internal aid to construction

8/18/2019 Internal Aid to Construction

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WITH AID OF CONSTRUCTION 2013

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, PATNA 1

1. INTRODUCTION

Laws enacted by the legislatures are interpreted by the judiciary. Enacted laws, specially the

modern Acts and Rules, are drafted by legal experts and it could be expected that the language

will leave little room for interpretation or construction. But the experience of all, who have to

bear and share the task of application of law, has been different. It is quite often observed that

courts are busy unfolding the meaning of ambiguous words and expressions and resolving

inconsistencies. The age old process of the application of the enacted laws has led to formulation

of certain rules of interpretation or construction.

“By interpretation or construction is meant”, says Salmond, “the process by which the courts

seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in

which it is expressed”. A statute is an edict of the Legislature and the conventional way of

interpreting and construing a statute is to seek the intention of its maker. A statute is to be

construed according “to the intent of them that make it” and “the duty of judicature is to act upon

the true intention of the legislature the mens or sentential legis.”

The term interpretation means “To give meaning to”. Governmental power has been divided into

three wings namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Interpretation of statues to

render justice is the primary function of the judiciary. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the

Act and give meaning to each word of the Statute.

The most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be understood in a

harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together. The maxim “A Verbis

legis non est recedendum” means that you must not vary the words of the statute while

interpreting it.

The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed

expressly or impliedly in the language used. In Santi swarup Sarkar v pradeep kumar sarkar, theSupreme Court held that if two interpretations are possible of the same statute, the one which

validates the statute must be preferred.


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2. KINDS OF INTERPRETATION

There are generally two kind of interpretation; literal interpretation and logical interpretation.

2.1 Literal interpretation

Giving words their ordinary and natural meaning is known as literal interpretation or litera legis.

It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is clear and

unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be the

consequence. The idea behind such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme law

making body must know what it intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has

been called the safest rule because the legislature’s intention can be deduced only from the

language through which it has expressed itself.

The bare words of the Act must be construed to get the meaning of the statute and one need not

probe into the intention of the legislature. The elementary rule of construction is that the

language must be construed in its grammatical and literal sense and hence it is termed as litera

legis or litera script.

The Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.

This interpretation is supreme and is called the golden rule of interpretation.

In Ramanjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh,1 the Election tribunal set aside the election of the

appellant under s 123(7) of the Representation of People’s Act, 1951 on the grounds th at the

appellant had employed more persons than prescribed for electioneering purpose. The appellant

contended that the excess employees were paid by his father and hence were not employed by

him. The Supreme Court followed the grammatical interpretation of S 123(7) and termed the

excess employees as volunteers.

In Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay,2

the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at an airportdid not declare that he brought gold with him. Gold, found in his possession during search in

violation of government notification, was confiscated under S 167 (8) Sea Customs Act, 1878.

He was charged under sec. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The appellant

1(1955) 1 SCR 671 : AIR 1954 SC 749.2[1953] S.C.R. 730.


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pleaded that his trial under the Act was violative of Art 20(2) of the constitution relating to

double jeopardy as he was already punished for his act by was of confiscation of the gold. It was

held by the Supreme Court that the sea customs authority is not a court or a judicial tribunal and

the confiscation is not a penalty. Consequently his trial was valid under the Act of 1947.

In Madan Mohan v K.Chandrashekara, it was held that when a statute contains strict and

stringent provisions, it must be literally and strictly construed to promote the object of the act.

In Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd,3 it was held that according to the

fundamental principles of construction the statute should be read as a whole, then chapter by

chapter, section by section and then word by word.

In Municipal Board v State Transport Authority, Rajasthan,4 an application against the change of

location of a bus stand could be made within 30 days of receipt of order of regional transport

authority according to s 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after

30 days on the contention that statute must be read as “30 days from the knowledge of the order”

The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the

application as invalid.

2.1(a) Exceptions to the rule of literal interpretation

Generally a statute must be interpreted in its grammatical sense but under the following

circumstances it is not possible:-

Logical defects

ambiguity

inconsistency

incompleteness or lacunae

unreasonableness

32002 AIR SCW 4939.4[1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373.


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2.2 Logical interpretation

If the words of a statute give rise to two or more construction, then the construction which

validates the object of the Act must be given effect while interpreting. It is better to validate a

thing than to invalidate it or it is better the Act prevails than perish. The purpose of construction

is to ascertain the intention of the parliament.

2.2(a) The mischief rule

The mischief rule of interpretation originated in Heydon’s case. If there are two interpretations

possible for the material words of a statute, then for sure and true interpretation there are certain

considerations in the form of questions. The following questions must b considered:

What was the common law before making the Act?

What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide a remedy?

What is the remedy resolved by the parliament to cure the disease of the common wealth?

The true reason of the remedy.

The judge should always try to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The mischief rule

says that the intent of the legislature behind the enactment should be followed.

2.2(b) Rule of casus omissus

Generally, the court is bound to harmonize the various provisions of an Act passed by the

legislature during interpretation so that repugnancy is avoided. Sometimes certain matters might

have been omitted in a statute. In such cases, they cannot be added by construction as it amounts

to making of laws or amending which is a function of legislature. A new provision cannot beadded in a statute giving it meaning not otherwise found therein. A word omitted from the

language of the statute, but within the general scope of the statute, and omitted due to

inadvertence is known as Casus Omissus.


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In Padma Sundara Rao v State of Tamil Nadu5 it was held that the cassus omissus cannot be

supplied by the court except in the case of a clear necessity and when reason for it is found

within the four corners of the statute itself.

Rule of Ejusdem Generis

Ejusdem generis means “of the same kind”. Generally particular words are given their natural

meaning provided the context does not require otherwise. If general words follow particular

words pertaining to a class, category or genus then it is construed that general words are limited

to mean the person or thing of the same general class, category or genus as those particularly

exposed.

Eg: if the husband asks the wife to buy bread, milk and cake and if the wife buys jam along with

them, it is not invalidated merely because of not specifying it but is valid because it is of the

same kind.

The basic rule is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in unrestricted sense,

then it need not have used particular words at all. This rule is not of universal application. In

Devendra Surti v State of Gujarat,6 under s2 (4) of the Bombay shops and Establishments Act,

1948 the term commercial establishment means “an establishments which carries any trade,

business or profession”. Here the word profession is associated to business or trade and hence a private doctor’s clinic cannot be included in the above definitions as under the rule of Ejusdem

Generis. In Grasim Industries Ltd v Collector of Customs, Bombay,7 the rule of Ejusdem Generis

is applicable when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by

general words.

In such a case the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those

specified. Every clause of a statute must be construed with reference to other clauses of the Act.

5(2002) 3 SCC 533.6[1969] 1 SCR 235.7AIR 2002 SC 1706.


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3. INTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

Statute generally means the law or the Act of the legislature authority. The general rule of the

interpretation is that statutes must prima facie be given this ordinary meaning. If the words are

clear, free from ambiguity there is no need to refer to other means of interpretation. But if the

words are vague and ambiguous then internal aid may be sought for interpretation.

3.1 Context

If the words of a statute are ambiguous then the context must be taken into consideration. The

context includes other provisions of the statute, its preamble, the existing state of law and other

legal provisions. The intention behind the meaning of the words and the circumstances under

which they are framed must be considered.

3.2 Title

Title is not part of enactment. So it cannot be legally used to restrict the plain meaning of the

words in an enactment.

3.3 Long title

The heading of the statute is the long title and the general purpose is described in it. E.g.

Prevention of Food Adulter ation Act, 1954, the long title reads as follows “An Act to make

provisions for the prevention of adulteration of food”.

In Re Kerala Education bill, the Supreme Court held that the policy and purpose may be deduced

from the long title and the preamble.

In Manohar Lal v State of Punjab,8 Long title of the Act is relied as a guide to decide the scope

of the Act.

3.4 Short Title

8AIR 1968 SC 488.


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The short title of the Act is purely for reference only. The short title is merely for convenience.

E.g. The Indian Penal Code, 1860.

3.5 Preamble

The Act Starts with a preamble and is generally small. The main objective and purpose of the

Act are found in the Preamble of the Statute. “Preamble is the Act in a nutshell. It is a

preparatory statement. It contains the recitals showing the reason for enactment of the Act. If the

language of the Act is clear the preamble must be ignored. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the

interpretation of an ambiguous act.

In Kashi Prasad v State,9 the court held that even though the preamble cannot be used to defeat

the enacting clauses of a statute, it can be treated as a key for the interpretation of the statute.

3.6 Headings

A group of Sections are given under a heading which act as their preamble. Sometimes a single

section might have a preamble. S.378-441 of IPC is “Offences against property”.

Headings are prefixed to sections. They are treated as preambles. If there is ambiguity in the

words of a statute, headings can be referred.

In Durga Thathera v Narain Thathera,10 the court held that the headings are like a preamble

which helps as a key to the mind of the legislature but do not control the substantive section of

the enactment.

3.7 Marginal notes

Marginal notes are the notes that are printed at the side of the section in an Act and it

summarizes the effect of the section. They are not part of the statute. So they must not be

9AIR 1974 587

10AIR 1978 254


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considered. But if there is any ambiguity they may be referred only as an internal aid to the

construction.

In Wilkes v Goodwin, the Court held that the side notes are not part of the Act and hence

marginal notes cannot be referred.

3.8 Exemptions

An exemption clause in a taxing statute must be, as far as possible, liberally construed and in

favour of the assessee, provided no violence is done to the language used. “It is true that an

exemption provision should be liberally construed, but this does not mean that such liberal

construction should be made even by doing violence to the plain meaning of such exemption

provision. Liberal construction will be made wherever it is possible to be made without

impairing the legislative requirement and the spirit of the provision.”

3.9 Provisos

The normal function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall

within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case. “The

main function of a proviso is to carve out an exception to the main enactment. It cannot,

normally, be so interpreted as to set at naught the real o bject of the main enactment.”

A proviso cannot be held to control the main enactment or to withdraw, by mere implication, any

part of what the main provision has given. But it cannot enable something to be done which is

not to be found in the enacting clause itself, on the ground that otherwise the proviso would be

meaningless and senseless.

“There may be cases in which the language of the statute may be so clear that a proviso may be

construed as a substantive clause. But whether a proviso is construed as restricting the main

provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it stands

as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.”


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3.10 Explanation

Sometimes an Explanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the meaning of the

words appearing in the section. Such an Explanation becomes an integral part of the main

enactment.

“An Explanation to a statutory provision has to be read with the main provision to which it is

added as an Explanation. An Explanation appended to a section or a sub section becomes an

integral part of it and has no independent existence apart from it. There is, in the eye of law, only

one enactment, of which both the section or sub section and the Explanation are two inseparable

parts. In the absence of anything repugnant in the subject or context, the words and expressions

used in the Explanation are to be given the same meaning as given to them in the main provision

itself.”

The purpose of an Explanation is not to limit the scope of the main section. An Explanation is

quite different in nature from a proviso; the latter excludes, excepts and restricts while the former

explains, clarifies or subtracts or includes something by introducing a legal fiction.

“An Explanation may be appended to a section to explain the meaning of the words used in the

section. There is no presumption that an Explanation which is inserted subsequently introduces

something new which was not present in the section before. Ordinarily, an Explanation is

inserted to clear up any ambiguity in the section and it should be so read as to harmonise it with

the section and to clear up any am biguity in the main section.”

“The normal principle in construing an Explanation is to understand it as explaining the meaning

of the provision to which it is added; the Explanation does not enlarge or limit the provision,

unless the Explanation purports to be a definition or a deeming clause; if the intention of the

Legislature is not fully conveyed earlier or there has been a misconception about the scope of a

provision, the Legislature steps in to explain the purport of the provision; such an Explanation

has to be given effect to, as pointing out the real meaning of the provision all along.”


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3.11 Exceptions and savings clause

To exempt certain clauses from the preview of the main provisions, and exception clause is

provided. The things which are not exempted fall within the purview of the main enactment.

The saving clause is also added in cases of repeal and re-enactment of a statute.

3.12 Non-obstante clauses

“A non-obstante clause is usually used in a provision to indicate that the provision should prevail

despite anything to the contrary in the provision mentioned in such non-obstante clause. In case

there is any inconsistency or a departure between the non-obstante clause and another provision,

one of the objects of such a clause is to indicate that it is the non-obstante clause which would

prevail over the other clause.”

3.13 Punctuation

“There are three activities serially set out in that sub-clause, namely, construction, manufacture

or production. A comma is, therefore, legitimately and as per the rules of grammar, required after

the first activity to separate it from the second activity of manufacture. Since the second activity

is followed by the word “or”, no comma is r equired after the second activity to separate it from

the third activity. Therefore, punctuation is put as grammatically required. It does not disclose

any intention of providing for a separate kind of business altogether. Punctuation, in any case, is

a minor element in the construction of a statute. Only when a statute is carefully punctuated and

there is no doubt about its meaning can weight be given to punctuation. It cannot, however, beregarded as a controlling element for determining the meaning of a statute.”


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3.14 Definition/ Interpretation clause

The legislature can lay down legal definitions of its own language, if such definitions are

embodied in the statute itself, it becomes binding on the courts.

When the act itself provides a dictionary for the words used, the court must first look into that

dictionary for interpretation.

In Mayor of Portsmouth v Smith, the court observed “The introduction of interpretation clause is

a novelty.”

3.15 Conjunctive and Disjunctive words

The word “and” is conjunctive and the word “or” is disjunctive. These words are often

interchangeable. The word ‘and’ can be read as ‘or’ and ‘or’ can be read as ‘and’.

3.16 Schedule

The Schedules appended to a statute form part of it. They are generally added to avoid

encumbering the statute with matters of excessive details, guidelines to work out the policy of

the statute, transitory provisions, rules and forms which need frequent amendment and the like.

Much importance is not given to the forms unless they contain requirements of a mandatory

nature. Schedules form part of a statute. They are at the end and contain minute details for

working out the provisions of the express enactment. The expression in the schedule cannot

override the provisions of the express enactment.

3.17 Illustrations

Illustrations in enactment provided by the legislature are valuable aids in the understanding

the real scope.


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3.18 Meaning of the words

The definition of the words given must be construed in the popular sense. Internal aid to

construction is important for interpretation.


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4. WITH AID OF CONSTRUCTION

Apart from the intrinsic aids to construction, such as preamble and the purview of the Act, the

Court can consider resources outside the Act, called the extrinsic aids, in interpreting and finding

out the purpose of the Act. Where the words of an Act are clear and unambiguous, no recourse to

extrinsic matter, even if it consists of the sources of the codification, is the intrinsic aids, such as

preamble and purview of the Act. Sources outside the Act called extrinsic aids. These resources

deal mainly with the history of the Act, both with the prior events leading up to the introduction

of the Bill, Select Committee reports.

External aids to interpretation of statutes include Parliamentary History, Historical Facts and

Surrounding Circumstances, Later Scientific Inventions, Reference to other Statutes (pari

materia) & Use of Foreign Decisions. Each of the above mentioned constituents of external

aids to construction have been dealt briefly in the due course of my work.

4.1 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY

The ingredients of Parliamentary History are the bill in its original form or the amendmentsconsidered during its progress in the Legislature, Speech of the minister who introduced the bill

in the Parliament which is also referred to as Statements of Objects and Reasons, Reports of

Parliamentary debates and resolutions passed by either House of the Parliament and the Reports

submitted different Parliamentary Committees.

According to the traditional English view the Parliamentary History of a statute was not

considered as an aid to construction. The Supreme Court of India in the beginning enunciated the

rule of exclusion of Parliamentary History in the way it was traditionally enunciated by theEnglish Courts but on many an occasion, the court used this aid in resolving questions of

construction.11

11Refer Generally, Singh G.P., Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 221 (Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, Tenth

Edition, 2006)


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In Indira Sawhney v. Union of India,12

while interpreting Article 16(4) of the Constitution the

Supreme Court referred to Dr. Ambedkar‟s speech in the Constituent Assembly as the

expression backward class of citizens’ is not defined. The court held that reference to

Parliamentary debate is permissible to ascertain the context, background and objective of the

legislatures but at the same time such references could not be taken as conclusive or binding on

the courts. Thus in the Mandal Reservation Case, the Supreme Court resorted to Parliamentary

History as an aid to interpretation.

In the Ashwini Kumar’s Case (1952),13

the then Chief Justice of India Patanjali Shastri quoted

that the Statement of Objects and Reasons should not be used as an aid to interpretation because

in his opinion the Statement of Objects and Reasons is presented in the Parliament when a bill is

being introduced. During the course of the processing of the bill, it undergoes radical changes.But in the Subodh Gopal’s Case (1954),

14 Justice S.R. Das although he fully supported Chief

Justice Patanjali Shastri‟s views in the Ashwini Kumar’s Case but he wanted to use the

Statement of Objects and Reasons to protect the sharecroppers against eviction by the new

buyers of land since zamindari system was still not abolished and land was still not the property

of the farmers. So Justice S.R. Das took the help of Statements of Objects and Reasons to

analyse the social, legal, economic and political condition in which the bill was introduced.

In Harsharan Verma v. Tribhuvan Narain Singh,

15

the appointment of Tribhuvan Narayan Singhas the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh was challenged as at the time of his appointment he was

neither a member of Vidhan Sabha nor a member of Vidhan Parishad. While interpreting Article

164(4) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that it did not require that a Minister should

be a Member of the Legislature at the time of his being chosen as such, the Supreme Court

referred to an amendment which was rejected by the Constituent Assembly requiring that a

Minister at the time of his being chosen should be a member of the Legislature.

12Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477.

13Ashwini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369.

14State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92.

15Harsharan Verma v. Tribhuvan Narain Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1331.


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4.2 HISTORICAL FACTS AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES

Historical facts are very essential to understand the subject matter of the statute or to have regard

to the surrounding circumstances which existed at the time of passing of the statute. The rule of

admissibility of this external aid is especially useful in mischief rule. The rule that was laid down

in the Heydon’s Case (1584),16

has now attained the status of a classic. The mischief rule enables

the consideration of four matters in construing an act:

What was the law before the making of the Act?

What was the mischief for which the law did not provide?

What was the remedy provided by the Act?

What was the reason of the remedy?

This rule was applied in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar 17

in the construction of Article

286 of the Constitution in which the Supreme Court held that a state has the legislative

competence to impose sales tax only if all the ingredients of a sale have a territorial nexus. Thus

on the same transaction sales tax cannot be imposed by several states.

Since the function of the court is to find the meaning of the ambiguous words in a statute, a

reference to the historical facts and surrounding circumstances that led to the enactment assist the

courts in efficient administration of speedy justice. The rule permits recourse to historical works,

engravings, pictures and documents where it is important to ascertain ancient facts of a public

nature. Historical evolution of a provision in the statute is also sometimes a useful guide to its

construction.18

16See., Heydon‟s Case(1584), as available in www.westlaw.com as accessed on 25th February,2008 at 3:45p.m.

IST. 17

Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661. 18

R. v. Ireland, (1997) 4 All ER 225


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4.3 LATER SCIENTIFIC INVENTIONS

The laws made in the past are applied in the present contemporary society in the light of changed

social, political, legal and economic circumstances taking into consideration the advancement in

science and technology. Statutes must be interpreted in accordance with the spirit of the

Constitution of India even though the statutes were passed before independence of India or

before the commencement of our Constitution.

The case State v. J.S. Chawdhry19 relates to Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which

only mentions about handwriting experts and not typewriting experts for the reason that

typewriters were invented much later than 1872.In the instant case the state wanted to use the

opinion of a typewriting expert as evidence in a murder case. The Supreme Court then overruled

its decision in the case Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh20 which held that the opinion of

the typewriting expert was inadmissible as evidence in the court of law.

State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Prafulla Desai21 case relates to Section 388 of the Indian Penal Code

which deals with gross medical negligence resulting in the death of the patient. The prosecution

wanted to produce the statements of a New York Doctor Dr.Greenberg as evidence. The problem

arose when Dr.Greenberg refused to appear in the Indian Court to record his statements. There is

no such provision which can compel a witness residing outside the domestic territory of India to

come to an Indian court as a witness. Thus in such circumstances video conferencing became the

only viable option. But the accused opposed video conferencing under Section 273 of Criminal

Procedure Code which clearly says that evidence can be recorded only in the presence of the

accused. The Supreme Court interpreted presence not merely as physical presence but as a

situation in which the accused can see, hear and question the witnesses.

4.4 REFERENCE TO OTHER STATUTES

Statutes must be read as a whole in order to understand the words in their context. Problem arises

when a statute is not complete in itself i.e. the words used in the statute are not explained clearly.

19State v. J.S.Chawdhry, AIR 1996 SC 1491.

20Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343.

21State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Prafulla Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053


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Extension of this rule of context permits reference to other statutes in pari materia i.e. statutes

dealing with the same subject matter or forming part of the same system. The meaning of the

phrase pari materia was explained in an American Case, United Society v. Eagle Bank (1829) in

the following words: “Statutes are in pari materia which r elate to the same person or thing, or to

the same class of persons or things. The word par must not be confounded with the word similes.

It is used in opposition to it intimating not likeness merely but identity. It is a phrase applicable

to public statutes or general laws made at different times and in reference to the same subject”.22

In the case, State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers syndicate Ltd., Okara,23

the Supreme Court

held that when two pieces of legislation are of differing scopes, it cannot be said that they are in

pari materia. However it is not necessary that the entire subject matter in the statutes should be

identical before any provision in one may be held to be in pari materia with some provision inthe other.

In the case State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanath Aiyer,24

the respondent, an income tax officer was

accused of accepting bribe. The Trial Court convicted him and awarded a rigorous imprisonment

of six months. When an appeal was made in the High Court, the High Court set him free on the

ground of a possibility that he might have borrowed the money and not accepted it as bribe. The

Supreme Court held the accused guilty and made an observation that the judgement of the High

Court was extremely perverse.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption

Act,1947, which directs that on proof that the accused has accepted any gratification other than

legal remuneration, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is established by the accused that the

gratification was accepted as bribe, has been held to be in pari materia with subject matter dealt

with by the Indian Evidence Act,1872; and the definition shall presume in the Indian Evidence

Act has been utilized to construe the words „it shall be presumed in section 4 of the Prevention

of Corruption Act,1947.

22See., Sigh G.P., Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 275(Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, Tenth Edition, 2006)

23State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers syndicate Ltd.,Okara, AIR 1964 SC 669.

24State of Madras v. A.Vaidyanath Aiyer,AIR 1958 SC 61


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4.5 USE OF FOREIGN DECISIONS

Reference to decisions of the English Courts was a common practice in the administration of

justice in pre independent India. The reason behind this was that the Modern Indian Legal

System owes its origin to the English Common Law System. But after the commencement of the

Constitution of India as a result of the incorporation of the Fundamental Rights, the Supreme

Court of India gave more access to American precedents.

It cannot, however, be doubted that knowledge of English law and precedents when the language

of an Indian Act was not clear or express, has often been of valuable assistance. Speaking about

Indian Codes Shri M.C.Setalvad has stated: “Where the language of the code was clear and

applicable, no question of relying on English Authority would arise. But very often the general

rule in the Indian Code was based on an English Principle and in such cases the Indian Courts

frequently sought the assistance of English Decisions to support the conclusions they reached.

They could not otherwise for not only the general rules contained in the codes but some of the

illustrations given to clarify the general rules were based on English decisions.”25

In the case General Electric Company v. Renusagar Power Company,26

the Supreme Court of

India held that when guidance is available from Indian decisions, reference to foreign decisions

may become unnecessary.

Different circumstances may also result in non acceptance of English precedents by the Indian

Courts. In the case M.V.Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd.,27

the Supreme

Court differed from English decisions and interpreted the words damage caused by a ship in

Section 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 as not limited to a physical damage caused by a

ship by reason of its coming into contact with something; it intended to include damage to the

cargo carried in a ship. The Supreme Court in this case differed in its opinion because in India

there is no other Act covering claim of damages for damage to the cargo carried in a ship but in

England this subject is covered expressly by a different Act.

25See., Setalvad M.C., The Common Law in India , 61 as cited in Singh G.P., Principles of Statutory Interpretations,

327(Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, Tenth Edition, 2006). 26

General Electric Company v. Renusagar Power Company, (1987)4 SCC 137. 27

M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 1014.


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5. CONCLUSION

The chief source of law is legislation, though there are other sources of law such as precedents

and customs. Every source of law finds its expression in a language. Often the language has a

puzzling effect, i.e., it masks and distorts. Often it is found that the language of a statute is not

clear. The words used in the statute too at times seem to be ambiguous. Sometimes it is not

possible to assign the dictionary meaning to certain words used in legislation. Meaning which is

to be assigned to certain words in a legislation. Even the dictionary does not give the clear cut

meaning of a word. This is so because the dictionary gives many alternative meanings applicable

in different contexts and for different purposes so that no clear field for the application of a word

is easily identified. So long as expansion of meaning takes place uniformly, the law will develop

along healthy lines. But if one judge takes the narrow view and the other the broad view, the lawwill mean different things for different persons and soon there will be confusion. Hence, it is

necessary that there should be some rules of interpretation to ensure just and uniform decisions.

Such rules are called rules of interpretation. There are various aids to the rule of interpretation

and in case the ambiguity is not removed even after applying the internal aids, then the external

aids can come in handy. They provide various methods by the help of which a statute can be

interpreted and used by the judiciary in deciding cases.


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BIBLIOGRAPHYBooks

1. Introduction to the Interpretation of Statutes, Dr. Avtar Singh, lexis nexis pub., 2009

2.

Interpretation of Statutes, Vepa P.Sarathi, 5th edition, 20103. The Interpretation of Statutes, Prof. T. Bhattacharyya, 8th edition, 2012

4. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Maxwell, revised by P. St. J.Langan, 12th

edition, reprint 2011

Webliography

www.google.com (search engine)

1. www.lexisnexis.com

2. www.legalservices.com

3. www.legalsutra.com

4. www.legallyindia.com

5. www.indiankanoon.com

6. www.manupatra.org

Articles

1.

http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1304152/

2. attorneygeneral.gov.mu/...Z%20Acts/.../INTERPRETATIONGENERAL ...

3. www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic2_guy_interpretation_act .pdf

4. www.mpil.de/.../the_interpretation_of_laws_and_general_clauses_act.pdf.

5. lawcommissionofindia.nic.in51 -100Report0.pdf

6. www.opc.gov.au/calc/docs/Loophole_paper sGloverAug2011.pdf
http://jainbookagency.com/newdetails.aspx?id=94756http://jainbookagency.com/booksearch.aspx?aname=Vepa%20P.Sarathihttp://jainbookagency.com/newdetails.aspx?id=123992http://jainbookagency.com/booksearch.aspx?aname=Prof.%20T.%20Bhattacharyyahttp://jainbookagency.com/newdetails.aspx?id=13104http://jainbookagency.com/booksearch.aspx?aname=Maxwell,%20revised%20by%20P.%20St.%20J.Langanhttp://www.lexisnexis.com/http://www.legalservices.com/http://www.legalsutra.com/http://www.legallyindia.com/http://www.indiankanoon.com/http://www.manupatra.org/http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1304152/http://www.mpil.de/.../the_interpretation_of_laws_and_general_clauses_act.pdfhttp://www.mpil.de/.../the_interpretation_of_laws_and_general_clauses_act.pdfhttp://indiankanoon.org/doc/1304152/http://www.manupatra.org/http://www.indiankanoon.com/http://www.legallyindia.com/http://www.legalsutra.com/http://www.legalservices.com/http://www.lexisnexis.com/http://jainbookagency.com/booksearch.aspx?aname=Maxwell,%20revised%20by%20P.%20St.%20J.Langanhttp://jainbookagency.com/newdetails.aspx?id=13104http://jainbookagency.com/booksearch.aspx?aname=Prof.%20T.%20Bhattacharyyahttp://jainbookagency.com/newdetails.aspx?id=123992http://jainbookagency.com/booksearch.aspx?aname=Vepa%20P.Sarathihttp://jainbookagency.com/newdetails.aspx?id=94756

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