interacting agents produce endogenous inequality
DESCRIPTION
Here is a talk delivered at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, Feb 26--March 1, 2009.TRANSCRIPT
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Endogeneous Inequality
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff
Annual Meeting of the Eastern Economic AssociationFebruary/March 2009, New York City
February 21, 2009
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Distributions of IncomeEconophysics
1 Income Distributions and EconophysicsDistributions of IncomeEconophysics
2 The ModelBehavioral RulesStructure of the Model
3 ResultsModel without bankIntroducing debtMobility
4 Conclusion
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Distributions of IncomeEconophysics
Income Distribution
Vilfredo Pareto, “Ecrits sur la courbe de la repartition de larichesse”, ch. 2, Librairie Droz, Geneve, (1896) 1965.
David G. Champernowne, “A model of income distribution”,EJ, 1953.
Benoit Mandelbrot, “The Pareto-Levy Law and theDistribution of Income”, IER, 1960.
John Angle (1983-. . . ), The Inequality Process.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Distributions of IncomeEconophysics
Conservation Principle
Conservation Law
Idea from physics: conservation of energy.In econophysics: conservation of money.We cannot keep track of all goods consumed.
A simple econophysics model
n agents, each agent has m Dollarstotal amount of money M = n × m̄each period two agents are drawn and a random amount ofmoney is transferred from one agent to the othernonnegativity constraint, mi ≥ 0
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Distributions of IncomeEconophysics
Distribution of Money
distribution of money converges to a Boltzmann-Gibbsexponential distribution (entropy increases)
thermodynamic equilibrium P(m) = c × e−m/m̄
m̄: money temparature, c : normalizing constant
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Distributions of IncomeEconophysics
Distribution of Money
5
III.D. As a starting point, Ref. [25] first considered sim-ple models, where debt is not permitted. This means thatmoney balances of agents cannot go below zero: mi ! 0for all i. Transaction (5) takes place only when an agenthas enough money to pay the price: mi ! !m, otherwisethe transaction does not take place. If an agent spendsall money, the balance drops to zero mi = 0, so the agentcannot buy any goods from other agents. However, thisagent can still produce goods or services, sell them toother agents, and receive money for that. In real life,cash balance dropping to zero is not at all unusual forpeople who live from paycheck to paycheck.
The conservation law is the key feature for the success-ful functioning of money. If the agents were permittedto “manufacture” money, they would be printing moneyand buying all goods for nothing, which would be a dis-aster. The physical medium of money is not essential, aslong as the conservation law is enforced. Money may bein the form of paper cash, but today it is more often rep-resented by digits in computerized bank accounts. Theconservation law is the fundamental principle of account-ing, whether in the single-entry or the double-entry form.More discussion of banks and debt is given in Sec. III.D.
C. The Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution of money
Having recognized the principle of money conserva-tion, Ref. [25] argued that the stationary distribution ofmoney should be given by the exponential Boltzmann-Gibbs function analogous to Eq. (1)
P (m) = c e!m/Tm . (7)
Here c is a normalizing constant, and Tm is the “moneytemperature”, which is equal to the average amount ofmoney per agent: T = "m# = M/N , where M is the totalmoney, and N is the number of agents.
To verify this conjecture, Ref. [25] performed agent-based computer simulations of money transfers betweenagents. Initially all agents were given the same amountof money, say, $1000. Then, a pair of agents (i, j) wasrandomly selected, the amount !m was transferred fromone agent to another, and the process was repeated manytimes. Time evolution of the probability distribution ofmoney P (m) can be seen in computer animation videos atthe Web pages [35, 36]. After a transitory period, moneydistribution converges to the stationary form shown inFig. 1. As expected, the distribution is very well fittedby the exponential function (7).
Several di"erent rules for !m were considered in Ref.[25]. In one model, the transferred amount was fixedto a constant !m = $1. Economically, it means thatall agents were selling their products for the same price!m = $1. Computer animation [35] shows that the ini-tial distribution of money first broadens to a symmet-ric, Gaussian curve, characteristic for a di"usion process.Then, the distribution starts to pile up around the m = 0state, which acts as the impenetrable boundary, because
of the imposed condition m ! 0. As a result, P (m) be-comes skewed (asymmetric) and eventually reaches thestationary exponential shape, as shown in Fig. 1. Theboundary at m = 0 is analogous to the ground state en-ergy in statistical physics. Without this boundary con-dition, the probability distribution of money would notreach a stationary state. Computer animation [35, 36]also shows how the entropy of money distribution, de-fined as S/N = $
!
k P (mk) lnP (mk), grows from theinitial value S = 0, when all agents have the same money,to the maximal value at the statistical equilibrium.
While the model with !m = 1 is very simple and in-structive, it is not very realistic, because all prices aretaken to be the same. In another model considered inRef. [25], !m in each transaction is taken to be a ran-dom fraction of the average amount of money per agent,i.e., !m = !(M/N), where ! is a uniformly distributedrandom number between 0 and 1. The random distri-bution of !m is supposed to represent the wide varietyof prices for di"erent products in the real economy. Itreflects the fact that agents buy and consume many dif-ferent types of products, some of them simple and cheap,some sophisticated and expensive. Moreover, di"erentagents like to consume these products in di"erent quan-tities, so there is variation of paid amounts !m, eventhough the unit price of the same product is constant.Computer simulation of this model produces exactly thesame stationary distribution (7), as in the first model.Computer animation for this model is also available onthe Web page [35].
The final distribution is universal despite di"erent rulesfor !m. To amplify this point further, Ref. [25] also con-sidered a toy model, where !m was taken to be a ran-dom fraction of the average amount of money of the twoagents: !m = !(mi + mj)/2. This model produced the
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 60000
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Money, m
Pro
ba
bili
ty,
P(m
)
N=500, M=5*105, time=4*10
5.
!m", T
0 1000 2000 30000
1
2
3
Money, mlo
g P
(m)
FIG. 1 Histogram and points: Stationary probability distri-bution of money P (m) obtained in agent-based computer sim-ulations. Solid curves: Fits to the Boltzmann-Gibbs law (7).Vertical lines: The initial distribution of money. (Reproducedfrom Ref. [25])
Figure: Boltzmann-Gibbs exponential distribution for money (Source:Yakovenko 2008).
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Distributions of IncomeEconophysics
Critique & Modifications
Critique
Model is attractive in its simplicity but represents a ratherprimitive picture of the market.Agents are characterized by their amount of money.
Modifications
Heterogeneous agents (in terms of money, abilities,opportunities, and savings rates).Ability changes as agents spend money on education.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Behavioral RulesStructure of the Model
The Question
How is inequality of incomes and wealth generated?
Simple four sector model.
Conservation law should be fulfilled.
Model should produce exponential and power-law distributionsof income.
Model should be more realistic but not too complex.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Behavioral RulesStructure of the Model
Characteristics of the Model
no representative agent
no utility function
no production function
no rational expectations
large number of heterogeneous agents
individual behavior is unpredictable
individuals follow simple rules
indeterminacy at the micro level (random selection from agiven distribution)
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Behavioral RulesStructure of the Model
Four Sectors
In the simplest version of our model we have three sectors.
Workers...
search for work.work for a wage or get dole.spend money on consumption (demand).
Firms...
hire workers.pay wages.receive revenue from selling output.
Government: collects taxes and provides dole.
Add banking sector later.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Behavioral RulesStructure of the Model
Wage Bargaining
Each agents’ reservation wage is given by:w(m, a, o) : R3 → R+
Hiring rule:
Every unemployed worker is matched with a randomly chosenfirm.Provided that the firm has enough money to pay the wage,
they sign a wage contract with probability p = min[
wF
wW ,wW
wF
].
Firing rule: If a firm has not enough money to pay all itsemployees, layoff workers until the firm can pay the wagebillfor the remaining workers.
Wage payment rule: Employees get their wages.
Dole payment rule: Unemployed workers get a dole-incomewhich is a fraction of their reservation wage.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Behavioral RulesStructure of the Model
Demand
Each agent (workers and firms) spends money on averageonce a month.
Agents save a fraction of their money sm, (s ∈ [0, 1]).
The agent (=buyer) spends a random fraction u (u ∈ U [0, 1])of his remaining money (1− s)m on consumption,∆m = u(1− s)m.
A fraction t∆m goes to the government as tax income (t =tax rate).
The remaining part (1− t)∆m is transferred to seller.
The seller is a firm. The probability that a particular firm ischoosen is proportional to the sum of its employees’ abilities.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Behavioral RulesStructure of the Model
Ability & Education
Modelled in a rather crude way.
Assume that a fraction of money is spend on education.
Ability increases by η = U [0, o] ∆m.
But more sophisticated versions are possible...
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Behavioral RulesStructure of the Model
Government
Government is passive (no government spending besides dole).
Spend money on dole.
Collect taxes on consumption.
Increase tax rate if government deficit, decrease if surplus.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Behavioral RulesStructure of the Model
Structure of the Model
Each month the following happens:
Wage bargaining.Demand.
At the end of each year we collect data on income distribution(and other data).
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Model without bankIntroducing debtMobility
Income Distribution
5 10 15 20 25 30
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
Figure: Probability density function for 95% of incomes and exponentialdistribution.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Model without bankIntroducing debtMobility
Banks: zero interest rate
debt is permitted (negative money)
unlimited borrowing has to be precluded
total amount of debt is limited by minimum reserverequirement for banks, M = M0
rmaximal debt of any agent is limited by, mi > −m̄d∀i
debt: increase in money temparature
Money supply ’increases’ (money multiplier) but conservationlaw is still fulfilled!
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Model without bankIntroducing debtMobility
Bond Market
Introduce a market for one-year bonds.
Agents can save (buy bonds) or get a loan (sell bonds).
Higher interest rate r increases supply and reduces demand.
Trading at disequilibrium.
Interest rate r adjusts.
r increases if excess demand for bonds.r decreases if excess supply for bonds.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Model without bankIntroducing debtMobility
Interest Rate Adjustment
supply
demand
r
r1
supply
demand
r
r1r2
t t+1
Figure: Excess demand in the bond market.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Model without bankIntroducing debtMobility
Measuring Mobility
Mb = 1N
∑Ni=1 | log m0
i − log m1i |
Two time period framework.
Money at time t: m0 = (m01,m
02, . . . ,m
0N)′.
Money at time t + 10: m1 = (m11,m
12, . . . ,m
1N)′.
Source: G.S. Fields & E.A. Ok, “Measuring Movement of Income”,Economica (1999).
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Model without bankIntroducing debtMobility
Mobility
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8spending
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
mobility
Figure: Absolute mobility and spending.
Higher savings → lower mobility.
Higher mobility if debt is allowed for.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Conclusion
summarize main results from our model
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Problems
Workers income is now wage income plus interest earned /paid (on bonds).
Income can get negative if interest payment > wage income.
A possible solution: Restrict borrowing and introduce aminimum wage such that income from minimum wage issufficiently high to pay interest.
Or: Allow for agents to get bankrupt. (Interest rate onborrowing > interest rate on lending.)
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Further research and possible extensions
Further research:
Allow for more than one bank.
Look at firm size distribution.
Fit model to actual data.
Possible Extensions:
Add production technology and growth.
Introduce central bank.
Look at the effects of policy.
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality
IntroductionThe Model
ResultsConclusion
Conclusion
http://www.stephenkinsella.net
http://matthiasgreiff.wordpress.com
http://www.newschool.edu/...
Stephen Kinsella, Edward J. Nell, Matthias Greiff Endogeneous Inequality