interaction transition report - february 2013

7/29/2019 InterAction Transition Report - February 2013

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From Crisis to Recovery: Lost inTransition

February 2013Report

For more information,

please contact:

Lynn YoshikawaSr. Program Manager

InterAction

[email protected]

www.InterAction.org

1400 16th Street, NW

Suite 210

Washington, DC 20036

202.667.8227

Introduction

For decades, aid actors have widely acknowledged the importance of facilitatingeffective transitions from relief to development and grappled with the operationaland policy challenges of rebuilding devastated communities and societies to laythe foundation for development. Despite some effective programming, weakgovernance and political will in affected countries and weak aid coordination tosupport multi-layered approaches to transitions continue to hamper effective im-plementation. While some progress has been made over the past decades, gapsstill remain, leaving millions of people vulnerable, with few solutions in sight. Theglobal pressures on international aid, coupled with increasingly complex humani-tarian crises, will likely widen the gap as limited humanitarian and developmentbudgets are further stretched.

Background on Transition Project and Methodology

In 2011, InterAction and the U.S. State Departments Bureau of Population, Ref-ugees, and Migration (PRM) developed a project to review programming andpolicy in the transition from relief to development in displacement settings. Overthe course of 2012, InterAction staff conducted three field assessments to devel-op country case studies examining policy and practice in the transition from reliefto development. This paper is a summary of findings and recommendations fromthe three case studies.

For this project, transition is defined as "the period between the immediate hu-manitarian response to a complex emergency and when long-term developmentprocesses are underway; where conflict or disasters may recur; in which basicservices provision often transitions from direct delivery by humanitarian agenciesto self-sufficient and resilient communities; and a time in which there is muchneed and attention to strengthening capacity among civil society, and nationaland sub-national governments. PRM funded the InterAction Transition Program,however, the views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the posi-tion of the U.S. State Department or PRM.

The country case studies included Liberia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The countryselection criteria were developed in consultation with InterAction members andPRM, and included: the engagement of PRM, USAID, and at least five InterAc-tion members; one experience of a major return of refugees or internally dis-placed persons (IDPs); and one protracted refugee situation. InterAction staffused semi-structured, qualitative interviews with representatives of internationaland national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society, UN agen-


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cies, donors, think tanks, and the World Bank at the field level and offices in Geneva, New York, andWashington, DC. Displaced and host communities were interviewed in all case studies, but with varying

degrees of access. Thirty-four InterAction member organizations directly participated through interviewsor group consultations.

Liberia: Return and Reintegration in a Statebuilding and Reconstruction Context

Liberia has made tangible political and development progress since the end of its devastating civil andregional wars in 2003. The 14-year conflict, which was characterized by the extensive use of child sol-diers and rampant sexual violence against women and girls, took its toll on the civilian population. Despiteadvances in rebuilding state institutions and the formulation of progressive policies under President EllenJohnson Sirleaf, concerns with the government of Liberias capacity to independently administer and de-liver basic services persist. The transition from relief to development in Liberia has been relatively suc-cessful due to the following factors:

Strong political will from the government of Liberia to address poverty, reconstruction, andpeacebuilding, which overlapped with and supported the reintegration needs of returning refu-

gees and IDPs.

Strong donor support in the development phase focused on both statebuilding and community-

based recovery. There was no gap in funding between the transition and development phases

and development funding was significantly greater than emergency funding levels during the con-

flict.

Positive relationships between the international community, NGOs, UN agencies, and host gov-

ernment allowed for effective partnerships.

Interviewees appeared to have limited institutional memory of past transition programming and thereforewere not able to identify many concrete program examples during the field assessment. Nevertheless,based on the interviews, InterAction found the following program approaches to be effective in the Liberiacontext:

Building program partnerships among key stakeholders, including international and national

NGOs and government ministries, in support of common strategies, implementation, and capacity

building.

Investments in long-term commitments, which were often made by NGOs with sector-specific

mandates and private funding, led to programs that bridged the transition period between hu-

manitarian and development programs.

Intensive, market-driven vocational training for ex-combatants, youth, women, and other vulnera-

ble groups.

Example 1: Human Resource Transfers

In post-conflict settings, NGOs often aim to transfer their staff, particularly teachers and health workers, togovernment ministries. As illustrated in the examples below, intensive planning, investment, and long-term commitment are required for a sustainable transfer of human resources. One NGO managing Mon-rovias largest hospital since the beginning of the war was unwilling to withdraw due to weak capacity andresources in the Ministry of Health (MoH) and alarmingly high rates of gender-based violence (GBV),which persisted following the war. The MoHs roll-out of its national health plan in 2008 signaled the be-ginning of the transition process, but it took 18 months for staff and equipment to be handed over to an-other international NGO which had been contracted by the government to manage the facility. The NGO


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stayed for an additional three months after the handover to monitor services. Similarly, an NGO investedcore funding to build policy and program systems and staff capacity within the MoH to directly manage

nutrition programs, which were then to be transferred by the NGO to the MoH. This handover process isexpected to take four years.

Example 2: Livelihoods for Ex-Combatants

Liberias disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs targeted over 100,000 comba t-ants and those associated with armed groups. However, the assistance was primarily focused on theshort-term aspects of disarmament and demobilization, leaving few funds available for reintegration activi-ties. Weak reintegration efforts left a major gap; one which interviewees said has had serious conse-quences for criminal activity, including GBV, in Liberia society today. NGOs found some success throughlong-term (four to six months), comprehensive programs, which allowed adequate time for re-building so-cial skills, achieving basic literacy and numeracy, addressing psycho-social issues, as well as undertakinglivelihood and business trainings. While this approach was relatively resource-intensive at an average

cost of $1250 per beneficiary, it demonstrated impact by reducing beneficiaries interest in armed activi-ties by one-third and improving their wealth assets.

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Protracted Refugee Situation

Transitioning from relief to development in protracted refugee situations, like that of Afghan refugees inPakistan,1 is challenging due to political deadlock, continued conflict in the country of origin, and restric-tive refugee policies by overburdened host countries. These factors often prevent refugees from beingintegrated into national development programs and services. Pakistan hosts the largest refugee popula-tion, and arguably the most complex and protracted displacement situation, in the world. Over 1.7 millionAfghans are registered as refugees in Pakistan and one million more are believed to be living in Pakistanwithout documentation. Despite major disasters and armed conflict in Pakistan, 83 percent of registeredAfghans residing there have no plans to return to their country, due to the lack of jobs and an uncertain

security situation.2 The Pakistan context did not provide a suitable environment for transition programs tosucceed for the following reasons:

Significant operational and security challenges faced by aid agencies.

Lack of policy frameworks that support development actors to engage with Afghan refugee

communities.

U.S. development assistance is primarily focused on stabilization and counter-terrorism ob-

jectives and not conducive to coordination on refugee assistance.

Weak coordination among stakeholders, particularly UNHCR, to address some of these chal-

lenges.3

These macro challenges limited the availability of sustainable partners for an effective transition to take

place. Nonetheless, some programs have had relative success in increasing ownership by the govern-ment of Pakistan and other development actors and increasing refugees self-sufficiency, but the overallimpact was limited due to weak coordination. The following approaches were effective in bridging thetransition gap:

1UNHCR defines protracted refugee situations as those where refugees have been living in exile for five years or longer with no foreseeable

implementation of a durable solutions.2

SAFRON/CCAR and UNHCR, survey of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, unpublished manuscript, 2012.3

Since the Pakistan case study was published in September 2012, UNHCR instituted regular strategic meetings with NGOs to discuss policies

and programs regarding Afghan refugees.


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Embedding NGO staff and programs within existing service structures to address the needs

of refugees strengthened the ownership of local actors and provided the foundation for long-

er-term development. In Pakistan today, this approach to transition will only succeed if there

are available funding and approval by the government of Pakistan, given the extremely fragile

state of public services.

Providing legal aid for refugees to support self-reliance and shape a protective environmentby improving access to basic services and raising awareness of refugee rights among law en-forcement officials and other local authorities.Joint capacity-building of host and refugee communities to implement community-based pro-jects and other social cohesion activities among refugee and host communities.Assessing whether the implementation of voluntary or user fees in care and maintenanceprograms is appropriate in order to increase their financial sustainability and reduce depend-ency.

International assistance has largely focused on non-emergency health, education, and livelihood assis-tance in the refugee camps with ongoing capacity-building efforts to facilitate a gradual handover of ser-vices to communities and local NGO management. Most NGOs long-term achievements are not welldocumented, particularly in short-term humanitarian project cycles, which are primarily focused on outputsand activities rather than impact.

Example 3: Capacity-Building

Throughout the decades-long response to Afghan refugees, NGOs have been engaging in capacity-building of their own staff, who are primarily Pakistani, as well as staff of their local partners, many ofwhom are refugees themselves. One refugee said, Its because of this assistance that we have amongour community educated people like doctors, teachers and engineers. This has played a major role in ourlives. One NGO estimated that in the last decade it has worked with refugee communities, it had trained

3,000 health workers, the vast majority of whom are Afghan. One of its refugee staff members had re-turned to Afghanistan in 2002 to start his own NGO, which is now one of the largest public health organi-zations in the country. A local NGO sampled and interviewed 348 teachers who had received training inPakistan and repatriated to Afghanistan. The survey found that 77% of those who returned to Afghanistanhad found gainful employment working as teachers for the Ministry of Education.4 Many NGOs do notmonitor and evaluate their capacity-building efforts in programs classified as humanitarian due to theshort-term nature of humanitarian project cycles.

Examples 4 and 5: Urban Services

Although an estimated 60 percent of registered refugees now live in urban areas, UNHCR and NGO as-sistance has largely remained focused on the refugee camps because UNHCR did not shift its priorities inline with the massive urbanization of refugees in the mid-1990s. Afghans, both those living in refugeecamps and urban areas, cite police harassment and extortion as one of their biggest challenges, yet only

30 percent have access to the legal or police support they need. 5 One NGO has operated legal aid cen-ters and conducted community outreach with a local partner for the past 10 years in Balochistan provinceto provide information and legal advice to both registered and unregistered refugees on issues rangingfrom access to government schools to the right to fair rent. NGO and partner staff conduct sensitizationtrainings with police, judges, and jail authorities to ensure that refugees rights are respected. The NGOalso set up a protection network of Pakistani volunteers who monitor detention of both registered and un-registered Afghans and are trained to advocate for the release of registered refugees and identify traffick-ing victims and other vulnerable individuals from local jails. The volunteers undertake jail visits, and as a

4BEFARe, "Survey Report on Follow-up of BEFARe Teachers in Afghanistan.

5SAFRON/CCAR and UNHCR, survey of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, unpublished manuscript. 2012.


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result of their efforts nearly all detained registered refugees they identify are released without a fine orpunishment.

While legal assistance programs lack development partners given the weak rule of law in Pakistan, thenature of assistance is designed to facilitate a more protective environment, allowing refugees to be moreself-sufficient in exercising their rights to livelihoods and existing public services, rather than relying onparallel service structures. The use of legal aid is an essential and cost-effective tool in urban settings,where refugees are widely dispersed and where there is often a higher risk of arrest and an increasedavailability of public services than in rural areas.

One NGO has been successful in handing over several of its health projects in urban areas, which targetboth refugees and Pakistanis, to the Peoples Public Health Initiative (PPHI), a quasi-governmental or-ganization. As a development partner, PPHI has been a much more effective health provider than thegovernment and has been supported by international donors. According to NGO staff, the handover toPPHI was successful largely because the NGO had already shifted from running stand-alone clinics to

filling specific service gaps including the provision of birthing stations, staff, medicines and administra-tive systemswithin PPHIs facilities over the course of the past decade. This shift in service deliverycame about as the refugee population had become increasingly urbanized and integrated with the localpopulation. The long-standing working relationship between the NGO and health facility staff, along withPPHIs willingness to expand its services to the majority Pakistani caseload, allowed the NGO to gradual-ly hand over services. In contrast, NGOs operating stand-alone facilities in refugee camps in ruralBalochistan were prevented by both the provincial Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, the Pa-kistani governments agency for Afghan refugees, and UNHCR offices from discussing a service hando-ver to PPHI and were instructed to continue operating.

Example 6: Social Cohesion

Following the initial wave of refugee returns and the closure of several refugee camps, UN agenciesagreed to pilot the Refugee-Affected Host Areas (RAHA) initiative in 2005 to respond to some of the de-velopment needs in neglected host communities. UNDP structured its RAHA component on the compa-rable strengths and needs of government actors and communities. UNDP funded the provincial planningand development departments to administer and oversee the overall program, while UNDP staff, whowere co-located in government offices, provided technical assistance to mobilize and support communityorganizations made up of both Pakistanis and Afghans to select and implement projects, such asstrengthening livelihoods or constructing flood protection walls. To increase the sustainability of the pro-jects, UNDP assisted local organizations to register with the National Rural Support Program and PovertyAlleviation Fund, which are supported by the government of Pakistan and other donors.

Sri Lanka: Return and Reintegration in the Absence of a Political Settlement

Sri Lanka is recovering from a devastating 26-year civil war which ended in May 2009 with the defeat ofthe separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the government. The rapid reconstruction ofmajor roads, power lines, and public buildings by the government is an impressive achievement. The re-turn of 300,000 people displaced at the end of the war was also swift, but an estimated 100,000 IDPs re-main in camps, host communities, and transit centers. Sri Lankas transition from relief to developmenthas been unique from other post-conflict situations because the government maintained basic servicesthroughout much of the conflict, which limited staff turnover and the need to significantly change systemsor standards in the recovery and reconstruction period. Paradoxically, as the government is trying tomove the country beyond the conflict, it is doing so in a manner that exacerbates the drivers of the con-flict, particularly through the heavy military presence in Tamil communities, the continued centralization ofpower, and weak reconciliation efforts. Furthermore, unlike other countries emerging from protracted con-flict, the Sri Lankan state is neither weak nor suffers a shortage of capacity, so the lack of engagement on


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key issues is perceived as a deliberate effort to marginalize the Tamil population. As one civil society ac-tivist said, The war was against the LTTE, but now we feel it is against the people.

Despite major challenges in working with the government and declining assistance for conflict-affectedcommunities, programs which transitioned from relief to development were generally successful for thefollowing reasons:

A strong human resource base exists, although the role of national actors is curtailed by intimida-

tion and threats to those who oppose the current governments policies.

Development infrastructure such as roads, electricity, and private sector markets are already pre-

sent at the national level and have been rapidly expanded to devastated areas of the Northern

and Eastern provinces. The primary recovery need of conflict-affected communities is to link them

to basic services and other development opportunities in an equitable, conflict-sensitive manner.

Relatively strong coordination among the U.S. government and other major donors humanitarian

and development agencies, as well as with NGOs, allowed for a more comprehensive transitionfocused on the recovery of conflict-affected communities.

International NGOs invested private funds to support recovery efforts and explored new ap-

proaches with the private sector.

The following program approaches were effective in transitioning from relief to development in Sri Lanka:

Establishing and strengthening market linkages between small-scale producers and the privatesector including but not limited to, regional businesses and both national and international cor-porationsto improve livelihoods. Strong facilitation, monitoring, and a do no harm assessmentshould be applied in the program design.Establishing village-based revolving funds, which build social cohesion and support livelihoodprojects and small enterprise at the local level.Developing joint guidelines among humanitarian actors to ensure that the government of SriLanka meets its obligations to facilitate the safe, voluntary, and dignified returns of IDPs, and thatthe humanitarian community provides appropriate support.Conducting protection and legal aid workshops with affected communities and civilian representa-tives of the government of Sri Lanka.Establishing long-term partnerships between national and international NGOs to build nationalNGOs management, technical, and fundraising capacities; some of these NGOs are now able todirectly access U.S. government funding.

Example 7: NGO Management Structures

Despite a significant decline in the number of NGOs operating in Sri Lanka, a couple agencies are mak-ing concerted long-term recovery and development plans, primarily through private funding sources which

are essential for planning and gap-filling when institutional funding is unavailable or inappropriate. OneNGO worker said, We have 15-year development plans for communities but without private fundingsources, we would have to leave next year. These agencies have re -constructed their program man-agement models and tools to bridge the gap between emergency and development programs by estab-lishing community-defined benchmarks to measure progress and trigger the use of different approaches,expertise, and funding types, as well as define when a program phase out is appropriate. This results-based approach to programming aims to increase the effect of short-term, output-based projects by build-ing on previous staff expertise and program experiences and monitoring impact over the long-term. FewNGOs have the resources to take on this resource-intensive approach, but these agencies attempts to


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bridge the gap between relief and development programs are illustrative of the required capacities, plan-ning, and transactional costs of doing so effectively.

Examples 8 and 9: Livelihoods

Aid agencies provided significant livelihood inputs for IDPs upon their return and rehabilitated communityinfrastructure such as irrigation tanks and feeder roads. Several NGOs went a step further to pilot projectslinking small farmers to supermarket chains and major food corporations. In these pilots, the physical in-puts from the NGOs were minimal as they were able to negotiate for the companies to provide seeds,fertilizer, and training. An independent evaluation of one such program found that strong facilitation andmonitoring by the NGO was key to ensuring that farmers were getting the maximum benefits, as few haveany experience with large companies. In one program, farmers were trained to cultivate jalapeno chilies,which are not native to Sri Lanka, for export to Thailand, while another NGO is marketing organic foodproducts to high-end tourist restaurants and hotels within Sri Lanka. Organic farming was found to be ap-propriate to farmers in former conflict areas as they had never used genetically modified seeds and ferti-

lizers. While NGOs engaged in these activities report success, more time and independent evaluation areneeded to determine the sustainability of the impact.

The establishment of revolving funds among livelihood groups is scaleable and effective in preparing con-flict-affected communities for longer-term development programs. One NGO provided bank accounts andbasic business training to each participant, who were then responsible for drafting a business conceptpaper to be approved by the livelihood group and NGO technical staff before receiving a loan of 35,000rupees (approximately $270). The groups met on a weekly basis to discuss their progress and submitsavings to their personal accounts, but they were also designed to provide a forum for people to gatherand discuss their problems. Proposals included the purchase of a cow and veterinary services, and weregenerally successful in providing income for their families food, education, and transportation costs andalso allow for some savings. Participants were required to pay back 25% of the first loan into the groupsrevolving fund. They could then submit new proposals for loans to build on their existing businesses or

start a different venture with the approval of the group. This two-year livelihood project was started in oneof the most devastated districts, where residents had returned six months prior. Although it is not neces-sarily an emergency program and was funded through the NGOs private funds, it provided a firm foun-dation for people to gain the skills, experience, income and links to markets to begin planning for theirfuture.

Summary Findings of the Case Studies

Despite the different contextual factors, all three country case studies demonstrate that transitioning fromrelief to development is challenging and requires a significant amount of time, flexibility of funding, andeffective coordination. Effective programs described in the case studies were generally developmental innature (even when they were funded by humanitarian donors) and adjusted to the specific needs arisingfrom protracted conflict and displacement, such as the destruction of livelihoods, institutions, property,

and the social fabric among communities. These program approaches warrant further evaluation and ex-pansion by NGOs, UNHCR, and donors. The findings also demonstrate that some good practice, such asservices in urban settings, remain limited despite high-level interest from NGOs, UNHCR, and PRM andthe fact that the majority of refugees live in urban setting. While PRM has called for proposals in urbanareas in a number of contexts, including Pakistan, the number of such NGO projects funded directly byPRM remains limited.

The program examples noted in this study can be categorized into two approaches to bridge the relief todevelopment divide. One approach seeks to increase the self-sufficiency of beneficiaries so that they canmeet their own basic needs. While self-sufficiency of beneficiaries and communities is a desired outcomeacross contexts and types of assistance, the expectations of such programs should be modest due to


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dynamic contextual factors and often recurring emergencies. In addition, resource poor environments withweak economic markets and infrastructure may not realistically support sustainable livelihoods. Camp

settings, in particular, are often defined by limited freedom of movement and lack of access to livelihoods,which inhibit self-sufficiency and integration. The second programmatic approach is to link programs orbeneficiaries to development processes and programs so that they are absorbed into existing publicservices or other development programs. This approach is most effective when there is a shift in both thelocal capacities and responsibilities of state or local institutions, such as in contexts of return and reinte-gration or (ideally, de jure) local integration.

Countries with a very low human resource base, such as Liberia or South Sudan, often require technicalassistance over extended periods of time (often spanning generations) in order to build the capacity andsystems to administer and deliver services. While UNHCR often provides technical assistance to hostgovernment offices responsible for displacement issues, these offices often lack political clout within thegovernment and do not significantly influence other ministries which are responsible for basic service pro-vision. Although this study did not find such examples, UNHCR should consider more creative ways of

integrating its displacement experts into key service delivery ministries (such as those involved in health,education, justice, and rural development), particularly in statebuilding contexts during key policy devel-opment periods. Such an approach should ensure that the particular needs of IDPs and/or returnees arerecognized early on and addressed during planning and implementation.

Figure 1: Approaches to Transition

Beneficiary Self-SufficiencyTransitioning Services to Development

Actors

Goal To build capacity of beneficiaries and af-fected communities to meet their ownneeds and support an enabling environ-ment for them to do so

To facilitate the transition from short-term,life-saving relief to longer-term recoveryand development assistance

Key Stake-holders -Displaced and host communities-Private sector-Local government actors, including po-lice, judiciary, legal associations, munici-palities, etc.-Local service providers, including privateclinics and schools-Community-based organizations

-Displaced and host communities-National and local government entities-Development donors-Dual-mandated and development NGOs-Local NGOs and civil society

Program Ex-amples

-Legal aid (example 4)-Livelihoods (examples 2, 8, and 9)-Rights-based programming (example 4)

-Joint programs between host and refu-gee communities (example 6)-Transfer of NGO staff to local institutions(example 1)-Capacity-building (examples 1 and 3)-Inclusion in public services or nationalprograms (example 5)

In the case studies, the type and flexibility of funding proved to be more important than the amount offunding available. For example, while Pakistan is the third largest recipient of U.S. assistance,6 there wereno joint programs or concrete examples of effective coordination between USAID and PRM regardingrefugee assistance. PRM has taken steps to address some of the obstacles, in particular by instituting amulti-year funding option for up to three years to its NGO partners, which would allow for more planning

6Congressional Research Services, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2013 Budget and Appropriations, July23, 2012.


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and flexibility. This mechanism, however, has not been widely used by NGOs due to a low level of under-standing of its purpose and risk aversion to different approaches at the expense of traditional programs.7

While PRMs use of multi-year proposals has significant potential to support strong transitional programs,success should be defined and focused on meeting transitional indicators and objectives, rather thantimelines. The case studies demonstrate that a three-year program cycle may not always adequate tosupport the full handover of programs to development partners. UNDPs RAHA program took four yearsfrom the initial concept to begin implementation,8 while in Liberia, the transfer of NGO staff to the MoHrequired two to four years. Donors should also curb expectations of the impact of transitional programssince crises often recur and a multitude of external factors will affect a vulnerable individuals or communi-tys capacity to recover and be self-sufficient.

An individual NGO or a single project will have a very limited impact unless it is well-coordinated and situ-ated within a comprehensive, multi-pronged transition strategy. For example, humanitarian NGOs in Libe-ria were able to successfully transfer staff to MoH management structures after extensive institution-building efforts by donors and development actors. In Sri Lanka, aid agencies were able to take on a

number of innovations in the transition from relief to early recovery, largely due to the generally unifiedfocus of major donors on the recovery of conflict-affected populations. On the other hand, the full transi-tion will depend on the government of Sri Lankas willingness to address issues of governance and sec u-rity sector reform. While there were positive program examples in Pakistan, the lack of coordinationamong key stakeholders meant that they remained limited in scope. Donors and aid agencies should en-sure that they and their partners are contributing to effective coordination and sharing of information andbest practices.

The Transition Policy Gap

Think tanks, academics, donors, NGOs, and UN entities have studied and written extensively on the chal-lenges and solutions to addressing the transition from relief to development for decades, with modifica-tions in the framework to adapt to global trends in disasters and international aid. Beginning in the 1970s,

when Cold War proxy conflicts led to protracted refugee situations in developing countries, the transitiondiscussion focused on implementing a broad development approach in countries of asylum to assist refu-gees, host communities, and host governments. As the Cold War and associated proxy conflicts came toan end in the 1990s, donors then focused on post-conflict reconstruction and major return operations,which marked UNHCRs early aid efforts in countries of origin. Post-9/11 aid policies, in which donor gov-ernments sought to integrate aid and security objectives, added a new dimension to the humanitarian-development nexus.9 In response to the most recent food crises combined with international financial aus-terity, the resilience agenda has become the latest priority for USAID and other donors, although the con-cept remains ill-defined. Despite high level efforts to improve coordination and disseminate best practiceon strengthening the links between relief and development over the past four decades, many if not all ofthe previously identified problems of weak leadership and coordination, lack of clarity in roles and respon-sibilities, and lack of flexible funding mechanisms continue to inhibit successful transitional programming.

A Challenge of Definitions

While both humanitarian and development actors aim to improve the lives of vulnerable people, there areinherent differences in approach that partially account for the difficulties in organizing an effective re-sponse to transition challenges. Humanitarian action is guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality,and independence, while development assistance is guided by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effective-ness, which emphasizes the principles of alignment with government priorities and systems to ensure

7 Based on group and bilateral discussions with InterAction members.8 The RAHA concept was initiated in 2005 following the Brussels Consultation. RAHA program implementation began in 2009.9 ODI-HPG, Beyond the continuum: The changing role of aid policy in protracted crises, 2004.


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sustainability. 10 Humanitarian actors seek to be independent and impartial to gain acceptance from allparties to the conflict in order to carry out their work. On the other hand, development assistance is often

a political endeavor in support of a state, which may be a party to a conflict. 11 Humanitarian action focus-es assistance efforts on the most vulnerable individuals while development assistance engages societiesand states to address its long-term problems in a sustainable manner. Furthermore, development ap-proaches traditionally target secure, stable areas, as well as individuals or geographical regions that maybe most viable for economic growth, rather than targeting those most in need.

The term transition lacks substantive meaning and is subject to confusion among aid practitioners andpolicymakers. Similar to early recovery, it has traditionally been used to define types of programs undera variety of sectors, but it is often defined by what it is not - i.e. not lifesaving assistance and not sus-tainable development. The program examples above utilize development tools, however, rigid systemsand funding streams among development donors often limit their own engagement in transition programs.InterAction developed a working definition for the purposes of the project, noted above, but it too remainsbroad due to vast differences in contextual factors. The UN-led cluster coordination system originally in-

cluded a stand-alone early recovery cluster, but given its lack of effectiveness and multi-sectoral nature, ithas been integrated within all the clusters.12 Figure 2 below illustrates the multiple, overlapping ap-proaches that could fall within the scope of a transitional program. The lack of a concrete definition hasled to wide interpretations among different institutions and individuals, and the lack of clear objectives andindicators to measure the effectiveness of transitional programming.

Figure 2: Approaches to Responding to Conflict and Promoting Peace and Recovery

Source: ODI-HPG, Early Recovery: An Overview of Policy Debates and Operational Challenges, November 2009.

10OECD, Paris Declarations on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action.11 The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 originally focused primarily on poverty reduction, but legislation was later added tostrengthen bilateral relationships with friendly governments, as well as engage in counter-terrorism and counter-narcotic activities.12 IASC, Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at the Country Level, October 2012.


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NGO Programs and Policies

Due to the influence of contextual factors, it is challenging to develop policies, guidelines, or tools that areflexible yet specific enough to adequately support transitional programs. No InterAction member inter-viewed for this study has a specific policy for transitional programs, although many have tools and guid-ance on specific sectors, such as health systems strengthening and capacity-building of local partners,which are transitional by nature. The vast majority of InterAction member organizations involved in thisstudy are dual, if not multi-mandated, and representatives note that transitioning from relief to develop-ment is embedded within their mandates and missions.

InterAction members widely cited the lack of funding as the main limitation to implementing transitionalprograms - an issue which has generally worsened with global austerity measures and decreases in pri-vate funding (from foundations, private citizens, etc). Private, unearmarked funding allows NGOs to investin innovations, implement programs in geographical areas or sectors neglected by institutional donors,and fill specific, time-bound gaps between project cycles. Many NGOs that rely primarily on government

donor funding noted that their exit strategies were determined by the availability of funds to keep basicoperations and staff in place to plan and implement transitional programs. While U.S. humanitarian do-nors have generally given their partners flexibility to engage in transitional programs some NGOs report-ed that they were restricted from including more developmental components, such as capacity-building, insome instances. To cope with the unpredictable nature of funding, one NGO representative said, Re-covery starts from day one and we begin planning immediately when funding is still available. Otheragencies noted the use of multiple funding sources to support broader transitional programs, such ascomplementing an OFDA-funded humanitarian project with a peacebuilding component funded by theOffice of Conflict Management and Mitigation.

As detailed above in the Sri Lanka case study (example 7), one NGO is piloting the re-structuring of sev-eral of its country programs in situations of protracted conflict in order to shift from relying on project fund-ing to long-term, strategic planning. This approach, however, was only possible due to the NGOs uniqueaccess to significant private funding sources to fill the gaps between projects and phases.

U.S. Government Policies

The U.S. government has no strategy or lead office with a mandate or dedicated resources for managingtransitions from relief to development, but various offices and bureaus within USAID, the Department ofState, Department of Defense, and Department of Agriculture have played roles in both transition con-texts and programs. Although the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) aimsto foster security and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict as a central national security objectiveand as a core State mission that must be closely supported by USAID,

13 it has not been consistently im-plemented largely due to a lack of flexible resources and inability to influence successful transitions. Thevariety of actors, coupled with weak inter-agency coordination and the lack of dedicated resources tosupport transitional programming and strategies, means that many displaced and conflict-affected popula-tions remain vulnerable and lack solutions for many years after the initial emergency.

OFDA is responsible for coordinating U.S. government efforts to save lives, alleviate human suffering,and reduce the social and economic impact of disasters. The latter objective provides the basis forOFDAs involvement in transitions. PRM has the mandate within the U.S. government to address and re-solve conflict-induced displacement by achieving durable solutions for IDPs and refugees.14 Over two-

13QDDR Leading Through Civilian Power, 2011.14 Options for durable solutions for refugees include: local integration in host country; resettlement in a third country; or return andreintegration in country of origin. For IDPs, durable solut ions include: local integration in host community; resettlement to a thirdlocation within the country; or return to area of origin.


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thirds of all refugees have been in exile for more than five years with no solution in sight15 and many areno longer in a state of acute crisis. The establishment of camps, particularly in refugee settings, often

means that peoples movements are restricted, as well as their access to livelihoods, which render themdependent on humanitarian assistance. Some aid groups note that camp-based responses are not cost-effective, limit the rights of displaced, and rarely contribute to achieving a durable solution.

16

PRM recognized the need for developmental approaches in situations of protracted displacement andreturn and reintegration and in 2012 developed a draft policy on the transition from relief to development.However, the draft policy only applies to PRM and not to other U.S. government offices engaged in de-velopment. In addition, transitioning refugee assistance to development actors is doubly challenging inrefugee contexts because host governments are often resource-poor and rarely prioritize or include refu-gees and other non-citizens in its national development plans. Many host governments perceive refugeesas security threats or undocumented migrants and actively exclude them from public services and devel-opment programs, such as in Bangladesh and Kenya.17 Within the U.S. government, there are no exam-ples from USAIDs Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS), (which guide country-level

planning, programs, and resource allocation over a three to five year period) of development assistancetargeting refugees, outside of situations of return. 18 A number of USAID missions, however, have incor-porated IDPs into their development planning.19 Prioritizing marginalized IDPs and returnees, as well asother minority communities, within a countrys development framework, however, can be challenged bygovernments which are not inclusive, as illustrated in the Sri Lanka case study.

Within the U.S. government, USAID is largely responsible for long-term development programs on pov-erty alleviation, economic development, and health. However, as widely noted by aid experts, U.S. foreignassistance mechanisms are cumbersome and uncoordinated, with up to 26 different U.S. governmentagencies involved in its provision.20Furthermore, much of USAIDs funding is heavily earmarked by Con-gress or siloed into flagship programs, which limits its flexibility and available resources to support countryownership and national priorities at the mission-level. USAIDs development programs take much longerto plan and lack the flexibility in funding mechanisms that humanitarian donors have, which inhibits its

ability to respond quickly or invest limited funds in situations which are fragile or in crisis. On the otherhand, the growing instrumentalization of aid to meet U.S. security objectives21 has obligated USAID toimplement development programs in contested spaces such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen,where counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are high U.S. government priorities. The lack of evidencefor the role of development aid in enhancing security has largely predetermined the failure to support sus-tainable development in these contexts.

The QDDR stated that in the recovery phase, it is particularly important for development professionals todesign short-term projects and programs in ways that will make it easier to transition to longer-term sus-tainable development.

22 Yet, USAID lacks the flexibility and resources to practically implement this ap-proach because there is no U.S. government-wide strategy to transition from humanitarian fundingstreams to development to meet the longer-term needs of crisis-affected people. While USAID plays asignificant role in transitional programs in Liberia and Sri Lanka, this approach is not consistently imple-

15According to UNHCR Global Trends 2011, 7.1 million out of a total of 10.4 million refugees under UNHCRs protection mandateare in a protracted refugee situation.16Smith, Merrill, Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity, 2004.17 In 2011, the government of Bangladesh rejected $33 million in development assistance to areas hosting unregistered refugees,who are recognized by UNHCR. In December 2012, the government of Kenya announced that all urban refugees should report tocamps and that NGOs should no longer provide refugee assistance in urban areas.18 Out of 15 finalized USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategies, which included three countries with large protractedrefugee populations, no strategy included or acknowledged the presence of refugees.19 Of the 15 CDCSs available to the public, Georgia, South Sudan, and Sri Lanka CDCSs include explicit plans to assist IDPs.20Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations, July 28, 2009.21In the administrations FY2013, 19% of all foreign assistance is directed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan.22 QDDR, p. 130


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mented in large-scale natural disasters or situations of protracted crises or displacement. One tool availa-ble to USAID missions is the application of the crisis modifier

23 in the strategic planning process, as well

as within programs, to allow for development funding to be re-directed in dynamic or crisis-prone coun-tries. In some critical sectors, such as housing, USAID has very limited development expertise and re-sources, which limits the ability to transition these activities within the U.S. governments aid agencies.Given the structural gap within the U.S. government, OFDA and PRM have, by default, often led efforts tosupport transitional programs but have received limited cooperation from USAID as its development re-sources are often allocated years in advance or bureaucratically restricted.

The major challenge for humanitarian actors lies in determining when and how recovery or, in cases ofdisplacement, a durable solution has been achieved. In the current environment of shrinking budgets andnew complex emergencies, humanitarian funding for transitional programs will likely be further limited.PRM and OFDA have allowed flexibility in transitional programming, but the end of their engagement inthe transition period is more often determined by the availability of funding rather than a handover to de-velopment actors. Humanitarian tools and funds are not designed to address long-term issues required to

address recovery or support durable solutions to displacement, such as access to justice and institution-building. While humanitarian efforts can be helpful to lay some groundwork, development actors need tobe involved early on and resourced to do so to ensure ownership.

Conclusion

Transitional programs have often been taken on by humanitarian actors due to the bureaucratic process-es and lack of flexibility and funding among development actors. To break this cycle, humanitarian anddevelopment donors should establish program linkages by improving inter-agency coordination throughjoint assessments and planning. While funding will always be a significant challenge, aid agencies mustalso go beyond the refrain of financial limitations and ensure that good practice is institutionalized acrossits staff and partners, particularly in urban services and livelihoods to improve outcomes for crisis-affected, vulnerable people. Without consistent efforts to transform the dialogue and practice on the nex-

us between emergency and development aid, these efforts will continue to fail.

Key recommendations for humanitarian agencies and donors to consider when developing andreviewing proposals which aim to strengthen linkages between humanitarian and developmentprograms and policies:

General Approaches1. Clearly define transition and if possible, its objectives within the specified context in consultation

with beneficiaries and partners. For donors, clarify whether transition is intended to mainstream or

hand over services to development actors, strengthen beneficiary self-sufficiency, or phase out

programs completely.

2. Ensure that the development of policies on IDPs and humanitarian assistance are U.S. govern-

ment-wide and give clear responsibilities to development actors in resolving displacement, as well

as in care and maintenance programs.

3. Recognize that the transition from relief to development occurs in multiple phases and often at

different rates in different areas, even within the same country; analyze and plan accordingly.

4. Define success by the achievement of transitional objectives rather than meeting timelines, and

allow flexibility. Aid agencies should detail external factors which may have an impact on meeting

any of the objectives.

23USAID, Automated Directive System 201.4.2.s on Post Crisis Planning and Implementation USAID Policies and Regulations,2001.


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5. Ensure that strategies to transition from relief to development are well-coordinated and have gen-

eral consensus among stakeholders, particularly beneficiary communities, local and national au-

thorities, key UN agencies, donors, and NGOs.

6. Ensure that transitional programs and strategies are supported by U.S. diplomatic and aid efforts,

as well as host government policies and, in refugee contexts, with the government of the country

of origin.

7. Timing is essential. Effective collaboration and cooperation between humanitarian and develop-

ment actors must begin as early as possible. Development planning and processes take more

time and are difficult to change once implementation begins.

8. In annual program plans and appeals, encourage agencies such as UNHCR and OCHA to devel-

op concrete indicators for transition and/or the achievement of durable solutions in partnership

with national and local governments, beneficiaries, NGOs, and donors. This could include a mix

of quantitative and qualitative elements, such as food security indicators, school attendance, con-

fidence in national or local administration to address basic needs, etc.9. For multi-mandated NGOs, proactively review whether development approaches and innovations

are appropriate in displacement and recovery contexts and pilot implementation.

10. Humanitarian agencies and donors should invite NGO, USAID, and UN development personnel

to participate in field assessments and monitoring visits to gain different perspectives and ap-

proaches.

11. Donors should request input from relevant USAID and UN development personnel when design-

ing programs and reviewing project proposals.

Program Design12. Ensure that the needs and perspectives of beneficiaries and affected communities are always at

the center of program design and implementation by instituting regular assessments and commu-

nity consultations and incorporating beneficiary feedback into the monitoring and evaluation pro-cess. Include donor participation.

13. Ensure that programs are based on a thorough context analysis with stakeholder mapping to

identify links between existing and potential humanitarian and development programs.

14. Aid agencies should develop appropriate indicators or benchmarks for transition within all projects

in consultation with beneficiaries, local authorities, UNHCR, and other relevant NGOs. Ensure

that these indicators are regularly monitored and adjusted as needed with beneficiary input.

15. Aid agencies should ensure that their respective monitoring and evaluations systems, particularly

in protracted crises, track capacity-building and other transitional elements over time and that

meeting specific benchmarks triggers an operational shift from relief to recovery or developmental

approaches.

16. Aid agencies should develop an exit strategy for each project based on local contextual factors

and scenario planning. Include the identification and assessment of local actors and other devel-

opment actors capacities to takeover services.

17. If partnering with local NGOs or authorities to hand over service provision, aid agencies should

include a capacity assessment to identify their current capacity and needs and outline a strategy

to close the gaps. The strategy should include a post-handover monitoring period of at least six

months to ensure that programs continue to run as planned.

18. Donors should only fund livelihood projects which are based on market assessments.

19. If a proposed project includes setting up stand alone services or facilities, aid agencies should

outline the specific obstacles to operating within or strengthening existing facilities.


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Key recommendations for development actors, particularly USAID, to strengthen linkages be-tween humanitarian and development programs and policies:

20. Ensure that the needs and capacities of populations affected and prone to crises, including dis-

placement, are accounted for in long-term development objectives and planning, such as

USAIDs Country Development Cooperation Strategy and the UN Development Assistance

Framework.

21. For development programs targeting volatile areas or those prone to crises, build in mechanisms

which increase flexibility, such as USAIDs crisis modifier to respond early and effectively to new

or recurring disasters.

22. For development programs targeting volatile areas or those prone to crises, solicit input on pro-

gram design from OFDA, PRM, and UN humanitarian agencies, such as OCHA and UNHCR.

23. For development programs implemented in volatile countries or those prone to crises, particularly

those involving basic service provision and access to justice, identify the obstacles to addressing

and accounting for the needs of displaced and disaster-affected populations. Share these with

key humanitarian agencies and donors to identify long-term solutions and program approaches.

interaction transition report - february 2013

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