interest groups in russian foreign policy: the invisible hand of the russian orthodox church

Original Article

Interest groups in Russian foreign policy: The

invisible hand of the Russian Orthodox Church

Nikita LomaginFaculty of Economics at St Petersburg State University, 3-38 Tuchkov pereulok,

St Petersburg 199053, Russia.

E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract Among the domestic interest groups that play a role in influencingRussian foreign policy the Russian Orthodox Church has become an importantactor. Its most important role has been that of supporting the emergence of a newnationalist Russian identity to undergird Russian policy. On specific policy issues,it has advocated the political reunification of Eastern Slavic Orthodox peoples, theemergence of a multipolar international system and the restatement of traditionalvalues as the foundation for the pursuit of global human rights.International Politics (2012) 49, 498–516. doi:10.1057/ip.2012.13;published online 16 March 2012

Keywords: interest groups; Russian foreign policy; Russian Orthodox Church;Russian identity

Introduction

At the end of WW II, during a discussion of the future of Poland, British PrimeMinister Winston Churchill cautioned Joseph Stalin to consider the views ofthe Vatican. To this the Soviet leader responded, ‘How many divisions does thePope of Rome have?’ For Stalin as a true realist, the only thing that matteredduring the war was power. Since the Pope had nothing he feared or wanted,Stalin would ignore him. In wartime, Stalin’s temporary rapprochement withthe Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the atheistic Soviet Union did serveexclusively the cause of mobilisation to fight the Nazis.

In contemporary Russia the role of the ROC has changed substantially.Although the institution of military clergy is beginning to develop in Russia bydecision of the Russian president,1 the ROC does not have any divisions, andits economic might is not as significant as that of the powerful energy lobby(Wolosky, 2000; Goldman, 2008) or the siloviki (the Russian term for the

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security apparatus) (Soldatov and Borogan, 2010), but it has enormous softpower. After the collapse of communism the Orthodox Church has become anincreasingly powerful presence in Russia, speaking out on issues of morality,economics, international relations, and, most recently, the Russian elections(Kishkovsky, 2011).

The present article examines the peculiar role of the ROC in the foreignpolicy of post-Soviet Russia and focuses on the role of the ROC in integra-tion projects on the territory of the former Soviet Union. More specifically,the Russian experience demonstrates that the country’s economic evolutiondoes not sufficiently explain its foreign policy. As Richard Sakwa (2011) hasobserved, although Russia ‘wants to be a nation-state, but with an imperialculture, imperial breadth, and imperial style’, there is no group ‘that would liketo create a real empire and would be ready to pay for that or to risk for that’.Moreover, severe economic crises in Europe revealed that every integrationproject is a very costly exercise and might be quite burdensome for leadingeconomies. Obviously, Russia can hardly avoid the same role as Germany inthe EU – a role of milk cow for weak economies in the case of crisis.Nevertheless, Putin has declared the integration project with Russia at itscentre. Why? Who is behind it? Can this project be reduced to the willingness ofnatural gas exporters to gain better control over transit states (Belarus andpotentially Ukraine) or, is it about a new hard security architecture? Or maybeboth?

Indeed, the end of 2011 was remarkable for Russia’s foreign policy in twoways. First, the country has completed its negotiations on joining the WorldTrade Organisation (WTO). Second, Vladimir Putin has launched the veryambitious project to build a Eurasian Union, which some experts view as anattempt to restore what remains from the Soviet Union.2 The common elementbetween the two aforementioned projects is the fact that they both result fromvery long-term processes and many efforts by the Russian governmentcompleted exactly on the eve of general elections in Russia. One can assumethat these projects, at first glance quite contradictory in their direction, do notsupport one another and will not be fulfilled. Indeed, from 2008 there wasa serious struggle within the Russian elite about the country’s foreign policypriorities. On the one hand, there were those who advocated the need to speedup the process of WTO accession, while others favoured reintegration of thepost-Soviet space. The members of the leading tandem symbolically embodiedthese two dimensions. President Medvedev has promoted the Westward trend,while Premier Putin stood firm on the priority of ‘assembling’ around Russiathe post-Soviet space. Thus, during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis,Moscow began to strengthen its regional economic standing and promotethe establishment of the customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, evenat the risk of complicating its membership in the WTO. The ROC generally

Interest groups in Russian foreign policy

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accepts the view that ‘the collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatestgeopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century’ (Putin, 2005). The ROC hasnever accepted the dissolution of the unity of the Orthodox world whosecore always was the Russian empire and later the Soviet Union. WhileRussian politicians under Boris Yeltsin were talking primarily about ‘keepinga common geopolitical space’3 and regarded the CIS as a mechanism ofa ‘civilised divorce’ between former Soviet republics, in order to avoid theYugoslavian scenario, the Russian Patriarch Alexy II, from the very beginningof a new Russia, strongly supported the unity of Slavic triangle of Russia,Belarus and Ukraine. After the breakup of the Soviet Union the Synodexpressed deep regret about an ‘artificial’ separation of Slavic republics. Thestatement goes: ‘Our Church is historically tied with Kievan Rus that gavelife to the Belorussian, Russian and Ukrainian peoples. That is why historicalunity and brotherhood of Slavic peoples baptised together, should not bebroken. Being separate on the level of states, we should be united spiritually’(Moskovskij tserkovnij vestnik, 1992).

The Problem

Shortly after declaring on 24 September 2011 his intention to run for theRussian presidency in spring of 2012 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin(2011a) published an article ‘A new integration project for Eurasia: The futurein the making’, which evaluates the past, present and the future of integrationin the post-Soviet space. Putin believes that ‘a crucial integration project, theCommon Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (CES), beganon January 1, 2012. This project is, without exaggeration, a historic milestonefor all three countries and for the broader post-Soviet space’ (Putin, 2011a).Putin noted, further, that ‘the road to this milestone was difficult and oftentorturous. It began two decades ago, when the Commonwealth of IndependentStates was established after the Soviet Union’s collapse. To all intents andpurposes, the selected model helped preserve the myriad of ties, both ofcivilisation and culture, which unite our peoples and also forged links inproduction, the economy and in other vital areas essential for our lives’.

On 8 October 2011, yet another ‘breakthrough’ occurred in the Common-wealth. The heads of the CIS states4 agreed to sign the treaty on the CISfree trade zone. In fact, post-Soviet states signed a free trade agreement in1994, but not all countries have ratified it yet, including Russia, so it did notwork. It took the CIS about 10 years to develop the terms of the agreement.They have been working on it intensely since 2009. One of the reasons behindthe final agreement was the fact that trade in the Commonwealth grew by

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48 per cent in the first half of 2011, exceeding $134 billion. This fundamentaltreaty will lie as the basis of CIS long-term trade and economic relations(Putin, 2011b).

In November 2011 the Russian, Belarusian and Kazakh presidentssigned a declaration on Eurasian economic integration, a roadmap ofintegration processes aimed at creating the Eurasian Economic Union, whichwill be based on the Customs Union and common economic space amongthe three countries. At their summit on 19 December 2001 the three leaderssigned an agreement on the Eurasian Economic Commission, a newsupranational body to manage economic integration of the three former Sovietrepublics.

Finally, in his Address to the Federal Assembly on 22 December 2011 DmitriMedvedev also confirmed that Russia intends to intensify economic integra-tion in the post-Soviet space and expects the Eurasian Economic Union withBelarus and Kazakhstan to come into existence by 2015. ‘As for economicintegration, we are going to proceed further. From January 1, 2012, a commoneconomic space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan will come on steamand a free flow of services, capital and workforce will be added to the freemovement of goods’. (Medvedev, 2011). Thus, a Eurasian Union of formerSoviet states became on the top of Russia’s political agenda. As Dmitri Treninobserved, ‘Putin wants even more: a “Eurasian Schengen” y by 2015,followed by a currency union and, ultimately, full economic integration.Indeed, Putin wants to restructure Russia’s relations with the former Sovietstates to create not merely a bigger market, but eventually an economic bloc-cum-security alliance’ (Trenin, 2011).

While for Russia’s partners the current forms of integration, such as thecustoms union and the forthcoming single economic space, are soundarrangements based solely on economic interests through getting access tothe 140 million strong Russian markets, Russia’s economic gains are of lessimportance with just 25 million potential new consumers in Belarus andKazakhstan. However, in the future, the Russian market might also beattractive to other post-Soviet states, including Ukraine. One can argue thateventual winning of Ukraine as a part of integration group might outweigh therelatively insignificant gains that Russia will get in the union with Belarus andKazakhstan. If we admit that re-integration project is not primarily abouteconomic gains, what is behind it? Some would argue that it was also meant tomobilise the conservative pro-Soviet part of the constituency, which feltnostalgic about the break-up of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, joiningthe WTO was targeted at the dynamic part of electorate, including export-oriented sectors and the youth who favour deepening integration of thecountry into the world economy, as well as downgrading the role of state in theeconomy and fighting corruption.



Theory

The initial literature on Russia’s post-Soviet statehood is dominated by theassumptions of transition to democracy after the ‘end of history’ and thecollapse of the Soviet Union (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Malcolm andPravda, 1996), when Russia was seen as headed towards joining the West.As Vadim Kononenko suggested, ‘this assumption was conditioned by thewidespread ideal of the legal-rational state with clear-cut separation of privateand public and effective institutionalised and autonomous government’. Russiahas been conceived along the weak/strong state or transition state/neo-patrimonial state dichotomy, with the Western liberal democratic state beingthe model case and the major yardstick (Markwick, 1996; Carothers, 2002;Shlapentokh, 2007; Kononenko and Moshes, 2011, p. 11). The centralanalytical characteristic that determines the ability of a state to overcomedomestic resistance is its strength vis-a-vis its own society. The weakest kind ofstate is one that is completely permeated by interest groups. The strong state isone that is able to remake the society and culture in which it exists (that is tochange economic institutions, values and patterns of interaction among privategroups) (Krasner, 1989).

Richard Sakwa defines basic contradictions of the Russian state as theduality between the states’ goals of the political regime and its practices, whichpermanently subvert the principles it claims to uphold (Sakwa, 2008, pp. 5–7).Lilia Shevtsova discerns such contradictory features of Russia’s political orderas those visible in adherence to mutually exclusive principles of the market andbureaucratic control, authoritarianism and democracy, anti-western and pro-western trends in foreign policy and rhetoric (Shevtsova, 2007, p. 894). Russiaunder Putin/Medvedev is viewed as a strong state, although some expertsbelieve that for the last few years its power substantially decreased.5

The Russian literature on interest groups in Russia focuses either on several‘circles’ of influence on Putin on the basis of private relations with the Russianleader or on re-emergence of a Soviet-like system of a ‘Politburo-CentralCommittee’, which advocates the priority of institutional frameworks overpersonal ones. Surprisingly enough, neither Y. Gontmacher nor V. Minchenkoinclude the Russian Patriarch in any of these schemes,6 although the economicdimension of ROC activity has attracted the attention of historians andjournalists. Some experts believe that by 2009–2010 the annual cash flow didnot exceed US$100 million. For years, allegations, which have never beenproved, linked the Patriarch with a scheme to profit from church tax breaks onduties for imported alcohol and tobacco in the 1990s. In 2008, AleksandrPochinok, a former tax minister, announced that Metropolitan Kyrill hadnothing to do with those deals. Nevertheless, it is clear that the ROC enjoys anumber of privileges in the economic domain. De facto, almost all financial

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operations occur outside appropriate regulation – for example the churchneither reports to the tax service nor pays taxes from operations that havenothing to do with the Church’s religious activities (for instance, sales ofunlicensed gold, tobacco and alcohol). There are some reports that the ROCis not very punctual in returning bank loans and so on (Timofeev, 2000,pp. 55–120, 151–187; Mitrokhin, 2004, 2005, 2011).

Recently, the concept of Russia as a network state was introduced.Networks are understood as the means of social interaction, which are lessformal than those between and within institutions. Networks are alwayspersonal and link individuals or groups that share similar interests, allegiancesand identifications (Kononenko and Moshes, 2011, pp. 5–6). However, whatwas lacking in this concept was the fact that interest-based, commercial orpersonal allegiances do not include at all the ROC as an important actorin designing Russian foreign policy. Also, one can hardly agree with thesuggestion that ‘what remains of foreign policy in its traditional sense y is infact, a rhetorical, diplomatic cover to further the interests of domestic interestgroups (Kononenko and Moshes, 2011, p. 7). Legally, the church is separatedfrom the state. But, this does not preclude religious interest groups fromlobbying; indeed, it is safe to say that all major religious groups are involved inpolitics to some degree. The most powerful is the ROC. Other ‘historical/traditional’ confessions, such as Islam, Judaism and Buddhism are less visible.Under Patriarch Kyrill, the ROC has an agenda that includes support forreligious education in school, opposition to homosexual rights, and thebanning of abortion and contraception. It strongly criticises consumerismand hedonism. As far as foreign policy is concerned, its interests are inspreading Orthodoxy (mainly in post-Soviet states), dialogue with othertraditional confessions in Russia. The ROC speaks about ‘harmony amongfour major religious in Russia’, which is the basis for dialogue amongcivilisations (soft power). The great mission of Russia is to be a mediator insymbolic/value-based conflicts.

The Role of the ROC in Russian Foreign Policy

A new Russian Patriarch, Aleksij II, in 1990 made clear that his main goal wastwofold: a revival of the ROC and keeping strong ROC unity. After thecollapse of the Soviet Union the second goal received an internationaldimension. The Holy Synod has accepted a formula: ‘Several states – onepatriarchate’. Borders of ROC may not coincide with states’ borders. Thepatriarchate is neither a political nor a national nor a geographic notion. It isa church-canonic reality built in order to support a unity of all institutionsbelonging to it (Moskovskij tserkovnij vestnik, 1991).



The Patriarch accepted that, although the breakup of the Soviet Union was aresult of totalitarian national politics based upon a militant atheism, ‘theabsolute majority of peoples of the Commonwealth (of independent states) didnot understand and did not accept the separation which was artificial becauseit went through every people, touched upon many families and hurt a commonconfession, culture, history, economy, and in the end it came through humanhearts’.

In the 1990s the ROC took part in a number of activities including thesigning of the Russo-Belarus Union treaty, peacekeeping in the Balkans andmissions in the Middle East. The ROC has established contacts with the UnitedNations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE), the European Union (EU) and other international institutions. Itcooperates very intensively with other confessions and religions that havebecome a growing factor in international relations today. The ROC has grownas a force, which was capable of generating ideas and lobbying in favour ofcertain directions of Russian foreign policy. The ROC has substantial moral,economic and social capital, which is essential for people’s mobilisation.7 TheROC is very active in social,8 the economic and educational domains ofRussian politics. Hence, it can easily transform the influence developed in theseareas into political influence. This capability to legitimise some of the policiesof the Kremlin makes the ROC essential and attractive as an institution.

The ROC’s views on the role of Russian in contemporary world wereexpressed in the late 1990s by the Patriarch in his work ‘The World at theCrossroad’ and by the head of external relations department, MetropolitanKyrill, who has published ‘Norm of Belief as a Norm of Life’. In 2001, in hisspeech at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian MFA, Kyrill (2001, p. 57)established three dimensions of cooperation between the state and the ROC:first, the return to Russia and the ROC of real estate property and piecesof arts lost after 1917 after the establishment of the Soviet government’sROC churches abroad; second, the defence of the rights of compatriots inthe near and far abroad, including the rights of believers; third, adherenceto the principle of multi-polarity in international relations.

The ROC fully supported the formation of a unified state of Russia andBelarus in 1996. Patriarch Alexy II stressed that ‘The will for integration ofstate leaders revealed a deep sympathy within two brotherly peoples. This isconfirmed by many appeals by believers – both Russians and Belorusians y’(Alexy II, 1999, pp. 52–53). The Patriarch revealed the hope that the unionbetween Russian and Belarus was just the beginning of re-integration. ‘WithLord’s help, this process will not stop and it will involve as many peoples aspossible united by the common historical fate. This unity is only prerequisitefor common life and work for the sake of a common good as well as for thegood of all peoples of Europe, Asia and the globe’. (Alexy II, 1999, p. 129).

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Alexy II was present at the signing of appropriate agreements betweenMoscow and Minsk in 1996 and 1999, and from 2000 on the ROC took partin the work of institutions of the unified state of Russia and Belarus, inparticular of a Union’s Public Chamber. After the ceremony of signingthe union treaty between Russia and Belarus in 1996, Alexy II noted that‘the emerging new union will be tragically unfinished unless it is joined by thepeople of Ukraine who have the same blood and confession’ (Alexy II, 1999,pp.128–129).

It is ironic that in the first half of the 1990s only the ROC and theCommunists – two former ideological rivals during the Soviet era – stronglysupported the reintegration process in post-Soviet space. Later official Moscowalso rejected the idea of a ‘civilised divorce’ and took some steps to push theintegration process. Under Patriarch Kyrill the ROC has managed to establisha good relationship with Orthodox Churches across the entire post-Sovietspace. The main achievement by 2011 was rapprochement with Orthodoxchurches in the two Western states of the CIS – Ukraine and Moldova(Opredelenie Osvjashennogo Arkhiereiskogo sobora, 2011).

According to the ROC, the second foreign policy priority of Russia shouldbe cooperation with traditional Orthodox countries. Alexy II pointed out thatstates with predominantly Orthodox traditions should have a permanent forumfor interactions between state officials, civil servants, businessmen and artists.‘Our Church will support such structures which will contribute to coping withcommon challenges y ’. It is worth noting that the first meeting of leaders ofOrthodox states of Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the cold wartook place in Jerusalem in 2000. The meeting was initiated by nationalOrthodox churches.

The ROC’s involvement in the Yugoslav conflict in 1999 was anotherreference point that revealed two main functions that the ROC was trying toplay on the international stage. First, the ROC was involved in peacekeeping,and second, it advocated the idea of multipolarity. Before NATO’s invasion ofSerbia, the ROC both called for peace and also provided humanitarianassistance. But later, the ROC actively worked on three different dimensions: itcommunicated with the Russian government, it kept in touch with the Serbs,and finally, it negotiated with other European confessions. During the Kosovocrisis, the ROC gained much sympathy abroad. Supporting Serbian PatriarchPavel and the people of Serbia, Alexy II expressed his solidarity with theSerbian Church known in Serbia and the West as a force which, on the onehand, opposed the NATO-led operation and called for a peaceful solution,and, on the other hand, it condemned the regime of Slobodan Milosevic andopposed his measures towards the Kosovars. Serbian President VojislavKostunica, who succeeded Milosevic, praised the Serbian Church’s contribu-tion to the democratisation of the country, and during his visit to Moscow he



paid a visit to Alexy II and thanked the Russian Patriarch for his support ofthe Serbian people.

For about a decade the ROC has supported the idea of multipolarity inthe international system. This concept calls for diversity of civilisationsin a globalised world. In 2000 then head of the External Relations Departmentof the ROC Kyrill, who succeeded the Patriarch Alexy II in 2008, claimed

We would like to be viewed as an integral part of the all-Europeanintegration process and want to contribute to the development of itsprinciples. In this sense Russia, as a Eurasian country which combinesEast and West, has got a unique civilisation potential. (Kyrill, 2001,p. 61)

The ROC pays special attention to so-called ‘people’s diplomacy’, invoking itscenturies-long experience of uniting people of the same religion. PatriarchKyrill believes that NGOs can play a significant role in political life. ‘It is toobad when the state does not use public diplomacy. The government does haveits own program, its own goal in the international arena. However, it is veryimportant for people to have an opportunity to reveal what they think andthus to influence decision makers’ (Obshestvenniye organizatsii, 2011).

Although Russia is a secular state, there are several channels of relationsbetween the state and religious organisations. Boris Yeltsin had an ambivalentrelationship with Alexy II, but Vladimir Putin has worked closely with thepatriarch. While during Yeltsin’s tenure in the Kremlin the Russian patriarchsent the President 41 business letters, for about 8 years of correspondence withVladimir Putin Alexy II sent him at least 169 business letters. A substantialpart of that correspondence concerned Orthodox unity with Ukraine andreunification of the ROC with ROC abroad (32 letters or 18 per cent of allbusiness letters). But the most significant novelty in relations between the ROCand the state became the patriarch’s proposals on joint activities in arrangingambitious political and social events, which have had in many cases substantialinternational dimension – International Christmas hearings, activity of theInternational Foundation for Advancement of Slavic unity, sessions of theGlobal Russian people’s Council, conferences against HIV/AIDS and so on.Practically in all cases, Vladimir Putin has supported patriarch’s initiatives(see Lukichev, 2009).9

Putin talked publicly about his Russian Orthodox faith and sought toenforce laws to maintain the church’s dominance in Russia. The church in turnhas championed Putin. In 2008, after Putin selected his close aide, DmitriMedvedev, as his successor as president, Alexy II praised the decision onnational television.

The leading figures of the ROC meet on a regular basis with state officialsand state leaders. For instance, Alexy II and Vladimir Putin in addition to

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official ceremonies and protocol gatherings have met at least 6–7 timesannually Also, institutional cooperation occurs, as well. For instance, theMFA cooperates with the Department of External Relations of the ROC.Sergei Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, openly admits thatthe ROC is an essential partner in coping with global challenges. ‘Ongoingfinancial and economic crises revealed the malaise of liberalism. Self-restraintand responsibility are two moral principles that are in need today. Just andharmonic system of international relations should be based upon the highestmoral law above all’, Lavrov said (Lavrov, 2011).

The Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs fully agreed with the ROC positionthat militant secularism and moral relativism are the basis for the so-called adhoc approach to international relations that comprises the politics of doublestandards. In this situation, Russia regards strengthening the moral founda-tions of international relations as an essential part of its policy. That is why theMFA is going to further strengthen its cooperation with the ROC, inter aliawithin the framework of a special working group. Sergei Lavrov hasacknowledged that multifaceted activity of the ROC contributes significantlyto the deepening of relations between states and fosters their harmonisation(Lavrov, 2011).

The framework of these meetings is flexible and allows the consultationswith other confessions such as Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. Some liberal andleft wing politicians are critical about this connection. Partly that attitude goesback to the Soviet times, when direct contacts of religious people of all rankswith the state were prohibited. They could only make contact through theCouncil on religious matters. It was up to this Council to decide whatinformation should go further, including to the Kremlin, and what should beput on hold (Alexy II, 1995, p. 15).

Just as the government has tightened control over political life, so, too, has itintruded into matters of faith. The Kremlin’s surrogates in many areas haveturned the ROC into a de facto official religion, warding off other Christiandenominations that seem to offer the most significant competition forworshipers. They have all but banned proselytising by Protestants anddiscouraged Protestant worship through a variety of harassing measures,according to dozens of interviews with government officials and religiousleaders across Russia. This close alliance between the government and theROC has become a defining characteristic of Mr Putin’s tenure, a mutuallyreinforcing choreography that is usually described as working ‘in symphony’.‘The Church is ready to continue cooperating [with the state], since we haveone Fatherland, one history and one future’, Alexy II said in his address tothe incoming Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. Medvedev, in turn, assuredthe Patriarch that ‘the special, trustful relations with the ROC will be keptand further developed to the benefit of the Fatherland’ (Medvedev, 2008).



Today Russia’s Orthodox Church, with the backing of President DmitriMedvedev, has allowed its clergy to enter politics in certain cases, in the latestsign of its growing presence in Russia’s secular society. ‘The Russian Orthodoxchurch is the largest and the most respected social institution in the modernRussia’, Medvedev told top clergy visiting the Kremlin. Although Russiaofficially separates church from state, Medvedev said the two should workmore closely. ‘In order to strengthen social stability today y (the state and theChurch), probably like never before, need to act together’, he said (cited inAnishchuk, 2011).

Finally, the ROC has re-emerged as an important actor in the Russianpolicymaking process. Its role is in setting general norms and principles fordecision-makers. The Church is quite active in defining the ‘main threats’ topublic health. Among those threats Patriarch Kyrill has identified spreadingthe ‘cult of pleasure’, enormous consumerism, as well as imposing on society‘low moral and devastating things that put into question the very nature offamily and marriage’. Kyrill admitted the growing role of the ROC for the‘moral health’ of the nation, including the ruling elite. In the context of ourtheme, it means that Russian leaders have become very receptive to thePatriarch’s positions on public morality, values and health. The fact thatcommercially profitable programmes for adults on TV, as one of first symbolsof the sex revolution in Russia, have practically disappeared and the vastmajority of government officials support the Patriarch’s position on preventivemeasures to stop HIV/AIDS is one of the results of the significantly increasedrole of the Church in public life (Kyrill, 2010).

Besides the leading tandem and the Minister of Foreign Affairs SergeiLavrov, who openly acknowledge the key role of the ROC as a moral andspiritual foundation for Russian foreign policy, many other state officials atvarious levels identify themselves in public as true Orthodox believers.10 Anuntrained observer can conclude that those who serve the Russian state are atthe same time God’s servants.

The ROC also has contributed much to the re-emergence of Russia’s identityas a ‘great’ power. Though this pretence meets some scepticism and even ironyin the West (and perhaps, for good reason), to the Russian elite this status restsupon three pillars: military (nuclear) capability; substantial economic might(namely, huge energy resources and appropriate market power); and theexistence of a clear ideology, which might be attractive beyond the country(soft power). Until recently Russian foreign policy was lacking the thirdelement. According to 1993 Foreign Policy Concept (FPC), Russia’s relationswith other countries were supposed to be based on pragmatism. This viewcontradicted a centuries-long tradition of messianism in Russian foreign policy(whether it was the idea of Russia as the Third Rome, or Panslavism or worldcommunism).11 Perhaps, only the combination of both hard and soft power

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can provide a country with the legitimate foundation to be viewed as a ‘pole’ ininternational arena. Russia’s attitude to the outside world, and to its ownidentity, has always been complex, and one issue over which Russians havelong disagreed centres on the country’s relation to Europe.

Another feature that the Russian state shares with the Tsarist state is adeep belief in the special role in world history, which the Russians are destinedto play. In the fifteenth century, and particularly after the capture ofConstantinople by the Turks, there arose the belief that Moscow was the ThirdRome, and that from it the true salvation of the world would come. Even afterthe barriers with the West had been broken down by Peter the Great andEuropean rationalism seeped into Russia, this belief persisted and was weldedinto a political force by the Slavophiles, who thought that the Slavic race assuch was the next great race of peoples that would be called on to play adominant role in world history. In addition, of course, Russia was the leaderand inspiration of the other Slavic peoples (Tarn, 1950). Today ‘selective’Pan-Slavism still plays an important part in Russian foreign policy andhas been exploited to the full in Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and someother post-Soviet states. A feeling of Slavic solidarity was certainly not aunimportant factor in the re-integration process after the end of the cold war.The defection of Yugoslavia, however, now makes Pan-Slavism a considerablyless effective appeal.

The most recent Russian FPC of 2008 reflected this complexity. For thefirst time in post-Soviet history, the FPC questions the superiority of the West(the West’s present fiscal crisis might yet prove to be a symptom of the rotwithin) and clearly underlines Russia’s choice in favour of some othercivilisation. This shift was quite striking because both the Russian Constitutionof 1993 and earlier versions of the FPC stipulated very different self-identification of Russia. In 1993 Russia was viewed as a democratic state,a part of a family of ‘civilised nations’ by which the Russian leadershipundoubtedly meant the Western civilisation. Medvedev’s FPC stipulates thatfor the first time in contemporary history global competition is acquiring acivilisational dimension, which suggests competition between different valuesystems and development models within the framework of universal demo-cratic and market economy principles. As the constraints of the bipolarconfrontation are overcome, the cultural and civilisational diversity of themodern world is increasingly in evidence. A religious factor in shaping thesystem of contemporary international relations is growing, inter alia, as regardsits moral foundation. The new Russian leadership believes that this problemcannot be resolved without a common denominator that has always existed inmajor world religions. The conclusion is more than striking. The new FPCargues that the reaction to the prospect of loss by the historic West of itsmonopoly over global processes finds its expression, in particular, in the



continued political and psychological policy of ‘containing’ Russia, includingthe use of a selective approach to history for those purposes – including itsinterpretation of World War II and the post-war period (Foreign PolicyConcept, 2008).

On 24 March 2011, at its sixteenth session, the UN Human Rights Council(HRC) passed the resolution A/HRS/16/L.6 entitled ‘Promoting human rightsand fundamental freedoms through a better understanding of traditionalvalues of humankind’ (www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/16session/resolutions.htm). The approval of the resolution continued the Council’s workon traditional values that began on 18 March 2008 by an address of HisHoliness Patriarch Kyrill of Moscow and All Russia, who was the head ofthe Department for External Church Relations in the rank of metropolitan,at the UN HRC’s seminar on ‘International dialogue on human rights’. Theresolution, introduced by Russia, was supported by the majority of theCouncil’s member states. Several states from various regions of the worldacted as co-authors. By the resolution that fixes the notion of traditionalvalues the Council confirmed that dignity, freedom and responsibility aretraditional values shared by humankind as a whole and fixed in the universaltreaties on human rights. The Council noted an important role of the family,community, society and educational institutions in maintaining and passingtraditional values and called upon all the states to strengthen this role throughadopting adequate positive measures. It is expected that the UN HRC willcontinue its work on the problem of traditional values (UN Human RightsCouncil, 2011).

The key proposal put forward by Russia aimed at changing the internationalcommunity’s approach towards human rights. ‘Dignity, freedom andresponsibility are traditional values that are shared by mankind. An emphasison links between traditional values and human rights will help to recognisehuman rights and fully understand them. In short, this will strengthen trustand establish a dialogue at the level of the international community’, thedeputy director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s information and pressdepartment, Alexander Boldyrev (2011) said. The United States and the EUrefused to support the resolution, saying that tying human rights to traditionalvalues might be perceived by some countries as the justification of discri-mination against women or the persecution of homosexuals. In this case, onehas to distinguish between the concept of traditional values and traditionalpractice.

It would be incorrect to suggest that ROC is returning to its traditionalrole in Russian history – to be just a servant of the state. As we have alreadyseen, the ROC opposed the ‘artificial separation’ of Slavic peoples in 1991and since then the ROC has been doing its best to re-unite the post-Sovietstates. ROC was very critical during the Georgia conflict in 2008. In fact, it

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marked the first war between countries with majority Orthodox Christianpopulations since the Second Balkan War in 1913. The patriarchs of boththe Russian and Georgian Orthodox churches issued strong and immediateappeals for peace. In the case of the Russian Orthodox patriarch, Alexy II,this was all the more unusual for putting him at odds with the Kremlin.‘Today, blood is being shed and people are perishing in South Ossetia and myheart deeply grieves over it’, the patriarch said in a statement publishedas fighting raged on 8 August. ‘Orthodox Christians are among those whohave raised their hands against each other. Orthodox peoples called by theLord to live in fraternity and love are in conflict’ (‘War splits orthodoxchurches’, 2008).

Despite the alarm, Orthodox ties proved strong enough to offer some reliefto civilians swept up in the conflict. The Georgian patriarch made a pastoralvisit, bringing food and aid to Gori, a central Georgian city that was occupiedby Russian forces. Then Metropolitan Kyrill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad,chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department of External ChurchRelations, said that the Russian church facilitated this visit and conveyedletters from Patriarch Ilia to President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime MinisterVladimir Putin (‘War splits orthodox churches’, 2008).

Finally, in late 2011 the ROC called for a just election process in Russia(Why Russian protests matter, 2011). The step followed demonstrations acrossthe country that called for a recount or a fresh vote, and outpourings fromindividual members of the church’s clergy, who reflected popular anger atthe flawed 4 December 2011 general election. ‘It is evident that the secretivenature of certain elements of the electoral system concerns people, and theremust be more public control over this system’, said Archpriest VsevolodChaplin, the most prominent spokesman for the church. ‘We must decidetogether how to do this through civilised public dialogue’.12 The pronounce-ment by Father Chaplin, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s synoddepartment of church and society relations, was especially significant becausehe is often criticised as an apologist for the Kremlin.

Conclusion

One can argue that over the past 20 years the ROC has regained its powerwithin Russia. It has important characteristics that distinguish it from all otheractors: historical legacy, strategic vision of being an agent of integration, andcivilisational scope. The relationship between the state and the ROC isgrounded in part in a common nationalistic ideology dedicated to restoringRussia’s might after the disarray that followed the end of the Soviet Union.The church’s hostility towards Protestant groups, many of which are based in



the United States or have large followings there, is tinged with the same anti-Western sentiment often voiced by Vladimir Putin and other senior officials(Levy, 2008). The ROC has a dual role in foreign policy: first, it is one offoundations for restoring an old identity of Russia as the Other to the West;and, second, the ROC supports the idea of re-integration of post-Soviet space.In part, because of the efforts of the ROC, Russia indeed has re-emerged as agreat power with all the essential features of a great power. It includes acomplex combination of pragmatism put forward by the energy lobby, on theone hand, and a value-based social policy and attention to compatriotssupported by the ROC, on the other hand. The ROC has made Putin’s regimebe more social-oriented. Finally, the ROC has managed to preserve itssignificant independence from the state. This gives the ROC a unique chance tocorrect faults committed by the Kremlin at home and abroad and to serve asmediator in case crises emerge.

About the Author

Nikita Lomagin, Doctor of Sciences (History, St Petersburg State University),J.D. (St Petersburg State University), is Professor of World Economy and wasDeputy Dean and at the Faculty of International Relations at St PetersburgState University, 1994–1998. He is a member of the International Institute forStrategic Studies. His research interests focus on contemporary Russianforeign policy, energy security and international organizations.

Notes

1 According to the Russian defense ministry, two-thirds of the country’s servicemen consider

themselves religious. Some 83 per cent of them are Orthodox Christians, about 8 per cent are

Muslims and 9 per cent represent other confessions (RIANovosti, 2011).

2 Dmitri Trenin (2011) believes that Putin’s new integration plans are not aimed at restoring the

Soviet Union under another name for three basic reasons: the complete evaporation of Russia’s

imperial elan, its unwillingness to pay other countries’ bills and the new countries’ unwillingness

to cede too much sovereignty to the former hegemon.

3 Boris Yeltsin noted in his memoirs that ‘building the CIS was the only option to save the

common geopolitical space y’. He said ‘I did believe that Russia ought to get rid off her

imperial mission’ (Yeltsin, 1994, pp. 152–153, 160).

4 Only Azerbaijan has refrained from joining the free trade zone.

5 Richard Sakwa (2008, pp. 5–7) defines the basic contradictions of the Russian state as the

duality between the stated goals of the political regime and its practices, which permanently

subverted the principles it claimed to uphold. Lilia Shevtsova (2007, p. 894) discerns such

contradictory features of Russia’s political order as those visible in the adherence to mutually

exclusive principles of the market and bureaucratic control, authoritarianism and democracy,

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anti-western and pro-western trends in foreign policy and rhetoric. See, also, Shevtsova and

Wood (2011) and Ferguson (2011).

6 Director of the Moscow-based International Institute of Political Expertise Yevgeniy

Minchenko suggested that a big ‘Politburo’ consists of members of the ‘tandem’ and key

figures of the Presidential Administration and the government, such as the former Chief of Staff

of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei Naryshkin, elected in December as Speaker of the

State Duma, his successor Sergei Ivanov, Vice-Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Minister of Defence

Anatoly Serdukov, Federal Security Service Director Alexandr Bortnikov, first Deputy Chief of

Staff Vladislav Surkov, Head of Russia’s Drug Enforcement Administration Viktor Ivanov,

and Minister of Emergency Sergei Shoigu. Other influential government figures, including the

ministers of interior and foreign affairs, CEOs of Russia’s ‘national champions’, as well as some

leaders of regions belong to ‘Central Committee’ (Minchenko, 2010).

7 The moral authority of the ROC in Russian society is proven by high rates of public approval

throughout the whole 1990s (Starye tserkvi, 2000, p. 14).

8 The ROC has developed several ‘Social concepts’, which contain basic principles of its activity

at home and abroad.

9 For details see Lukichev (2009).

10 Andrei Bel’janinov, Director of Federal Customs Service; the CEO of the Russian Rail Roads

Vladimir Yakunin; the Governor of St Petersburg Georgi Poltavchenko, to name just few of

them.

11 The process of ‘secularisation’ of Russian foreign policy, its liberation from the ‘special spiritual

mission’ of the country, finally seemed to prevail. As Trenin and Lo stated, Yevgeny Primakov,

who succeeded Kozyrev in January 1996, adapted Palmerston’s dictum in claiming that Russia

‘does not have permanent friends, but permanent interests’. This thesis of permanent interests

can be sustained as it relates to such broad objectives as national security, territorial integrity

and economic prosperity (Trenin and Lo, 2005). For historical accounts of Russian national

interests see Lederer (1962); Rubinstein (1989); Rieber (1993).

12 The web site that Father Chaplin spoke to, ‘Pravoslavie i mir’ (Orthodox Christianity and

the World), has become a platform for debate about politics and morals. Its editor, Anna

Danilova, said the reaction inside the church arose from disgust at official dishonesty

surrounding the election. ‘A Christian has to protest against lies, especially lies to millions of

people’, she said.

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interest groups in russian foreign policy: the invisible hand of the russian orthodox church

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