This article was downloaded by: [University of Birmingham]On: 14 November 2014, At: 23:57Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

DemocratizationPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscriptioninformation:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20

Interactive Society and Democracy: CivilSociety and Pluralism in Africa RevisitedR.H.T. O'KanePublished online: 06 Sep 2010.

To cite this article: R.H.T. O'Kane (2001) Interactive Society and Democracy: Civil Society andPluralism in Africa Revisited, Democratization, 8:3, 129-148, DOI: 10.1080/714000215

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714000215

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, ouragents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to theaccuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions andviews expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are notthe views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not berelied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylorand Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs,expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantialor systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply,or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Interactive Society and Democracy:Civil Society and Pluralism in Africa

Revisited

ROSEMARY H. T. O’KANE

Views on multi-party elections and democracy in Africa have become increasinglymore sceptical, with the capacity of those in power to keep themselves in powerthrough manipulating the electoral process being especially criticized. Starting fromthe position that such manipulations may be more easily accepted in some societiesthan in others, consideration of the kind of society most supportive of democracy isdeveloped through examination of the theoretical literature on society and democracyand on pluralism in Africa. Reflecting also on cases, most notably Zimbabwe, theargument is made that the society in which democracy is most likely to flourish is aninteractive society. Such a society is one in which diverse people are brought togetherinto groups that provide the cross-cutting structure to encourage interaction and todevelop values of co-operation and respect for difference.

The introduction of multi-party elections in Africa (and elsewhere) in recenttimes led too easily to labelling new systems as ‘democracy’. In Joseph’sassessment, ‘Pluralist constitutional democracy in Africa represented a realchallenge to autocratic regimes for no more than three years after 1989’.1 Insimilar vein, Decalo observes that competitive elections have been used togive an image of democracy while leaving the hegemony of authoritarianleaders ‘largely intact’.2 Most recently, Adejumobi has concluded, ‘thatwhat is currently taking place in Africa is largely “elections withoutchoice”, or caricature elections, which rarely advance the cause of a true andgenuine democracy’.3 Joseph’s assessment leads him to make a generalargument against the literature on democracy and democratization forconverging on a view of ‘liberal democracy as virtual democracy’.4

‘Virtual democracy’ is conceptualized by Joseph as having formallypresent the necessary institutions of liberal democracy for representationand participation but in practice protecting the interests of establisheddominant groups, particularly economic ones and those in high governmentand social positions. Because the choices of those in government, with theircombined political and social status, are so dominant and decisive in the

Democratization, Vol.8, No.3, Autumn 2001, pp.129–148PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

Professor Rosemary H. T. O’Kane, School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment,Keele University.

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 129D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

move to democracy, Joseph stresses that it does not take long for them to‘realize that democratization can be manipulated to legitimize theircontinuation in power’. They soon learn, in Bratton’s words, ‘how tocontrol the process of competitive elections so that they can win a grudgingstamp of approval from western donors but still hang on to power’.5

The recognition that political leaders can and do manipulate elections tostay in power provides a salient lesson in why the description of theinstitutions of democratic government does not constitute proof of a ‘real’(as opposed to Joseph’s virtual) democracy.6 At the same time, toconcentrate only on government, its personalities, economic and socialinterests of dominant groups, and international constraints is to ignoreanother very crucial dimension – the society in which those democraticinstitutions operate. In short, the manipulations of those established inpolitical power may be more tolerated, perhaps even welcomed, in somesocieties while in others not only would they be found intolerable butconditions might be present which would enable them to be resisted. If so,the question for understanding democratization would be to identify thekind of society in which democratic institutions once in place would have ahigh chance of flourishing while in another kind of society they wouldwither.

Recent works on democracy in Africa have re-focused attention onsociety and, more specifically, on ‘civil society’.7 While supporting the viewthat international politics has led to an indiscriminate acceptance ofelections as democracy, Adejumobi argues, strongly, against claims thatAfrican countries lack the ‘vibrant’ civil societies required for liberaldemocracy. He declares: ‘It is incorrect to assume that Africans nevercraved democracy, for there is no undemocratic country where democraticstruggles are not being waged’.8 As examples of vibrant civil societies thatplayed crucial parts in the elections of the early 1990s that succeeded inremoving the incumbents from power he gives the Benin Republic, Zambia,Malawi, and Congo, though, as he points out, Zambia has now ‘relapsed’into autocratic rule and ‘fabricated elections’.9 Togo, Kenya, and Zaire (nowthe Democratic Republic of Congo), he argues, also displayed civil societiesbefore they were ‘hijacked by the regime’.

Similar arguments are also central to Bratton and van de Walle’s studyof African democratic transitions where national conditions are viewed asfar outweighing international ones in shaping regime transitions.10 Alongwith other factors, such as relationship with the military, Bratton and van deWalle argue that mass political protest action, which formed into socialmovements for democracy, has been a significant precondition of the‘founding elections’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Africa. They linkthis capacity for protest to the political conditions in the previous regime:

130 DEMOCRATIZATION

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 130D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

whether it offered experience of political competition and participation, beit in mass elections or plural associations in civil society. They drawattention to the particular advantages of participation and competition in,what they term, ‘competitive one-party systems’: Cameroon, CentralAfrican Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Rwanda, SãoTomé, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia.

The subsequent civil wars in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, coupled withAdejumobi’s less complimentary views of the situations in Zambia andTogo and his contradictory assessment of Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon(portrayed as state ‘guided democracy’) suggest that along with experienceof competition a deeper understanding of civil society and its relationshipwith democracy is required.11 This view is given further support by theevents in Côte d’Ivoire in October 2000 when General Guei was overthrownby a popular uprising after falsely claiming victory in the election.12

Civil Society and Democracy

The notion that a vibrant civil society in which people demonstrate thecapacity to participate in protest action is the life-blood of democracy has atheoretical foundation that stretches back to Alexis de Tocqueville. Putnamhas recently highlighted the importance of a civil society for democracy inthe case of Italy.13 Putnam found a strong association between membershipsof groups and ‘civic community’, the support of democratic governmentbased on trust built through the practice of co-operation. Berman, however,has questioned the linkage between civil society and democracy through adetailed analysis of civil society in the Weimar Republic, that highlydemocratic political system that was instrumental in the rise to power of theNazis who then destroyed democracy, totally.14 Berman finds vibrant civilsocieties in both Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany, but, contrary to thetheoretical view, German society was not integrated but fragmented. Ratherthan membership of clubs (choral societies, bird-watching groups, and soon) drawing diverse people together, there tended to be separateassociations (for singing, ornithology, etc.) for socialists, for Catholics andalso for wealthier Protestants. This situation was exploited by the Nazis,who infiltrated existing voluntary groups and exploited the segmentednature of German society.

The case of the Weimar Republic and its destruction offers a salientlesson on the care that needs to be taken between too easy andundiscriminating a link being made between civil society and democracy.Berman’s conclusions highlight the need to interpret the likelyconsequences of civil society activity through consideration of politicalreality, to include the strength of political institutions and whether they have

131CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM IN AFRICA

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 131D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

support and legitimacy.15 She also reminds political scientists thatTocqueville’s analysis was as concerned with political associations as withthe non-political, narrowly ‘civil’, organizations.

Democracy and Democratic Society: Tocqueville

In his study of democracy in America Tocqueville differentiated betweenthe political institutions of suffrage, such as elections, and the socialcondition of equality which combined with the capacity of people to formvoluntary associations in support of their interests. The equality ofAmerican society which struck Tocqueville was not a simple observationabout the relative distribution and level of wealth or what today isoperationalized by Gross National Product per capita and related socio-economic indicators. For Tocqueville, the notion of equality involved theimportance of meritocracy, the equality of inheritance within families, theneed for everyone to earn a living, a basic standard of education for all and,naturally, the absence of an aristocracy with the status and privilege whichit involved.16 Impressed by this social condition of equality what most struckTocqueville was the capacity of Americans to form voluntary associationsin support of their interests: ‘As soon as several of the inhabitants of theUnited States have taken up an opinion or a feeling which they wish topromote in the world, they look out for mutual assistance; and as soon asthey have found each other out, they combine’.17 In contrast, in his analysisof the French Revolution, fought for both freedom and equality, Tocquevillecomments: ‘When the revolution started, it would have been impossible tofind, in most parts of France, even ten men used to acting in concert anddefending their interests without appealing to the central power for aid’.18

It is to this lack not simply of the existence of associations but of thecapacity of people to form together to achieve their own common interestsrather than looking to the central power to do something for them that heascribes the failure of representative government, the ‘irresponsiblesovereign assemblies’,19 and the predictable move to authoritarianism afterthe revolution. It is to this incapacity and the political centralization thatfollowed which he ascribes the chequered and uncertain path to democracytaken by France (until 1856).

These are also themes to be found in Robert Dahl’s modern empiricalworks on democracy.20 Dahl, too, theorizes a kind of society in whichdemocracy can flourish and without which authoritarianism (hegemony) islikely to take hold.

Polyarchy and the ‘Modern Dynamic Pluralist’ Society: Dahl

In his classic empirical theory of democracy Dahl ‘reserve(s) the term“democracy” for a political system one of the characteristics of which is the

132 DEMOCRATIZATION

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 132D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to allcitizens’.21 With democracy an ideal he identifies the ‘institutions ofpolyarchy’ – elected officials; free and fair elections; inclusive suffrage;right to run for office; freedom of expression; alternative information;associational autonomy – which together provide the necessary means forapproximating democracy in practice.22 Just as Joseph and Adejumobiobserve, Dahl allows that such institutions of polyarchy can be turned intothe equivalent of virtual democracy where political leaders seek to hold onto power and donor countries choose to interpret the virtual as real. Dahlargues that polyarchy is unlikely to be sustained: if a foreign power, hostileto polyarchy, intervenes; if coercion is not under civilian control; and ifpolitical activists do not believe in the legitimacy of polyarchy.23 Dahl’sarguments about military relations fit well with those made by Bratton andvan de Walle.24 Importantly, Dahl also identifies a kind of society – the‘modern dynamic pluralist society’ (MDP society) – which he views asconducive to the development of stable polyarchy.

The MDP society has similarities with Tocqueville’s views inhighlighting aspects of society relating to equality of conditions and theimportance of independent groups. It is ‘modern’ in the sense that it is urbanand its people have relatively high levels of wealth, education and so on. Itis ‘dynamic’ in the sense that it benefits from economic growth and risingstandards of living; and ‘pluralist’ in the sense that it has ‘numerousrelatively autonomous groups and organizations, particularly in theeconomy’.25 Bratton and van de Walle’s operationalization of ‘plural civilsociety’ as ‘the numbers of business associations, trade unions, dailynewspaper, periodicals, and publishers…and the numbers of church-sponsored schools and medical facilities’26 is clearly in line with Dahl’sversion. Dahl, however, is concerned not only with the number ofindependent associations but also with their configuration and its effects.

For Dahl, the most essential attributes of the MDP society are that itdisperses power to a variety of groups and ‘fosters attitudes and beliefsfavourable to democratic ideas’.27 In a way reminiscent of Tocqueville, Dahlargues that: ‘the dispersion of wealth, income, education, status, and powercreates various groups of persons who perceive one another as essentiallysimilar in the rights and opportunities to which they believe themselvesentitled’.28 As such the MDP society has a shared culture and Dahl directshis concerns, therefore, to the problem of heterogeneous culture.

The pluralism argued by Dahl to be conducive to stable polyarchy is tobe found in societies where cleavages are cross-cutting, not reinforcing. Heviews ‘subcultural pluralism’, where cleavages are reinforcing and based onethnic, racial, linguistic, regional, or religious differences, to be a poor basisfor polyarchy.29 The society least conducive to democracy he sees as one

133CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM IN AFRICA

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 133D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

with essentially just two subcultures, each with their interests reinforced tothe exclusion of the other’s interests. Though political activists may in thesecircumstances seek to moderate intense cleavages (whether byconsociational or other means), Dahl argues that the chances of succeedingin achieving stable polyarchy rests heavily on the other conditions (modernand dynamic) being favourable. Dahl concludes that ‘because many lessdeveloped countries not only are riven by subcultural conflicts but also lackother strongly favourable conditions, their prospects for developing stablepolyarchies are rather slim’.30

Pluralistic Society and Democracy: Sartori

Giovanni Sartori’s position is close to Dahl’s in rejecting ascriptivegroupings such as race, religion, region, and language as a basis fordemocracy and in stressing the importance of cross-cutting cleavages.Sartori argues as follows:

Pluralism does not simply consist of multiple associations. Thesemust be, in the first place, voluntary (not ascriptive) and, in the secondplace, non-exclusive, i.e., based on multiple affiliations – the latterbeing the crucial distinguishing trait of a pluralistic structuring. Thepresence of a large number of identifiable groups by no meanstestifies to the existence of pluralism but only to a developed state ofarticulation and/or fragmentation. Multigroup societies are‘pluralistic’ if, and only if, the groups are associational (not customaryor institutional) and, moreover, only where it can be found thatassociations have developed naturally, that they are not ‘imposed’.31

For emphasis, Sartori adds: ‘This notably excludes so-called Africanpluralism, which hinges on customary communal groups and results in afragmented crystallization’. Sartori’s view that societies structured so as torestrict membership of groups only to associations that reinforce outlooksand to close opportunities for meeting those of different persuasions offerno basis for sustainable pluralistic democracy clearly fits with Berman’sanalysis of Weimar Germany. It also contributes to an understanding of thereality of politics in Africa. In questioning generalized expectations aboutdemocracy in Africa, Decalo exactly focuses on such problems, for themajority of cases, of narrow, ethnically based, localized and personalizedparties.32 He notes, for example, that in Benin, with an electorate of undertwo million voters, 41 political parties registered in the elections andsupport divided ethnically in much the same way as in the elections of 30years earlier. In the Congo, over 60 parties competed in the 1992/3elections, and he comments that the ‘ethnic, regional, intergenerational,

134 DEMOCRATIZATION

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 134D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

religious’ cleavages continue to generate violent political conflict.33 Yet, asmentioned above, both of these cases are specifically noted by Adejumobifor having ‘vibrant’ civil societies.34

This distinction between plural groups with voluntary memberships thatcross-cut with other such associations (Dahl’s ‘pluralism’, Sartori’s‘pluralistic society’) and plural groups that are ascriptive and exclusive,structured so as to reinforce cleavages (Dahl’s ‘subcultural pluralism’ orSartori’s ‘so-called pluralism’) is critical to an understanding of the kind ofsociety in which democracy can flourish.

Pluralism and Plural Society in Africa

The relationship between pluralism and democracy in Africa has been animportant feature of the study of African politics. To the detriment of anunderstanding of African democracy, however, the different kinds of groupsand the nature of their plurality have become merged in the literature, thetwo ‘pluralisms’ viewed as one. In the classic volume, Pluralism in Africa(1969), Kuper differentiates between the two crucially different schools ofthought on the relationship between pluralism and democracy. The‘equilibrium school’ holds to a view ‘in which the pluralism of the variedconstituent groups and interests is integrated in a balanced adjustmentwhich provides conditions favourable to stable democracy’.35 This is in linewith Dahl’s MDP society. The other approach, the ‘conflict school’, isdistinguished by Kuper as being based on the theory of plural society inwhich the stability of such societies is seen as precarious and threatened bysharp cleavages between different plural sections, whose relations to eachother are generally characterized by inequality. This Kuper links to thetradition of Furnivall developed through the works of Smith.36 Crucially, inFurnivall’s conception, the ‘plural society’ is incompatible withdemocracy.37

Furnivall developed his ideas on ‘the plural society’ from study of theeffects of colonialism and capitalism on traditional societies, initially insouth-east Asia and with particular reference to Burma. Colonialism had ledto vast movements of population. Under British imperialism not only hadwhites imposed themselves in domination over societies, but foreignworkers had also been introduced mostly to run commerce and industry.38

All of these groups retained their own languages, cultures and religions, nointegration took place and community, even within these groups, wasdestroyed by the disruption of having been moved from a foreign country.What held the society together was a combination of force, exerted by the(external) colonial power, and the dominance of the capitalist system ofexchange. As developed, the term ‘plural society’ applied only to colonized,

135CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM IN AFRICA

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 135D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

tropical territories that contained immigrant ethnic and racial groups.Outside the tropics, society could have ‘plural features’, but such featureswould not constitute their being ‘plural societies’.39 Furnivall had a clearconception of a society where ethnic and racial difference formed the basisof ascriptive groups and where the cleavages of religion, language, andculture were reinforcing. Furnivall’s position is, clearly, in line both withDahl’s later conception of subcultural pluralism as antithetical to democracyand also with Sartori’s scornful assessment of ‘customary communalgroups’ as a basis for democracy.40

Conceptual Stretching

What happened in the literature on pluralism in Africa was that Furnivall’sconcept of ‘plural society’ became stretched, moving down the ladder ofabstraction to take on more and more characteristics when for application toever wider and disparate cases a move up the ladder to universal conceptsis required.41 Smith adapted the concept of a plural society to be appliedbeyond tropical colonial societies. He developed the idea of ‘the pluralsociety’ as the extreme case with degrees of ‘pluralism’ existing in othercases too, including the United States and Brazil, to reflect the racialcleavage in each case.42 What had begun with Furnivall’s ‘plural society’ asa measure of a society with reinforced religions, languages, and culturalcleavages, with a single group politically dominant, to be applied only tocolonies, was transformed. Following de-colonization it was turned into ameasure – ‘pluralism’ – intended to reflect degrees of ethnic or racialplurality and racial discrimination in any society.

This merging of different kinds of pluralism was further compounded byattempts to reconcile the two views of pluralism, the ‘equilibrium’ and‘conflict’ schools, identified by Kuper.43 Over time, the distinction betweengroups based on ascriptive, reinforced cleavages (Dahl’s subculturalpluralism, Sartori’s ‘fragmented crystallization’, Furnivall’s ‘pluralsociety’, Kuper’s ‘conflict school’) and cross-cutting cleavages based onvoluntary associations (Dahl’s pluralism, Sartori’s ‘pluralistic society’,Kuper’s ‘equilibrium school’) became lost. Under the stretched concept ofpluralism all societies have ‘pluralism’ to a degree, groups added togetherirrespective of whether they constitute the kind that were believed to beconducive to democracy (voluntary and cross-cutting) or to stand indemocracy’s way (ascriptive and re-inforcing). Exploration of therelationship between the stretched concept ‘pluralism’ and an understandingof the conditions that are conducive to stable democracy becomesmeaningless. Ronen highlights the problem in his introduction toDemocracy and Pluralism in Africa:

136 DEMOCRATIZATION

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 136D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

My initial intention had been to use the term ‘democracy’ to denote aprinciple; by ‘pluralism’, on the other hand, I referred to theobservable fact of cultural or ethno-cultural heterogeneity in Africanstates. In my view, it is this ethno-cultural heterogeneity that makesimplementation of democracy in Africa problematic. However, mostcontributors to this volume, quite significantly, use democracy andpluralism interchangeably.44

Sartori: Valuing Diversity

Sartori is careful to keep the concepts of pluralism and democracy separate.They are not interchangeable. For Sartori, pluralism relates to the kind ofsociety that underlies modern, representative, democracy. This ‘pluralisticsociety’ has two crucial conditions. The first, and basic, condition on whichthe other rests, is the cultural belief in the value of diversity: ‘The belief thatdifference and not likeness, dissent and not unanimity, change and notimmutability make for the good life’.45 It is this belief in difference,‘dissensus’ over consensus, which, he holds, underlies the capacity for thebargaining, compromising and give-and-take that is so crucial to moderndemocracy. As Sartori argues, contrasting modern with ancient democracy:‘Above all, modern democracies are related to and conditioned by thediscovery that dissent, diversity and “parts” (the parts which becomeparties) are not incompatible with social order and the well-being of thebody politic’.46 The second condition that, Sartori argues, underliesdemocracy is structural and based upon this belief in toleration. Thisstructural condition is the existence of a society of cross-cutting cleavages,that is a society in which membership of groups and associations isvoluntary and affiliations to groups are multiple and not reinforcing.47

Sartori’s position on the primary importance of values fits with Chazan,Mortimer, Ravenhill and Rothchild’s classification of African regimes, fromindependence to 1988, where the ‘pluralist regimes’ – Botswana, TheGambia, Mauritius and post-1976 Senegal – are distinguished from all otherregimes by the principles underlying them.48 Whereas all other regimes arebased on unity or uniformity or a mixture of the two, they argue, in contrast,that ‘the principles guiding pluralist regime activities have been a mixtureof bargaining, compromise and reciprocity’.49 The classification as pluralistregime does not, however, constitute being fully a democracy (orpolyarchy). Chazan et al. find too much elitism and inadequate checks onbureaucracy and they also draw attention to the role of interest groupshaving mostly been concerned only with local issues. In Sartori’s terms,Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius, and Senegal display elements of‘fragmented crystallization’.

137CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM IN AFRICA

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 137D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

Interactive Society: Cross-Cutting Experiences

Though persuasive and fitting with examples of African politics, Sartori’sview that tolerant beliefs are the foundation of a pluralistic society can bequestioned. Beliefs are difficult to pin down and most especially so wherefreedom of expression is restricted and objective evidence on opinions isunavailable. These problems are compounded, respectively, by the absenceof democracy itself and by the lack of the wealth required for the collectionof the required evidence. Both are conditions found widely in Africa.Sartori’s claims about the primary importance of toleration remains open toquestion, therefore, because the necessary evidence is lacking. For givingbeliefs primary importance, Sartori’s explanation is also open to challengebecause there are two alternative lines of explanation for the developmentof modern democracy. The one is that structural changes occurred, whichaffected both attitudes and behaviour at the same time, the other is thatbehavioural changes occurred first, affecting values later.

An argument of the first kind, in which structural changes affectbehaviour and values at the same time, is found in Marxist analyses whereindustrialization produces new social classes that develop new interests. Anargument of the second kind, in which action is given primacy, is found inboth Tocqueville’s and Arendt’s works. Arendt’s view is that it is theprocess of coming together in concerted action which is the basis of modernplural democracy.50 For Tocqueville, as explained, it is having people ‘usedto acting in concert and defending their interests without appealing to thecentral power for aid’ which is crucial. People used only to authoritarianregimes lack the capacity to act together in furthering mutual interests.Following Tocqueville, again, the French Revolution which swept away theold aristocratic order brought changes to society – society became moreegalitarian. The revolution also brought changes to the political system –government eventually became more representative. ExtendingTocqueville, experience of those social and political changes, in time, setthe conditions for those required changes in behaviour – the capacity to acttogether and form associations.

As a generalization, societies that become mobile, geographically andsocially, bring people into new situations, new contacts, new experiences. Ina society where such changes are taking place, possibilities for voluntaryassociations develop; the relationship between industrialization and thedevelopment of new social classes and trade unions is an obvious example.The very experience of change, as the consequence of modernization(essential for the move to Dahl’s MDP society, which is modern in the senseof being largely urban with high levels of education and economic growth)and the geographical and social mobility that follows, opens society to new

138 DEMOCRATIZATION

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 138D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

experiences. The impact of new experiences in a mobile society is, surely,what Tocqueville found in nineteenth century America. It is important toconsider too, however, the lessons that nineteenth century America alsooffers in respect of factors that operate against democracy – the ascriptivegroups which segmented society into black and white. Within Americansociety both the pluralism of Sartori’s ‘pluralistic society’, woven togetherinto democracy, and Furnivall’s ‘plural society’ (or Dahl’s worst kind of‘subcultural pluralism’), cleft and unsuited as democracy’s support werepresent. Modernization holds the potential then to change experiences andtherefore behaviour in ways conducive to democracy, notably through thedevelopment of voluntary associations with memberships which cross-cutsocial cleavages. It offers, however, no guarantees, as both WeimarGermany and the racial divide in America showed.

The process of modernization is not the only means through whichbehaviour may change. Behavioural changes may also occur as a directconsequence of events such as revolution (as in Tocqueville’s example ofthe French Revolution), of guerrilla warfare, and even wars abroad. Suchevents bring people into new situations and new groupings. In a similarvein, the effects of direct experiences of aspects of democracy, such asparticipation in elections and in protest movements, and so on, are centralto Bratton and van de Walle arguments. All such events could have theeffect of opening up society, bringing diverse people together in newgroupings providing opportunities and encouragement for interaction. Inthis line of argument, changes in values develop as a consequence of cross-cutting experiences, rather than vice versa as Sartori proposes. ‘Interactivesociety’ is a useful term to describe such a society in which diverse peopleare brought together into groups that provide experiences of the cross-cutting structure to encourage interaction and develop values of co-operation and respect for difference.

The important question of the extent to which governments candeliberately alter people’s experiences in ways conducive to thedevelopment of supportive actions and beliefs follows and it is an especiallyimportant question for governments that are not themselves democratic.One thing is clear, governments that introduce legislation which segmentssociety into reinforced cleavages will undermine democracy. Moregenerally, retaining the emphasis on experiences, it follows that much willdepend on the nature of the experiences and on whether they prove positiveor negative. For example, participation in local elections that turn out toserve only corrupt interests will be likely to be counterproductive, whilelocal elections that have the promised effect for local policies will be likelyto count positively. Government actions such as permitting free speech,freedom of the press, and, perhaps most especially, freedom to form

139CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM IN AFRICA

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 139D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

associations will certainly enhance the potential for new experiences.Following both Tocqueville and Arendt, it is crucial, however, that thecoming together to act in concert is not itself state-orchestrated.

In coming together in action, independent of state direction, it is alsocrucial that protest movements are for democracy. As Chazan comments on‘democratic revivals’ in Africa in the post-colonial era, ‘the main lessonemanating from the failed attempts of the past was that the battle againstunjust and arbitrary regimes was qualitatively different from the struggle forfreedom, justice, and democratic government’.51 A good example is that ofZambia where the demonstrations for multi-party democracy in Lusaka in1990 drew crowds quite as large as those in Leipzig, East Germany.52

Zambia’s elections in 1991 achieved alteration in power, but Chiluba whoreplaced Kaunda then sought to manipulate the electoral system to ensurehis re-election in 1996 and according to Adejumobi has proved himself ‘asmall despot’.53 Zambia illustrates that pro-democracy demonstrations, evenvery large ones, are not sufficient protection from the slide into virtualdemocracy. Zimbabwe, however, illustrates and offers support for theimportance of an ‘interactive society’ for meaningful democratization.

Interactive Society in Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, concerted action, primarily through guerrilla warfare, wascritical to the overthrow of the regime that Prime Minister Smithinaugurated in Rhodesia with the unilateral declaration of independence, in1980. As Kuperus argues, ‘The genesis of associational life began duringthe liberation struggle’.54 She continues, however: ‘Immediately afterZimbabwe received independence, the goals of civil society were subsumedunder the state’s interests of unity, class reversal and redistributionenterprises’. The duality between the move towards pluralist democracy andthe unity of Marxism, which inspired Robert Mugabe and the majorityZimbabwe African National Union party (ZANU), has led to disagreementsover both the classification of Zimbabwe’s political system and its potentialfor sustainable democracy.

Prior to the new wave of democracy and adding to Botswana, Gambia,Mauritius, and post-1976 Senegal, Diamond offered Zimbabwe as a case of‘multi-party democracy’.55 This view of Zimbabwe was supported by others,such as Sklar and Sithole.56 At the same time, however, a contrasting viewwas taken by Chazan et al., who classified Zimbabwe (along with Ghanaunder President Nkrumah, Mali under Modibo Keita, Guinea under SekouTouré, Zambia under Kaunda, Algeria under Boumedienne, and Tanzaniaunder Nyerere) as a ‘party-mobilizing regime’. Though they conceivedparty-mobilizing regimes as sharing some of the participation characteristic

140 DEMOCRATIZATION

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 140D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

of the pluralist regimes, crucially, Chazan et al. argued that, ‘the principlesunderlying this [party-mobilizing] regime type highlight notions not only ofunity but also of uniformity’.57 In 1987, ZANU merged with the ZimbabweAfrican People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo, to form theZimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).58

More recent assessment of Zimbabwe has swung clearly behind Chazanet al.’s position. While noting that before 1989 Gambia, Botswana,Mauritius, Zimbabwe, and Senegal from 1976 all shared a history of multi-party elections, Adejumobi now categorizes them, with the exception ofMauritius which has achieved alteration in power, as under ‘de facto one-party rule’.59 Zimbabwe he describes as having ‘very weak and depreciated’opposition parties.60 Bratton and van de Walle similarly classified Botswana,Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe as having multiparty systemsbefore 1989 but also viewed oppositions as weak, with Botswana, Senegal,and Zimbabwe seen as particularly ‘imperfectly democratic’. In the longerterm, as the experience of democratic procedures becomes routinized, theyfind some room for optimism for Botswana and Senegal but not forZimbabwe.61

Yet, against the odds calculated on these more recent assessments and inthe face of intimidation and violence used against opposition to Mugabe, inthe elections held in June 2000, the opposition party, the Movement forDemocratic Change (MDC) won 57 seats in the parliament. The ruling party(ZANU-PF) won 62 seats.62 This result was made even more surprising bythe fact that the MDC had formed less than a year before the election. Themovement’s formation occurred against the background of a failingeconomy together with President Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF’s plansto confiscate farms owned by white Zimbabweans and to introduce a newconstitution designed to increase Mugabe’s power. These conditionsgalvanized action and organizations came together in opposition.

With inflation running at 140 per cent since October 1997 and a 25 percent rise just in the first two weeks of January 1998, rioting broke out in themiddle of January when a 21 per cent increase in the price of maize, thestaple food, was announced. Student demonstrations and boycotts overgrants and a pensioners’ demonstration over pensions followed in February.On 3–4 March 1998, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU),organized a general strike against food prices and tax increases. Anestimated 80–90 per cent of workers came out on strike, in spite of the strikehaving been declared illegal by the government. The student demonstrationscontinued in May with anti-government demonstrations in early Juneresulting in the closing of both the University of Zimbabwe and HararePolytechnic. A new political party, the General Conference of Patriots(GCP) was established to represent youth in opposition to Mugabe and the

141CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM IN AFRICA

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 141D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

old guard. In August another new opposition party, the Zimbabwe’sPeople’s Convention (ZPC) was launched with the aim of promotingdemocratic, pluralist government as government in Zimbabwe they arguedhad become a ‘one-man gang’. The ZPC then announced that it wouldmerge with the Zimbabwe Liberation War Collaboration Association.63

The government reacted to these protests by criticizing the press andbanning strikes and restricting public demonstrations to those for whichpolice permission had been sought and granted. Following outbursts by civilrights groups, however, in early August, the regulations were declared‘invalid’ and lacking the president’s approval. In reaction to weekly strikesorganized by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, strikes were againbanned in November 1998. Again the ban was reversed; in February 1999,the legal committee of the legislature, the House of Assembly, ruled the banon strikes unconstitutional. Mugabe then hit out at both the judiciary and thepress. Three journalists and the owner of an independent newspaper werearrested for publishing criticism of the detention and alleged torture ofjournalists arrested in December. Students again came out in protest,clashing with the riot police. Also in February, some civic and politicalgroups rejected ZANU-PF’s offer to participate in the drafting of a newconstitution.64

In March 1999 marches were staged with the aim of ensuring popularconsultation in the drawing up of the new constitution. These marches wereorganized by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a movementcomposed of an array of organizations including opposition parties, tradeunions, and student groups. In June teachers and civil servants went onstrike over their salaries and the two major companies supplying maize mealto the towns shut down in protest over government price controls. Thatsame month African Rights, the human rights group, published a reportdeeply critical of the government. New oppositions continued to develop. InJuly, ZAPU was revived as ZAPU 2000 with a programme for federalism.In August, yet another opposition party was formed, the ZimbabweIntegrated Programme (ZIP).

On 11 September 1999, the party that was to take so many seats in theJune 2000 election was formed, the Movement for Democratic Change. TheMDC was formed by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) inassociation with civic groups. The MDC’s manifesto was opposed to theconstitution as currently being drafted and called, instead, for a ‘people’sconstitution’. The manifesto also promised open and accountablegovernment, along with social and economic policies: a universal healthservice and educational system, economic stability, growth and measures tocreate employment and a pledge for land reform, breaking up farms of over3,000 hectares.65

142 DEMOCRATIZATION

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 142D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

On 12 February 2000, a referendum was held on the new constitution,which substantially increased the powers of the president, decreased civilliberties and distributed land owned by white farmers. Fiercely criticized bythe NCA movement, it was rejected, with 55 per cent of the votes cast (in a20 per cent turnout) against it. While, in spite of promises of land, poor ruralvoters abstained, in urban areas black voters turned out to vote against theconstitution.66

Plans to seize 1503 white-owned farms were first announced inNovember 1997. Inaction as a consequence of disputes about the legality ofthe proposals led to hundreds of peasants taking over six farms in June1998. The Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU) vociferously denounced it.In August Mugabe launched his resettlement plans for black peasantfarmers, plans which were to form a part of the new constitution. InNovember, orders were issued for land confiscation and redistribution.Following the rejection of the constitution in the referendum in February2000, protesters, led by veterans of the guerrilla war which brought an endto Smith’s white-dominated Rhodesia, illegally occupied 30 farms.Occupations continued, reaching a total of 800 white-owned farms inMarch, in spite of a ruling that they were illegal by the High Court followingan action brought by the Commercial Farmers Union. With the electionstemporarily postponed, legislation was introduced in April to enable thegovernment to take over the farms so, in effect, legitimizing the earlieroccupations. Violence against activists and supporters of the mainopposition party, the MDC, escalated, resulting in some killings, andoccupations of white-owned farms increased bringing the total to 1,200 bythe end of May. Violence used to intimidate groups likely to support theMDC, such as teachers and industrial workers, intensified.67

It was against this background of violence and intimidation that theMDC took 57 of the 120 directly elected seats in the 24–25 June election.Though not enough support to win the election, 57 is enough to deny thetwo-thirds majority required for constitutional change, even allowing for theadditional 30 unelected seats nominated by Mugabe. The mere 62 electedseats gained by ZANU-PF also contrasted with the 118 out of 120 gained inthe previous election, April 1995. The turnout in June 2000 also broke allrecords with 2.8 million of the possible 5.1 million voting in the election.68

The history of the MDC, in bringing together trade union and other politicaland social organizations clearly demonstrates the capacity in Zimbabwe forpeople to come together, take action and form associations with cross-cutting memberships, for pluralist democracy. Analysis of support for theMDC also highlights the cross-cutting structure of society. Support, whileconcentrated in urban areas, brought like-minded voters togetherirrespective of race. The MDC also performed well in some rural areas,

143CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM IN AFRICA

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 143D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

gaining 10 out of the 12 constituencies in Matabeleland and even someareas dominated by the Shona tribe. In contrast, ZANU-PF won only oneurban constituency and votes cast came almost exclusively from ruralShona voters. The strength of Shona support for ZANU-PF indicates thepresence of an ascriptive cleavage, though the MDC complained that theywere prevented from carrying out an effective campaign in main rural areasof Mashonaland. This was confirmed by a Commonwealth report.69

Though cleavages in Zimbabwe may not all be voluntary, nevertheless,support for the MDC along with the process of its development and thespeed with which support grew reveals the important presence of aninteractive society. In Zimbabwe, people demonstrated the capacity to acttogether, to form voluntary organizations with over-lapping memberships,for the purpose of defending and campaigning for democracy. In aninteractive society the anti-democratic manipulations of those established inpolitical power were not only found intolerable but conditions were presentwhich enabled those manipulations into ‘virtual democracy’ to be resisted.

Conclusion

Interactive societies, in which diverse people are brought together intogroups which provide experiences of the cross-cutting structure toencourage interaction and develop values of co-operation and respect fordifference, are far from a general condition of African countries. So often,the experience their peoples face, the structures in which they findthemselves, deny them incentives for and practice in forming voluntaryassociations. Their societies are not structured to cross-cut cleavages,dissensus is not valued as a good thing. It is so much easier for politicalleaders to keep themselves in power through manipulation of democraticstructures, creating something like Joseph’s ‘virtual democracy’. There,values in support of unity and uniformity still abound, and reinforcingcleavages facilitate not bargaining as compromise and reciprocity but ratherthe playing off of groups against each other, interest groups localized orascriptive, political parties communally or regionally based.

At the same time, the presence of governments exploiting elections tokeep themselves in power does not, of itself, indicate that meaningfuldemocracy is incapable of flourishing. African countries are not allinherently trapped by the legacy of colonialism to authoritarianism as aconsequence of the wrong kinds of plural societies. Change can and doestake place and it is the new experiences involved in change that offer thesolid basis for democratization in Africa and, indeed, elsewhere.Importantly, cross-cutting structuring of society and the accompanyingpluralistic democratic values can be generated through new experiences,

144 DEMOCRATIZATION

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 144D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

new behaviours, new encounters which open up society, bringing diversepeople into cross-cutting situations. Under such conditions, more pluralisticways of behaving can be developed and, not least, the capacity to formvoluntary associations with over-lapping memberships and to valuediversity of opinion and interests and the social condition of equality. It isthe dynamics of such societies that provide the sustenance for lasting, non-virtual, democracy. It is in such societies – interactive societies – thatdemocratic institutions once in place would have a high chance offlourishing. The case of Zimbabwe offers such evidence but optimism fordemocratization in Africa, generally, is fed by the observation that strugglesfor democracy are being waged in every one of the undemocratic countriesof Africa.70

NOTES

1. Richard Joseph, ‘Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and TheoreticalPerspectives’, Comparative Politics, Vol.29, No.3 (1997), pp.363–82, p.368.

2. Samuel Decalo, ‘On Statistical Correlates of Democratization and Prospects ofDemocratization in Africa: Some Issues of Construction, Inference and Prediction’, in TatuVanhanen, Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries, (London: Routledge, 1997),pp.301–14, esp. pp.304–5.

3. Said Adejumobi, ‘Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy?’, InternationalPolitical Science Review, Vol.21, No.1 (2000), pp.59–73, p.70.

4. Joseph, op. cit., p.367.5. Joseph, op. cit., pp.367–8; Michael Bratton, ‘International versus Domestic Pressures for

Democratization in Africa’, MSU Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa, No.12 (15Nov. 1994), p.10, quoted by Joseph, op. cit., p.368.

6. A democracy, that is, where the electorate choose the government in competitive electionswhich are fairly conducted and free from manipulation by those in power. To the extent that‘a mobilization of bias’ is found to be present in any democracy the notion of ‘realdemocracy’ is open to challenge. See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power andPoverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.43–46. For thepurpose of contrast here the capacity for government actually to be voted out of officebecomes crucial. For support, see Stephanie Lawson, ‘Conceptual Issues in the ComparativeStudy of Regime Change and Democratization’, Comparative Politics, Vol.25, No.2 (1993),pp.193–4, where it is argued, crucially, that to be a democracy it must be the case that theopposition sometimes is the government, alteration actually occurring through elections.

7. For a general discussion of the rise in importance of ‘civil society’ to analysis ofdemocratization, specifically for Africa, see Tracy Kuperus, ‘Building Democracy: anExamination of Religious Associations in South Africa and Zimbabwe’, Journal of ModernAfrican Studies, Vol.37, No.4 (1999), pp.645–6.

8. Adejumobi, op. cit., p.64.9. Ibid., pp.65–6.

10. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: RegimeTransitions in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997),p.223. For what follows in this paragraph see pp.196–8, 272.

11. Adejumobi, op. cit., p.65.12. The Guardian, 26 Oct. 2000 (London and Manchester: Guardian Newspapers Ltd).13. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

145CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM IN AFRICA

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 145D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

14. Sheri Berman, ‘Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, World Politics,Vol.49, No.3 (1997), pp.401–29. For what follows in this paragraph see pp.419–24, 426.

15. Ibid., p.427.16. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America: The Republic of the United States of

America, and Its Political Institutions, Reviewed and Examined, first published in two parts,1835 and 1840 (New York: A. S. Barnes and Co., 1862), Part I, pp.47–56.

17. Ibid., Part II, pp.117–18.18. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution, first published 1856

(Manchester: Collins/Fontana, 1966), p.223.19. Ibid.20. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, (New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press, 1971); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1989).

21. Dahl, Polyarchy, p.2.22. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, p.221. These ‘institutions of polyarchy’ are reduced from

the original eight in Dahl, Polyarchy, p.3, with the ‘right of political leaders to compete forsupport’ and for votes and ‘institutions for making government policies depend on votes andother expressions of preference’ combined under ‘elected officials’.

23. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, pp.244–64.24. Bratton and van de Walle, op. cit., pp.210–17.25. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, p.251. He acknowledges (pp.251–2) that the MDP society

cannot be a sufficient condition of democracy because there are examples of MDP societieswhich have not produced polyarchy, such as in Yugoslavia, South Korea and Tiawan. He alsoaccepts that it is not a necessary condition either because democracy developed inagricultural societies, not least the United States and also Norway and Sweden, and he notesthat democracy today can also to be found in predominantly agricultural societies such asIndia.

26. Bratton and van de Walle, op. cit., p.157, fn 68.27. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, p.254.28. Ibid., p.252.29. Ibid., pp.254–5.30. Ibid., p.260.31. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.18.32. Decalo, op. cit., p.307.33. For the two examples see Decalo, pp.307, 310. Decalo’s central concern is to challenge

Vanhanen’s claims (Vanhanen, op. cit., pp.21–66) for the general importance of ‘diffusenessof power’ as measured by socio-economic indicators. The debate indirectly relates to thecrucial differences between societies in respect of types and structuring of groups, which areconcealed by Vanhanen’s indicators.

34. Adejumobi, op. cit., p.64.35. Leo Kuper, ‘Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems’, in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith

(ed.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1969), pp.7–26, p.7.36. J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and

Netherlands India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948); M. G. Smith, ‘Socialand Cultural Pluralism’ in V. Rubin (ed.), Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean(New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1960); M. G. Smith,‘Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism’, in Kuper and Smith, pp.25–65.

37. Furnivall (op. cit., pp.306–7) viewed plural societies as incompatible with democracybecause they lacked ‘control by social will’. ‘Each section in the plural society’ he argued,‘is a crowd and not a community’. In Furnivall’s view, the government simply representedthe interests of its own dominant group.

38. Furnivall, op. cit., p.117.39. Ibid., p.305.40. See also Alvin Rabushka, and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of

Democratic Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), who employ cleavage

146 DEMOCRATIZATION

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 146D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

analysis and conclude that the plural society, based on Furnivall’s definition, is incompatiblewith democracy.

41. See Giovanni Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.64, No.4 (1970), pp.1033–53; Giovanni Sartori, ‘Comparing andMiscomparing’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.3, No.3 (1991), pp.243–57. ‘Conceptualstretching’ has the potential to seriously mislead understanding and to generate wastefulresearch because it defeats ‘the very purpose of comparing – control’ (‘ConceptMisformation’, p.1053). It follows that, not only must the kinds of ‘pluralisms’ be keptseparate, but also that if we are to learn about the ‘democracies’ of Africa, it is essential thatcountries which are not democracies are not counted as democracies, even to a degree, butrather are used for contrast, as different, and not compared as similar. For a demonstration ofthe importance of these arguments and the misleading research which results fromconceptual stretching see Rosemary H. T. O’Kane, ‘The Ladder of Abstraction, The Purposeof Comparison and the Practice of Comparing African Coups d’Etat’, Journal of TheoreticalPolitics, Vol.5, No.2 (1993), pp.169–93.

42. Smith, ‘Institutional and Political Conditions’.43. See Pierre L. van den Berghe, ‘Pluralism and the Polity: Theoretical Exploration’, in Kuper

and Smith, op. cit., pp.67–81.44. Dov Ronen, (ed.), Democracy and Pluralism in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986),

p.1.45. Giovanni Sartori, ‘The Background of ‘Pluralism’, Paper presented at the International

Political Science Association World Conference, Berlin, 1994, p.7.46. Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House,

1987)., p.288. Though arguing that ‘dissensus’ is fundamental to modern democracy Sartori(p.91) recognizes that dissent runs the risk of turning into conflict, which is damaging fordemocracy. He argues, therefore, that there is one area in which consensus is necessary,namely, agreement on the rules for resolving disagreements; procedural consensus is thenecessary condition of democracy. This fits with Lawson, op. cit., pp.192–4, where‘constitutional political opposition’, opposition, that is, which has the aim of becoming thenext government through the accepted rules, is proposed as a necessary condition fordemocracy.

47. Sartori, ‘The Background of ‘Pluralism’, pp.12–13.48. Naomi Chazan, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild, Politics and Society

in Contemporary Africa (London: Macmillan, 1988), p.136.49. Chazan et al., op. cit., p.137.50. Hannah Arendt, ‘Communicative Power’, in Steven Lukes (ed.), Power (Oxford: Basil

Blackwell, 1986), pp.59–74.51. Naomi Chazan, ‘Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures and

Democracy’, in Larry Diamond, (ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in DevelopingCountries (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp.59–97, p.73.

52. See Decalo, op. cit., p.304.53. Adejumobi, op. cit., p.66.54. Kuperus, op. cit., p.660.55. Larry Diamond, ‘Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope’ in Diamond et al., op. cit.,

p.1.56. Richard L. Sklar, ‘Reds and Rights: Zimbabwe’s Experiment’ in Ronen, op. cit., pp.135–44;

Masipula Sithole, ‘Zimbabwe: In Search of Stable Democracy’, in Diamond et al., op. cit.,pp.217–57.

57. Chazan et al., op. cit., p.139.58. ZAPU’s support came entirely from Matebeleland where rebellion lasting from 1982–87 was

crushed by the Zimbabwe army. Keesing’s Record of World Events 1999 (London andHarlow: Longman, 1999), p.43052.

59. Adejumobi, op. cit., p.63.60. Ibid., pp.66–7, where Adejumobi also describes the 1996 election in Gambia as a

manipulated process with opposition parties deliberately undermined and disadvantaged bythose in power.

147CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM IN AFRICA

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 147D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014

61. Bratton and van de Walle, op. cit., pp.81–2, 236. Decalo’s (op. cit., p.302) view, at the timewas that Botswana and Mauritius were the ‘only two time-proved and fully-fledgeddemocracies in Sub-Saharan Africa’. Earlier, Christopher Clapham and John A. Wiseman,‘Conclusion: Assessing The Prospects for the Consolidation of Democracy in Africa’, inJohn A. Wiseman, (ed.), Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, (London:Routledge, 1995), p.231, stated, more cautiously, ‘It could seriously be argued thatdemocracy has already been consolidated in Botswana and Mauritius’. Back in 1995,however, Zimbabwe, along with Senegal, South Africa, Cape Verde, Namibia, São Tomé andPríncipe and Seychelles, was offered as a case with good prospects for democracy.

62. See The Guardian, 29 June 2000, p.16; 1 July 2000, p.13, Keesing’s Record of World Events2000, pp.43556, 43608.

63. For the above paragraph see Keesing’s Record of World Events 1998, pp.41989, 42109,42253, 42320–1, 42385.

64. For the above paragraph see Keesing’s Record of World Events 1998, pp.42385, 42428,42596; 1999, pp.42713, 42769.

65. For the above paragraph see Keesing’s Record of World Events 1999, pp.42821, 42981,43052, 43092 43132.

66. For the above paragraph see Keesing’s Record of World Events 2000, p.43393.67. For the above paragraph see Keesing’s Record of World Events 1998, pp.41989, 42051,

42429, 42596; 2000, pp.43393, 43446, 43500, 43556. Chenjerai Hunzi, the leader of theNational Liberation War Veterans’ Association (NLWV), was prosecuted for not orderingNLWV members to leave the farms they had occupied. He was removed by NLWV’sexecutive committee two months after the June 2000 general election.

68. For the above paragraph see Keesing’s Record of World Events 2000, p.43608.69. See Keesing’s Record of World Events 2000, pp.43608, 43662. The Report of the

Commonwealth Observer Group, The Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe 24–25 June2000, was published by the Commonwealth Secretariat, London (2000).

70. Adejumobi, op. cit., p.64.

148 DEMOCRATIZATION

83dem06.qxd 21/08/01 15:36 Page 148D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Bir

min

gham

] at

23:

57 1

4 N

ovem

ber

2014