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Thomas, Alan Price orcid.org/0000-0002-8053-7195 (2018) Intelligibility All the Way Down : Nagel on Mind and Cosmos. Klesis Revue philosophique. 1–29. ISSN 1954-3050

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IntelligibilityAlltheWayDown:InterpretingNagel’sMindandCosmos.

Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos is, to date, his most recent philosophical

monograph.1IthasalsoprovedtobehismostcontroversialasNagelwasdragged

intoAmerica’sculturewarsovertherespectiverolestobeplayedinintellectual

life between the claims of scientific belief and of religious faith. Yet, as I will

demonstrateinthispaper,thisbookissimplythelatestdevelopmentofananti-

reductionismthathasbeenpresent,asaleitmotif,inNagel’soeuvreoveraforty-

yearperiod.Sothosescandalizedbythebookarealittlelatetotheparty.Iwill

outlinethemainclaimsofthebookandtracetheircontinuitywithearlierthemes

inNagel’sworkbeforeassessingtheirphilosophicalmerits.

TheContinuityofNagel’sArguments

The arguments ofMind and Cosmos are clearly a continuation of some of the

central themes of Nagel’s earlier work, particularly as expressed in the most

comprehensive presentation of his philosophical outlook in The View from

Nowhere2.InMindandCosmosNagel’sargumentopenswiththeclaimthatthere

is an ineradicable tension between two forms of our self-understanding that

appearsmostvividlyintherestrictedcaseofthemental/physicalproblem(this

claimisalsomadeinTheViewfromNowhere).Butwhilethisparticularexample

of«placing»mentalityinthephysicalworldiswherethetensionappearsmost

strikingly, the ramifications of the problem are farwider. Solving the problem

involvesaradicalchangeinourself-understanding.Sothelaterbookrepresents

adevelopmentinNagel’sthoughtasheworksthroughwhatthischangeinvolves:

«[A] true appreciation of the difficulty of the problem must eventually

changeourconceptionoftheplaceofthephysicalsciencesindescribingthe

naturalorder3.»

WhatdoImeanherewhenIreferto«twoformsofself-understanding»?First,

thatwethinkofourselvesasconscioussubjectswhohavearationalnatureand

whoengagewithvalue;second,wealsothinkofourselvesaspartofthenatural

1T.Nagel,MindandCosmos:WhytheMaterialistNeo-DarwinianConceptionofNatureIsAlmost

CertainlyFalse,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012.2T.Nagel,TheViewfromNowhere,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1986.3T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.3.

order.By«thenaturalorder»ismeant,inturn,aconceptionofnature–viewedas

atotality–whoseexistenceisindependentofusandwhichweclaimtoknowvia

differentformsofunderstandingincludingthatexemplifiedbythesciences.

Nagelbelievesthatatensionarisesbecause,atthelevelofreflection,we

havetwosetsofirreconcilablecommitments:thattowhichweseemcommitted

whenweexplainmentalityseemstoberuledoutbyaconceptionofourselvesas

partofthenaturalorderas that latter ideahasbeendevelopedbythephysical

sciences.(Thatis,giventhecontingenthistoricalpathwayoftheirdevelopment–

thispointwillproveimportanttowhatfollows.)Nagel’simplicationseemstobe

thatsciencehasbeensetonthewrongpathbyphilosophers’commentaryonits

contentandimplications.EarlyinthebookNagelidentifieshistargetasacertain

philosophicalviewandnotascientificone:

«[A] comprehensive, speculative world picture that is reached by

extrapolationfromsomeofthediscoveriesofbiology,chemistryandphysics

– a particular naturalistic Weltanschaaung that postulates a hierarchical

relation among the subjects of those sciences, and the completeness in

principle of an explanation of everything in the universe through their

unification4.»

SoNagelisnotdescribingcurrentphysics.Itis–notoriously–noteveninternally

unified. Nor is he simply defining «science » by iterating a list of disciplines

whereby physical science is conjoined to all the other non-special and special

sciences (however the line is drawnbetween those two classes).He is, rather,

describing a philosophical view – hence the word «speculative» – that

«extrapolates» from the success of the core sciences to a comprehensive

philosophical naturalism that is also committed to the positivist project of

explanatorycompletenessandunificationbyexplanatoryreduction.

ItisimportanttowhatfollowsthatNagel’sownviewisalso,ultimately,a

formofphilosophicalnaturalism;unfortunately,«naturalism»isoneofthemost

protean terms in recent philosophy. It is also true that the view that Nagel

describesasreductionistnaturalismdoesnotunderstanditselftobereductionist

–itsproponentstakeittobetheonetruenaturalism.However,Nagelisnotalone

inidentifyingaviewofthiskind–inMindandWorld,JohnMcDowellcallstheview

4T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.4.

thatNageltargetsbythenameof«baldnaturalism»5.So,forconvenience,Iwill

refer toNagel’sviewas«naturalism» andaview thathe rejects«reductionist

naturalism» even if its proponents would reject that characterization of their

view.

Nagel further conjoins reductionist naturalism to an epistemological

project envisioned by the Vienna Circle in the guise of the International

EncyclopediaofUnifiedScience.Thatprojectistheunificationofallthesciences

via reductive bridging laws. So, once again, Nagel is not critiquing any of the

resultsofthephysicalsciences,butaphilosophicalviewthatisextrapolatedfrom

them:

«[S]uchaworldviewisnotanecessaryconditionofthepracticeofanyof

thosesciences…mostpracticingscientistsmayhavenoopinionaboutthe

overarchingcosmologicalquestions towhich thismaterialist reductionism

providesananswer6.»

ThisechoesNagel’searliercritiqueofaviewthathecalled«physicalism»inThe

ViewfromNowhere:acritiquegroundedonhisradicalrealism.Radicalrealismis

the view that not only is our current understanding of the world fallible –

somethingmostphilosopherswouldadmit–but that futureconceptionsof the

world might have the feature that we could not, now, understand them. To

understandthemnow,wewouldhavetohavecompletedaniteratedsequenceof

understandingsoftheworld–from«hereandnow»to«thenandthere».Nagel

isscepticalthatthisambitioncouldberealized.

He believes that our current form of scientific understanding, then, is

inherentlylimited.Nageldoesnotmeanbythisthat,givenourcurrentmethods,

there are things we do not know – that is platitudinous. Rather, our current

methodshavenecessary,not contingent, limitations: thereare some thingswe

cannotknowrelativetoourcurrentunderstanding.Thatis,however,noreasonto

cut reality down to our size by drawing a principled connection between the

knowableandtherealthatensuresthatthelattercannotoutstriptheformer.In

The View from Nowhere, the physicalist, like the idealist, is accused of cutting

reality down to size: of privileging one form of description of the world that

5J.McDowell,MindandWorld,Cambridge,MA,HarvardUniversityPress,1994,p.xvii,ff.6T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.4.

aspirestobebothcomprehensiveandcomplete.Nagelthinks,onceagain,thatthis

ambitioncannotberealized.Hisradicalrealismisthetrueformofrealismand

onethatrunsagainstacounter-currentofidealismthatNageldetectsinthework

ofWittgensteinandDavidson–aswellasthemisguidedviewofthephysicalist.7

In order to begin to make the case for an alternative to reductionist

naturalism, Nagel proposes a transcendental argument that begins from an

assumption shared with the scientific enterprise: that the world is rationally

intelligible–allthewaydown.ThisplacesNagel,asheconfesses,inthetradition

ofthe«objectiveidealism»ofPlato,SchellingandHegel:anunderlyingorderto

experienceispostulatedtomakeasuperficialphenomenonintelligible.Toadmit

that our explanations havehit bedrock is, forNagel, a failure andought to re-

interpretedasa counsel todigdeeper8.There isalwaysadeeper intelligibility

conferring explanation to be found; ifwe cannot find one, that is a contingent

limitationonour(current)abilities.Weareinaworldnotofourownmakingthat

existsanyway; ifwe fail tomakesenseofpartof it, that reflects thenecessary

limitationsofthecurrentstateofourunderstanding.

From Nagel’s rationalist perspective, as expressed inMind and Cosmos,

merelyidentifyingthecauseofaphenomenonisnotenough;norarecorrelations

between distinct phenomena. We seek explanations and to explain is to bring

events under some description or other. Those descriptions introduces an

elementofgeneralitythatis,forNagel,partandparcelofanyexplanation9.Thisis

thebasisofhisclaimthattherewouldbea«doubleinvolvement»ofmindinthe

naturalorderintherenovatedworldviewthatitisthetaskofMindandCosmosto

makeplausibletous:

«Theintelligibilityoftheworldisnoaccident.Mind,inthisview,isdoubly

relatedtothenaturalorder.Natureissuchastogiverisetoconsciousbeings

withminds;anditissuchastobecomprehensibletosuchbeings.Ultimately,

therefore,suchbeingsshouldbecomprehensible to themselves.Andthese

are fundamental features of the universe, not byproducts of contingent

developments whose true explanation is given in terms that do not make

referencetomind10.»

7T.Nagel,ViewfromNowhere,pp.97,pp.105–109.8Whileacceptingthat,metaphysically,“allexplanationscometoanendsomewhere”.T.Nagel,

MindandCosmos,p.22.9T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.47.10T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.17.

ForNagel,thehybrisofthereductionististheclaimthatthereductivenaturalist

worldpicture,whichexcludesthementalabinitio,sufficesreflexivelytoexplain

its own generation and acceptance by conscious subjects with reason. The

reductivenaturalistcangiveusnoreasontobelieveherownviewsincethevery

ideaof«reasonsforbelief»doesnotfeatureinheraustereontology.11

Forthereductionistnaturalist,herpositionsuffersmerelyfromthedefect

ofincompleteness:wearealreadyinapositiontostate,now,that«mentalistic,

teleological, or evaluative intelligibility … have been left behind for good as

fundamental formsofunderstanding12».Bycontrast,Nagelasksus toenvisage

whataconceptionofexplanationmightlooklikethatkeptthesealternativeforms

ofintelligibilityinplay–thatmake«mind,meaning,andvalueasfundamentalas

matterandspace-time inanaccountofwhatthere is13». Inenvisagingsuchan

alternativeNagelarguesthatweneedtore-conceiveofthesciencesoflifeinsuch

awaythattheycanbeintegratedintoareflectiveaccountoftheworldandour

place in it as conscious, rational, persons such that it is highlyprobable that a

temporalprocesscouldhaveledtotheevolutionofmindslikeours.

NowtheconstraintsofNagel’scommitmenttopanpsychismintrudeonthe

argumentinawayIwillexplainbelow:becauseheisapanpsychist,Nagelbelieves

thatwecannotunderstandmentalityashavingemergedfromthefundamentally

non-mental.Itcanhavearisenasadevelopmentonlyfromthatwhichwas«proto-

mental»–aNageliantermofartthatIwillexplainbelow.(Healsousesthephrase

«proto-psychic»torefertothesameproperties.)Havinggivengroundsforrejecting

theisticandmaterialisticexplanationsofthisdevelopment,Nagelfeelscompelled

togivenanexplanationbasedinthecomplexityofthenaturalorderitself.

Soinhisnon-reductionistnaturalism,wehavetoassumethatsomeofthe

basiclawsofworkingoftheuniverseareteleologicalinformanddonotalltake

the formofmechanistic causal laws.Thatwhich theDutchhistorianof science

EduardJanDijksterhuiscalledthe«mechanizationoftheworldpicture »hasbeen

mistakenly over-generalised: some causal processes may only be constitutively

11ForanargumentthatparallelsNagel’sseeL.RudderBaker,SavingBelief:ACritiqueof

Physicalism,PrincetonUniversityPress1989.12T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.20.13T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.20.

understoodintermsoftheendstatethattheyseek(metaphorically)torealise»14.

Mentality, or proto-mentality, must be built into our understanding of the

universe and its workings at the ground floor: its most fundamental laws of

workingmustincludethecapacitytoexplainhowproto-mentalityledtomentality

intheguiseinwhichitisexemplifiedinus.AsNagelputsitinastrikingmetaphor,

atsomepointthenon-mentaluniverse«wokeup».Heseeksanon-reductionist,

non-materialist, explanation of how that could be possible that makes it

intelligible that such an occurrence would be a probable development in the

workings of nature. He thinks the only way in which that is possible is by

postulatingsomefundamentallawsofnaturethatareteleologicalinform.

SavingtheData

Atsomepointinthehistoryoftheuniversesentientandconsciousbeingscame

intoexistence;fromourvantagepointinhistorywearewitnesstotheevolution

of a species in which we instantiate a capacity for reason that is reflectively

appliedtounderstandingthatevolutionitself.ForarationalistlikeNagel,reason

gives us privileged insight into the truths of reason, and given his other

philosophicalcommitmentshehasalwaysbelievedthatethicsandmathematics

areparadigmsofobjectiveknowledgethatalsohavearationalistbasis.Reason

also,ashearguesinbothTheLastWordandMindandCosmos,givesusadirect

and unmediated access to certain truth of reason that are plausibly to be

interpretedasapriori15.

Furthermore,wecanreflectontheoperationsofourminditselfandsee

that we face, to borrow David Chalmer’s expression, a «hard» problem of

consciousness that suffices to showthe falsityofpsycho-physical reductionism

aboutthemental16.Suchreductionismneithertherapeuticallydissolvesthehard

problem; nor does it explain it away. Hence the persistent sense that the

reductionist has redefined the problem of placing mental properties in the

physical world to make it “easy” – that means, in effect, soluble to her own

14E.J.Dijksterhuis,TheMechanisationoftheWorldPicture,PrincetonUniversityPress,1961.15T.Nagel,TheLastWord,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1997.T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.

79–81.16D.Chalmers,TheConsciousMind:InSearchofaFundamentalTheory,Oxford,OxfordUniversity

Press,1996.

satisfaction,buttono-oneelse’s.AsalwaysinNagel’sphilosophy,webeginfrom

formsofobjectiveknowledge,andcapacitiesthatfindtheirexpressioninthem,

and seek a reflective account of ourplace in theworld that is non-revisionary

towards both. In that loose sense, of beginning from a minimally theorised

conceptionoftheworldandourplaceinit,Nagelisaphenomenologist17.

Mind and Cosmos is replete with subtle discussions of the

phenomenological data to be derived from experience of consciousness,

rationalityandengagementwithvalue.EachofNagel’sseparatediscussionsisof

interest in its own right. Individual chapters of the book are devoted to

consciousness, cognition and value, interwoven with the exposition of Nagel’s

centralargument.Ineachcase,Nagelrejectsareductionistaccountoftheformof

knowledgeinquestion.

Inthesecharacterisationsofthedataofourexperienceitistheproblemof

consciousnessthatplaysthemostimportantroleinNagel’soverallconception.He

is,afterall,seekingaspeculativemetaphysicalfoundationforthesciencesoflife

in thisbook.The inadequacyof theviews thathecriticises seems tohimmost

evident in the case of the mental/physical relation. It is his solution to that

problem–thecaseofneutralmonism–thatexplainsagreatdealelseaboutthe

argumentsofMindandCosmos.

Nevertheless,Nageldoesdistinguishthechallengesthateachofthethree

problemsposesforthereductionistasthatcarriesovertotheproblemfacingthe

anti-reductionistnaturalistassheconstructsheralternativeexplanations.Nagel

seeksexplanationsthataddresstwokindsofquestions:oneconstitutiveandone

historicalthathedistinguishesasfollows:

«An ahistorical constitutive account of how certain complex physical

systemsarealsomental,andahistoricalaccountofhowsuchsystemsarose

intheuniversefromitsbeginnings18.»

Nagel is sensitive to how these two different problems may place different

constraintsontheirsolution.Takethecaseofconsciousness:givenhisrepeated

rejectionofemergentistexplanations,hisexplanationwillbe«reductive»inhis

17M.Ratcliffe,«HusserlandNagelonSubjectivityandtheLimitsofPhysicalObjectivity»

ContinentalPhilosophyReview,vol.35,no.4,pp.353–377,2002.18T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.54.

ownsenseofthatterm.Thatiswhatdriveshimtowardspanpsychism;butifthat

adequately answers the constitutive problem, Nagel doubts that it can be an

answertothesecond,historical,question.

«[I]tisnotclearthatthiskindofreductiveexplanationcouldreallyrender

the result intelligible … The protopsychic properties of all matter, on this

view, are postulated solely because they are needed to explain the

appearanceofconsciousnessathighlevelsoforganiccomplexity.Apartfrom

that, nothing is knownabout them: theyare completely indescribable and

have no predictable local effects, in contrast to the physical properties of

electronsandprotons,whichallowthemtobedetectedindividually.19»

Nagel isalsotroubledbyhowweareeventounderstandhow«proto-mental»

propertiescanbespatiallylocatable.Butthatisnottherealproblem,asfrankly

acknowledgedinthisparagraph:giventhatweknownothingabouttheintrinsic

nature of protopsychic properties it is difficult to envisage the historical

counterparttotheconstitutiveexplanationofconsciousmentality.

Furthersensitivitytothedifferencebetweentheproblemsemergeswhen

Nagelturnstothenatureofrationalcognition.Here,somekindofholismseems

to him inescapable, and any constitutive account given in terms ofmore basic

elementsdoesnotcomeclosetoofferingasatisfactoryexplanationofrationality:

ashenotes«justasconsciousnesscannotbeexplainedasamereextensionor

complication of physical evolution, so reason cannot be explained as a mere

extensionorcomplicationofconsciousness20.»

Nagelbelievesthatthesametwoquestions–constitutiveandhistorical–

emergeinconnectionwithvalues21.Theanswertotheconstitutivequestion, in

this case, involves the phenomenon of reason responsiveness: Nagel claims of

evaluative facts that «it is through being recognized as reasons by a value-

sensitive agent that they affect behavior 22 ». This is an avowedly anti-

psychologisticconceptionofexplanation;again,alegacyofNagel’smuchearlier

workinThePossibilityofAltruismwherepsychologicalexplanationisconstrained

by some identifiable a priori principles of practical reason.23As in the case of

19T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.62.20T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.81.21T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.112–114.22T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.113.23T.Nagel,ThePossibilityofAltruism,OxfordUniversityPress,1970.Foranassessmentofthis

radicalanti-psychologismseeA.Thomas,ValueandContext:theNatureofMoralandPolitical

rationality,Nageldoesnotthinkthatareductiveexplanationwillbeplausiblein

thiscase.

Whenitcomestothehistoricalquestionaboutvalue,Nagelarguesthatthe

answeris«muchmoreobscure24».Conscious,rationalbeingscometofindvalue,

notonlyinthemselvesbutalsointheworld:

«Accordingtothehypothesisofnaturalteleology,thenaturalworldwould

haveapropensitytogiverisetobeingsofthekindthathaveagood–beings

forwhichthingscanbegoodorbad25.»

ThismeetsNagelscriterionforanacceptableexplanationas«valueisnotjust

an accidental side effect of life; rather, there is life because life is a necessary

conditionofvalue26.»This«predisposition»onthepartofthecosmosis,Nagel

admits,aspeculationthatisunlikelytofindfavor;butheendorsesitonlybecause

hethinksnootherexplanationisplausible:itisan«admissibleconjecturegiven

theavailableevidence27.»

BeforeIturntothealternativeconceptionofthesciencesoflifethatNagel

develops,andanassociatedcritiqueofthecurrentformofevolutionarytheory,

moreneedstobesaidabouthisneutralmonism.Thisisthecrucialmetaphysical

breakthroughthathasledNageltothislarge-scalecritiqueofthesciencesoflife

eventhough,asIhavejustnoted,Nagelisworriedaboutwhethertheviewcanbe

a comprehensive answer to both of the questions that he tries to answer,

constitutiveandhistorical,foreachofthethreedomainsofmentality,rationality

and evaluation. Nagel believes that a relatively local philosophical problem –

explainingtherelationbetweenthementalandthephysical–hasthisdramatic

consequence.Thatisbecauseinunderstandingthisrelationbetweenthemental

and the physical we are given insight into the fundamental nature of the real,

namely,thatitcorrectlydescribedbyneutralmonism.Iwillnowexplainwhatthat

Knowledge,Oxford,theClarendonPress,2006,chapterfour;A.Thomas,ThomasNagel,London,

Routledge,2008,chapterfour.24T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.117.25T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.121.26T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.123.27T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.124.

viewissupposedtobeandhowitrelatestoNagel’sindependentcommitmentto

panpsychism28.

TheCentralRoleofNeutralMonism

AversionofneutralmonismfirstemergedinNagel’spaper«ThePsychophysical

Nexus»,wherehe first speculated thatwe areon the vergeof discovering the

natureofasubstancewhosenaturenecessitates that ismanifests itself inboth

physicalandmentalproperties29.Nagelrecapitulatessomeofthemainclaimsof

thatpaperinMindandCosmos:

«[T]heappearanceofcontingencyintherelationbetweenmindandbrain

is probably an illusion … it is in fact a necessary but nonconceptual

connection,concealedfromusbytheinadequacyofourpresentconcepts

…weshouldexpecttheoreticalprogress inthisareatorequireamajor

conceptualrevolution…Weourselvesarelarge-scale,complexinstances

of something both objectively physical from outside and subjectively

mental from inside. Perhaps the basis for this identity pervades the

world30.»

This«perhaps» formsthebasisof theargumentsofMindandCosmos:as«the

Psychophysical Nexus» made clear, uncovering this substrate that upwardly

necessitatesbothitsmentalandphysicalaspectswouldbeanempiricaldiscovery

by the sciences of the mind; but there is philosophical insight in coming to

understand the form that an intelligibility conferring explanation of the

mental/physicalrelationhastotake.Sowhilethereisonesenseinwhichitisup

to science to discover the substrate, there is another sense in which we have

solvedthephilosophicalproblemofthemental/physicalrelationinthatwehave

identifiedtheformthatanysuccessfulexplanationwouldhavetotake.

Thisunderlyingsubstrate,then,isneithermentalnorphysicalinitsown

right:hencetheword«neutral».Theremaywellbeapluralityofsuchsubstances,

but each of them is of the same fundamental type, hence themonism. Yet, for

reasonsIwillshortlyexplain,Nagelseemstohavecometoacceptthatthisviewis

28ThiscommitmentgoesbacktooneofNagel’searliestpapers:T.Nagel«Panpsychism»in

MortalQuestions,pp.181–195.29T.Nagel,«ThePsychophysicalNexus»inConcealmentandExposure,Oxford,OxfordUniversity

Press,2002,pp.194–236.30T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.41–2,emphasisadded.

more accurately classified as a version of dual aspect theory and inMind and

Cosmositisrevisedtomakeitapurerexemplarofneutralmonism.

ThekeycomponentsofNagel’sversionofneutralmonism–aviewwitha

longhistoryinphilosophy–isthatit«accountsfortherelationbetweenmindand

brainintermsofsomethingmorebasicaboutthenaturalorder»31.This«more

basic”thingisunitaryas«theconstituentsoftheuniversehavepropertiesthat

explainnotonlyitsphysicalbutitsmentalcharacter».InMindandCosmosNagel

quotesThomasSorrell’sviewthat thesebasicelementsare«transphysicaland

transmental32.»This,then,capturesboththeneutralityoftheelements–theyare

neitherphysicalnormental–andtheirunitarynatureastheyformonekind.Any

basicconstituent,evenifisnotpartofaperson,couldbeapartofsomethingwith

mentalfeatures.Therefore,itmustformpartofanexplanationofwhyamental

subjecthasanunderlyingnaturethatis,initself,neitherdistinctivelymentalnor

physical.

However, Leopold Stubenberg has noted an important shift between

Nagel’s position in «ThePsychophysicalNexus» to the view later defended in

MindandCosmos33.Theformerexplainsthe«neutrality»ofmentalandphysical

aspectsviawhatStubenbergcallsthe«neither»view:anaspectofasubstrateis

«neutraljustincaseitisintrinsicallyneithermentalnorphysical»Hecitesthis

passageasevidenceofNagel’searlierviewofneutrality:

«[T]hisviewwouldimplythatthefundamentalconstituentsoftheworld,outof

whicheverythingiscomposed,areneitherphysicalnormentalbutsomethingmore

basic. This position is not equivalent to panpsychism. Panpsychism is, in effect,

dualismallthewaydown.Thisismonismallthewaydown34».

StubenbergcontraststhisparagraphwiththelaterpositioninMindandCosmos:

«Everything,livingornot,isconstitutedfromelementshavinganaturethatisboth

physicalandnonphysical—thatis,capableofcombiningintomentalwholes.Sothis

reductiveaccountcanalsobedescribedasaformofpanpsychism:alltheelements

ofthephysicalworldarealsomental35».

31T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.56.32T.Sorrell,DescartesReinvented,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2005,p.95.Quotedin

T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.57.33L.Stubenberg,«NeutralMonism»inTheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy2016.34T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.231.35T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,2012,p.57.

Stubenberg’sworryisthatthisisanequivocation–orshift–inwhatNagelmeans

by«neutral».

Intheearlierpaper,NagelholdswhatStubenbergcallsthe«neither»view

of the neutrality component of neutral monism: the aspects are neither

intrinsicallymentalnorintrinsicallyphysical.However,bythelaterbookNagel

holdsthe«both»viewofneutralitywhereaspectsarebothphysicalandmental.

Thesearetwodifferentsensesof«neutrality».Seekingclarification,Stubenberg

receivedthefollowingexplanationinpersonalcorrespondencefromNagel:

«[T]hefundamentalelementswouldbeneithermerelyphysicalnormerelymental,

butsomethingthatwasnecessarilybothphysicalandmental,(orprotomental);but

since thisnecessaryconnectioncan’tholddirectlybetween thephysicaland the

mental as we conceive them, it would require that the real character of these

fundamental constituentsbesomethingmorebasic thataccounts for theirbeing

bothphysicaland(proto)mental36».

SoStubenbergisright:thereisanimportantchangehere.

The view in «ThePsychophysicalNexus» ought – in retrospect – to be

interpretedasa formofdualaspecttheorywithacleardistinctionbetweenan

underlyingsubstanceandtheupwardsentailmentoftwokindsofaspect–mental

orphysical.ByMindandCosmosthatviewhasbeensupersededbypansychismin

awaydrivenbythecommitmenttomonism.Nagelhasalwaysbeenapanpsychist,

so in theperiodbetween thepublicationof these twoworksheseems tohave

revisedhisdualaspecttheorytomakeitconsistentwithhispanpsychism:onthe

«both» view of neutrality in the later work «the fundamental elements [are]

necessarilybothphysicalandmental».

Yet,aswehaveseen,MindandCosmoscombinesare-affirmtionofNagel’s

commitmenttopanpsychismwiththefrankexpressionofaproblemforthatview:

Nagel is concerned that panpsychism may do better as an explanation of the

constitutivenatureofconsciousnessthanasanaccountofitshistoricalevolution.

Iwouldsurmisethatthepostulationof teleological laws inMindandCosmos is

developedpreciselytoaddressthissubsidiaryproblem.Panpsychismremainsas

an answer to the constitutive question, but fundamental teleological laws are

36T.Nagel,T.personalcorrespondence,notdated,citedinL.Stubenberg,«NeutralMonism»in

TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy2016.

necessarypostulatesifonewantstoanswerthehistoricalquestion.Theymight

alsothenplayaroleinanyholisticaccountofthenatureofrationalityorinan

explanatoryaccountoftheoriginofvalue–Nagelisclearthathisaimisnothing

lessthana«theoryofeverything».

SowhatmotivatedNagel’smovefromdualaspecttheorytopanpsychism

asananswertotheconstitutivequestion?Isurmisethatthecrucialargumentfor

thechange is this:mentalitydoesnotmanifest itselfeverywhere.Personshave

mental attributes; pet rocks do not – not really. However, in any case where

mentalitydoesnotmanifestitself,thesameunderlyingsubstratemustbeinvolved

(becauseofthecommitmenttomonism).Thatsubstrate, then,eithermanifests

physicality and mentality (where mentality is instantiated) or physicality and

proto-mentality (where mentality is not instantiated). To preserve the unified

natureoftheunderlyingsubstance–thisis,afterall,aformofmonism–itisalways

eitheroneortheother:hencethepanpsychism(inits«both»versionwherethe

fundamentalelementsare«transphysicalandtransmental»).

Thisisnot,then,theclaimthateverythingismental,butthateverythingis

eithermentalor«proto-mental».Thisistheview,then,whose«appearance…

castsitsshadowbackovertheentireprocess»–theprocess,thatis,describedby

thesciencesoflife37.Nagelpresentshisbasicargumentformonismasfollows38:

«[S]inceconsciousorganismsarenotcomposedofaspecialkindofstuff,

butcanbeconstructed,apparently,fromanyofthematteroftheuniverse

suitably arranged it follows that this monism will be universal.

Everything,livingornot,isconstitutedfromelementshavinganaturethat

isbothphysicalandnonphysical–thatiscapableofbeingcombinedinto

mental wholes. So this reductive account can also be described as

panpsychism;alltheelementsofthephysicalworldarealsomental39».

Nagel franklyadmitsthathisoutlineofhowwemightchangeourfoundational

assumptionsinthelifesciencesisspeculative,butitisreasonedspeculationthat

appealsnot to theism,but to«complications to the immanentcharacterof the

naturalorder40».Itwouldnotonlybeaunifyingexplanation,butamoreunifying

37T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.8.38Nagelexplainshisdistinctionbetween“reductive”and“reductionist”:T.Nagel,Mindand

Cosmos,p.44,fn.14.39T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.57.40T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.12.

explanationthatitstheisticrivalsgiventhatthoseviews,too,assumethattheonly

naturalistic option is a reductive naturalism. Reductive naturalism shapes the

formtakenbythetheistic«intelligentdesign»alternative;absentthepresumed

sexism,we can use J. L. Austin’s phrase that these twopositions “take in each

other’swashing”41.Nagel’spositionis,inthatsense,evenmoreradicalthanthat

envisaged by proponents of intelligent design: his view is that «materialist

naturalism,isfalse,andnotjustaroundtheedges»42.Oneimmediatepayoff,as

thebookmakesclear,isthatweneedtotakeanotherlook–amorescepticaland

challenginglook–atthereductionist,materialist,understandingofthetheoryof

evolution.

Nagel’sCritiqueofEvolutionaryTheory

Nagel’scritiqueofthetheoryofevolutionisattheheartofhisbookandexplains

agreatdealofthecontroversythatithasgenerated.Thisisnotleastbecausein

developingthiscritiqueNagelishappy,indevelopingascepticalaccountofthe

theory of evolution in its current guise, to borrow arguments from religiously

motivated proponents of intelligent design – even while he rejects their

alternativetheisticexplanationfortheappearanceofdesign.(Intheircase,that

the appearance ought to be accepted at face value.) We need to explain how

mentality could have evolved, given the truth of Nagel’s neutral monism, as

opposedtosimplyacceptingexistingconceptionsofevolutiontoocloselytied,he

implies,topsychophysicalreductionism.

As Nagel notes – anticipating the controversy his book would cause –

criticizingthetheoryofevolutionisviewedasboth«politicallyincorrect»aswell

as scientifically incorrect. But Nagel believes that standard conceptions of

evolutionarytheory–hecallsthemvariously«materialist»or«neo-Darwinian»

–fallwiththepsycho-physicalreductionismtheyseektovindicate.Hearguesthat,

tothispoint,wehaveunderstoodthe«BookofNature»inphysico-mathematical

terms that have omitted the mind’s place in nature. Concomitantly, biological

41«[T]hesetwoterms,‘sensedata’and‘materialthings’,livebytakingineachother’swashing–

what is spurious is not one term of the pair, but the antithesis itself. » J. L. Austin, Sense and

Sensibilia,OxfordUniversityPress,p.4.(IthinkwemaysafelypresumethatAustindidnottakein

hisownwashing.)42T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.15.

theoryhasrestricted itself tomechanisticexplanationsaspartof thisunhappy

alliance with psycho-physical reductionism. Neutral monism opens up the

prospectofareorientationofthesciencesoflifearoundprinciplesthat«arein

theirlogicalformteleologicalandnotmechanistic43».

«Mind,asadevelopmentoflife,mustbeincludedasthemostrecentstageofthis

long cosmological history, and its appearance … casts its shadow back over the

entire process and the constituents and principles on which the process

depends44.»

Can we infer, then, from this foundational error in the assumptions of

evolutionarytheory,thatitisintellectuallyunsatisfactoryinitscurrentform?

Nagelthinksthatweareentitledtodrawthisconclusion.Inparticular,he

claimsthatevolutionarytheory,understoodinareductiveandmechanisticway,

cannotanswertwoquestions:

«[W]hat is the likelihoodthatself-reproducing life formsshouldhavecome into

existencespontaneouslyontheearlyearth,solelythroughtheoperationofthelaws

ofphysicsandchemistry?

Intheavailablegeologicaltimesincethefirstlifeformsappearedonearth,whatis

the likelihood that, as a result of physical accident, a sequence of viable genetic

mutationsshouldhaveoccurredthatwassufficienttopermitnaturalselectionto

producetheorganismsthatactuallyexist?45»

Nageladdsfurtherclaimstohiscritique:thatevolutionarytheoryisincomplete

(merelyanexplanationsketchor«schema»);itlackssufficientevidentialsupport

and must rest on «general assumptions »; that it runs contrary to common

sense46.

Criticsaresurelyrighttofindthisconjunctionofclaimsaboutthecurrent

understanding of evolutionary theory unconvincing. To take them in reverse

order:being«contrarytocommonsense»isaweakargumentgiventhatmany

well-establishedscientificclaimsseemcontrarytocommonsense.Anhistorical

perspectiveonhowscientifictheoriesofthepastwerereceivedbytheaudiences

43T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.7.44T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.8.45T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.6.46T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.6–7.

contemporaneoustothemwouldseemtostrengthenthispoint–particularlyso

inthecaseofthetheoryofevolutionwhenfirstputforwardbyDarwin.

OnNagel’ssecondobjection:wholebooksarewrittenonwhysuperstring

theoryisasociologicallywell-entrenchedpositioninphysicspoorlysupportedby

evidence.Onanyrealisticconceptionofhowscienceactuallyoperatessometimes

«generalassumptions»doplayanimportantroleintheacceptanceofscientific

theories.Clearly,theremaybesomethingintellectuallyunsatisfactoryaboutthis

stateofaffairsifitpersists–orthecritiquesofsuperstringtheorywouldnotbe

written–butmypointisthatitisnotunusualfor«generalassumptions»tocarry

aburdenofproof, at leastprovisionally.Theanswer toNagel’s concernwould

seem to be: more and better science (of the same general type) in the field

concernedthatwillseeusdobetter«overthelongrun».

Finally,onthethirdpoint, ifwehaveonlyexplanationsketches inthese

cases,thentheanswer,onceagain,isthatscientistsworkinginthefieldfacethe

taskofcomingupwithbetter,moredetailed,moreconvincingexplanations–a

taskthatdoesnotrequirecommentfromthesidelinesfromthosenotexpertin

thefield.

IfNagel’schallengetothecurrentunderstandingofevolutionarytheoryis

tobestrongerthanthis,then,heneedstodomorethanraisescepticalquestions

aboutit;thesearewhatPeircecalled«paperdoubts».Heneedstosubstantiate

theclaimthatthetransitionfrompsycho-physicalreductionisminthephilosophy

ofmindtoneutralmonismpayssubstantialphilosophicaldividends.Itisbecause

we have been successfully convinced that we need a new paradigm for the

explanationofmindandvaluethatweareforcedtoreviseourassumptionsabout

evolutionarytheoryandtolookatitsfoundationalcommitmentsinanewlight.

Nagel may reasonably respond that it is not his job to re-write the life

sciences; it is simply to draw attention to some of their deepest foundational

commitmentsinordertoholdopenintellectualpossibilitiesthatseemdefinitively

closedformistakenreasons.Butifweseekmorethanthat,theremustatleastbe

anoutlineofanargumentthattakesusfromNagel’sfoundationalre-orientation

tobetteranswerstothetwo,fundamental,probabilisticquestionswithwhichhe

begins: first,howdoestherecoveryofnatural teleologyallowustogivebetter

answers to the questions of the origin of life? Second, is a single mechanism

adequatetoexplainallthecurrentformsthatlifetakes?

Nagelbelievesthatwearejustifiedinbeginningfromourwell-grounded

experiences that we use our ordinary capacities for knowledge – perception,

reasonandconsciousawareness–andtoconcludeonthatbasisthatthisisdata

thatnointellectuallysatisfyingexplanationcanoverturn.Re-capitaluatingsome

ofthecentralclaimsofhisbookTheLastWord,theexerciseofourbasiccapacities

forknowledgegivesusreasonswithgreaterintellectualauthoritythanthatofany

scepticalchallengetothosecapacitiesandreasons.47Onthecontrary,thisbasic

pointguidesustowardsaconstraintonasolutiontotheproblemtohand:

«[T]he appearance of living organisms has eventually given rise to

consciousnesss,perception,desire,actionandtheformationofbothbeliefs

andintentionsonthebasisofreasons.Ifallthishasanaturalexplanation,the

possibilities were inherent in the universe long before there was life, and

inherent in early life long before the appearance of animals. A satisfying

explanationwould show that the realization of these possibilitieswas not

vanishinglyimprobablebutasignificantlikelihoodgiventhelawsofnature

andthecompositionoftheuniverse.Itwouldrevealmindandreasonasbasic

aspectsofanonmaterialisticnaturalorder48.»

Itisworthrecallingthatby«nomaterialistic»Nagelisherereferringbackto

hisneutralmonisminwhichthebasicelementsofrealityaretrans-mentaland

trans-physical alike. What conception of law would make it intelligible how

elements like these developed over time to compose conscious, rational,

valuingcreatureslikeus?

Nagelistransferringtheburdenofproof:givenotherthingsweknow,

ofatleastasmuchcertaintyasthetheoryofevolution,thenthattheorymust

meetthestandardofrationalistintelligibilityinexplaininghowcreatureswith

ourcapacitiescameintoexistence–orwemustrejectthatstandard.Severalof

Nagel’s criticshavewillinglyembraced the latteroption;now theburdenof

proofisonthemtoofferindividualexplanationsofhowwedonotseemtoknow

whatNagelthinkswecandemonstratethatwedoknow.Weknow,inaway

immunetoscepticalchallengetoourbasiccapacitiesforknowledge,thatwe

47T.Nagel,TheLastWord,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1997.48T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.32.

areconsciousbeingswithdirectknowledgeofthetruthsofreason.Givenhis

wider philosophical rationalism, Nagel extends this defense to the truths of

mathematicsandethics,too.If,however,weacceptthestandard,andaccept

the validity of the knowledge claims, then we need to look again at the

foundationalassumptionsofthesciencesoflifeasNagelrecommendsandasI

shallnowexposit.

Nagel’sRenovatedConceptionoftheSciencesofLife

GiventheboldnessofNagel’sclaims,onemighthaveexpectedinMindandCosmos

a detailed working out of the new form that the sciences of life must take.

However,Nagelbelieves–correctlyinmyview–thatthisisnottheroleofthe

philosopher.Thetaskshefacesistoarticulatetherelationbetweenhighleveland

abstractconceptionsofhowtheworldworkstothemoredetailedspecificationof

those conceptions exemplified by the sciences themselves. Philosophy and the

sciencesmaywellhavepartedcompany forgood in theseventeenthcentury–

thosewhocomplainthatphilosophymakesnointellectualprogressforgetthatit

spinsoffsuccessfulsciencesthatbecomeautonomousfromit–butphilosophical

presuppositionsmaycontinuetoplaceempiricalenquiryonthewrongpathby

falselyconstrainingtheavailableoptions.ThatseemstobeNagel’sview:empirical

scientistsgoabouttheirbusinesswithnoregardforphilosophy,butheimplies

that high level philosophical misconceptions may play a role in prematurely

shutting down paths of enquiry that should have remained open. The

mechanisation of the world-picture was undoubtedly a significant intellectual

achievement,butifphilosophersareguiltyofover-generalisingitssuccess,then

they areprematurely foreclosingon explanatoryoptions in the sciences of life

withoutsufficientgroundsfordoingso.

Thebasicidea,then,isthatweneedageneralconceptionofthesciencesof

life that does not reflect the false philosophical outlook of the reductionist

materialist.Nagel’sspecificproposal,asIhavenoted,dependsontheconstraints

placedonthesesciencesbyhispanpsychism.

The panpsychist has to deny that the mental emerges from the

fundamentallynon-mental,whetherinthedevelopmentofeachindividualorat

thelevelofthewholespecies.Theobviousopponenthereistheemergentist,who

arguesthatthefundamentallynon-mentalcandevelopinitscomplexityuntilwe

reach the point at which sophisticated biological organisms start to exhibit

cognitive states – at some particular time in their evolutionary history. As a

further,complexdevelopmentwithincognition–anddifferentaccountsexplain

this complexity indifferentways– cognitiondevelops intoconsciousness49. So

consciousmentalityisanemergentfeatureofsophisticatedorganismsthatalso

havea«baselevel»descriptionthat iswhollyphysical.This istheemergentist

explanationofmentalitythatisarivaltoNagel’spanpsychism.

Nagel recapitulates, and endorses, his earlier critiques of emergentism

interpretedasaconstitutiveaccountofwhatmakesagivenorganismconscious;

«it still seems likemagic»50. Emergence, forNagel, canplaya limitedpart in

derivative explanations; his critique applies only its deployment in basic

explanations.However,hethinksthateveninderivativeexplanationstheideaof

emergencemustalwaysbe«cashedout».However,whenwedocashitoutwe

see that it is «analysed through the character and interactions of … more

elementary components51» and can see its inadequacy. Any such explanation

rulesoutthe«completelynew»;butthisiswhytheemergentistcannotexplain

consciousness 52 . Nagel can accept the uncontroversial claim of epistemic

emergencewherewecanbesurprisedbyadiscoveryofaconsequenceofwhat

weknow.Metaphysicalemergenceiscategoricaldifferent.Thepanpsychistdenies

that the mental could ever emerge from the non-mental even if we add in

complexity.Ifyoumakeacomplexphysicalsystemevenmorecomplex,well,that

iswhatyouendupwith–adifferenceofdegree,notoneofkind.ForNagel,even

themostcomplexphysicalsystemsstillfallthewrongsideofthemental/physical

divide:

49J.Jaynes,TheOriginofConsciousnessintheBreakdownoftheBicameralMind,HoughtonMifflin,

1990.D.Dennett«JulianJaynessSoftwareArchaeology»inCanadianPsychology,vol.27,no.2,

pp.149–54,1986.50T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.55–6.51T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.56.52This objection is repeated in connection with a suggestion of Sharon Street’s proposal of a

psychophysical, historical, theory of the emergence of conscious organisms: a “brute fact of

emergence…thereforeessentiallymysterious”.YetNagelconcedesthatthisview“[requires]the

smallestalterationtotheprevailingphysicalformofnaturalism”.T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.61.

[huh?Thisisobscure.]

«If evolutionary theory is a purely physical theory, then it might in

principle provide the framework for a physical explanation of the

appearance of behaviorally complex animal organisms with central

nervous systems. But subjective consciousness, if it is not reducible to

something physical, would not be part of this story; it would be left

completely unexplained by physical evolution – even if the physical

evolutionofsuchorganismsisinfactacausallynecessaryandsufficient

conditionforconsciousness53.»

FortherationalistsuchasNagel,itisnotsufficienttoassertabrutecorrelation

betweensophisticatedphysical thingsandmental features: theirco-occurrence

must be intelligible, hence necessitated. (Needless to say, those not equally

committedtophilosophicalrationalismdenythisconnection:forthem,perhaps

necessitiesareintelligible,buttheconversedoesnothold.54)

FromNagel’sperspectiveitisnon-accidentalthatsomephysicalthingsare

conscious, soareductionistnaturalismthatseesaworldwhollydescribable in

termsofbasicphysicalcausallawsisfailingeventoexplaintheactualworld.That

is because it is failing to explain part of it – its conscious, mental, part. If the

implication of reductionist naturalism is that the fundamentalworkings of the

worldcanstaythesamewhetherpartsofitareconsciousornot–modulosome

magicalmindstuffaddedtoittoexplainwhypartsofitareconsciouswhenthey

are–thenthisisaflawedbasicconception55.Thisisthefundamentalthoughtthat

motivatesNagel’spanpsychism:wehavetobuildintoourbasicconceptionofthe

worldthatpartoftheworldmanifestsmentalproperties.Thispotentiality,then,

mustbeanaspectofeventhemostfundamentalproperties:hencetheconception

ofthemastrans-physicalandtrans-mental56.

AnimportantintermediateassumptioninNagel’sargumentisthatwhathe

callsa«nonhistorical»theoryofconsciousness,whichexplainedofanyparticular

organismwhyitwasorwasnotconscious,cannotbeindependentofatheoryof

howconsciousorganismsaroseinthefirstplace.Asingleprocesswouldhaveto

explain both the evolution of consciousmentality and supply the basis for the

53T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.44.54Iamgratefultoananonymousrefereeforthisjournalforremindingmeofthisanti-rationalist

positionby,asitwere,holdingit.55“Onapurelymaterialistunderstandingofbiology,consciousnesswouldhavetoberegardedas

atremendousandinexplicableextrabrutefactabouttheworld”.T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.45.56T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.45.

«nonhistorical»productofthatprocess.Thatiswhyhispanspychismevolvesin

Mind and Cosmos to include a novel conception of scientific law that could

accommodatethatexplanatorydemand.

Nagel thinks thata reconsiderationof thesciencesof lifewouldhave to

include«a teleologicalaccount» thatpostulatestheexistenceof«principlesof

self-organisationorofthedevelopmentofcomplexityovertime»57thatarenot

solelygroundedoncasuallawasconceivedofinanorthodoxway:

«Naturalteleologywouldmeanthattheuniverseisgovernedrationally

inmorethanoneway–notonlythroughthequantitativelawsofphysics

thatunderlieefficientcausation,butalsothroughprincipleswhichimply

that thingshappenbecausetheyareonapaththat leadtowardcertain

outcomes–notably, theexistenceof living, andultimatelyof conscious

organisms58.»[Nagel,2012,p.67]

Tothispointpanpsychismhasnottakenthisextrastep;fromNagel’sperspective,

thepanpsychistisbeingundulyconservativeaboutthekindsoflawsthatthere

are. If they can appeal only in their reductive, historicist, explanation of the

emergence of conscious life to orthodox causal law their account will be

unconvincing.Itisforcedtotaketheformofa“mentalisticreductionism”thatsees

mentalityasapropensitybuilt intothenatureofmatter.Nagel isscepticalthat

thisgeneralformanexplanationdoesconferanyintelligibility:

«The protopsychic properties of all matter … are postulated solely

because theyareneeded toexplain theappearanceof consciousnessat

highlevelsoforganiccomplexity.Apartfromthatnothingisknownabout

them: they are completely indescribable and have no predictable local

effects59.»[Nagel,2012,pp.61-62]

SoasananswertoNagel’stwoquestions,then,heseemstohavecometobelieve

that panpsychism can really only answer his constitutive question about

conscious mentality. Explanations of its historical emergence or parallel

explanations of cognition or value are going to need to appeal to his novel

postulation of basic, teleological laws in the life sciences. As always, this need

arisesbecauseNagelcanseenootherwayofdoingjusticetothatwhichneedsto

beexplained.

57T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.459.58T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.67.59T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.61–2.

IsthisaVindicationofTheism?

In thedevelopmentofhisproject,Nagelunfoldsadialectical contrastbetween

theism and materialism; predictably enough, both postulate «explanation

stoppers» that fail to meet the requirement posed by Nagel’s «form of the

principle of sufficient reason 60 ». Theism ends the regress of justification in

mentality,admittedlythementalityofanagentofanunusualkind(asitalsohas

thefeatureofexistingnecessarily):

«Theismoffersavicariousunderstanding,byassigningittoatranscendentmind

whosepurposesandunderstandingoftheworldwecannotourselvesfullyshare,

butwhichmakesitpossibletobelievethattheworldisintelligible,evenifnotto

us61.»

Asacounter-reactiontoreductionistnaturalism,theviewiswell-motivated.But,

for Nagel, theism is finally unacceptable because it «pushes the quest for

intelligibilityoutsidetheworld62».

Materialismisfundamentallygroundedonacompactsetofphysicallaws

thatare,conceivably,aselectionfromalternativepossiblesets.Theexplanations

it offers of our human capacities is insufficiently reassuring: «evolutionary

naturalismprovidesanaccountofourcapacitiesthatunderminestheirreliability,

andindoingsounderminesitself63.»

Neither theism nor reductive naturalism (materialism) can, then, be

anything other than a temporary stopping point for Nagel’s kind of objective

idealist. The key elements Nagel isolates in both views is that they seek

comprehensiveness, and must therefore include their own generation and

acceptance.Theymustbe«reflexive»bywhichImeanthatbothviewshaveto

give an account of the social practices, norms and values in which the very

enterpriseoffindingoutthefundamentaltruthaboutrealitythateachprojectis

embedded. Eachplaces a constraint on the vocabularywe canuse to give this

60T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.17.61T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.23.62T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.26.63T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.27.

account:theaustereresourcesofreductionistnaturalismseemsunabletoexplain

theveryideaofareasonforbelief.Thelimitedresourcesoftheismpostulatean

agent in some ways like us, but in a fundamental way not – an agent whose

motivations must be opaque to us. Nagel’s aspiration is for something less

ambitious:areflective«placing»ofourhumanpointofviewthatisa«plausible

pictureofhowwefitintotheworld64.»

Ratherthanallowingevolutionarynaturalismtoundermineourmostbasic

capacitiesofknowledge–giventhatsuchanambitiouwouldbeinternallyself-

undermining–Nagel claims that theargumentought tobe reversed:ourmost

«basic forms of thought» are not candidates for being undermined by

evolutionaryunderstanding:

«[I]t seems reasonable to run the test equally in the opposite direction:

namely,toevaluatehypothesesabouttheuniverseandhowwehavecome

intoexistencebyreference toordinary judgements inwhichwehavevery

highconfidence65.»

Again,consistentlywithNagel’spreviousexpressionsofhisphilosophicaloutlook,

we should not resile to quietism where that would mean delineating our

conceptual scheme «from within» and noting differences between different

forms of representation without investigating issues of explanatory priority66 .

Because reality is unitary, all our representations – of different degrees of

«perspectivalness»–havetobemutuallyadjustedandreconciledtobeplacedin

some intelligible relation to it: quietismdoes not face up to the fact that «the

questionisthere,whetherweansweritornot67.»

Thefailureoftheismandreductivenaturalism,then,leavesthatwhichis

tobeexplainedintact:theexerciseofbasiccapacitiesofknowledge.

«Theexistenceofconsciousmindsandtheiraccesstotheevidenttruthsof

ethicsandmathematicsareamongthedatathatatheoryoftheworldandour

placeinithasyettoexplain.Theyareclearlypartofwhatisthecase,justas

muchasthedataaboutthephysicalworldprovidedbyperceptionandthe

64T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.25.65T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.29.66T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.31.67T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.30.

conclusionsofscientificreasoningaboutwhatwouldbestexplainthatdata.

Wecannotjustassumethatthelattercategoryofthoughthaspriorityover

theothers,sothatwhatitcannotexplainisnotreal68.»

These facts are as they are; Nagel is convinced that neither reductionist

materialism,northeism,offeranycredibleexplanationforthem.LikeRyle,inhis

rejectionof the ghost in themachine,Nagel is awareof how these two flawed

conceptions–oneofmentalityandtheotherofmatter–workintandemtomake

both equally unacceptable.69The picture of a mechanised nature into which a

divineagentintrudesisamacro-levelequivalentofthemicro-levelaccountofthe

mental-physicalrelationtowhichRyleandNagelareequallyopposed.

HowPlausiblearetheseArguments?

Iturnnowfromexpositiontocriticism.Nagel’sbookhasmetwithagreatdealof

criticism,muchofitsevere,butnotalwayscharitable.Iwillbeginwiththesimpler

caseswhereexegeticalcharitymighthaveledtoamorereasonableunderstanding

ofNagel’spositionthatmighthaveforestalledsomeofthiscriticism(oratleast

muteditstone).

First, Nagel’s defense of «common sense». Peter Godfrey-Smith’s

response,inafair-mindedreview,isthemostforthright:«thisisoneareainwhich

intuitionsareworthnothing70». I thinkthat iscorrect: itwouldbeunfortunate

indeedifadevelopedscientifictheorywerebeingrejectedonthebasisofcommon

sense.However,thatwouldbeaveryuncharitablereadingofNagel’sargument.

Byvindicating«commonsense»Nagelisnotsettingthetruthofanyspecificclaim

of common sense against the truth of a theory; he is, rather, vindicating the

underlying capacities for knowledge manifested in such claims. The only

exceptiontothisclaimarethetruthsofreasonthatNagelclaimsareself-evident,

butifheisright,thentheinteresthereisintheclaimofself-evidenceandnotin

theobservationthatsuchtruthsformpartofcommonsense(iftheydo).Ifthere

areaprioritruths–andplausiblythereare–everyviewneedsanexplanationof

theirspecialepistemicstatus.

68T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.31.69G.Ryle,TheConceptofMind,Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,2000.70P.Godfrey-Smith, «Not SufficientlyReassuring: reviewofNagel’sMindandCosmos»London

ReviewofBooks,vol.35,no.2,pp.20–21.

Nagel is avowedly a rationalist and has been since The Possibility of

Altruism:wehavea capacity for reason that is expressedbyour capacities for

knowingspecifictruthsofmathematicsandethics(totaketwoofNagel’sfavourite

examples)71.Whenthatcapacityseekstofindahomeforitselfintheworld,and

doesnotfindaconvincingexplanationofthisintheworld-viewofthereductionist

naturalist,Nagelaskswhetheranotherviewispossible.

Asecondobjectionrunsasfollows:oughtthephilosopherbelecturingto

the scientist? Again, that is not Nagel’s view: reductionist naturalism is

extrapolated fromtheactual resultsof thesciencesand isnot itselfascientific

view. Conversely, the philosophical question of whether there are irreducibly

teleological forms of causation has not been answered solely by the rise of a

mechanistic world-picture in the seventeenth century as John Hawthorne and

DanielNolanpointoutinapapertowhichNagelrefersapprovingly72.

Ifthequestionhadbeensettledinthisway,thenatleastweareowedan

accountof theempiricalcontentof thetheoryandtheprocessbywhich itwas

refuted.Yet,HawthorneandNolannotethat«therelationof thehypothesisof

final causation to evidence is much more of a philosophical puzzle » than

workadaycasesofexplaining,say,howphlogistontheorywasoverturnedbythe

evidence.Intheirpaper,HawthorneandNolanconstructamodelteleologicallaw,

wherelaw-likenessisexplainedinDavidLewis’swayascombiningsimplicityand

informativeness.Theythenask,rhetorically,whytherecouldnotbelawsofthis

kind?(Theystrengthentheirargumentbynotingthatteleologicallawsmightbe

found in the special sciences and thereby restricted to particular domains.) If

HawthorneandNolanhavepresented,asitwere,a«proofofconcept»thenwe

canconclude,atleast,thatNagel’sproposednaturalteleologyisnotapriorifalse

norinternallyinconsistent.Ifhecanmakeaprimafaciecasethatteleologyofthis

kindisnecessarytoexplainthesciencesoflife,thenthereis,asitwere,acaseto

answer–evenifthefinaldeterminationishandedovertotheempiricalsciences

andnotlefttophilosophers.

71T.Nagel,ThePossibilityofAltruism,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1970.72JHawthorne&D.Nolan,Daniel«WhatWouldTeleologicalCausationBe?»reprintedinJ.

Hawthorne,MetaphysicalEssays,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2009,pp.265–284.

Athirdobjectioncouldbeviewedasmeta-philosophical:Nagelisbundling

togethernon-reductionistsolutionstotheexplanationofhowwehaveknowledge

acrossseveraldomainssuchasthemoral,themathematical,andaprioritruths

about the structure of reason itself. Neutral monism is an overarching

metaphysicaltheorythatexplainsthefundamentalnatureoftherealitythatcan

accommodatesuchtruthsandthecapacitiesofreasonthatunderliethem:sowe

needanaccountofthesciencesoflifeconsistent–strictly,moreconsistent–with

the truth of neutralmonismor panpsychism. (Wehave seenNagel canvas the

advantagesordisadvantagesofbothviews.)

IfthishishowwearebesttounderstandNagel’sproject,thenitlookslike

aparticularambitiousversionofaninferencetothebestexplanation.Mindand

Cosmosisthesearchforanoverallpackageofcommitmentsthatisstrengthened

by its comprehensiveness. The critic may urge that we ought, case by case, to

explain specific problems in specific ways and that inferences to the best

explanationarenotmeta-philosophicallydefensible.Butifheismistakenonthis

point,thenNagelisatleastingoodcompany:forexample,DavidLewis’sOnthe

PluralityofWorldsdefendsmodalrealismpreciselybysuchaninferencetothe

bestexplanationthatspanssolutionstoseveraldistinctphilosophicalproblems73.

Lewis seems also to believe that his overall view – whatever its intrinsic

plausibility – gains credibility from its comprehensive coverage of disparate

problems.

Mostcharitably,Nagelisnottellingthescientistinthelifescienceswhatto

do in the practice of her discipline, simply freeing up that practice from false

assumptionsimposedbyotherphilosophers–notscientists:

«Philosophycannotgeneratesuchexplanations;itcanonlypointoutthe

gaping lack of them, and the obstacles to constructing them out of

presentlyavailablematerials74.»

Reductionistmaterialismistheprematureclosingdownofoptionsthatneedto

be kept open. This is a claim at a high level of generality; I have heard the

distinguished philosopher of science Hilary Putnam remark thatKarl Popper’s

73D.Lewis,OnthePluralityofWorlds,Oxford,Wiley-Blackwell,2001.

74T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.68.

criterionoffalsifiabilitycouldnotbeamarkofagenuinetheorybecausemany

theoriesaresocrazythatthereisnopointtestingtheminthefirstplace.ButNagel

isnotaddinganothercrazytheorytothislist;simplyissuingareminderthatthe

caseagainstbasicteleologicallawsinthelifescienceshasnotconclusivelybeen

made–aclaimatahighlevelofgenerality.Sothereisatleastaprimafaciecase

for considering whether teleological laws are admissible candidates for a

renovationofthelifesciences.ThetaskofproducingsuchtheoriesisnotNagel’s;

butthattaskcanbepursuedfreedfromafalsephilosophicalpreconceptionthat

lawsofacertaincharacterarenotevencandidatesforreasonableconsideration.

Afifthobjectionseemtometocarrymoreweight:itisraisedbyJohnDupré

in his insightful review of the book. Nagel postulates irreducibly teleological

developmentallawstoexplainwhyconsciousmentality(andrationality,andan

innernisustowardsvalue)historicallydevelopedinawaythatmakesthemmore

probable than they would be on a purely mechanistic understanding of their

development.AsDuprénotes, itmaycertainlybedesirablethatanexplanation

makeaneventveryprobablerelativetothesetupinwhichitdevelops.However,

healsonotesnotallexplanationsworklikethis:

«Nagelconstantlyassertsthattoexplaintheexistenceofconsciousness,etc.,

evolutionmustnot justshowthat theyarepossible,butalso that theyare

likely,ortobeexpected…[this]seemstomepoorlymotivated.Atthetimeof

mybirthitwasveryunlikelythatIwouldseveraldecadeslaterbereviewing

abookbyafamousphilosopher;butitisnotmysteriousthatthiseventually

came about. The improbability has been declining rapidly for the last few

decades. Just sowith evolution.The evolutionof reasonmaywell be very

unlikelyindeedonayoung,hotplanet.It'sagreatdealmorelikelybythetime

therearehighlysocial,ifnotyetrational,multicellularorganismswithvery

complexnervoussystems75.»

Perhaps we should view the developmental process as involving a series of

discontinuous breaks that, in each case, fundamentally re-set the baseline

probabilitiesrelativetoeachnewsetup.

ThatmayinvitearesponsefromNagelthatwewouldliketodobetter:his

rationalist,teleologicallygroundedexplanationoftheemergenceofconsciousand

rational subjects ismore intellectually satisfying than itsmaterialist rival. (We

75J.Dupré,«ReviewofNagel’sMindandCosmos»NotreDamePhilosophicalReviews,29thOctober

2012.

haveseenthathiscritiqueofemergentisminvolvesdenyingDupré’slastquoted

point:forNagel,noamountofbiologicalcomplexitycanexplaintheemergenceof

consciousmentality.)Butthepointisthatthereisagapbetweentheclaimthat

onestyleofexplanationcandobetterthananotherwhenitcomestomakingthe

developmentofaneventmoreprobable,andtheclaimthatdoesbetterinmaking

theoccurrenceoftheeventmore«intelligible».

ItakeDupré’sdeeperpointtobethatintelligibilityis,inthatsense,quitea

weakconstraintandbothkindsoflaws–causal–mechanicalandteleological–can

meetit.Itmaybelessintellectuallysatisfyingtopostulatealow-probabilityevent

thatthenmakessubsequenteventsmoreprobablerelativetothenewsetupthat

it establishes; but it meets Nagel’s constraint of being intelligible. Perhaps we

simplycannotdoanybetterinthiscase.

Thesixth,andfinal,objectionisthatNagelistoolooseinhisdefinitionsand

attacksastrawman–orasuccessionofthem.Anexamplethatacriticmightcite

isDanielStoljar’spaperinwhichhearguesthatneutralmonismisactuallyaform

ofphysicalismandnotanalternativetoit.76Ithinkthebestresponsehereisto

saythatofcourseabooklikeMindandCosmosisaninvitationtofurtherworkand

to further arguments – such as formulations of non-standard versions of

physicalism of the kind Stoljar develops. If no one remains committed to the

epistemological project of unity represented by the Encyclopedia of Unified

Science,or topsycho-physical reductionism, then fromNagel’sperspective that

canonlybegoodnews.Infact, itseemstomethatheisrighttoidentify«bald

naturalism » as a strong undercurrent in recent philosophy in the analytic

tradition.

Conclusion

I think it is reasonable to describe the critical reception of Nagel’s book as

unfortunate. It should be clear from all of the foregoing that Nagel is simply

workingthroughtheimplicationsofphilosophicalcommitmentsthathehasheld

fordecades.«ThePsychophysicalNexus»isonlyacomparativelyrecentpaper;

76D.Stoljar«TwoConceptionsofthePhysical»,PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearchvol.

62,no.2,pp.253–281.

hiscommitmenttopanpsychismpre-datesitbydecades.Thecentralpartofthe

argumentofMindandCosmosisdrivenbyNagel’sattempttospecifytheimpactof

absorbing the claims of the later paper into the framework of the earlier and

envisioningtheconsequencesforthesciencesoflife77.Thatweoughtnotsimply

toassumethattheideaofateleologicallawisanobsoleterelicisanoptionworth

pursuing,particularlygivenHawthorneandNolan’sclearexplanationofhowa

lawcouldtakethis form.Theyexplainhowsuch lawsarepossible;Nagelgives

grounds for takingsomeof these lawstobeactual. It isnothis jobtodiscover

them,buttoenrichtheintellectualpossibilitiesofthoseworkinginthesciences

of life given that we can all agree that the problem of explaining mentality,

rationalityandvaluearehardproblems.

Onspecificissues,Nagelisnotaloneinholdingtheviewshedoes:heshares

hisconceptionoftheproblemofconsciousnesswithDavidChalmers;heshares

his«reasonsrealism»withCharlesLarmoreandThomasScanlon;heshareshis

panpsychismwithGalenStrawson78.Neutralmonism, in itsRussellianguise, is

currently undergoing a resurgence79 . Nagel’s sin, it seems, was to attempt to

weave these views together in a single synthesis and then derive implications

fromthemforthelifesciencesthatledtohiscritiqueofthetheoryofevolution.It

isthelatterthathasearnedhimthehostilityofseveralofhisreviewers.

Nagel explicitly states that he has been influenced by the critique of

evolutionarytheorydevelopedbyproponentsoftheintelligentdesignhypothesis,

butheisequallyexplicitthatherejectsboththathypothesisofintelligentdesign

andthetheismthatgroundsit.Itseemsodd,then,forhiscriticstoaccusehimof

supernaturalism when Nagel explicitly states that specific explanations in the

naturalsciencescannotbegroundedonfactsaboutdivineagency–theconception

77Asheremarks,thosewhoremaincommittedtopsycho-physicalreductionism“canregardthe

argumentthatfollowsasahypotheticalone”.Headds“Iassumethishypotheticalpositionwillbe

welcome to reductionists, since it shows just how extravagant and costly a position

antireductionisminthephilosophyofmindis”.T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.43.78D.Chalmers,TheConsciousMind;C.Larmore,TheAutonomyofMorality,Cambridge,Cambridge

UniversityPress,2008;T.Scanlon,BeingRealisticAboutReasons,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,

2014;G.Strawson,etalConsciousnessandItsPlaceinNature:DoesPhysicalismEntailPanpsychism?

Exeter,ExeterAcademic,2013.79 B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter, London, Kegan Paul, 1927; G. Rosenberg, A Place for

Consciousness:ProbingtheDeepStructureofthePhysicalWorld,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,

2005;P.GoffConsciousnessandFundamentalReality,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2017.

ofGodassomekindofpartymagician.80ThegeneralchargeseemstobethatNagel

is keeping bad company. 81 But it can hardly be a constraint on a work of

speculativemetaphysics that itoughtnot tobepublishedbecausesome things

oughtnottobesaid,asitwere,«infrontofthechildren».Nagel’ssympathiesare

withintelligentdesign’scritiqueofreductionistnaturalism–notwithintelligent

designitself,thathemakesclearisanexplanatorynon-starter.

Moregenerally,therearecomplaintsthatNagelbegsthequestionwhenit

comestoassumingthetruthofmoralormathematicalrealism,ortotherebeing

truthsofreason,ortotherebeingahardproblemofconsciousness.82Thesereally

areinstanceswhereonephilosopherannouncesassumptionsanddrawsacertain

conclusiononlyforcriticstorespondthat,giventheconclusion,theassumptions

areunacceptable–itisnotasifNagelhasnotalreadydischargedhisintellectual

responsibilitiesinmakingargumentsforeachoftheseclaimsinwhatisnowan

extensivebodyofwork.Eachis,undoubtedly,adisputableclaim;buttherearenot

manyindisputableclaimsinphilosophy.IfNagel’sinventoryofhisowncandidates

forindisputabletruthsisfaringaspoorlyaseveryoneelse’ssimilarlistthensobe

it.However,giventhatNagelhasmadethecaseforthesetheseselsewhereishe

not entitled to draw out what would be, for him, the inference to the best

explanationthatmakesthembothprobableandcredible?

Perhapsweshouldconcludethatphilosophersdostandtolearnat least

thismuchfromthesciences:HelenLonginohasconvincinglymadethecasefor

whatshecallstheoreticalorexplanatorypluralism.83Weneedtokeepasmany

theoreticaloptionsopeninthesciencesaspossible,becausethatwhichweseek

toexplainisverycomplex.Sheconcludesthatwemayneedmanyintellectualtools

inourtoolkit.HasokChanghasaddedtheclaimthatweneedalotoftheoretical

optionsinthescienceseventoexplainverysimplethings,forwhichwedoknow

80Leiter,B.,&Weisberg,M.,«DoYouOnlyHaveaBrain?:OnThomasNagel»TheNation,October

12,2012.81Leiter,B.,&Weisberg,M.,«DoYouOnlyHaveaBrain?:OnThomasNagel»TheNation,October

12,2012;J.Dupré,«ReviewofNagel’sMindandCosmos»NotreDamePhilosophicalReviews,29th

October2012.82S.Blackburn,«ThomasNagel:APhilosopherwhoconfessestofindingthingsbewildering»The

NewStatesman,8thNovember,2012;J.Dupré,«ReviewofNagel’sMindandCosmos»NotreDame

PhilosophicalReviews,29thOctober2012.83H.Longino,TheFateofKnowledge,Princeton,NJ,PrincetonUniversityPress,2001.

thatweneedalotofintellectualtoolsinourtoolkit.84Forasubjectonalesssecure

epistemic basis than the sciences, namely philosophy, this would seem to be

methodologically sound advice pertinent to the present case. Speculative

rationalism isnotwell represented in the toolkitof recentphilosophers,but it

wouldbeunfortunateifphilosophydecideditcoulddispensewithitaltogether.

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