionuclides 137Cs, Am-Be, Pu-Be and other, maximum activity 240 ⋅ 109 Bq; 2687 static current neutralization devices with radionuclide 239Pu, maximum activity 140 ⋅ 109 Bq; 1245 calibration sources with radionuclides 90Sr+90I, 239Pu, 137Cs, maximum activity 530 ⋅ 109 Bq; 6752 other sealed sources with radionuclides 90Sr+90I, 239Pu, 137Cs, 63Ni and other, maximum activity 2,6 ⋅ 109 Bq; smoke detectors make the biggest part of sources. There are 31991 such sources in Lithuania. They contain a mixture of plutonium radionuclides. Now we observe a good tendency of disposal of these smoke detectors in the country.
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1.4 Licencing of the practices According to the requirements of the Law on Radiation Protection and the Governmental Resolution On Regulations of Licensing the Practices with Ionising Radiation Sources it is prohibited to produce, operate, market, store, assemble, maintain, repair, recycle, and transport sources and handle (collect, sort, treat, keep, recycle, transport, store and decontaminate) radioactive waste without a license issued by the Radiation Protection Centre.
The legal persons wishing to obtain a license shall apply to the Radiation Protection Center and shall present all necessary documents proving that during the practice involving sealed sources the safety of workers, population and environment will be ensured. Among the documents these are of most importance: a motivated explanation of necessity of the future practice involving sealed sources; a plan of implementation of quality assurance program; an emergency preparedness plan; a plan of implementation of radiation protection system of the workers; a design of physical safety of the sources; a plan of the management of radioactive waste.
The Radiation Protection Center has the right to suspend or repeal the license, when the licensee does not follow licensing conditions, until these conditions will be re-established.
1.5 Inspection Licensed users are inspected on a routine and special basis, and these are prioritized according to the category of radiation sources. Both announced and unannounced inspections are carried out, and periodic summaries are prepared. RPC have a programme for inspecting licensees and some of these inspections have focused on security. The inspections include background checks on personnel and a review of the licensees security assessment.
1.6 Implemented and planned actions After the events of the 11th of September, 2001, a special attention is given to the assurance of the physical safety of the sealed sources, i.e. proper protection against theft, loss, etc. It is required: i) to limit the access to the premises where the sealed sources are kept, ii) the premises to be kept locked, iii) a warning system to be installed, and other precautions to be taken.
With the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency and other organisations, Lithuania has taken the necessary measures to improve the national physical protection system of radioactive materials. Improvements in the physical protection system of high activity sealed radioactive sources in five Lithuanian personal health care institutions of an oncological profile have been made. The physical protection system in the Maišiagala repository was modernised. In 2004, with the assistance of the US, an investigation of orphan sources was conducted in those former industrial and military enterprises of the Soviet Union which used radioactive sources in their operations.
With a view to implementing the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [6], [5]appropriate changes were made in the legislative framework which regulates the requirements for the physical protection and safety of such sources and planned actions implemented:
- The Categorization system of radioactive sources [6], [7] was introduced in the national legislation;
- The Physical safety and security requirements for different categories of radioactive sources were approved;
- The Procedure for Control of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Source was approved;
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- Workshops for users of sources falling into I-III categories were organized with the aim to introduce physical safety and security requirements;
- Purposive inspections were conducted in all facilities of Lithuania, that conduct practices with radioactive sources of categories I-III, with the aim to assess the physical safety and security status;
- Specialists from the Radiation Protection Centre attended various workshops, training courses on physical safety and security of radioactive materials.
Implementing the provisions of the Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom on the control of high activity sealed and orphan sources, the control system for the high activity sealed sources was drafted and it is under implementation.
The laws adopted and the legislative and administrative measures implemented in Lithuania allow for effective implementation of safety and security control and preventive activities for prohibiting the trafficking, transport, loss, theft and storage of radioactive materials.
Lithuania expresses sincere appreciation to the IAEA for the support in creation of national radiation protection infrastructure. Recently steps are taken in creation of quality system of regulatory authority. Self sustainability of the radiation protection infrastructure will be ensured also by the Central Eastern European ALARA Network which was created with the help of the IAEA and is intended to be used for information exchange among countries facing similar problems in radiation protection.
For implementation of the radiation protection infrastructure [3] in Lithuania, performing our duties and ensuring protection of sealed sources it is very important for Lithuania to receive necessary help and expertise from the International Atomic Energy Agency, other international organisations and countries in the framework of co-operation.
2. Conclusions 1. The most valuable results are that the radiation protection infrastructure has been created according to the IAEA recommendations and European Commission requirements. It allows us to presume that the necessary level of radiation protection is achieved in Lithuania [3].
2. International co-operation and co-operation between countries and spreads the experience of good practice on regulation of sources of ionising radiation between the member states. are an inportant elements achieving appropriate level of safety and security of radioactive sources in the countries;
3. It is desirable to have detailed recommendations and procedures of the implementation of the safety and security of sources prepared by IAEA.
4. Education and training all concerned governmental organizations, professional associations, radiation protection and other specialists is the motor to improve the system of the safety and security of sources and general radiation protection in the member and non-member states.
REFERENCES
[1] International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series No.115, IAEA, Vienna, 1996
[2] Safety assessment plans for authorization and inspection of radiation sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1113, IAEA, Vienna, 1999.
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[3] Organization and implementation of a national regulatory infrastructure governing protection against ionizing radiation and the safety of radiation sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1067, IAEA, Vienna, 1999
[4] Safety of radiation sources and security of radioactive materials, IAEA-TECDOC-1045, IAEA, Vienna, 1998
[5] Strengthening control over radioactive sources in authorized use and regaining control over orphan sources – National strategies, IAEA-TECDOC-1388, Vienna (2004).
[6] The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, IAEA/CODEOC/2004, IAEA, Vienna (2004).
[7] Categorization of Radioactive Sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1344, Vienna (2003).
[8] Basic Standards of Radiation Protection. Lithuanian Hygiene Standard HN73-1997 (2001), Vilnius, 1998
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NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN TANZANIA
W.E.Muhogora and F.P.Banzi Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission, Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania
Abstract. In Tanzania, practices involving radioactive sources are found in medicine, agriculture, industries, research and education. Apart from known stochastic and deterministic effects, it is now of great concern that radioactive sources can also be deployed in terrorist activities if effective safety and security mechanisms are not instituted. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that from the initial stage of the source use to its final disposal stage, adequate security measures are put in place to prevent any related malevolent acts. In this paper, we describe the national strategy to meet this noble objective. The strategy involves the institution of regulatory control, education and training of regulatory staff and stakeholders, collection of disused sources, security upgrading of facilities with high risk, emergency preparedness and international cooperation. While the situation is encouraging and the need for improvements desirable, future needs have been identified as searching, locate and recover orphan and disused sources, monitoring of border crossing for detecting illegal sources movements, strengthening security during the transport of radioactive sources, increasing the capability and basic knowledge of the first respondents, collection and conditioning of the sources no longer used as well as scrap metal monitoring
1. Introduction Radioactive sources have diverse applications in Tanzania covering covers medical, agriculture, industrial, research and education uses. Medical uses include radiotherapy, brachytherapy and nuclear medicine while industrial applications cover non destructive testing (NDT) and various types of gauges. The use of radioactive sources in research and education encompasses radiotracers techniques, Moss Bauer spectroscopy, calibration and blood irradiators. The radioactive sources in current uses are summarized in table. After their lifetime uses, disused and spent sources are produced and many of them are often still strong enough to attract radiation protection concern. In addition to these, Tanzania has also experienced a number of orphan sources, series of illicit trafficking or sources in advertent movements, which are listed in table 2. Both disused sources and those in use need to be secured well.
Table 1: Summary of radioactive materials in use
Radionuclide Number of sources Uses
137Cs 29 medicine, industry
192Ir 10 industry
226Ra 1 industry
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241Am-Be 23 industry
60Co 7 medicine, industry
90Sr 14 medicine, industry
The usefulness of the radioactive sources applications can not be overemphasized but they are also believed to induce cancer and hereditary disorders [1]. Experience has shown that the loss of control over sources in use, spent or disused sources have led to these health effects [2 ]. It is therefore necessary to enforce suitable radiation protection measures to minimize radiological accidents or mitigate their consequences should they occur. In addition to these effects, recently there has been an increasing global concern on the possible deployment of radiation sources in terrorist activities if strict control of radioactive sources is not exercised. The present paper presents and discusses the national strategy in the country’s attempts to ensure safety and security of the radiation sources.
Table 2: Inventory of radioactive waste at CRWMF (spent, disused, orphan and inadvertent movements)
Radionuclide number of sources previous application status of
Conditioned
(Yes/Not) 226Ra 32 31 brachtherapy Yes
1 captured by police Not 137Cs several brachtherapy, research, Not
non-destructive testing,
density gauges, 1 captured
by police 60Co several brachytherapy, 1 calibration Not
facility 90Sr 3 research, gauges Not 241Am 4 gauges Not
Unknown 1 captured by police Not 238U 2 captured by police Not 32P 1 unknown Not 125I 4 3 unknown Not
1 research Not 14C solution research Not
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3H solution research Not 192Ir 1 non destructive Not
testing
2. National Strategy for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
2.1 Regulatory Control The control of radioactive sources is governed by the Atomic Energy Act, 2003 and Atomic Energy (protection from ionizing radiation) regulations, 2004 [3,4 ]. Under this legislation, the Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission (TAEC) is a sole regulatory authority that oversees all practices involving peaceful applications of ionizing radiation. The main functions of TAEC are as follows:-
- Issue authorization for exportation, importation, possess and use of radioactive sources
- Promulgate regulations and codes of practices for ionizing radiation
- Carry out regulatory inspections and take necessary enforcements
- Disseminate information through education and training t workers and members of public
- Advise the government on international agreements and promote international cooperation
- Coordinate the national radiological emergency plan and preparedness.
For smoother execution of its functions, TAEC maintain the inventories such as sealed sources in use, disused sources in the country, disused sources at interim storage facility, sources involved in illicit trafficking, sources which have been lost and unsealed sources. Some gap information e.g. characterization, previous uses etc exist in the inventories and related investigations are undergoing. The presence of legal backing in safety and security issues implies that appropriate enforcement can be done as may be necessary.
2.2 Education and Training Programes As it is globally recognized [2], education and training programes form an essential component of radiation protection and safety. TAEC implements its training program to its staff, occupationally exposed workers and the members of public at large. Training of regulatory staff is supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and already about 20 staff have received relevant trainings with more ones being envisaged. Training of specialized staff for users is also supported by IAEA and more than 100 workers have obtained such trainings. Through IAEA program on training of the trainers, TAEC offers training to occupationally exposed workers and disseminate radiation safety and security information to the members of public through seminars, mass media, posters and flyers. A significant progress has recently been earmarked where the conscientization of front line officers such as police, customs, clearing and forwarding, harbour and ports officers has been done with IAEA assistance. More requests on such trainings have been received by TAEC.
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2.3 Collection of Disused Radiation Sources and their transfer to Central Radioactive Waste Management Facility (CRWMF)
Timely management of spent and disused sources is a key to the national strategy for safety and security issues. More than 58 disused sources have been collected in the country and transferred to CRWMF (see table 2). There are still about 13 known disused sources at various premises in the country and the plan is to transfer them to CRWMF. These include threes 137Cs brachytherapy sources, each one for 60Co teletherapy source, 137Cs blood irradiator, 226Ra, 90Sr and 241Am neutron activation facility. It is assumed that there are still other disused sources and efforts are to search, locate and transfer them to CRWMF; and this activity is prioritized for categories 1 and 2 disused sources. IAEA is assisting the national efforts to meet this endeavor.
2.4 Security Upgrading of Facilities with High Risk Sources With the assistance of the US Department of Energy through Basic Order Agreement (BOA), Tanzania is upgrading the security of facilities with high risk sources (category 1 to 3) in use and those still not transferred to CRWMF. The security upgrading includes the installation of active response system in case of unauthorized intrusion, radio communication systems, reliable padlocks and fences where not available. Such improvements have been done at CRWMF, cancer institute, sterile insect technique centre and neutron activation analysis facility. Some of these facilities will be under 24 hour surveillance.
2.5 Development and Establishment of Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
Emergence response plans are being developed at each centre using radioactive sources. This exercise is currently being coordinated by TAEC and the final plan is to form the national emergency response team, which will be part of the national disaster team that is under the prime minister’s office. The eventual objective is to mitigate the effects of any accident or incident involving radioactive sources should it occur. The country has so far not experienced any radiological accident.
2.6 International cooperation Since 1984, Tanzania has enjoyed close ties with IAEA such that the country’s radiation protection infrastructure could have not reached at the present stage without technical assistance of agency. The county has participated in a number of IAEA radiation protection projects. Presently, model projects, nuclear security and waste management projects are among the projects being implemented. Tanzania has signed international conventions such as non proliferation of nuclear weapons treaty (NPT), additional protocols on safeguards and is also participating in IAEA’s early notification of radiological accidents scheme and illicit trafficking data base (ITDB). Furthermore, Tanzania is implementing a project supported by the US Department of Energy through BOA as mentioned earlier.
3. Experiences The major achievements of the national strategy for safety and security of radiation sources may be summarized as follows:-
- Collection of legacy radium sources and condition them
- Training of frontline officers at borders and entry ports to identify, detect and respond to illicit trafficking incidents
- Invited INNSERV mission to assess and advise on the state control and accountability of radioactive materials the cradle to grave concept.
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- Security upgrades of facilities with high risk radiation of category 1 to 3 in Tanzania with the assistance of US DOE
Despite these achievements, there is a need to strengthen efforts in the following areas:-
- Search, locate and recover orphan and disused sources
- Monitoring of border crossings for detecting illegal movement of sources
- Strengthening security during the transport of radiation sources
- Increasing the capability and basic knowledge of first respondents
- Collecting and conditioning sources no longer used by the institutes in its secure CRWMF.
- Perform scarp metal monitoring
- Combat illicit trafficking
- Adopt the international code of conduct on safety and security of radioactive sources.
4. Conclusions The national strategy for safety and security of radioactive sources has been presented. The status of implementation is encouraging with significant achievements noted. Behind this success is the support of IAEA and other international organization as well as the good political will of the government of Tanzania.
REFERENCES
[1] IAEA. International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources, SAFETY SERIES NO. 115, (IAEA:Vienna) (1996)
[2] ICRP. 1990 recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publication 60 (Oxford: Pergamon Press) (1991)
[3] United Republic of Tanzania, Atomic Energy Act No 7, 2003
[4] United Republic of Tanzania, Atomic Energy (protection from ionizing radiation), regulations, 2004
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UPGRADING THE NATIONAL REGULATORY INFRASTRUCTURE. A WAY TO ACHIEVE THE CONTINUOUS CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES URUGUAY STRATEGY
Alejandro V. Nader National Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines
Montevideo, Uruguay
Abstract. From our beginning as head of the National Nuclear Authority in Uruguay, in January 2002, we have like primary target the total control of radioactives sources all over the country. We are convinced that the best way to obtain an efficient control of the sources is through the continuously improvement of the radiation protection infrastructure. The reality was not the ideal. In spite of not have register neither incidents nor relevant accidents, the situation as far as the safety and security might be improve and specially taking in consideration the international facts happened during the year 2001. With that objective we began to work intensely as a new participant of the IAEA Model Project being received technical cooperation in implementing the BSS to establish a regulatory framework involving regulations, and the establishment of a system for the operation licenses, individual authorizations and inspections. Also at the present, we are working specially in the improvement of the security of our national waste facility and consolidating the national system of radiological emergencies. Three key points for our national strategy of safety and security that allows the continuous control in Uruguay and to avoid therefore the existence of orphaned sources and the illicit traffic are: updated national radiological regulatory infrastructure, control of the import and export according to the directives of the new Code of Conduct (2004) and the definitive and consolidated improvement of the security of our national waste storage.
1. Introduction From the beginning of 2002, the primary and superior target of the National Nuclear Authority has been the upgrading radiation protection infrastructure to the safety and security of radioactive sources. Through the Model Project has been achieved very important goals but in spite of them and in addition of them, we are at the present time working focused in a national strategy about the permanent control of our radioactive sources from its entrance to the country to its declaration like disused or spent source.
2. Present Situation in Uruguay
2.1 Regulatory Control Uruguay has no radioprotection law yet, but we have a basic regulatory regulation and 16 code of practices that were approved between 2002 and 2003. All the framework according to the IAEA BSS. In addition from July 2004, we have a national governmental decree nº 151/2004 that confirms and it details the scope that must fulfill the Authority. Under this legislation, the use of radiation and radioactivity is regulated by the only National Nuclear Authority which belongs to the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines. The project of radioprotection law was drafted and is
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presently under national review. It is important to remark that the present project or a new one improved, will be submitted to the consideration of the new government that will assume on March 2004.
It has been completed with the national inventory of ionizing radiation sources and X ray generators and settled in the Regulatory Authority Information System - RAIS, which stays updated in dynamic form, having itself registered 1.468 sources and X Ray generators in the whole country, including radiodiagnostic X-Ray, nuclear medicine, industrial gammagraphy, nuclear gauges, radiotherapy, nuclear medicine, X Ray equipment for the control of people and luggage in airports and the national waste storage according the present table:
RADIODIAGNOSTIC MEDICAL EQUIPMENT: 548
RADIODIAGNOSTIC ODONTOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT: 776
LUGGAGE X RAY CONTROL : 33
HIGH ENERGY ACCELERATORS: 6
INDUSTRIAL X RAY: 23
NUCLER MEDICINE INSTALLATIONS: 8
COBALTO GAMMAGRAPHY SOURCES: 7
COBALTO TELETHERAPHY SOURCES: 10
BRACHITHERAPY SOURCES: 154
DISUSED OR SPENT COBALTO SOURCES:
(in national waste storage under regulatory control) 11
It has been established during 2003, and completed during 2004 a complete system for the notification, authorization and licensing and it is just completed all about radiotherapy practices, nuclear medicine and industrial applications and also we have a national system of inspections. In the past, before 2003 there was not a licensing system and there was not a national actualized inventory of radioactives sources.
Individual authorizations in nuclear medicine area 49
Individual authorizations in industrial applications 14
Individual authorizations in radiodiagnostic equipment X Ray technical services
31
Total individual authorizations delivered in 2004 94
Licenses delivered in nuclear medicine area 5
Licenses delivered in industrial applications 8
Licenses delivered in radiodiagnostic equipment X Ray technical services
19
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Licenses delivered in import companies 7
Total licenses delivered in 2004 39
RX Medical
RX Odontological
Radiotherapy Nuclear Medicine
Safety Luggage
Industrial
Applications
INSPECTIONS delivered 2004
258 124 21 8 10 44
Missions of qualified experts have been received for the training of people in charge of radiological safety in the areas of licensing, nuclear medicine, external beam therapy and in management of radioactive waste.
We are working now in the implementation of quality management system specially as for having written procedures as much for licenses as for inspections also through the Model Project cooperation.
2.2 Import and export control: In March of 2004, Uruguay presented its support to the new Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and participated of the Technical Meeting on Action Plan based on the Findings of the International Conference on National Infrastructures for Radiation Safety. From that official support we have begun to work intensely in the subject of the control of import of sources from their enter in the country, the follow up till their disposal and the final of the cycle life like radioactive waste. Uruguay is not producer of radioisotopes reason why the totality of the sources is imported and their uses are specially two: nuclear medicine and industrial gammagraphy. With less frequency some Cobalt 60 source enters for teletherapy.
During 2004 entered in Uruguay 394 radioactives sources between open sources for nuclear medicine and a few for industrial gammagraphy through 225 import authorizations.
In this field we are working according to the chapter IMPORT AND EXPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES (23 – 29). On that way in 15 December 2004, an agreement with the National Customs was signed in consideration of the Guidelines of the Code. In the introduction it says: “For the execution in the present Agreement of Cooperation the parts will consider the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources according their possibilities, and always within the limit of their respective attributions”.
During the year also we have done several training workshops to the Customs and all the group of the National System of Emergencies (police, firemen, road police, army, national hospital and ministries involved).
2.3 Waste security storage and National Strategies : We are now at present in an action plan focused on the development and implementation of a National Strategies for Regaining Control over Orphan Sources through the IAEA cooperation; additionally, this action plan identifies ways in which the national control of sources might be strengthened, thereby preventing further sources becoming orphaned. This national action plan
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covers all radioactive sources with the exception of nuclear material from civil nuclear power or nuclear weapons programmes, which do not exist in Uruguay.
This action plan provides the information and the steps necessary to implement a national strategy for controlling radioactive sources, including the prevention of the appearance orphaned sources, in Uruguay.
Our waste storage is a deposit in The Nuclear Research Center (CIN) is an state university institution dating to the 1960s. It was used to house a research nuclear reactor using high-enriched uranium. This reactor was defueled and decommissioned and demolition is nearly completed. Outside of the main building is a smaller facility that is used for radioactive waste storage. It was no the ideal solution but on the positive side, the highest activity sources are fairly safe against theft by a casual thief. However, we also note that upgrade actions must be taken immediately to improve the security of the waste storage in the short term and to dispose of them in the long term. A summary of sources stored at the CIN is found in the following table.
ISOTOPE ACTIVITY (GBq) ISOTOPE ACTIVITY (GBq)
90 Sr S/d 60 Co/137 Cs S/d
226 Ra 519,63 mg 60 Co 1,110E+05
226 Ra 43,8 mg. 241 Am 3,700E+00
226 Ra 7,400E+01 Am 241/Be 5,180E-01
239 Pu-Be 1,850E+02 137 Cs S/d
60 Co 3,000E+03 60 Co 1,111E+00
60 Co 7,400E+03 60 Co 1,850E+00
60 Co 7,400E+03 137 Cs 3,700E-04
60 Co 8,380E+04 60 Co 3,330E-01
60 Co 5,600E+03 60 Co 2,220E+00
60 Co 1,400E+04 113 Sn 1,500E+00
60 Co 1,130E+04 235 U S/d
241 Am-Be 1,100E+00 241 Am 1,640E-02
137 Cs 7,400E-01 235 U S/d
137 Cs 3,000E+04 241 Am 3,700E+00
137 Cs 1,110E+00 137 Cs/ 60 Co 3,300E+01
226 Ra-Be 3,700E+00 60 Co 2,296E+04
241 Am-Be S/d 90 Sr/90 Y 3,700E+00
226 Ra-Be 7,400E-02 60 Co 1,670E+01
204 Tl 6,390E-02 137 Cs 9,300E+00
85 Kr 5,550E+01 198 Au S/d
226 Ra 8,500E-01 198 Au S/d
241 Am 8,500E-01 182 Ta S/d
241 Am S/d 60 Co 2,550E+04
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Diversos S/d 60 Co 3,650E+04
Prod. de fisión /137Cs S/d
3. Conclusion
The history of radioactive source management and control within Uruguay is such that there are not likely to be a significant number of orphan sources in the country. However, we must take place a higher priority on locating such legacy sources as exist, or to confirming that such sources have, indeed, been accounted for. The sources currently stored at the CIN should be better-secured through the improvement of the security and in the next future relocated to a more secure location at the earliest opportunity to prevent criminal actions, thieves either accidental or purposeful loss, and the National Nuclear Authority should be provided the staff, training, and the central government the resources necessary to adequately locate, secure, and dispose of these sources.
However the three milestones as follows:
– permanent upgrade and update of the regulatory body according with BSS
– control of the import and export according the Code of Conduct
– consolidated improvement of the security of our national waste storage
and finally the next future instrumentation of the National Strategy will allow the continuous control of sources in Uruguay without neither the existence of orphaned sources nor malicious acts.
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PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
I. Okhotina, L. Andreeva-Andrievskaya, B. Lobach Rosatom, Russian Federation
1. Structure of regulatory control. The basis of the government regulatory control over the management of radioactive materials and ionizing radiation sources in the Russian Federation is:
• The Federal Law of the Russian Federation "On Use of Nuclear Power",
• The Federal Law of the Russian Federation "On Sanitation and Epidemiological Well-being of the Population".
The Federal Law "On Use of Nuclear Power" establishes key provisions regulating the activities related to development, manufacturing, disposition, and use of radioactive materials in different spheres, their accounting and control, physical protection and export-import regulation.
To implement the provisions of the Federal Law "On Use of Nuclear Power" the government of the Russian Federation endorsed a number of regulations:
• Regulation on licensing activities in the field of the use of nuclear power;
• Regulation on government accounting and control of radioactive substances and radioactive waste (RW) in the Russian Federation;
• Regulation on the establishment of Rules to structure the system of government accounting and control of radioactive substances and waste;
• Regulation on ensuring nuclear and radiation safety and physical protection during transportation of nuclear fissile and radioactive substances;
• Regulation on importing to the RF and exporting from the RF of radioactive substances and goods;
• Legal and technical documents that secure requirements and rules on the management of sources, such as requirements to designing, manufacturing, storage, useful life extention, etc.
Currently the executive authorities in charge of regulatory control over radioactive sources (RS) in the Russian Federation are:
• Federal oversight service in the area of consumers' rights protection and individual well-being, that provides government registration of potentially hazardous products and facilities, as well as issuing of permits for their use at facilities after examining conditions in which the sources are to be used;
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• Federal service on environmental, technological and nuclear oversight (Rostechnadzor) that carries out functions on adoption of legal bills, control and oversight in the field of safe use of nuclear power, in particular licensing of activities related to the use of sources, as well as control over compliance with licensing requirements;
• The Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) that exercises governing of the system of state accounting and control of nuclear materials, radioactive substances and waste, including management of corresponding registers and records.
In accordance with the Provision on the Federal Atomic Energy Agency adopted by the government of the Russian Federation, Rosatom is an authorized federal entity of the executive power that carries out functions on conducting government policy, legal regulation, rendering government services and managing government property in the field of nuclear power use, development and safe operation of nuclear power production, nuclear weapons' complex, nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear science and technology, nuclear and radiation safety, non-proliferation of nuclear material and technology, as well as international cooperation in this area.
The Federal Atomic Energy Agency is a government entity managing nuclear power use, and a competent government entity on nuclear and radiation safety during transportation of nuclear materials, radioactive substances and waste. It is a principal government entity and communications office in accordance with International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, and authorized national agency on implementation of the commitments of the Russian Federation in the field of physical protection of nuclear material at the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international organizations.
The Federal Atomic Energy Agency performs the following key functions:
• managing the system of government accounting and control of nuclear materials, radioactive substances and waste, including management of relevant registers and records;
• ensuring nuclear and radiation safety;
• coordinating management of nuclear materials, radioactive substances and waste,
• coordinating and controlling activities on site selection, design, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, radiation sources, nuclear materials and radioactive substances storage stations and radioactive waste storage facilities;
• ensuring physical protection of nuclear installations, radiation sources, nuclear materials and radioactive substances, nuclear materials and radioactive substances storage stations and radioactive waste storage facilities;
• arranging export and import of nuclear installations, equipment, technology, nuclear materials, radioactive substances, special non-nuclear materials and services in the field of nuclear power use.
2. Personnel Training The national nuclear industry puts special emphasis on personnel training and qualification up-grading in such areas as security culture, basics in accounting and control of radioactive substances and a number of other qualifications. Rosatom maintains a number of government and regional professional educational and training institutions. Managers and specialists of all levels up-grade their qualifications in special advance training institutes, both central and regional.
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3. Progress in developing national register of radioactive sources The structure of government accounting and control of radioactive substances and waste includes:
1. Rosatom and its leading Informational and Analytical Center, that ensures accounting and control of RS and RW on federal level.
2. Federal entities of executive power and their Informational and Analytical Centers. These entities provide accounting and control of RS and RW to organizations under their supervision. They are government unitary enterprises and government agencies.
3. Executive power entities in the regions and their Regional Informational and Analytical Centers. They are responsible for accounting and control of RS and RW everywhere in the region short of organizations subordinate to federal authorities.
4. Regulatory and law-enforcement agencies that assure oversight of the system operation throughout all the levels, as well as investigation of incidents and taking measures to prevent theft of sources, etc.
5. Organizations that are involved in direct use of RS and RW. They provide initial accounting and control of RS and RW. They are responsible for observing requirements set by legal bills and other documents on safe operation, security and physical protection, etc.
Informational and Analytical Centers arrange and carry out accounting and control of RS and RW including:
• collecting information on RS and RW from subordinate organizations including data from regulatory authorities, inventory results at locations, and inspections;
• processing and analyzing collected data validity on accounting and control of RS and RW;
• creating and operating database (registers and records) on accounting and control of RS and RW;
• preparing in proper order of data on accounting and control and its transfer to the principal Informational and Analytical Center;
• participating in inspections of accounting and control nature at different organizations in accordance with rules set by the federal authority;
• arranging training of experts on accounting and control at subordinate organizations.
The functioning of the system of government accounting and control of radioactive substances and waste is based on legal bills and methodological documents that are constantly being updated.
Accounting of ionizing radiation sources (IRS) in the system begins from the moment they are delivered to the goods' storehouse of the manufacturer (later all the transits of the source are registered) and up to the moment of their disposition and storage. Currently organizations provide Informational and Analytical Centers with information on the transit of the sources in accordance with set notification rules. Both the supplier of the source (after its shipment) and the recipient (after its receipt) must submit relevant data.
The system functioning significantly improved prospects of:
i. identifying those responsible for loss of control over the sources,
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ii. control over timely decommissioning and disposition of expired sources.
Overall inventory of radioactive sources and upgrading of legislation in the part that regulates the issuing of permits for deals with category 1 and 2 sources is scheduled in Russia for 2006.
4. Approaches to RS management throughout its life cycle In the Russian Federation expired radiation sources are returned by the customer to the manufacturer or sent for long term storage to territorial specialized production facilities of the "Radon" system. In case of necessity the operating organization may extend the operating time of the source if it gets an approval from relevant commission comprised of representatives from Rostechnadzor, Government sanitation and epidemiological oversight authority and operating organization.
When expired RS are returned to the manufacturer, radioactive material, if necessary, is extracted from sources for further use. In case of lack of reprocessing technology or if reprocessing is economically inefficient the expired source is disposed of.
Currently in accordance with Article 48 of the Federal Law on Environment import of radioactive sources to the Russian Federation is prohibited.
However Rosatom realizing the importance of observing item 27 of the Code of Conduct is preparing proposals to the government of the Russian Federation on repatriation of expired RS for reprocessing.
5. Progress with arrangements for implementing the import and export provisions of the Code of Conduct
Russia is one of the largest exporters of RS (including categories 1 and 2) based on cobalt-60, selenium-75, iridium-192, americium-241, californium-252, etc.
Currently export and import of radioactive substances and goods is a license-based activity. Licenses are issued by the Ministry of Economic Development and Commerce of the Russian Federation. Rosatom conducts technical assessment of materials proposed by the Russian participants for export deal.
The participant requesting export-import licenses must submit to Rosatom copies of Rostechnadzor licenses on management of radioactive substances (production, storage, transportation, use, rendering of intermediary services on sales of radio-izotopic products).
In case of lack of a license for any one kind of activity the participant submits a contract/agreement with the production facility that has a required license.
When RS is imported copies of manufacturer's certificates are to be submitted, as well as other materials necessary for conducting an assessment (expertise).
In accordance with Article 64 of the Federal Law on the use of nuclear power export and import of radioactive materials is subject to rules set in provision on export and import of radioactive sources and goods.
The existing system of control over the management of nuclear and radioactive materials in the Russian Federation provides for extensive control over the sales of afore materials inside the country as well as their import and export.
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REGULATORY CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN LATVIA
U. Sprule, A. Salmins Radiation Safety Centre, Maskavas 165, Riga, LV-1019, Latvia
Abstract. The current system of the regulatory control of radioactive sources has been created in Latvia in order to ensure radiation and nuclear safety in compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency recommendations and European Union requirements. The Radiation Safety Centre was established as an independent regulatory authority responsible for radiation and nuclear safety. It is responsible for the implementation of the provisions of the Law on Radiation Safety and Nuclear Safety and the related regulations.. The Radiation Safety Centre is responsible for maintaining a state level the data base containing an inventory of all ionising radiation sources, and a listing of all licensed practices. The operators of ionising radiation sources are obliged to maintain local data base of radioactive materials in their possession and are responsible for their physical inventories. The regulatory system is continuously improved and by now it provides an efficient control over radioactive sources in current practices, and at the same time provides for an adequate handling of consequences of the legacy of the past.
1. Introduction Since Latvia regained its independence in 1991, the Parliament and the Government of Latvia have devoted a great effort to establish a solid framework of legislation and control in various fields where the previous system had certain obvious deficiencies. One of these areas was radiation and nuclear safety with a particular emphasis on the control of nuclear and radioactive material. As a result of more than a decade of continuous improvement the current Latvian regulatory control system complies with international requirements and recommendations and meets the European standards. This is clearly reflected in Latvia’s successful accession to the European Union in May 2004.
2. Laws and Regulations Article 111 of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia stipulates that “the State shall protect human health and guarantee a basic level of medical assistance for everyone.” Article 115 says: “The State shall protect the right of everyone to live in a benevolent environment by providing information about environmental conditions and by promoting the preservation and improvement of the environment.” [1].
Following the principles set out in the Constitution, the new Law [2], promulgated by the Parliament of Latvia in 2000 defines the legal framework of the regulatory control of the ionising radiation sources (including radioactive sources and nuclear material) in the Republic of Latvia. The new Law, which is fully compatible with the international requirements and recommendations replaced the previous one (from 1994) in order to harmonise the Latvian legal system with that of the European Union and with the obligations under the relevant international nuclear safety conventions to which Latvia is a party. The Law establishes an independent regulatory authority, the Radiation Safety Centre (Radiācijas Drošības Centrs, RDC).
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Building upon the Law [2], several regulations issued by the Cabinet of Ministers define the procedures of licensing and regulatory control of practices involving the various sources of ionising radiation [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. The requirements follow the IAEA recommendations [8, 9] and are compatible with the relevant legal instruments in force in the European Union [10, 11].
3. The regulatory authority – the radiation safety centre The RDC was established in 2001. It is an independent regulatory authority reporting to the Ministry of Environment. It is responsible for the implementation of the provisions of the Law [2] and the related regulations. Its major tasks are the following [2]:
• to supervise and control practices involving sources of ionising radiation;
• to issue licences for practices involving sources of ionising radiation;
• to maintain data bases on practices, sources and exposures;
• to coordinate the combat against illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials;
• to operate emergency preparedness organisation for the early notification of a radiological or nuclear accident;
• to provide for the identification, investigation and assessment of unknown radioactive sources discovered on the territory of Latvia, or of undeclared radioactive sources discovered at the state’s border, and to provide for a safe disposal in the cases when the user or the owner of the radioactive source can not be identified.
The RDC consists of the following main sections: Licensing, Inspection, Early warning (radiation and nuclear emergency preparedness), Radiation Safety and Dosimetry. These operational sections have a staff of about 30 specialists with high level of competence in radiation and nuclear safety. The Administrative, Legal and Public affairs sections support the work of the operational sections.
The RDC is entitled to immediately receive information about any accidents and incidents that may have an impact on radiation and nuclear safety, as well as to request and receive from other state institutions, authorities and the operators themselves any information relevant to radiation safety and nuclear safety in order to carry out its functions [2].
In the field of combating illicit trafficking and regaining control over radioactive sources, RDC co-operates with various other authorities, and organisations (The State Border Guards, Customs, State Police, Security Police, etc.) [2].
4. Practices, Operators, Radioactive Sources Practices involving ionising radiation sources are subject to licensing. Licences are issued by the RDC, based on a decision made by the Licensing Commission. In the licence the RDC identifies which practices are allowed for private persons or legal entities. A licence may be revoked or suspended if there is a failure to meet requirements of the regulations relevant to radiation and nuclear safety, or any special requirements which might have been prescribed in the licence itself. Licences are issued for a maximum period of five years, the actual period of a licence depending on the type of the practice [3].
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There are ~680 operators, who have licences for practices, under supervision and control of the RDC. The largest number of sealed radioactive sources used by operators is in the industry (~540), science (~130) and medicine (>10). The medical sector uses a significant amount of open radioactive substances (radiopharmaceuticals and diagnostics) and also ionising radiation equipment/apparatus that does not contain radioactive substances. The number of radiation workers in Latvia exceeds 2000 [12].
The operators are responsible for their inventories of radioactive materials and they should ensure that all radioactive waste be collected, isolated, stored, treated and if necessary, disposed of causing no risk to workers, to members of the public and to the environment [2].
5. Regulatory Control According to the Law [2] the RDC is responsible for maintaining a state level the data base containing an inventory of all ionising radiation sources, and a listing of all licensed practices. All operators should maintain up-to-date accounts of all radioactive sources in their possession and are obliged to perform physical inventory taking annually. The results of inventory taking should be reported to the RDC. Disposal of disused radioactive sources and any changes in the practice are also to be reported. The operators are regularly notified about their reporting obligations in various ways: in notification letters sent to the operators annually requesting the provision of information, at the time of application for a licence and during on-site inspections. The operators should inform RDC in writing about any changes relating to ionising radiation sources and the practices. The import and export of ionising radiation sources are reported to RDC by the Customs.
The new amendments to the Law [2] – which are expected to be approved by Parliament in the nearest future – are designed to further improve the quality and reliability of the reporting system. The scope of the information to be reported will be significantly widened to include not only changes in the inventories and practices, but all circumstances which may have an impact on radiation and nuclear safety (changes in staff, education, training etc.). The frequency and deadlines for reporting is also revised.
The state inspectors of RDC perform regular on-site inspections at the premises of operators of ionising radiation sources. The inspections are based on an annual inspection plan, which is designed on the basis of the type of practice and the associated risk, the performance record of the operators, the statistics of previous offences and the annual plan of activities of the operator (if available). The inspection frequency ranges from one inspection per two years (very low risk practices, scrap metal yards, etc.) through one inspection per half year (nuclear materials, most radioactive sources, state borders) up to one inspection in each quarter of a year (significant radioactive sources, radiation service providers) [11]. During their inspections the RDC inspectors together with personnel of the Laboratory Section carry out a high number of radiation measurements not only in the controlled areas of operators but also in the environment for the possible detection of orphan sources (about 60% of the approximately 2000 measurements carried out during 2003 was aimed at searching for orphan sources) [12].
In its regulatory work, RDC extensively uses the computerised database system RAIS (“Regulatory Authority Information System”) which was developed by the IAEA in the framework of a Technical Co-operation program targeted to help Member States to establish and improve the regulatory control of radioactive sources. RDC currently uses RAIS for managing the national inventory of all ionising radiation sources (including radioactive sources), as well as for recording licences and operator data. RAIS proved to be a very useful tool also in the planning of inspections and in the evaluation and handling of the results and findings of the inspections.
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6. Regaining control over Orphan Sources Due to the legacy of the past, the possibility of existing orphan sources in Latvia still can not be ignored. However, the current situation is fully under control: the legal and regulatory system provides a firm framework and the responsible organisations have appropriate procedures and equipment for the efficient management of possible situations associated with orphan sources.
The above is clearly demonstrated by a recent case. In November 2004 the RDC staff carried out background measurements in the environment in a territory of a hospital. In the office of the bookkeeper the radiation detectors indicated a highly elevated radiation level. As a result of a systematic search, a number of 226Ra pins were discovered in an unused safe-box in the office. These sources were used for medical treatments during the ‘60s and nobody had any information on how and when they ended up in the bookkeepers’ office. The sources were transferred to the radioactive waste disposal facility and the personnel which might have been affected by the incident were sent to a health examinations.
7. Conclusions The current system of the regulatory control of radioactive sources in Latvia meets the international requirements and is compliant with Latvia’s international obligations. However, the Latvian Government and the regulatory authority are committed to further improve the reliability and confidence of the system. As an example: recently the Government decided to introduce a quality management system based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard at the regulatory authorities. Based on the Government’s decision, the radiation and nuclear safety authority, RDC is among the first authorities, which began the preparatory works to implement the ISO standards.
The efficient operation of the regulatory system provides sufficient assurance that current applications of high activity radioactive sources do not pose an unacceptable risk to society. At the same time, the continued high awareness of the legacy of the past provides a guarantee that its possible consequences of the present and the future are adequately managed.
REFERENCES
[1] Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, Adopted by the Constitutional Assembly of Latvia on February 15, 1922, as amended by the Law of May 8, 2003
[2] Law on Radiation Safety and Nuclear Safety, October 26, 2000
[3] Procedures for Issuing Special Permits (Licences) and Permits for Practices Involving Ionising Radiation Sources, and Procedures for Public Dispute on the Establishment of Ionising Radiation Facilities of State Significance or on Essential Modifications thereto, Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No.301, July 3, 2001
[4] Regulations on the Protection against Ionising Radiation, Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No.149, April 9, 2002
[5] Requirements for Physical Protection of Ionising Radiation Sources, Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No.129, March 19, 2002
[6] The Procedure of Practices with Nuclear Material, Related Material and Equipment, Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 398, April 22, 2004
[7] Regulations on the Protection against Ionising Radiation during Transport of Radioactive Material, Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 307, July 3, 2001
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[8] International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series No.115, IAEA, 1997
[9] Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, IAEA, 2004
[10] 1493/93 Euratom Regulation – On the Transport of Radioactive Materials between Member States of the European Union
[11] 2003/122 Euratom Directive – On the Control of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources and Orphan Sources
[12] Public Annual Report of the Radiation Safety Centre, RDC, Latvia 2003
[13] Draft of Regulation on the Practices of the Radiation Safety Centre, RDC, Latvia
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SECURITY OF THE SOURCES OF IONIZING RADIATIONS IN EL SALVADOR
Torres Gomez R. E Unidad Reguladora y Asesora de Radiaciones Ionizantes (UNRA), Ministry of Health, San Salvador
Abstract. The paper describes the implementation process, the problems during the process and the actions taken at present, to keep safe the sources that are being imported, exported, the ones that are used and the ones in disuse for any reason. After the events on September 11, 2001, as regulator authority, actions were implemented which main objective is maintain safety the sources to avoid robbery, or any use for terrorist purposes in our country or other close countries. The application of the Protection Regulation and Radiology Safety gives us the legal support to carry out the implemented actions, such as confiscation, sources of disuse and residue centralization, exportation of sources to the country of origin, and implementation of safety measures inside the building to avoid any robbery or loss.
1. Introduction The practices with radioactive sources are well known in El Salvador, especially in the field of medicine and Industry.
It is necessary to implement measures to keep safe the existent radioactive sources that enter the country, and its demanded because of our ascending technological development.
The regulating authority, supported by the existing legal standard, demands the entities that own radiological sources to improve the safety measures, as well as the use of modern technology (constant visual control and alarm systems), to maintain constant control and to minimize the possibility of robbery or loss.
The International Organization of Atomic Energy, through the Model Project, continues to be an important piece for the implementation of the safety measures of the building and sources, as well as the offering of technical cooperation from the United States Department of Energy.
2. Description Strategies used:
(a) Visits to all establishments to maintain up to date the census of radioactive sources that are being used and not used.
(b) Storage in the national deposit of sources in disuse:
-This way, the holder can export the sources to the country of origin, and;
-Gathering and centralization of orphan sources is carried out.
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(c) Inter-Institutional Cooperation Agreements
-Superior Council of Health
-Board of Vigilance of the Medical Profession.
-Ministry of Foreign Relations
-General Department of Customs
-Ministry of Labor
-Research Center and Nuclear Applications of the Faculty of Engineer and Architecture of the University of El Salvador.
(d) Training of personnel from the Regulating Authority, for the identification of orphan sources.
(e) Improvement of safety systems of the building of the radioactive sources disused.
(f) Implementation of the Register system of disused sources.
(g) Counseling for the buildings to improve their safety systems
(h) Control systems for the radioactive sources that pretend to enter the country without permission.
(i) Notification from the importers about the final destination of sources.
(j) Processes of coercion due to nonfulfillment of the legislation.
3. Conclusion The IAEA assistance, through its trainings and supply of information, has been very important for the implementation of the safety program, and fundamental for its development. Hiring professionals with different careers and experiences have made a grate impact, especially to the medical practice.
The agreements made in institutions are related to the control system of the buildings, practices, employees, and sources.
The application of a legal framework in relation to the International Norms of Protection and Radiological Safety (BSS 115) has been fundamental for the implementation of the safety program.
The variety of professional employees facilitates the delegation of responsibilities, and, in this way, gives each one of them a specific practice in accordance to their capacity.
The support form the National University Laboratories has been fundamental for the identification of orphan sources in disuse. Implementation of auditor ships into the building is necessary in order to verify the inventory of radioactive sources. It is necessary to have training and motivation for customs employees, in order to demand from them the necessary permissions for the import of sources issued by the regulator authority. It is necessary to motivate national authorities to modernize the braquitherapy and increase the measures of safety sources along with the installation of alarm systems. It is also important to facilitate the deposit of radioactive residues, in order to be utilize as a centralized entity of warehousing and control of the disuse and orphan sources.
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REVISED PHILIPPINE ACTION PLAN FOR THE SAFETY & SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
E.M.Valdezco, J.E. Seguis, E.S. Caseria and T.G de Jesus Philippine Nuclear Research Institute
Abstract. Radioactive sources are used in many fields of peaceful applications and continue to benefit human society in many different ways. Although radioactive sources are generally managed safely and securely and that they bring benefits to our people, accidents involving radioactive sources have occurred in a number of countries, some with serious – even fatal – consequences.
Starting from the Philippine participation in the International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Materials held in Dijon, France in 1998 , the Buenos Aires Conference in 2001 and until recently, the Hofburg Conference, a Philippine Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources was formulated and later revised by the PNRI following the guidance contained in the revised IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources. This action plan is currently being implemented as an integral part of our national effort to enhance and strengthen the safety and security of radioactive sources under the regulatory control of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. The Philippines, through an official communication in February 2004 addressed to the IAEA Director General, expressed a non binding political commitment and stated among others, that it fully supports and endorses the IAEA’s efforts to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources and that it is working towards this end following the guidance contained in the revised Code.
The paper describes our past and current initiatives to ensure that radioactive sources are used within an appropriate framework of radiation safety and security and in accordance with the principles contained in the Revised IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources.
1. Introduction The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute is the regulatory body in the Philippines that is responsible for the safe use and application of radioactive materials in all fields, i.e., medical, industrial, research, education and other civilian applications. The Figures below indicates the extent of radioactive material use in the country by geographical location and by practice.
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Philippine Nuclear Research Institute 4
Region I = 2Region III = 26Region IV = 43Region V = 2Region VI = 9Region VII = 14Region VIII = 4Region IX = 3Region X = 5Region XI = 11Region XII = 3Caraga = 1CAR = 4NCR = 181TOTAL 308
Radiation Safety and Regulation
Distribution of Distribution of Licensed Licensed Users by Users by GeographiGeographical cal LocationLocation
As of Decemberr 2004
Philippine Nuclear Research Institute 5
Profile of licenseesTotal No. of Licensees (as of December 2004): 308
1Holder of Facility License:
39Commercial
23Research
27Industrial Radiography
138Industry
80Medical
Holder of Radioactive Material License:
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2. Legislative The Philippine Atomic Energy Act of 1958, among others, empowers the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission then, now the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute to promulgate rules and regulations to ensure the safe use and application of radioactive materials in the different fields. Relative to this, the PNRI developed and continue to develop practice specific Code of PNRI Regulations (CPRs) which are reviewed and revised periodically through a system of consultations involving a number of stakeholders.
The PNRI completed the revision of two major CPRs in 2004 and have consequently published these in the Philippine Official Gazette. These are CPR PART 3 Standards for Radiation Protection published in September 6, 2004 and CPR PART 4 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials in the Philippines published in October 25, 2004. CPR PART 3 is largely based on IAEA SS 115, International Basic Safety Standards while CPR PART 4 is based on IAEA ST-R-1.
PNRI CPRs are currently being reviewed to ensure that appropriate security requirements in addition to safety requirements are included for purposes of granting authorization for the use of radioactive sources in the different fields. In the interim period, these security requirements are imposed as additional specific conditions of licenses issued subject to verification inspections for compliance purposes.
3. National Register of Radioactive Sources The PNRI adopted through an Administrative Order in February 26, 2004 IAEA TECDOC 1344 and has classified the sources in its national registry according to this categorization system. Special attention was given to Category 1 & 2 sources as a first priority in terms of a risk based inspection program for purposes of determining compliance with regulatory requirements.
These sources are the following:
Category 1 Sources:
• Co-60 Irradiator 1
• Co-60 Teletherapy 14
• Co-60 MultiBeam Tele 1
• Co-60 Calibration SSDL 2
• Cs-137 Blood Irradiator 3
Category 2 Sources:
• Ir-192 HDR Brachytherapy 6
• Industrial Radiography 27
Ir-192, Co-60
Category 3 Sources:
• Fixed industrial gauges
Level gauges 99
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Conveyor gauges 3
• Well logging gauges 9
4. Adoption of the IAEA RAIS Version 3 IAEA RAIS Version 3 was installed and run successfully in August 2004 at the PNRI Nuclear Regulations, Licensing & Safeguards Division. Transfer of data from the old database/national registry of sources is ongoing with the data on Category 1 sources completed in EO 2004. Target date of completion for the other categories is EO 2005. In the meantime, request for IAEA assistance in organizing a National Workshop on RAIS3.0 has been submitted and is being given due consideration by the IAEA. Tentative schedule for the National workshop is in the 4th Q of 2005. It is planned to include participants from the Department of Health, the other regulatory body for x-rays and electrically produced radiation devices in the country.
5. Management of Disused Radioactive Sources The Philippines issued in 2000 a regulatory policy on the use of radium sources for human use following its participation in the IAEA Radium Conditioning Project. A Philippine team under advisement of an IAEA Expert collected and successfully conditioned all the previously authorized radium sources in March 2001.
Decommissioning of all disused Co-60 teletherapy sources in the country and the subsequent management of these sources have been successfully undertaken and completed in 2004 with the assistance of the IAEA.
The PNRI continue to pursue the upgrading of its centralized facility for low to intermediate level radioactive waste treatment facility with assistance from the IAEA through the INT project on sustainable development.
6. Security Upgrades of Critical Infrastructures The PNRI is currently implementing an agreement with Batelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories under the framework of the US Department of Energy’s Radiological Threat Reduction Program in which security upgrades are provided in selected critical radiation facilities in and outside of the PNRI. Security upgrades at the Co-60 irradiation facility and at the centralized radioactive waste management facility of the PNRI are targeted for completion at the EOMarch 2005 while those outside of PNRI where Category 1 sources are used are targeted for completion in mid 2005.
The PNRI is also an active participant in the Australian Regional Project on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and has taken an active role in the formulation of the regional action plan to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources in the South East Asia region.
Parallel to this, we have also received an IPPAS (International Physical Protection Advisory Service) Mission from the IAEA and PNRI is currently addressing the implementation of the Mission’s recommendations.
7. Capability Building, Training of Regulatory Staff and Related Activities The PNRI constituted in February 2005 a Committee tasked to formulate a strategic training program for its technical personnel with the regulatory staff as a first priority. Questionnaires
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were asked to be filled up by the regulatory staff following the guidance provided in IAEA TECDOC -----. Responses to the questionnaire are now being analyzed, as a first step for purposes of making an assessment of the training needs of the regulatory staff. The Committee is tasked to present its findings and recommendations in a report to be submitted by mid 2005.
The PNRI constituted a Committee on Quality Management Systems for Nuclear Regulations and Licensing Activities in July 2004 to ensure a continuing improvement in the effective and efficient implementation of the PNRI regulatory control program for purposes of radiation protection and for the safety & security of radioactive sources. The Committee is also responsible for the review, assessment and needs analysis of the various regulatory activities
Awareness seminar to various groups are conducted by the PNRI through its Information Section. These seminars are conducted either in response to requests for such awareness seminar by specific groups or through the initiative of the PNRI as part of the training program routinely conducted under the National Radiological Emergency Response & Preparedness Plan.
Awareness seminars for scrap metal dealers & steel mill operators have been organized and well received. Continuing dialogue with other relevant agencies of government to update existing Memorandum of Understanding to address the importation and exportation of scrap metals with possible presence of radioactive sources in the country are conducted.
Participation in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database is maintained and information from this participation are disseminated to relevant agencies of government. Relative to this, the list of reported lost/stolen and/or unaccounted radioactive sources in the country is being revisited for the conduct of appropriate safety assessments and consolidation of lessons learned.
8. Nuclear Security Plan The PNRI is currently formulating a national nuclear security plan in cooperation with security organizations, law enforcement agencies and other military/police/government authorities. The Plan is a comprehensive approach to nuclear security which aims to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear material and other radioactive materials in use, storage or transport and of nuclear/radiation facilities against nuclear terrorism, the security of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications, the national capability for detection and unauthorized movement of radioactive materials, the national radiological emergency response capabilities and the country’s multilateral/bilateral linkages with international organizations/countries with nuclear security programs.
The Plan will be implemented in a comprehensive 3-tiered approach, namely:
a) prevention of any illicit or non-peaceful use of nuclear or other radioactive materials as the first line of defense;
b) detection of any illicit activity involving such materials as second line of defense;
c) response in the event that an illicit activity has occurred.
A general framework of the plan has been agreed upon by the participating agencies, the specific action plans for each task group have been developed and the lead agencies have been identified.
9. Future Plan The Philippines is scheduled to conduct a national workshop on borders monitoring in April 2005 with participation from all regional seaports and airport. Facilities in the country. The workshop will be conducted with support and assistance of the IAEA.
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The Philippines has finalized its position relative to the proposed Memorandum of Understanding between the Philippine Government and the United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Second Line of Defense Program. Under the Megaports Initiative, the DOE/NNSA in a cooperative effort, will provide the Philippines with radiation detection equipment, training and sustainability support to key ports in Manila and other regions to provide these ports with the technical means to deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. The signing of the MOU is expected to take place before the middle of this year pending the resolution of certain items relative to custom duties and taxes.
The Philippines has signified its interest and willingness to receive the IAEA ITE Mission with the Department of Foreign Affairs as the lead government counterpart. The PNRI commits to provide technical assistance to the Department of Foreign Affairs in this regard.
The PNRI, after its participation in the recently concluded workshop on search and secure orphan sources in Sydney, Australia , has signified its interest to receive the USDOE/Australia/IAEA mission in May 2005 for an assessment to be undertaken relative to the issue of orphan sources.
10. Conclusion The Revised IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources provides good guidance to national authorities in ensuring that radioactive sources are used within an appropriate framework of radiation safety and security. The Philippines, following the principles contained in the Code has formulated and revised accordingly, an action plan to further strengthen its regulatory control effectiveness and has demonstrated improvements in many areas.
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Technical Session 2: National Strategies and Experience for Regaining and Maintaining Control
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SAFETY AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT FOR RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AT UNIVERSITY’S SCIENCE LABORATORIES An implementation status review
Subbiah Annamalai and Lim Tit Meng Faculty of Science, National University of Singapore
Abstract.Teaching and Research science laboratories handling low and highly active radioactive sources such as X-ray machines, Neutron sources, Gamma sources and hundreds of alpha and beta radio isotopes which pose a great concern to the faculty management on safety & security while transporting, handling and disposals. A comprehensive Safety and Security management system is proposed in line with IAEA and Singapore Goverments guidelines . Implementation of such system will certainly be beneficial to the Faculty of Science which will provide a healthy academic environment, preserving resources and complying Singapore’s radiation safety related regulations. The author reviewed the present situation and recommend the management to intiate real time indoor and outdoor exposure monitoring programs and find solution for security of the un-disposable radioactive sources by collaborating international body’s to attain “risk free” science laboratories.
Faculty of Science, National University of Singapore
1. Introduction Faculty of Science (FoS) planned and start implementing a Radioactive Safety and Security Management System in 2003 for the purpose of complying legal requirements, minimize accidents and bring a new “safety culture” among the staff and students for radioactive use,
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transportation and disposals. This study conducted to check the present status , finding the lapses and recommend the appropriate control measures to essure radioactive safety & security in Faculty of Science laboratories.
2. Review of Radioactive Safety and Secuity (RSS) Planning RSS system documents, implementation records reviewed and it is covered all elements which are required by the regulatory guidelines. The planning also found with the the following lapses
the policy was not endorsed by higher management and not communicated among all staff and students widely
training plan did not include students, researchers and visiting scientists
the radiation safety officers duties and responsitbilites was not covered in detail
the risk analysis methods are not planned according to international guidelines
the responsibility for ultimate enforcement not included in the in-house regulation
The licencing to students and visitors were also not included
continuous radioactive monitoring program was not addressed.
3. Review of Radiation Safety and Security Management Implementation
3.1 Inventory Control RSS records show that the safety committee recommendations have been accepted by the management and various infrastructure development and redesign of laboratories have been achieved. There are about 400 sources are updated every year and all new sources will be purchased through central procurement system and such records normally included in the master inventory list.
3.2 Engineering and Administrative control measures The radioactive sources are handled only in isolated rooms, glove boxes and fume hoods. Separate ventialtions have been provided for source handling and storages. There are some low level isotopes used in common labs advised to keep under safe distance and shielding. All new laboratories were scruitinised by design review team and all applicable standardards are complied in design stage. Lebelling and warning signs were in place. Administrative control measures such as keeping the staff/students working with radioactive sources, their annual doses and medical records are properly managed. The author recommed the management to keep all their health records for atleast 20 years for future legal references and study purposes.
3.3 Training, Awareness and Competence All staff and students working with radioactive sources are undergoing specially designed courses internally as well as with the regulators of Singapore. The faculty record shows that the 90 percent staffs have completed all statutory, mandatory training programs conducted by the university safety office and external training institutes. The author found that less number of students were trained in radiation safety and recommend to arrange more training & education programs to increase their awareness on radiation safety.
3.4 Status of Safety and Security Monitoring The physical safety and security surveys are conducted frequently. The radiation monitoring is carried out frequently. The author further recommend to monitor the radiation levels through real
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time monitors to ensure all exposures are withing the limits specified by Health Science Authority of Singapore and to activate alarm in case of accidental releases.
Figure 3. Inspection, Audits and Monitoring
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
2003
2004
2005
Yea
r
Numbers
Rad.Survey 8 12 6
Audits 2 3 2
Inspection 6 12 4
2003 2004 2005
3.5 Status of Compliances
Licensing for most of the sources have been complied and most of the staff and students have been obtained individual dosimeters (TLD). All dosimeters are regularly read by HSA and the doses were recorded for reference.
Figure 4. Licensing Control
0
200
400
2003 2004 2005
Year
No.of Licences X-ray
IsotopesRad.Worker
3.6 Emergency Planning The emergency plan widely covered all the necessary action to be taken by the emergency action team members and how to contain the spills / exposures. A simulated emergency evacuation drill was recorded in March 2004 and one real emergency situation were handled effectively. The author recommends to keep antidotes and SCBA for handling radioactive emergency situations.
3.7 Source Security The author found that there are many sources left in unsecured laboratories which is a potential security threat he advise the management to enhance its security measures thorough study and consultation with experts. He also advise to minimise the usage and storage quantity to reduce the propable security risk potential.
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3.8 Radioactive disposals The disposals are being carried out once in 3 months with the help of universtiy’s safety office and Health Science Authority of Singapore. Many radioactive wastes left in the store rooms because these activity levels are beyond the disposal limits of HSA. These undisposal wastes are stored in specially designed stores and could not export its origin due to techincal problems. The author found that the accumulation of these wastes is a serious environmental and safety threat and advise the management to study and find a solution to dispose these wastes through consultation with HSA and IAEA.
4. Accident Statistics and Analysis The accident statistics for the last 4 years were analyzed and the accident trend is declining and the vulnerability of incident scene has changed for the last two years.
Table 1. Accident statistics 2001 to 2004
Type of Accidents 2001 2002 2003 2004
Radioactive spills 0 0 0 0
Accidental Exposures 0 1 0 0
Over doses 0 0 0 0
Security violations 2 3 2 1
Other incidents 1 2 1 1
The above study shows (RSS Accident analysis records 2001 to 2004) that the radioactive incidents are due to human errors and security violations are found increasing. The author suggests the management to study in detail and arrive solutions to achive “zero” incident labs.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations The results of review and study show that a remarkable achievments have been made to minimize non-compliances and close monitoring of safety /security of radioactive materials in the science laboratories. The author recommend the management to study further and initiate suitable education programs to minimize the human error problems. To intiate real time indoor and outdoor exposure monitoring programs and find solution for security of the un-disposable radioactive sources by collaborating international body’s are the key recommendations arrived by the author to achieve the overall objectives of RSS and to attain “risk free” science laboratories.
REFERENCES
[2] AURPO Guidance Notes on Working with Ionising Radiations in Research and Teaching June 2002 Edition
[3] Occupational Radiation Protection, Safety Guide No. RS-G-1.1 IAEA Vienna
[4] Radiation Protection Act (chapter 262) and Radiation Protection Regulations (Ionising Radiation) Regulations 2000 Republic of Singapore
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[5] Accident data / records of FSMS at Deans office, Faculty of Science NUS
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SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF HIGH ACTIVITY IRS MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIA WITHIN THE U.S.-RF COOPERATION
R.V. Arutyunyana, I.A. Osipyantsa, L.G. Shpinkovaa, S.N. Brykinb, I.S. Serebryakovb, V.N. Ershovc, N.S. Glushakc
a Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, IBRAE RAN, Moscow, Russia Federation
b All-Russian Research Institute of Chemical Technology, VNIIKhT, Moscow Russia, Federation
c FSUE "Emergency Technical Center", St. Petersburg, Russia, Federation
Abstract. The paper contains main results of the first stage of the survey of conditions of use and status of high activity IRS in Russia. The survey is carried out to draw up recommendations on priority measures aimed at reduction of probability of their unauthorized use, including for terrorist purposes. The paper presents results of survey analysis carried out in 20 regions of Russia. It highlights key problems associated with IRS control and accounting, their safety and security, and disposal of unused IRS. The paper formulates practical recommendations on measures targeted to solve the said problems.
IRS are widely used in various industries in Russia. According to different estimates their total number exceeds 500,000 in more than 4,000 organizations. In the late 1997, the RF Government issued the ordinance to approve the Rules of Organization of the State System for Control and Accounting of Radioactive Substances and Radioactive Waste.
The ionizing radiation source control and accounting are tasked to the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) [1] federal executive bodies and executive bodied of the Russia’s federal subjects.
The ionizing radiation source control and accounting are carried out in frames of the State System for Control and Accounting of Radioactive Substances and Radioactive Waste starting from their incoming to the producer’s finished-products storage area and includes their all subsequent transfers until their disposal and placing for storage (burial).
The Rosatom’s Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety directly manages the State System for Control and Accounting of Radioactive Substances and Radioactive Waste (SSCA). FSUE VNIIKhT and FSUE ATC SPb function as the Central Information and Analytical Center for collection, processing and analysis of the information.
According to the said Rules, Rosatom, within its jurisdiction undertakes:
1. Federal-level control and accounting of radioactive substances and radioactive waste;
2. Activities related to setting up, functioning, methodological support and improving the control and accounting system, as well as to setting up, as necessary, interagency boards (commissions) for coordination of activities in this area;
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3. Rendering the information on existence and transfers of radioactive substances and radioactive waste as well as on their export and import to the state authorities, federal executive bodies, which control and regulate the uses atomic energy at the state level, and to other interested federal executive bodies; such information is rendered in the scope required for the latter to exercise their powers;
4. Collection and analysis of information on control and accounting of radioactive substances and radioactive waste at the federal and agency levels;
5. Development, jointly with interested federal executive bodies, of federal standards and regulations for control and accounting of radioactive substances and radioactive waste, which are approved in accordance with the procedure established by the Government of the Russian Federation;
6. Research, methodological and engineering work in the area of development, functioning and improving the control and accounting system at the federal, regional and agency levels;
7. Coordination of activities of the federal executive bodies as regards drafting of legal acts on issues of control and accounting of radioactive substances and radioactive waste;
8. Support of activities of information and analytical centers and centers for collection, processing and transmission of information, which provide for functioning of the control and accounting system at the federal level;
9. Drafting and approval, in accordance to the established procedure, of standard format documents for control and accounting of radioactive substances and radioactive waste at the federal, regional and agency levels.
By present, 65 regional information and analytical centers (IAC) have been created. In the early 2004 eleven agency-wide IAC were functioning. The control and accounting system covered over 2,500 facilities.
It should be noted, however, the SSCA does not include tasks related to the analysis of IRS use conditions at facilities, assessment of their security degree against unauthorized use and their physical protection conditions.
Due to emergence of new threats associated with the IRS involvement in radiological terrorist acts, the task of identification of areas and conditions of IRS use which are potentially attractive in terms of their use in radiological terrorist acts is especially acute. It is this circumstance that motivated Russia to launch activities in this area.
The JCC-4 meeting (July 30 – August 1, 2003 in Vienna) resulted in the decision to put the work on security of radioactive sources on the list of main areas of MPC&A cooperation between the USA and Russia.
On the basis of this decision the work has been organized on the topic:
“The Development of Recommendations on Measures Aimed at Reducing the Possibility of Unauthorized Use of IRS as Based on the Analysis of Aveilable IRS Information”.
The Brookheaven National Laboratory, acting under the contract with the U.S. Department of Energy, is the customer for this work.
At the first stage of the work the survey of IRS handling conditions was carried out at facilities located in 20 regions of Russia (678 organizations) (Fig. 1) and pertaining to 11 agencies (676 organizations).
The special attention was paid to high activity sources:
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Type of radiation Radionuclides Maximum activity, Ci
Alpha 238Pu, 241Am, 252Cf, 226Ra 10
Beta 90Sr 100
Gamma 60Co, 137Cs, 192Ir 100
The analysis has shown that such IRS are used in 141 organizations of regional jurisdiction and 150 organizations of agency jurisdiction. Total number of high activity IRS is 4,567 and 1,546 correspondingly.
The analysis has identified integral parameters which characterize the situation of sealed radionuclide sources (SRS) handling and main needs of analytical and information centers as regards implementation of measures improving SRS handling safety and security in terms of information protection.
The system analysis has allowed for identifying three priority work areas associating with the reduction of threats of unauthorized use of high activity IRS:
1. Disposal of unused IRS to reduce the number of organizations possessing high activity IRS.
2. Improvement of IRS physical protection systems of organizations which operate IRS.
3. Improvement of IRS physical protection during their transportation.
Fig. 1. IRS information analysis in Russian regions
The selection of organizations to be in the first place put on the Work Plan for IRS unauthorized use threat reduction took account of a number of factors, including the current state of physical protection systems, how the security is arranged for at the facility and on the premises where IRS
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are present, economic and financial situation of the facility, location of the facility in terms of unauthorized access.
As a result, 108 organization have been identified which handle 3,744 high activity SRS and which require SRS handling safety improvement measures. Of this number 44 organizations have been selected to be put on the Plan of Priority Measures to improve physical protection or disposal of unused SRS.
The analysis done is sufficiently representative to conclude that similar high activity SRS handling situation is true for other 68 RF federal subjects and federal executive bodies (ministries, agencies and services). Presently, the work stage 2 is underway which covers 10 regions of Russia (Fig. 1, marked yellow). Besides, because of the administrative reform there is the need to survey enterprises subordinate to the newly emerged agencies and ministries.
In addition, the analysis has allowed to formulate some recommendations of general nature:
1. The upgrading of the State System for Control and Accounting of Radioactive Substances at the federal, regional and agency levels is a key component of high activity IRS handling safety improvement and should be aimed at control over circulation of high activity IRS, provide for a procedure for getting approvals for contracting their transfers among legal entities.
2. In terms of IRS handling safety a number of problems are posed not only by sealed radionuclide sources but also by sources of the open type (solutions, powders) which are widely used by research and development institutions.
3. Organizations located in the territories of the surveyed regions operate a significant number of sources of lower activity. For example, about 8,000 sources of activity within the range of 1 to 100 Ci are in circulation. Often, one organization operates 100 and more of such sources.
4. The training and improvement of professional skills of the personnel who control and account of SRS in information and analytical centers and at enterprises is an important element which improves SRS management safety.
REFERENCES
[1] The Ordinance No 1298 of October 11, 1997, “Regarding Approval of the Rules of Organization of the State System for Control and Accounting of Radioactive Substances and Radioactive Waste”
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GERMAN ACT ON THE CONTROL OF HIGH-ACTIVITY RADIOACTIVE SOURCES Implementation of the EU Directive 2003/122/EURATOM requirements in a Federal Legislation System
R. Czarwinski, R. Sefzig, W. Weiss Federal Office for Radiation Protection Department Radiation Protection and Health, Salzgitter, Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn
Abstract. The concern about orphan sources arising from poor safety and security of radioactive materials around the world resulted in intensive global actions especially in the light of the present precarious security situation. The improvement of the regulatory control e.g. stricter controls on high radioactive sealed sources is one of the key elements in preventing people, goods and environment from being exposed exceptionally. Based on the requirements of the European Directive 122/2003 on the control of high activity sealed sources Germany has initiated a draft of an act on that topic. Most of the requirements of an adequate regulatory infrastructure are already fulfilled by the German legislation. The main focus of the near future activities is the establishment of a national register on high activity sealed sources based a common European protocol. The information presently available for a substantial number of competent federal state (“Länder”) authorities has to be collected in a central register. A very important issue is the well functioning data flow to and from the register. These issues and few other cornerstones of the draft Act will be described in the presentation.
1. General In the light of the uncertain security situation worldwide, substantial efforts are being made by governments to prevent the uncontrolled spread of radioactive substances. The goal of such efforts is to maximise the effectiveness of restrictions on the availability of radioactive substances that could be misused. Introducing stricter controls on high active sources is therefore one of the cornerstones of proliferation prevention.
In fact, high-activity sources that are no longer subject to control may cause serious damage to the health of workforces and of the population at large, which usually have little or no knowledge of the serious risks posed by the radioactive source or of ways to deal with these risks. If such a radioactive source is destroyed, a significant radiation exposure for workers and a serious contamination of materials and soils in the environment may be the result.
In response to these hazards, Germany has tabled a draft Act on the Control of High-Activity Radioactive Sources, which transposes EU Directive 2003/122/EURATOM into national legislation.
In addition to the need to establish and operate a national register on high-activity sources, the bill contains further provisions, based on the control system established in Germany under the Atomic Energy Act and the Radiological Protection Ordinance.
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2. Central register on high-activity sources
2.1. Concept The centrepiece of the bill is the establishment and operation of a central register at the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS). The purpose behind the central registration of high-activity sources is to improve control of sources and information concerning their actual location any time. Central registration thus provides an important basis for the control of high-activity sources from “cradle to grave”, in other words, from manufacture to final disposal.
The register will provide the following information on the various radioactive sources:
1. unique identification number;
2. information on source strength, the radionuclide and (on) technical characteristics;
3. information on authorization to use or import the source;
4. information on continuous control of the source and
5. if necessary, reporting loss, theft or discovery.
In accordance with the German Atomic Energy Act, the control of high-activity sources is a responsibility of the federal states (“Länder”). However, if such radioactive sources are shipped across state borders as a result of the business cycle, the most effective way of tracking of the radioactive source throughout its lifecycle is by means of a central register.
National registers are also part of the concept advocated in a recommendation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, so-called Code of Conduct. Along with the other G-8 countries, Germany declared its political support for implementation of this recommendation at the G-8 summit in summer 2003.
The creation of a central register will thus help to improve Germany’s internal and external security. The national security agencies must be in a position to quickly retrieve information on the actual location of high-activity radioactive sources as well as details on ownership and authorisations granted. Centrally stored and thus quickly available information can help to reduce a malpractice of such high-activity sources.
2.2. Information flow to and from the register Under the new regime, the holder of an authorization for managing high-activity radioactive sources (“licensee”) will be required to provide the register operated by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) with all the information specified in the EU Directive. The “Länder” verify the data for compliance with the previously granted authorization and declare them as “verified”. If the data provided for the register are incomplete or do not conform with the authorization granted, the competent authority will ensure that the holder of the authorization conveys new, corrected information to the register. In this way the responsibilities of the “Länder” pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act remain unaffected.
Reporting duties include any loss or theft of high-activity sources. If a high-activity source is discovered, the responsible competent authority must inform the register thereof no later than the first following working day. This helps to ensure that the relevant information is passed on to the authorities responsible for security at national level in a fast and comprehensive manner. In the same way the high demands for information on the part of foreign institutions and authorities can be met.
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The Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) responsible for trans-boundary shipments and the control of radioactive materials in Germany, the Federal Railway Authority (EBA) supervising the transport by rail, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and the German safety authorities will have direct access to the data stored in the register. The BAFA will inform the register of any import authorisations granted for high-activity sources from non-EU member states, in order to ensure a complete trace ability of high-activity sources.
Information will be also provided for relevant international institutions such as EUROPOL, the EU Commission or the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In accordance with the German Federal Data Protection Act, the holder of an authorization is free at any time to request information about the data of relevance to him which are stored in the register.
The data on high-activity sources will be stored in the register for a period of 30 years from its last update. This period is sufficient to guarantee a reliable knowledge of the location of high-activity sources or former high-activity sources.
3. Requirement to mark high-activity sources In future, each high-activity source will, when manufactured, be marked not only with the radiation hazard warning sign, but also with a unique, instantly recognizable identification number. The Federal Office for Radiation Protection will keep a central list of such identification numbers as part of the register, if no serial number is foreseen by the manufacturer or supplier.
4. Authorisation requirement for handling The currently applicable exemptions from the requirement to obtain an authorisation for the use and transport of radioactive sources not exceeding a given source strength, laid down in the Radiological Protection Ordinance, will be restricted. The use and transport of high-activity sources will be subject to authorization. The aim is to ensure that a person is allowed to handle high-activity sources only after his or her reliability, financial security and technical competence, as well as the radiation protection measures taken, have been examined by the competent authorities.
5. Authorisation requirement for import from or export into States outside the European Union
In future, the import and export of certain high-activity sources from or into non-EU member states will be subject to authorization. This new provision concerns approximately 5 % of the relevant import and export volume of sources which are already subject to a reporting requirement.
This is in line with the declared political intentions of the G-8 States, and especially Germany, to implement the recommendations of the IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources – and thus with the idea of proliferation prevention.
6. Requirement to return or receive high-activity sources High-activity sources that can no longer be, or are no longer intended to be, used as permitted in the authorization obtained will in future be returned to the manufacturer, to the supplier or to another authorisation holder (“licensee”) or disposed of as radioactive waste. They are not allowed to remain with the authorization holder. The purpose of this new requirement is to ensure that the loss of knowledge about radioactive sources which are no longer in use (and which, under
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the previous regime, were allowed to remain with the (former) authorization holder (“licensee”)) does not lead at a later stage to any persons not having the necessary knowledge about radiation protection being exposed to these sources, or result in the sources being disposed of inadequately (e.g. scrapping).
Along with this obligation, manufacturers and importers of high-activity sources will now be required to accept the return of sources.
7. Financial security for orphan sources The EU-Directive requires member states to establish a system of financial security to cover intervention costs relating to the recovery of orphan sources. Under German legislation (Nuclear Financial Security Ordinance), the amount for the standard coverage for attributable high-activity sources, in other words, those that were used under a German authorization, will be increased. Any costs resulting from other orphaned sources, which are not registered in the central register (e.g. illegally imported radioactive sources), are already covered by the state under the current regime.
8. Schedule In the light of the joint political will manifested by the Federal Government and the “Länder” with regard to the creation of a central register, the work for the development of the register is expected to begin in early 2005, so that the register is likely to be in place when the Act enters into force on 1 January 2007 in agreement with the requirements of the EU Directive 122/2003.
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REGULATORY INSPECTION: A POWERFUL TOOL TO CONTROL INDUSTRIAL RADIOACTIVE SOURCES.
Francisco Cesar Augusto da Silva, João Carlos Leocadio, Adriana Teixeira Ramalho
Instituto de Radioproteção E Dosimetria, Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear, Brazil
Abstract. An important contribution for Brazilian development, especially for the quality control of products, is the use of radiation sources by conventional industries. There are in Brazil roughly 3,000 radioactive sources spread out among 950 industries. The main industrial practices involved are: industrial radiography, industrial irradiators, industrial accelerators, well logging petroleum and nuclear gauges. More than 1,800 Radiation Protection Officers (RPOs) were qualified to work in these practices. The present work presents a brief description of the safety control over industrial radioactive installations performed by the Brazilian Regulatory Authority, i.e. the National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN). This paper also describes the national system for radiation safety inspections, the regulation infrastructure and the national inventory of industrial installations. The inspections are based on specific indicators, and their periodicity depends on the risk and type of installation. The present work discusses some relevant aspects that must be considered during the inspections, in order to make the inspections more efficient in controlling the sources. One of these aspects regards the evaluation of the storage place for the sources, a very important parameter for preventing future risky situations.
1. General aspects The Brazilian Regulatory Authority is the National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN), which is responsible for all activities related to nuclear or radioactive materials. CNEN has an infrastructure for controlling industrial radioactive installations, composed by a Director of Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety and two General Coordinators. One is the General Coordination of Medical and Industry Installations – CGIMI, responsible for the national system of authorization and control over radioactive practices. The other is the Institute of Radioprotection and Dosimetry (IRD/CNEN), responsible for the national programme of radiation safety inspections. Every installation that uses radiation sources in Brazil must be authorized by CNEN and may be subjected to the regulatory process of licensing: authorization, inspection, control and personnel certification. CNEN has a data base programme with the Brazilian inventory of sources and installations. Nowadays there are approximately 3,070 radioactive installations: 41% in medical field; 31% in industrial area; 22% in research; 4% in commerce and 2% in services area. CNEN is also responsible for the Brazilian regulation related to industrial radioactive installations.
The CNEN’s regulation comprehends a general regulation and six specific guidelines, as follows:
a) General Regulation: Basic guideline for radiation protection, NN 3.01-CNEN [1], based on IAEA recommendations of BSS 115 [2];
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b) Specific Guidelines: Radiation protection services CNEN-NE-3.02 [3]; Licensing of radioactive installations, CNEN-NE-6.02 [4]; Operation of industrial radiography services, CNEN-NE-6.04 [5]; Certification of qualification for radiation protection officers, CNEN-NE-3.03 [6]; Management of radioactive waste in radioactive facilities, CNEN-NE-6.05 [7]; Transport of radioactive materials, CNEN-NE-5.01 [8].
The 950 installations that use radioactive sources for industrial applications are classified into the following practices: industrial radiography (162 installations), industrial irradiators (8 installations), industrial accelerators (14 installations), well logging petroleum (23 installations), nuclear gauges (612 installations) and others (130 installations).
Additionally to the number of fixed industrial radiography installations, usually each year more than 200 on-site radiation jobs are carried out throughout the country. These installations are responsible for the movement of a high number of industrial gamma radiography apparatus and workers. The same situation happens in well logging petroleum practice, with their offshore and onshore installations.
For the last 25 years the Institute of Radioprotection and Dosimetry (IRD) has been responsible for performing the national program of inspections in order to control the safe use of radioactive sources at industry activities. Since then, more than 2,000 radioactive industrial facilities were inspected.
Based on CNEN’s regulations, it is required that each industrial installation that deals with radiation sources must have at least one Radiation Protection Officer (RPO), responsible for the radiation protection service. However, for practices classified as IAEA categories 1 and 2 (industrial irradiators and industrial radiography) [9] at least two RPOs are required. During almost 30 years more than 1,800 RPOs were qualified by CNEN to work in the industry practices.
The IRD’s planning for the periodicity of inspections depends on the type of application, on the installation’s past performance and on the risks presented by the radioactive sources. Usually the regulatory inspections are performed without previous announcement, i.e. they are unannounced.
The frequencies for routine regulatory inspections scheduled by IRD/CNEN are:
- Industrial radiography practices:
- On-site installations: once a year;
- Fixed installations with gamma rays: once every two years;
- Fixed installations with X rays: once every three years.
- Well logging petroleum practices: once every two years;
- Industrial irradiator practices: once every two years;
- Nuclear gauges practices: Manufacturers: once a year;
Installations are subgrouped according to the number of radioactive sources:
- Up to 10: once every five years; if neutron sources are present, once every four years;
- From 11 to 40: once every four years; if neutron sources are present, once every three years;
- Forty-one or more: once every three years; if neutron sources are present, once every two years.
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2. Main recommendations for inspecting the security of sources
The existence of an efficient system for regulatory control is the most important factor for the safety of radiation sources. In such systems, regulatory inspections deserve especial attention. In order to make the inspections more efficient in controlling radiation sources, priority must be assigned to the inspections according to the categorization of practices and sources [9]. In this way, regulatory authorities must give priority in some aspects to categories 1 (industrial irradiators), 2 (industrial radiography) and 3 (nuclear gauges and well logging petroleum).
While planning inspections to large-scale industrial irradiators, the most relevant aspect is the transport of sources. During transportation those sources are carried in a Type B(U) container. To avoid malevolent motives such as terrorism or individual’s intent to harm the population, the transport must be more surveilled and protected than others, using an intensive vigilance during the route of transportation. The other safety aspects at industrial irradiators are easier to control, as the design of these facilities provides that persons cannot have access to the radiation room while the source is in the exposed position. Such control of access relies heavily on the use of interlocked systems. Another point is that as these sources have very large activities, they are installed in large water filled storage pools.
On planning on-site industrial radiography inspections, it is recommended that one should:
- Increase the frequency of unannounced inspections, because the surprising factor helps to reveal how the service is really being performed and whether the sources are kept in safety;
- Perform the highest number as possible of on-site inspections, because the probability of loosing control over a source is higher at those services;
- Keep a record with all scheduled on-site jobs, including localization, date, time, staff, equipments and apparatus.
During on-site industrial radiography inspections, it is advisable to check:
- The conditions in which the exposure containers are temporarily stored, to prevent the risk of them being stolen;
- The localization of the place for temporary storage, emphasizing that it must be under the responsibility of the hiring company;
- The transport conditions, with emphasis on the safety of exposure containers;
- Conditions of surveillance of the exposure containers, counting the number of persons appointed to take care of them, including operators and guards, especially when the jobs are being performed in remote locations;
- The use of physical safety equipments, suitable and necessary for performing on-site jobs at night;
- The high-risk operations that may cause the source to be dettached and lost;
- The conditions of control over the exposure containers’ keys.
On performing inspections at the headquarters of the radiography organizations, one should check:
- Whether the records of on-site jobs are updated, in order to confirm the exact localization of the radiation sources;
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- The conditions of storage of the exposure containers, with emphasis on access control (keys, cameras, physical barriers) and on suitable warnings, to decrease the chance of stealing;
- The maintenance status of the exposure containers, in order to prevent that some of them, not in a good condition be taken to on-site jobs, increasing the probability of an accident;
- That exposure containers are transported just with specific suitable equipments;
- The conditions of storage of exposure containers without radiation source or out of use;
- The conditions of physical safety at the headquarters.
On planning inspections at nuclear gauges facilities, it is advisable to check:
- The physical condition of the place where the nuclear gauge is installed;
- The safety conditions of the storage place, with emphasis on access control (keys, cameras, physical barriers) and on suitable warnings, to decrease the chance of stealing;
- The access control to the nuclear gauge;
- The conditions of surveillance during on-site jobs;
- The conditions of transport, especially in relation to the safety of the gauges.
On planning inspections at well logging petroleum, it is advisable to check:
- The safety conditions of the storage place, with emphasis on access control (keys, cameras, physical barriers) and on suitable warnings, to decrease the chance of stealing;
- The conditions of surveillance during on-site jobs;
- The conditions of transport, especially in relation to the safety of the gauges.
3. Conclusions Brazilian experience, acquired mainly with the Goiânia accident which occurred in 1987 [10], as well as with other accidents in industrial area, headed us to a more proactive attitude regarding the control over radiation sources in Brazil. In order to improve this control, the concepts and recommendations of the standard ISO-IEC-17020 [11] were introduced in our programme of inspections. This implementation, together with the experience acquired along 25 years performing regulatory inspections, helps us in keeping under effective control the radioactive sources in use in our country.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors are indebted to their colleagues − IRD’s regulatory inspectors in industry applications − and to all of those who, direct or indirectly, collaborated in the present work.
REFERENCE
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[1] COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR, Basic guideline for radiation protection, NN-3.01-CNEN, 2005
[2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Basic safety standards, Safety Series No. 115, IAEA, Vienna, 1996.
[3] COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR, Radiation protection services, NE-3.02-CNEN, Rio de Janeiro, 1988.
[4] COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR, Licensing of radioactive installations, NE-6.02-CNEN, 1998
[5] COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR, Operation of industrial radiography services, NE-6.04-CNEN, 1989.
[6] COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR, Certification of qualification for radiation protection officers, NE-3.03-CNEN, 1999.
[7] COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR, Management of radioactive waste in radioactive facilities, NE-6.05-CNEN, 1985
[8] COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR, Transport of radioactive materials, NE-5.01-CNEN, 1988
[9] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Categorization of radiation sources, IAEA-TECDOC 1344, Vienna, 2003.
[10] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The radiological accident in Goiânia, IAEA Accident Response Series, STI/PUB/815, Vienna, 1988.
[11] INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, General criteria for the operation of various types of bodies performing inspection, ISO/IEC 17020, 1998.
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STRENGTHENING CONTROL OVER RADIOACTIVE SOURCES CERNAVODA NPP OPERATING EXPERIENCE
I.E. Daian, V. Simionov CNE-PROD Cernavoda, Romania
Abstract This paper presents national legal frame governing radioactive sources activities, legislative requirements introduced during last years and current status of controlled radioactive sources program at CNE-PROD Cernavoda NPP.
Romania has only one nuclear power plant, Cernavoda NPP, equipped with five PHWR - CANDU-6 Canadian type reactors - with a 700 MW(e) gross capacity each, in different implementation stages. Unit 1 is in commercial operation since December 2, 1996, Unit 2 is under construction and Units 3, 4, 5 are under preservation.
The legal representative of the nuclear power production sector in Romania is “Nuclearelectrica” S.A. National Company (SNN). SNN is a governmental owned company reporting to the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
The company has its Headquarters in Bucharest and three subsidiaries:
• CNE-PROD Cernavoda (CNE-PROD), the operator of Cernavoda NPP - Unit 1;
• CNE-INVEST Cernavoda, in charge with the completion of Unit 2 and with the preservation of Units 3,4,5;
• Nuclear Fuel Plant in Pitesti (FCN).
The operation of Cernavoda NPP requires the use of radioactive sources that may present a significant risk to health, property and the environment when control is lost.
Within the last years CNCAN issues new regulations stating clear responsibilities for the different institutions involved in radioactive materials control programs.
To manage radioactive sources in a safe way CNE-PROD established and revised Controlled Radioactive Sources Program, as part of Station Radiation Protection Regulation, assuring a strict records of radioactive sources and their usage, assuring physical and radiological security, protecting personnel, members of the public, the environment from the hazards of ionizing radiation during the life cycle of the plant.
1. Existing Legal Frame The Romanian legislative framework that governs safe deployment of nuclear activities including radioactive sources contains laws on safe deployment of nuclear activities, on environmental protection, on public health, on defence against disaster, on civil protection, on civil liability for nuclear damages, on ratification of Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
Law no.111/1996 establishes the regulatory framework for nuclear activities. According to this law the regulatory body, National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), is empowered with the regulation, authorisation, and control of nuclear activities.
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Beside the general requirements for nuclear safety, radiation protection, quality assurance, safeguards, physical protection, emergency planning, preparedness and implementation, Law no.111/1996 (as amended) has also specific requirements regarding:
• Production, siting and construction, supply, leasing, transfer, handling, holding, processing, treatment, use, temporary or permanent storage, transport, transit, import and export of radiological units, nuclear and radioactive materials, including nuclear fuel, radioactive waste and ionizing radiation generating device;
• Production, supply and use of dosimetric equipment and ionizing radiation detection systems, materials and devices used for the protection from ionizing radiation, as well as containerization or means of transport for radioactive materials, specially designed for such purpose;
• Manufacturing of products and provision of services designed for radiation sources, dosimetric control instruments, ionizing radiation detection systems, materials and devices used for the protection from ionizing radiation.”
The activities and sources stipulated above, except for the transport activities of ionizing radiation generating devices, the use of dosimetric control instruments and ionizing radiation detection systems, required authorization issued by CNCAN, in compliance with the authorization procedure typical of each kind of activity or source.
The holder of authorisation shall have the obligation and responsibility to take all necessary measures in order to:
• Ensure and maintain nuclear safety, protection against ionizing radiation, physical protection, his own emergency plans in case of nuclear accident, and quality assurance for activities deployed or sources associated with them;
• A strict record of the nuclear and radioactive material as well as of all sources associated with them;
• Institutes and maintains a system according to the specific regulation of physical protection of radioactive materials, including storage facilities for radioactive sources;
• Institutes and maintain his own approved preparatory system for the intervention in case of nuclear accidents;
• The standard radiation sources and measuring instruments in the domain of ionizing radiation must have a model approval issued by the Romanian Bureau of Legal Metrology and should be metrologically checked in accordance with legal provisions.
Through station Operating and Maintenance Licence CNE-PROD is authorised for handling, holding, purchase, use, temporary or permanent storage of radiological units, radioactive materials and ionising radiation generating devices. For the rest of activities involving radioactive sources the authorisations are granted on a case-by-case basis.
2. New Legislative Issues Within the last the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN) issued new regulations in the nuclear safety field, including safe management of radioactive sources, radioactive waste transport activities, clearance, etc.
First important regulations issued by CNCAN were “Fundamentals radiological safety regulations” in 2000, which, togheter with « Medical Surveillance of Workers exposed to ionizing radiation » issue by Health Ministry transpose Council Directive 96/29/ EURATOM,
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laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation.
These two norms were followed by a series of new norms regulating authorization of practices that involve use and transport of radioactive sources, radiation exposure monitoring and control and radiation protection of outside workers, describing legal obligations.
These are very important since they introduce new terms, concepts and obligations for the licence’s holders.
3. Controlled Radioactive Sources Program The operation of Cernavoda NPP requires the use of radioactive sources that may present a significant risk to health, property and the environment when control is lost.
To manage radioactive sources in a safe way CNE-PROD establishes Controlled Radioactive Sources Program, as part of Station Radiation Protection Regulation.
Station Radiation Protection Regulation establishes the standards applicable to the CNE-PROD radiation protection programs. These standards are designed to protect members of the public, the environment and all persons at the nuclear power plant from the hazards of ionizing radiation during the life cycle of the plant
The regulations have been formulated by the Health Physics Direction in compliance with Romanians Laws and Norms and on the Recommendations of the ICRP, IAEA, EU and on experience gained in the operation of nuclear power reactors.
Activities covered by the program are: purchasing, utilization, transfer, transport, storage and disposal of radioactive sources.
To accomplish the established purposes CNE-PROD has procedures, trained personnel with well defined responsibilities, storage facilities and monitoring equipment.
This program is separated by the Radioactive Waste Management Program and by the Spent Fuel Management Program.
4. Types of Controlled Radioactive Sources Controlled radioactive sources are defined as materials that present radioactivity ( artificial or natural) and equipment that incorporate such materials, except spent fuel and radioactive waste.
Controlled radioactive sources are classified as follows:
• Radioactive sources means sealed and / or opened sources used for tests, calibration and maintenance activities (i.e. Ba-133, Cs-137, Co-160, etc.);
• RX generators means device capable of generating radiation, such as X rays, neutrons, electrons or any other charged particles ( luggage’s scanners - Linescan 215E Scan);
• Installations means installation, apparatus or device containing sealed radioactive sources, which is unaccessible during normal operation conditions. (PAD’s readers, Shepherd calibrators, Packard Liquid Scintillattors Counter TRICARB 3100 TR, Quantulus / Wallac Low Level Scintillation Counters, Panasonic Irradiator for TLDs, Gaseous Fission Products Detection System).
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5. Program’s Associated Responsibilities Persons with responsibilities in Station Controlled Radioactive Sources Program are: Station Manager, Health Physics Manager, Radioactive Sources Administrator, Radioactive Sources Responsibles and work groups using controlled radioactive sources.
Station Manager is responsible for:
• designating Radioactive Source Administrator;
• assure financial arrangements for activities involving controlled radioactive sources.
Health Physics Manager is person licensed by CNCAN to organise and coordinate all activities involving controlled radioactive sources in compliance with station’s approved programs and procedures and international practices.
He has the following responsibilities:
• to designate Work Group’s Radioactive Sources Responsibles;
• to approve radioactive source storage locations;
• to approve training packages for personnel dealing with controlled radioactive sources;
Radioactive Source Administrator is a person designated by the Station manager with the responsibility of managing Station’s Controlled Radioactive Sources in conformity with legal provisions.
Radioactive Source Administrator has the following responsibilities:
• to elaborate, implement, revise and control the compliance with the procedures for purchasing, transfer, transport, test, usage and reporting of controlled radioactive sources;
• keep tracking of radioactive sources inventory, locations and movements;
• provide training programs for Work Group’s Radioactive Sources Responsible;
• establishing packaging, labelling, transport and licensing requirements in compliance with Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials Norms;
• inspect, on a routine basis, storage locations and records keeping
• assure leak tests with established frequency,
• inform Shift Supervisor and Health Physics Manager about any incidents involving controlled radioactive sources;
Work Groups have to:
• respect specific procedures and work plans for activities involving controlled radioactive sources;
• designate Work Group’s Radioactive Sources Responsible;
• Work Group’s Radioactive Sources Responsible has to:
• maintain weekly update of radioactive sources used for work group’s activities;
• keep tracking of radioactive sources from his responsibility;
• inspect and controls of radioactive sources from his responsibility;
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• inform Station Radioactive Source Administrator about any incidents related to radioactive sources from his responsibility;
• make monthly reports about inventory, contamination and gamma rays dose rates surveys, opened sources consumption;
Metrology Laboratory has to:
• assure metrological checks for all standard radioactive sources in accordance with legal provisions;
• stores standard radioactive sources used within the plant;
6. CNE-Prod Storage Facilities CNE-PROD Storage facilities consist in a Station Central Storage and approved Storage Facilities for Work Groups using radioactive sources for routinely activities.
Controlled radioactive sources are stored within the plant assuring physical and radiological security, as requested by law. Each storage facility consists in locked cabinets with controlled access and proper hazard warning.
The storage facilities have to respect the following gamma dose rates:
• For Station Central Storage, lower than 10 microSv / hour on the storage external walls,
• For Laboratories Storage Facilities, lower than 10 microSv/hour on contact with cabinets.
To avoid any incidents, controlled radioactive sources which are no longer used for work groups daily activities, are transferred to Station Central Storage waiting for storage as radioactive waste within the plant facilities or for transfer to specialized companies.
7. Activities Involving Controlled Radioactive Sources Radioactive sources are used within the Plant’s Systems and for Laboratories activities.
All activities are performed within the plant based on specific procedures and work plans endorsed by Health Physics Division.
Receiving procedures primarily assure that controlled radioactive sources are properly packaged, labelled, has all requested licenses and certificates and include gamma dose rates and contamination surveys. This procedure is applied both for radioactive sources which are CNE-PROD proprietary or which are in transit.
Using of radioactive sources is accomplished by radiological posting, access control and radiological surveys. During these activities personnel have to wear dosimetry ( TLDs and PADs) and radiation protection equipment without no exception.
Special types of activities involving controlled radioactive sources are radiographic activities. Radiographic activities within the plant are performed by CNE-PROD’s contractors licensed by CNCAN.
Before performing radiographic activities special precautionary measures are taken to ensure that unwanted personnel exposure is avoided.
These measures are as follows:
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• determine an exclusion zone around radiography area and evaluate boundary integrated dose;
• all access points to radiography locations ( from above, below and around) are properly posted and observed ( penetrations, stairways, doors);
• personnel are excluded from High Radiation Areas generated during shots;
• visual inspections and warning (through Station’s Public Address System) are used to assure that the exposure area is clear of personnel prior to the exposure;
During exposures radiological surveys are provided around determined exclusion zone.
8. Movement Control and Records Controlled radioactive sources movement between approved sources storage or use location are performed with Radioactive Sources Administrator approval, after checking contamination and gamma dose rates.
Separated records are keeping for each controlled radioactive sources category, consisting in description, nuclides, serial no., activity and reference date, correspondent licenses and certificate, locations, leak test information.
CNE-PROD authorized practices that involve ionizing radiation exposure risk are carried out in an well-advertised controlled zone limited inside security area.
Controlled area is divided into three different areas: Zone 1, Zone 2 and Zone 3.All persons and equipment moving from a zone of higher contamination probability to a zone of lower contamination probability shall be monitored for beta-gamma contamination at the point of entry to the zone of lower contamination probability.
Additionally to above mentioned contamination checks there were installed Large-Area Plastic Scintillation Detectors (Portal Monitors) at the Station Main Exit Point to strength control over radioactive sources movement.
9. Incidents Involving Radioactive Sources The liquid and solid radioactive sources could be involved in incidents, which could lead to the air, surfaces and personnel contamination and to increased dose rates, depends on the activity of the sources. In case of such events with radiation consequences, consequences on the health of the site personnel, the on-site emergency plan is activated and the response is ensured by the applying emergency procedures.
When radioactive sources are shipped outside Station, CNE-PROD, as consignor, has to give to carrier instructions and any other relevant information about emergency response and have to ensure, before to take over a radioactive materials shipment, that the carries knows the emergency procedures.
Also, CNE-PROD, together with the radioactive materials carrier have responsibilities for: safe transport conditions for radioactive materials, appropriate emergency response actions and technical support for the personnel involved in the emergency response.
10. Conclusions In the light of the new legal obligations established for nuclear activities licence holders, CNE-PROD Cernavoda NPP has revised Controlled Radioactive Sources Program assuring a strict records of radioactive sources and their usage, assuring physical and radiological security,
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protecting personnel, members of the public, the environment from the hazards of ionizing radiation during the life cycle of the plant.
REFERENCES
[1] CNE-PROD – SI – 01365 – RP1, DELIVERY, RECEIVING, HANDLING, CONSIGNMENT AND ACCOUNTING OF CONTROLLED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
[2] CNE-PROD – RD – 01364 – RP8, ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN
[3] LAW NO. 111/1996 ON SAFE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES (MODIFIED, COMPLETED AND APPROVED BY LAW 193 / 2003);
CNE-PROD – RD – 01364 – RP8, ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN
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ACTIONS TO RECOVER A SET OF ORPHAN SOURCES
C.N. Dulama, Al. Toma, I.V. Popescu, C. Paunoiu Institute for Nuclear Research, Pitesti, Romania
Abstract. The paper describes the development of a situation concerning identification, recovery and characterisation of a set of radioactive sources. The bio-gas generator from a waste water treatment plant was planned to be demolished. A warning about the level gauges was received by national regulatory body and therefore one triggered the events which led to the sources. Institute for Nuclear Research was charged by the National regulatory body, with tasks for identification, recovery and conditioning of radioactive sources.
1. Introduction In the autumn of 2003 our Institute was contacted by the national, nuclear regulatory body (CNCAN) to assure technical support in identifying, recovery and conditioning of a set of four sources which equipped the level gauges of a bio-gas generator from a waste water treatment station.
The bioreactor was built more than 15 years ago, and at the moment was planned for dismantling and blast demolition. At this time, on the site is ongoing an EU funded project for rehabilitation of the waste water treatment station and a new installation has to be constructed in the place of the old bio-reactor. When the company in charge with the rehabilitation project has presented the plans for the demolition of the old installation, a responsible person from the waste treatment plant warned about the presence of the sources. The national, nuclear regulatory body was informed about this situation and about the fact that at that time no license for ownership of the sources was in force. CNCAN asked our Institute to give the technical support required in solving the situation and charged the institute with the recovery, transport and conditioning of radioactive sources.
2. Actions taken In October 2003 a team of specialists from our institute has gone to the site in a fact-finding mission. By inspecting the installation they found out that on the site there were two tanks equipped with level gauges. Both of them were found unsealed, the top lids being removed.
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FIG. 1. Top lids being removed on both tanks and the side wall hole at tank #1
One of the tanks was previously empty and a huge hole was cut into the side wall approximately 1 meter above the ground level. (See fig 1)
The institute’s specialists properly equipped entered into the empty tank to identify the sources and to measure the dose rate in their vicinity in view of planning their removal. They found out that gauges were equipped with cobalt-60 sources being spent at the time of this investigation and therefore the dose rate appeared to be under 100 µSv/h at the contact with containment. The second tank was like being filled with sludge and it could not be inspected for source identification.
In april 2004 a second team of specialists arrived to the site ready to recover the sources. The tank #2 was inspected and sources was searched by scanning the side wall of the tank with a NaI(Tl) source finder. Considering the symetry of the two tanks and using the results of gamma searching, it was determined the positioning of the two sources from the second tank. As no data were available concerning the content of the tank, a set of inspecting holes were drilled at different heights to establish the level of separation between the liquid phase and sludge. The holes were used also to unload the liquid phase from the tank after the previous checking of the radioactive contamination. (see fig. 2)
FIG. 2. Water spilling from tank #2
After the whole liquid was spilled from tank #2 a bigger hole was broken to start to discard the sludge, as it was covering the lower source with a 1.5 meter thick layer. When the sludge level was low enough to assure easy handling of the lower source, a hole into the tank wall was cutted through, at 0.5 meter above position of each of the sources. The source shelves were cutted and
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sources were extracted from the tank through the openings. The sources from tank #1 were extracted through the inspection shaft, as the tank was ventillated by advection due to the base opening.
FIG. 3. Radioactive sources as they were recovered from the bioreactor
During the entire operation a special attention was given to monitoring of personel and environment. Samples were taken and analysed to assure radioactive clearance of liquid and sludge, direct measurement of sludge was permanently performed, gamma dose rate measurement was done. (see fig. 4)
FIG. 4. Contamination monitoring of water and sludge
A rough estimation of the present activity of the sources was done considering the doserate measured at different distances to the source conteiners. Conservatively a value of 2 mCi Co-60 was assigned to each of the sources. To perform activity calculations the Nuclides.net web-based application[2] was used.
After the final check-up on the site, sources were safely transported to the Institute for Nuclear Research to be properly conditioned for final disposal. A technical report was forwarded to the CNCAN which describes all operations that were performed to secure the sources.
REFERENCES
[1] Dr. J. Magill, NUCLIDES.NET an Integrated Environment for Computation on Radionuclides and their Radiation, European Communites and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2003
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THE USE OF THE AIRBORNE GAMMA SYSTEM HELINUC FOR ORPHAN SOURCES SEARCH
L.Guillot, Ch.Bourgeois CEA/DAM-Ile de France, Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique, Bruyères-le-Châtel, France.
Abstract. The airborne gamma-ray spectrometry has been recognised as a very powerful tool to operate in case of emergency situation. A lot systems, developed mainly in Europe and in U.S are now included in emergency preparedness. The French system Helinuc is here described. The surveys are generally performed at a ground clearance of 50m, and a speed of 70 km/h. About 5 km²/h can then be investigated. In order to optimise the radioactive sources detection limits, it is recommended to operate with a ground clearance not higher than 50 m. For a 137Cs source, the detection limit is about 40 MBq at 40 m and reaches 130 MBq at 80m. Recent exercises (RESUME 95, HELGA 2004) have demonstrated the performances of airborne gamma mapping to detect and to locate radioactive sources, but also real campaigns such like the assistance of CEA (France) to Georgia in June 2000.
1. Introduction Since Chernobyl accident, airborne gamma-ray spectrometry has been recognised as a useful tool to evaluate consequences of an accident over large areas. About ten European countries have capabilities to perform such measurements. Between 1996 and 2003, a collaboration between these teams was supported by European Community [1].
The Cosmos 954 satellite fallen in 1978 in Canada revealed for the first time the usefulness of airborne gamma mapping to look for radioactive material over large areas. The exercises RESUME 95 organised in Finland in 1995 and more recently HELGA 04 in France have confirmed the reliability of airborne measurements to find orphan sources. The French system Helinuc was used in 2000 to assist Georgia [IAEA Project GEO9006-9002] to look for orphan sources on its territory.
The AGRS (Airborne Gamma-Ray Spectrometry) system Helinuc [Registered Trademark] is shortly described in this paper and a choice of results obtained in orphan sources search is presented.
2. Description of the Helinuc system The CEA (French Atomic Energy Commission) has developed an airborne gamma mapping system known as Helinuc. It enables a radiological analysis of an area from a few square kilometres to several hundred square kilometres in a few hours, identifying the radionuclides with a sensitivity ranging from the level of the background radiation to that of a serious emergency situation. Helinuc can also be used for rapid detection and location of orphan radioactive sources.
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Helinuc was set up to fulfil to the needs of the French authorities 20 years ago. More than 50 French nuclear and industrial sites have been surveyed up to now. Several campaigns in foreign countries were also carried out: Iraq 1997 and 1998, Ukraine 2000, Georgia 2000.
The Helinuc system is described in Table 1 and presented in Figure 1. The main detector is a 16 litres sodium iodide crystals pack inside a dedicated container fitted under the helicopter. There is also a 70 % Ge detector on both sides of the container.
The position of the helicopter is given each second by a GPS, which can be used in real-time differential mode to obtain a sub-metric precision. The ground clearance is given by a radio-altimeter with a precision of 1 meter. A pilot indicator is fitted in front of the pilot. Theoretical and real flight lines are displayed, as where the flight parameters (speed, line spacing and ground clearance).
The signal processing and the recording is performed by an acquisition rack inside the cabin. An operator can control the acquisition process and the real-time data-processing. At the end of the flight, the data are transferred on a PCMCIA memory card for post-processing. The system can be installed on-board a light helicopter within two hours.
Table 1: System description.
Gamma Detectors NaI pack of 16 litres
2 Ge detectors of 70 %
Energy range 40 keV to 2800 keV
Sample time 2 s
Positioning system GPS Trimble, type AG 132
Ground clearance measurement Radio-altimeter Thomson ERT 011
Hardened PC Kontron FW 8500
Figure 1: The Helinuc system installed on-board an AS355 helicopter.
A preliminary processing of NaI data is done in real time. The charts of count rate, activity of specified nuclides or dose rate can be displayed. A “rainbow” graph, showing the last fifty spectra
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is also displayed. In case of alarm, the operator can have a look at the spectrum and identify the radionuclide.
3. Performances The radioactive sources detection limits for some radionuclides are given in Table 2. The ground clearance is the most influent parameter, so it is recommended to fly between 40 and 50 metres. At a speed of 70 km/h and a distance between flight lines of 100 metres, the area covered is about 5 km²/h.
Table 2: Detection limits of orphan sources by Helinuc system (CEA, France).
Detection limit
Ground clearance 40m 80m
238UMetallic 800 MBq 4500 MBq
241Am 250 MBq 1500 MBq
226Ra 100 MBq 330 MBq
131I 70 MBq 260 MBq
137Cs 40 MBq 130 MBq
60Co 20 MBq 65 MBq
4. First example: Assistance to Georgia On request of IAEA, the CEA team did a survey in Georgia in 2000 in order to find orphan sources. A 75 GBq 137Cs source was discovered in the mud of a trench bank in the Poti harbour [2]. The gamma signal was detected on four adjacent flight tracks, with a line spacing of 120 metres.
Figure 2 : Detection of a 137Cs orphan source in Poti, Georgia [2].
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5. Second example: Helga 2004 exercise The Helga exercise was organised in France in September 2004. Two CEA teams (France) and two BfS/BGS teams (Germany) participated. One of the goals of this exercise was to demonstrate the reliability of airborne gamma measurements to detect orphan sources. Six radioactive sources of 137Cs, 60Co and 241Am were hidden in a 8 km² area. Each team had 40 minutes to fly over the area. An example of the results obtained by both CEA teams using systems with comparable performances is presented on Figure 3. The americium sources in location 2 and 3 were detected by both teams with a good spatial precision. The location of the sources was estimated with a precision of 40 metres. The intensity of the signal recorded in both cases was also comparable. At location 2, the isolation of americium contribution by the spectral analysis method was not disturbed by the caesium source hidden at the same place. The results obtained for 137Cs and 60Co sources were similar. These results demonstrate that airborne gamma-ray spectrometry is a powerful and reliable tool for orphan source search.
Figure 3 : Comparison of detection of 241Am sources by the CEA teams.
6. Conclusion In the last twenty years, a lot of airborne gamma ray systems have been developed in the world for environmental purposes and emergency preparedness. In France, three people are continuously on duty to operate the Helinuc system in case of emergency situation. Several exercises (RESUME 95, HELGA 2004) demonstrated the performances and the reliability of this type of measurement to locate quickly radioactive sources. In 2000, during a real survey in Republic of Georgia, the French system Helinuc has given a good demonstration of the possibilities of this powerful tool. A no-shielded orphan 75 GBq 137Cs source was discovered in the Poti harbour.
REFERENCES
[1] ECCOMAGS project. Fifth Framework Programme N° FIKR-CT-2000-20098.
[2] Ch. Bourgeois et al, 2000. Report on the Hélinuc team contribution in the Georgia survey. May 26th –June 17th. Project GEO9006-9002.
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THE IAEA’S CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES: MOVING TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
P. K. Holohan, T. E. Essig, C. R. Cox, J. W. N. Hickey Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC USA
Abstract. The Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (the Code) was published in final form by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in January 2004. The Code prescribes legislative frameworks, regulatory programs, and import/export provisions for IAEA Member States. Following the IAEA General Conference in September 2003 where the Code was formally adopted by Member States, the U.S. Government (via the State Department) indicated that it would implement the Code’s provisions, even though the Code is not legally binding on IAEA Member States. Because of the mature state of the regulatory program for commercial uses of radioactive material within the U.S., most of the Code provisions applicable to NRC’s regulatory program either have already been met or only relatively minor programmatic adjustments are needed to meet it. In two areas, however, programs are being developed: a national source registry and modification of import/export controls. Development of the National Source Tracking System (NSTS), which will serve as the source registry, has begun. The effort to populate the NSTS is expected to be initiated by late 2006. In the meantime, the NRC has developed an interim database (updated annually) as a precursor to the NSTS. A rulemaking effort to modify import/export controls is also underway. These efforts will require rulemaking. Areas of additional attention include the proper management of disused sources (to minimize their becoming orphaned) and the reuse/recycling of sources.
1. Introduction The “Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,” was published in January 2004 [1] by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The scope of the Code applies to all radioactive sources that may pose a significant risk to individuals, society, and the environment when not safely managed or securely protected. “Significant risk,” as used in the Code of Conduct, refers to severe deterministic health effects, including permanent injury and death.
2. A short history of its development The IAEA sponsored the first International Conference on the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials in Dijon, France in September 1998. The Action Plan which followed this conference [2] led to the publication of IAEA-TECDOC-1191, Categorization of Radioactive Sources [3]. Subsequent IAEA Technical Meetings and Conferences were held to further develop the international framework and posture for the safe and secure management of sources. Key activities included the Buenos Aires Conference in December 2000 and a Technical Meeting in Vienna in July 2003. The Buenos Aires Conference
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led to a revised Action Plan [4] At the time of the July 2003 Technical Meeting, the IAEA published TECDOC-1344, Categorization of Radioactive Sources [5]. Following 9/11/01 terrorist events, the source security aspect of these efforts was strengthened. The centerpiece of these efforts became known as the “Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.” The July 2003 Technical Meeting produced the final draft of the Code. This draft was presented at the Agency’s General Conference and Board of Governors Meeting in September 2003. The Code was officially adopted as a result of these meetings. Although the Code has not been enacted via IAEA Convention (and is therefore not legally binding on Member States), many countries have formally indicated their willingness to implement the spirit and letter of the Code. The United States has provided such a commitment via letter from the Department of State to the IAEA.
3. Scope of the Code and Provisions of TECDOC-1344 The Code applies to all radioactive sources that may pose a significant risk to individuals, society, and the environment. The IAEA has defined five categories of sources in terms of a ‘D’ value. As defined in Reference 5, a D value is that quantity of radioactive material which has a significant potential to cause severe deterministic health effects if not managed in a safe and secure manner. Annex I of the Code states that it applies to the top three source categories (the highest risk sources) defined by TECDOC-1344, that is: D, 10D, and 1000D. These D values are provided in Table I of Annex I. The Code’s scope is further limited to Categories 1 and 2 for the national source registry and to import/export provisions.
TECDOC-1344 ranks sources in terms of potential risk associated with malevolent use, considering the normal quantity used in various applications:
Π Category 1: RTGs, irradiators, teletherapy....
Π Category 2: industrial radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy....
Π Category 3: fixed industrial gauges, well logging....
Malevolent use considers Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) and Radiological Exposure Devices (RED). The top three categories can result in severe deterministic effects, including permanent injury (Category 3 sources) and even death (Category 1 & 2)
4. Principal Features of the Code The Code of Conduct prescribes an infrastructure in terms of legislative elements and regulatory programs to be developed and promulgated by regulatory agencies within all Member States, ranging from developing countries to those with mature programs. The Code is divided into 23 general principles, 13 principles for legislation and regulations, 36 principles which apply to the regulatory body, and 7 principles for the import and export of radioactive sources. All principles are directed toward ensuring that an adequate legislative program exists to support a regulatory program which ensures that sealed sources are managed and controlled in a manner to minimize the potential for unsafe management and malevolent use.
5. The Challenge of Code Implementation: Within the U.S. Although the NRC’s and 33 Agreement States’ programs are reasonably mature, additional attention is needed, primarily from a security perspective, to assure that provisions of the Code will be met. Areas needing the most attention include the following:
Π Development of a national source registry.
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Π Modifying import/export programs to ensure that additional measures prescribed by the Code are in place.
Π Improving control over orphan sources, including promoting awareness of orphan source issues amongst external stakeholders.
Π Management of disused sources, including the establishment, where applicable, of agreements for the return of such sources to the manufacturer.
Π Continue promulgating Additional Security Measures to licensees possessing sealed sources in quantities of interest (irradiators and manufacturer/distributors have been completed as of December 2004).
Regarding the development of a national source registry, the NRC, in cooperation with the 33 Agreement States, developed an interim database of licensees possessing IAEA Category 1 and 2 sources as of mid-2004. This database was intended to be a “snap shot” of material actually possessed at the time compared with licensed authorizations. The data base is being updated during 2005 and 2006. It will serve to meet the U.S. commitment for a national source registry until the web-based National Source Tracking System (NSTS) is operable, beginning in late 2006 to early 2007. The NSTS will include individual Category 1 and 2 sources possessed by each licensee and will be required to be updated following the acquisition, transfer, or disposal of a source.
The regulatory infrastructure for source imports and exports is being codified through a rulemaking to 10 CFR Part 110. This rule will require specific licenses (currently, a general license is sufficient in most cases) for the import or export of IAEA Category 1 and 2 sources. Notification of the receiving country will be required for movement of such sources. In addition, the prior consent of the receiving country will be required for Category 1 sources. The Part 110 rule was published in the Federal Register for public comment on September 16, 2004. It is scheduled to be published in final form December 2005.
The NRC’s efforts to improve control of orphan sources and manage disused sources has two principal components: (1) keep sources from being orphaned by maintaining control; and (2) recover sources that become orphaned. The NRC’s efforts in the control of sources has several facets. First, the General License Tracking System was initiated in 2002. This increased tracking and licensee awareness of generally licensed sources. Second, the final rule on portable gauges (under development) should increase control of portable gauges in field situations. Third, as previously mentioned, the National Source Tracking System, which will be operational in late 2006, will increase tracking and NRC awareness of materials of concern. Finally, the NRC’s
Lost Source Enforcement Policy (2001) provides incentive to ensure proper control, transfer, and disposal of sources by ensuring that civil penalties outweigh costs of direct disposition. Civil penalties are assessed at three times the cost of authorized disposal in order to encourage proper management.
Sources that become orphaned are handled in one or more of several approaches. First, there is a Trilateral Initiative between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada which was signed in 2002. This initiative provides notification when sources are lost or stolen near a common border. Second, the Department of Energy’s Offsite Source Recovery Program, which has been effect since 1990, provides for the recovery of unwanted sources with no disposal pathway (primarily greater than Class C - 10 CFR 61.55 - or near those values). During 2002-2004, DOE recovered 5000 sources at the request of NRC. Such requests are facilitated via a Memorandum of Understanding with DOE on Management of Sources (June 1999). Third, the NRC provides financial support to the
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Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors in their National Orphan Radioactive Material Disposition Program. Finally, the NRC fosters an open forum for individuals who find a source to come forward. The Commission believes that “Non-licensees who find themselves to be in possession of radioactive source that they did not seek to possess should not be expected or asked to assume responsibility and cost for exercising control or arranging for their disposal.”
Additional Security Measures (ASM) have been promulgated by NRC Orders issued to panoramic irradiator licensees (June 2003) and source manufacturer/distributor licensees (January 2004). These ASM require background investigations, protecting sensitive information, license verification, shipments and transfers (domestic), and establishing means for intrusion detection and response. They also require the establishment of a security zone(s), means for access control, coordinating with local law enforcement authorities to ensure a timely response when needed, conducting background investigations for certain employees, and protecting sensitive unclassified information. Similar security measures are being developed for medium priority materials licensees.
6. Conclusion The existing NRC program, as enhanced by security improvements since 9 September 2001, largely meets the Code, except for additional export/import controls which are scheduled to be completed by December 2005. In addition, NRC is developing a National Source Tracking System which will provide improve long term monitoring.
REFERENCES
[1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Vienna (2004).
[2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Proposed Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials, Attachment 2 to GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10, Vienna, (1999).
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Categorization of Radioactive Sources, TECDOC-1191, Vienna (2000).
[4] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Revised Action Plan on the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources, GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12, Vienna (2001)
[5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Categorization of Radioactive Sources, TECDOC-1344, Vienna, (2003).
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ATTEMPT AT CATEGORIZING THE SEALED SOURCES HELD IN FRANCE
A.Hoorelbeke Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN)
Abstract. The IRSN, in charge of the French national register of radioactive sources with end-users, made an attempt to apply the IAEA categorization to the 26 000 sealed sources it manages. The results may differ greatly depending on the priority given to the various considerations of the IAEA categorization methodology. Source transfers (such as exports) can only be categorized in terms of a comparison of activity versus D_value for each radionuclide. But for sources in use within a plant, considering each source, each device or the aggregate of them all shows the difficulties which arise when doing this exercise on the scale of the entire State. As an overall result, less than 10% of the total number of sources or facilities fall into Category 1. The categorization cannot be properly applied to a list of sources. It is much more useful to categorize facilities in which devices containing sources are used.
1. Introduction The Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) is in charge of the national register of radioactive sources. It records the sources used in France in files created for each authorization issued by the competent authorities.
This national register was used for a real-scale simulation of the categorization of sources as proposed in IAEA documents [1] and [2] to enable States to take, on the basis of document [3], the appropriate preventive measures with attention focused on the sources thought to be the most dangerous.
2. Categorization of sources in use in May 2004 2.1. Sources taken into account
The national register managed by the IRSN contains nearly 30 000 sealed sources, some of which have an activity lower than the new exemption thresholds set in the French regulations of 2002, adopted in implementation of [4]. These were excluded from the simulation, which also did not take into account: unsealed sources, although some uses of unsealed sources are listed in the categorization; sources with activities below the thresholds of [4]; sources not requiring authorization of their use and therefore not tracked (smoke detectors, old lightning preventers); sources with natural radionuclides not used for their radioactive properties (collimators, shieldings); and specially tracked sources such as those implanted in patients (grains, old pacemakers).
2.2. Classification methodology
The categorization was applied in four ways:
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– using a “D_value” criterion to compare the nominal activity of each source with the D_value defined in [5]. This is the simplest criterion to apply since it does not require any data manipulation;
– using a “refined” criterion as proposed in Appendix II of [1]. This criterion in fact led to two different classifications:
• one where each source was classified according to its use, without considering its activity if the use was cited in the categorization, and complementing this by the D_value criterion for sources whose use was not cited (“use” criterion);
• the other taking use into account but generalizing the notion of source to the device (e.g. one gamma knife, rather than 201 sources) and verifying the agreement of the activities with the activity range used as reference for the classification of Appendix II of [1] (“device” criterion);
– using the source accumulation criterion Σn(ΣAi,n) / Dn proposed in the section “Aggregation of sources” in [1].
2.3. Difficulties encountered
In the case of a multi-source device, the categorization is ambiguous. The example of building-site moisture gauges does distinguish the caesium and americium sources they may contain, but the categorization makes reference to the “gauge”. The example of the gamma knife is based on the total activity contained (the sources are identical) and thus tends to demonstrate that the “refined” categorization does cover the device containing the sources. The term “source” in this case applies rather to the device containing the sources, even if it is an irradiator pool, and the breakdown by radionuclide then no longer has much significance since there can be different radionuclides together in the same device.
There are differences in the description of the use between the French data and the examples cited in [1]. This leads to doubts about the classification of sources used in research, analysis or even in pulsed-rate brachytherapy (should they be put with low-rate brachytherapy in Category 4 or with high-rate brachytherapy in Category 2?).
All calibration sources are excluded from the “refined” criterion IAEA categorization, even if their activity is very high as in the case of dosimeter calibration benches. Conversely, the sources accompanying gamma cameras are listed in Category 5, whereas for the French national register they are just ordinary calibration sources.
Even when one is dealing with a use listed by the categorization, it is not always certain that the radionuclide will be listed among the examples given for that use and, when it is, that the range of activities will agree with the generic classification level. This fact is particularly striking for the use “irradiation” under Category 1, with examples including pool irradiators and pocket irradiators for blood or laboratory samples which have cobalt or caesium sources with activities exceeding a TBq. Meanwhile the French national register lists many irradiation sources with very different characteristics (strontium, californium, activity in MBq ...), used for instance to irradiate electronic components, which it would be unreasonable to put in Category 1 and for which one would have to fall back on the D_value criterion to arrive at a correct classification.
Some hundred of the sources in the French national register are mixtures of radionuclides that are difficult to classify: while their activity is often low, there are some mixtures of transuranium elements which belong in Category 4.
For some radionuclides, the D_value was not found. Thus, Ac-227, Co-56, Cu-64, Ho-166, Mn-54, Na-22, Sm-151, Sn-113, Sn-119, Sr-85, Th-228, U-233 or Y-88 sources have activities
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exceeding the thresholds. On the other hand, some radionuclides (I-129, U-238…) have an unlimited D_value, which puts all the sources concerned in Category 5.
The accumulation criterion produces a rigorously reproducible classification provided it is clear what constitutes proximity (same production hall or same building or same industrial site). For simplicity, it was considered in this simulation that sources covered by the same authorization file were in close proximity, and so the accumulation criterion was applied to each of the 4059 files containing at least one sealed source. However, this does not fully meet the principles of accumulation since some sites have several files (laboratories at a university, for example) and, conversely, there are some rare authorizations where nothing is kept at their official address (sources along a pipeline, on boats ...), which should prevent the accumulation criterion being applied to them.
2.4. Results and analysis
In mid-2004, 26 172 sealed sources had a nominal activity exceeding the exemption thresholds, leaving aside the exact positioning of certain mixtures, which we chose to reduce to the most penalizing radionuclide in terms of thresholds. The results of applying the categorization to these 26 172 sources, with the different criteria presented in section 2.2, are set out in Table I.
Table I: Categorization of sealed sources contained in the IRSN national register
“D_value” criterion
“Use” criterion
“Device” criterion
“Accumulation” criterion
Total number of “sources” categorized 26 172 26 172 12 549 4059
Category 1 1737 2378 129 (197) 125
Category 2 1252 854 701 (854) 192
Category 3 329 4728 1748 (4728) 155
Category 4 5210 3744 2730 (3284) 943
Category 5 17 558 3597 1465 (3483) 2644
Outside categorization 86 10 871 5776 (3) 0
The sources outside the categorization, for the “D_value” criterion, correspond to sources with radionuclides having no defined D_value. By the “use” criterion, these are uses with no category assigned in Appendix II of [1], i.e. mostly calibration sources.
To apply the “device” criterion, the sources with no category assigned were first excluded and the activity present in each device was counted as being in a single “source”. It appears that many sources do not fall into the categories proposed in Appendix II of [1]: unlisted use, radionuclide not mentioned for the particular use, activity not corresponding to the bracket justifying the classification even though the radionuclide and use are listed ...). They represent 46% of the total, including 5085 sources with an activity outside the range cited for the use and 691 sources with radionuclides different from those cited for the use. The values in brackets in Table I correspond to the same “device” criterion when a criterion “use and D_value” is applied to break down these 5776 sources. These values should be compared with Categories 1 to 5 of the “use” criterion.
Between the “D_value” and “device” criteria, the number of sources of Category 1 decreases. This decrease is due largely to multi-source irradiators, whether pool-type or in a laboratory. On
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the other hand, 50 facilities without a Category 1 source by the “D_value” criterion move into this category with the “accumulation” criterion.
The exercise conducted shows that the IAEA categorization in its final version (“refined” criterion taking into account several factors in addition to the activity) cannot be used in an automatic fashion to classify a particular source. On the other hand, it allows classification of facilities containing one or more sources by applying the accumulation and proximity rules and taking into account the overall classification of each type of device.
The same simulation was done for high-activity sealed sources in the sense of [6], i.e. those whose activity exceeds one hundredth of the A1 value of the international transport regulations. 3370 of the 26 172 sources can be classified as high-activity, 63% of them being Co-60 sources (92% in Category 1). A comparison with the IAEA categories reveals great disparities: a high-activity source may fall in IAEA Category 5, or even be placed outside the categorization. Conversely, a source belonging to Category 3 or 4 may not be considered as high-activity. This is due to the different notions on which the exemption thresholds, the D_value and A1 threshold, are based. The ratio 100*D_value/A1 varies, depending on the radionuclide, between 0.15 (Po-210) and 5000 (H-3). Similarly, the ratio D_value/exemption threshold, when calculable, varies from 3.105 to 3.109. An example of an extreme case is U-235, whose D_value is very low (80 MBq), whereas the A1 threshold, and hence the high-activity threshold, is unlimited.
Looking at the movements of sources in the most dangerous categories, one notes that very regular flow regimes (iridium for radiography) co-exist with very irregular peaks related to the reloading of large cobalt facilities. The possibility of partial reloadings implies that only very simple criteria (D_value) can be used to categorize source movements. The same is true of exports, for a manufacturer cannot always know the end use of his sources. For the less dangerous categories not covered by the Code of Conduct, annual movements are heavily dominated by the flow of iodine implants: 80 000 per year, in Category 5 by the “D_value” criterion.
3. Conclusion While an activity criterion is simple to use and can be applied to each unitary source, the categorization may, depending on how it is read, lead to different results both for the total number of sources and for the proportion accounted for by the different categories, depending on whether it is applied to sources, devices or facilities.
The study carried out shows that it quickly becomes difficult to provide a classification adhering strictly to the considerations developed in the IAEA documents on the categorization of radioactive sources when the latter is applied to a list of sources such as the national register. In fact, for a non-negligible percentage of the sources in the national register, it is essential to examine the conditions of use case by case. This is confirmed by the fact that the categorization, in its final version, aims to categorize uses rather than sources, and that this categorization leaves a certain amount to experience, judgement and the consideration of other factors by the competent authorities in determining the category of a use.
REFERENCES
[1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Categorization of radioactive sources, TECDOC-1344, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
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[2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Categorization of radioactive sources, Draft Safety Guide DS343, IAEA, Vienna (April 2004).
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, IAEA, Vienna (2004).
[4] Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation. Official Journal of the European Union of 29 June 1996.
[5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Method for developing arrangements for response to a nuclear or radiological emergency — EPR Method (2003) (updating TECDOC–953), Appendix 8, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
[6] Council Directive 2003/122/EURATOM of 22 December 2003 on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources. Official Journal of the European Union of 31 December 2003.
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AN EXAMPLE OF DISCOVERING MAN-MADE RADIOACTIVE HOTSPOT 152EU BY THE AIRBORNE SURVEY
Hu Mingkao, Shen Zhengxin, Gu Renkang, HouZhenrong Airborne Survey and Remote Sensing Center of Nuclear Industry, Shijiazhuang, China
Abstract. This paper introduces a radioactive hotspot 152Eu was discovered successfully in front of the gate of the cement pipe prefabricated component factory when we had been carrying out airborne survey for natural radioactivity levels and searching for radioactive sources by the Airborne Monitoring System for Nuclear Accident Emergency at somewhere in northern China. The total activity estimated is (2.13�4.11)×109Bq(57.5�111.0mCi). And the error of longitudinal position is less than 15m.
Key Words: radioactive hotspot nuclear accident emergency airborne monitoring 152Eu
1. Foreword With the extensive application of radiation and radioisotope in various fields of national economy, safety management of radioactive sources has been paid to the widespread attention increasingly from the administration of every country. Moreover, some activities whose purpose is not the application of radiation and radioactive material also brings on radioactive environmental pollution, such as a phosphorus fertilizer factory. We regarded the radioactive material that was out of control or distinguished obviously in environments as the radioactive hotspot.
It’s beyond dispute that the airborne gamma ray spectrometry techniques can discover radioactive hotspot caused by natural or human activity rapidly and effectively. For example, Yangjiang rock body of Guangdong province was discovered by the airborne survey in 1976. The Kaolin of the fireproof material factory of Zhejiang province was discovered in 1994. Part rich half marshland silt of Qinghai Golmud was discovered, which caused by eroding and transport of the modern rainwater. Coal ash cinders of Hebei and phosphorus rock raw materials of the certain chemical fertilizer of Shanghai were discovered, which were caused by the human activities.
There are many examples that the radioactive hotspot caused by the man-made nuclide was discovered successfully. Using the airborne gammy ray spectrometer, the Canada discovered successfully the fallout from the Soviet satellite Cosmos-954, which fell in northern Canada in 1978. The Sweden located the extent of the contamination and distribution of individual radioelements coming from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident rapidly and efficiently too. This discovered radioactive hotspot resulted from the man-made radionuclide 152Eu. It was the first time that the man-made radioactive hotspot was discovered with the airborne survey in China. In this paper we briefly describe the outline of discovered the radioactive hotspot, the methods and result of the total activity estimated and the position.
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2. Discovery of the radioactive hotspot
2.1 Origin of the project Commissioned by the China National Nuclear Emergency Management Administration, we carried out first-phase of project- development and study of airborne spectrometer system with NaI(Tl) detectors being compatible with nuclear accident emergency monitoring. Based on the project contract, Many experimental flights had been carried out at the certain area of about 100km2 in March 2001, such as natural gamma radioactivity levels survey, the experimental monitoring of radioactivity plume Argon-41 (41Ar), distinguished point sources of different activity and energy, searched for blind sources, response of the radioactive hotspot etc. It was the first time that the airborne survey system that used for uranium exploration tried on airborne monitoring of nuclear accident emergency after study and development in China.
2.2 Monitoring instruments The airborne monitoring system included MCA-2 airborne gamma ray spectrometer with 256-channels, TANS-�type GPS (global position system), CDI-7 data acquisition and recording system and auxiliary instruments, such as radar altimeter, barometric altimeter, temperature sensor and flight-path video system. It was loaded at small-scale fixed wing aircraft.
Airborne Gamma-Ray Spectrometer associated NaI (Tl) Crystal Detector system that places 14 crystals(size is 10.2cm×10.2cm×40.6cm) in the three boxes separately with its own photomultiplier tube, among each of two detector packs has a crystal of upward looking that laid flatly on the crystals of downward. The system adopts constant temperature and dual automatic stabilizing of spectra using natural potassium(40K). Stability of temperature is approximately 0.01%��. Resolution of the spectrometer is less than 10%(which is measured using 137Cs gamma ray peak at 662 keV). The spectrometer is divided into the downward looking and the upward looking that recorded 256 channel data of full spectral respectively, with potassium, uranium, thorium, cesium, cobalt, cosmic and total count windows.
Navigation position system included TANS�type GPS (satellite navigation position system) and VFPG�3 color flight-path video system. The total precision of position is about 30m.
The system-controll and data acquisition and recording is fulfilled by CDI-7. Collected data was recorded the nine-rail magnetic tape and 11-inch-wide simulation paper separately through CDI-7.
2.3 Measurement grid arrangement This experiment survey is small range and large scale. It was planed that measuring line is 10km long and space of measuring line is 100m and the flying speed is 180km/h± 20km/h and the flight height is 120m± 30m. In order to assure the flight safety, some measuring lines that have dangerous barrier, such as high-voltage line, building had not been carried out. In fact, space of measuring line is 100m. The biggest line spacing is 400m.
Flight line spacing of the discovered hotspot is 400m. The hotspot deviated from the line 1780 which distance ranges from 95m to 132m. The airborne survey anomaly has a good peak. The hotspot deviated from the line 1740 which distance is 300m. The airborne survey anomaly did not show.
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2.4 Hotspot discovered and ground validation On the afternoon of March 8, 2001, the airborne survey was carrying out and implemented mostly the natural radioactivity levels survey. At the 632 sampling location of line 1780, an unknown radioactive hotspot was discovered at height of 107m. The original simulation recorder of air response showed that the count rates in the uranium window and thorium window had not been responded and the potassium window increases slightly and total counts window was up to 3781cps. The value exceeded background field 2500cps by 50%. Analysis of this data showed that the hotspot was not caused by the natural nuclide but man-made radionuclide.
It is difficult to distinguish an unfamiliar nuclide for the airborne gammy ray spectrum on condition that the response database of relevant nuclide to the airborne NaI(Tl) detector did not build at present , In order to find the character of the hotspot, we have carried out ground validation based on the position of GPS and location by the sampled picture of flight path video on April 3, 2001.
Geographical coordinates: Nx9°45.025′Exx6°02.411′
Distribution range: The four punctiform objects of the different activity were distributed asymmetrically over the west of the dirt road in front of the gate of the cement pipe prefabricated component factory. The distance is about 5m from north to south.
The exposure rate of a certain point at 1 m above ground level is 1.6×10-6C·kg-1·h-1 (6213µR/h) with the gamma radiometer (FD—3014).
Analysis of sampling shows that the anomaly was caused by 152Eu.
2.5 Position accuracy Position data is acquired with GPS every one second. Air position of the 632 sampling location is X=**02316m �Y=*17832m. Response peak (see Fig 1.) of quick total count window (respond one count every 0.1 second) locate at the 632.5 sampling location. According to the speed of 48m/s, X value of the hotspot of the longitudinal location should be: X=**02316+24=**02340m.
Ground position with GPS: E**6°02.411′ N*9°45.025′
Transformed to meter: X=**02335m�Y=*17737m�
The hotspot located at the lane below the high-voltage line based on geographical information characteristic. From the 1/50,000 topographic map (**-**-5-C) published in 1983, the hotspot position had been acquired: X=**02350m�Y=*17700m.
According to three groups of coordinates, the position located in the sky is in between. The biggest difference is 15m among the three. The error of vertical measurement line is unable to calculate accurately. In general, the weighing index is less than a half of line spacing. The difference between coordinates in the sky and other two groups is 95m and 132m respectively, which is smaller than the half of the distances between line 1780 and line 1740.
2.6 Activity estimated It was impossible to calculate accurately the calibration coefficient of the radionuclide 152Eu with the known calibration data because the response calibration to the airborne NaI(Tl) detector of nuclide 152Eu had not been carried out. So as a estimating roughly method, the activity of the hotspot was estimated based on the calibration coefficient of 137Cs and 60Co and Γconstant issued of the relational information.
According to calculating formula of point source:
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ReR
BsfhN µ
π−= 34 (1)
where
24 Rs
π is geometry factor,
Rh
is the correction of incident ray direction, is the correction
of gammy-ray attenuation.
Re µ−
Where: H is the survey height (flying height), 107m,
R is the distance between detectors and radioactive hotspot, m
N is the net count rate of total count windows. N=3781-2500=1281cps(2500 is estimated value of background)
s is the cross-section area of detector to gamma ray. s =0.495m2
µis the linear attenuation coefficient of air for gamma ray. The value can be fitting by making a series of flight at different heights. µ=5.53×10-3 m-1
f is the number of photons produced by radioactive sources decay per time ×detector efficiency, cps/Bq.
Based on the value of the calibrated 137Cs and 60Co(fCs, fCo) andΓconstant(KCs, KCo, KEu) from the information to interpolate detector efficiency of the Eu source(fEu):
fCs=0.6035cps/Bq
fCo=1.7917cps/Bq
KCs=313 µR h-1 m2 mCi-1
KCo=1240 µR h-1m2 mCi-1
KEu=539 µR h-1 m2 mCi-1
fEu=0.8932cps/Bq
According to the formula (1) to estimate activity of hotspot
When the distance that flight line deviated from the hotspot is 95m,
B=2.13×109Bq�57.5mCi�
When the distance that flight line deviated from the hotspot is 132m,
B=4.11×109Bq�111.0mCi�
According to the data measured by FD-3014 to estimate activity of hotspot
B=4.25×108Bq×4�(46.0mCi)
The data measured by the gamma radiometer can't representative all activity because the hotspot has a range. It is normal that the estimated activity is on the small side. So the total activity is roughly (1.7~4.11)×109Bq or (46.0~111.0 mCi).
2.7 Inter-comparison between the measured value and theoretical value A theoretical profile had been calculated at its corresponding space point of airborne survey profile by the formula (1). Fig.1 is the Response profile of quick total count window, which
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point-distance is 0.1 seconds and based on practical and theoretical calculation. The theoretical profile is very close to practical measurement one when the chosen parameter and activity is suitable.
When the chosen distance that deviated from line is 95m and the fitting activity B is 55.0mCi, the correlation coefficient of two profiles is the best, up to 0.97. The relative error of the total count rate is 5.3%. Total variance is tending towards the least (91.1cps), be equivalent to 4.0% of fitting environmental level (background value) 2282cps.
When the chosen distance that deviated from line is 132m and the fitting activity B is 108.1mCi, the correlation coefficient of two profiles is the best, up to 0.96. The relative error of the total count rate is 7.5%. Total variance is tending towards the least (107.7cps), be equivalent to 4.9% of fitting environmental level (background value) 2212.5cps.
20002200240026002800300032003400360038004000
627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637
f i duci al
s- 1 Tot al count r at e5 poi nt aver age cur veCal cul at e cur ve
Fig.1 Response profile of quick total count window about hotspot
3. Conclusions It was the first time that the man-made radioactive hotspot was discovered by the airborne monitoring in China. The discovered man-made radiouclide was not a common nuclide, such 137Cs, 60Co that cared about universally. This had proved that the effectiveness and applicability of airborne NaI�Tl� spectrometer searching for radioactive hotspot. judged by the GPS position and the sampling picture of video, the longitudinal position error of hotspot could reduce to 15m. The activity of this discovered hotspot after the ground analysis is about 75mCi. Although the estimate by the airborne survey is very rough, the estimated activity is roughly during�1.7~4.11�×109Bq(46.0~111.0 mCi) from the estimated result and profile fitting result and in situ measure result of the peak value. The error is less than 50%.
Possibility of suffering from the unexpected injury was avoided effectively because the hotspot was discovered in time and dealt with properly, Base on our experimental data, it is effective to search for an uncover radioactive source that its activity exceeded 2×108Bq for the airborne survey system. But the radioactive source that has a certain buried depth depended on concrete conditions. We proposed that the management should resumed the control within the shortest time for the sporadic uncontrolled radioactive source by using airborne survey for nuclear accident emergency system in time to avoided enlargement of the accident while continuing and further strengthen management of the radioactive material.
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We would like to thank the Academician Pan Ziqiang and expert Xu Mingda for carefulness guidance and help. We also thank China Institute of Atomic Energy and China Institute for Radiation Protection for assistance.
REFERENCES
[1] Technical reports series No.323. Airborne Gamma ray spectrometer surveying the International Atomic Energy Agency Vienna, 1991.
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THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RADIOISOTOPE DEPARTMENT OF IFIN-HH, ROMANIA, IN PRODUCTION, TESTING, DELIVERY, TRANSPORT AND EVIDENCE OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
C.Ivan, M.Sahagia, A.Luca, E.L.Grigorescu National Institute of R&D for Physics and Nuclear Engineering, Bucharest, Romania
Abstract. The paper describes the results obtained in our laboratory, in the following types of activities, carried out in the field of radioactive sources. Elaboration of methods and equipment for their technical characterization, such as:
(i) Identification of the type of source and its radionuclidic composition.
(ii) Measurement or estimation of the activity.
(iii) Check of radiological security conditions. Elaboration of Technical Documents, and their practical implementation in the activities involving radioactive sources and materials. Accomplishment of international and national regulations regarding authorizations, accreditation, registration, reports to be sent to the CNCAN.
1. Introduction Our laboratory carries out expertizes for radioactive sources produced in the Radioisotope Department of IFIN-HH, as well as for those submitted for analyse by various users, in its quality of an authorized and notified as testing Laboratory in the field of radioactive sources and materials, by the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), according to the requirements of the SR: ISO/IEC 17025 [1].
(i) One aspect regards the assurance of the technical conditions in the design and initial testing of sealed radioactive sources produced in our department, described in the referential (Technical Specification), including the conditions and testing methods, in accordance with the requirements of the applicable standards in radiological security. (SR: ISO 2919, [2] SR: ISO 9978 [3]).
(ii) Another field of concern is the technical testing of sealed radioactive sources, either produced by us, or purchased from other deliverers, throughout their life cycle, in technological installations, belonging to various users, in accordance with their authorization requirements, imposed by the CNCAN.
(iii) The third aspect regards the expertize to be accomplished in order to identify and describe some unknown (orphan) sources, by the type and by the radionuclide content, as well as the evaluation of the dosimetric hazard implied by their manipulation.
On this purpose, various methods of investigation: spectrometric methods, sometimes completed by neutron activation analysis (NAA), total activity or surface activity determination, dose rate measurement, were used. At the same time, some measurement equipment was constructed in
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our laboratory, such as an alpha and beta contamination monitor [4] , or was put into operation: gamma spectrometry systems and dosimetric equipment.
On the other side, the laboratory issues and applies Technical Documents regarding the legal use and circulation of radioactive materials.
An well established system of rules to be applied for the delivery of the radioactive sources to users, for the registration of the circulation of radioactive materials as well as for the content of reports to be sent to the CNCAN, was elaborated. The assurance of the technical and legal conditions for the transport of sources, from our production, or belonging to other owners, is also an important concern .
2. Technical expertize methods, equipment and results.
2.1 Identification of sources, evaluation of radionuclidic composition, and activity
The majority of sealed sources are made from gamma emitters. The use of gamma spectrometry method is an usual and rapid mean to identify their composition and to measure their activity.
In the followings, we present some interesting results of accomplished expertizes [5].
One example was the requirement to identify some radioactive sources trafficked illegally during the period 1993-1997. Several situations are presented. One of them regarded several cylindrical sources provided with lateral plastic windows, in aluminium holders, introduced in lead containers. The traffikants pretended to contain 239Pu. A preliminary investigation, by gamma spectrometry resulted in obtaining a continuous spectrum, with the maximum energy of 500 keV, and maximum amplitude of spectrum at about 100 keV. The values of dose rate were 50-200 µSv h-1 at the plastic window and 50-700 µSv h-1 at the opposite side. It was concluded that it must be a Bremsstrahlung 90(Sr-Y) source. For the evaluation of activity, we took into account the relation existing between the linear energy transfer values, by bremsstrahlung emission and by ionization, (dT/dX)bremss./(dT/dX)ioniz.=TZ/1600 mc2, where T is the kinetic energy, keV, Z is the atomic number of the target, and the dose rate values, reported above. The evaluated values of activity were within the interval 3.7 – 37 GBq. The radiological hazard consisted in the direct irradiation, and mainly in the tentative action of cutting the sources and manipulation of a high activity of a radiotoxic radionuclide
Another example is the expertize of some pretended 185Os sources, confounded with 187Os, a strategic inactive material, very frequently trafficked at that time. As we did not found any radioactive emission, the material was submitted to NAA; in the gamma spectrum the
51Cr, 54Mn, 59Fe, 60Co, 187W were identified. The final conclusion was that the material was a high quality stainless steel!
The following example is the requirement to expertize a ” Radium source” which has to be treated as a radioactive waste . The gamma spectrum did not contain the 185 keV gamma quantum of 226Ra, or other gamma rays from 222Rn daughters. A continuous spectrum was registered, and a high value of absorbed dose rate was measured at the surface of the source; this value diminished at the zero value for a distance of about 250 cm. The conclusion was that the source should be made from 210Pb, RaD (sic!) and the beta high energy, 1161 keV was due to 210Bi, the daughter of 210Pb. From the dose rate value, an estimation of activity value of 30 MBq was made.
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2.2 Testing of the accomplishment of the radiological conditions The most frequent tests regard the checking of the following radiological safety conditions: tightness and unfixed surface contamination. Two situations were meet.
(i) One case regarded the check of 137Cs sources, with mean activities of about 2 GBq used in brachytherapy procedures (Amersham products) [6]; a preliminary control of the surface contamination was carried out and afterwards the sources were tested for tightness by the classical method of immersion in water, at 500C, for a 4 hours interval. The measurement of the whole activity of the immersion water was made by the gamma spectrometry method. The total activity was within the limits of the Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA)= 4Bq, much lower than the requirement of the SR:EN ISO 9978 value, 200 Bq. The individual activities, determined by using a calibrated CENTRONIC IG12/20A ionization chamber [7], with uncertainties of ±5%, were within the interval (1.3 – 2.8) GBq.
(ii) Another case regards frequent tests accomplished on the site, for high activity sources, mounted in technological installations[8]. In this situation , the method recommended by the SR ISO 9978 is the wipe test. It was combined with the surface contamination test, consisting in the evaluation of the contamination; if it is due to the source radionuclide, one concludes that the source is not tight; if other radionuclides are found, they are due to the accidental external contamination. For the activity measurement, the SR ISO 7503 [9] was applied; according to it, the drawing factor F, was determined, by successive wiping of the sources with swabs soaked in alcohol. Their activities were measured by alpha -beta surface contamination of the swabs , with a very sensitive, portable alpha-beta contaminometer, constructed and calibrated in the laboratory [4].
A total number of about 1100 sources were expertized up to now; only a number of 5 unsealed sources were found. The recommendation for these sources was to be treated as radioactive wastes. As a conclusion of the experience gained in such measurements, a Technical Procedure, entitled “Checking of the tightness and contamiantion of sealed radioactive sources “ issued in agreement with the Quality
Manual of IFIN-HH and rules applied by the Quality System , under the code number AC-PL-CPR-22 is fully applied.
3. Technical and legal documents for delivery, transport, reporting In our country, the whole activity implying radioactive sources is reglemented by the Law 111/1996, completed by 193/2003, the Fundamental Norm regarding the radiological security, CNCAN (NSR01), and other reglementations.
3.1 Delivery
A strict evidence of the radioactive material, on the whole chain, from the rough material by the sources, is working in the Department, according to the inventory of radioactive material requirements. The finite products, radioactive sources , are individually registered by number and activity. The delivery is made according to the Technical Procedure” Delivery of Radioactive Sources” Code AP-PT-CPR-08, containing some special provisions:
(i) A delivery contract must be in force.
(ii) The user must be authorized by CNCAN, for the type of source and activity level (an authorization copy is attached to the delivery contract); he is aware of its responsibility as owner of the source and its obligation to close the source life cycle.
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(iii) The necessary documents to be completed at delivery:
Quality certificate, issued by the Quality Department of IFIN-HH; Source evidence bulletin; Transfer document from IFIN-HH to the user.
3.2 Transport
The transport of the radioactive materials on public ways inside Romanian borders is supposed to the CNCAN Norm regarding the Transport of radioactive materials, as well as to the rules established for dangerous goods transport.
In order to accomplish these requirements, for IFIN-HH products, as well as for transport services for other units, the following documents were elaborated:
- The technical procedure” Transportation of radioactive materials by using IFIN-HH autotransport means”, code AC-PL-CPR-38.
- The accompanying documents during the transport:
(i) Transport Authorization , including the special driver licence;
(ii) Inventory of radioactive materials during transport;
(iii) Transfer document from IFIN-HH representative to the user;
(iv) Transportation regulatory;
(v) Technical rules of intervention in accident/incident situations.
Technical measures are taken for safe transport: assurance of radiation shielding, legal inscription and emergency equipment .
3.3 Reporting
The authorization, issued by CNCAN, for Production, Manipulation, Use, Delivery, Transport, requires the following biannual reports to be sent to CNCAN:
- The inventory of materials processed in our Centre;
- The inventory of the delivered sources, by characteristics and by users, and returned in the Department as wastes;
- The evidence of transport activities;
- The evidence of expertized sources and materials, including the results.
4. Conclusions 1. The whole production, delivery, transport, reporting activities developed in our
Institute are in compliance with the International and Romanian legal requirements.
2. A lot of experimental procedures and written documents were elaborated and applied for our products, and for other expertized radioacive sources and materials.
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REFERENCES
[1] SR: ISO/ IEC 17025 –2000 General requirements for the competence of testing and
calibration laboratories ( SR =Romanian Standard)
[2] SR: ISO 2919-1996, Sealed radioactive sources. Classification
[3] SR: ISO 9978-1996, Radiation Protection- Sealed Radioactive Sources. Leakage test methods
[4] M.Sahagia, A.C.Razdolescu, C.Ivan, Equipment and standards for surface contamination measurements”, International Congress on Radiation Protection, International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA 9), Proc. Vol.3, pp34-36, Vienna, Austria, April 14-19, 1996
[5] M.Sahagia, C.Ivan, E.L.Grigorescu, A.Luca, A.C.Razdolescu, Methods for characterization of unknown suspect radioactive samples , IRPA Regional Congress on Radiation Protection in Central Europe, Radiation Protection and Health, Dubrovnik, Croatia, May 20-25, 2001, Abstract book
[6] C.Ivan,A.Luca, L.Grigorescu, M.Sahagia, A.Razdolescu, Control of activity and security conditions for medical and industrial radioactive sources, Jurnal de Medicina Preventiva, 5,4 (1997)70-76, ISSN 1221-5260
[7] E.L.Grigorescu, A. Luca, 4π gamma ionization chamber for secondary standardization of radioactive solutions, Rom. Journ. Phys.1-4(2003)91-95
[8] C.Ivan, A.Luca, E.L.Grigorescu, M.Sahagia, A.C. Razdolescu, Certification and check of the safety conditions of the sealed radioactive sources, IRPA Regional Congress on Radiation Protection in Central Europe, Radiation Protection and Health, Dubrovnik, Croatia, May 20-25,2001, Abstract book.
[9] ISO 7503,Evaluation of surface contamination. Part I. Beta-emitters (maximum beta energy greater than 0.15 MeV ) and alpha -emitters
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KAZAKHSTANI EFFORTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ORPHAN SOURCES RECOVERY STRATEGY
A. Kima, T. Prokhodtsevab aAtomic Energy Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, Republic of Kazakhstan bNuclear Technology Safety Center ,Almaty, Republic of Kazakhstan
Abstract. Practical results that Kazakhstan has achieved as a result of cooperation with international organizations and world nuclear community in the field of radiation sources accounting, control, and recovery are presented. Several cooperative projects supported by the different international organizations are described. They are devoted to orphan sources recovery strategy development, to physical protection upgrades of oncology centers and storage facilities in Kazakhstan; to sources inventory and to the physical search of orphan sources.
1. Introduction Radiation sources are widely used in the modern technologies all over the world. They are spread in the different medical, industrial, agricultural, military, and research applications. Republic of Kazakhstan has many power, mining, oil and gas enterprises, which use tens of thousand radiation sources. In addition a great number of medical institutions in Kazakhstan use radiation sources.
Usually the level of safety and security of the sources is rather high. However recent fundamental changes that took place in Kazakhstan could lead to the lack of appropriate regulatory control, and as a consequence to orphan sources appearances. To strengthen control over radiation sources the country needs the strategy identifying the magnitude of the existing problems and the priorities of the action plan for strategy implementation. Some of the problems could be solved by means of participation in the cooperative projects supported by the different international organizations and within projects under bilateral agreements between governmental bodies.
Below we will present results, achieved in Kazakhstan during last years.
2. Strategy Development In accordance with the nuclear legislation of the country Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) is defined as Central regulatory body in the field of supervision for safely using of atomic energy [1].
KAEC is responsible for:
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• Realization of State Policy in the field of safely atomic energy use.
• State control of nuclear, radioactive and special non-nuclear materials, dual-use commodities. Providing Regime of Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear and radiation Safety during the using of atomic energy.
• Development of acts, regulations, standards, rules in the field of atomic energy use.
• Licensing of all types of activities in the field of atomic energy use.
• State accounting and control of nuclear materials and supervision for providing physical protection during their storage, transport and use.
• Providing and coordination of co-operation of Kazakhstan institutions with IAEA and other International organizations in the field of atomic energy use.
• Emergency preparedness.
• Coordination and organization of research and scientific activity in the country and international co-operation in the field of atomic energy use.
• Preparation of proposals for upgrading and improvement of legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the field of atomic energy use.
• Others.
Nuclear Technology Safety Center (NTSC) is a nongovernmental organization, which was established as technical support organization for KAEC. KAEC together with NTSC has conducted a number of projects in the field of the nuclear and radiation safety. The projects listed below are supported by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
2.1 Orphan Source Recovery Strategy, 2003-2004 The United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation is involved in an initiative to reduce the threat of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) incident.
Control and accountability of sources is done mainly from a safety and health perspective, not from the security perspective that is common practice in the control and accountability of Special Nuclear Materials. There is a growing concern that terrorist groups can gain access to radioactive sources. Identifying, consolidating, and securing radioactive sources are in the best interests of both the Republic of Kazakhstan and the United States.
The objective of this Project was to develop an orphan source recovery strategy for the Republic of Kazakhstan. IAEA TECDOC-1388 was used for draft strategy development [2]. Representatives of eighteen Kazakhstan organizations, including all key ministries were involved in the development of the draft strategy and took part in the discussions. The draft of document was reviewed and was taken into consideration while developing IAEA recommendations for Kazakhstan Action Plan. They were developed during IAEA mission on National Strategy for Orphan Source Recovery to Kazakhstan in November 2004.
Although the orphan sources recovery strategy is not yet officially approved, because we need some time for normal juridical procedure on consideration this document in the Government of the country, but there’ve been made certain attempts to start its implementation. Few projects clarify the practical steps that were undertaken by KAEC/ NTSC.
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3. Strategy Implementation
3.1 Security Upgrades at Oncology Centers in Kazakhstan The objective of this project is to characterize the high-power radiological materials present at the Oncology Centers, to conduct vulnerability assessments, to propose rapid security upgrades, and to implement the upgrades. The team of representatives from KAEC/NTSC and Ministry of Health should visit oncology centers for providing assessment of operation and security conditions for radiation sources.
The above mentioned work should be conducted for 16 oncology centers in Kazakhstan. This is an ongoing project. The work has been already completed for the first six towns: Almaty, Taldikorgan, Taraz, Shimkent, Semey, and Pavlodar (Fig. 1). By the end of the next year the similar upgrades will be conducted for the other ten oncology centers located in the different Kazakhstani towns.
3.2 Investigation of Potential Sites for RDD Security Upgrades in the Republic of Kazakhstan
Investigation of potential sites for RDD security upgrades in the Republic of Kazakhstan was conducted by the specialists of KAEC/NTSC during 2003-2004. The available KAEC’s information on enterprises having high-power sources was analyzed. As a result of this work other project supported by DOE RDD Program is carried out: two storage facilities for spent radiation sources in Taraz, known to have high-power radiological sources, were chosen for security upgrades. The team of representatives from KAEC/NTSC and Ministry of Health visited these storage facilities and made vulnerability assessment for future security upgrades. This work will be finished at the beginning of the next year.
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3.3 The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Projects Following the Agreement between United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee for co-operation in nuclear safety matters NRC also supports the activity that leads to improving control over radiation sources within Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is planning to create the National Register of radiation sources and pursue work in this direction. Several projects are carried out in this field:
• Administrative search of radiation sources
• Sources inventory in Kazakhstan
• Nuclear legislation update
• Development of the software for accounting and control of radiation sources in Kazakhstan
The data that is been gathering while administrative search will be entered into the KAEC database that is developed at the present.
3.4 US DOE/IAEA Search and Secure Program In November 2004 Kazakhstan has joint US DOE/IAEA Search and Secure Program. Kazakhstan Orphan Sources Recovery Strategy supposes the stage relating to physical searches of radiation sources in definite regions of the country. In accordance with this Program US DOE will provide technical assistance in this area, including equipment and personnel training. Kazakhstan planes to involve in this project the specialists of different specialized enterprises for participation in the activity on physical search of orphan sources.
4. Conclusion Kazakhstan is taking practical measures to strengthen control over radiation sources, trying to locate and properly dispose orphan sources. Cooperative projects help to acquire necessary support for this activity, in particular, for orphan sources recovery strategy implementation. They allow to intensify the activity and to gain the results in a shorter period of time.
REFERENCE
[1]. A. Kim. Nuclear and radiation safety in Kazakhstan. Materials of International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Safety, Vienna, Austria, 3 - 6 Sept. 2001, p. 80-85
[2]. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Strengthening control over radioactive sources in authorized use and regarding control over orphan sources – National Strategies, IAEA TECDOC-1388, Vienna (2004)
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REGULATION OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF RADIATION SOURCES IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Valery Bezzubtsez, Boris Krupchatnikov Federal Service for Environmental, Industrial and Atomic Supervision of Russia
Abstract. The legislation of Russia installs large scale spectrum of measures for safety, security and preventing of uncontrollable use and distribution of radioactive sources and radioactive materials (RSM). Among them there are subjects of
• radiation safety, accountability and control and physical protection;
• State system of RSM accounting and control;
• Physical protection
• State regulation in this area
The state regulation assumes activity of Federal Regulatory Authority (Regulator) having the following responsibilities:
• development and enforcement of the federal norms and rules
• licensing of hazardous activity with the purpose to guarantee safety
• supervision of execution of the normative requirements
• application of the statutory sanctions under finding of violations.
The organizations using RSM (Operator) should be guided by the requirements, which
are installed by the federal norms and rules and other normative documents of a federal level,
departmental level and documents approved by administration of Operator. In addition to this the
Regulator has the right to install the special requirements in the license conditions.
One of the main points of the system for RSM safety, security and preventing of their illegal usage is the categorization of RSM and radiation - hazardous facilities. The paper presents some general requirements fixed in federal level document "Rules of physical protection of radiation sources, storage facilities, radioactive substances " (NP-034-01). The general principles and instruments of state regulation in the field of accountability and control and physical protection are illustrated.
The legislation of Russia installs effective measures for safety, security and preventing of
uncontrollable use and distribution of radioactive sources and radioactive materials (RSM).
Among them there are subjects of
- radiation safety, accountability and control and physical protection;
- State system of RSM accounting and control;
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- Physical protection
- State regulation in this area
The state regulation assumes activity of Federal Regulatory Authority (Regulator) having the following responsibilities:
a. development and enforcement of the federal norms and rules
b. licensing of hazardous activity with the purpose to guarantee safety
c. supervision of execution of the normative requirements
d. application of the statutory sanctions under detection of violations.
The organizations using RSM (Operator) should be guided by the requirements, which are installed by the federal norms and rules and other normative documents of a federal level, departmental level and documents approved by administration of Operator. In addition to this the Regulator has the right to install the special requirements in the license conditions.
One of the main points of the system for RSM safety, security and preventing of their illegal usage is the categorization of RSM and radiation - hazardous facilities.
The Draft revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources establishes tree categories of radioactive sources on a degree of their potential danger.
Category 1 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected would be likely to cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for more than a few minutes. It would probably be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded material for a period of a few minutes to an hour. These sources are typically used in practices such as radiothermal generators, irradiators and radiation teletherapy.
Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy.
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly — although it is unlikely — be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging.
The Russian normative document "Rules of physical protection of radiation sources, storage facilities, radioactive substances " (NP-034-01) entered in force since June 1, 2002 installing the requirements to systems of physical protection of RSM, offers the categorization of RSM with the purpose to apply the differentiated measures of physical protection adequate to potential danger of RSM.
This document the establishes the following general requirements for physical protection of RSM, RSM storage facilities, RSM facilities.
- the requirements to organizational measures of the system of physical protection, such as the requirements to a complex of organizational measures, requirement to documents on organization and maintaining of physical protection.
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- the requirements to constructions and equipment of the system of physical protection, such as the requirement to have approved design, designer and fabrication documentation, requirement to technical means of the system of physical protection, requirement to engineering constructions of the system of physical protection
- the requirements to protection forces.
Classification (categorization) of radiation sources, items of storage, radioactive substances on their potential radiation danger
Potential hazardous Category
Probably radiation effect on the population measures till it to protection also can require
Item of storage, radio nuclide thermo -electrical generators RTG (unattended)
1
The radiation effect is limited by territory of a sanitary - protective zone
Item of storage, high-power gamma of installation
2
The radiation effect is limited by territory, on which RS are used
Medical and plants
3
The radiation effect is limited by placement, in which RSM are located
Radio-isotope instruments, laboratory
4
As an example the structure of the requirements to the system of physical protection of RSM is presented
№
п/п
Requirements Category
2 3 4
1 Requirements to organizational measures
1.1 The complex of organizational measures must include
1.1.1 • Security service and its functionong
+ + + -
1.1.2 Organization of Protective Forces + + + -
1.1.3 • Organization of “self protection forces”
+ + + +
1.1.4 • Compensatory measures in f h i l Pt t ti i t
+ + + +
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case of physical Ptrotection equipment falure
1.1.5 • The set of normative documents for physical protection
+ + + +
1.1.6 Self control for physical protection system + + + +
1.1.7 limited personal having excess to RSM + + + +
1.1.8 Rule of two (three) persons while:
operation
at transport check point
at pedestrian check point
+
+
+
-
+
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.1.9 excess control for personal, visitors etc + + + +
1.2 Availability on technical and organizational documents
1.2.1 design threat sheet + + + +
1.2.2 documentation of categorisation + + + +
1.2.3 statute of security service + + + +
1.2.4 protective plan + + + +
The note. The sign "+" the requirement, mandatory for execution is designated,
The sign "-" - absence of the requirement or it nonobligatory force.
The federal norms and rules installing requirements to the accounting and control RSM are in final stage of development. The State System of Accountability and Control of RSM operates on the basis of documents approved by the Government of Russian Federation and Russian Agency for Atomic Energy.
The next stage of normative documents evolution will be the development of methodical documents, working out in details of the requirement of federal norm and rules and offering probable way (acceptable for a Regulator) for implementation of the normative requirements. In documents of this class should be reflected the requirements concerning orphan RS, RS manufacturer and stored in the previous period, overused RS, and also other special problems.
The second direction of regulating activity is the licensing licenses of a Regulator. According to legislation requirements Operators do not have right to manage and transfer RSM without licence issued by Regulator. The operation without the licence is a criminal offence according to the Russian legislation. The conditions of licences obligatory contain a set of the requirements relating RSM PC&A. By receiving the declarations from potential licensee, Regulator conducts the comprehensive analysis of represented documents, carries out inspections for verification correspondence of represented materials to an actual state of matters, and also entrusts expert organization (witch also must has the appropriate licence for expertise in this area), on preparation of an experts' report on safety and security.
To check the implementation of normative requirements and conditions licence, Regulator conducts inspections. The matters of inspection activity are regulated by regulatory documents of
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Regulator. According to an adopted classification the regulatory documents are subdivided into four classes:
- positions,
- model documents,
- the instructions and
- methodical documents.
The regulatory document structure in the field of RS PC&A is under the development now.
The development of Professional training courses and programs for MPC&A inspectors are being developed in parallel to the development of regulatory documents. Regulator accomplishes its functions in close collaboration with Operator. But for all that the safety and securing of RS and prevention of RS uncontrolled usage and trafficking has as a basis the division of responsibilities between Operator and Regulator. The other main principle is the independence of Regulator from Organizations of RS Management .
At present the most important aims are the following:
- to develop the main set of federal level documents on RS PC&A;
- to maintain the functioning of State system of RS accountability and control on the basis of periodical inventory taking and appropriate information system;
- to improve and upgrade the physical protection of RS and facilities in accordance with the requirements of federal norms and rules NP 034-2002;
- to develop measures to consolidate and to utilize the orphan and low controlled as well as overused PS, to provide technical and financial support of these measures;
- the improvement of regulatory activity on all its branches mainly on physical protection, accountability and control.
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SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN KAZAKHSTAN
Ch. T. Massenov, S.Y. Chelnokov Atomic Energy Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Abstract. This paper contains the following questions connected with the problemes use of radioactive sources:
Kazakhstan has a developed complex of industrial enterprises, power plants, mining and oil industries, which use tens of thousands of ionizing sources. An overview;
Strengthening the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan for sources accounting, control and tracking. The focus will be made on the enterprises that have not passed the licensing procedure. This also includes enterprises that terminated their financial and economic activities after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
The need to review and reevaluate the existing system of radioactive sources physical protection at the enterprises that use, store and transport (including boarding pass) the sources.
Activities planned by the Kazakhstan State authorities to improve the state sealed sources control regime in answer to the increased requirements for safe management of radioactive materials. The main trends of this activity are as follows:
Systematization of the control and accounting of radioactive sources that are in use or being stored,
Organization of the search and conditioning of orphan sources;
Coordination of ministries' and agencies' efforts in organizing measures to prevent unauthorized use of radioactive sources
1. Introduction Kazakhstan has a developed structure, which use tens of thousands of ionizing radiation sources. Their use is accompanied by the necessity to solve the some problems such as: ensuring of the required level of radiation safety and preventing an unauthorized access to places of radioactive sources location. Special procedures of their accounting, control and physical protection are developed for this purpose.
A number of statements and normative documents which has been developed in Kazakhstan determine the main statements of the state system of radioactive sources accounting and control. They are:
The laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan: "The Law for Atomic Energy Use", "The Law about Radiation Safety of the Population", "The Law on Protection of the Environment", "Sanitary-and-epidemiological well-being of the population", "The Law on Licensing".
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Resolutions of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan: "The Regulations of Licensing of Activity connected with Atomic Energy Use", "Regulations on Procedure of Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Republic of Kazakhstan ", "Decree No 183 on Export and Import of Nuclear Materials, Technologies, Equipment, Special Non-nuclear Materials, Materials and Technologies of Dual Use, Sources of Radioactive and Isotope Products", "The Regulations on Licensing of Export and Import of goods (work, services) in the Republic of Kazakhstan",
Norms and rules: "Radiation Safety Norms, RSN-99", "Sanitary-and-hygienic requirements on maintenance of radiation safety of the population ", "Safety Rules for Transportation of Radioactive Matters".
2. Activity of Atomic Energy Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the field of radioactive sources accounting
The problem of safety regulation at use of atomic energy is assigned to Atomic Energy Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KAEC) [1], which basic directions of activity are:
State regulation in the field of atomic energy use;
Licensing of the activity when atomic energy is used;
Ensure the work of the state system of accounting and control of nuclear materials and radioactive sources;
Ensure the control of export and import of the goods and services in the field of atomic energy use, and also radioactive sources and isotope production;
The state supervision of maintenance of nuclear and radiating safety on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and also supervision of maintenance of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.
One of the directions of KAEC's activity in the field of safety use of radioactive sources is the creation and maintenance of precise system of their accounting and control which must be carried out with the purpose of:
Determining the available amount of radioactive sources in the places of their location, storage and disposal;
Prevention of the losses, unauthorized use and plunder of radioactive sources;
classifications of radioactive sources according to the degree of represented danger;
Control over the use, write-off and a disposal of radioactive sources;
Control over the movement of radioactive sources.
From the of 2000 the main focus of the system of accounting and control formation is laid on the work with enterprises and organizations, which have KAEC's licenses for radioactive sources treatment or going through the procedure of licensing.
The radioactive sources coming into the Republic of Kazakhstan according to the developed requirements licensees direct the reporting forms with the results of annual sources inventory to KAEC at a certain dates. They also report about all radioactive sources received or transferred by
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the organization. In addition are put on the account in KAEC while going through the procedure of licensing of their import.
As a result of realization of the complex of measures KAEC has received reliable information on the amount of sources in licensed organizations; and the control of movement of radioactive sources is adjusted.
The total radioactive sources accounting data of licensed organizations that was introduced into KAEC database is given below:
Number of organizations registered in KAEC…………………………… ~ 700
Number of organizations using radioactive sources …… …………… … ~ 100
Amount of radioactive sources, used at enterprises ………………...…... ~ 7000
Amount of radioactive sources, on long-term storage ………………..…. ~ 70000
The other direction of KAEC's activity relates to the problem of orphan sources detection and identification. This problem remains rather actual and demands separate studying because it arises frequently enough in practical activities of many enterprises dealing radioactive sources with treatment. More often it is connected with the fact that in the past the simple procedure was used for treatment of radioactive sources, including unused radioactive sources. Besides one of the reasons of occurrence of orphan sources was promoted by the fact that after disintegration of the Soviet Union the great number of enterprises and organizations of state submission using radioactive sources has passed in private and other kinds of the property. Significant part of enterprises has stopped their financial and economic activities without carrying out of establish procedures on recycling radioactive sources according to legislation. Now, with a view of formation of the complete approach to a problem of search of orphan sources in territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, effective distribution of authorities between various enforcement authorities, liquidations of gaps blanks in the legislation, and also its effective realization in practice, "Orphan sources recovery strategy" has been developed for Kazakhstan. Simultaneously KAEC together with the Committee of sanitary-and-epidemiological supervision of the Ministry of Health starting a works on drawing up the lists of organizations that are using radioactive sources during the period from 1991 to 2004. This list includes enterprises, which have not passed the procedure of licensing in KAEC, and also enterprises which have stopped economic activities after disintegration of the former USSR. The next stage will be check and specification of the received information with the purpose of drawing up more detailed list of such organizations and preparations for carrying out of actual inventory.
The solving of the problems connected with accounting and control of radioactive sources, is mainly aimed on providing radiating safety while their use, storage or transportation. However, the problem connected with the maintenance of physical protection of such sources is also important.
At present there are no normative documents on physical protection of radioactive sources in the Republic of Kazakhstan. However KAEC has made attempts in this direction. "Requirements for ensuring physical protection of radioactive sources" is started. This requirements will take into consideration recommendation of IAEA. In 2004 KAEC has carried out the survey of 16 oncology centers, which use radioactive sources with total activity more than 500 Ci. At the same time two industrial enterprises having storage facilities for radioactive sources were examined; the total activity of the sources is more than 500 Ci. The assessment of current system of physical protection was fulfilled for these enterprises as well as the necessity of their
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modernization. As a result of this work the update of physical protection systems of 5 oncology's centers and 2 storage facilities have been done. In 2005 it is planned to modernize physical protection systems in the rest ontology centers of Kazakhstan.
3. Conclusion It is necessary to note that the significant activity on provosion of radiation safety has been fulfilled in the Republic of Kazakhstan. For example during the last 3 years about 46000 of radioactive sources were placed into long-term storage. Consequently it means that both radiation risks have reduced as a whole, and the probability of emergency situations and appearance of orphan sources.
REFERENCES
[1] Resolutions on “Atomic Energy Committee of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan” approved by Resolution of the Government of degree N1108, Astana (2004)
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SEARCH, LOCATION, IDENTIFICATION, AND DISPOSITION OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN
Ulmas Mirsaidova, Jamshed Kamolovb a Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency (Regulatory Authority) of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan
b Republican Chemical and Radiometric Laboratory of the Ministry of Extreme Situations and Civil Defense of the Republic of Tajikistan
In Tajikistan ionizing radiation and radioactive sources were widely used in different fields and areas, such as, medicine, industry, agriculture, scientific research, study processes. In this connection the problems of accounting, control, storage, and safety of radioactive substances and materials were taken under strict control and were strictly followed on the basis of existing legislative documents of the Soviet Union (NRS-78), which in the whole matched BSS. Disintegration of the Soviet Union, state structure and economic system and transfer to market economics not only resulted with destruction of state system, but also negatively effected the infrastructure for nuclear and radiation safety.
During the Civil war in Tajikistan, a lot of enterprises and plants were closed and a lot of experts and specialists left the country. It was a hard blow for our radiation safety infrastructure. The inventory of radioactive sources has not been carried out during several years. After stabilization of situation in Tajikistan were radiological service of the Ministry of Extreme Situations and Civil Defense of the Republic of Tajikistan and Sanitary and Epidemiological Station carried out account and control of radioactive sources. After organization in 2001 of Atomic Energy Agency and establishment in 2003 of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency (which is Regulatory Authority), the problem of accounting and control became one the most actual tasks of this Agency. Now we account more than 700 radioactive sources having different activity. Today the Agency creates a computer database of radioactive sources:
1. Data about radioactive sources of the enterprises and plants of the Republic of Tajikistan was gathered (control inspections were carried out);
2. Certain work was carried out on search and collection of “orphan” radioactive sources;
3. Measures on liquidation of emergencies and deactivation of polluted areas had been taken.
Unfortunately, we are not able to carry out all necessary actions in the Republic of Tajikistan because of lack of modern equipment and trained staff in the nuclear and radiation safety infrastructure.
Since 1997 till today 129 organizations and enterprises, which used radioactive sources, had been inspected. In the course of inspections radioactive sources had been taken under control and card-file of radioactive sources was created because of temporary dysfunction of the state system of accounting and control.
Under our recommendations and joint efforts of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency, Ministry of Extreme Situations and Civil Defense of the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republican Radioactive Waste Repository Site, unused radioactive sources had been collected
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and buried; in some plants and enterprises had been carried out measures according to the existing rules of treating radioactive sources.
Radiation emergency situations had been detected during monitoring of territories. For example, in 1997 had been found four “orphan” high level radioactive radioisotope “RITEG”s. One of the “RITEG”s was dismantled. Dose rate on the surface was 200 roentgen/hour, in the distance of one meter 4.60 microroentgen/second. Activity of the source SR-I-90 according to the “RITEG” documentation was 40 kilocurie. Emergency situation was liquidated in 1998. In 2001 three residuary “RITEG”s had been given to temporary storage to the Republican Radioactive Waste Repository Site. There is information that several “RITEG”s are still in the mountains.
In 1998 during inspection of the territory of stock enterprise Tojikazot had been found two “orphan” radioactive devices KSG-2 with radioactive sources Cs-137. The host of these devices have found – it was enterprise Tojikgaz of Kurgonteppa-city. During the Civil war in Tajikistan a stranger gave these devices to storehouse for storage. Two of the same kind of devices had been found in the storehouse of Tojikgaz enterprise of Kulob-cvity. Altogether the Chief Administration of Tojikgaz imported 11 such devices into the Republic. We are carrying out the work on search of other five radioisotope devices KSG-2.
During inspection of the territory of Dushanbe airport in 2001 in one of the workshops was polluted with radionuclide Ra-226. Under our recommendations had been carried out internal inventory and taken under control all radioactive sources in the Dushanbe airport. The last inventory in Dushanbe airport was carried out in 1986. Still the detected radioactive sources and spare parts are stored in the airport storehouse.
In 1999 by the Ministry of Extreme situations and Civil Defense of the Republic of Tajikistan Radioactive Sources from some military units have been found out and were handed over to a burial place (so-called problem of former military units of the Soviet Army). So three radioisotope devices with radioactive sources Cs - 137 in Shahrinav district, three radioisotope devices with radioactive sources Sr - I -90 (RIS BIS-MNA- 1) and two neutron sources in Dushanbe have been found out. It is necessary to make prospecting works in other military units too.
It is pertinently to note realization of prospecting works in mountain conditions in 2002 with IAEA experts on a place of crash of the helicopter MI- 8 in Central Tajikistan, where the radioisotope device RIO - 3 with a radioactive source Sr - I -90 have been found out. Previously search group of the Ministry of Extreme situations and Civil Defense of the Republic of Tajikistan has made prospecting works on a place of crash of the helicopter, has found out a radioactive source. Afterwards the representative commission of the NRSA of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan, IAEA, Ministry of Extreme situations and Civil Defense of Republic of Tajikistan, and Republican Repository Site has transported to the Republican Repository Site and buried this source.
In 2003 in one of garbage dumps in Dushanbe three "orphan" containers with a protective material from U - 238 of a set of defectoscope "Gammarid" with radioactive sources Ir - 192 and Tm - 170 have been found out.
On available information it is necessary to make prospecting works on a place of disposition of "former" military bases of the Soviet Army in Central and Northern Tajikistan (radioisotope devices, calibration and reference sources with radioactive sources Co60, Cs 137. Sr - Y90), on a place of crash of the Aircraft in mountains in Shahrinav district (radioisotope device RIO - 3 with a radioactive source Sr - Y90), in nearby villages of Tursunzade city and Shahrinav districts (radioisotope device BGI - 75 with radioactive sources Cs 137), nearby villages of Yavan city (3 radioisotope devices BGI - 75 with radioactive sources Cs 137), in Vahdat city (radioisotope
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device KSG - 2 with radioactive sources Cs 137), in Shahrituz district (with radioactive sources Cs 137),in Dangara district (Co60, Cs 137), around Anzob Mining Plant in Ainy district (with radioactive sources Co60, Cs 137, Sr - Y90, Am, Pu 239), around State Enterprise "«VOSTOKREDMET" Chkalovsk city (radioisotope device BGI - 75 with radioactive sources Cs 137), around of Khujand city (radioactive sources Co60, Cs 137, Sr - Y90), in Isfara district (radioactive sources Cs 137), in Kairakkum city (radioactive sources Co60, Cs 137, Sr - Y90), in Gafurov city (radioisotope device KSG - 2 with radioactive sources Cs 137), high active radioactive sources Sr - Y90 from a set "«RITEG" in mountains of Central Tajikistan.
Now before NRSA the following tasks are standing:
- to make monitoring with the purposes of detection, localization, and collection of "orphan" sources in the Central and Northern Tajikistan. Organization of accounting and control of radioisotope devices at the enterprises. Creation of a database of radioactive sources.
- Decrease of the risk of an unreasonable irradiation of the population and pollution of an environment and territory by radioactive substances
- Realization of radiation monitoring, realization foot scale of shooting of territories and revealing of radiation anomalies. Revealing of radioactive sources, unused in manufacture, with the expired working life and storage. Realization of identification of the revealed "«orphan" radioactive sources.
- The notification of the population about dangerous high active places and radiation anomalies.
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SAFETY OF FIXED RADIOGRAPHY BUNKERS
A.E. Moore, R.B. Jammal, E.R. McCabe Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Ottawa, ON, Canada
Abstract. As the nuclear regulator in Canada, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) licences approximately 140 industrial radiography operations utilizing radioactive sources. Of this group, approximately 50 are known to be operating out of fixed radiography facilities, also commonly referred to as bunkers. Fixed facilities are located across the country and by definition are enclosed, shielded rooms, cells, vaults, or other areas in which radiography is performed. In accordance with CNSC regulations and license conditions, radiographers are required to keep an inventory of all nuclear substances in their possession. If the nuclear substance is contained within a radiation device, records of the exposure devices must be kept to include, the quantity of the nuclear substance contained within the device, the manner in which the nuclear substances are used, the dates on which and locations where the exposure device is operated, the date of acquisition and, where applicable, the date of disposal of the exposure device. The CNSC categorizes the practices and sources of industrial radiographers as a high risk to human health if not managed safely and securely. In Canada, a number of regulatory issues regarding fixed radiography bunkers have been identified, many of which could potentially lead to exposures that are higher than the Canadian Regulatory limit of 1 mSv/year for members of the public. The purpose of this paper is to share regulatory challenges as they pertain to safety in the operation of these fixed radiography bunkers. There has been extensive reporting of injuries to the public caused by orphaned radioactive sources; however, unnecessary exposure to the general public caused by inadequate shielding should not be ignored even though it is of a much lower magnitude of acuteness.
1. Introduction In Canada, the competent authority is the CNSC empowered by the Canadian Parliament. The CNSC has the authority to develop and implement regulations, and except in the cases of radiation dose limits, the regulations are mainly non-prescriptive; licensees are told broadly what to do, but not how to do it.
Over the past two years, the CNSC has adapted a risk informed approach to its regulatory application. The CNSC Risk Based Regulatory Program categorized the practice of industrial radiography as “high risk”. CNSC staff has started to re-evaluate the health, safety and security of industrial radiography operations in accordance with the CNSC Risk Based Regulatory Program.
Many industrial radiographers operate out of fixed radiography bunkers. One major concern with regulating these fixed facilities is their potential to exceed the allowable dose of 1 mSv/year to members of the public, as specified in Canadian Regulations [1]. This is due to the limited amount of emphasis placed by industrial radiographers on the type of shielding (concrete, steel, lead) used in the construction of the bunkers, operational limits (workload versus shielding), and areas adjacent to these fixed facilities which may be occupied by members of the public.
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In Canada, licensees operating an exposure device must limit the dose of radiation received by any person, other than a nuclear energy worker (NEW), as a result of the operation of the exposure device, to 0.1 mSv per week and 0.5 mSv per year. It should be noted that these dose limits reflect the amount of dose contributed to a person’s total dose as a result of radiographic operations conducted by a licensee. [2]
Industrial radiographers in Canada are licensed by the CNSC to use various strengths of radioisotopes. Licensees operating out of fixed radiography bunkers, most commonly use the radioisotopes Ir-192 with an activity range of 3,700 GBq to 5,550 GBq, and Co-60 with an activity range of 4,070 MBq to 16,000 GBq. A CNSC licence authorizes a licensee to use or possess an exposure device up to the maximum source activity as specified on the exposure device certification. All exposure devices in Canada must be certified by the CNSC before a licensee is authorized to use it [2].
2. Fixed Radiography Facility Project Due to industrial radiography being categorized as “high risk” by the CNSC Risk Based Regulatory Program, and the potential for additional public exposure from radiography applications performed in fixed facilities, the CNSC initiated an investigation into the impact of these facilities on members of the general public.
2.1. Information Collected Over the last two years, information has been collected from each licensee operating a fixed radiography facility. The CNSC requested information through the use of questionnaires and letters designed to obtain the licensee operational information required to assess the operational impact on the health, safety, and security of members of the public that are adjacent to these fixed radiography operations. The quality and quantity of the information collected varied. The following is a sample of the information collected:
2.1. the number and locations of bunkers operated by the licensee;
2.2. the radioisotopes used (Co-60 and/or Ir-192) and corresponding maximum activities;
2.3. the frequency of exposures (daily, weekly, monthly);
2.4. use of alarms, interlocks, or lockout as safety devices;
2.5. exposure data from dose rate surveys and dose estimates outside the bunker;
2.6. type of occupants located in adjacent areas outside the bunker; and
2.7. specifications and characteristics of the bunker construction, for example, type of shielding, thickness of shielding, and drawings illustrating the bunker’s design.
CNSC staff reviewed the information collected recognizing the CNSC’s mandate to protect the health, safety, and security of members of the public. In addition, CNSC staff evaluated where deficiencies in shielding might exist. The objective was to establish the likelihood of a licensee exceeding the allowable dose as limited by CNSC Regulations, which is 0.1 mSv per week and 0.5 mSv per year [2].
The licensees were categorized into three groups based on CNSC staff’s evaluation of the submitted information. The first group included licensees who provided sufficient information to indicate that their bunker’s operation did not exceed the dose limit to members of the public, and were in compliance with CNSC regulatory expectations. The second group submitted inadequate information for CNSC staff to accurately determine the level of compliance with CNSC regulatory expectations. The third group of licensees provided information that revealed that there
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may be improper shielding in place, with the potential for non compliance with CNSC regulatory expectations.
2.2. Discussion Deficiencies in the information provided were identified, such as bunker construction, the location of the bunkers, the adjacent areas around the bunkers and their corresponding occupancy factors, the activity of radioisotope being used, the result of dose surveys and dose estimates, and also the level of licensee understanding.
2.2.1 Bunker Construction
2.2.1.1 Walls
The facilities’ walls are constructed of various materials including solid concrete blocks of various sizes, hollow concrete blocks, steel, and also various lead lined materials. Due to the lack of quality control in the construction materials and also the design of the facilities, the use of published Half-Value-Layers (HVLs) or Ten-Value Layers (TVLs) for calculating dose rates can not be fully applied. Actual survey results submitted by the licensees showed variations that could be attributed to the inconsistent construction of these facilities. The reliability of shielding calculations using HVLs and TVLs is questionable for these fixed radiography facilities.
The existence of voids in the shielding due to the lack of or improper use of mortar to secure the concrete blocks in the bunker walls was also identified as a common problem. In some cases, no grouting was used in the wall construction, leading to holes or gaps which provide no shielding. It should be noted that in order to use TVLs or HVLs as a method of determining dose rates, it is necessary that a wall is uniformly constructed. The uniformity of the wall can be maintained by applying mortar or grout that is of equal or greater density than that of the concrete blocks.
2.2.1.2 Doors
Many bunkers include overhead doors in their design. These overhead doors are constructed of thin sheet metal to allow large industrial pieces of equipment entry into the radiography bunker. In many cases, no additional shielding was added to the door.
2.2.1.3 Roof
Skyshine is a significant source of radiation that can be detected outside the bunker if the roof is inadequately shielded. Most of the fixed radiography facilities do not include a properly shielded roof, resulting in a skyshine factor.
2.2.2 Bunker Location
Most bunkers are located in remote areas; however, in some instances the fixed radiography facilities are located adjacent to areas occupied by members of the public.
2.2.3 Limitations of information
In many cases the information provided by the licensee was lacking important details. Some areas of deficiency include, the source strengths used within the facility, whether or not the source is collimated, variations in the sources strengths used, the frequency of use, and exposure times. Without all of this information being complete the CNSC is unable to accurately calculate dose estimates.
2.2.4 Dose Surveys and Dose Estimates
Due to the lack of information provided by licensees, as noted above, dose rate surveys do not provide sufficient information to accurately determine the potential dose received by members of the public. The method of data collection in dose rate surveys was also identified as a problem. In
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many cases, the dose rate surveys were performed with instrumentation that is not capable of reading to the required dose levels.
Another problem that was identified involves the acquisition of the dose data through the use of thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). The sensitivity of the TLDs used for the survey is 100 µSv. All doses received by the TLD below this minimum dose limit are presented to the licensee as “no reading”, which is often interpreted as 0 µSv. If the licensee is submitting their area monitoring TLDs with their two week badge cycles, it is very possible for them to exceed the 0.5 mSv per year limit. If TLDs are used as the method of data collection, it is necessary that the badges are left in place for a longer period of time, preferably three months.
In Canada, it is the responsibility of the licensee to provide the CNSC with the necessary information and data to properly assess their level of compliance. When asked for exposure data, most of the licensees did not supply sufficient information to determine doses to members of the public.
3. Conclusions and Recommendations As competent nuclear authorities, regulators should require the following for industrial radiographers operating out of fixed radiography facilities:
• Uniform construction of walls and roofs, thus enabling the use of HVLs and TVLs to calculate accurate dose estimates for members of the public;
• Special shielding on all doors in order to ensure adequate shielding of the facility;
• Consideration of skyshine in the determination of doses to members of the public;
• Detailed survey results using properly calibrated instrumentation;
• Increased use of regulatory compliance activities; and
• Effective communication with licensees to ensure understanding of regulatory expectations.
REFERENCES
[1] CANADIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMISSION, Radiation Protection Regulations,
May 30, 2000.
[2] CANADIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMISSION, Nuclear Substance and Radiation
Devices Regulations, May 30, 2000.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Corie Doyle, CNSC, Jim Presley, CNSC.
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CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS: STATUS AND PERSPECTIVES
V.Paliukhovich, V.Piotukh Department for Supervision of Industrial and Nuclear Safety of the Ministry for Emergencies of the Republic of Belarus (Promatomnadzor), Minsk, Belarus
Abstract. Radioactive sources are extensively used in the Republic of Belarus in medical, industrial, agricultural, scientific and educational applications. Recognizing all the concerns posed by both “orphan” sources and the possibility of malevolent acts involving sources, Belarus strives to take all possible measures to ensure proper control of radioactive sources during their life cycle. Such measures include, inter alia, registration, licensing, inspection, and export/import control. In 2003 Belarus welcomed the approval of a revised version of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and in 2004 informed the IAEA Director General about its desire to work towards implementing the requirements of the Code. This paper describes some elements of the system of control of radioactive sources in the Republic of Belarus as well as major ongoing and planned activities aimed at strengthening this system.
1. Introduction In 1991 the Republic of Belarus faced an urgent need to set up its own system of radiation safety supervision. The decision to establish the comprehensive radioactive sources inventory dates back to those early years of political and regulatory independence. The information request to submit to Promatomnadzor specified data on radioactive sources and activities involving their use was sent to all ministries and other governmental bodies. The data provided was accumulated in the special registries and each applicant was assigned an individual number.
The thorough inspection of all users, both registered and potential, by Promatomnadzor served as an invaluable source of information for the inventory. In case there was no documentation (passport) on a source, the owner had to certify that source and get a new passport.
The registration was conducted in that way from 1991 to 1996. In 1996 a computerized inventory was set up in Promatomnadzor and a special document was adopted that laid down the registration requirements and procedure.
2. The comprehensive system of accounting for and control of radioactive sources The State System of Accounting and Control of ionizing radioactive sources was set up and commissioned through Regulatory Resolution No. 1537 issued by the Council of Ministers in 1999. Promatomnadzor was designated as the competent body for establishing and maintaining the System and all the users were to register their sources at Promatomnadzor. The System includes a series of organizational and technical measures ensuring source and user data receipt, storage and processing. The major goals of the System is to provide the state control of radioactive sources as well as to plan safety related activities, including radioactive waste management.
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The System consists of 2 levels: primary accounting by users and state accounting and control by Promatomnadzor. All the sources meeting the established criteria are registered in the in the MS Access controlled database irrespectively of their ownership. At the moment approximately 50 000 sources belonging to more than 1000 users are registered, some of them are excluded from the control. The main types of sources are: radioisotope smoke detectors, accelerators, sealed sources, X-ray apparatus, gamma-defectoscopes, etc. The database contains source and user information and includes date of registration; it allows both tracing a concrete source, and acquiring information on a single user. The database is run by a designated employee of the Division of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Supervision and Regulation. It is constantly updated and stored on 2 independent hard drives. Any unauthorized change of the data is excluded by the use of a special code. At the same time, the data contained in the database may be accessed through the view mode. If a user considers certain information (or its part) to be confidential (in case its dissemination is legally prohibited or may lead to economic loss), the information is marked as confidential and Promatomnadzor is responsible for its protection from disclosure. The information contained in the database is mainly used for the inspection purposes.
In 1999 Promatomnadzor issued the Order On the Comprehensive State System of Accounting for and Control of Radioactive Sources setting up the requirements for submitting information on a source itself, its owner and timing of reporting. Any receipt or transfer of a radioactive source shall be authorized by regional division of Promatomnadzor and Gossannadzor (state sanitary supervision). In 10 days after a receipt of a source its user shall apply to Promatomandzor to register it, in case of a transfer its former user shall also apply to deregister the source. If contact details of a user (address, name, etc.) change or information on a source needs to be changed or specified, the user is supposed to inform Promatomanzdor not later than in 10 days following the change.
3. Other elements of the control system Illicit trafficking in radioactive sources is a multidimensional safety and security issue. Situated in a high-risk trafficking area, Belarus considers the task of combating illicit trafficking essential to ensure state security, public health and environmental protection. There have been a series of activities underway in Belarus to prevent, intercept and respond to it. At the international level the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in close co-operation with World Customs Organization and Interpol plays an important role in a number of bilateral and multilateral activities aimed at stopping illicit trafficking. Belarus has always been a strong supporter of these activities, being conscious of the fact that illicit trafficking is fraught with both proliferation implications and public exposure potential [1]. From 1993 to 2004 12 incidents involving unauthorized use of radioactive sources were registered in Belarus.
Apart from maintaining a comprehensive and up-to-date radioactive sources inventory, measures aimed at preventing illicit trafficking in sources include export/import control. Export/import control of radioactive sources is regulated, inter alia, by Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 2003 No. 133 On the Fulfillment of Measures of State Regulation of Export/Import of Specific Goods (Works, Services) (amended in 2004) and Order On the Procedures for Issuing Permits on the Movement (Import, Export, Transit) of Radioactive Sources, Nuclear Substances and Materials, Technical Devices, Installations, Articles Which These Substances are Components of, Across the Customs Border of the Republic of Belarus (approved in accordance with Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 1997 No. 218, amended in 1999, 2000). Export/import control exercised by Promatomandzor includes issuing permits on radioactive sources export, import and transit and maintaining a database of such permits.
The approval of a revised version of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in 2003 was regarded by Belarus as an important step on the way towards
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establishing an effective system of control of radioactive sources worldwide. Belarus welcomed the approval of the Code and in 2004 informed the IAEA Director General about its desire to work towards implementing its requirements. Specialists of Promatomandzor took part in Meeting to develop internationally harmonized guidance for the import and export of radioactive sources in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. At the moment Promatomanzdor is considering upgrading its export/import control system to make sure that importing state has necessary technical and administrative capabilities, resources and regulatory infrastructure (including competent authority and a licensed user receiving the source) before granting an export permit.
Another kind of measures contributing to illicit trafficking prevention is ensuring physical security of high activity radioactive sources. In March and July 2004 experts of the USA Department of Energy visited Belarus in the framework of the Radiological Threat Reduction Program. The expert group accompanied by Promatomanzdor employees inspected the existing physical security arrangements for the high activity (more than 100 Ci) gamma sources. The agreement was reached on the financing of the activities aimed at upgrading existing physical security systems.
4. Management of disused and spent radioactive sources The further use of disused or spent radioactive sources is prohibited. The term of use is specified in the passport of each source; it can be prolonged only by a decision of a special commission based on the tests results. Disused and spent sources are considered to be radioactive waste. They can be temporarily stored at a facility for no longer than 6 months and should be then transferred to the centralized enterprise for radioactive waste management “Ekores” for storage or disposal. However, sometimes Promatomanadzor has to authorize long term storage of spent sources at the facilities where they have been used (mainly Co-60 and Cs-137 sources of the old research and radiation therapy gamma facilities) as neither the facilities, nor the state budget can provide financing needed for the unloading of such facilities, sources transportation and disposal. The stringent safety measures are applied to the storage of such sources, and so far there have been no radiation accidents involving such sources.
Currently Promatomandzor is introducing a requirement to include into contracts obligation to return spent sources to the supplier.
5. Further considerations Despite a series of measures taken at the national level, there are still certain problems to be addressed. In this respect the following steps may be proposed to strengthen the existing Safety and Security of radioactive sources: - Developing the national normative documents on physical protection of radioactive
Sources;
- Developing DBT as a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of physical protectionmeasures of radioactive sources;
- Developing a maintenance plan for the system of physical protection and to seek financial support for its implementatio;
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- Improving the national system of mutual notification of incidents involving radiation sources by setting uniform requirements for information to be submitted and through establishing a computer database to register all the incidents;
- Upgrading the laboratory under Promatomnadzor conducting primary measurements and identification of detected ionizing radiation sources;
- Training personnel.
REFERENCES
[1] O. Piotoukh "Measures against Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources in the Republic of Belarus"//International Conference on Security of Material: Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources. Stockholm, Sweden (7-11 May 2001). P. 9-10.
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SYSTEM OF LICENSING, INSPECTION AND REGISTRATION ASSURING SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIATION SOURCES IN HUNGARY
S. Pellet, A. Kerekes, L. Hidasi, A. Temesi and L. Koblinger
Abstract. In Hungary, the control and book-keeping of radioactive material have long traditions. A central registry contains all relevant data of all sources. External dosimetry of radiation workers (altogether about 15,000 people) is carried out centrally by a nation-wide system based on film dosimeter readings. Internal contamination measurements and registers are not centralized. In the operation and development of the system support gained via Model Project RER//9/062 of the International Atomic Energy Agency is utilized.
1. Development of the registry of radiation sources Wide scale application of radioactive materials in Hungary started in the early 1960s. At that time, the only company authorized for importing and distributing artificially produced radioactive material was the Institute of Isotopes of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission. Realising the serious health issues involved, the Institute exercised a strict control over radioactive materials and established a registry of the imported and manufactured products at a very early stage.
Many years later, when new legislation established the central registry of radioactive materials, the registry of the Institute of Isotopes served as the starting point, and the Institute was mandated to maintain the central registry. Due to this continuity, the central registry has an almost complete inventory and history of radiation sources and open radioactive substances in Hungary.
2. Legal background Act CXVI. of 1996 on atomic energy (hereafter Act) stipulates that ‘In the use of atomic energy, safety has priority over all other aspects’. The Act defines the legal responsibilities of the users of nuclear energy and of the authorities.
Decree 16/2000. (VI. 8.) of the Minister of Health lays down the basis of radiation protection in accordance with the recommendations of ICRP 60, IAEA Safety Series No.115 and 96/29/EURATOM. This Decree defines the basic rules of the application of radioactive materials.
According to the decree, all activities related to radioactive substances (application, production, marketing, export, import and transportation) are subject to licensing. Licences are given for a fixed period, and the licensees must be regularly inspected. Unused, superfluous radiation sources and old sources that have exceeded their working time should be disposed of. Furthermore, the Decree defines the basic qualifications needed for working with radioactive material, and describes the requirements of a training programme for radiation workers.
The legal basis for the central registry of radioactive material is given in the Act. Decree 25/1997 (VI. 18.) of the Minister of Industry and Trade and Tourism regulates the system of local and central registries of radioactive material. Under the system all licensees should have a local registry of all radioactive sources in their possession. In parallel, the central registry should be
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maintained in such a way, that the quality, quantity and location of all radioactive material in Hungary could be established in any given time.
The initial reporting to the central registry is the duty of the distributor (at this moment there are only three licensed distributors in Hungary). Later, licensees are required to report any changes in their stock (distribution, transfer, disposal, export, import etc.). Prior to the final disposal, the radioactive waste management company (Public Agency for Radioactive Waste Management) reports to the central registry.
3. Regulatory infrastructure Licences are issued by offices of the State Public Health and Medical Officer Services (SPHAMOS). General inspections are performed by the 7 regional Radiological Health Centres of SPHAMOS. The frequency of inspections are determined according to the level of hazard involved and regulated by the decree No. 16/ 2000 of the Ministry of Health. In case of abnormalities SPHAMOS may impose a fine or suspend or withdraw the licence.
All of the radiation workplaces registered by the local authorities and summarized in a central registry in the NIRR. The registry contains all of the relevant data of workplaces together with the sources with details applied or used in workplaces.
Parallel with above mentioned registry an additional computerized central registry of radioactive materials is supervised by the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority and maintained by the Institute of Isotope and Surface Chemistry of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Hungary obtained the computer of the registry from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and in the development of the computer program for data acquisition experiences gained from the Agency’s software was utilized. More details and functional data of the registries and the regulatory system will be presented.
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EVALUATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR REGAINING CONTROL OVER RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
Didas Shao Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission, Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania
Abstract. In recent years, almost every part of the world there is a global warning of terrorist. In this matter the safety and security of radioactive materials are very important. In Tanzania technologies that make use of radiation sources and radioactive material is growing day to day. Radioactive materials in the country are used in Agricultural, research establishments, biological and medical laboratories, industrial, universities, mining and medical centers. The safety record of the technologies and their application is good, but the security of radioactive materials has been an issue of concern. The first incidence of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials has been reported in 1996 and other more reported events in 2002. This paper intends to evaluate the national strategies for regaining control over radioactive sources in the country. The evaluation strategies involve regulatory framework; radioactive sources inventories; import/export of radioactive sources; management of disused sources; scrap metal monitoring. Others are search of orphan sources; illicit trafficking in country; USDOE and INNSErv mission and projects and activities Tanzania participating in IAEA.
1. Introduction Radioactive sources have been used in the world now more than century to benefit humankind in agricultural sector, industrial, research, electricity, education, medical and preserving food. In Tanzania the application started in 1940s in mining industries before the existence of regulatory authority. According to National inventory of radioactive sources in use and spent which started maintained from 1986, today in the country there are 121 radioactive sources in use and 82 spent/disused sources [1]. As the application began before the existence of regulatory authority, make big challenge to regulatory authority to track and control all radioactive sources in use/disused in the country. Most of the sources were abandoned when no longer required as far as there was no regulatory authority controlling the application of radioactive sources in the country. Example is the one Cs-137 in category two recovered from the mud in TAZAMA Pipeline Company and three Cs-137 in category 3 recovered from Williamson Diamond Mining Company. This paper summarizes the evaluation of national strategies issues relating safety and security in regaining control over radioactive sources in the country.
2. Regulatory Framework The Atomic Energy Act No. 7.of 2003, which repeal the former Protection from Radiation Act. No. 5 of 1983, provide legal framework for protection of individuals, public and the environmental from harm by establishes and maintain effective safety and security of radioactive materials/radiation devices used in the country. The law establishes the regulatory Authority, Tanzania Atomic energy Commission (TAEC) which is a sole competent authority and is empowered to regulate the safe and peaceful use of atomic energy by ensure that no person shall
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use, possess, produce, export, import, store, process, or disposal of radioactive materials except under the authority of license [2]. TAEC is also responsible for: - carry out regulatory inspections and ensure that corrective actions are taken if unsafe or potentially unsafe conditions are detected, hold or facilitate the conducting of seminars, workshops of short training courses, including public education for the safe and peaceful uses of atomic energy and under technology, Establish, promote or adopt guidelines upon which their regulation actions are based, advise the Government on the administration of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and other related International Nuclear Agreements, protocols, conventions and Treaties and formulate and operate national radiological emergency plan and preparedness.
In the following year 2004, Atomic Energy (protection from ionizing radiation) regulations 2004 were promulgated. The regulations aim to specify minimum requirements for safety and security of radiation sources [3].
3. Radioactive Sources Inventories Inventorying means a campaign to physical check all sources possessed, by specifically and uniquely identifying each individual source using appropriate means such as serial numbers [4]. TAEC has made a good start by developing an electronic inventory [5]. TAEC has several inventories, which grouped in four groups: -The inventory of unsealed and sealed radioactive sources in use; inventory of devices which generate radiation e.g. x-ray equipment; inventory of spent, disused, illicit trafficking, and abandoned/lost sources and final separate inventory of disused/spent sources which stored in temporary Radioactive waste Facility (TRWMF). In the inventories the following are included; physical form; source use history; unique source ID number, the source’s Isotope name and activity on a given date, location, Name of manufacturer/supplier, and source certificate of source. Authors are recommending TAEC to use a single database of sealed radioactive sources in use/spent instead of having several inventories using spreadsheet software. Human resources are required for search and install appropriate software.
4. Import/Export of Radioactive Soruces For good control over orphan radioactive sources, regulatory authority needs be sure that it is aware of all sources that are entering and leaving the country [5]. Tanzania is neither producer nor exporter of radioactive sources. Most exported sources are disused sources, spent or returned to manufacturer/supplier after its useful time or application. Exportation/importation of radioactive sources in the country require license from TAEC. Although in import still there is a little compliance of users who tried to avoid administrative workload of source management, but most users in the country are aware with the requirement of existing regulations in relation of import and export.
5. Import/Export of Commodities In 1998 the control of Radiation contaminated foodstuffs regulations became effective promulgated. These regulations require that all foodstuffs being exported or imported into Tanzania be checked for radioactive contamination. The regulations based only on foodstuffs and not to other commodities such as metals, building materials, etc. The recent regulations required to take considerations of including others commodities to be monitored for radioactive contaminations.
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6. Management of Disused Sources The timely disposal of disused sources is key to a national strategy of source management. The total activity of disused/spent sources in Tanzania is not known as most sources is historical, orphan sources and illicit trafficking. According to inventory of spent/disused radioactive sources, which are controlled by radioactive waste management section up to date, there are 82 disused sources in the country. 61 spent disused sources currently are stored in TRWMF with only 31 needles of Ra-226 conditioned. The remained 21 disused sources still stored at user’s premises. The plans are in progress to complete Central Radioactive Waste Management Facility (CRWMF) where all disused radioactive sources will be collected, conditioned and kept safe and secure waiting the availability of disposal facility in the country. TAEC with cooperation with IAEA expected to move all 82 disused/spent sources, which are in category 1-5 to CRWMF in the coming year 2005.
7. Scrap Metal Monitoring In Tanzania Scrap metal business is increasing because scrap metals are cheaper to be used by metal industries when compared to imported iron [6]. In Tanzania there is a need for scrap metal industries to be monitored as the application of radioactive sources started in 1940, before the existence of regulatory authority. In recognition of this, monitoring in the scrap metal industries done in October 2004 at P & P Industry (J.A. Patel limited), and at Iron and steel limited industry. The two searches, which yielded no discovery of radioactive sources or contamination, it is not the confirmation that there is no possibility of radioactive disused sources to be collected/enter into the scrap metal industries. More searches for other scrap metals industries is are needed and encouragement of scrap metals industries to use radiation monitors to avoid what happened in Goiania Brazil and cause 4 deaths and wide spread contamination [7]. Also there is a need to provide radiation training to scrap metal dealers how to recognize containers of radioactive sources, what radiation trefoil mean and on how to search, locate and recover incase of radioactive sources enter in scrap metal industries.
8. Search of Orphan Sources In Tanzania the contribution of orphan sources is due to the application of radioactive sources started before the existence of regulatory Authority (historical sources) and some users tried to avoid administration workload of source management. In case of historical sources one Cs-137 of category 2 and two Cs-137 in category 3 were discovered in the search which done by regulatory authority. This achieved when regulatory authority was conducting inspection and pay attention to other storage rooms and other areas outside the facilities and led to discovering of those forgotten/abandoned/historical sources. In the second case, this year five companies found imported radiation sources without importation license. The problem identified when inspectors from regulatory authority during inspection asking about the competitors who doing the same work. Then inquiries made as to whether or not they are indeed using radioactive materials. More searches are required in other fields such as research institutes, schools, medical centers and historical big buildings (lighting rods).
9. Illicit Trafficking Lack of proper identification of key problem, which leads to theft or illicit trafficking of radioactive, is set back for formulating strategies to proper maintain the security of radioactive materials and preventing theft or illicit trafficking. In Tanzania already there are 13 incidents of illicit trafficking reported by police from 1996 to Dec 2002. The prevailing problems were identified as; Radioactive sources, which are outside the regulatory control because they are not registered or not known; Lack of enough/proper security of sources stored at user’s premises;
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Lack of public awareness to assist reveal the secrets movement and sell of radioactive sources; Lack of proper training system and equipment for border control officials including customs and police; Searches of orphan sources not done in other fields than industry field. Author propose more training to borders, customs, harbors and ports officials, police and public and practical demonstration on how to detect including how to detect high enriched uranium packages to be conducted and more searches of orphan sources in the country to be given priority by regulatory authority.
10. USDOE and INNSErv Mission
10.1 USDOE In order to keep all disused/spent sources in the country safe and secure National Radiation Commission (NRC) currently known as TAEC has requested the technical and funding assistance from USDOE, and therefore signed the agreement known as Basic Order Agreement (BOA) to upgrade the security of facilities which possess/store the sources of different category. In the country Four Centers, which possess category, 1-2 and two Centers, which possess category 1-5 benefited from the agreement. The agreement includes the installation of radio communication, infrared motion detectors, barriers, interlock and alarm/ electronic devices.
10.2 INNServ Mission Following the work plan 2003- 2007 of the project report of nuclear security RAF/01/021 which was disused in technical committee of the NRC currently TAEC has requested the IAEA expert for fact finding mission on assess and advise on the state control and accountability of radioactive materials., the INNSErv Mission conducted on 3-7 November 2003. The mission visited 10 relevant organizations with security matters of radioactive materials and discussed with the organization’s officers. Through the implementation of the INNSErv recommendations and the national plan, TAEC in cooperation with IAEA prepared a three days local training course for front –line officers on preventing illicit trafficking of radioactive material on 26-28 July 2004, which held in Dar Es Salaam capital city. The training attended by customs officers, clearing and forwarding agents, harbor and ports officers and police. Similar training will be held in Arusha and Mwanza and in the coming event scrap metal dealers, Fire Bridge, will be included.
11. Projects and activities Tanzania participating in IAEA Tanzania is now participating in more than five projects which covers sustainable radiation and waste safety infrastructure, legislative and nuclear security. Participating also in illicit trafficking data base (ITDB). Some of the projects are RAF/9/029, RAF/4/015/, RAF/0/21, RAF/0/15 and national project of safety and licensing of radioactive waste management in Tanzania. Through the projects the country has benefited expert mission advisory from IAEA, postgraduate education in radiation protections, fellowships, scientific visits, on job training courses including local and oversees and various detecting ionizing radiation equipments have received.
12. Conclusion While much has done in the country for regaining control over radioactive materials including seeking international assistance such as USDOE and INNSErv, it is only the beginning and much more needs to be done by providing more basic training to targeted groups such as border and port control officials, law makers, law enforcement, custom officials, user of radiation sources and public. Also it is expected through the national project of safety and licensing of radioactive waste management, the more search of orphan sources and scrap metal industry monitoring will be taken care. Finally it is my great hope IAEA will continue without tired assisting Tanzania in
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regaining control over radioactive sources in the country through training/ workshop and providing equipments.
REFERENCES
[1] National inventory of radiation sources in use and disused/spent radioactive sources
[2] TAEC, the Atomic Energy Act, No. 7 of 2003
[3] TAEC, The Atomic Energy (Protection from Ionization Radiation), Regulations, 2004
[4] IAEA, Security of radioactive sources, Interim guidance for comment 19 March revision
[5] Brian Dodd and Nickolas Goevelinger, National Strategy for regaining control over radioactive sources. An action plan for the United Republic of Tanzania, 2003
[6] Shao Didas, Sungita Yesaya and Banzi Firmi; Challenging Issues in the management of disused sources in the United Republic of Tanzania, IAEA, Symposium Proceedings 13- 17 Cordoba, Spain
[7] IAEA, The Radiological Accident in Goiania 1988
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REGULATORY SUPERVISION OF THE RECOVERY, DECOMMISSIONING AND DISPOSAL OF RTGS IN NORTH-WEST RUSSIA
Malgorzata K. Sneve Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Østerås, Norway
Abstract. Several hundred radioisotopic thermoelectic generators (RTGs) have been used along the Russian Federation’s Arctic coast to power remote lighthouses. Similar RTGs were also used as power sources in other remote locations in the Russian Federation and elsewhere in the Former Soviet Union. The RTGs typically contain one or more strontium-90 radionuclide heat sources (RHSs) of the order of thousands of TBq, making them Category 1 sources within the IAEA scheme. The Norwegian Government has financed the removal of more than 60 RTGs from lighthouses on the Kola peninsula. In parallel with such industrial projects, NRPA has been providing support to regulators in the Russian Federation. The major goal of this Regulatory Support Project is to assist Russian regulatory bodies when developing guidelines and requirements for planning, licensing and implementation of the industry projects. The Russian Federation Nuclear Industrial and Environmental Regulatory Authority (NIERA) has recognised that there is a need for upgrading the regulatory framework for the safe decommissioning and disposal of RTGs in the Russian Federation. A regulatory project with this aim is therefore now being carried out in parallel with the ongoing industrial project. The primary foci of the project are to clarify roles and responsibilities, to establish requirements on source term informatino, and to develop regulatory requirements and regulations suitable to assure the safety and security of RTGs throughout their life-cyle, including use, recovery, transport, decommissioning, storage and disposal. The project will also provide regulatory support in relation to licensing and authorizations, supervision over radiological safety, and emergency preparedness.
1. Introduction Several hundred radioisotopic thermoelectic generators (RTGs) have been used along the Russian Federation’s Arctic coast to power remote lighthouses. Similar RTGs were also used as power sources in other remote locations in the Russian Federation and elsewhere in the Former Soviet Union. The safety and security issues associated with these RTGs are becoming better documented, partly as a result of the IAEA’s programme of assistance to Georgia following a series of incidents involving such sources. The RTGs typically contain one or more strontium-90 radionuclide heat sources (RHSs) of the order of thousands of TBq, making them Category 1 sources as defined in the international Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
In 1993 there were almost 200 RTGs in lighthouses in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions of the Russian Federation. Due to the remoteness of these lighthouses and other factors, maintenance and security of the RTGs has been less than to be desired. While there is no evidence of any attempt to interfere with RTGs with malevolent intent, there have been incidences of theft in which the shielding materials were stolen (presumably for their value as scrap metal) and the RHSs abandoned.
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2. Norwegian Action Plan for Nuclear Safety and Security Between 1995 and the end of 2004, the Norwegian Government’s Action Plan for Nuclear Safety and Security has provided support worth more than €130 million to help improve nuclear safety and security in north-west Russia. Through this Action Plan, Norway has contributed to major projects including the decommissioning of nuclear-powered submarines of the Northern Fleet and rehabilitation of the Andreeva Bay technical base.
The Action Plan has also financed the removal of more than 60 RTGs from lighthouses on the Kola peninsula and their replacement with solar panels and nickel–cadmium battery packs is under way. After inspection and preparatory work, the RTGs were transferred by helicopter, boat and road to a temporary storage point at ATP Atomflot near Murmansk. They were then transported by road and rail to the dismantling point at ARC Izotop in the Moscow region, where the RHSs were removed. The RHSs were then transported by road and rail to PA Mayak, where they are currently stored pending disposal.
Independent consultants working on behalf of NRPA reviewed the environmental impact assessment (EIA) carried out by Russian contractors [1]. The reviewers found some scope for improvement of the EIA, but identified no environmental concerns that would have required Norway to stop funding the project. They concluded that the ‘do nothing’ option was not realistic – if the RTGs were to be left in situ then signficant security improvements would be necessary – and that the approach being adopted presented a low probability of significant environmental impact under both normal and accident conditions, provided proper control measures are maintained.
3. Regulatory Support Projects In parallel with the industrial projects mentioned above, NRPA has been providing support to regulators in the Russian Fedeeration. The major goal of the Regulatory Support Project is to support Russian regulatory bodies when developing guidelines and requirements for planning, licensing and implementation of the industry projects. The general objective is that the industrial projects in north-west Russia be managed in such a way as to efficiently secure an acceptable level of protection of human health and the environment, consistent with Russian Federation Law and with best international guidance and practice, as applicable within the Russian Federation. In addition to the industrial projects mentioned above, major regulatory support projects have included general work to compare applications of and approaches to EIA in the Russian Federation and western countries and specific support in relation to regulation of the possible unloading of spent fuel from the Lepse service vessel.
NRPA’s main partners in the Regulatory Support Project are Gosatomnadzor (GAN) – now incorporated into the new Nuclear, Industrial and Environmental Regulatory Authority of Russia (NIERA) – and to Federal Authority “Medbioextreme” – now the Federal Medical–Biological Agency (FMBA). NIERA is responsible for nuclear safety regulation and nuclear safety assessment in the civilian sphere. NIERA’s responsibilities also include Environmental Impact Assessment and environmental protection related to radioactivity. FMBA regulates human health protection, for workers and the public. In addition, FMBA regulates environmental aspects, but only when it is of relevance to radiation doses to humans, e.g. through foodchain pathways. FMBA also has responsibilities for regulating activities at the Andreeva Bay technical base. Nuclear safety and safety assessment for defence-related activities are regulated by Ministry of Defence (“military GAN”) and the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Minatom – now Rosatom).
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4. Regulatory Support for the Decommissioning of RTGs NIERA has recognised that there is a need for upgrading the regulatory framework for the safe decommissioning and disposal of RTGs in the Russian Federation, taking account of the magnitude of the problem and the high hazard associated with the RTGs, as well as the lack of experience in this area. NRPA is therefore supporting NIERA in a regulatory project bring carried out in parallel with the ongoing industrial project. Other technical organisations are also involved, and the work is coordianted with other western support. The project is intended to relate to RTGs throughout the Russian Federation.
The aim of the project is to upgrade the existing regulatory framework of the Russian Federation for the safe decommissioning and disposal of RTGs, with foci on the following priority areas:
1. regulatory requirements and regulations,
2. requirements for data, safety assessment and quality assurance
3. supervision over radiological safety, and
4. emergency preparedness.
Other areas of interest, such as preparation and certification of the personnel, on-going complaincemonitoring and information of the public are also being considered and may be given closer attention at a later stage.
4.1 Regulatory infrastructure The major initial focus of the project is to ensure that the basic regulatory infrastructure for the control of RTGs is in place and effective.
The first task in this area is to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the different organizations involved – particularly operators and regulators – with respect to the safety and security of RTGs. The aim is to ensure that there is clear allocation of responsibilities, consistent co-ordination of regulatory control and compliance requirements, effective transfer of responsibility a teach stage in the overall management process and transparency within the Russian regulatory regime. Indications are that there are currently gaps in these areas. This task will need to address both the roles and responsibilities relating to RTGs in situ, but also those relating to the other stages involved in decommissioning, including the transport of complete RTGs and of RHSs, the dismantling of RTGs, and the storage and ultimate disposal of RHSs.
In line with the Code of Conduct requirement of a national register of Category 1 and 2 sources, the operating organization is developing – through a parallel industrial project – a database containing comprehensive information related to each RTG, e.g. location, description, key characteristics (including size of radioactive source) and associated potential hazards. The database will also provide an assessment of vulnerability specific to each RTG. Based on analysis of information from this database, NIERA will consider whether the types of data held are adequate for all locations and RTGs, and thus identify gaps in information to be filled through the industrial project.
A major task in this area will be to identify Russian Federation regulations relevant to the control of RTGs and to consider – taking into account international recommendations and national best practice in other countries – whether existing regulations need to be supplemented or modified and/or whether new regulations need to be developed. Again, this review will need to consider safety and security measures at the various stages of the RTG life-cycle: use, recovery, transport, decommissioning, storage and disposal. Any regulations identified through this process as requiring modification or ‘missing’, and which fall within the remit of NIERA, will then be modified or developed.
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Specific aspects of the regulations to be reviewed within this task will be the requirements for assessment of safety and security, and for EIA, in relation to RTGs, provision for inspection and enforcement actions by the regulator, and requirements for emergency preparedness.
4.2 Application and enforcement Once the basic regulatory infrastructure has been updated, it is proposed that further assistance will be provided in relation to some specific aspects of NIERA’s role within the infrastructure.
Accordingly, support will be provided to NIERA in developing an assessment capability, independent of the operators, sufficient to perform its two main functions related to assessment of safety and security, and to EIA, for the various activities involving RTGs, namely:
- developing regulatory guidance for operators on conducting assessments that satisfy regulatory requirements for each stage of the RTG life-cyle: use, recovery, transport, decommissioning, storage and disposal; and
- critically reviewing and evaluating safety and security assessments and EIAs submitted by operators in support of licensing and authorization applications at different stages, as a basis for regulatory decision-making.
This independent capability will feed into the more general regulatory function of evaluating licensing and authorization applications against the updated regulatory requirements.
Support will also be provided to adapt existing inspection procedures, or develop new ones, to be applied to the various stages of an RTG’s life cycle in accordance with the updated regulatory requirements. This will aim to provide a system for tracking and recording inspection procedures developed and monitoring of the risks. The audit trail would ensure compliance with regulation and help identify promptly any irregularities, or potential problems.
Finally, support will be provided for the development of regulatory guidance on requirements for emergency planning in relation to accidents or illegal actions involving RTGs at any stage of their life-cycle, and to improve the capabilities of NIERA (and its TSOs) to fulfil their functions in the event of such an emergency.
4.3 Project timescales The initial work is being carried out in 2005. The priority for 2005 is to have the tasks to strengthen the regulatory infrastructure sufficiently advanced to allow the application and enforcement tasks to proceed during 2006.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
NRPA is grateful for the cooperation of a wide variety of Russian Federation organisations, notably NIERA, in the completion of the work described.
REFERENCES
[1] ACONA group AS (2004). Review and risk Assessment – Environmental Impacts of the Decommissioning of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators in Northern Russia. Rport prepared for the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority. ACONA, Stavanger.
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MANAGEMENT AND PRACTICE OF SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN CHINA
Wucheng Xie China Atomic Energy Authority, Beijing 100037, China
Abstract. The Chinese government is aware that the use of radioactive sources involves risks due to potential radiation exposure, attaches high importance to nuclear safety, makes unremitting efforts to meet and keep a high level of nuclear safety standard accepted internationally. China has established full government infrastructure and corresponding legal system for safety and security of radioactive sources. As the competent authority of nuclear industry involving radioactive sources, China Atomic Energy Authority(CAEA) has made great endeavor to promote the development of application of radioactive sources, in the meantime, in order to protect individuals, society and the environment, with National Nuclear Safety Administration(NNSA) and Ministry of Public Security(MOPS) and Ministry of Health(MOH), taken strict measures to ensure the safety and security during all stages of the life-cycle of radioactive sources and the promotion of safety culture and of security culture with respect to radioactive sources.
1. Roles and Responsibilities
CAEA is the competent authority of nuclear industry in China, The responsibilities of CAEA are as follows:
· Deliberating and drawing up policies and regulations on peaceful use of nuclear energy;
· Deliberating and drawing up the development program, plan and industrial standards for peaceful use of nuclear energy;
· Organizing argumentation and giving approval to China's major nuclear R&D projects; supervising and co-ordinating the implementation of the major nuclear R&D projects;
· Carrying out nuclear material control, nuclear export supervision and management;
· Dealing with the exchange and co-operation in governments and international organizations, and taking part in IAEA and its activities in the name of the Chinese government;
· Taking the lead to organize the State Committee of Nuclear Accident Coordination, deliberating, drawing up and implementing national plan for nuclear accident emergency;
· Taking responsibility for management of physical protection of nuclear materials.
NNSA is mainly safety regulatory body in this sphere. It is responsible for safety surveillance of all stages of the life-cycle of radioactive sources, Deliberating and drawing up regulations and standards on safety of radioactive sources, establishing register system for radioactive sources, conducting a licensing system for nuclear safety, managing professional qualification in this field,
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monitoring of radiological environment of nuclear facilities, investigation and treatment of radiation accidents.
MOPS is responsible for securing radioactive sources, detecting and recovering the lost or stolen radioactive sources, participating in emergency response activities.
MOH is responsible for formulating hygienic rules and standards related to personnel of nuclear facilities and general public, reviewing and approving the evaluation of the health effects on human body due to nuclear contamination, prevention and cure of radiation injury, participating in emergency response activities.
Ministry of Commerce, Customs General Administration and Administration of Railway, Communication, Aviation and Post adopt corresponding measures to control transfer of radioactive sources, participate in safety and security surveillance of radioactive sources.
2. Legislation and Regulation
According to the experience combined with the newest requirements of international nuclear
industry, China continually perfects its nuclear safety laws and codes. The system of laws�codes
and guides for Chinese nuclear safety consists of state laws, administrative regulations of the
State Council, department rules, guiding documents and reference documents. The hierarchy of
nuclear safety laws, codes and guides is listed in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. The hierarchical structure of laws, regulations and guides on nuclear safety of China
Related National laws:
1. Laws on the Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China(1989)
2. Act of Protection and Remedy of Radioactive Contamination of the People’s Republic of
China( 2003)
3. Atomic Energy Act (being legislated)
Related Regulation:
1. Regulation on Radiation Protection of Radioactive Isotope and Radiation Installation(1989, being revised);
2. Regulation on Transportation of radioactive Materials (being legislated).
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3. Emergency Management Regulations for Nuclear and Radiation Accidents(1993, being revised)
3. Management and Practice For a long time the production and management of radioactive sources in China were carried out by the military industry authority, and thus under strict controls. Such control has been further strengthened since the military industrial enterprises were transformed to civilian purposes. The government exercises review and approval throughout the life-cycle of radioactive sources and adopts a licensing system. We categorized radioactive sources according to the newest international requirements, and adopt coherent identification system for relatively dangerous sources, especially for high-risk sources.
We have our national plan for management of radioactive sources throughout the life-cycle. In 2004, We conducted the special action for locating, searching for, recovering and securing radioactive sources all over the country, collected many disused sources to store the storage facilities and strengthened management of vulnerable and dangerous sources .
We have established the responsibility system for related entities in this field. We strengthen physical protection and security management of storage facilities of radioactive sources, install the monitoring and detecting equipments at most customs port for interdicting illicit trafficking of radioactive sources.
We propagandize the basic knowledge and information about radioactive sources to the public, require licensees to organize special training for related workers and some important professional shall get qualification from government, and do some inspection regularly. Every year we sponsor symposium of management of radioactive isotope and radiation installation for promoting close collaboration among government, licensees and related organizations in the area of safety and security of radioactive sources, especially high-risk radioactive sources.
We have established nuclear emergency preparedness and response system�require related organization to conduct regular drills. We can provide for rapid response for radiation accidents caused by radioactive sources to minimize the loss of accidents.
The government supports R&D of technology about radioactive sources to improve safe application of radioactive sources, for example, advanced produce process and analysis, dosimetry, monitoring technology.
The Chinese Government greatly emphasizes the IAEA’s positive role in promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and safety and security management of radioactive sources. We will stick to support the IAEA’s efforts in this area, sincerely hope to keep expanding cooperation and exchanges with other countries in this field, and continuously to make joint efforts to ensure safety and security of radioactive sources.
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SAFETY REGULATION ON RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN CHINA
Zhao Yongminga, Liu huaa, Zhang Jialia, Zhou Qifub. aNational Nuclear Safety Administration,State Environmental Protection Administration b Nuclear Safety Centre
Abstract. With the continuous development of nuclear industry and nuclear technology, RS and radiation generators have been utilized in industry, agriculture, medicine, scientific research and teaching, and contributed to economic development and social progress significantly. However, some RS have been out of control due to lost, theft and illegal transfer, which have led to radiological incidents or accidents. Some of them have caused life casualty, resulted in severe environmental and economic consequences, became unsteady factor of the society.
a. Concerned laws were not perfect, and law on radioactive waste and RS should be issued.
b. Regulation system was not scientific, several authorities were existing and regulations were cross and unstrict.
c. Some facilities didn’t applied for environmental impact evaluation reports, authority and registering. A few facilities illegally sold or transferred sources to those facilities which had no permissions. Some regulations were so weak that quantity of sources was not clear and some sources were not under the effective regulation.
d. Because education to citizens on RS was not enough, safety consciousness was lacking. Furthermore, caution sign of RS wasn’t clear. Some RS were sold to scrap dealers as waste metals, or some were sold to steel works and were melted, some RS lead shields were destroyed, resulted in radioactive pollution.
1. New regulations on RS In order to resolve these problems, a special law against radioactive pollution, “People’s Republic of China Law on the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution”, has been issued and come into force on Oct.1, 2003.
In this law, which regulates “The competent environmental protection administrative department under the State Council shall exercise unified regulation on radioactive pollution prevention and control work for the whole country in accordance with this Law”, the system of radioactive pollution prevention and control is adjusted further.
Also in 2003, the Chinese government put the function of unified supervision of radioactive source under the department of environment administration (nuclear safety administration), thus adjusted the system of radioactive source safety supervision.
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The regulation on RS from cradle to tomb was carried out in China. Authority on manufacture, import, export, sell, operation, store and dispose was set, no company can do these activities without permission. Company should submit the following files to apply for permission.
a. Site, establishment and equipment are accord with the requirements of the law and operation.
b. Have organization and full time or part time staff on radiation safety and protection, have necessary radiation protection things and radiation measurement meter.
c. Staff on radiation protection have special and protection knowledge, and have no occupational forbiddance.
d. Radiation safety, security and protection management system and radiation accident emergency measurement should be established.
e. Facilities should deal with the waste properly which emission gas waste, liquid waste or solid waste.
f. Those who engaged in manufacturing, selling and operating radioisotope and radiation generator with RS should compile environment impact assessment report, and the report should be authorized by provincial environmental protection administrative department.
We implement registering system in RS manufacture, transfer, import and export. Sources who never fulfill registering can not leave factory, transfer, import and export. In order to control the headstream of RS, manufacture, import and export must register from central government environmental protection administrative department.
Coding Rules for Radioactive Sources were being compiled. It means that identity supervision system for sealed sources is going to be implemented. Each source will be given a unique lifetime identity code. Facilities are responsible to fill in the identity cards, while the cards are to be mounted on the assorted instruments or exterior packaging. The identity cards must follow the sources with their transfer.
Radiation protection staff must attend the training which contains related laws and ordinances, radiation safety and protection, special technique, and radiation emergency knowledge. And they must pass the examination of the training and acquire certificate before dealing with radiological operation.
2. Check RS act In order to neaten the management of RS safety, a special action : “check the radioactive source to set civilian’s heart at rest” was conducted in 2004, which was headed by State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA) and attended by the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Health.
From the special action, we find out the quantity, type and distributing of RS through declaration and registration. We inspect the safety of the RS in the process of produce, import, export, sell, operation, transport, store, dispose by means of local check, neaten with time limit and put on record. We collect and deposit the disused/spent radioactive sources forcibly to eliminate the hidden trouble.
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SPECIAL ACTION TO CHECK THE RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN CHINA
Zhou Qifub, Zhao Yongming a, Liu Huaa, Zhang Zhiganga, Zhang Jialia, Yang Chunb, Huang Chaoyunb a National Nuclear Safety Administration, State Environmental Protection Administration, P. R. China b Nuclear Safety Centre, State Environment Protection Administration, P. R. China
Abstract. For the purpose of check the current status of radioactive sources in china and protect people’s health and maintain stability of society, a special action: “check the radioactive source to set civilian’s heart at rest” was conducted from April to November in 2004,, which was headed by State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA) and attended by the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Health. During the special action, we informed the facilities to register their radioactive sources and then go to verify, store the waste radioactive sources, eliminate the hidden trouble, also establish the dynamic regulatory information system.
1. Introduction With the continuous development of nuclear industry and nuclear technology in china, radioactive sources and radiation generators have been utilized through industry, agriculture, medicine, scientific research and teaching and contributed to economic development and social progress significantly. In 2002, an incomplete statistics shows that there were 8300 more application units nationwide, with a sum of 63700 more sources. Meanwhile, there were 13800 more waste radioactive sources to be disposed, among which 270 ones were orphan and 2750 ones were owned by bankrupt enterprises.
In china, the system of radioactive source safety supervision was established from the 50th, but there are many problems existing with respect to radioactive source safety management ever:
(1) Facilities are supervised by several authorities with different policy, so in fact some regulatory measures have not taken into effect.
(2) Regulatory authorities didn’t know the exact quantity of radioactive source, different authority have different statistical result. For examples, Ministry of Health claimed that there are about 50000 radioactive sources throughout the country, but SEPA statistic there are more than 63700.
(3) Supervision on the facilities was not strict. Some facilities didn’t submit environment impact report and applied for authorization before purchasing radioactive sources or assorted equipments as regulated;
(4) Regulatory authority didn’t compile the code for radioactive source, and also didn’t establish national regulatory information system, so can’t control the radioactive source throughout their life.
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The development of radioactive source safety management can’t keep up with the progress of utilization of radioactive source, consequently there are many hidden troubles:
(1) Some facilities bought and sold radioactive sources without authorizations, and regulatory authority then lost the control on these radioactive sources.
(2) Some facilities didn’t carry out their conventional supervision duty, and some facilities lack of necessary security measures. As a result, the defects leading to theft and lost radioactive sources exit widely.
(3) The bankruptcy of enterprises resulted a certain amount of radioactive sources, which are either decommissioned or left unused, these sources have not been sent to municipal radioactive waste repository timely, and thus become hidden trouble to the public and environment.
(4) Poor consciousness of safety and imperfect warning signs of radioactive sources often resulted that radioactive sources were reclaimed and melted as common waste metal, alternatively, their containers were broken. Thus, accidents with people injured or environment polluted happen.
In order to resolve these problems and supervise the radioactive source more effectively, the central government adjusts the system of radioactive source safety management. On Oct.1, 2003, �People’s Republic of China Law on the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution� was issued and come into force. In this law, it regulates “The competent environmental protection administrative department under the State Council shall exercise unified regulation on radioactive pollution prevention and control work for the whole country”.
From April to November in 2004, a special action: “check the radioactive source to set civilian’s heart at rest” was conducted, which was headed by State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA) and attended by the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Health. It’s propose is to check the current status of radioactive sources in china, reclaim and reserve waste radioactive sources safely, clear the harm of radioactive pollution, set up effective regulatory system, promote the safe utilization of nuclear technology, protect people’s health and maintain stability of society.
2. Special action To carry out the special action successfully, SEPA prepared seriously, worked out the scheme which divided special action into three phases-- preparation�execution�summarization, make the action content and action objective definite.
1: preparation
(1) Every government attach importance to special action
Special action was put into practice seriously by governments and regulatory authorities. Some leaders of the State Council cared about the special action and made some written instructions. Leading groups came into existence in each province, and some group’s principal were hold by vice-nomarch.
National and provincial governments all appropriated abundant funds for special action to invite the expert, to buy the instrument and equipment, to train the officials and personnel, these measures insured the success of special action.
(2) Publicize broadly to build favorable social circumstance
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SEPA compiled propagandistic placard, special topic movie and commonweal advertisement and also set up a column on the web site to popularize the radioactive knowledge and convey the information of special action. Every provincial authority propagandized special action and knowledge of radioactivity on a large scale. These measures brought much advantage to the public, advanced their familiarity to radioactive source, eliminated their fear to the radioactivity, and promoted their enthusiasm to participate in the supervision on radioactive source. There were more than 500000 propagandistic materials have been provided throughout country.
(3) Train the personnel
Regulatory authorities lacked technicians of radioactivity safety management and associated personnel of facilities lacked professional knowledge, so SEPA organized some specialist to compile (Train Materials for Radioactive Source Safety Management). SEPA and provincial regulatory authorities had organized some training courses to train officials and associated personnel of facilities, including working content of the special action, establishment of the regulatory information system, law and standard of radioactivity safety and security, radiation protection, etc. According to the statistics, the number of personnel who had attended training course is more than 10000.
2: execution
(1) Handover supervision function of radioactive source completely
According to the (People’s Republic of China Law on the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution) and the scheme of special action, all regional environment protection administrative department and health department cooperated mutual to hand over the supervision function of radioactive source step by step. At the same time, regional health department handed over the archives of authorization and other data of radioactive source to corresponding regional environment protection administrative department.
(2) Facilities declare and register their sources to regulatory authority
To ensure the integrity of data, regulatory authorities exerted a lot of means to inform facilities to declare and register their radioactive sources. For examples, SEPA publicized the uniform hot line for special action; some provincial regulatory authorities publicized on TV and hold videophone meetings; some provincial regulatory authorities examined the records in archives or consulted the business association about the information of facilities which were likely to use radioactive source, etc.
(3) Check in the locale and verify the data
Regulatory authorities had done a lot of work in this phase because it was difficult to find out all radioactive sources. Some facilities disguised their part sources; some facilities purchased radioactive source illegally, and no authority knew; some facilities possessed a mass of radioactive sources, even thousands, so it was hard to check the amount and verified one by one.
To guarantee the data is authentic, Provincial regulatory authorities went to all registered facilities to verify the data of radioactive sources. For those sources registered, authority detected them with instruments. For those lost sources, authority associated with police to put on record and search.
(4) Enforce strictly to eliminate the hidden trouble
During the special action, authorities also examined authorizations, materials for environment protection. bylaws for security, safety precautions, etc and found out some problems. Some
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facilities didn’t carry out their conventional supervision duty; some facilities lacked necessary security measures; some facilities’ workers didn’t operate complying with the bylaws, etc.
These facilities were warned and demanded to rectify. Authorities also performed following inspections to examine whether these facilities had carried out the rectification. Those facilities which refused to rectify were punished. During the special action,, over 3800 facilities were demanded to rectify and about 17 facilities were punished. Also there are over 20 radioactive accidents have been disposed.
(5) Store spent/unused sources
An incomplete statistics shows there are about 20 radioactive sources had been stolen or lost, about 80% of all accidents. Spent/unused sources can’t be stored timely is the main cause. So it is one of the key works to store all spent/unused radioactive sources.
During the special action, a lot of spent/unused radioactive sources had been found. But some of them were buried underground deeply and no one knew where they were after some years; some of them were situated off the beaten track, so it was hard to go to store them.
According to the register data, there are more than 23000 spent/unused sources have not been stored safely throughout the country. Some of them would be reclaimed by production units, others would be stored by regulatory authority and sent to municipal radioactive waste repository.
(6) Compile the code for radioactive sources and establish information system
In order to control the radioactive source throughout their life, we compiled the coding rule for radioactive sources. It meant that identity supervision system for radioactive sources were to be implemented. Each source will be given a unique lifetime identity code unless the half life of the radioisotope is less than 60 days. And after Jan.1, 2005, it is forbidden to produce, import, export, sell, use and store radioactive sources without identities. All provincial regulatory authorities have coded all radioactive sources based on this code rule.
SEPA had introduced Regulatory Authority Information System (RAIS) from IAEA in Aug and trained officials of provincial regulatory authorities and associated personnel from production units. And then they input the information of facilities and sources into the database to construct respective information system.
3: summarization
(1) Examine and check strictly
Up to November, special action had been accomplished in all provinces. Each provincial authority constituted workgroup to recheck the information of radioactive sources, to recheck whether facilities have carried out the rectification, etc.
SEPA mapped out detailed tabulation based on the information feed backed from each provincial authority and require them to fill in seriously.
On Dec, SEPA, Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Health constituted united workgroup to check the accomplishment of special action in all 31 provinces.
3. Achievement 1: SEPA exercise unified regulation on radioactive source
Smoothly handover of supervision function from Ministry of Health eliminated the institutional flaw. Environment protection administrative department began to exercise unified regulation on
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radioactive prevention and control work for the whole country and would recertification for radioactive source on January 1, 2005.
The Chinese government will issue a new regulations on (The Regulations on safety and protection of radioisotope and irradiation apparatus) at the beginning of 2005. A department rule (Rules on Radiological Accident Management) will also been issued soon. And a three year plan has been worked out to standardize the radioactive source safety supervision, during which assorted bylaws would be completed.
2: Make the current status of radioactive source clear
Through this special action, we make the current status of radioactive source clear, master the amount, distribution, nuclide and other information of the radioactive sources.
As mentioned at the beginning, there were about 8300 facilities nationwide with a sum of 63700 radioactive sources in 2002. But after special action, we find that the number of facilities registered at regulatory authority is 12412 and the number of radioactive source is 108504, respectively increased 49.5% and 70.3%. The number of radioactive source in using is 76022.
Most of the nuclide is 137Cs and 60Co, respectively account for 44.8% and 27.0%.
3: store the spent/unused radioactive sources
To store the spent/unused sources and orphan sources is one of the key works of special action, also is the most difficult. During the special action, there were about 8594 radioactive sources had been stored into radioactive waste repository.
To store spent/unused radioactive sources not only can decrease the possibility of lost and theft, eliminate the hidden trouble, but also alleviate the public’s mental pressure.
4: establish the national dynamic information system
Identity supervision system for sealed sources is going to be implemented in china. All radioactive sources have been coded and input into provincial database, these data would be consolidated into national dynamic information system.
SEPA is establishing a data centre of radioactive source supervision to collect the data from each provincial authority, then consolidate them and analyze. These data would be updated periodically and hence achieve the dynamic management.
4. Conclusion It is the first time to organize so large-scaled actions after SEPA began to exercise unified regulatory on radioactive source, and achieve consummation. It is also important for future supervision of radioactive source.
Special action attacked a lot of people’s attention, from country leaders to the public. During the special action, a lot of persons worked hard to achieve the target of the special action. And we believe that supervision of radioactive source in china would become more normatively, effectively and scientifically.
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Technical Session 3: Regional and International Efforts to Regain Control
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DECOMMISSIONING OF RTGS IN NORTHWEST RUSSIA: THE NORWEGIAN APPROACH FOCUSING ON RISK AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS.
I. Amundsena, I. E. Finnea, W.J.F. Standringa , P.E. Fiskebeckb Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Østerås, Norwaya Office of the County Governor of Finnmark, Vadsø, Norwayb
Abstract. The nuclear legacy in Northwest Russia continues to be a large concern for Russia’s neighbouring countries, the international community and indeed Russia herself. Potential radiation hazards to man and environment from accidents at nuclear installations and waste starages should be a focus area. The process of removing a potential radiation hazard may lead to an increase in risk in the short term. However, this risk is usually of minor importance when decomissioning Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs), compared to future potential risks if the “do nothing” option is chosen. Removing and securing RTGs has been a priority task for Norway in recent years. Fifty-five RTGs were removed and secured by the end of 2004. A further 31 RTGs are planned to be decomissioned in 2005. It is important to minimize risks when decommissioning. Performing risk and environmental impact assessments that address different options are key tools used to provide a minimum risk to man and environment from a specific measure. Such an assessment was performed in 2004, and additional assessments are planed during 2005 acitvities. International consensus on requirements for these assessments is needed to reduce potential risks for radioactive contamination, especially when western donor countries fund specific projects in Russia.
1. Introduction The Norwegian government annually allocates funding to help improve the safety and security of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in Northwest Russia. An important goal is to prevent potential radioactive contamination of the environment from waste storages and nuclear facilities. Such activities are funded by the Norwegian Nuclear Action Plan (NNAP), which is administered by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA). An important aspect of the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) involvement is to provide independent assessments of health and environmental consequences of specific projects. According to a statement from the Norwegian parliament, health- and environmental assessments should be carried out prior to projects receive funding.
Along the Arctic coast of Russia, in remote areas where electricity is not available, there are lighthouses powered by RTGs in which a radioactive strontium-90 source produces heat that powers a generator. The generator produces electricity to power the lamp in the lighthouse. RTGs are also used as power sources in radio beacons and weather stations and are found throughout Russia and other former Soviet republics. At present, about 750 RTGs are located in remote areas of Russia. The large majority of them belongs to the Northern Fleet or the Ministry of Transport.
Decommissioning RTGs in Northwest Russia is a priority area under NNAP. This project is headed by the Office of the County Governor of Finnmark and is carried out in close cooperation
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with the Regional Administration in Murmansk and VNIITFA (the All Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation).
There are important security, environmental and radiological protection incentives for the RTG decommissioning project. The RTGs contain highly radioactive strontium-90 sources, which represent a local environmental and public hazard. Due to insufficient regulations for control and physical protection of the sources, many RTGs are accessible to intruders and the general public. A number of thefts from RTGs has been discovered in recent years. In 1999, 2001 and 2003 RTGs have been vandalised mainly due to attempted theft of the valuable cladding metals in the RTG structure. These thefts demonstrate that intruders may easily gain access to these radioactive sources and highlight the potential security concerns related to RTGs in remote areas.
An independent health and environmental assessment has been undertaken as part of the joint Norwegian-Russian project to decommission RTGs in Northwest Russia. It is based on information received from VNIITFA (the Russian project leader for the decommissioning work), as well as independent reviews and assessment.
2. Decommissioning of rtgs Inside the RTG are one or up to six radioactive sources (Radioactive Heat Sources – RHS) that decay, thereby generating heat which is transformed into electrical energy by a semiconductor thermoelectric converter. The RTGs used in Russian lighthouses utilise radioactive strontium, Sr-90, a beta-emitter with a half-life of 29.1 years. The activity level in one RTG may range from 0.7 PBq to 13 PBq. The 90Sr is most often in the form strontium titanate (SrTiO3) chosen specifically as it is a high-temperature resistant, relatively insoluble ceramic. X-rays are emitted as bremsstrahlung when the beta radiation from the 90Sr is absorbed in nearby materials. RTG cores are shielded in a special capsule to reduce the external radiation emissions. Radiation dose rate to Man can reach 10 Sv/h on the surface of an unshielded core, which could provide a lethal dose within half an hour of exposure.
The removal and securing of RTGs started in 1997. Since that time a total of 55 RTGs, containing 65 RHS, have been removed from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblast with funding from Norway. Thirty-seven of the RTGs have been replaced with solar cell panels. All of the replaced RTGs belonged to the Northern Fleet. A general procedure for RTG decommissioning has been as follows: The RTGs are inspected to assess their current condition; are removed from their location by helicopter to a temporary storage site; the RTG is then transported further to RTP Atomflot by a boat belonging to the hydrographical service of the Northern Fleet; the RTGs are then transported by train to VNIITFA near Moscow where the RTGs are dismantled. The RHS are then taken out and placed in a special shielding device before being transported by train (in especially built railway wagons) for final storage at Mayak Production Association in South Ural. At Mayak the RHS await vitrification, together with other high-level radioactive waste, and final storage. More information on decommissioning activities can be found in publications from The Office of the County Governor of Finnmark [1] and from NRPA [2].
During the period 2006 – 2009 Norway are planning to fund removal of all remaining RTGs in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Nenets (about 110) and replace them with solar cell panels. International effort is needed to enhance the speed of RTG removal and waste handling. The rate of waste treatment and storage at Mayak is 100 RHS each year. Other bottlenecks are the need for more transport containors and lack of proper interim storage facilities.
3. Risk and Environmental impact Assessment Prior to decomissioning activities in 2004, it was decided to perform an independent risk and environmental impact assessment of the work funded by Norwegian. The scope of the assessment
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was the removal of 23 RTGs located in the Barents Sea and White Sea region. The main aims of impact assessments are to minimize or avoid adverse health and environmental effects before they occur and to incorporate environmental factors into the decision making process. Here, adverse effects are understood to be detrimental effects on local and distant human populations and the environment.
The purpose of the independent assessment was to:
• Review the scope and content of the existing Russian assessment, their proposed working procedures and quality assurance measures
• Provide an independent analysis of the potential worker, public and environmental risks associated with the 2004 RTG decommissioning project
• Make recommendations on improvements to the work specifications and their implementation
As part of this work, three different key scenarios were considered: accidentally dropping an RTG into the sea; a drop onto the shoreline or in very shallow seawater and a drop onto (or other accident) on land.
A first step in the process was to obtain first hand information regarding health, safety and environmental aspects associated with RTG decommissioning. Such information was obtained by the Russian operator and project leader (VNIITFA). The process of obtaining information from the Russian project leader was very similar to the internal process in Norway between a regulatory authority and the operator. A chronological overview of the process is given below:
Some of the main outcomes from the assessment was as follows [3]:
1. As the 90Sr heat source is well protected in a RTG of good stand it is deemed highly unlikely that a hypothetical accident connected to the planned decommissioning of RTGs will cause radiation exposures to the surroundings. If, in the unlikely event of a breach being caused to the RTGs multiple protective layers during an accident, the 90Sr source is exposed to air or water, the resultant spreading of radioactivity will be very limited due to the low solubility of the 90Sr titanate matrix. The 90Sr titanate also has a high melting point, indicating that the risk of radioactive contamination due to fires is also negligible.
2. The very robust nature of the RTG system and its low potential for significant releases of activity to the environment and hence migration rates into the food chain of the radioactive source material, has been demonstrated. This indicates a low probability of significant environmental impacts under both normal and accident conditions providing the control of the project, its work plans, safety regulations and a consistent approach to compliance and communication by all involved parties is achieved.
3. The “do nothing” option (i.e., leaving the RTGs where they are) is not realistic. However, the instigation of a high security regime designed to protect the radioactive sources is a possible option that might be cost effective. The EIA process should cover reasons for not considering any options and why they are discounted.
Based on results from the independent assessment it is concluded that the decommissioning project should continue, as leaving the RTGs unmonitored could potentially lead to a risk of undesired access to radioactive materials. However, it is important to ensure that the relevant Russian regulatory authorities and organisations have clear separate responsibilities throughout the entire process of inspecting, collecting and dismantling the RTGs, as well as the storage and disposal of radioactive waste generated from decommissioning. Radiation protection guidelines
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should be reviewed and amended where necessary with correct procedures and checklists to ensure compliance.
The following recommendations were stated:
• Guidelines for radiation protection and procedures to ensure implementation should be documented
• Transport by helicopter should be used only where the lack of other transport options means that it is necessary and over as short distances as possible
• When using helicopter transport, an emergency beacon should be used to help recover the RTG in case of an accident
• Experience from previous work on removal and handling of RTGs should be documented and a report summarizing the work in 2004 should be submitted to NRPA.
4. Conclusions The removal and securing of RTGs is considered to be an important task to reduce the radiation risks to man and environment from exposure to these sources.
The independent assessment in 2004 provided specific information regarding present and potential health, safety and environmental consequences of the removal of RTGs. Even though some information was lacking comparing to the requirements for a complete EIA, the outcome increased our knowledge, which will be useful for future decommissioning of RTGs in Northwest Russia. This work will be followed up prior to funding further decommissioning work in 2005.
The Norwegian government has stated that they will provide funding for removal of all RTGs in the Murmansk, Akhangelsk and Nenets areas in the years to come. It is important to obtain an international focus on removing and securing theese radioactive sources. At the CEG workshop in Oslo, 16-18 February 2005, decommisioning of RTGs was a focus area and it was agreed to establish an international coordination group to address the topic.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are grateful for the cooperation of the Russian organisations and authorities involved in the RTG decommissining, and especially VNIITFA for obtaining information on health and safety aspects.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
RITEG Dismantling on the Kola Peninsula, The Murmansk Regional Government, The Office of Finnmark County Governor, 2003. Dismantling of RTGs on the Kola Penninsula, NRPA bulletin, 07:2004. www.nrpa.no Assessment of environmental, health and safety consequences of decommissioning radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs) in Northwest Russia, Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, NRPA report 2005:4.
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GERMAN SUPPORT TO SECURE RADIOISOTOPE GENERATOR SOURCES IN RUSSIA
P. Bogorinski, G. Pretzsch Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Köln, Germany
Abstract. Germany, represented through the Foreign Office, provides financial support to the Russian Federation in the framework of the G8 Global Partnership programme to secure nuclear and radioactive materials against misuse and proliferation. In this context, GRS, on behalf of the Foreign Office, is co-ordinating activities to create secure interim storages for disused radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RITEG) from Siberia at the Irkutsk Specialized Enterprise RADON. Tasks of this project encompass constructing the storage, locating and registering the RITEG and transporting them to the interim storage. A similar project is intended for RITEG from the Baltic Sea which will also include their replacement by alternative energy sources.
1. Introduction The German Foreign Office is funding physical protection measures for several nuclear sites in the Russian Federation within the framework of the G8 Global Partnership programme to secure nuclear and radioactive materials. Concerns about the misuse of disused radioactive sources to build radioactive dispersion devices (RDD, also “dirty bomb”), which may be exploded to cause contamination of large economic centres thus disrupting their activities, initiated a recent project to secure such sources. Of biggest concern in this respect are the radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RITEG) which are used in remote regions of the arctic and pacific costs of Russia as well as along waterways in the Baltic Sea to power lighthouses and meteorological stations as well as military installations.
The core of a RITEG consists of a strong Sr-90 source producing heat due to its radioactive decay which is then converted by means of thermoelectric effects into electricity. The total activity inventory of Strontium-90 and its daughter Yttrium-90 depends on the RITEG type and ranges from 3.7 to 37 1015Bq (105 to 106 Ci).
2. Description of projects
2.1 Siberia and Far East A large number of the RITEG addressed here are located in remote regions of western and eastern Siberia including the territories of Krasnoyarsky Kray, the Republic of Yakutia, Kamchatkaya Oblast, the Autonomous Region of Chukotka, and Primorsky Kray. Figure 1 shows a map of their application. It demonstrates that these areas constitute about 60% of the territory of the Russian Federation. The project presented in this section addresses only RITEG which are in the possession of the Russian Ministry for Transport.
According to data of the State Supervision for Technology, Ecology and Nuclear Safety (ROSTECHNADZOR, formerly GOSATOMNADZOR) approximately 300 RITEG reached or
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exceeded their design lifetime. Their estimated total activity inventory of Sr-90 and Yt-90 approaches 1018 Bq.
For the past ten years disused RITEG have not been properly maintained and secured. Therefore, they constitute a substantial radiological hazard for the population and the environment of the Russian Federation and of neighbouring countries of the northern hemisphere. In addition they may also attract terrorists to make use of them in RDD attacks. Theft has already occurred, mostly for economical reasons to sell the metal surrounding the source.
On-site physical protection and maintenance of these disused RITEG seems to be unfeasible for organizational and economical reasons, namely because of their remoteness and the distribution of their locations along the coasts. The administrative regions (kray, republic, and oblast), where RITEG are or have been in use, have no possibility to collect and store RITEG due to lack of appropriately licensed sites and also lack of trained personnel and of proper storage installations. One option would be to send RITEG back to the producer, e.g. the All-Russian ISOTOP enterprise or for reprocessing to the Mayak Production Association. This would require the needed capacities for storage or reprocessing to be available and would also involve the risk and costs of transportation over very long distances. Therefore, an alternative and most sensible approach is to create regional central storages at those sites which are in possession of respective licenses, e.g. at the regional RADON enterprises.
Considering Central Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation, as shown in the map in figure 1, the favoured site for a central storage is the RADON Specialized Enterprise in Irkutsk.
Fig. 1. Service area for the planned Ir
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kutsk central storage for RITEG
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The Irkutsk site and the RADON facility seem to be favourable for this purpose for several reasons:
− The location of the town of Irkutsk allows optimizing the transportation routes in terms of their length as well as in terms of radiological risk. For a big part RITEG could be transported from the Arctic Ocean along the rivers Lena and Yenissey and their contributories to the towns of Kirensk and Krasnoyarsk respectively and from there with the enterprise’s transportation vehicles to their storage destination. These transportation routes would avoid densely populated areas thus reducing the potential consequences of a radiation accident.
− The geological environment at the foreseen site close to Irkutsk has favourable conditions compared to other similar facilities.
− RADON is a specialized state organization which is in possession of the required licenses to transport radioactive substances, to manage them on site, and to operate radioactive waste storages:
− The site is large enough to built the storage building within the licensed areas;
− The site has a well developed infrastructure to manage radioactive waste;
− RADON employs well trained personnel;
− RADON operates a well operating system for radiation monitoring and for physical protection of radioactive material;
− RADON operates the needed number of transportation vehicles;
− RADON employs the only emergency and rescue service for radiological incidents in Siberia and the Far East, which is certified by the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations and which is fully operational.
The project stretches over three years. It will be carried out in close collaboration with the RADON Specialized Enterprise in Irkutsk, the Ministry of Industry of the Russian Federation and ROSTECHNADZOR. The first step will be the identification of the RITEG and their registration in an appropriate tracking, surveillance and documentation database. This will be followed by designing the requested interim storage facility including its physical protection system. Next, ROSTECHNADZOR and other competent authorities will be appropriately involved in granting the permission to construct the storage and also, at a later stage, in granting the operational license. Thereafter, the building will be erected and the necessary systems will be installed. The existing physical protection system and the radiation monitoring system of the site will be modernized. After completion, the RITEG will be collected and transported to the newly constructed long-term storage.
2.2. Baltic Sea A second project is in preparation which concerns about 100 RITEG operated in the Baltic Sea. Different types are in use there, see figure 2. In addition to collecting the RITEG, their transportation to a central interim storage, the site of which has not yet been selected, and securing them, this project will also deal with their replacement by appropriate alternative energy sources such as wind or solar energy. The project preparation is at a very early stage and is intended to be carried out in close collaboration with ROSATOM. Funding has not yet been allocated.
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Fig. 2. Usage of RITEG in the Baltic Sea
3. Summary and Conclusion Two projects have been proposed in the frame of the G8 Global Partnership programme to secure radioactive Sr-90 sources from Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, one for the regions of Central Siberia and the Far East of Russia and the other for the Baltic Sea. Both involve the construction of a central interim storage and the registration of the RITEG, their collection and transportation from their current location to the storage. In addition to the prime objective of physical protection both projects will require extensive expertise in the following areas:
− Analysis of the consequences of potential terrorist activities using RDD;
− Radiation protection during transport and storage;
− Accident analysis (scenario development, consequence analysis)
− Remediation after potential radiation accidents;
− Decommissioning.
At the end of the projects about 400 RITEG will be stored in a secured long-term interim storage waiting for further processing and eventually final disposal.
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REPATRIATION IN FRANCE OF THE IRRADIATION DEVICE LISA3 FROM THE COCODY UNIVERSITY IN ABIDJAN (IVORY COAST)
Patrice CharbonneauA2, Bernard CrabolB, Jean François Mousseignec a Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
bCommissariat à l’Energie Atomique, Centre de Saclay, France cCommissariat à l’Energie Atomique, Direction des Relations Internationales,
France
Abstract. In 1969, a irradiation device, LISA3 type, was given by France to the research institute ITIPAT of Ivory Coast. This institute was involved in research on food conservation. The LISA3 irradiator, made in France, is equipped with 8 sources of 5000 Ci of 137Cs each one, i.e. a total activity in 1969 of 40000 Ci (1500 TBq). The irradiator was installed on the campus of the COCODY Abidjan university. When ITIPAT institute disappeared, the installation remained on the campus. In 1995, IAEA drew the attention of the presidency of the Ivory Coast Republic on the risk linked with the presence of the irradiator. Ivory Coast required the assistance of France for the elimination of the radioactive sources and their storage in a safe place. The French Atomic Energy Commission was in charge of organizing the operations. It appeared rapidly that dismantling locally the irradiator was not possible and that the only possible way was to bring back the irradiator in France and dismantle it in an appropriate facility. These actions were performed in October 2003. This paper describes the solutions which were adopted for the evacuation and the transport of the device to France and its dismantling. The organization settled for this purpose is also described. The total cost of the operation (approximately 300 k€) and the financial aspect are also considered.
1. Introduction
In 1969, a LISA3 type irradiator was given by France to the Ivory Coast research institute ITIPAT. This institute was involved in research on food conservation. The LISA3 irradiator, made in France, was equipped with 8 sources of 5000 Ci of 137Cs each one, i.e. a total activity in 1969 of 40000 Ci (1500 TBq). The dose rate in the irradiation chamber was approximately 700 Gy/h at this time.
The irradiator was installed in a small building (figure 1) on the campus of the COCODY Abidjan university. When the ITIPAT institute disappeared, the installation remained on the campus. In 1995, considering the risk linked with the presence of the irradiator, IAEA drew the attention of the presidency of the Ivory Coast Republic. Ivory Coast required the assistance of France for the 2 today retired
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elimination of the radioactive sources and their transport and storage in a safe place. The French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) was in charge of organizing the operations. It appeared rapidly that dismantling locally the irradiator was not possible and that the only possible way was to bring it back to France and dismantle it in an appropriate facility. It appeared also rapidly that the simplest and the cheapest way to bring back the irradiator in France was a maritime shipment. In order to limit the cost of the operation, a regular transport was preferred to a dedicated one (see § 4 hereafter).
2. Organization et responsibilities
In July 2000, the CEA/ Direction of International Relations (DRI) launched the operations. The roles of the different participants were defined, in connection with IAEA, as follows : IAEA is ordering the operations and entrust CEA with the organization of the operations. CEA subcontracted the different actions : the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) in charge of designing the operations and coordinating them, Areva Cogema Logistics (ACL) in charge of organizing the transport of the irradiator from Ivory Coast to France, Schering Cisbio International, heir of the CEA division formerly supplier of the sources, in charge of dismantling the irradiator and conditioning the sources in an appropriate cask.
3. Progress of the operations
3.1 Preparation In April 2002, 4 French experts went to Abidjan for one week in order to : meet the Ivory authorities, meet the local companies involved in the actions on the Ivory Coast territory, define the operations to be handled locally, evaluate the condition of the irradiator, and gather all the relevant information necessary for the evacuation of the irradiator. The French experts observed that the irradiator was in good condition. No mark of damage of it was noticed. Radiological controls were performed and showed no detectable surface contamination on the irradiator. The γ dose rate inside the building reached a maximum value of 0,3 µGy/h, mainly due to the presence of a neutron source located close to the irradiator. Elsewhere, the dose rate was comparable to the background. The road from the university campus to the Abidjan harbor was traveled through in order to verify that no particular problem could be met by the transport convoy. The technical and administrative aspects of the operations in Ivory Coast, as well as a preliminary planning, were discussed with the director of the National Laboratory for Public Health (LNSP) and the director of the COCODY university. Following this visit, the recommendations of the French experts were presented to the IAEA in May 2002. They concern the reinforcing of the survey of the building where the irradiator was located, the need to validate the road to be followed on the campus and outside the campus, the evacuation of the neutron source from the building to the LNSP where exists an appropriate cell. An other important aspect of the preparation concerned the transport of the irradiator to France. Different tasks were performed : finding an appropriate container, designing and preparing the wedging of the irradiator inside the container, organizing the shipment of the container, getting the authorization of transport from the national safety authorities, getting the customs documents,…
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3.2 Intervention The evacuation and transportation of the irradiator was planned from 09th to 17th of October 2003. These dates took into account different constraints, notably the availability of the transportation container, the time necessary to get the different authorizations, and the agenda of the ships bringing the empty container from France to Abidjan and bringing back to France the container with the irradiator.
Two French experts, one from ACL, the other being the IRSN coordinator, were present in Ivory Coast during this period. On October 14, a meeting with the Ivory Coast Health, Education and Environment Ministers, with representatives of the national police and the French experts took place. The aim of this meeting was to verify that the preparative actions were realized and that the operational actions could be launched.
These actions were launched on October, 16. The irradiator was settled in the container and transported from the campus to the LNSP. Radiological controls of the irradiator were performed and showed no surface contamination. The container was under police survey all the time until the arrival of the ship in Abidjan and its transportation to the harbor. The departure occurred on October 22 morning, the container was shipped on the boat and the boat leaved Abidjan harbor at midday on the same day. It arrived in France on October 30 in the morning. In the evening, the loading was in the facility of Shering Cisbio International company.
3.3 Dismantling On October 31, the irradiator was removed from the container, controlled by the Shering radioprotection service and stored in an appropriate building. Some days after, the irradiator was transported in hot cell where the 8 sources were extracted. A control showed no surface contamination of the sources. The sources were then placed in a lead cask.
4. Total cost of the operation The global cost of the operations was around 300 k€, shared as follows : approximately one third for the transportation aspects, approximately one third for the dismantling of the irradiator and the conditioning of the sources in a lead cask, the last one third covering CEA and IRSN manpower, storage of the sources and other expenditures. As already indicated, a regular ship, accepting the container with other goods, was chosen in order to reduce the cost. A dedicated ship should have increased the cost of approximately 200 k€. The financing was ensured by the French Foreign Office, CEA and IAEA.
5. Conclusion We believe that the success of the operation was possible thanks to the following factors:
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a good preparation and a large involvement of all the intervening bodies. All along the preparation of the operation, regular meetings were organized by the CEA with the subcontractants in order to discuss the different options and take the right decisions ; the French Foreign Office, in relation with the French Embassy in Ivory Cost, played also an important role in this preparative phase, a very good collaboration with the Ivory Coast authorities and government departments involved in the operation, the choice of experimented people for the operational aspects, able to react and adapt to the circumstances, sometimes not foreseeable, all along the process.
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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE SECURING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN AZERBAIJAN
Ibrahim Gabulov Institute of Radiation Problems of Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, Baku, AZ1143; Azerbaijan
Abstract. The role of international cooperation during last 3 years in the secucring radioactive sources in the Republic of Azerbaijan is given in this paper. The issues regarding improvement securing radioactive sources, seacrhing orphan sources as well as the enforcement of control over export, import, transit and other movement of radioactive materials are presented in the paper.
1. Introduction The Republic of Azerbaijan has no nuclear facilities or nuclear materials at own territory. Nuclear activities in Azerbaijan are limited by peaceful application of nuclear sciences and technology such as typical uses in oil industry, medicine, agriculture and scientific researches. Azerbaijan has a legislative and regulatory basis in the field of peaceful application of nuclear energy.
It is necessary to note that the the Republic of Azerbaijan has strategic geographical location. Azerbaijan looks like special “bridge” between East and West. Addionally, the country is surrounded by the States having nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons on the one side and on the other hand the States trying to develop nuclear technologies and nuclear explosive devices or so-called “dirty bombs”. Therefore, is makes the country is interesting from different view points as for instance a transit corridor for both licit and illicit trafficking of radioactive sources as well as nuclear or radiological terrorism.
It is obviously that the IAEA has a leading role in the global efforts to improve the global nuclear and radioactive security framework. During last 3 years after that Azerbaijan joints to the IAEA, huge volume of work and efforts were done in order to bring radiation safety and physical protection levels into the line with international requirements. Azerbaijan Government carriest out certain actions in order to upgrade existing situation, but it is very important to assist and share with them modern approach and cumulative knowledge, skills, experience and expertise on multiple issues of securing radioactive sources. So, it is necessary to continue efforts in these directions, because the general level of the security and safety of radioactive sources is still underdeveloped.
2. Main Results Physical protection levels of radioactive sources located at the most facilities were significantly improved in 2004 using financial support from the US Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration “Radiological Threat Reduction Program”. Problems connected with high-level activity radioactive sources are being solved by the construction of long-term storage facility. It is extremely need to remove immediately used radioactive sources with 60Co and 137Cs isotopes from different locations into specialized facility “Isotope” after that construction process will be completed. This activity could be done using IAEA assistance and specialized team.
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Searching and disposal of orphan sources that could be lost by the Former Soviet Union military units are additional issues that cause anxiety. There are some unconfirmed report that high-activity radiation sources such as thermoelectric generators (RTG) were lost by Former Soviet Union troops. Therefore, it is need to conduct comprehensive searching of radioactive sources throughout the country and probably it will be the better solution to start this activity from territories located near to former military units. Implementation of these efforts will be practically impossible without full scope international support and mainly from the side of IAEA specialists having sufficient experience and skills in this area.
However, before inviting IAEA expert mission on these issues it will be good solution if the country will prepare a list of possible orphane sources along with sites where the sources could be located, but in fact it is not so much easy because some information was lost after Soviet Union collapse. There is a need to update accounting and control for radioactive sources and materials. It is need fully complete national database for the inventory of radiation sources. That is why the country can use in such a case IAEA or other international organizations assistance in getting information from appropriate States or institutions.
IAEA experts can work with Azerbaijan experts for priotirization of the list of possible orphane sources and search sites based on the IAEA categorization system. Another issue is search methodology. What type methodology should be use? What type equipment should be use? IAEA and Azerbaijan experts have to discuss and propose search methodologies for each possible orphan source as well as necessary equipment. Taking into account local conditions we can say that Azerbaijan needs additional equipment, which will be used to search potential source locations. IAEA experts could provide a short time training for local experts for familiarization with modern searching equipment.
Additional issue –What type team needed and what team has to be created for searching? IAEA and Azerbaijan experts could discuss this issue and prepare some recommendations for responsible authorities. It is suggested that this team could be consist of specialist from regulatory bodies, enforcement structures and scientists. The involving of scientists as a radiation safety specialists will allow to reduce significantly the risks of irradiation exposure for team members. In addition, it is suggested to use existing capabilities from the Institute of Radiation Problems (IRP) of Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences as a main scientific institution dealing with radiation issues in Azerbaijan for carrying out expertize in case if orphane sources will be found. Established team have to be trained by the IAEA experts based on the experience from other countries where such kind activities have been implemented.
Another issue is an export, import, transit and other movements of radioactive sources through State boundary. This issue could be considered together with issue about illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. Taking into account a fact that Azerbaijan is developing-transit country with underdeveloped export controls [1], presented issues have to bring to the forefront. Enforcement of export control and transit requirements pertaining to nuclear and other radioactive materials as well as preventing, detecting and responding to the smuggling requires awareness and specialized knowledge on the part of customs and border guard officials as well as national security and other appropriate enforcement institutions. The absence of sufficient experience and skills among law enforcement officials on issues regarding nuclear materials and radioactive sources facilitates smuggling of these kinds of items. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the level of knowledge of enforcement officials in the area of security and safety of radioactive sources. Such kind activities are carried out by the specialists of IRP along with the US Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Argonne National Laboratory and IAEA. However, this work has to be established on permanent basis. Another issues closely connected with illegal movement across borders is unsufficient level radiation detection equipment on the border control check-points. Certain work has been done already
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within the framework of Technical Cooperation projects between IAEA and Azerbaijan. Some activity is being carried out within “Nuclear Security Implementation Support” (AZB/9/003) National TC and other regional projects. However, the activity in this field has to be continued in order to provide assurance that Azerbaijan’s borders will be sufficiently guarded from any illegal actions . Thus, the strengthening controls over export, import, transit and other movements (legal or illegal) of radioactive sources is issue that has to be one of the priorities in further cooperation between Azerbaijan and IAEA.
Securing radioactive sources and combating illicit trafficking require not only reliable detection and seizure radioactive or nuclear materials on the borders or at the control check-points, but also the establishment of National Nuclear Security and Radiation Safety Laboratory that will has to be directly involved in the characterisation of seized nuclear or radioactive materials. Such kind laboratory is being established on the basis of the Institute of Radiation Problems within the framework of “Development of National Capabilities for Radionuclide Monitoring” (AZB/9/004) National TC Project. Establishment of this laboratory will give the opportunity to significantly reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region and to create conditions, which also allow to detect so-called “Orphan” radioactive sources. This laboratory will has to be take part at the response to the cases of illicit trafficking and criminal use of nuclear and radioactive substances, starting from the on-site investigation of the package at the place of the incident and completing by the issue of an expert conclusion concerning the characteristics of the seized material, which is submitted to the competent low-enforcement institutions. However, the funds specified in the project budget will not allow to establish fully equiped laboratory and Azerbaijan will need to find additional financial sources for extended technical capabilities of this lab. Using international assitance could be and should be considered in this respect.
Special action plan that will show in details all above stated including the timetable for proposed recommendations could be as a final result of IAEA expert mission. Such kind action plan has to be established as soon as possible and passed to the responsible institutions.
Such kind plan could be considered as a basis for creation of effective national programme on security and safety of radioactive sources.
3. Conclusion The following steps have to be implemented as soon as possible in the Republic of Azerbaijan for strengthening security of radioactive sources:
- to remove all used radioactive sources in specialized long-term storage facility;
- to complete national inventory database on radioactive sources;
- to prepare a list of possible orphane sources along with sites where the sources could be located;
- to prepare a priotirization list of possible orphane sources;
- to estimate the needs for additional search equipment;
- to establish national team on searching and securing radioactive sources;
- to continue efforts in the strengthening controls over export, import, transit and other movements of radioactive sources
- to establish and fully equip by modern equipment the National Nuclear Security and Radiation Safety Laboratory;
- to prepare special action plan including timetable for carrying out above stated.
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The fundamental purpose of all activities related to the enhancing security and safety of radioactive sources in Azerbaijan has to be the establishment of sustainable, long-term and full control of radioactive sources and the strengthening of international cooperation and joint efforts in order to get this result is a primary task.
REFERENCES
[1] I.A.Gabulov – Emerging Nuclear Security Issues For Transit Countries – M.K.Zaidi And I. Mustafaev (Eds.), Radiation Safety Problems In The Caspian Region, Pp. 165-168, 2004, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed In Netherlands.
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THE S-E ASIA REGIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR SOURCE SECURITY
C Maloney and A Murray Safety & Radiation Science, Australian Nuclear Science & Technology Organisation
Abstract. A regional partnership is being realised under the ANSTO-led project on the Regional Security of Radioactive Sources for South-East Asian countries3. The Australian Government is funding this program over three years from July 2004 to work in partnership with regional countries, and others, to enhance and maintain the control and security of radioactive sources. Planning and consultation meetings have been conducted, with self-assessment and peer-evaluation undertaken of the identified needs to improve and to sustain the appropriate control and security of radioactive sources throughout their life-cycle.
The resulting program of activities [1], which is currently being implemented, includes satisfying such functional objectives as
committing to, and implementing, the IAEA Code of Conduct and its requirements for all regional countries
conducting risk assessment and developing appropriate risk management methods for source legacy issues including regaining control of, searching for, and / or securing sources
implementing training programs; for example, the practical workshop held in Sydney in February on searching, locating, identifying, recovering and disposition of uncontrolled radioactive sources, with eight S-E Asian countries participating
peer-reviewing and advising on improvements to national legislation, regulations and authorization and source registry systems, and inspection procedures and practices
providing information outreach to users and the public, and the information coordination of national and regional authorities such as customs and police.
One of the challenges in this regional partnership is that due to the region’s diverse history, geography and cultures, each country, national organisation or user, may have quite different methods and varying levels of resources to achieve succesful outcomes for these functional objectives. However, a fundamental, yet somewhat tacit, objective being achieved is a better understanding and improvement of the safety and security culture(s) associated with radioactive sources.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This authors gratefully acknowledge the active participation of all regional countries and the expertise within their national authorities and users, and the support and assistance of the IAEA and US DOE, to the success of this S-E Asian regional partnership.
3 S-E Asia countries include: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
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REFERENCES
[1] S-E Asia Program of Activities for 2005, Regional Security of Radioactive Sources project, ANSTO 21 December 2004.
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AN APPROACH TO THE CONTROL AND FOLLOW-UP OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN AFRICA
Jean-Paul Montmayeul
Atomic Energy Commission (France)
Abstract. For many years, the control and the follow-up of radioactive sources has been the major concern of industrialists, competent national authorities and the international organizations concerned. Recent changes having taken place in the world have reinforced this awakening. After the breakdown of the former Soviet block, the international community reinforced its safety and security measures concerning the borders of these countries. At first glance, African countries may seem little concerned by such measures and recommendations taken at international levels.
Nevertheless beyond the specific levels of development, radioactive sources are used more and more in the fields of industry, agriculture, health and research. A look at the data base established by the IAEA in 1996 and entitled “A Comprehensive List of Illicit Trafficking Incidents” confirms the presence of illegal movements of sources. After having analyzed the facts in regards to the global movement of such sources as also apply to Africa and the assistance brought by tools such as the IAEA data base, several possible answers will be evoked.
This approach will be treated in relation to targeted controls, the mobilization of the various participating bodies and the means of setting up such controls.
If measures of safety and security of sources during their life cycle fall mainly under the responsibility of specialized authorities on a national level, other controlling authorities such as customs agents or police forces can be of efficient help.
Finally and through the case of a recent operation of dismantling by France of a radioactive source in the Ivory Coast, we will show the necessity for establishing an overall system of control and follow-up of the sources during their life cycle and this beyond specific borders thanks, in particular to the co-operation brought about by the IAEA.
1. Introduction: The international awakening to the existence of illicit trafficking and inadvertent movements of radioactive materials constitutes a relatively recent phenomenon when compared to the development of world trade in the fields of industry, health and research. It appears possible to situate its first becoming sensitive in the 1990s in particular with the suppression of customs controls within the European Community as of January 1st, 1993 considering the risks which could have resulted from it. The international organizations concerned and in particular The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) immediately set up structures of analysis, information, follow-up and control. Many seminars and several international conferences made it possible to facilitate the consideration of incurred risks. The Dijon Conference (France) in 1998 obviously constituted a beginning of the development of a global conception and co-ordination concerning the safety and the security of radioactive sources. Other international conferences have confirmed this orientation.
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Major progress has been made. However, it appears that illicit trafficking and inadvertent movements of radioactive sources has not disappeared. Following the changes which occurred in the former Soviet block, controlling of the inadvertent movements of radioactive sources has privileged certain countries and certain directions. The African continent does not constitute a privileged path for the movement of such radioactive sources.
Nevertheless, the economic development of this continent as well as the presence of major international groups requires measures of safety and security for radioactive sources. The data base installed by the IAEA to analyze the illicit trafficking of radioactive sources reveals the existence of such cases. Therefore, after having evoked the facts concerning these cases of illicit movements detected in Africa, we will attempt to analyze them in order to find answers enabling these countries to ensuring a total system of control and follow-up of such radioactive sources during their life cycle in particular to the co-operation brought about by the IAEA
2. Facts of the case
2.1 Globalisation of the movement of radioactive sources According to the IAEA, several million radioactive sources have been distributed in the world over the last fifty years. Their use is multiple in both the sectors of industry and in health research. As such, 12 000 industrial sources of radiography are distributed each year and more than 10 000 sources of 60Co appear to be used in the sector of the radiotherapy alone.
Those sources whose control was lost and which are commonly called “orphan sources” must be of particular concern. In the United States, NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) has recorded 200 lost sources, thefts or dumping every year. American companies appear to have lost the trace of approximately 1500 sources since 1996 and more than half appear never to have been found. In the European Community approximately 70 sources appear annually to no longer be under the control of a national authority. [1]
2.2 Africa does not escape the risks related to the movement of radioactive sources
The industrial development and the globalisation of exchanges involve much movement of radioactive sources not only in industrialized countries, but also in developing countries such as certain African countries. Industralized sectors like those of petrochemistry and health have a major recourse to radioactive sources. African countries are thus naturally and primarily concerned by the licit movements of radioactive sources. They are also exposed to the risks that constitute the presence of “orphan sources” on their territory, either owing to a lack of efficient national structures of control or because of the temptation of certain indelicate operators trying to free themselves from follow-up regulation concerning the cycle of radioactive sources for reasons of cost or of administrative negligence.
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2.3 Effective assistance furnished by the IAEA data base
During the year 1996 the IAEA set up a data base entitled “A Comprehensive List of Illicit Trafficking Incidents” intended to count the cases of illicit movement occurring in the world. [2].The incidents appeared and compiled by the appropriate authorities have been listed since January 1st, 1993.
This date confirms, if need be, the beginning of an international awakening concerning the changes which have occurred in Europe. Many countries have adhered to this data base, however, we must admit that only those countries made sensitive to this matter participate in an exchange of information and they alone have established suitable methods of control. Whereas the majority of African countries have still not adhered to this data base.
___________________________________________________________________________
Date Nature Identification
1997.04.24 Theft Cs-137 (leaded container 70 kg)
1997.07.21 Unauthorized 269 g Natural Uranium
1999.02.28 Unauthorized SR-90 and Ra-226 (60 KBq)
Possession
2000.02.17 Theft Caesium 137 (0.1 Ci)
2000.06.14 Accidental Anchor mantles impregnated with Thorium
2001.01.09 Theft 55.515 kg Depleted Uranium
2002.12.03 Theft Two Am-241/Be neutron sources identified as part of
3. Analysis of a few cases of illicit trafficking listed in Africa
of the incident ____________________________________________________________________________
Transfer
1999.09.15 Theft Iodine 131 (185 MBq)
Contamination
a well-logging device stolen from an oil service company
2002.12.06 Unauthorised Natural Uranium/893 g (postal parcel)
Possession
2003.10.03 Theft 16,8 kg Ir 192
Possession after being used at a Sugar Company
2003.10.17 Unauthorised Ir-192 (30 microsievert/hour); the source was to be shipped
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____________________________________________________________________________
This presentation of a few cases declared by African states and listed by the IAEA shows that Africa, like the other continents, is not untouched by the illicit movement of radioactive products. Only a few cases are listed because of the low number of detections and the very small number of African States which take part in this data base. We find the same problems as in more developed countries.
Appear, first of all, the movement of radioactive sources subject of an illicit movement, at the time of an unauthorized transfer, no authorization having been presented by the holder or the exporter.
The cases of declared theft are also significantly similar to these situations, without it always being possible to determine if the theft of the source was due to malevolent intention, lures of gain or a related act at the time of the theft of a vehicle for example.
Finally, the contamination of a marine anchor by thorium proves that the subject of the scrap contaminated by the accidental presence of radioactive sources in industrial foundries also concerns the entire African continent [3 ].
4. Possible answers
4.1 Targeted controls The size of the African territory requires a targeting of controls likely to be set up in order to monitor the movement of radioactive sources. The obligatory points of passage such as ports and airports make it possible to concentrate means, thereby avoiding disproportionate costs.
Outside of the traditional maritime and air ways, the monitoring of radioactive sources transported by express freight companies or train and postal agencies should not be neglected. Indeed, the small size of these radioactive sources, their short life duration, the distance of the head offices in foreign companies as well as the requests for rapid supplying to local industries confirm the interest in targeting controls among these specific supply paths. [4]
4.2 Potential participants
The first and most efficient answer consists, as is the case for the more advanced countries, in posting national authorities having legal competence. But in the countries which appear not to have the means of setting up of such structures, recourse to participants usually assigned to other official control missions would make it possible to rectify this situation.
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Customs agents are, by their function, in direct contact with products of varied nature and therefore with radioactive sources. They are present at borders and on the front line of inadvertent movement. Moreover, they have legal means for carrying out seizures and detaining suspects. Whenever they lack the scientific competency necessary, they can seek help from research centres and universities in their country. In the same way, policemen and firemen can also contribute usefully to monitoring radioactive sources.
4.3 Means
The installation of structures of control of the radioactive sources in lesser developed countries obviously requires means in both men and materials.
Plans for staff training are first of all necessary. For this reason the IAEA and the World Customs Organization have worked out specific training classes for customs agents. In so fair as the Atomic Energy Commission is concerned, it takes part in training activities intended for French customs agents within the framework of a protocol of collaboration signed in 1997. Adapted teaching supports have been conceived according to the personnel’s needs.
The setting up of a total system of control and follow-up of these radioactive sources during their life cycle also requires means in materials. It would be illusory for less advanced countries, which have other priorities, to seek to install expensive high technology equipment at times unsuited to local conditions. Recourse to international co-operation would make it possible to bring adapted answers.
5. Analysis of a specific French mission in French-speaking Africa
In 1969, a research institute in the Ivory Coast received a LISA 3 irradiator in the framework of development and research tasks undertaken for the transformation and the conservation of foodstuffs in that country. In 1995, faced with the major risk consisting of the presence of over 20 000 Ci (740 TBq) residual of 137
Cs in this irradiator located within the walls of an Ivory Coast university, the IAEA drew attention to Ivory Coast authorities. Following many interventions over the past years, France was finally able to recuperate this machine at the end of 2004 in order to ensure its dismantling [5].
This international collaboration in a French-speaking country of Africa shows the importance of setting up a total system of control and follow-up of radioactive sources during their life cycle in order to ensure an optimum level of safety and security.
6. Conclusion:
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The beginning of the movement of illicit radioactive products privileged, first of all, geographical areas located at, inside or near former Soviet block countries. Following the changes occurring in these countries, measures were taken by international organizations, in the forefront of which figure IAEA and various other national authorities concerned.
Thereafter, it very quickly appeared that the risks incurred by the cross border movement of radioactive sources could not be reduced to the presence of a few cases of suspected or proven illicit trafficking.
Industrial development in the world involves the circulation of many radioactive sources in fields as varied as those of industry, health, agriculture and research. Beyond safety and security measures taken by the States, certain risks remain at the time of the existence of this inadvertent movement. The presence of cases of transfer without authorization, unauthorised possession and the theft brought about by the interest in radioactive sources or caused by attraction of the means of transport is inevitable.
It would be illusory to think that only countries producing radioactive sources or located near production zones must take measures to ensure the safety and security of such radioactive sources. African countries are also concerned, proportionate to their respective levels of development.
The data base established by the IAEA in 1996 and entitled “A Comprehensive List of Illicit Trafficking Incidents” reveals cases of illicit movement of radioactive sources in Africa.
As of now, measures must be taken in co-operation with the suppliers, the States concerned, the IAEA and those international organizations made sensitive to these questions to ensure a total system of control and follow-up of these radioactive sources during their life cycle and thereby ensure a high level of safety and security including in African countries.
This approach expresses only the personal opinion of its author and in no way of engages the responsibility of the organizations and the quoted administrations.
REFERENCES
[1] Greta Joy DICSU – USA Perspectives: safety and security of radioactive sources. IAEA bulletin 22-27, quoted by Patrick Fracas and Thierry JUHEL, RGN n° 1 (Jan. – Feb. 2004).
[2] Secretariat’s Circular Letter N4.11.42 Cir, dated August 21st, 1996.
[3] seminar on the products contaminated by the radioactivity organized by the economic Commission on Europe of UNO, Prague (Czech Republic), May 26-28, 1999.
[4] Guidelines for monitoring of Radioactive Material in International Mail Transported by Public Postal Operators - IAEA TECDOC September 2004.
[5] Recuperation of a LISA 3 irradiator from Abidjan, Ivory Coast, report IRSN-CEA 2004.
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Panel 2: Inadvertent Movement and Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Sources
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EXPERIENCE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE “SPANISH PROTOCOL” FOR THE RADIOLOGICAL SURVELLANCE AND CONTROL OF SCRAP AND THE METALIC PRODUCTS RESULTING FROM ITS PROCESSING
Pedro Carboneras, José Ignacio Serrano ENRESA – SPAIN
CSN – SPAIN
Abstract. Despite the fact that the use of radiation technologies has been subject to strict controls in most countries since the very beginning, the presence of radioactive materials in scrap has been detected relatively often in recent years. This has led to the implementation of a series of national and international initiatives aimed at detecting and preventing such events, regardless of whether they are intentional or unintentional.
The Spanish iron and steel industry is one of the most important industrial sectors in the country, and depends to a large extent on the importing of a significant proportion of the scrap used as raw material. Experience has shown that countries that import large quantities of scrap should complement the aforementioned international initiatives with others of national scope, in order to reduce the risks arising from the presence of radioactive material in such material.
In this context, in 1999 the Spanish authorities, along with the business associations involved in the metal recovery and smelting industry and the radioactive waste management agency, voluntarily signed a “Protocol” defining and implementing a national system for the radiological surveillance and control of scrap and products resulting from its processing. Since then the most relevant Trade Unions and others in the industrial sector have also signed the “Protocol”.
The system defines the rights and obligations of the Parties and describes the surveillance and control system to be established, which consists of a set of legal bases, the operation of specific radiological surveillance equipment - either new and specific or general purpose equipment already in existence prior to these initiatives - the development of radiological training and information plans for the professionals involved in the metal recovery and smelting sectors, the definition of a fully operational system to safely manage the materials detected and general improvement of the national radiological emergency system.
Since its signature more than 85 industrial companies have joined the “Protocol”, and new industrial sectors are actively considering joining also. The accumulated experience has proven to be very positive and the Spanish example is increasingly being seen as a “good reference”. The number of real “detections” so far stands at around 400, with more than 100 sources and 900 “other radioactive materials” (mostly with natural radioactivity) having been detected and controlled.
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The “Protocol” contains a Main Text with the basic agreements and a Technical Annex describing the operational actions undertaken by the Parties. It establishes a “Technical Commission” to follow up its operation and to learn from experience. On this basis a new revision of the “Technical Annex” has been prepared and will be formally in operation in January 2005.
1. Preface. Recycled scrap metal is increasingly used in modern steel production. In 2001, the worldwide consumption of scrap metal was of the order of 370 million tonnes. Scrap yards and steel mills are increasingly detecting radioactive materials in incoming scrap metal as the result of accidents or inadvertent disposal. In North America alone, nearly 4,000 incidents were recorded in 2001, involving various types of radioactive materials in scrap metal. Some of these sources have gone undetected, have been accidentally melted down or shredded and have thus entered the metal stream. The origin of the radioactive sources entering the recycled scrap metal stream is very often unknown. In the past few years there has been a significant increase in the number of such uncontrolled (orphan) radioactive sources. While the potential environmental and health risk of most of those incidents is usually not very high, due to the relatively low radiation levels involved, they are still often above acceptable levels, but more significantly the economic and financial consequences of such incidents for the steel processing industry are always very serious (e.g. the cost for the clean up of individual incidents can range from 1 million to more than 100 million Euros). The detection of radioactive materials, even with radiation levels below those requiring regulatory control, almost always results in the closure and clean-up of the facilities involved. In addition, such incidents might lead to a loss of trust in recycled materials as business and consumers simply do not want to have any radiation emanating from their purchases. With the use of increasingly sophisticated systems, the detection of radioactive sources in scrap metal will continue to rise. Current efforts to control high activity sealed radioactive sources will not change this trend in the near future, since recovered and recycled scrap metal is often 40 years old or more. Therefore, the effective monitoring and control of radioactive materials, particularly in scrap metal that, to a large extent, is transported and traded internationally, is of considerable importance and should be tackled both at national and international levels. Considerable work has already been undertaken by many countries and international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the European Union (EU) to address environmental and health aspects of radioactive materials and its transport - even though the implementation and enforcement of these regulatory standards and procedures still needs to be enhanced. However, little concerted action has been taken by countries and the international community to consider harmonized standards and procedures that would facilitate the international transport and trade of scrap metal that is virtually free of detectable radioactive contamination and is thus acceptable to metal processing industries and consumers world-wide.
2. Background for the situation in Spain.
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As a result of an incident that occurred at a steelyard in the province of Cadiz (May 1998), the Spanish Authorities set up a working group to promote, define and coordinate national actions aimed at preventing radiological risk in the industrial activities involved in the recycling of metals. The Spanish radioactive waste management agency (ENRESA) was invited to participate in this group. On 2nd November 1999, and as a result of the work of the aforementioned group, the Spanish Authorities, including the Nuclear Safety Council (CSN); ENRESA; the Iron and Steel Companies Union, and the Spanish Recovery Federation signed the “Protocol on Collaboration in the Radiological Surveillance of Metallic Products” (from hereon the “Protocol”). Subsequently, and in view of the importance of the correct radiological surveillance of metallic materials for iron and steel company workers and for society in general, the “Protocol” was signed also by the most relevant Trade Unions in the field. Likewise, and more recently, the “Protocol” has been signed by other non-ferrous metal recycling associations (the Spanish Society of Aluminium Refiners, the National Copper Industries Union, the National Lead Industries Union and the Spanish Federation of Smelting Associations). Each individual company joins the “Protocol” voluntarily and a register is kept of all the members, which currently number more than 90. The Protocol contains a main text and a Technical Annex, in which are established the commitments undertaken by each of the signatories. The system defined in the Protocol is structured around five actions: Legal bases of the radiological surveillance and control of scrap. Installation and/or improvement of radiological detection and surveillance systems. Implementation of fully operational systems to safely manage the radioactive materials detected. Implementation of radiological training and information programmes. Enhancement of radiological emergency response plans. Among other aspects the main text includes the agreement between the signatories to set up a “Technical Commission for tracking of the Protocol on collaboration in the radiological surveillance of metallic materials”. The Commission was given the task of analysing the results of implementation of the “Protocol”, interpreting the contents of its Technical Annex and, where appropriate, agreeing on and incorporating whatever possible modifications such implementation might make advisable. In the wake of the aforementioned Agreement, the “Technical Commission” has among other actions, revised the content of the “Technical Annex” which has entered into force in January 2005. The overall evaluation of the Spanish experience is highly satisfactory for all the signatories of the “Protocol” and for the different companies attached to it. Other Spanish industrial sectors are formally considering joining the Protocol. The actions performed since the incident in 1998 that led to the initiative of establishing the Protocol have allowed more than 100 radioactive sources to be recovered without processing, plus more than 900 miscellaneous materials with radioactive contents, mainly of natural origin. During this period there have also been a further five incidents in which a radioactive source was processed. In all cases, the existence of the Protocol has undoubtedly proven to be efficient and it has also been possible to improve its operability on the basis of the experience.
3. The Spanish Experience.
The number of detections to date amounts to some 400, distributed over time as indicated in figure 1. A more detailed description of ENRESA’s activities is provided in Annex 1, which
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includes details of the types and characteristics of the radioactive sources and materials removed. Annex 2 includes a selection of photographs and characteristics of certain of these materials. As has been pointed out above, since the initial event in 1998 there have been five other incidents resulting from the accidental processing of radioactive sources: one in 2001, two in 2003 and two others in 2004. In four of these cases, the incident involved steelyards that had smelted a radioactive source of some magnitude, and in the last a metal recycling company that inadvertently processed a radioactive source in a disused automobile fragmentation system. The radioactive sources involved in all these cases were of Cs-137 and had moderate levels of activity (units or tens of Gigabecquerels). None of these cases implied any radiological impact for people or the environment, although the operations of the companies in question were affected and the costs of cleanup and management of the radioactive wastes were significant in some cases. (Annex 3 includes a summary of the main data on these incidents, while the data on the radioactive wastes generated are included in the aforementioned Annex 1).
4. Recent Relevant International Developments.
It may be said that in 1998 there were no systematic practices in place regulating the radiological surveillance of scrap at international or national level (Italy might be the only exemption). 4.1. European Union (EU). The most noteworthy recent development emerges most clearly in the edition of the EU Council’s Directive 2003/122/EURATOM, of 22/12/03, on the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources, in relation to the need to establish systems for the detection of orphan sources in large stores and recycling facilities for metallic scrap. Additionally it is good to recall the European Council Resolution on the establishment of national systems for surveillance and control of the presence of radioactive materials in the recycling of metals materials in the Member States (2002). 4.2. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The most noteworthy recent development has been the approval by the Board of Governors of the Code of Conduct for the Safety and the Security of Radioactive Sources, which has now been signed by 28 countries and for which application guidelines are currently being prepared. Likewise, the development and implementation of a specific Action Plan in this area is under way. For several years the IAEA has been promoting International Conferences in this area. Following those held in Dijon and Buenos Aires, the next is scheduled for June 2005 in Bordeaux (France). Specifically interesting has been the recent publication of Safety Guide RS-G-1.7 on the scope of radiation protection standards, which defines, at world level, the levels of concentration of activity of the various radionuclides below which materials may be used without being subject to the said standards. The IAEA is preparing similar guidelines on the release of land. 4.3. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (Unece).
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In 2001, the UNECE published a report, “Management of Radiation Protection in the Recycling of Metal Scrap”. As a follow-up, a Group of Experts on Monitoring of Radioactively Contaminated Scrap Metal was convened by the UNECE in Geneva (5-7 April 2004). The first session, which was attended by experts from more than 20 countries and international organizations, reviewed the results of a questionnaire that had been circulated to countries and discussed policies and experiences in the monitoring and interception of radioactively contaminated scrap metal worldwide. The primary focus was on ways and means to facilitate and secure international trade and transport of scrap metal. In addition, safety and health issues that generally are already addressed and regulated in legal instruments, standards and guidelines prepared by UNECE and IAEA were reviewed. With a view to addressing these issues, the session, the session considered the need for (a) examining the possible preparation of an international voluntary protocol facilitating a consistent, comprehensive and harmonized approach to monitoring, interception and response measures in the event of radiation contamination incidents, (b) preparation of training and capacity-building materials on best practices to assist affected personnel dealing with the control of scrap metal, and (c) establishment of an Internet-based information exchange system open to all concerned parties. More detailed information on the activities of UNECE including those of the expert group meeting is available on the following web site: http: //www.unece.org/trans/radiation/radiation.html.
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4.4. World Customs Organization (Wco). The illicit trafficking of radioactive and other hazardous goods has been a concern of WCO for a number of years, and the focus is on stopping such activities at borders. In 1998, IAEA and WCO established a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU), and training efforts for Customs officers are being developed. A small number of detection incidents have been reported so far. In June 2003, the Johannesburg Convention was approved, which enhances border controls, including previsions for hazardous goods. Efforts should continue and should be reinforced.
5. Conclusions and Lessons Learned in Spain.
5.1 The View of Enresa.
Conclusions ENRESA’s activities are undertaken always on the basis of notifications received, as established in the “Protocol”. These are of two types: a) Removal of radioactive wastes (prior to or following the eventual processing of radioactive materials). b) Technical advice on various issues (including training). To date the following conclusions may be drawn from the information provided: The surveillance and control systems established are certainly efficient for the detection of the presence of radioactive materials, which indeed appear with significant frequency. Most of the radioactive materials detected contain exclusively radioactivity of natural origin. To date no homogeneous international approach has been adopted regarding how to proceed: for some countries such materials should not be treated as “radioactive” while for others they should. Of the rest of the materials detected, the vast majority are radioactive sources with very low levels of activity (or moderate in certain cases). The eventual processing of such materials might have caused operational disturbances and material damage to the industry involved, and would certainly have led to the undesirable generation of radioactive wastes to be managed, but it is not credible that it would have caused significant radiological effects for people or the environment. If detection occurs before the radioactive material is processed, the operational impact on the industry is minimal and the total volume of radioactive wastes produced is normally small. Indeed, when the radioactive content is exclusively of natural origin, it is frequently possible to process the materials in the normal manner, following the appropriate evaluations, without this implying any effect at the factory, in its products or by-products or for the environment. When, on the other hand, the radioactive material is detected after processing, the operational impact on the industry is high (or very high), and the total volume of radioactive wastes produced is normally large (or even very large). When detection occurs before processing, the operation of segregating, removing and managing the wastes is being carried out in an absolutely normal manner. In the event of detection occurring after processing, the efficiency of the internal management of the wastes by the industry and of their removal by ENRESA has improved as a result of the experience acquired from the incidents that have occurred since May 1998, although the results depend substantially on the specific problems involved in each case. The origins of the different radioactive materials detected, both national and international, vary, although both the industry and the Authorities are now taking specific actions when there are
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signs that a given supplier might be causing problems. Nevertheless, the current scrap market at world level is affected by defects in supply. The re-exporting of the radioactive materials detected to their places of origin is proving to be very complex for a variety of reasons. This has been achieved in very few cases and has always been possible because the specific origin of the material (previous country and owner) has been identified. Lessons learned The experience accumulated through application of the “Protocol” may be described as being clearly positive. Its existence and content have served especially to minimise the effects and consequences of incidents due to the presence of radioactive materials in metallic scrap. Indeed the capacity, agility and efficiency of the actions required, essentially as a result of the incidents due to the processing of certain radioactive sources, have improved significantly. Notwithstanding the above, the following aspects open to improvement may be identified from the experience acquired by ENRESA: It is necessary to continue strengthening the essentially preventive spirit of the “Protocol”, the objective of which is to attempt to prevent the presence of radioactive materials in scrap, and in any case to detect such materials and remove them from the stream as early as possible, preventing them from being processed, since this is where the consequences of all types are greatest. In all the incidents in which radioactive sources have been unduly processed, there has been a “human factor” in their development. Emphasis should be placed on the training of the workers and the information provided to them. There continues to be a need for efforts to clearly discriminate between the waste materials generated (especially when radioactive sources have been processed) and those that are to be managed as “radioactive wastes”. This is especially important when the radioactive content is of natural origin. Also to be underlined is the need for specific installations, for the optimum management of great volumes of very low level radioactive wastes, which constitute the vast majority of those to be expected in this type of event. The essentially international dimension of this issue cannot be forgotten. The Spanish experience is highly valued in all the forums known to ENRESA, but the implementation of specific measures varies from one country to the next, and the “globalisation” of sensitivity to the subject is still clearly insufficient, including that of the International Organisations and of the market itself. Only in this way will it be really possible to achieve the ultimate objective sought, which is to bring about a world metallic scrap and materials market free from the presence of radioactive sources. Although the experience acquired to date is clearly positive, it should not be forgotten that public opinion is of decisive importance for the type of actions required in application of the “Protocol” to be performed in the best way possible.
5.2. The View of the Nuclear Safety Council. Conclusions The Protocol is now fully operative and the experience has underlined its usefulness, not only to detect the radioactive material that might be present in the scrap recycled, thus preventing the risks that this implies, but also to achieve that even in the event of a radioactive source being smelted, contamination is prevented from spreading outside the facility. Likewise, the presence of previously established rules for action makes it possible for interventions to be initiated automatically and allows for better coordination between the entities involved and for a reduction of the radioactive wastes to be managed and of plant recovery time. Lessons learned
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In this situation, and following approval of the modification to the Technical Annex, the most significant action to be addressed in the future will be the resolution of technical aspects pending in the practical application of the Protocol. In this respect the Technical Group is currently working on analysis of the existing radioactivity detection systems and on the preparation of procedures and practical guidelines for the actions to be taken in the event of detection in scrap, products or by-products. In addition, the training and public information activities foreseen in the Protocol are to be strengthened, for which a photographic database of detections that will be available to the public is being developed. Finally, the Protocol is expected to be extended to include other industrial sectors, such as possibly steelyard dust management companies.
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ANNEX 1 SUMMARY OF ENRESA’s ACTIONS IN APPLICATION OF THE SPANISH “PROTOCOL” FOR THE RADIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL OF METALLIC SCRAP, INCLUDING THE RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSED OF AS OF 31st DECEMBER 2004
ENRESA ACTIVITIES
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
YEAR
Nº
REMOVAL RADIATION PORTECTION31-12-2004
REMOVED SOURCES
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
AÑO
Nº
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
GLO
BA
L N
º
Ra-226 Other Global31-12-2004
DISTRIBUTION OF 134 RADIACTIVE SOURCES
Am-Be0,7%
Kr-850,7%
Ra-Be0,7%
Sr-900,7%
Otros6,7%
Am-2412,2%
Ra-226+Am-2411,5%
Co-609,7%
Cs-13713,4%
Ra-22670,1%
ACTIVITY DISTRIBUTION
OTHER98%
RADIUM
2%
31-12-2004
DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS CONTROLLED BY ENRESA1080 PIECES
Otros14,5%
LIGHTENING RODS1,6%
URANIUM PIECES1,2%
NONE0,0%
COMPACTED SCRAP0,5%
SMOKE DETECTORS2,6%
RADIUM SOURCES7,7%
ARTIFICIAL CONTAMINATION3,0%TUBES WITH NORM
12,9%
NON RADIUM SOURCES3,3%
PRODUCTS WITH RADIUM/TORIUM22,7%
OTHER0,3%
PIECES WITH NORM42,3%
31-12-2004
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ANNEX 2 SELECTION OF A SERIES OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS DETECTED IN APPLICATION OF THE SPANISH “PROTOCOL” FOR THE RADIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL OF METALLIC SCRAP
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ANNEX 3 SUMMARY OF THE MOST RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED TO THE INCIDENTS OCCURRING DUE TO THE PROCESSING OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN SPAIN (FROM 2001 TO 2004) 1st Incident. Iron and steel industry. December 2001. Smelting of a radioactive source of Cs-137 of some 100 GBq (2.7 Ci). Operational activities were interrupted for one month in the affected part of the facility. An outside steelyard dust management facility was affected and had to be cleaned. There was no radiological impact at all, to either people or the environment, other than the need to clean the aforementioned steelyard dust tip. A total 325 m3 of radioactive wastes were generated and sent to El Cabril. The surveillance and control system installed at the facility worked correctly and efficiently and proved to be sufficient. There was a human error in interpretation of the indications provided. Analysis of the incident led to various improvements for incorporation in the Technical Annex of the Protocol and personnel training was reinforced. Neither the steel produced nor the slag was affected. Only the steelyard smoke dust and facility systems associated with it were affected. 2nd Incident. Metal recycling industry. August 2003 Destruction of a radioactive source of Cs-137 of some 10 GBq (210 mCi) in a disused automobile fragmentation machine. Although the rest of the facility continued to operate, the shredder machine was shut down for 1.5 months. There was no radiological impact for either people or the environment. A total 40 m3 of radioactive wastes were generated and sent to El Cabril. Although the facility was fitted with surveillance and control systems, their operational application was insufficient and the personnel in charge of their operation were insufficiently trained. Analysis of the incident underlined the importance of reinforcing the awareness of this type of problem in the metals recycling industry, which includes a high degree of fragmentation technology capacity. 3rd Incident. Iron and steel industry. September 2003 Smelting of a radioactive source of Cs-137 of some 2 GBq (47 mCi). The operational activity of the affected part of the facility was interrupted for 8 days. There was no radiological impact for either people or the environment. A total 75 m3 of radioactive wastes were generated and sent to El Cabril. Although the facility was fitted with surveillance and control systems, it was demonstrated that the materials entry system failed as a result of human error and that the detection system installed in the smoke line was inefficient in the case of the smelting of moderate activity sources. The incident underlined the fact that, instead of sophisticated radiological detection systems in the smoke dust processing systems, it was simpler and more efficient to ensure
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that the exit of by-products was controlled in addition to the entry controls implemented. Training was also reinforced. Neither the steel produced nor the slag was affected. Only the steelyard smoke dust and facility systems associated with it were affected. 4th Incident. Iron and steel industry. March 2004 Smelting of a radioactive source of Cs-137 of some 36 Bq (80 mCi). The operational activity of the affected part of the facility was interrupted for 12 days. There was no radiological impact for either people or the environment. A total 70 m3 of radioactive wastes were generated and sent to El Cabril. Although the facility was fitted with surveillance and control systems, there was a failure due to human error in the materials entry system. The by-product exit control agreed on in the wake of the 3rd incident operated correctly. As a result of this incident, the measure agreed on following the previous incident was seen to work correctly, the mechanisms for communication and coordination between the affected companies and the Authorities involved were improved and training was reinforced. Neither the steel produced nor the slag was affected. Only the steelyard smoke dust and facility systems associated with it were affected. 5th Incident. Iron and steel industry. May 2004 Smelting of a low activity radioactive source of Cs-137 (not valued). The operational activity of the affected part of the facility was interrupted for 3 days. There was no radiological impact for either people or the environment. No radioactive wastes to be managed by ENRESA were generated. Although the facility was fitted with surveillance and control systems, there was a failure due to human error in the materials entry system. Furthermore, the exit by-product control system had not been implemented, although the redundancy of the overall system worked correctly, since detection occurred at the company receiving the steelyard dust for recycling. As a result of this incident, the need to comply strictly with the agreements reached on the basis of the “Protocol” was underlined, in the interests of the companies themselves. Agreements were reached regarding reinforced training and information, these having been implemented during 2004. Neither the steel produced nor the slag was affected. Only the steelyard smoke dust and facility systems associated with it were affected.
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DETECTION OF UNAUTHORIZED MOVEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR REGAINING CONTROL ON ORPHAN SOURCES - SYSTEMS AND FEASIBILITY
Harikumar M, Vaishali M Thakur, Amit Kumar Verma, Krishnamachari G, Sharma D. N Radiation Safety Systems Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, Mumbai - 85
Abstract. Radioactive sources are used extensively throughout the country for various medical, industrial, agricultural and research applications. Specia Nuclear Materials (SNMs) like Plutonium and Uranium are handled at reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication units and in reactors for power generation applications. These SNMs are fissile material and have to be stored very carefully in criticality safe proper geomentries and quantities. All radioactive materials i.e. sources and SNMs need to be properly safeguarded and accounted to prevent their unauthorized movement and also illegal trafficking. This necessitates monitoring of these materials even in very small quantities not only at the entry/exit gates of the nuclear facilities but also at entry and exit ports of the country. Most widely used radioactive materials are gamma ray emitters. The fissile materials (SNMs) may also emit neutrons due to presence of spontaneously fissioning isotopes of the SNMs. Therefore, detectors, which can detect gamma rays and / or neutrons, can be used to detect the presence and movement of these materials in the public domain. Different types of systems with plastic scintillator coupled with a Photomultiplier Tube (PMT) as a sensor offers a very simple and efficient detection method. Because of its easy availability in large sizes, ease of handling and reasonable efficiency for gamma-rays a plastic scintillator is an ideal radiation detector for such applications. Plastic scintillator enclosed in a non-metallic enclosure, can detect low energy gamma rays. Portal monitor and Limb monitor are two such systems that have been developed and installed at various locations. A combination of transit detection system and assertive detection systems have to be used for an effective methodolgy to stop pilferage of radioactive materials. This paper describes the systems developed using plastic scintillators and their applications in monitoring in the public domain in India. The systems make use of microcontroller based single board computer that provides data acquisition, data transfer and display alongwith activation of alarm. The systems have sensitivity of the order of few hundred milligrams for Pu and can detect a low levels (order of kBq) of Cs-137 or Co-60. False alarm rate was found to be less than 2% of total number of alarms generated by the system. The applications of such stealth detection systems find much importance in the present day scenario of nuclear terrorism.
1. Introduction: Scintillation detectors have been in use since the beginning of this century for the detection of ionizing radiation. These detectors make use of the property of certain chemical compounds which emit short light pulses (scintillation) after excitation by the passage of charged particles or by photons[1]. Scintillation is characterized by the absorption spectrum, emission spectrum, and
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decay times; the latter range from less than 1 nsec light yield (modern fast plastic scintillators) to few tens of nsec. Because of its easy availability in large sizes, ease of handling and reasonable efficiency for gamma-rays, plastic scintillator is an ideal radiation detectors for use in monitoring systems for detecting the presence of the radioactive materials and Special Nuclear Materials (SNM)[2]. This paper describes two such systems developed indigenously using plastic scintillator detectors for detection of radioactive materials in nuclear facilities as well as in the public domain. The gamma rays emitted by SNMs and other radioactive materials forms the basis for detection. In India the monitoring requirements in the public domain makes it mandatory to have simple and compact system to meet the large requirement. Basically two types of systems i.e. a portal montor for pedestrians and a camouflaged Limb/Pole monitor have been developed, calibrated and installed at a few facilities. The paper describes the design, analysis and sensitivity of these systems. Metal detectors and neutron detection systems can be used to augument these sytems to detect shielded sources and/or neutron emitting radioactive materials. Once a subject or package is isolated by these monitors, the extensive search and identification can be performed by using hand held monitors by authorized persons. When there is no movement of fissile / radioactive material, the system monitors the ambient radiation background and transmits data to PC to study the variation in background in the area.
2. System Description:
2.1 Portal Monitor The system basically comprises of four plastic scintillators (0.05 m diameter and 0.5/1 m long, Fig-1&2) coupled to PMTs which are used for the detection of gamma rays. The detectors are fitted on all four sides of the portal. Simpler systems can also be made with two or three detectors depending on the requirement. The plastic scintillators are enclosed with good light reflectors and placed in a PVC / Delrin enclosure with an integrated preamplifier assembly. The PVC or Delrin covering ensures that there is negligible attenuation for even low energy gamma rays emitted from the fissile materials. The signal from the PMT is amplified by the integrated pre-amplifier and is processed by amplifier-discriminator module to give digital pulses (Fig-1). These pulses are counted by custom made Phillips 235 chip based 8-channel counter-timer that is interfaced to the microcontroller based Single Board Computer (SBC)[3]. The detector counts and alarm values are displayed on a LCD display and the alarm levels is enterd using a 16 key Hex keypad. The keypad and LCD display are password protected to avoid unauthorized modifications of the system settings . Standard serial RS 232 protocol is used to transmit the data to a printer or to a PC for permanent storage and further analysis. The alarm monitor is a self-contained unit designed to provide remote audio-visual alarm for counts exceeding the pre-fixed levels, low background radiation levels indicating system problem and in the event of unauthorized tampering with the system. The system also incorporates a watchdog timer for uninterrupted system operation.
2.2 Limb Monitor The Limb monitor comprises of one 1 m long 2”diameter plastic scintillator detector coupled with a Photomultiplier Tube (PMT) (Fig.1). The detector is covered with a good light reflector and placed in PVC/ Derlin covering ensuring negligible attenuation for the low energy gamma radiations. The electrical pulses produced by the detector and PMT due to incident gamma ray are amplified by a pre-amplifier and shaped to TTL pulses. The pulses are then counted by a compact Atmel series microcontroller AT 89C52-based Single Board Computer (SBC)[3]. The SBC acquires data, analyses and activates alarm at a remote place when counts exceed the preset level. Dip-switches are provided on the SBC to set alarm levels. The acquired counts are displayed on a 16X1 characters LCD to facilitate calibration and alarm level setting. To minimize the size of the monitor the pre-amplifier, amplifier, electronic processing units,and the high voltage unit are
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encapsulated in the pole of the Limb monitor which makes the system fully integrated into a single pole. A provision for remote alarm is also provided to alert the security personnel in case of un-manned system operation. The SBC can communicate with computer using RS 232 protocols for settings the system parameters and for alarm activation. The Limb monitor has been specially designed to prevent tempering. The monitor can be deployed at strategic places in such a way that it can go unnoticed in the area of application. It can be operated on a maintenance free 6 V/4Ah battery for 24 hrs. This makes it possible to use this system for portable and transit applications. Factors, like isotopic contents, ambient background and electronic noise affect the sensitivity of the monitor The system design has been optimized by improving the associated signal processing modules to provide a good gain to the low amplitude pulses and keep signal to noise ratio high to ensure maximum sensitivity.
FIG. 5. Block Diagram of Portal Monitor and Limb Monitor
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FIG. 6. Schematic Sketch of the Portal Monitor and Limb Monitor
3. Sensitivity of the systems:
PORTAL
2 m
0.75 m
Detectors
CONTROL
UNIT
Remote Alarm/ACK
PORTAL
2 m
0.75 m
Detectors
CONTROL
UNIT
Remote Alarm/ACKRemote Alarm/ACK
Outer PVC enclosure
SBC & SignalProcessing Module
PMT and HV unit
Plastic Scintillator
Mounting Base
Data to PC
Outer PVC enclosure
SBC & SignalProcessing Module
PMT and HV unit
Plastic Scintillator
Mounting Base
Data to PC
SBC & SignalProcessing Module
PMT and HV unit
Plastic Scintillator
Mounting Base
Data to PC
The performance of both systems has been evaluated by collecting data from the systems over one-second time interval to assess their usage as walk through monitors. Data was collected with the sources placed in the centre of portal and 0.5m away from the Limb Monitor. The background CPS recorded was around 214.13 ± 17 cps at an ambient background radiation level of of 0.10 µSv/h ( ~10 µR/h) resulting in a minimum detectable level corresponding to 265 counts with 3σ counts above background.
The sensitivity of the systems under actual conditions of operation was analysed taking into account the least sensitive zones in the portal and at 0.5 m away from the limb monitor. The false alarm rates and failure rates was studied and accounted while arriving at the sensitivity levels shown in Table-1.
Table 1. Sensitivity of the systems
Source strength / Weight
Source Portal Monitor
(at the centre of the portal)
Limb Monitor
( at 0.5 m)
Pu (RG) 0.2 x 10-3 kg 0.5 x 10-3 kg
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U(Nat.) 0.2 kg 0.8 kg
Cs-137 37 kBq 92 kBq
Co-60 20 kBq 37 kBq
The variation in the counts of the detector along the length was within 10% and the radial response was found to be nearly uniform. The false alarm rate was found to be less than of 2% of total alarm generated by the system, which is comparable to the ASTM standards[4]. The failure rate (number of times the system could not detect the presence of radioactive material) of the system was 1.5% at the minimum detectable levels. The detection technique or methodology adapted in these systems can be extended to develop radiological access control systems and baggage checking systems at air/sea ports and monitoring vehicles or containers to detect inadvertant movement of radioacitve material with a very low level of detection limits. Thus the systems developed or techniques used can be utilized effectively to detect orphan sources and unauthorised movement or illicit trafficking of radiation sources or radioactive materials.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Authors wish to express their sincere thanks to Shri. H.S. Kushwaha, Director, Health, Safety and Environment group for his keen interest in the work. The authors also acknowledge with thanks Dr. K.S. Pradeep Kumar, Shri. D.A.R Babu and Shri. S.J. Chothramani for their valuble suggestions and advice in the development of the systems.
REFERENCES
[1] Birks J. B. et. al, “ Theory and Practice of Scintillation Counting”, 1988
[2] Fehlau Paul E. et.al , “1990 Update for the Application Guide to Pedestrian SNM Monitors”, Los Alamos National Laboratory Report, LA-11971-MS, December 1990.
[3] Phillips data book /Atmel catalogue – Datasheet of microcontrollers-, 1997
[4] ASTM Standards: C 1169-97, “Standard guide for evaluation of Automatic Pedestrian Monitor performance”.
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POLISH EFFORTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
G. Smagala Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection, Warsaw, Poland
Abstract. This paper presents an overview of the Polish progress in the fight against illicit trafficking in radioactive sources. Although, a requirement for the security related aspects of radioactive sources to protect them against damage, theft or falling into the hands of wrongdoers is legally effective since 1st May 2004, the registration of and the control over those sources dates back to the mid 1960-s in Poland. National efforts aimed at interdicting an illegal movement of radioactive materials across the borders, or inside the country resulted in a deployment or an modernization of the equipment for detecting such materials. Next to the undertaken work for combating illicit trafficking in radioactive materials and for avoiding in the metal recycling industry of an unwanted radioactive component in metal scrap, some further steps have been taken to increase awareness and effectiveness in responding to the events involving radioactive sources of unknown origin. To this end, a demonstration exercise of the response to illicit trafficking in radioactive materials combined with explosives was held on 28 September 2004 in Poland. The exercise contributed to the enhancement of co–operation among all the involved authorities and services. Analysis of the exercise, the gained experience and the revealed gaps can be used for the system improvements so that similar situations can be avoided in the future.
1. Background Since 1964 activities involving radioactive sources have been subject to licensing, accounting and national control in Poland. In spite of its well–developed accounting and control systems, the country registered some radiological emergency events involving orphan sources and cases of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials. The first registered such incidents took place in 1992 both, at the borders and within the country, including accidental smelting of radioactive ceasium source(s) in the steel plant at Ostrowiec. A total capture of radioactive sealed sources amounts to about 40 items (Cs–137, Co–60, Sr–90) for the period 1992–2001 while such cases occured. All seizures were carried out by the law enforcement services with assistance of the 24h National Emergency Service in detection and response actions. It was decided in 1990 to equip gradually all border checkpoints with portal radiation monitors to detect all attempts of imported commodities with abnormal radiation levels. The Border Guards operating portal gamma radiation devices at the borders detected cases such as a deliberate intent to smuggle radioactive materials, radioactively contaminated products, radioactive materials without the obligatory transportation documents, persons after the isotope diagnostics or therapy, to mention some. Inside the country some lost, vagabond, or buried in the forest radioactive sources appeared to be,
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inter alia, the legacy of the former Soviet/Russian military bases deployed in Poland.4 Since 2002 activities to support the countermeasures against illicit radioactive traffic have been intensified and tightened in Poland in respect to the all three systems: prevention, detection and response. Adjustment of the newly revised Atomic Law to the European Union legislation, technical modernization of the equipment used by the law enforcement services and testing of the services capabilities in detection of and response to illicit trafficking in radioactive materials have contributed to the whole security system of radioactive sources in Poland. Apart from the works having been done by the services being in charge of combating illicit trafficking, some further steps have been taken to increase awareness and effectiveness in responding to the events involving detection of inadvertent and illicit movement of radioactive materials or orphan sources. Given the consequences of the explosion of a radiological device the preparedness against such threat has had to be augmented.
2. Legislation and regulatory aspects Regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and the control of radioactive sources is founded upon Act of Parliament of 29 November 2000 the Atomic Law5 as amended. The Law follows the provisions of the Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and it had to be harmonized with the provisions of the European Union legislation before Poland has become a member of the EU on 1 May 2004. As a general rule, a license application for the peaceful use of radioactive sources has been examined in respect to the requirements of nuclear safety and radiation protection provisions. The requirement for the security related aspects of radioactive sources to protect them against damage, theft or falling into the hands of wrongdoers has become effective since 1st May 2004, the date of ensuring full compliance of the Polish Atomic Law with the European Union legislation. This complies also with the provisions of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Another matter of concern of the Code of Conduct, the control over export and import operations of sealed radioactive sources is also regulated and accompanied document for shipment of the sealed radioactive source is required where is a need of prior authorization for its use.
The President of the National Atomic Energy Agency (NAEA) and its safety inspectors are responsible for the state control of all aspects of nuclear safety and radiological protection.
3. Control and Detection Practices The early recognition of the illicit trafficking issue and domestic co-operation among the law enforcement forces and the nuclear safety and radiological protection bodies has contributed to preventive measures and to diminishing the number of occurrences. Since 1990 the Border Guards has been increasing systematically national control and detection system at the border checkpoints, especially on the eastern border being also an external border of the European Union. Additionally to portal radiation devices, the Border Guard staff is equipped with personal radiation signalling devices and more sophisticated instruments for searching the source of radiation.
The control rests also with the manager of the metal recycling industry, who should organize in situ metal scrap control for radioactivity and if necessary for object identification ask for help experts in nuclear safety and radiation protection. As of December 1999, the minister for 4 The withdrawal of Russian troops was completed on 17 September 1993. May 1995, the police found a container with two Cs-137 sources, of activity 1.9 GBq and 78 MBq, stolen in 1992 from the Russian military base in Borne-Sulinowo. The seizure was in a private apartment. 5 Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) No 3 of 2001, item 18. Since then it has been amended seven times, the last one in 2004, Dz.U. No. 70, item 632.
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economy issued the regulation on the Safety and Hygiene of Work when Eliminating Hazardous Material in Metal Scrap imposing the obligation for control radioactivity in metal scrap. Smelting case of 1992 in steel plant and international pressure to produce clean metal commodities were also taken into account for controlling radioactivity of metallurgical scrap.
Since 2001 the Mobile Spectrometric Laboratory has been used for searching, locating and identifying radioactive sources, if lost or where might be abandoned. The issue was an element of the international intercomparison exercise of the Mobile Spectrometric Laboratories held in Turawa in Poland in September 2003. The task of participating teams was to estimate the distance to the hidden radioactive sources of unknown isotopic identity and activity. Four radioactive sources were used during the exercise (Se–75, Cs–137, Ir–192, Co–60).
4. Emergency Response Maintenance Management of radiological emergencies involving radioactive sources of unknown origin rests with the regional and local administration. For a potential radiological emergency with involved radioactive sources the user of such sources and the Governor of the Province6 are oblidged to prepare emergency response plan for the facility and the region, respectively, and to verify the plan by testing and exercises.
In the event of a radiological emergency caused by an unknown perpetrator, the service which first obtained the information or detected the radioactive source secures the emergency site and notifies the President of the NAEA through the 24h National Emergency Service and the Governor of the affected Province through the 24h Crisis Management Service in the Province. If the Governor finds it indispensable, he shall request the assisstance from the President of the NAEA, defining the scope of this assistance.
A demonstration exercise of the response system to incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials was held on 28th September 2004 at the border crossing in Bobrowniki and its surrounding in the Podlasie province in Poland. The exercise was the last element of activities within the PECO project (Pays Europe Centrale Orientale, i.e. an assistance program to the Central and East European countries), related to its final product a handbook for the response system RITNUM (Response to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material), developed on the basis of the model action plan by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection (CLOR), Polish executor of the project. In conformity with an agreement signed in 2001 by President of the National Atomic Energy Agency and Director of the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) in Karlsruhe, representing the European Commission, the handbook should be subject to verification by conducting a field demonstration exercise. It was found applicable to accept a scenario, which will verify collaboration and competence of various services for two related places of incidents – a border crossing and an area, which is not directly controlled by Border Guards, that is, not located in the borderland zone. The exercise was held with the use of samples of real nuclear and radioactive materials, taken over in a similar incident in the past. The quantity and activity of the nuclear and radioactive materials were selected in such a manner that they did not provide ionising radiation that would be dangerous to participants in the exercise or observers. Safety conditions planned by CLOR were formally approved by NAEA in the form of an administrative decision authorising the use of such materials in the exercise (Notification No. R-7611). The incidents provided for a possibility of combining radioactive materials with explosives or explosive devices as well as with so-called “blocking of the object” by a group of criminals. The exercise was hosted by the Voivod (Governor) of Podlasie and organised by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection in collaboration with the National Atomic Energy Agency and the Podlasie Voivodship (Province) Office in Bialystok. The entities participating in 6 Poland is divided into 16 Provinces administratively.
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the exercise were services of the Podlasie Province, respectively to the accepted scenario of the exercise. The exercise was joined and supported by: 24h National Emergency Service, CLOR specialists in the area of categorising of nuclear and radioactive materials and measurement of environment contamination as well as a transportation team from the Radioactive Waste Management Plant in Swierk. The exercise was observed by representatives of authorities and services from Podlasie, central administration, specialist institutions, public mass media as well as invited foreign representatives: from the European Commission, including ITU, from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), European Police (EUROPOL), Republic of Belarus and the United States of America (USA). Jointly, the practical activities of the services were watched by a group of over 100 persons representing 31 national institutions, 5 international organisations or foreign countries as well as by a group of journalists from public mass media from Podlasie.
The scenario of the exercise assumed two related incidents:
• At the border crossing, after information received from the Police of planned illicit transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials through Poland’s eastern border, an officer of Border Guards after activation of his personal radiation signalling device, stopped a vehicle suspected of carrying radioactive materials or of radioactive contamination. In effect of a search of the vehicle, a metal object was found emitting ionising radiation as well as two small metal pieces (pellets) with increased level of radiation, hidden in a pallet of transported goods.
• About 30 km from the border crossing, in an abandoned farm from which the objects found at the border crossing in Bobrowniki were collected and where, in accordance with the account of the detained driver, there is a suspicion that the persons staying there are armed as well as other radioactive, nuclear and explosive materials of illicit origin may be stored.
The first case responders were: Border Guards and Customs Service with an aid from the Province Sanitary Epidemiological Station. In the second case the Podlasie Governor activated emergency response plan with all local services involved and the police being the main player. In both cases the assistance from the President of NAEA was requested.
In a summary discussion of the exercise some kind of its evaluation was done and drawn preliminary conclusions, which included iter alia:
• There was close conformity of the procedures of specific services with the law in force and provisions of the developed handbook for the response to illicit trafficking in radioactive materials.
• The categorisation of radioactive materials during the exercise was made with very simple equipment, so-called mini spectrometers, based on scintillating detectors, with resolution insufficient to identify a mixture of radioactive or nuclear materials. That was due to the fact of existing limitations in the availability of measuring equipment for such tasks.
• The gained experience will also be used by other institutions, such as the National Atomic Energy Agency to introduce appropriate amendments to the existing bilateral agreements between the services and NAEA.
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5. Conclusions • A consolidated action and co–operation between all institutions involved in prevention,
detection and response to orphan sources or illicit trafficking in radioactive sources leads to effective prevention and elimination of hazards.
• The PECO project has contributed to the Polish developments in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.
• The applied procedures should be verified in the practice with the use of the real material.
• The increased awareness of the law enforcement forces and well–protected borders might be the explanation for diminishing numbers of occurrences at the borders.
REFERENCES [1] Smagala, G., Tanczyk, R. Domestic Cooperation in Combating Illegal Nuclear Traffic:
Experience of the Emergency Service Centre, C&S Papers Series No. 12/P, IAEA, Vienna 2002.
[2] Isajenko, K.A., Lipinski, P., Exercise Turawa 2003, 2002-2003 Research and Operational Activities, Report of CLOR, CLOR, Warsaw 2004.
[3] Handbook for the Response to Illicit Trafficking or Inadvertent Movement of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials in Poland, Warsaw 2004.
[4] Report on hands–on workshop on Response to Illicit Trafficking or Inadvertent Movement of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials in Poland – Bobrowniki 2004, CLOR, Warsaw October 2004.
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COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN SLOVAKIA
Juraj Václav Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic Trnava, Slovak Republic
Abstract This presentation contains short description of measures used in the Slovak Republic to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Though prevention is the most effective measure, especially suppression measures are described as a mean how to cope with insufficient protective measures applied in some countries. Some proposals are formulated how the situation could be further improved.
1. Introduction Starting with political changes in the East and the Central Europe in the beginning of nineties we are facing a new type of crime – smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Being aware of serious impact of this new phenomenon on proliferation and radiation safety risk the government of the Slovak Republic issued several resolutions focused on measures for combating it. These were mostly concentrated on detection at the state border as well as inside the state and subsequent safe handling of confiscated material. However, the most important is a system of measures how to prevent removal of material into illegal use.
2. Description of System The main goal of the described system is to allow safe and effective utilization of nuclear and other radioactive materials under surveillance of responsible state authorities as well as recover materials that were removed form legal utilization despite the preventive measures.
2.1. Prevention Prevention is the most effective and the cheapest way how to overcome problems. An important precondition for prevention is existence of a national (or state) system for controlled utilization of nuclear and other radioactive materials completed by effective physical protection of these materials and facilities involved and supported by sufficient low enforcement.
2.1.1. Accounting of materials A state system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in Slovakia has its origin in the former Czechoslovak Republic. The system has been built according to the IAEA INFCIRC/153 requirements and due to its long-term effectiveness and reliability the government of Slovakia accepted it. A fact that the IAEA inspectors never have recognized any unaccounted nuclear material could be the best proof of its quality. The system is based on reports of nuclear material users to the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (ÚJD SR), which is regulatory authority in this field. Information on inventory changes reported in this way is subsequently controlled by the ÚJD SR inspection, and a real status of the inventory is controlled every year by physical inventories. The IAEA inspectors independently verify changes in the inventory and results of the physical inventories.
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Similar system is used for other radioactive materials - regulatory authority in this field is the Ministry of Health but this system is not under international control.
Since 1st May 2004 Slovakia became a member state of the European Union (EU). According to the EU rules the EU inspectors take part in the inspections.
2.1.2 Physical protection Physical protection system in Slovak nuclear installations is based on principles applied for development of advanced physical protection systems used in western installations. Technological systems and nuclear materials, according to their sensitivity, are categorized into three categories – first one is the most sensitive. The first category technology and material is located into inner area, lower category is located into protected and guarded area.
Guarded area of the most sensitive installations is limited by barriers in the form of isolation zone equipped with two independent detection systems and is monitored by TV system. Protected area is limited by barriers equipped with single detection system and is monitored by TV system. Inner area is located inside buildings with concrete walls equipped with detection on doors, protected windows and ducts.
Entrances are equipped with locked doors, doors with magnetic lock or turnstiles controlled by card readers. Entrances into inner area are guarded.
The physical protection system is controlled through sophisticated software supplied by system vendor. The software runs on efficient PC based computers located at the main control room.
Installations operators operate the system. Entrances are guarded by security guards, which also perform mobile patrol inside the installation. The Police create response forces.
2.1.3. Legislation The Act No. 130/1998 on Peaceful use of nuclear energy regulates utilization of nuclear material and nuclear energy and states requirements on physical protection was in force since end of November 2004.
Since 1st December 2004 a new Atomic law entered into force. The Atomic law fulfils requirements described in the EU legislation.
The Act No. 272/1994 on Protection of health of people in its later modifications regulates handling with other radioactive materials.
After the first few events of illicit trafficking in Europe the Criminal Code of the Slovak Republic has been amended and the illegal possession of nuclear and radioactive material is treated as a crime and involved persons may be heavily punished.
2.2. Suppression Suppression follows when preventive measures have been broken (either inside of state or in neighbor countries). Its purpose is to detect illegally owned material and return it back to a legal owner or to dispose it safely.
After first few trafficking incidents on the territory of the Slovak Republic the government recognized seriousness of the problem. Based on its resolution No. 538 from 1995 a group of experts from involved ministries elaborated a system of measures how to cope with this phenomena. This system covered
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- detection of illegally transferred radioactive material at a border or inside the territory of the Slovak Republic
- handling and processing of confiscated material
- radiation protection of involved persons
- improvement of analytical instrumentation in laboratories of the Ministry of Interior and of the Ministry of Health.
2.2.1. Detection Based on experience gained during application of the group’s proposals the system was several times modified according to governmental resolutions No. 537/97, 36/98 and 559/98. The measures were applied in two steps. Within the first step some portal detectors were installed at the border with Ukraine, some police and customs officers were equipped with handheld and personal dosimeters. As the second step portal detectors have been installed at all border crossings with Ukraine and at two border crossings with Poland. Police and customs officers were equipped with handheld and personal dosimeters at all border crossings.
Detection at a border
According to a decision of customs authorities detected material can be returned back to the country of origin or it can be confiscated. In the case of confiscation a special group of the Civil Defense Authority (CDA) and Public Health Office (PHO) is called in. Its duty is to carry out basic identification of the material and to apply, together with customs officers, necessary radiation protection measures. The event is reported to the Police, which perform investigation.
Detection inside a state territory
Inside a state territory the Police mostly confiscates the trafficked material. The Police authority usually relies on intelligence information. As in the previous case a special group of the CDA identifies the material and together with police officers applies necessary radiation protection measures.
2.2.2. Final analysis According to the group’s proposals laboratories of the Ministry of Health were equipped with instrumentation capable of comprehensive analysis of the confiscated material. Due to problems with restricted budget this intention is still not enough performed. For this purpose services and co-operation with specialized laboratories of some Slovak universities, the IAEA and EC Joint Research Center are employed.
2.2.3. Co-operation Based on the group’s analysis and real experience it was clear that the combating could be effective only when all involved state authorities would co-operate
- the Customs authorities and the Police co-operate in investigation of events
- the CDA and PHO co-operates with the ÚJD SR (nuclear material) and the Ministry of Health (other radioactive material) on identification of confiscated material
- on the base of an agreement between the Ministry of Interior (Police, Civil Defense) and the Slovak Power Plants (SE) the SE’s facility specialized on decommissioning, radwaste treatment and spent fuel handling (SE VYZ) will carry out transport, storage and preparation of confiscated material into a form suitable for disposal.
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Special form of co-operation is co-operation between the Police of the Slovak Republic and police authorities of surrounding states and INTERPOL. This is the most effective way how to detect trafficked material inside a state territory (in the case of alpha emitters maybe the only way) and really the intelligence information of the Police allowed to confiscate trafficked material almost in all events on the territory of the Slovak Republic (see table 1).
Certain form of international co-operation is participation of the Slovak Republic in the IAEA programs in this field, mainly contribution to the IAEA database on illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials (the ÚJD SR is a point of contact) and participation in the EU PECO project.
2.2.4. Legislation It was not necessary to create special legislation – existing legislation fully covers all parts of the system. Reading of relevant paragraphs of the Criminal Code has been formulated more strictly. Also some laws had to be modified to find out financial support for confiscated material handling.
2.3. Possible improvements During several years exploitation the system proved its effectiveness and reliability. Due to development of methods and procedures of traffickers its improvement is inevitable and is concentrated on
(a) instrumentation - portable detectors capable to identify immediately confiscated material (customs, the
ÚJD SR)
- more sensitive personal detectors (pagers) for customs and police officers
- upgrading of portal detectors to detect neutrons
- modernization of instrumentation of the PHO
(b) training – training courses for customs and police officers and their management.
3. Conclusion Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials is an international type of crime and as such it can be defeated only by co-operation of the whole international community. The government of the Slovak Republic is ready to offer all experience that was collected during its short history.
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a Stolen material
March 1993
Zvolen
yellow cake 2,5 kg
October 1993
Trnava
fuel pellets enr. 3% 860 g
September 1994
Slovenské Nové Mesto
fuel pellets enr. 3% 920 g
April 1995
Poprad
metal natural uranium 18 kg
October 1996
Podbrezová
radioactive sources Co 60 ~600 MBq
February 1997
Zvolen
fuel pellets enr. 3% 2360 g
December 1997
Trnava
uranyl nitrate 5,33 kg
August 1999a
Pohronský Ruskov
container made from depleted uranium with radioactive source Co 60
28 kg
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Technical Session 4: Strengthening Controls over Imports and Exports
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IMPLEMENTING IMPORT AND EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CATEGORY 1 AND 2 RADIOACTIVE SOURCES A Canadian Approach
P.M. Lorda, A. Thibertb a Office of International Affairs, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Ottawa, Canada b Directorate of Nuclear Substance Regulation, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Ottawa, Canada
Abstract. This paper describes the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC) approach in the development of the regulatory framework to control the import and export of radioactive sources in accordance with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. CNSC’s risk-informed regulatory principles serve as a guide in focussing efforts.
1. Introduction In Canada, the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA) [1] establishes requirements to regulate the use of nuclear energy and materials to protect health, safety, security, and the environment and to respect Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is the regulatory body that is mandated by the NSCA to:
• regulate the development, production and use of nuclear energy in Canada;
• regulate the production, possession, use, transport, import and export of nuclear substances, and the production, possession, use, import and export of prescribed equipment and prescribed information;
• implement measures respecting international control of the development, production, transport and use of nuclear energy and nuclear substances, including measures respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices; and
• disseminate scientific, technical and regulatory information concerning the activities of the CNSC and the effects on the environment and on the health and safety of persons, of the development, production, possession, transport and use referred to above.
Under the NSCA, a nuclear substance is defined as, among other things, any radioactive nuclide. Nuclear substances include radioactive sources and nuclear material, such as uranium, plutonium and thorium. As a result, the CNSC is the single national regulatory authority mandated to control both radioactive sources and nuclear material in Canada.
The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (the Code) [2] was approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 8 September 2003. The Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources (the Guidance) [3] was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 2004. Together, these serve as the focal point of the CNSC’s efforts in developing import and export controls for high-risk radioactive sources (defined in the Code as radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded in a solid form).
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2. Risk-Informed Approach Several years ago, the CNSC concluded that the development of a formal approach based on risk management would better guide the resource allocation and decision-making process across the entire nuclear regulatory program, in particular licensing and compliance activities.
As a result, the CNSC adopted a risk-informed approach to regulation such that the CNSC:
• regulates persons and organizations, subject to the Act and regulations, in a manner that is consistent with the risk posed by the regulated activity;
• recognises that risk must be considered in the context of the CNSC’s mandate;
• makes regulatory decisions and allocates resources in a risk-informed manner; and
• indicates acceptable ways to meet regulatory requirements, and allows licensees to propose alternative methods.
3. Current Framework The CNSC’s risk-based regulatory program as it pertains to radioactive sources (sealed and unsealed) is consistent with internationally recognised principles, such as the IAEA risk-based categorization of radioactive sources as documented in IAEA TECDOC-1344.
The CNSC has adopted a life-cycle cradle-to-grave approach to regulating radioactive sources to ensure compliance with the NSCA and its Regulations in the use of radioactive sources. The cradle-to-grave approach provides for continuous regulatory control and it is but one component of many within the regulatory infrastructure. Every stage of the life-cycle of radioactive sources - from production, distribution, use, possession and disposition - has its own unique needs for regulatory control and security.
The NSCA requires that a licence be obtained prior to the import and export of all nuclear substances governed by the Act. Hitherto, in the absence of harmonised multilateral guidance on import and export of radioactive sources, such authorization was carried out by way of general licensing within possession licences whereby the licensee was authorized to import or export nuclear substances where the capability to manage the nuclear substance safely had been demonstrated.
4. The Way Ahead The Code and Guidance now establish specific expectations in controlling the export and import of high-risk radioactive sources. A major regulatory challenge is achieving the objectives of the export and import provisions of the Code without unduly restricting the medical, industrial, academic or research benefits received from the use of high-risk radioactive sources.
The CNSC is reviewing its practices to ensure that they fully reflect Canada’s commitment to the Code, including the licensing of exports and imports of high-risk radioactive sources. To this end, a CNSC Working Group is developing the framework required to implement import and export controls consistent with the Code and Guidance. This includes the identification and development of appropriate regulatory tools, including regulations, as well as organisational roles and responsibilities within the CNSC required for authorising imports and exports. Effort will also be taken to use existing licensing processes to minimise effort in developing procedural changes where adaptation of existing processes is possible and desirable.
The Working Group is comprised of CNSC staff whose experience and technical background relate to safety, security and transport of radioactive sources in addition to legal counsel and
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international affairs staff. The Working Group also consults with stakeholders (e.g. licensees) to gauge the impact of the initiative being proposed.
One of the challenges facing the Working Group is the blending of import and export licensing controls with Canada’s nuclear non-proliferation commitments and the Code for those substances whose exports and imports are already controlled for nuclear non-proliferation purposes (e.g. plutonium, radium, californium, beryllium and depleted uranium used as shielding). This will likely be achieved by way of an assessment approach that results in a single licence authorization for the import or export activity, using an integrated licensing process. Such dual-assessment will require well-defined processes that account for both assessment streams.
The CNSC has developed an outreach program, including a database of stakeholders, to facilitate the dissemination of information, including information related to these types of new programmes. Past CNSC outreach activities promoting regulatory requirements have included public meetings and presentations to stakeholders.
It is expected that the most time-consuming component will be the development and implementation of changes to Canadian regulations. This type of effort in Canada is governed by a process that includes public, stakeholder and inter-departmental consultation. Regulatory change requires a long-range planning horizon. The principal basic legal requirements for such regulatory changes include:
• development of the regulatory proposal;
• central agency review;
• making or approval;
• parliamentary scrutiny; and
• coming into force [4].
Past experience in formulating and establishing new regulations indicates that this process normally takes about 24 months. The objective of the Working Group is to complete the establishment of required processes for implementation by 1 January 2006 as suggested by Member States [4] and full implementation on completion of the Canadian legal process by 1 January 2007.
5. Conclusion The CNSC’s overall strategy, which includes a risk-informed approach to regulating radioactive sources and nuclear materials, is key to achieving our overarching goals which are to protect health, safety, security and the environment and to respect Canada's international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Canada is committed to complying with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources along with its import and export provisions.
In looking at the remaining challenges, regulatory authorities should harmonise approaches and build on our collective experiences in controlling radioactive sources and nuclear materials.
As the national authority responsible for regulatory control of both radioactive sources and nuclear materials in Canada, the CNSC is working toward these ends and is committed to meeting the new challenges in these areas.
For more information on the CNSC and its nuclear regulatory activities, please visit:
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http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca or http://www.suretenucleaire.gc.ca/
REFERENCES
[1] http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca
[2] IAEA/CODEOC/2004
[3] GOV/2004/62-GC(48)/13
[4] Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regulations, 2nd Edition, Government of Canada, Privy Council Office, ISBN 0-662-33724-7, 2001
[5] GOV/2004/62-GC(48)/13, Report of the Chairman, paragraph 8
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Technical Session 5: Strategies for the Management of Disused Sources
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CHARACTERIZATION AND CONTROL OF DISUSED SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AT THE WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES IN CUBA
C. Benitez Navarro, M. Salgado Mojena Centre for Radiation Protection and Hygiene, Nuclear Energy Agency, Havana, Cuba
Abstract. Sealed radioactive sources are widely used in Cuba for different applications in medicine, industry and research. Once the sources are declared disused, they are transferred to the Centre for Radiation Protection and Hygiene (CPHR), the institution in charge of radioactive waste management in the country. From 1990 all disused sealed sources generated in the country are transported to and stored at the Waste Management Facilities, belonging to the CPHR. A considerable amount of sources were collected without the necessary information: radionuclide, activity and reference date, etc. These “unknown sources” must be characterized. Most disused sealed radioactive sources are also conditioned, in order to reduce the risk associated with them. The appropriate record keeping is established at the Waste Management Facilities for the control of radioactive sources, guarantying the traceability of waste (disused sealed sources) from their collection at the generator institution until their storage in conditioned waste packages. A quality management system is implemented for the radioactive waste management activities, according to the ISO 9001:00 Standard.
1. Introduction Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are widely used in Cuba in industry, medicine and research. Once SRS are no longer in use, they are declared disused and managed as radioactive waste.
In order to reduce the risk associated with disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS), the first priority would be to bring them under appropriate controls. It is important to have a proper infrastructure in the country for their safe management. The Centre for Radiation Protection and Hygiene is responsible for centralized collection, transport, conditioning, storage and disposal of DSRS in Cuba. The National Center for Nuclear Safety (CNSN) is responsible for the licensing and supervision of radioactive and nuclear installations.
From 1990, there is in operation in the country a Centralized Storage Facility for radioactive waste. All DSRS generated in different medical, industrial and research institutions are collected and transported by the CPHR and stored in this facility. A considerable amount of sources were received from the users without the required information, such as the radionuclide contained, activity and reference date. At that time the existing registry was incomplete, of poor quality and did not contain the needed information for the stored DSRS. For that reason, some information regarding the sources was not registered properly.
It was extremely necessary to establish adequate control over disused radioactive sources at the Centralized Storage Facility. The creation of proper registry of DSRS became a high priority item
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in the institutional strategy. The first tasks were to characterize all the “unknown sources” and implement an appropriate system for record keeping.
2. Characterization of unknown sources The identification of the radionuclide presented in the sources and the estimation of the activity have been considered the most important parameters for the characterization of disused sealed sources.
A gamma spectrometric system (multichannel analyzer with a NaI(Tl) detector) has been used for the identification of the radionuclide. A portable gamma spectrometer (Exploranium) was also available. The source, inside its lead shield, was put at appropriate distance from the detector (Fig. 1). As the material of the shielding could affect the measurements, the radiation beam from the source was opened. It was very important to control that the signal processing capabilities of the spectrometric systems were not overloaded. This issue, as well as the radiation levels from the source were considered in determining the distance between the source and detectors.
FIG. 7. Identification of the radionuclide contained in a disused sealed source
The activity of the sources has been estimated by measuring the dose rate at a certain distance from the source and using the following expression. At the distance of measurement, the source could be considered as a point source.
D = Γ x A / r2
Where: D – dose rate from the source at a distance r
Γ - gamma constant for the identified radionuclide
A – activity of the source
r – distance between the source and the detector
More than 200 disused sealed radiation sources at the Centralized Storage Facility have been characterized following this procedure. The type of source and possible application (for sources where these information were unknown), were approximately identified considering similar sources stored at the facility.
At present strict controls over sealed radioactive sources exist at the users, as a requirement of the Regulatory Authority. The information regarding SRS is available when they are declared disused and transferred to the CPHR. Nevertheless, the procedure exists at the Waste Management Facilities for the characterization of the sources, if needed.
A visual image of each source or device has been prepared during the characterization process. These pictures are currently recorded as part of the radioactive source inventory at the Centralized Facility. This photographic inventory of stored sources, which is available in hard copy and electronic, is considered as a very useful tool for quick identification of unknown DSRS and devices within the facility as well as during the collection of DSRS around the country.
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3. Record of disused sealed radioactive sources A record of disused sealed sources (table 1) has been implemented at the Centralized Storage Facility. The information is reliably stored and archived both manually and by a computerized database. Information includes the source model, identification numbers (source and container), radionuclides, activity and reference date, former user and storage location. Once the source is conditioned, according to the methodology described in previous paper [1], the number of the waste package is also registered in this record.
Table 2. Record of Disused Sealed Sources – RP/GDR/01
Code Rn Serial
number (source)
Activity / Ref. date
Type of source
Container model
Serial number
(container)
Location in the storage Former user Waste
Package
1636 137Cs unknown 244 GBq / 1982 Level gauge E-1M 121 O-22 Nickel
company DA-02-008
1637 137Cs unknown 244 GBq / 1982 Level gauge E-1M 106 O-22 Nickel
company DA-02-002
1638 137Cs unknown 244 GBq / 1983 Level gauge E-1M 151 DA-02-003
1639 137Cs unknown 122 GBq / 1982 Level gauge E-2M 504 O-22 Nickel
company DA-02-001
1640 137Cs unknown 122 GBq / 1982 Level gauge E-2M 516 O-22 Nickel
company DA-02-001
O-22 Nickel company
4. Conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources It is recognized that conditioning of radioactive waste (including DSRS) minimizes the risk associated with them. The waste package produced is more appropriate for handling, transport, storage and/or disposal. In our case, DSRS are conditioning for long term storage in the same Centralized Storage Facility.
As final disposal of radioactive waste has not been defined yet in Cuba, the majority of DSRS has been conditioned to allow retrieval, taking into consideration possible changes to repository waste acceptance criteria [1]. Two hundred litre drums are filled with concrete with a cavity in the centre. Disused sources, with their radiation shielding, are successively placed in the cavity until either the cavity is filled or until a limit of activity had been reached. The lid of the drum is placed on and locked (fig. 2). Once a waste package is produced a formulary is filled with all the information regarding its content (table 2).
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FIG. 8. Conditioning of DSRS in Cuba
5. Traceability of Disused Sealed Radioacti e Sources The Centre for Radiation Protection and Hygiene has implemented a Quality Management System for the Radioactive Waste Management Service, according to the ISO 9001 Standard [2]. This service comprises all the a conditioning and storage
f radioactive waste, as well as decommissioning of small nuclear facilities.
he traceability is one of the requirements of the ISO 9001 Standard. The system for record keeping implemented for the Radioactive Waste Management Service allows to identify
llection, until its storage in a conditioned package. Once the source is received at the Waste Management Facilities it gets a
v
ctivities: collection, transport, treatment,o
T
radioactive waste and track it individually, from the time of its co
code with is kept through all the handling and procesing stages [2].
Table 2. Formulary for Conditioned Waste Package
CPHR
WWaassttee PPrroocceessssiinngg aanndd SSttoorraaggee FFaacciilliittyy
WWaassttee PPaacckkaaggee wwiitthh DDiissuusseedd SSeeaalleedd S CCooddee:: DDAA-- 0022-- 000033 Soouurrcceess
1. General characteristics of the waste package
Immobilization agent
Concrete
Other Original radiological status of package:
Cement mortar
Volume:
No Bottom of drum filled with concrete
Yes Maximum contact radiation level: 430 µS/h
Concrete lining Si
No Maximum radiation level at 1 metre from surface: 10.5 µS/h
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Steel reinforcement bars No
Maximum surface contamination level: 4 Bq.cm-2
Yes
200 litre
d-571mm,
470 Kg
2. D used sealed sources ined in the paetails of the Dis conta ckage
thpackage Code in the Container
storage model Serial
number Radio-nucl
Activity, GBq / ce date
Mr /h cm dm3 Inf. Med
ide referenax. dose
ate µSvDimensions, Volumen
1638 E-1M 151 137Cs 244 / 1983 8 x 14500 d-29.5 l-33 21.
3. Long term Storage
Storage F ility Storage
ate 2 / 01 / 02 22 / 01 / / 01 / 02 / 02
erson ( and ture) . Benítez J.C. Be tez Barce
6. Conclusions for the control of disused sealed radioactive sources are implemented at the
Centralized Storage Facilities for Radioactive Waste in Cuba. All the sour dthe information is registered in an appropriate system for record keeping.
REFERENCES
] Benitez J.C., Salgado M. – “Disused SRS Management in Cuba: Retrievable Conditioning”. IAEA-WMDB-ST-4, 2004
enitez J.C., Fernández I.M., Marrero M. – “Implementation of a Quality :
ental
Appropriate measuresces are identifie
and
Geometry and dimensions of the package
drum
h-863 mmTotal activity in the package: 252 GBq
Weight Reference date: 2002
Position in e
. Sup.Remarks
1379 BGI-75A 1263 137Cs 61.1 / 1988 16.1 d-25.5 l-36 17.7 x
1380 BGI-75A 1199 137Cs 61.1 / 1988 22.7 d-25.5 l-36 17.7 x
Package prepared
Despatch at Processing Facility
Transportation to the ac
Reception at the Facility
D 1 02 22 22 / 01
Responsible p name signa J.C ní R. ló M. Salgado
[1
[2] Salgado M., BAssurance System in Radioactive Waste Management in Cuba”. Proceedings of ICEM ‘03
The 9th International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management and EnvironmRemediation. September 2003, Oxford, England
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RESO A
D.M. Dogaru National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control, Bucharest, Romania
Abstract. The greatest part of the spent sealed radioactive sources (SSRS) collected until 1998 from all Romanian territory was already dispose off to the National Repository for Radioactive Waste from Baita Bihor. The new waste acceptance criteria set up by regulatory authority leaded to the increasing of the number of the SSRS stored. The paper contains relevant data on the long lived, radium sources, neutron sources and orphan sources inventory reported by the radioactive waste storage facility at the end of year 2004. The paper contains also, the regulatory frame work on the management of SSRS and the measures taken by regulatory authority in order to discourage the holding of the sealed radioactive sources (SRS) without any utilization.
1. The Inventory of Spent Sealed Radioactive Sources The inventory of spent sealed radioactive sources is composed by the inventory already disposed in the National Repository for the Radioactive Waste from Baita Bihor, by the inventory stored in the different storage facilities. Until 1998 has been disposed SSRS with activity not greater that 103 Ci/m3 of conditioned waste package, according to the waste acceptance criteria valid on that time. These acceptance criteria did not contain any reference on the life of radionuclides. This is the reason for which the greatest part of the SSRS was disposed to the National Repository for Radioactive Waste Baita Bihor. [1]
Since 1998 the regulatory authority imposed new waste acceptance criteria on activity limits both for short lived radionuclides and for long lived ones. Also the total allowed amount of C-14 is limited to 1.1011 Bq/m3. These new activity limits lead to accumulation of the SSRS in storage facilities. In Romania there are two main storage facilities dedicated to the SSRS long term storage. One of them belongs to the National Institute for Development&Research for Physics and Nuclear Engineering –Horia Hulubei, by Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant and is dedicated to storage of all kind of SSRS except the high activity SSRS. Another one, belongs to the Subsidiary Branch for Nuclear Research from Pitesti and is dedicated to long term storage of high activity SSRS. Both of them are authorized by regulatory authority for storage of SSRS. [2]
The Romanian inventory of SSRS includes a lot of disused radioactive sources which are originated from recovery of the sources from decommissioning of different devices from industry, agriculture, research, etc. These disused radioactive sources are stored in different locations such as research laboratories, bunkers, etc. The greatest number of the disused radioactive sources are stored in the National Institute for Development&Research for Physics and Nuclear Engineering –Horia Hulubei (IFIN-HH) which is the manufacturer of SRS by Radioisotope Production Center. The institute had been authorized to produce the SRS, to install the devices containing SRS, as well as, to dismantle them after the period of use was expired. The dismantling of the disused sources permitted to institute by some laboratories to accumulate a great number of SSRS, a part of them is now out of the regulatory control. The regulatory authority has imposed to transfer all these disused sources, as radioactive waste, to Radioactive
LEVANT DATA ON THE SPENT SEALED RADIOACTIVE URCES INVENTORY IN ROMANI
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Waste Treatment Plant after the identification of radionuclides and measurements of their activity.
The ncollec 00 SSRS and more than 13300 Am-2
1.1 Radium Inventory he st ntory is about 529 mg and consists of needles, tubes, cells and standard ource NCAN have not authorized any more the use of radium in medicine. All
the ra nt as radioactive waste.
umber of the SSRS has decresed year by year, such as during years 2003-2004 had been ted from the users other than those from IFIN-HH about 641 from smoke detectors.
Ts
ored radium inves. Since 2000, C
dium inventory from medicine was transferred to Radioactive Waste Treatment Pla
FIG. 9. Radium spent sealed radioactive inventory
The stored inventory of radium consists of about 200 SSRS with the total weight of 529 mspread as follow: 187 mg already disposed in National Repository for Radioactive Waste fBaita Bihor, 199 mg stored in Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant Magurele, 32 mg stored in National Uranium Company, 3 mg stored in the laboratories of Health Ministry and 8 mgin other organizations. These radium sourses are now under a IAEA project for conditioning forlong term storage.
Supplementary of these SSRS, in the storage facility of RWTP there is an atypical SSRS which was recovered from the floor of an oncology hospital. The SSRS is incorporated in a piece of concrete, no definite shape and activity. There is also in storage a radium source of 2 Ci which i
g rom
stored
s
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now unsealed and shows leakage. These two SSRS mentioned above are not included in thradium inv
e entoy.
ow
tion there are in use about 200 mg of radium SRS.
entory
ords and to the testimonies of the retried personnel involved in the dioactive waste management there was not disposed any neutron sources in the National adioactive Waste Repository from Baita Bihor.
upplementary of these SSRS there are stored in the different location at the institute less than 20 disused neutron sources.
1.3 Long lived sources inventory The relevant long lived radionuclide in Am-241. It is found in the smoke detectors, standard sources and so on. There are stored more than 20 thousands of sources recovered by the smoke detectors. During the years 2003-2004 was collected about 50 SSRS from different applications other than smoke detectors. [3]
According to the Romanian regulations the Cs-137 is not considered the long lived radionuclide. [4]
1.4 Orphan sources During 2004 year was detected and recovered 4 sources of Co-60 from a building which was proposed to be demolished. The building belonged to some owners and the information on the existing of the radioactive sources was lost. When the tasks were started the workers had been seen the radiation signs on the containers. The sources were recovered and transferred to the storage facility of Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant Magurele.
2. Regulatory Framework According to the Law no. 111/1996 on the safe deployment of nuclear activities, with subsequent completions and modifications, all activities and practices involving the use, holding, manufacture, import, export, storage, treatment, disposal, transfer, transport of SRS shall to be authorized by competent a
he competent authority in the nuclear field is National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN) with duties in regulations, authorization and control. The competent authority
y in
CNCAN implemented the requirements of IAEA BSS 115 in the Fundamental Norms for Radiological Safety which was issued in 2000. Also, CNCAN issued
Norms on the safe management of radioactive waste, which represent the implementation of the
In the laboratories and bunkers of IFIN-HH there are some disused radium sources which are nunder a program of identification and characterization.
According to the CNCAN estima
1.2 Neutron sources invThe stored neutron sources inventory consists of about 60 sources as follow: 38 sources of Am-Be, 14 sources of Ra-Be, 9 sources of Po-Be. [3]
According to the recraR
S
uthority.
T
is empowered to issue regulations in order to detail the general and specific requirements for nuclear safety, radiological safety, quality assurance, physical protection, and intervention in theemergency, as well as any other regulations necessary for the authorization and control activitthe nuclear field. [4]
Based on its duties,
regulations which detail the requirements for authorization process.
In the field of radioactive waste, based on the IAEA SS-F 111, CNCAN issued the Fundamentals
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nine principles of radioactive waste management. The set of regulations for radioactive waste field include the requirements on the clearance, predisposal requirements, sitting of disposal
ve sources, CNCAN has developed and t contain any
The eco en developed by the IFIN-HH by RWTP and include
active sources without using, the regulatory kage as
h of the validity of authorization.
REFERENCES
ealed
cceptance Criteria , Yungscan, Iugoslavia (2000)
TP, personnal communications (2004)
e safe management of radioactive waste, published in Official
equent
facilities.
In order to maintain a strict record of the sealed radioactimaintained the national record keeping system data base. This record system does noreferences on the SSRS.
r rd keeping system for SSRS had bedata on the last owner, activity, radionuclide and storage or disposal place.
In order to discourage the holding of disused radioauthority has taken same measures such as: requested to perform the checking of the leathe sources is in used, imposed the returning of the SSRS to the producers as well as the higlevel of tariffs for authorization and the limitation
[1] Dogaru, D.M., Dogaru, Ghe., Legislative Framework for Management of spent sradioactive sources in Romania, WM’01 Tucson, Arizona (2001).
[2] Dogaru, D.M., Waste A
[3] Dragolici, F., N., Dogaru , Ghe., Matei, G., The inventory of radioactive waste in RW
[4] Fundamental Norms for thBulletin of Romania no. 393/2004, part I, (2004)
[5] Law no. 111/1996 on the safe deployment of nuclear activities, with subscompletions and modifications, republished in 2004
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POLICY OF SRS MANAGEMENT IN EGYPT
M.R.EI-Sourougy
t rch
ctivities all over the country. This paper is concerned only with the management of SRS management in Egypt, with special reference to the conditioning processe, interim storage and
ng-term storage specifically designed for spent radium sources. The Egyptian strategy consider the total waste inventory, waste treatmen range of different waste types, timescales for the treatment for interim s ptance criteria and availability of ulti investme gs are likely to resu r ate and enf W
1. IntrThe rprinciple ese principles are applicable to all cou sche lenvironm rden on the new generations[1]. In addition to the internationally accepted principles, waste management in Egypt is managed in accordance with the following policy principles:
Waste Generator pays: The financial burden for the management of radioactive waste borne by the generator of that waste.
Sound decision-making based on scientific information, risk analysis and optimization of resources: Decision-making shall be based on proven scientific information and recommendation of competent national and international institutions dealing with radioactive waste management.
Precautionary principle: Where there is uncertainty about the safety of an activity; a conservative approach shall be adopted.
International cooperation: The government recognizes that it shares a responsibility with other countries for global and regional radioactive waste management issues. Our actions follow the principles of this policy and all relevant regional and international agreements.
The Egyptian radioactive waste management strategy cover the total life cycle of waste management from the waste generation to the disposal. Fig. 1 illustrate the Egyptian waste management strategy. This strategy is comprehensively illustrated in The Waste Management Regulations [2].
Waste Management Centre. Atomic Energy Authority of Egypt
Abstract. Since the establishment of nuclear activities in Egypt in the late fifties, these activities give rise to an appreciable quantities of liquid and solid wastes as well as a big number of spensealed sources from different applications in industry, medicine, agriculture and reseaa
lot methods for the torage, waste acce
mate disposal facilities. A well-developed waste management strategy helps to eliminate nt in poorly specified facilities and as a result, substantial cost savin
lt. Force
om the Regulatory point of view, Egypt has already succeeded to promulgaste Management Regulations since the beginning of the year 1996.
oduction Inte national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has developed a comprehensive set of
s for the safe management of radioactive waste. Thntriemica
and can be applied to all types of radioactive waste, regardless of its physical and characteristics or origin. These sets are the protection of human health and the ent, now and in the future without imposing undue bu
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2. Characterist Sources sealed in a capsule or closely bound
application it is classifi be used for its dedicated purpose, the following management options may be considered: Return to the manufacturer (if possible) Storage for decay of source containing radionuclide with short half-life. Transportation to a radioactive waste facility for conditioning followed by interim storage or final disposal in a licensed repository.
by the aid of the IAEA. This system relay on the database registry
of the e
garding the declaration of that source.
Fig 1 the Egyptian waste management strategy
ics And Classification Of Sealed Radioactivedioactive material that is permanently
within a solid matrix. If a source is no longer needed or has become unfit for the intended ed as spent or disused source. When SRS is no longer to
A sealed source is a ra
3. Spent SRS InventoryOne of the most important concerns of t waste management of SRS is to ensure that sealedsources are properly controlled after they are no longer used, and eventually are disposed of. This concern requires that any new source is tracked throughout its lifetime, that commitments for its disposition are made prior to its import, and that a plan is established and implemented for safe management of the source after it has become spent. A record-keeping system for tracking the SRS is established in Egypt program developed be the IAEA experts.
3.1 Declare a source as spent The first step in the spent SRS management is the user declaration to discontinue the usesource. The user of a potentially spent SRS should communicate in writing to the radioactivmaterial coordinator about his source. Then the radioactive material coordinator will inform the regulatory body re
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3.2 Spent Radium Sources managment he sources are first packed into stainless steel containers (approximately 50 mg of radium in ach container), which are then welded and bubble tested. The stainless steel containers (in undles of 10) are placed into a lead container, which is packed into standard 200 l drums filled ith concrete, then the drums are properly marked. Characterization and conditioning of the
ources are done by the IAEA approved procedure and supervised by the Agency. Presently, the rums are at Inshas interim storage. Their long-term future is still not decided.
3.3 Interim storage of conditioned and unconditioned wastes A new interim storage facility composed of 4 modules was designed and the first two modules
ere erected and are now used to accept all types of conditioned and unconditioned waste ackages especially (SRS). Each module can accommodate up to 18-36 spent sealed sources in
18 pits and up to 250 concrete containers in the front hall. Fig.2. show the number of radioactive ources stored in the temporary stores according to their type of radionuclide from 1990-2004. ig 3 shows one of the interim store.
ation and site nstruction. The first
batch sould be loaded in the facility after the final regulatory body decsion. Fig. 4 shows one of
ts
onsistently produced. In addition, it will include a system q of process parameters for effective conditioning is esta lish . The measurements that verify the acceptability of the
Tebwsd
wp
sF
Fig. 2 SRS stored in the temporary store
3.4 Shallow land disposal repository A near field disposal facility covering an area of 4000 m2 is planned. Site investig
and a lisence has been issued for siting and co
Co-60 Cs-137 Ir-192 Sr-90 Am-BeFe-55 Cd-109 Kr-85 Am-241 Cf-252
selection studies are completed
the four trenches and the drainage well.
3.5 Quality Assurance A quality assurance program shall be established for the management of the SRS wastes. This program will be submitted to the regulatory authority for approval. The quality assurance aspecof the operation of the conditioning systems will include a process control program, which will ensure that an acceptable waste package is c
ualification, whereby an envelope b ed by testing the actual equipment
process parameters will also be included. The program shall also provide for the preparation maintenance, and use of shipping and disposal records and documentation A manifest system should be established to account for waste package transfers and shipments.
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4.
t sources
• ing from industrial ,mining and milling as well
ety
Series No- 115, IAEA, Vienna (1996).
] Egyptian Official Journal, Regulations of Radioactive Waste Management (1999)
Fig. 3 The New stores
Fig.4 One of the Four Trenches and The Drainage Well
f Waste Management Program In Egypt Problems Facing The Implementation O• Conditioning and disposal of neutron sources
• Conditioning of high activity sources (teletherapy machines)
• Disposal of conditioned Ra-226 spen
Proper management of TE-norm wastes arisas from petroleum and gas exploration activities
REFERENCES
[1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Basic Safety Standards for
Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of RadiationSources, SafStandards
[2
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SOLUTIONS FOR DISUSED SEALED RADIATION SOURCES: LEGISLATIVE AND TECHNICAL BASIS.
Zhiwen Fan
China Institute for Radiation Protection
Abstract. Over ten thousand of radiaiton sources have been used in various fields in China. Currently, a source should be sent to a provincial storage facility when becoming disused and return to suppliers are encouraged but not compulsory. This paper discusses options which may be practically implemented for disused sources except for storage in a provincial storage facility, which includes disposal of short-lived and lower radioactivity sources in a low-and-intermediate level radioactive waste disposal facility ; long-term storage of the long-lived and much higher radioactivity sources before geological disposal facility is available, return of reusable and recycle sources suppliers or manufacturer; and disposal in a non-radioactive waste disposal facility for those with much lower radioactivity. At present there are two near-surface disposal facilities in operation for low and intermediate level radioactive waste but sealed radiation sources are not allowed to enter for disposal. This paper also discusses mechnism that may promote the source users to send disused radiation sources to the provincial storage facilities. The legislative and technical challenge for the above options are option-specific and further efforts is urgently needed before these options can come into practice.
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BASIC DESIGN OF AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE HANDLING OF SPENT HIGH ACTIVITY SOURCES.
M. Al-Mughrabib, M. Smitha a South Africa Nuclear Energy Corporation b aste Technology Section
g
ity val we
ve a se.
deal with Spent High Activity Radioactive Sources (SHARS) the basic design was developed. This paper presents the basic
esign of the inftrastucture for handling and conditioning of SHARS. The infrastructure is a hotcell consisting of a biological shield, manipulators, source transfer port, viewing window and lifting equipment. It can be disassembled, packed and transported across borders. The paper also describs various subsystems, and auxillary systems and equipment. The main shielding material is water and sand the two materials that are abandant and need not to be transportaed. The operation design is also described.
The infrastucture is mainly aimed at assisting countries without adiquate resources to handle and condition for long term storage spent high activity radioactive sources. It is designed to be operated by an expert team working under the auspices of the IAEA. However, ease of opeartion and low cost are some of the attractive features of this infrasture.
1. Introduction It has been esstimated that there are several million sealed radioactive sources in the world [4], Most of these sources are of low activity. While there has been no accurate number for the SHARS experience and field work suggests that there number is around several tens of thousands. Their storage conditions in most developing countries is not accepable. Most of them are stored at the place where they were last used. The records in most cases are non existant or incomplete. Almost all of them are stored in their working shield which was not ntended for long term storage. Source security was not an issue and hence security of the source was never put in an acceptable condition. As a result, we have seen an accedent or two resulting in several deaths or serious injuries annually.
E. Maphisaa,
IAEA W
Abstract. High activity sources produce intense gamma field around it that makes its handlinand manipulation a difficult task. While in special situations it maybe possible to use distance as factor for waste management purposes and for substantial reduction in the size of the waste it is not practical nor possible to relay on distance and time for source manipulation. Utilization of a suitable shield along with the required tools and equipment handle, manipulate and condition the source for the intended purpose is a prerequisite. On the other hand, manipulation of high activsources outside their shields requires also the experience that would allow their proper retrieand conditioning. Looking at the available infrastructure in most countries around the world found that most developing countries lack such infrastructure and the experience. In some countries sources are stored under totally unacceptable conditions. Most of these sources haspecial form certificate that expeired and their original transport container have lost its licenMobility of the infrastructure is one important requirement. The concept of such a system was developed at IAEA head quarter. Following the presentation of the Conceptual design to an international consultancy that accepted the design as a mean to
d
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In order that such sources are managed properly a number of requirements need to be met. Proper records on there sources are required. Radioactivity, radioisotop, source design and chemical-physi m mana uirements for lo cell and well designed storage shield that meets safety and security requirements as well as the required personnel that have the experience and expertise to conduct such sensitive work. This
y in well developed countries. In order that this can be done either the sources need to be transported across boundaries where such infrastructure exists or the infrastructure and the experienced perssonnel be taken to where such sources physically reside. Both s
Since either a valid special form certificate nor a licensed ansport container the attempt to transport them proved to be uneconomical. This has been
carried out in limited cases and cost several hundred thousand dollars per source. This makes it
e
of
n,
ong
The Biological Shield is a double walled cell within which handling of unshielded sources will be
ponents of the conditioning facility are mounted. These include; master slave manipulators, internal crane, ventilation system, and source transfer port. Access for video cameras (two of them), power supply and source transfer are also included.
The Biological Shield consists of a 1.55 meters wide hollow wall filled with sand as a shielding material. The walls of the biological shield are made from standard mild steel shuttering. The sand should have a density of at least 1,6 kilograms per litre. This density reduces radiation from a 1000-Curie source inside the Biological Shield to 0.045 mSv per hour on the outside wall surface [4]. 90m3 of sand is required to fill the cavity. The working volume of the Biological Shield is 2.5m long, 1,6m wide and 3,0m high. This gives enough room to accommodate the
cal composition are minimum information required for conditioning and long tergement. Substantial volume reduction and introcuction of safety and security reqng term storage call for source recovery and conditioning. This requires a hot
infrastructure exists onl
olutions are not practical nor economical.
most of these sources no longer have ntr
impossible to adopt this as a worldwide solution. Transport of a normal hot cell will be even much more costly. Apart from all the technical difficulties to disassemble and assemble a normal hot cell the cost of shipment of the required lead shield will be over whelming. The solution presented in this paper is based on the selection of shielding materials that are readily available inmost countries and the design of a hot cell that is designed with assembling, disassembling and transport in mind.
1.1 The suggested solution The concept consists of a cavity similar to the cavity of a hot cell flarge enough to house thSHARS with its working shield and has all the tools equipment required for working on the source including master-slave-manipulators. The bilogical shield surounding the cavity is made a steel outer shell (both from the inside and outside) and has all the required channels to access the cavity for the various operations (power supply, smeer tests, transfer of tools, video visioetc.). The main shielding material used is sand for most of the bilogical shield and water where direct sight of the source is required. Inner and outer lifting cranes and source transfer for the lterm storage shield are included. The concept is expected to be used for SHARS recovery andconditioning in Developing countries. The basic design of the main systems of the mobile SHARS installation is presented here.
2. Biological Shield
performed. Its main function is to protect operators, the public and environment from an equivalent of a 1000Ci 60Co source ionizing radiation. It should also prevent the spread of contamination in case of a leaking source or an accident. The Biological shield shown in figure 1 performs a secondary role of being the platform on which other com
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SHARS working shield while allowing free movement of the manipulators. It also accommodates the internal crane and other tools and equipment needed for source dismantelling.
Some panels have to be modified and strengthened to accommodate through access-tubes and thewindow. The shuttering panels for the internal and external walls are connected by steel rods to prevent them from buckling under the weight of the sand. The method for assembly and securingof the shuttering are standard. This industrial system has been designed for easy erection andismantling which can be done many times without significant loss of efficiency. Customised rods are preferred to the standard horizontal pipes to avoid compromising shielding. I-beams placed within the Biological Shield cavity provide structural stability and support for the roof.
d
HARS conditioning facility general arrangement and subsystems FIG. 10. S
It is designed that the internal surfaces of the Biological Shield be easy to decontaminate.joints of adjacent shuttering panels are filled with silicon glue to provide airtight smooth surThe internal surface of the Biological Shield is painted with epoxy paint for ease of decontamination.
3. Window and vision equipment The Window’s primary pu
All faces.
rpose is to provide sufficient vision to allow personnel to view the
l
ent polycarbonate end panels, which are shatter proof. For the window to have the same depth as the
operation area inside the Biological Shield. The Window also provides shielding which is at worst equivalent to that provided by the walls of the Biological Shield. The Window is positioned such that the operator can view the operation area from a standing position. It is not an integral part of the Biological Shield. It has to be put into position during erection of the steeshuttering.
The Window consists of a container filled with a transparent heavy liquid and having transpar
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cavity while still providing the same level of shielding, the shielding liquid will be a 50% zinc bromine solution in water. The solution reduces dose due to a 1000Ci source inside the Biological
ess
four 250W high-pressure sodium lights mounted vertically in the corners of the front wall to provide illumination. The lighting should have sufficient redundancy to mitigate any lighting failures.
Emergency battery operated lights will be installed inside the Biological shield in case of power failure. This will allow basic operations to take place such as placing an exposed source in a lead pot or shielded box. Two closed circuit cameras will be installed inside the cell and connected to two independent monitors outside the cell.
4. Handling and Lifting Equipment The main function of Master Slave Manipulators is to perform the final dismantling of the working shield in order to expose the unshielded sealed source. They cover the entire cell area so that they can handle objects anywhere within the cell to a height of 1,2 meters above the workbench.
The Master-Slave Manipulators model KTH200 was selected from the Korean Radiation Shield Eng. Co. LTD catalogue. These are telescopic manipulators capable of lifting up to 20kg weight. Some modifications to these manipulators are necessary to ensure that the wall tube covers the 1,5 meters thickness of the Biological Shield wall.
An Internal Crane (jib crane type) is designed to lift objects too heavy for the master slave manipulators such as Teletherapy and blood irradiator drawers. It covers as much of the cell as possible, especially the rear of the cell where most of the work will be done. The crane arm can swivel through 180o about its mounting. Its hoist travels the length of the crane arm and is electrically oper t capacity of the c s
e External Crane’s main purpose is to lift heavy objects such as the source’s working shield
along the ns of a motorized pinion on a rack mounted on the crossbeam. It has a lifting
height of 3.9 meters from the ground. This gives it a working clearance of 750mm above the
F147
t a transport container. Transportation, if required, will be on special arrangement and
Shield to an effective dose equivalent of 0,027 mSv/h on the outer wall [4]. A lead skirt will be installed on the bottom section of the window to provide added shielding in case the sand settles and creates voids through which there could be radiation steaming.
The oval shape of the window gives it strength and rigidity while allowing for a wide angle ofvision. Most work will be carried out to the rear of the cell, which will allow the work in progrto be viewed directly through the Window. The area not visible through the Window will be viewed with a camera installed inside the cell and positioned by the manipulators. There will be
ated. I has a total lifting height of 1,2 meters above the workbench. The lifting rane i 200kg.
Thinto and out of the Biological Shield. It is also used during assembly of the Biological Shield, Window, and placing of roof panel. The External Crane is a gantry crane type with 4 large rubber wheels for moving across even surfaces. The hoist has a capacity of 2 tons. It movescrossbeam by mea
Biological Shield.
5. Source Tranfer Port The long-term storage shield is a container based on and compatible to the design of the source transport container by MDS Nordion. The container will be design to the same Type B transport container requirements but will not be licensed as such since it is essentially a storagecontainer nothere will be no need for trans-boundary license, as each country will store its sources. The storage container is designed to for a period of 75 years. Demonstration of this capability, based
298 297
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on theoretical studies and modelling will be required. It also provides shielding, which will allofor the container to be handled without need for further shielding. The storage container is provided with a cover to protect it from environmental effects.
The long term storage container is shown on figure 2 coupled to the transfer port of the BiologicaShield. The source drawer can be pushed into the storage shield thro
w
l ugh the the transfer port with
ess
ources with a total activity of about 10kCi. The dose rate on the outer surface of the
ormally 200mm long and 10mm in diameter.
no increase of the radiation level outside the biological shield. The source is placed into the drawer and the loaded source drawer retracted into the Long-Term Storage Shield. The Long-term Storage Shield has a locking mechanism that makes it very difficult for unauthorized accof the stored source. Special knowledge and authorization is required to open the shield once the sources have been introduced. The storage shield allows for the storage of sources for blood irradiators as well as Teletherapy sources etc. It is designed to have four drawers capable of holding sshield should not exceed 2,0mSv/h.
Allowance is made for about 2 Teletherapy sources and about 5-10 blood irradiator pencils per source drawer. The blood irradiator pencils must fit into the drawer in a horizontal position. The size of the blood irradiator pencils used is n
FIG. 11. Long-term storage shield coupled to the Biological Shield transfer port.
The detailed design of the long-term storage shield is to be performed by RWE Nukem in the United Kingdom.
6. Auxillary Systems and Equipment Auxiliary systems will be bought off–the-shelve. These include fully automatic welding equipment, Leak testing equipment and radiation protection equipment. Some tools for stripping
g and dismantling of the biological shield, and other general rt of standard equipment. A 6 metres ISO shipping container will be
of Teletherapy heads, buildinapplications will also form pamodified and adapted for the transportation of the facility. Other equipment will include; cement vibrator, vacuum cleaner, and power supply with sufficient redundancy .
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7. Conclusion The basic design has been reviewed by a panel of international experts who found the concebe sound and fit for the intended purpose. Preliminary safety ass
pt to essment which is a subject of a
nt
work
[5] Qamar, Ali. (2003), Conditioning of High Activity Radioactive Sources
[6] IAEA, (2003), Development of the infrastructure for the handling and conditioning of spent high activity radioactive sources (SHARS) (internal working document)
separate paper, demonstrated the safety of the infrtastructure.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to thank all those involved in the SHARS project at Necsa, especially Mr. RG Heard, Mr. GR Liebenberg, L. Hordjik and Mr. AJ Ramlakan.
REFERENCES
[1] IAEA, SHARS facility conceptual design
[2] Prelimenary safety assessme
[4] Maphisa E., Smith ME. (2004), Basic design for the SHARS conditioning facility (done for the IAEA)
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NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SAFE AND SECURE MANAGEMENT OF DISUSED SEALED SOURCES IN I.R. OF IRAN
S. Momenzadeh, M. Ettehadian, A. Maleki, M. Akbarzadeh aste Mangement Department, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
Abstract. Sealed radioactive sources have been widely used in Iran for many years in industry, medicine and research. Since Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has laid down a regulatory framework to control sealed sources, a number of historical, orphan or non-registered sources a cal risks for the populatiopractices disused sealed sources from being misused or accessed by unauthorized people. This article describes national
for management of new and disused sealed sources in I.R. of Iran.
1. Introduction Disused sealed sources are generated from a large number of different activities in Iran: the use of radioisotopes in medicine, research and industry. In addition, because of unstable social, economical and political conditions in neghboring countries in recent years, many orphan and unknown sources have been intentinally or unintentionally entered into the country borders.
Policy of Iran in the field of radioactive waste management is to protect man and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation originating from radionuclides contained in radioactive waste at present and in the future without imposing unnecessary burdens on the future generations[1]. This task can be achieved by implementation of modern techniques in compliance with the basic international radiation protection and waste management principles and requirements (formulated by the ICRP and the IAEA in their publications). The IAEA recommends each Member State to establish a proper radioactive waste management system, which shall include all legal, regulatory, organizational and technical components to be commensurate with the types and quantities of the waste generated[2].
2. Legal And Regulatory Framework
2.1 Responsibilities of The Parties Involved in Waste Management All the parties involved in management of radioactive sealed sources have been identified and their responsibilities clearly defined as required by the IAEA[3]. These responsibilities are presented in Table 1 and briefly described below[1]. A regulatory and controlling task in the field of nuclear safety, waste safety and radiation protection is imposed on the AEOI. The AEOI in turn, designated its Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority(INRA) as the Competent Authority for implementation of the above task. INRA is authorized for issuing rules and regulations and conducting licensing and supervisory processes for issued licenses, and thereby regulating nuclear safety, waste safety and radiation safety for siting, design, equipment manufacturing, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities or specific
W
re occasionally found and retrieved, which may represent high radiologin if not monitored and collected. In addition, safe and secure management schemes and implemented by waste Management Department of AEOI prevents
strategy
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aspects thereof. The INRA is also responsible for the regulation of issues related to accounting for and control of nuclear materials, radioactive substances and physical protection.
Table nt in Iran
Ac
3. Responsibilities of the parties involved in radioactive waste manageme
tivity(for radiactive sources) INRA Sealed Source User(or Purchaser) WMD
Import/Export C R -
Collection C R A
Ch R+A aracterization C -
ansport of unprocessed sources C - (Except Radiography SourcesTr ) R
Storage of unprocessed sources C - A
Decay storage C - A+R
Disposal of exempt sources C - A+R
Conditioning C - R+A
Transport C - R
Interim storage C - R
Long term storage C - R
Disposal C - R
Institutional control R - -
R – responsible, A - advisory services, C - control functions
Sealed Source Users(Operators) General and main responsibilities of the users (those are considered as Operators) are as follows:
(1) The operator(s) shall submit to, and receive approval from the INRA an application detailing the design, suggested operation and decommissioning of the proposedequipment. The details shall meet general design, criteria/guidelines set up by the
(2) Assignment of a competent person as health physicist of the institute.
(3) Submission of complete information on the type, nature, amoun
facility or INRA.
t and the necessity of the radioactive source for import or application.
l required safety equipment list.
(5) A
(4) Submission of an emergency plan and al
programme for training of personnel
Waste Management Department(WMD) The WMD is designated by the AEOI as the central waste management organization in Iran to be responsible for consulting on all aspects of radioactive waste management activities in the country, and for transportation, processing and storage of institutional radioactive waste includingmanagement of disused sealed sources.
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D is u s e d s e a le ds o u rc e s
D e c a y s to ra g e
V e ry s h o r t - l iv e d(T 1 /2 < 1 0 0 d )
A r e th e c le a ra n c ele v e ls m e t?
D is p o s a l in ala n d f i l l
N o
S h o r t - l iv e d(T 1 /2 < 3 0 y )
C o n d i t io n in g
S to r a g e
D is p o s a l in a n e a rs u r fa c e r e p o s i to ry
L o n g - l iv e d( T 1 /2 > 3 0 y )
C o n d i t io n in g
L o n g te r min te r im s to ra g e
D is p o s a l in a g e o lo g ic a l r e p o s i to ry
R e tu rn tos u p p l ie r
T ra n s fe r toa n o th e r u s e r
Y e s
A lte rn a t iv e l yB o r e h o le
ning of all spent sealed sources.
The following acts, regulations and pro t a nt activities and other issues related to sealed sources, have already been approved by the Parliment:
nergy Act of Iran (approv n 1974);
ection Act of Iran (approved in 1989).
Basic Radiation Safety Standards (BRSS) (approved in 1999).
otection Regulations (approved in 1990).
3. Thtra
sufficgreate
conditioning followed by centralized storage until a disposal option becomes possible/available. Conditioning
(e.g. a lding will be placed in the centre of a drum
The WMD will also be responsible for disposal of all radioactive waste in Iran including disused sealed sources. The WMD is also responsible for collection, storage and conditio
2.2 Legal Framework cedures, hat partially address the basic waste m nageme
Atomic E ed i
Radiation Prot
Radiation Pr
Procedure for import of in )
Procedure f 001)
Procedu of
been adopted on ].
Currente following managem
dustrial sources(approved in 2000
or issuing occupational licensing in industrial radiography(approved in 2
re of contamination control metalic scrapes in customs(approved in 1995)
The IAEA regulation for transport of radioactive materials outside of nuclear facilities has the national level[4
Practices in Management of Disused Sealed Sources ent options can be considered for disused sources: return to supplier,
nsf storage and disposal. The Figure 1 shows management procedures for disused sealed sources. A preferable strategy is to return the disused source (in particular radiotherapy sources) to the supplier. All new purchasers(importers) should include in the purchase contract a clause permitting the return of the source after the end of its use. The sealed sources to be returned to the supplier should be
er to another user, storage for decay, conditioning followed by
packaged and shipped in its original container.Sources that are suitable for decay storage are those sources with half-life less than 100 days such as 192Ir. A decay period of 10 half-lives is
ient in most cases to allow the decay of activity to clearance levels. Sources with a half-life r than 100 days that cannot decay to or below clearance levels require conditioning.
All disused sealed radioactive sources will be sent to the WMD for controlled
of disused sources of lower activity is based on the enclosure of the source in a type A package mild steel 200 L drum). The source in its shie
with concrete lining.
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FIG. 12 Management Procedures For Disused Sealed Sources.
A tota ve been found within the metal scraps at different customs by Radiation Protectin Department in 2000, 2001, 2002 respectively. Details of these These type of sources have been found hboring countries. When these petent staff will co y accident caused by unauthorized people.
About in 2004. Some old telethesecurity reasons are collected and stored by WMD. These disused sources have still a very high activitcooperation to find some solution in safe storage and conditioning of them. Siting for a near surfacto be constructed for disposal of disused sealed sources in the same site. It is estimated that this site be selected by mid-2006.
Tab ear 2004
Table 2 shows total number and activity of all diused sealed sources which have been collected and conditioned or stored by WMD only in 2004. Two of the Cs-137 sources have been collected in Iraq borders inside metal scraps from some dismantled equipment in Iraq due to war aftermath.
l number of 11, 66 and 9 unauthorized sources ha
sources are recorded and are available for presentation.due to instability and lack of control in crisis periods in our neig
sources are found by radiation protection inspectors on the borders, WMD comllect and store them in centralized facility to prevent an
151 brachytherapy and 31 teletherapy sources are being used rapy sources are often found in medical centers with no return-to-supplier contract and for
y (about 5000 GBq each) and very large and heavy heads. WMD has asked for IAEA
e repository is in progress by WMD and in cooperation with AEOI. A borehole is planned
le 4. Disused Sealed Sources Collected and Conditioned By WMD in Y
Nuclide Total Number Total Activity on Date(GBq)
Situation
Co-60 86 19005.4 Conditioned
Cs-137 269 1065.1 Conditioned
Ra-226 196 (collected in last 15 years)
42.9 Conditioned witcooperation of
h
IAEAKr-85 1 0.545 Stored
About 980 sources in research and training centers, 178 industrial radiography sources and 790 miscellaneous sources(level, density and thickness gauges; well logging,…) have been licensed in2004 and are in use.
4. Summary and C
onclusion A relatively suitable legal framework and control system has been established in Iran for
anagement of sealed sources from purchase to disposal. All the parties involved in management f radioactive sealed sources have been identified and their responsibilities clearly defined as
required by the IAEA. Waste Management Dept. of AEOI has set up a centralized facility as well as a recording system to deal with disused sealed sources in a safe manner and internationaly ccepted methods. Nevertheless, the issues of unreturned teletherapy sources and disposal of
other sources are under negotiations.
mo
a
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Authors wish to thank staff of Radiation Protection Dept. of AEOI specially Mr. S. Borhan-Azad for provision of s ic
ive
aste
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Legal and Governmental port Safety,
rt of -1 (ST-1
tastist s on sealed sources in use.
REFERENCES
[1] WASTE MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT OF AEOI, National Strategy for RadioactWaste Management In the I.R. of Iran, Tehran, Dec. 2003.
[2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Principles of Radioactive WManagement, Safety Series No. 111-F. Vienna (1995).
[3] Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and TransRequirements, IAEA Safety Standards, No. GS-R-1, Vienna (2000).
[4] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulations for the Safe TranspoRadioactive Material – 1996 Edition (Revised), Safety Standards Series No. TS-RRevised), Vienna (2000).
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MANAGEMENT OF THE RADIOACTIVE LIGHTNING CONDUCTORS: THE POLICY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN CROATIA
No KOTEH dozimetry Co. Radiation Protection, Zagreb, Croatia
Ab tseveral dthe lightn r general licenses wit esome of tsecurity p exposures to the public and radioactive contamination. The prevention of radioactive sources from entering the public domain in an uncontrolled manner has
ecome an international challenge to authorities responsible for regulating the safe use and disposal of radioactive sources. A new specific safety problem appeared during the 1991-95 war in some newly independent countries formed after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Investigation showed that many RLC in war affected areas were displaced, and some were even found buried under the ruins. These damaged RLC became available for unauthorised uses or subject to unsafe handling by the local population. Furthermore, radioactive materials could be collected by local scrap merchants and sold to steelworks. For these reasons over the past years Croatian authorities mounted campaign to locate, recover and dispose of all RLC that had been damaged, lost or abandoned. After successful completion of the campaign some specific lessons were learned from this experience that served as a basis for further actions in this field. RLCs represent the largest homogenous group of radioactive sources in Croatia but with the least regulatory control of all radioactive sources and they frequently enter to public domain in an uncontrolled manner from time to time. In order to maintain and regain full control over all radioactive sources in the country and because of some doubts about their operational effectiveness, there is consensual decission that about 250 RLC installed in Croatia has to be dismantled and properly stored as soon as possible.
1. Introduction Global awareness is growing of problems associated with commercial radiation sources whose whereabouts are largely unknown. With radiation sources being transported across borders, the implications stretch beyond the country where the sources were originally used.
The great majority of radioactive devices in Croatia are used under licenses. Routine inspection and control of the radioactive sources used in medicine, industry and research as well as other regulatory mechanisms to periodically contact licensees prevent these radioactive devices enter the public domain in an uncontrolled manner, typically by being discarded with scrap metal.
The special problems are radioactive lightning conductors (RLC) that have been used in Croatia for several decades. RLCs represent the largest homogenous group of radioactive sources in Croatia. In the 1960s, the commercial manufacture of radioactive lightning conductors began and
vakovic M., Nikolic V., Kozuh D., Posedel D. E
strac . Radioactive lightning conductors (RLC) have been used in a number of countries for ecades because it was believed that radioactive attachments improve the effectiveness of ing conductors. These sources were and still are used in Croatia unde
h littl or no regulatory control. Not surprisingly, absent of such control and inspection led that hese devices enter the public domain. Lost and unwanted sources can cause safety and roblems such as radiation
b
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they were introduced into regular practice because it was believed that radioactive attachments improve the effectiveness of lightning conductors. At that time the activities of these devices were he consu ense concelicensed radioactive sources or devices. In former Yugoslavia manufacturer used cobalt 60 or europium-152 and 154 with activity 10 – 20 GBq which exclude them from the consumer products category. These are sealed radioactive sources.
ven though these types of RLC have not been manufactured in last 10 years, many are still in regula iation protection and regulatory proble
. Safety problems associated to RLC
rent
le d. For
August 1995 almost half of Croatia was affected by war. Towns and settlements with hundred s of installed RLC sustained heavy mortar shelling and air raids. Many
e
stored during
C
no higher than 500 kBq and therefore they were classified as consumer products. Tmer products are usually covered by the general license concept. The general licpt enables persons with minimal or no training in radiation safety to possess and use
Er use in Croatia and have created a number of specific radms.
2A key feature of these devices is their robust design and installation on the relatively unapproachable place: roofs, pillars or buildings. Because the requirements for robust design and other manufacturing criteria of RLC provide assurance that they can be used safely, there was no routine inspection programme or other regulatory mechanism to contact most users periodically. The robustness and anticipated inherent safety enabled persons with minimal training in radiationsafety to possess and use RLC with minimal risk to the users or to the public while the devices are in use. Persons using RLC do not need to apply for a specific license but possess and use the RLC under the general license and its conditions which are provided in the regulations. Inhein this concept was the notion that general licensees will exert appropriate control and accountability of the radioactive sources while they possess them and will properly dispose of them when they are no longer needed.
As time goes by, warning labels and signs on RLC often became obliterated as a result of exposure to adverse environments and improper maintenance. Also, personnel knowledgeable about the RLC retire, are discharged or otherwise leave the licensee’s plant.
Not surprisingly, predictable consequence of these developments and absent of control and inspection led that some of these RLC enter the public domain, most frequently by being discarded with scrap metal.
It became apparent in the past ten years that radioactive lightning conductors could expose peopliving or working in the vicinity to radioactive device, especially if assemblies were damagethis reasons and because of some doubts about their effectiveness many countries adopted a policy of not promoting their further use; some of them even banned the installation of new devices.
From July 1991 until
RLC were partially dislocated, damaged or remained under ruins. During and especially after thwar activities the Croatian authorities launched a campaigns to locate, recover and safely store damaged RLC. As many as 170 RLC had been collected, conditioned and safely these campaigns. Because of reasonably good registration and licensing practices in Croatia, it was possible to handle this intervention efficiently.
Several specific lessons were learned from this experience. An important lesson learned from theoperational experience with RLC users is that periodic contacts by regulators with users of RLserve as reminders to them of the need to maintain control and accountability of the radioactive sources, to properly dispose of the sources when they are no longer needed, and otherwise fortheir safe use.
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Additional evidence has been gained that RLC shall be replaced by other types of lightning protectors as soon as possible, taking into account the financial resources needed for this undertaking. Moreover, current use of RLC does not meet two main ALARA principles, namjustification and optimization of the practice.
Even though the general trend is a decrease in the use of RLC worldwide, it seems that there isneed for stronger international recommendations to ban these unjustified applications.
One country’s efforts against lost or orphan sources can b
ely,
a
e jeopardized if neighbouring countries
l approach, rather then isolated national actions, is needed to cope with the problem of the region share the same problem related to the e of device and radioactive source) and are
n
xperts
nctions he result of these discussions was the ban of further installation and
use of RLC. The final year for dismantling and storing all RLcs is 2005. The project has been developed including administrative, organizational, technical, protective and practical details to condition dismantled radioactive sources from RLC and other disused sources in Croatia that no future use is foreseen including the conditioning and design of appropriate original packaging for interim storage. Disused sealed sources addressed in this project are mainly those that had been used in medicine and dismantled from lightning conductors because that is the largest
m in a disposal container.
do not regain and maintain control of their own sources at the same time. Moreover, the unauthorized transfer and export to other countries, as well as sources mixed with scrap metals, may well be very difficult to eliminate with isolated national initiatives. Comprehensive internationathe lost or orphan sources. Several countries inradioactive lightning conductors (the same typdeveloping strategies to cope with it.
Search campaign for the lost or orphan sources can even be more productive if international-regional programmes are operated in many countries simultaneously in a synchronized manner and information exchanged at regional level.
Special measures and care should be taken to keep displaced, damaged, lost or abandoned radioactive sources from RLC out of the hands of scrap metal merchants, who could spread radioactivity throughout the steelworks.
The efficient handling of these situations requires relevant emergency plans and teams who canact promptly. An adequate storage or disposal facility should be available for the implementatioof the emergency plan.
3. Applying the lessons learned In 2000, the Croatian authorities expressed concern about the RLC. A group of erecommended that the regulatory authority give higher priority to license policy of the RLC because of problems with RLC being abandoned, disposed of in unauthorized ways, malfuand lack of accountability. T
homogenous group of sources in Croatia (more the 80%).
It is necessary to develop a simple Type A packaging which can be used for the interim storage ofthe spent sealed sources, and at the same time suitable for the transport.
It is necessary to develop techniques and methods to facilitate reduction of the volumes to be disposed in a depository, once the option is made available, by retrieving the individual waste containers from the storage container and placing the
Shielding is necessary during the handling, transport and storage phases. In this context, physical protection is best achieved through the storage facility being safeguarded from intrusion, safe closure of waste packages and keeping handling equipment inoperational when not in use under supervision of the storage facility operating staff.
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To deal with the issue of radioactive wastes including spent sealed, the Croatian authorities sestablish suitable interim storage. Existing premises will be used as the facility for interimstorage, subject to approval, and proper measures for reconstruction and adaptation. The option ofconstruction the new storage facility would not
hall
be disregarded in case that above mentioned
,
poses.
dards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Standards Series No. 115, IAEA, Vienna (1996).
[2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nature and Magnitude of the Problem of Spent Radiation Sources, IAEA-TECDOC-620, IAEA, Vienna (1991).
for
[4] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Methods to Identify and Locate Spent CDOC-804, IAEA, Vienna (1995).
active Waste
ge
ment .
premise would not be available.
4. Conclusion In order to improve control and accountability of radioactive sources in general, especially to maintain and regain full control over the sources possessed and used under the general license concept, the Croatian authorities launch the initiative to search, locate, recover, collect dismantletransfer and store these sources. The main concern is given to the RLC because of their high activity and vulnerability due to weak regulatory control. The outcome of these efforts will be reduced possibility for large number of relatively high activity sources to become orphans or being dismantled by accident or publicly accessible or worse to be misused threatening pur
REFERENCE [1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Basic Safety Stan
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Establishing a National SystemRadioactive Waste Management, Safety Series No. 111-S-1, IAEA, Vienna (1995).
Radiation Sources, IAEA-TE
[5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Categorization of RadioManagement, IAEA-TECDOC-1191, Vienna (2000).
[6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Handling, Conditioning and Storaof Spent Radioactive Sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1145, Vienna (2000).
[7] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Generic Procedures for Assessand Response during a Radiological Emergency, IAEA-TECDOC-1162, Vienna (2000)
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PRELIMINARY SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSEDSHARS FACILITY
handling equipment. For regulatory and economic reasons it is not practical to attempt to transport such sources to developed cou ditioning for the purpose of either long-term rproper mIAEA se imum activity equivalent of a 1000 Ci Co-60 source and allow for the transfer of the source from its Original Source Shield to a Long Ter oRadiolog been per eCi Co-60 er of the public was 14 µSv. A Detailed Design is to be developed as well as a full Operational Rad
1. The Preli s a radiological safety assessment basexposureand cpro iaccidents
. Facility Description
2.1 Facility Design The facility consists of a biological shield with a window for viewing work in progress within the operational area within the biological shield of the facility. The Biological Shield consists of a double walled cavity, 1,55 meters thick and filled with sand of density of at least 1,6 kg/L as a shielding material. The working volume of the operational area is 2.5m long, 1,6m wide and 3,0m high. The window of the biological shield will have a 50 % ZnBr2 solution as the shielding material and will have two transparent end panels through which the cell is viewed. The end panels are made of polycarbonate which has extremely high impact strength [2].
The Biological shield performs the secondary role of being the platform on which other components of the conditioning facility are mounted. These include; master slave manipulators, internal crane, ventilation system, power supply, vision systems and source transfer port. It makes use of master-slave manipulators and an internal crane to handle and lift various objects within
A. J. Ramlakan, M. Al-Mughrabi, L. Hordijk, M. Smith, E. Maphisa NECSA, South Africa
Abstract. Presently it is not possible to handle Spent High Activity Radioactive Sources (SHARS) outside their working shields in countries which do not possess a hot cell and remote
ntries for their con sto age or disposal. The availability of a mobile facility would therefore be instrumental for
anagement of SHARS. A conceptual design of such a facility was developed by the cretariat [1] which can handle SHARS up to a max
m St rage Shield. As part of the first phase of the project, a Preliminary Operational ical Safety Assessment of the SHARS conditioning facility and process has
form d. Doses were calculated for a conditioning operation of 435 minutes for a single 1000 source. The dose to the operator was found to be 197 µSv whilst the dose to a memb
iological Safety Assessment as part of Phase 2 of the project.
Introduction minary Safety Assessment of the SHARS facility [4] i
ed on the design described in [4] . Radiological hazards were identified and the potential to the public and workers during normal operations was calculated. A Failure Modes
Effebabil
ts Analysis and a Severity Analysis were performed for possible accidents. A stic analysis will be performed in the full Operational Radiological Assessment for identified as serious. The likelihood of fire was also discussed.
2
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IAEA-CN-134
the cell. A crane is available outside the shield for use in lifting heavy objects in and out of the Biological Shield. A ventilation system maintains a negative pressure within the cell to contain the sp ll be cocell.
Further details can be found in [4] .
2.2 Process Description he co e
times pilot operation. Contamination checks will be performed during the pre-mission and during steps 1, 3 and 6.
Table 5. Process description of the SHARS facility.
s)
read of possible contamination. The Long-Term Storage Shield (LTSS) for the SHARS wiupled to the side of the biological shield for easy and safe transfer of the sources from the
T nditioning process for a teletherapy head is given below with estimated times. Accuratwill be available after the
Operation Step Time (Minute
(1) The teletherapy head is removed from the original location. 120
(2) The head is transported to site. 120
(3) The irradiator is partially dismantled up to such a state that the source could be removed in the cell with manipulators but without introducing the risk of the source falling out during the lifting of the teletherapy head into the cell.
30
(4) The teletherapy head is transported into the cell. 45
(5) The cell roof is closed and ventilation system switched on to achieve negative pressure inside the cell.
20
(6) The source is removed from the head. 30
(7) If the source is found to be leaking and contamination is below defined 30 limits the source will be re-encapsulated.
(8) The source is placed into the Long-Term Storage Shield. 10
(9) The Long-Term Storage Shield is disengaged and placed into storage. 30
Total 435
3. Rad
with
le for
iation Protection
3.1 Design Aspects of Radiation Protection Sand of density at least1.6 kg/L is used as the shielding material for the wall of the biological shield whilst a 50% ZnBr2 solution is used as the shielding material for the window. A 0.23 m concrete slab is to be placed on top of the biological shield to reduce skyshine radiation.
The ventilation system will maintain a negative pressure within the cell and will be equipped HEPA filters through which the air will pass to prevent spread of contamination.
A lead container, which will provide a minimum 20 cm of lead shielding, will be availabemergency shielding of the source inside the cell.
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IAEA-CN-134
4. Public and Occupational Exposure During Normal Operation
4.1 Radiological Hazards The potential radiological hazards in the facility are through external exposure and inhalation aninges
d tion of radioactive material. The dose to operators due to ingestion and inhalation of dust
si ed negligible due to safety measures being in place including contamination checks, a ban on eating and smoking in the demarcated area around the facility and a ne
h
d.
Operator dose rates for steps 1-4 onservative estimates from [5] wm South Africa and in the rest
of Africa.. Dose rates for steps 5-9 were calculated using the modelling software MicroShield [4]
mostlyof the at least 10 m from t erating conditions, for a single 1000 Ci Co-60 source will take 435 minutes as described in Table 3.
Sv whilst a member of the publpresent for the complete conditioning exercise at 10 m from the source, will receive a total dose
cility to ntify which potentially fail, what the consequences of that failure would be on further operation, and what hazardous effects it may have on the operators,
b
ulate the severity of the effect , i.e. the dose to an operato ember of the public. Where information waavailable, probabilities of accidents were calculated. A full probabilistic analysis will be
erformed for accidents identified as ‘serious’ in the FMEA in the full Safety Assessment. The information was then used to determine counter measures, which either involve designing out a
tions, or managing the consequences of the accident. Possible acci ent added during the detailed design of the facility w lity and it’s components.
ielding.
of
(6) The source is found to be leaking inside the cell.
during normal operations is con der
gative pressure in the hot cell..
The external radiation exposure to the public and operators is via direct external radiation througthe SHARS facility biological shield and skyshine radiation whilst operators also incur doses from handling of the disused teletherapy hea
4.2 Public and Occupational Doses were based on c ith experience
in front
ic,
ide
r and m s
accu ulated at NECSA and during source conditioning exercises in
and Microskyshine.
The operator is expected to be working at 0.5 m away from the biological shield, 50% ZnBr2 window, when the source is in the cell. The public will be kepthe facility by a public barrier. The conditioning operation, under normal op
An operator will receive an estimated total dose of 197 µ
of 14 µSv.
5. Accidents A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was performed for the SHARS fa
components or stages of the system could
mem ers of the public and on the environment.
The accidents identified in the FMEA were deterministically analysed to calc
p
counter measure for the implicad s are listed below.Other accidents can possibly be
hen in depth information is known about the faci
(1) The source activity > 1000 Ci.
(2) The shielding of the wall is below design requirements or voids form in the sand sh
(3) The shielding of the window is below design requirements.
(4) The shielding of the roof is not sufficient.
(5) The source is dropped after being taken from original source shield resulting in rupturesource capsule.
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IAEA-CN-134
(7) The source is damaged when withdrawing the source drawer into the LTSS.
(8) e source drawer being misaligned.
source inside cell.
(15) Th conditioning operation.
chine, camera and electrical sockets inside the cell. The only flammable materials allowed inside the cell will be the video camera. The floor of the cell will be lined with
S fire statistics [8], indicate a total fire probability of 1.42 E-5 for an electrical facility. It is possible that by selecting high performance sockets and ensuring
camera it is not considered necessary to set up a fire protection programme or to include a fire
to reduce the g to below 1E-6.
The au to thank all those that have worked on the SHARS project especially Rob
The transfer of source fails due to th
(9) The source falls outside the biological shield when transferring the source.
(10) The manipulator malfunctions whilst the source is in the cell.
(11) The biological shield or window isdamaged whilst bringing in original source shield.
(12) Difficulty in finding dropped
(13) A power outage in cell.
(14) Light bulbs in cell fail.
e facility collapses whilst performing the
(16) Failure of the camera inside the cell.
(17) Failure of lifting equipment.
Accident doses are generally below dose limits in [7] except for those accidents identified being of medium to high severity. These were accidents 9, 11, 15. The detailed design phase of the project will seek to reduce the probabilities of these accidents occuring to below 1E-6.
6. Fire Electrical fires are the only possibility of a fire in the cell. The sources of electrical fires are the welding ma
aluminium foil. Ufire in the SHARSstrict quality control of the electrical equipment that the probability of a fire could be reduced to below 1E-6.
As the possibility of fire is relatively low and the only flammable material in the cell is the video
extinguisher in the cell. Standard fire protection measures outside the cell will be complied with.
7. Conclusion Dose rates for the SHARS operation for a single 1000 Ci Co-60 source are well below IAEA recommended dose limits.
Accident doses are also generally below IAEA dose limits except for three accidents identified being of medium to high severity. The detailed design phase of the project will seekprobabilities of these accidents occurin
The possibility of a fire in the hot cell is considered unlikely due to the low fire probability and the scarcity of flammable materials inside the hot cell.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
thors would likeHeard and Gert Liebenberg.
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IAEA-CN-134
REFERENCES
[1 ceptual Design, IAEA,
004), Preliminary Radiological EA-003, IAEA, Vienna.
n, IAEA-
303 10 TNT Polycarbonate Data Sheet.
on with Mike Smith, Chief Technologist at the Isotope Centre at
), “Microshield® Verification & Validation Report”,
[7] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (1996), International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources,
imates,
] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, SHARS ConVienna.
[2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (2Safety Assessment for the SHARS Conditioning Process, IA
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (2003), SHARS Basic Desig002, IAEA, Vienna.
[4] Dow Plastics, Calibre
[5] Email CommunicatiNECSA.
[6] Areva Radiation Software (2003Vermont, United States.
Safety Series No. 115, IAEA, Vienna.
[8] U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (1998), Residential Fire Loss EstWashington.
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RA 226 SOURCES: A DEMANDING TASK UNDERTAKEN Y
TH
.Technology and Health Department, Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome, Italy
Abstract. Since the end of the 1920’s the Istituto Superiore di Sanità, ISS (Italian National Institute procuremended in sources were substituted by other radionuclides, and radium source therapy became obsolete. In the 1980’s, upon a proposal of the ISS tdisposal site. In this paper the authors report the work undertaken, on a voluntary basis, to prevent these radium sources from becoming orphan sources. The idea was to act as a reminder of the presence of the sources in the hospitals, make an inventory, and find a final destination for them.
1. Introduction and Historical Frame In the 1930’s a Radium Office was operating in the building in Via Panisperna, Rome, where Fermi’s famous laboratory was located. This was the Physics Institute of Rome University, where - under Fermi’s guidance - F. Rasetti, E. Segrè, E. Amaldi, E. Majorana and later on B. Pontecorvo (the boys of via Panisperna) were doing research into atomic and nuclear physics. Under the responsibility of the Minister of Domestic Affairs, the Radium Office was part of the Physics Unit of Public Health, and was in charge of all the technical operations connected with government procurement of radium and its distribution to various centres for cancer therapy.
In 1934 the Radium Office, renamed Physics Laboratory7, was one of the four units that made up the Istituto di Sanità Pubblica (Public Health Institute) to which a new building was allocated at 299, Viale Regina Margherita (now Regina Elena) in Rome. In 1941, the Istituto di Sanità Pubblica took the name of Istituto Superiore di Sanità, ISS (Italian National Institute of Health), and in 1959 the responsibility of the Institute passed to the Health Minister, appointed for the first time.
2. The Physics Laboratory: actions associated with radium sources
2.1 The radium needles, tubes, cells and plaques: their use in medicine The Radium Office, later on the Physics Laboratory, was responsible for allocating the radium tubes, needles, cells and plaques (see figure 1) to public hospitals, but the Ministry kept ownership of such material. At that time 226Ra, of all available radioactive substances, was the most commonly used isotope in brachitherapy, for the high energies of its radiation and its very
DIUMB THE ISTITUTO SUPERIORE DI SANITÀ TO PREVENT
EM FROM BECOMING ORPHAN SOURCES
S Risica, A. Grisanti†, G. Grisanti
of Health) has been involved in all the technical operations connected with government ent of radium and its allocation to public hospitals for cancer therapy. The allocation 1970. With time in brachitherapy radium
, a re rieval process began, but was discontinued in 1996, owing to the saturation of the
† Retired in November 1997. 7 In 2004 the ISS was reorganised, and the Physics Laboratory together with other two laboratories formed the Technology and Health Department.
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IAEA-CN-134
long half-life [1]. Moreover, the Radium Office/Physics Laboratory was in charge of all the technical allocation-related operations, i.e., checking and supply to users, source calibration and certif
The r Ra), tubesactivi um had been bought and distributed, certainly a huge investment [2]. For example, in 1958 a purchase of 2.1 g of radium (225 tubes and 208 needles) was done, as testified by a test record. Allocation on behalf of the Ministry started in 1928 and continued up to 1970 for a total amount of about 50 g of 226R largest allocations were made in the years 1935 – 1940
ication, checking of the integrity of the capsules in order to avoid radon leakage, etc.
adium sources allocated to hospitals and clinics were needles (1, 2, 3 and 3.33 mg of 226
(2, 5, 10, 20 and 30 mg), cells (1 and 2 mg) and plaques (5 and 10 mg). This means ties from 37 MBq to more than 1.1 GBq. By 1936, almost 4 g of radi
a (that is about 1850 GBq). However, theand in the mid 1960’s.
FIG. 13. Radium plaques, cells, needles and tubes (with an eye but without point).
In order to comply with its responsibility, the Radium Office/Physics Laboratory created an archive to collect all the official correspondence and index cards containing information such aname of town and hospital, number of radium sources allocated and, for each source, acronym, series number, dimensions, activity and allocation date. One of the authors of this paper (A.G.) has been involved in this task since 1955.
s
lities
, upon a proposal of the Physics Laboratory of the ISS, the Ministry of Health started to have this sources retreived and stored in a temporary radioactive waste site, already existing
final disposal. The retri to Carlo Po l and
amaged
2.2 The radium needles, tubes, cells and plaques: the early disposal phase Over time, the use of radium sources became obsolete, having been replaced in brachitherapy by widely available artificial radionuclides (60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs and 192Ir) produced in nuclear faciand accelerators. These radionuclides are less dangerous due to their much shorter half-life, compared to that of 226Ra, and to the absence of radon emanation risks. For this reason in the 1980’s
within the Nuclear Research Centre of CNEN8 at Casaccia (Rome), awaiting foreval process was organised with the collaboration of CNEN. At that time, thankslvani (CNEN), who strongly believed that radium sources were precious materia
should be stored in such a way as to be reused, the sources were not definitely disposed of as waste. The idea was to save the sources in good condition, and plan a final disposal for dones. A special gas-tight brass container was designed and initially produced in the ISS Physics
8 In the 1980’s the Comitato Nazionale per l’Energia Nucleare was at the same time the Italian Department of Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The two roles were then entrusted to two separate institutions (ENEA and ANPA, respectively). The waste site is still near the ENEA research centre at Casaccia.
316 315
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Laboratory, not so much to shield them, but to prevent possible radon leakage from damagedsources and to render them sealed sources. A second type of gas-tight container was planned by the ISS Physics Laboratory, paying attention to simplifying the operational procedures in o
rder to
ass
which the dose rate at contact was reduced to 40 - 100 mR h-1
(about 350-870 µGy h-1).
The collection of radium sources was planned and carried out quickly in the first years, starting from the sources withdrawn and stored at the Physics Laboratory, but the pace would slow down in the years to come. Initially, the Physics Laboratory also acted as first collector of sources, then it was directly involved in the collection as supplier of the containers, and finally an authorized carrier collected the sources directly at the hospitals upon a direct agreement between ENEA and the hospital. At the beginning of the 1990’s the collection started to slow down, and stopped altogether in 1996, because the disposal site got saturated, leaving a significant fraction of the sources entrusted to the hospitals. A total amount of about 52 g of radium had been collected and stored. This amount comprised both the sources owned by the Ministry of Health and those directly purchased by the hospitals. In those years many telephone calls and written requests arrived, asking the ISS to act as a promoter of the resumption of the radium collection program, and to find a definitive solution to the disposal of radium sources.
2 e
e very small dimensions of the sources (the needles, tubes an
f the ese
s. d
o f
limit the exposure of workers to ionizing radiation. Later on, container production was entrusted to a private company. According to an official letter dated 1978, which accompanied the containers shipped to the users, 100 mg of radium (the maximum quantity allowed) in the brcontainer would expose the gonads to an equivalent dose of about 50 mrem (0.5 mSv) upon working for 10 minutes at a distance of 40 cm. This was half of the weekly dose limit for category A workers, as stated by the Italian regulation at that time. For this reason, it was recommended to make the necessary arrangements for the protection of the personnel, and reduceexposure as much as possible. For storage at the waste site, the containers were placed inside larger shielded containers, by
.3 Th radium needles, tubes, cells and plaques: toward their final disposalNotwithstanding the fact that the ISS has no direct responsibility in the matter - which is entrustedto the Health Ministry and to the users - in October 1996 the authors of this paper decided to address the problem, aware that the loss of memory of all these past events might turn radium sources in what is now called orphan sources9, with the potential exposure of workers and population to ionising radiation. Indeed, th
d cells in question are at most 27 mm long) increase the risk.
To begin with, the index cards regarding the allocation of sources were converted into an electronic database, containing information about 160 hospitals of 111 towns. The database was then updated with the collaboration of ENEA, which supplied copies of the official records olast years of the collection, when the ISS no longer received relevant communications. With thdata the authors prepared booklets, specific to each Region10, containing, for each hospital, the information the ISS has about radium source allocation and collection, and two questionnaireOne questionnaire regarded the radium sources owned by the Ministry, the other, those purchasedirectly by the hospital. In the meantime, the Health Ministry was officially informed of the necessity of planning the final collection and disposal of sources. The Ministry’s first step was tplan the distribution of the booklets to the Regional Health Authorities with an official letter othe Minister (April 1998), asking the people in charge to check the information and eventually amend or complete it. Unfortunately, few Health Authorities complied in the first year. For this
9 IAEA [3] defines an orphan source as “a radioactive source which is not under regulatory control, either because it has never been under regulatory control, or because it has been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or transferred without proper authorization”. 10 The Italian territory is divided into 21 Administrative Districts named Regions.
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reason, some reminders were sent in subsequent years and as of today, data related to more tha91% of the towns are available. However, only 52% of the questionnaires provided a clear picturof the situation of the hospital. In any case, these data confirm that at least 8 g of radium are still in the hospitals as disused sources. Six hospitals informed of the loss of some radium sources, reported to the authorities in distant years.
In the meantime, the Health Ministry is active in finding a final disposal for all sources, both those in the temporary disposal and those still in the hospitals. In order to achieve this goal, thMinister of Health raised some questions to the National Council of Health, which, in an ostatement of July 12th, 2000, declared that brachitherapy with radium sources should be considered obsolete and that it is urgent to complete the final disposal of these sources.
3. Conclusions
n e
e fficial
o
oned, radium sources may become
e nts is
uried treasure is today
h n
tion - p 50.
[2] BATTIMELLI, G., “Le origini del Laboratorio di Fisica” Rendiconti della Accademia Nazionale delle Scienze, serie V, vol XXIII, parte II, Tomo I (1999) 149 –160.
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Strengthening control over radioactive sources in authorized use and regaining control over orphan sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1388,
The authors’ initiative has shown to be in good agreement with the Action Plan proposed and performed in the meantime by the International Atomic Enegy Agency (IAEA) [4], aimed at assisting developing countries in collecting, conditioning and disposing radium sources [2]. This is part of the programme on the management of radioactive disused sources that IAEA launched at the beginning of the 1990’s. IAEA maintains that, differently from modern sources, radium sources cannot be located, are not traceable and have been the cause of the highest number of accidents in the nuclear industry in peace time. Moreover, at the end of 2003the issuing of the Euratom Directive “…on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources” [6] confirmed that the authors were on the right road. Article 9 of the Directive reads “…Member States shall ensure that campaigns are organised, as appropriate, trecover orphan sources left behind from past activities. The campaigns… may also include surveys of historical records of authorities, such as customs, and of holders, such as research institutes, material testing institutes or hospitals.” As already menti
orphan sources, be disposed of improperly and melted in a foundry together with scrapmetal. Unluckily in Italy this risk may not be neglected for there is a high number of foundries of this type [6].
After so many years – and a world war in between - what the authors can do is the best possiblmapping of the current situation regarding allocated and retrieved radium sources. What couthat this major voluntary effort will see the final disposal of these highly hazardous sources and achieve the expectation that: “the element that was once dug up as a breturned to the ground as buried waste.” [5]
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are very grateful to Drs. L. Frittelli and E. Resta for having supplied ENEA data about the collection of radium sources, to Drs. D. Ballada, G. Ruocco and A. Renzi of the HealtMinistry for their invaluable collaboration, and to Monica Brocco (ISS) for the linguistic revisioof the manuscript.
REFERENCES
[1] RADIUM BELGE (UNION MINIERE DU HAUT KATANGA), Radium. ProducPropriétés Générales - Son application en thérapeutique. Appareils. (1925). Bruxelles.
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Vienna (2004).
[4] FRIEDRICH, V., “Transfer of technology: management of disused radioactive sources”, Proceedings of International Conference National Regulatory Authorities with Competin the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials, Buenos(Argentina) 11-15 December 2000
in: ence
Aires , IAEA Vienna (2001), 110-114.
ge of
ber 2003 on ficial Journal
of the European Union 31.12.2003, L346/57.
. and NUCCETELLI, C., “The Italian Experience and Policy on Radioactive of the
19 May
of
[5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Conditioning and interim storaspent radium sources, IAEA-TECDOC-886, Vienna (1996).
[6] EUROPEAN UNION, Council Directive 2003/122/EURATOM of 22 Decemthe control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources, Of
[7] RISICA, SContamination of Metal Scrap”, in: Proceedings of 10th International Congress International Radiation Protection A0ssociation (IRPA), Hiroshima, Japan, 14-2000, T-8-3, P-4b-242.
[8] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Environmental behaviourradium, IAEA Technical Report Series No 310, IAEA, Vienna (1990).
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COCO
o Seof
Abstractis focuse from a distance. Cobalt metal is irradiated in the form of pellets of 1 mm dia X 1mm ht in the nuclear reactor to produce 60Co by the nuclear reaction 59C )encapsul Ci/gm) in tainless steel capsules. The sources are loaded in the teletherapy machines installed at the
hospitals. When the source output reaches to less than 40 RMM(88.8 TBq/2400 Ci), treatment is not recommended as the time of treatment increases considerably. At this stage fresh sources are loaded in the teletherapy machines. These decayed sources require continuous monitoring till they are disposed in the well guarded national waste management facilities. The decayed sources are reused by cutting open the capsules to recover pellets for fabrication of sources for laboratory irradiators and further encapsulated in the source pencils to use as industrial sources. These methods allow the 60Co for another two half lives and hence the activity to be disposed will be reduced by 75 %. In India, both of these methods are being followed to effectively utilize the 60Co and to reduce the quantity to be disposed as active waste.The decayed teletherapy sources if left unattended may cause serious security concerns. Teletherapy sources in the hospital are under control, the laboratory and the industrial sources are in the control of the competent authority. After the use in the irradiators the sources will be transferred to the waste management agency. Thus continuous control is established for the teletherapy sources during its use, reuse in the laboratory and irradiators and further in the waste management agency.
1. Introduction Treatment of Cancer by using 60Co radiation sources is a well established method. Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology(BRIT) fabricates and supplies teletherapy sources using 60Co to hospitals in the country with outputs up to 170 RMM corresponding to activity 370TBq (10000Ci).Fabrication of these sources involve double encapsulation of the required 60Co activity (in the form of 1 mm dia X 1 mm thick nickel plated, irradiated pellets) with specific activity greater than 9.25 TBq/gm (250Ci/gm) in standard stainless steel capsules, testing them for leak and surface contamination, measurement of activity / output and finally loading each source in a special shielding container for transferring the source into the teletherapy machine in the hospital. Figure 1 shows the details of a teletherapy Source Capsule.
The output and the specific activity reduce due to the decay of 60Co with 5.27 years half life. Normally this source is replaced when the dose rate reduces to around 40 RMM(88.8 TBq/2400 Ci). Around 150 teletherapy centers are using these sources at present.The decayed sources will be returned to the suppliers, BRIT in INDIA, are being stored in BRIT hot cells for the last 30 years pending final disposal. About 20 decayed sources are received annually by BRIT and
BALT 60 TELETHERAPY SOURCES - CONTINUOUS NTROL THROUGHOUT THEIR LIFE CYCLE
K nakanchi V. S. Sastri aled Sources & Rappcof Programme Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology, Department Atomic Energy, Mumbai, India
. Teletherapy is a method of treatment of cancer in which the radiation from a source d on the cancerous tissue
o(n,γ 60Co. Teletherapy sources (output 100-170 RMM) are fabricated by doubly ating these pellets with specific activity greater than 9.25 TB1\q/gm (250
s
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nearly 200 decayed sources are stored in the hot cells. BRIT also fabricates and supplies 60Co sources for Gamma Chamber 900 and 4000 units for research purposes. These sources are norm 28.4 mm le gs for dose u 30 Ci / gm) as comp ed to teletherapy sources. Figure 2 shows the details of the Gamma Chamber Source Pencils.
ally fabricated by encapsulating the aluminum cladded Co-60 slugs of 9.4 mm dia Xngth in stainless steel capsules. These sources require very low specific activity sluniformity in the product with an activity of 0.666 to 1.11 TBq/gm (18 –
ar
FIG. 14 Teletherapy Capsule.
FIG. 15. Gamma Chamber Source Pencils using slugs.
2. Re-Cycling of the Decayed Teletherapy Sources-method-1 The activity in the decayed teletherapy sources is in the range of 11.1 -74.0 TBq(300-2000 Ci)Instead of disposing the sources by sending them to the national waste management agency, the sources can be recycled and reused. The activity is in the required range f
.
or use in the laboratory
.
irradiator pencils. The activity being in the form of pellets instead of slugs has to be doubly encapsulated. A special cutting device was used for cutting open the selected decayed sources. Care was taken to avoid any spillage of pellets and spread of contamination during cutting and transfer. 70 decayed teletherapy sources were cut opened. Details of some of the sources are given in table-1. The recovered pellets were first cleaned with water and then dried with acetone
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All the pellets were thoroughly mixed and the total activity of the pellets was measured. Aroun2.2 kg of pellets were recovered with total activity of 1430 TBq (40 kCi). The average specactivity was of the order of ~ 650 GBq /gm (18 Ci / gm).
Required quantity of the pellets were dispensed into the inner pencils of irradiators were sealed by the standard Tungsten inert gas welding process. These inner pencils were checked for leakand contamination and were encapsulated in the outer pencils. These outer pencils were checkfor the co
d ific
ed
ntamination and leak and the activity were measured as per the national and international standards. Details of the sources fabricated are shown in table2. Figure 3 show the sketch of a Gamma Chamber Source pencils fabricated using these pellet pencils.
FIG. 16. Gamma Chamber Source Pencils using pellets.
Table 6. Details of teletherapy capsules
Sl. No. Output at time of cutting
RMM
Weight of pellets
gm
Activity
TBq/Ci
Specific Activity
Ci / gm
1 9.4 28.4 20.83 / 563 19.8
2 9.9 21.3 22.01 / 595 27.9
3 7.7 17.8 17.09 / 462 25.9
4 14.9 25.5 35.0 33.07 / 894
5 16.1 35.3 35.70 / 965 27.3
6 15.9 37.5 35.33 / 955 25.4
Table 7. Details of Gamma chamber pencils
Type of pencil No. of Pencils Activity per Pencil Total Activity
GC – 900 109 125 Ci / 4.625 TBq 12,500 Ci / 462.5 TBq
GC – 4000 94 275 Ci /10.175 TBq 27,500 Ci / 1017.5 TBq
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3. Re-Cycling of the Decayed Teletherapy Sources-method- Method-2 The decayed teletherapy sources are encapsulated in the source pencils and are used in the industrial irradiators. The normal irradiator pencil and the pencil with the decayed teleteheapy
y
ree
are encapsulated in irradiator pencils and are tested for the bend test. Necessary approval from the competent authority in India ,the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) has been obtained. 5. By using 140 decayed teletherapy sources with an activity of 80 kCi ,10 industrial irradiator pencils are fabricated.
sources are shown in figure-4 and figure-5 .Normally inner pencils with slugs are used for the fabrication of the irradiator sources. Instead of slugs along with inner pencils,decayed teletherapsources are used in the outer pencils.The decayed teletherapy sources are checked for leak and contamintion before loading in the outer pencils. The sources so fabricated will have thencapsulations, two from the teletherapy sources and one for the outer pencil as compared to double encapsualtion of the normal irradiator pencils. Dummy teletherapy sources
FIG. 17. W-91 Source pencil (Outer)
FIG. 18. Sou therap
4. Conclusion herapy sources are recycled/reused to fabricate laboratory and industrial irradiator
sources which resulted in the effective utilisation of the 60Co activity. These decayed sources left
rce pencil using Tele y Sources
Decayed telet
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in the hospitals unattended may cause serious security concerns. The irradiator sources are under the safeguards while in irradiators and will be disposed in the appropiate postions of the national waste management facility after their use.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wish to acknowledge the support of Mr. J.K. Ghosh,Chief Executive, BRIT and Mr. Y.D.Parmar,General Manager, SS&R,BRIT for their support in this work. The author also acknowledge the staff members of SS&R, BRIT and IAD, BARC for their cooperation in carrying out this work.
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Technical Session 6: Management of Radiological Emergencies Involving Radioactive Sources
EXPERIENCE OF PAST RADIATION ACCIDENTS AND PROBLEMS OF RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE DISPERSION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN URBAN CONDITIONS
A.M. Agapova, R.V.Arutyunyanb, A.Yu.Kudrinc, A.M.Eliseevd a Federal Atomic Energy Agency, Moscow, Russia b Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, IBRAE RAN, Moscow, Russia
c Research and Development Institute of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations, Moscow, Russia
d Main Departmant of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations of Moscow, Russia
Abstract. The report studies into key problems associated with direct and indirect consequences of possible radiological terrorist acts committed in urban conditions. Much attention is paid to the analysis of lessons learned from elimination of consequences of past radiation accidents in the territory of the former USSR, especially as regards radioactive contamination of cities. The report contains recommendations on necessary improvements of instrumentation, methodological, legal and organizational bases of managerial decision-making to reduce a probability of radiological terrorism acts and minimize their direct and indirect consequences.
Problems of terrorism in general and nuclear terrorism in particular are receiving great attention in all world countries. With that, the notion of a “dirty bomb” is widely used to mean both a nuclear weapon featuring a low level of technology and a device built with conventional explosives and radioactive substances (RS). The non-proliferation regime, the effectively working special system for control and accounting of nuclear weapons predetermines the situation where the threats of the use of RS in terrorist purposes are most likely to be carried out.
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The radiological terrorism (RT) should be understood as a deliberate dispersion of RS or planting nizing radiation sources (IRS) in the human environs or infrastructure objects as well as acts of
abotage at radiation hazardous facilities to cause radiation impacts to the population, nvironmental objects and disruption of social life and economy of the society. This report
focuses on the problems for the society associated with possible consequences of RS dispersion in a large city.
Considering the problem RT acts feasibility, it should be understood that generally it is a matter of a variety of possible ways of dispersing RS in the environment with the aim to cause direct or indirect damage to human health, environment, social and economic activities. Assessments based on the factual analysis of the lessons learned from elimination of past radiation accidents show societ pacts to people.
relation to the radiation terrorism threats the world community is facing an extremely difficult challenge of effective countering them. Another task is not least important: to build a response ystem capable of minimizing consequences of the radioactive substance use for terrorist
purposes. In this regard, the analysis of positive and negative experience in doing away with consequences of past accidents and incidents (Kyshtym accident in 1957, accident on a nuclear submarine (NS) in Chazhma Bay in 1985, Chernoby accident in 1986, accident at the Siberian Chem he repon e of ina ect losses cause
Time ty of radiation situation parameters, especially in the urban area (see manifested itself in these accidents, creates technical and methodological
difficu g radiological situation at an early stage after the RT act has been committed. In this regard, special measu essing need to be developed to makepopul
The fcombiradiation level, makes the system as a whole substantially unstable: the social risk aggravation mech s case the magnitude of indirect damage caused by the inadequate behavioral response will
evitably exceed any consequences of radiation exposure proper.
iose
that a RT act indirect consequences can lead to direct economic and social losses in they which essentially exceed losses due to direct radiation im
In
s
ical Combine (SCC) in 1993 etc.) is the evidence that mistakes and drawbacks in tse system lead to extremely severe consequences for the society, with indirect consequencdequate radiation risk management turning out to be much greater in scale that dird by damaging factors.
and space discontinuiFigure), which clearly
lties in arranging for the monitoring and prompt analysis of the developin
rement hardware and software for monitoring data proc adequate, in terms of time, assessments of the situation and to draw out decisions on urgent ation protection measures.
ear of radiation makes the society extremely vulnerable to the RT threat. This fear, in nation with easiness to acquire instruments capable of detecting slightest increases of the
anisms are triggered by a slightest threat of a terrorist act involving radiation sources. In thi
in
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Examples of spatial discontinuity of urban contamination.Left – factual measurement data of 137Cs soil contamination density after Chernobyl accident; right – computational results of the integral of 2
concentration resulted from a “dirty bomb” detonation.
In the event o
41Am air
f the RT act in urban conditions
90
its indirect consequences are most likely to
ith widely
substantially prevail over direct radiation effects on a small group of people occurred in the terrorist act scene. Howevere, there are terrorist act scenarios involving crowded people and possible significant irradiation doses to hundreds of individuals. A brief analysis of assessment results of consequences of several RT act scenarios is given below.
One of such scenarios deals with the analysis of possible detonation of a 90Sr “dirty bomb” at asubway station. It was assumed that a low-yield (in TNT equivalent) “dirty bomb” wused Sr radiation source detonated in the central section of the platform of a subway station of this type during the rush hour. With assumptions used in the calculations, the maximum internal exposure doses to lungs of some dozens of persons could have been 5 Sv and higher. Indirconsequences of such terrorist act will be:
• radioactive contamination of the subway station and adjacent territories due to spread ofradioactive substances;
• simultaneous closing of one or several stations and transfer stations that will nearly immobilize subway operations and cause huge transportation problems in the large city;
• problems associated w
ect
ith compensations for losses of contaminated belongings to
f
a low-yield explosion device or by the use of various
It is known that in the course of the Chernobyl accident assessment the contamination of areas territories to the zones having the
body as a fact of recognition by the State lth. A direct application of this guideline to an
act can lead to decontamination of the area nd to losses of apartment and non-residential
ousands of square meters.
ernobyl period, triggered Russia to set forth es. Application of such radiation criteria leads
hich is indeed harmless for health, Chernobyl-related legislation guarantees a
area residents for whom the additional natural background radiation.
persons occurred in the radiation contamination zone, as well as with arrangements for long-term medical attendance of a large group of people both directly involved in the given incident and participated in elimination of its consequences.
The third terrorist act scenario considered concerns dispersion of some quantity of 137Cs over an urban area. Two 137Cs sources of low and intermediate activity are considered as the sources oradiation. Such sources are rather widely used. Dispersion of a contaminant at 100 or 200-meter height is effected by detonation ofdispersion device options.
The calculations have demonstrated that even in case of dispersion of a low activity 137Cs sourceover the urban area there is a probability of 0.2 up to 2.6 km2 of the city territory being contaminated higher 1 Ci/km2 with this radionuclide. Larger contamination zones will emerge if an intermediate activity source is dispersed over the city.
with 137Cs higher 1 Ci/km2 was the basis to attribute such privileged socio-economic status and perceived by everythat residing there is dangerous for the human heaurban district contaminated as a result of the RTwhere dozens of thousands of people reside abuildings could amount up to several hundred th
The “radiation populism” prevailing in the post-Chunjustifiably rigid, legally binding sanitary guidelinto the facts where even a slight excess of guidelines, wbecomes a source of serious public concerns. So the compensation for health damage to the Chernobylexposure level is deliberately lower than variations of
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IAEA-CN-134
Tacalculated values of radio
uidelines for one of the scenarios described above – dispersion of an intermediate activity 137Cs ource at 100 m height above a large city territory. It comes from the Table that when ICRP
recommendations regarding RT are used to make decisions concerning the population protection measures the maximum sizes of sheltering zones or zones for temporary relocation of the population can be of 0 up to 3 km2. When OSPORB sanitary rules are applied to such situation the measures implementation zone sizes can approach 100 km2 and cover a significant part of the megapolis considering the interfaces of the city infrastructures.
t
ossible transfers of radioactive sources, especially in
• ods for operative radiation survey in urban conditions for e
Stationary and mobile equipment for monitoring and survey of the radiation situation must ensure obtaining confident and complete input information, promptness of acquisition, transmission and processing of initial data in conditions of high spatial discontinuity and large number of radiation contaminated objects as well as limited time for decision-making.
r ht
he data given in the Table are illustrative of how the levels of guidelines in use affect sizes of reas where these or other population protective measures are implemented. The Table contains
active contamination zone areas featuring exceeded recommended gs
In this regard, the problem of development of systems for prompt radiation monitoring and response in urban conditions to confine resulted contamination and identification of its characteristics for the analysis of the situation and support of decision-making to promptly protecthe population acquires topicality. With that, the development of instrumental means of countering radiation terrorism must pursue two paths:
• the strengthening of control over ppublic places and critical facilities of the city;
the development of methadequate assessment of the situation after the RT act and designing the most effectivmeasures to protect the population.
Table. Areas of a large city featuring radiation factor values exceeding recommended criteria fothe population in the event of dispersion of an intermediate activity 137Cs source at 100 m heigabove the city.
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Information source Recommended guideline Area of the contaminated
territorydepending on weather, km2
Sheltering, 10 mSv over 2 days 0.0 – 2.0
Temporary evacuation, 50 mSv over 7 days
0
Draft ICRP recommendations on radiological terrorism
Relocation, 0.1 Sv over the first year 0.1 – 3.3
ICRP Publication No 82 10 mSv over a year 3.1 - 11
EPA Recommendations 20 mSv over a year 1.3 – 8.5
5 mGy over 10 days – Level A for sheltering
0.0 – 2.0 iat n Safety Standards, ,
50 mGy over 10 days – Level B for sheltering or Level A for evacuation
0
500 mGy o
Rad ioNRB-99
Russia
ver 10 days – Level B for 0 evacuation
10 µSv/yr – population exposure dose monitoring zone
37 - 99 Sanitary Rules, OSPORB, Russia
100 µSv/yr – protective measures optimization zone
27 - 58
1 mSv/yr – population exposure dose reduction area
18 -24
Chernobyl-related legislation 1 Ci/km2
50% addition to fallout density 37 -103 Current levels of soil contamination due to 137Сs global fallouts 2-time increase in global fallout
magnitude 55 - 235
200 beta-particles/(min*cm2) – vehicle contamination
22 - 41
100 beta-particles/(min*cm2) – contamination of clothes and building internal surfaces
25 - 51
Guidelines for permissible contamination of surfaces for the population residing within the Chernobyl zone
10 beta-particles/(min*cm2) – contamination of skin, underwear and bedclothes
35 - 91
On the basis of the analysis done on possible consequences of a RT act in urban conditions an array of priority tasks may be proposed to include:
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IAEA-CN-134
• Development and implementation of a IRS safe handling system at their entire lifespans,
• strategy and set ystem for emergency response and protection of population and territories in the event of RT taking into account many, essentially new technical, legislative and organizational challenges,
• Setting up national and international systems of objective informing the public about radiation risks, radiation safety approaches and guidelines, objective representation of lessons learned from radiation accidents and incidents of the past, especiall s their real radiological con
Considering the topicality of the radiological terrorism issue the work in the said areas must be supported by a broad international cooperation that will allow finding effective wayprobability of RT acts and minimize their direct and indirect consequences.
Development of a ting up a corresponding s
y as regardsequences.
s to reduce
330 329
IAEA-CN-134
Autho Aga vAkbarzaAlarfaj,Aleissa,
102 Andriambololona, 37 Annamalai, 121 Arutyunyan, 126, 325 Azhar, 42 Banzi, 92 Bariev, 46 Benitez Navarro, 280 Bezzubtsez, 178 Bogorinski, 225 Bourgeois, 150 Brykin, 126 Caseria, 114 Chahed, 51 Charbonneau, 229 Chelnokov, 183 Cherkaoui, 63 Chouak, 63 Cox, 154 Crabol, 229 Czarwinski, 130 da Silva, 134 Daian, 139 de Jesus, 114 Dembek, 55 Dogaru, 285 Dulama, 146 Dziubiak, 59 EI-Sourougy, 289 El Messaoudi, 63 El Moursli, 63 Eliseev, 325 Ershov, 126 Essadki, 63 Essig, 154 Ettehadian, 301 Fan, 294 Finne, 221
26
Guillot, 150 Gutterres, 65 Hammou, 51 Hicke, 154 Hidasi, 198 Holahan, 2 Holohan, 154 Holubiev, 70 Hoorelbeke, 158 Hordijk, 310 Horn, 2 HouZhenrong, 163 Hu Mingkao, 163 Huang Chaoyun, 20, 215 Huszti, 9 Ivan, 169 Jammal, 190 Jovanovic, 74 Kamolov, 187 Kerekes, 198 Kettunen, 82 Kim, 174 Koblinger, 198 Kozuh, 306 Krupchatnikov, 178 Kudrin, 325 Leocadio, 134 Lferde, 63 Liu hua, 213 Liu Hua, 20, 215 Lobach, 102 Lord, 275 Loy, 76 Luca, 169 Makarovsk, 70 Maleki, 301 Maloney, 237 Maphisa, 295, 310
Mastauskas, 87
idov, 187 nzadeh, 301
Montmayeul, 239 Moore, 190 Mousseigne, 229 Mtimet, 51 Muhogora, 92 Murray, 237 Nader, 97 Nikolic, 306 Novakovic, 306 Novikov, 46 Okhotina, 102 Oksanen, 82 Omrane, 51 Osipyants, 126 Paliukhovich, 194 Paunoiu, 146 Pellet, 198 Petkov, 5 Pető, 9 Petrová, 14 Piotukh, 194 Popescu, 146 Posedel, 306 Pretzsch, 225 Prokhodtseva, 174 Ramalho, 134 Ramlakan, 310 Randriantseheno, 37 Ratovonjanahary, 37 Risica, 315 Rozdyalouskaya, 46 Sahagia, 169 Salgado Mojena, 280 Salmins, 106 Sastri, 320 Schuyler-Hayes, 55 Sefzig, 130 Seguis, 114
r Index
po , 325 deh, 301
27 27
Fiskebeck, 221 Gabulov, 233 Ge Lixi, 20 Glushak, 1
Maréchal, 65 Markkanen, 82 Massenov, 183
Al-Mughrabi, 295, 310 Amirjanyan, 32 Amundsen, 221 Andreeva-Andrievskaya,
Grigorescu, 169 Grisanti A., 315 Grisanti G., 315 Gu Renkang, 163
McCabe, 190 Meng, 121 MirsaMome
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IAEA-CN-134
Serebryakov, 126 hao, 200 hen Zhengxin, 163
imionov, 139
a, 37
Sprule, 106 Standring, 221 Temesi, 198 Thibert, 275 Toma, 146
11
Yang Chun, 20, 215 Zafimanjato, 37 Zhang Jiali, 20, 213, 215 Zhang Zhigang, 20, 215 Zhao Yongming, 20, 213,
215
SSShpinkova, 126 SSlimane, 51 Smith, 295, 310 Sneve, 205 SolofoarisinSouza, 65
Torres Gomez, 1Valdezco, 114 Ward, 2 Weiss, 130 Xie, 209
215 Zhou Qif, 20 Zhou Qifu, 213,
332 331