INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM

(IBF)

INTRODUCTION

Pre-IBF Background

• 1920-es: first ITF-ISF coordination around ILO maritime meetings

• Up to late 1940-es: relationship restricted to ILO business

• 1948 – ITF FOC Campaign

• 1978 - ISF/ITF “Understanding” on wage rates for non-dom seafarers on national flag ships (under UK “pay parity” regime)

• 1990-es: ITF-ISF consultations (inability to engage in pay negotiations; no mandate to discuss wages on behalf of national federations; some national owners associations’ without sufficient constitutional status; decisions not compulsory upon members)

• 1993: ISF’s “London Committee for Asian Crews” changes name to “IMEC”, focuses on ITF FOC standards

• 1994: IMEC involved in ITF negotiations in India and Philippines

• 1997: ISF rejects ITF pay increase and negotiations. IMEC takes over.

• 2000: ITF - IMEC Joint Negotiating Forum; IMEC Model TCC Agreement (with the ITF Benchmark still set unilaterally by ITF)

Year 2003Expectations out of the new system:

• Continuity of agreements

• Real counterpart

in place of internal argument

• Compliance / enforcement

• New mechanisms to amicably settle with companies

• More vessels under ITF agreements

• Inspectors to concentrate on other targets

• Global scale

• New areas of cooperation / mutual interest

For the ITF:

• Continuity of agreements

• Equal participation in discussion in place of ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offers

• Competitive benefits / advantage for members

• Recognition of training and other costs

• More members to join

• Mechanisms to amicably resolve problems with Inspectors / affiliates

• Global scale

• New areas of cooperation / mutual interest

For the Employers:

Creation of the IBF May 2003, Yokohama

Parties: ITF and JNG (IMMAJ + IMEC)

Parties to the IBF, as of 2013:

ITF

maritime

affiliates

worldwide

ISEG (IMMAJ+Evergreen)

IMEC

KSA

International Bargaining Forum

ITF JNG

IBF Settlements (pay, contractual and partnership issues)

• November 2003 (San Francisco) • October 2005 (Tokyo) • September 2007 (London) • October 2009 (Manila) • July 2011 (Miami)

Model Ship (“Bag”) methodology: wages; company and union funding; vertical & horizontal distribution parameters; complex central-to-local transformations

No pay negotiations; DER (SEPF/SPF)

New methodology: only wages and union funding (part “A”); each specific local agreement affected

Pay Outcomes:• 2003 - 8% on IBF Model Ship for two years: 2004 and 2005

• 2005 - 5% on Model Ship in 2006, plus further 5% in 2007. Also: extra $10 to ITF WFF in 2006, plus additional $10 in 2007. • 2007 - 8% on Model Ship for two years: 2008 and 2009. (Further extended throughout 2010 and 2011)

• 2011 - 2% in 2012; 2.5% in 2013 and 3% in 2014. Applicable only upon part "A" of the scale

Contractual: amendments to terms and conditions envisaged by

CBA; Special Agreement and Employment Contract

Partnership: all MOU issues, incl. ILO; IMO; piracy, disputes, training, welfare, manning agents, P&I, joint secretariats, data exchange, administration and etc

OTHER FEATURES:

• POSSIBILITY OF HIGHER REBATE FROM ITF WFF AS INCENTIVE TO ENROLL MORE VESSELS (total number of fleets to increase: +2% in 2012; +2% in 2013 and + 1% in 2014)

• MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR NEW JNG MEMBERS / NEW IBF AGREEMENTS

• INDEXATION OF COMPESATION LEVELS

• ALL CBAs SUBJECT TO APPROVAL

• JOINT CBA VETTING MECHANISM

• JOINT WARLIKE OPERATIONS AREAS COMMITTEE / SOS CAMPAIGN

• JOINT OPERATION OF TRAINING AND WELFARE FUNDS

• CONSTANT INTER-SECRETARIAT COOPERATION

Balancing between “market” and “policy”(ITF’s view, as example):

What is artificial / excessive from employers point of view:

•Ratings wages and compensations could be lower.•Some CBA benefits beyond P&I coverage.•Wish to negotiate with labor supply only.•Why pay beneficial unions and ITF?•Why pay for “DER” needs?•No need for MOUs, talk onboard conditions only

Benefits of having “real” counterparts: guarantee of implementation; argument outside ITFDangers: external market supply-and-demand rules

Balanced outcome: •Ratings level maintained despite market and crisis and, steadily, increased. •Officers wages still not reflected fully, but minimum figures guaranteed. •ITF Beneficial Ownership and other policies – recognized and working.•Improving wages, CBA and MOU slow and difficult, but happens regularly. •No cuts or downgrading once a level is achieved.•Vetting complicated by the variety, but possible.

What is insufficient from the ITF point of view:

•Ratings wages slow increase•No uniform benchmarks•Officers beyond the ITF’s scope•CBA could be better•MOU cooperation could be more

IBF bargaining processCentral negotiations:

Claims consideration & settlement:

• Amicable• Prior paperwork / correspondence• Thorough discussion (working groups; experts)• Secretariats• Argument / Persuasion• Reference to objective data • Invite third-parties and sources • Counter-proposal• Counter-balance against other issues• Compromise

Local / National negotiations:

• Implementation of central outcome in existing agreements• Considerable flexibility

System may not be perfect, but time-tested, stable and working!

INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM10 YEARS EFFICIENT!

IBF