intelligence bulletin ~ jun 1946

8/9/2019 Intelligence Bulletin ~ Jun 1946

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mceJUNE 1946ulletin

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - WAR DEPARTMENT . W AS HING TO N D. C.

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NoticeThe Intelligence Bulletin, published monthly, is theprincipal means by which the War Department Gen-eral Staff furnishes intelligence on foreign militaryforces to the junior officers and enlisted men of theRegular Army, National Guard, and Organized

Reserves.The Intelligence Bulletin also gives assistance tospecific phases of Army Ground Forces, Army AirForces, and Army Service Forces intelligence trainingprograms, and in general seeks to keep its audiencefully aware of the vita l im portan ce of intelligence andcounterintelligence.Since some of the m ater ial contained in this publica-tion has been drawn from sources that originally wereof a higher classification, the Intelligence Bulletin isclassified as R E S T R I C T E D . This classification,however, should not be construed to prevent the widestpossible circulation amo ng mili tar y personne l of everyran k or grade . Th e effort mad e to present m ater ial inthe most interesting manner possible should not be in-terpreted as detracting in any way from the impor-tance of the intelligence presented.Reproduction within the military service of Intelli-gence Bulletin material is encouraged, provided thesource is stated, the classification retained, and a copyof the publication in which the material is reproducedis sent to the M ilitary Intelligence Division.Readers a re urged to send comm ents and suggestionsdirectly to the Deputy Director of Intelligence forDissemination, Military Intelligence Division, WarDepartment, Washington 25, D. C.Requests for additional copies should be madethrough channels in the manner prescribed for otherofficial War Department publications.


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R E S T R I C T E D JUNE 1946

Intelligence

M I L I T A R Y I N T E L L I G E N C E D I V I S I O NWAR DEPART MENT WASHINGTON, D. C.


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II

DISTRIBUTION:A A F (3 0 ) ; A G F (35 ) ; A SF (2 ) ; T (10 ) ; Depts (10 ) ;Base C omds (10) ; A rm & Sv Bd (5) ; Def Comds(1 0) ; Tech Sv (10 ), except 9 ( 2 0) ; SvC (10) ; H D(5) ; F C (5) ; B U (4) ; L S ( 2 ) ; P E (10) ; Sub P E(2) ; Cargo P E (2) ; PG (2) ; A G F K epi Dep (10) ;Dep (1) ; Dist 9 (5) ; G H ( 1 ) ; C H (1) ; R H (1) ; Gen& Sp Sv Sch (100) ; U SM A (850) ; R O TC ( 3 ) ; Tn g C(50) ; A (10) ; C hg (10) ; D (2) ; B (2) ; R (2) ; Bn( 2 ) ; C ( 4 ) ; A F (10) ; W (2 ); G ( 2 ); S (4 ) ; Specialdistribution.

For explanation of distribution formula, see SM 21-6.


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RESTRICTED JUNE 1946

CONTENTS

PageMOEOCCAN GOUMS 1SOVIET TANKS IN CITY FIGHTING 9SWEDEN TURNS TO JETS : 14THE RED ARMY INFANTRYMAN 21ALAMO SCOUTS 29THE NAZI "KA MIK AZE S" 37

SOVIET HAND GRENADES 43NAME, RANK, SERIAL NUMBERPLUS! 57PUNISHMENT BY EXAMPLE 63

COVER ILLUSTRATION: On the night of 28-29 July 1943, the 4th Tabor, a unitof Goumiers attached to the U. S. 1st Infantry Division, received ordersto occupy an enemy-held mountain. The attack up the mountain was aparticularly bloody one, made in the face of severe German machinegun and mortar fire. But in the words of the French after-action report :"The attack was pressed home, and the position stormed. Some of theenemy may have escaped. No prisoners were taken. Mission accomplished." The story of these Goumiers may be found on page 1.

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Scouting and patrolling come naturally to the small infantry reconnaissance units, known as Goums, which are recruited by the Frencham ong the hillmen of Morocco. Goums fought w ith the Fre nch Ar m yin Tunisia, Corsica, Italy, and Southern France, and were attached toAm erican forces in Tun isia and Sicily. The individ ual Goumiers arefierce Mohamm edans w ith a very wa rlike traditio n. Pr im itiv e lives inthe rugged Atlas Mountains have made them hard y. They can climbmountains like goats, and are particularly adept at night fighting.Dressed in dark, loose-fitting, hooded robes, they can squat motionlesslike roc ks ; on sanda led feet they move with litt le noise. They c arryAm erican small arms, but prefer the koumia, a 10-inch knife w ith w hichthey are reputed to behead the ir foes.

As early as the Tunisian Campaign they became almost legendaryfigures, greatly feared by the Germ ans. The Itali an s were so m ortallyterrified of th e "M arocchini" th at once in. the M ateur-B izerte sector,where Goums were attached to the U. S. 9th Infantry Division, threeItalian companies surrendered en masse as soon as they heard that thetroops in fron t of them were Goum s. The success the Goums enjoyed,and the usefulness of their operations, underlines the importance ofscouting ability on the pa rt of the individu al soldier.The organization, training, and equipment of the Goumiers is alldirected towards making the most of their natural characteristics.They are used in small group s, are lightly equipped, and are capable ofrapid movement in rough mountain country.

-During World War II, most Goumierswere armed with American equipment. This individual, typical of hisrace, carries an '03 rifle and an old-style U. S. bayonet. The helmet isnot ordinarily tvont ~by these troops.

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Goums are infantry companies of 165 natives, 6 French noncommissioned officers, and 1 1 Fr en ch officer. Eac h Goum is divided into 3 rifleplatoons, a machine gun and mortar platoon, and a train of 20 mules.Four Goums constitute a Tabor, or battalio n. Ea ch Tabor has acavalry platoon for messenger and scout duty.Three Tabors form a Mehalla, or grou p, but a Tabor or even a Goumis usually attached directly to an infantry division for reconnaissanceuse.French officers and NCOs of the Goums speak the native tongue anduse it in all the ir commands. Fre nch NCO s are all sergeants or above;they wear Sam Browne belts and are saluted. D uring the W ar, someGoum lieu tenan ts were Moroccans, as were most of the NCOs. Anative sergeant Moquaddemor corporal Maouncould give orders, but could not impose punishm ent. Th is was a needed precautionagainst their cruelty.The World War II organization of the Goums represents a markedincrease over th eir peacetime streng th. General Gu illaume , who commanded the Goumiers in Italy, had already introduced the Tabororganization in 1938, however, and also increased materially the size ofeach Goum. A t tha t time there were also two Goums of "S aha ranpa tt er n" w ith horses and camels for use in rapid displacemen ts. Animals were for transportation only; the Goumier has always fought onfoot."Goum" means family or clan, and was originally a unit of about ahun dred men from the same tribe . Since the Fr en ch first arrived inMorocco in 1912, they have used Goum s as a sor t of police force. The irFrench commanders were officers of the Bureau of Native Affairs, andadm inistered the clan from which the ir men were draw n. I t was soonfound desirable to recru it not more than one-th ird of each Goum locally,and the other two -thirds from "foreign" tribes. Th is ensured tha tblood-ties would not inte rfer e too much w ith peacetime police functions.Thu s it is tha t Goumiers are substantially irre gula r troops more afterthe na tur e of home gu ard soldiers. Th eir organiza tion is based essential ly on the village. In w artim e, the men are mobilized w ithin a fewhours notice by the Fr en ch Bureau of N ative Affairs officers, who abandon the ir gove rnm ental duties for this purpose. In view of the ir irregular statu s, the Goums are among the first units to sta rt dem obilizing atthe end of hostilities. Th e num ber at present on active service probably does not exceed some 2,000.During World War II, Goumiers used less American materiel andequipment tha n other Fren ch Army units. Much of their clothing wastheir own, although their turbans and djeballahs, or flowing, hoodedrobes, were designed by each commanding officer to distinguish theirown Goum , and were furnished by the Fre nch authorities . Th eir san

1 During World War II, commissioned strength of a Goum normally was increased tofour officers.


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Goum iers are tough, Berber tribesmen from the hill country of M orocco. Theyare particularly adep t at night fighting, scouting, and patrolling. They prefersandals to U. S. style shoes.dais, and the curved knives dangling from their belts, were personalpro perty . Mounted men owned the ir own horses. Goum iers liked theAllied equipment they used very much. Th e Goums drew a smallnum ber of jeeps, which prov ided the native hillmen the first automobilerides of the ir lives and deligh ted them hugely. W ith robes flying andw earing hap py grin s, they were an incongruous sigh t as they tore alongthe road s. They used B rit ish Sten gun s, American rifles, Model 1903,and any hand grenades they could obtain. Much Am erican equipmen tthe Goumiers did not need. They had little use for steel helmets, andthey norm ally spurned shoes, tents, and blankets. A s they w ereMohamm edans, no one fed them Spam. They did no t like C rationseither, but were adept at foraging. Fo r fresh meat they had sheepdriven behind them or ahead of them, thro ug h minefields. Theirfavorite drink was tea.


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Goumiers shave the head as a part of their religion. In this picture, the ma chineguns are U. 8. Brownings, the rifles are 8-mm Mannlicher-Berthier carbines.

Moroccans are not Arabs, but are members of the white race; theybelong to a people known as Be rbers . W hen corsairs sailed the seas,this people gave its name to the "Barbary Coast" of North Africa.Be rbers have coffee-colored skins, and brown or hazel eyes. A feware blond e; but most have dark brown hair. M any are bea rded ; towear a beard and to carry arms are signs of manhood among them.Characteristically, they are lean and tall. Their Mohammedan faithprescribes a fatalistic atti tud e tow ards death, and as a rule, Moroccansuse no alcohol. Th eir observances include shaving the top of the headand wearing a pigtail, which the Prophet can grab when he reachesdown to pu ll them up to heaven. Th eir religion is not orthodox , however. Berbers are not polygamous, like A rab s, and their women gounveiled. Moroccan women accompany the Goums in the field asofficially recognized camp followers.

Berbers have an extremely warlike trad ition. The Ba rbary pirateslevied tribute on England, France, and the Italian states; they leviedtribute on the distant United States until Stephen Decatur taughtthem better. They were grea tly outnumbered by the A rabs, and inthe course of many wars most were pushed out of Algeria and theMoroccan plains and into the A tlas M ountains. Sultans of Morocco,however, never ruled the hills. Berbers resisted the armies of France


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from 1912 to 1933. Lo yal Moroccans from the p a rt of the co untryunder French control formed celebrated shock troops in World War I;the M oroccan Division had a. 300 percent turn-over du ring th at war,and was called "The Stormy Petrels" after birds that are said to bringstorms. Am ericans fought w ith them at Chateau Th ierry an d elsewhere under General H en ri Gou raud. Abd El K rim , Berber chief,wiped out a Spanish army under General Sylvestre in Tangier in1923, and w ith 20,000 men harried for 8 years a Fren ch army whichgrew to 140,000. Berbers flown to Sp ain from Spanish Morocco gotFr an co started in the face of huge odds. Berbers can fight. Two Moroccan infantry divisions and a Moroccan mountain division addedfresh proof of that in World War II, but the best African nativetroops of all are the Goums.

Goumiers are illiterate, which made their military instruction difficult, despite the fact that our numerals, on sights and instruments, arederived from their own. A lthou gh they are intelligent, enthusiastic,and attentive to all instruction in arms, some did not become expertwith mortars and machine guns, and skilled snipers were relativelyrare am ong them. Th eir illiteracy was an advantag e in one sense.They had never strained their eyes in reading or by doing close work.They had not used artificial ligh t. Lik e all peoples who live nex t tonature, they had better eyesight than more civilized men, both in

These Govm members on parade wear their traditional robe, which contrastsivith the U. 8. iveb equipmen t and M1911 rifles.

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visual acuity and nig ht vision. I t has been suggested th at their nativediet, including much whole grain, may have contributed to this result.Aggressiveness, patience, and ability to utilize terrain are amongthe ir assets on pa trol d uty. The y creep and crawl less th an w e d o; although their long woolen djeballahs cover their equipment and prevent noise, it is easier for the men inside them to move in crouchingbounds. H av ing lived in noimlas, stone huts built like igloos, they sitcross-legged on the ground from infancy, and their limbs are not assubject to stiffness as are ours.Chief among their fighting talents is the extraordinary enduranceof the Goumiers. They are won derful w alkers, and are also trainedto use a sort of shuffling ru n. Like American Ind ians, whom Moroccans much resemble, they measure social status by physical prowessmore tha n by wea lth. H ard iho od is a grea t source of prid e. A Goumier easily accomplishes a march of 40 to 50 miles in broken, hillycou ntry, w ithou t rest and on sho rt ration s. T he topmo st peaks of hismountains are snow-capped all the year, and the winter climate of hisnative cou ntry is very bit ter indeed. W inte r in the djehels, the h ills ofTunisia, or in the Apennines was easily endured.Fame was won by the Goums in the Tunisian Campaign for theirreconnaissance work in the mou ntains. In the early stages, however,while British and American forces were being moved up from Algeria with limited transportation facilities, and the Germans were enlarging their beachhead rapidly, it proved necessary to use severalGoum s on defensive missions to hold key te rr ai n features. They diddelay the German advance somewhat, but at the cost of very heavylosses. Th eir light equipm ent was no t enough in a slugging m atchwith German tanks and artil lery. As the campaign wore on, however, they were given missions more in keeping with their trainingand ab ilities. The ir success in the no rth , in the final offensive of thecam paign, was particu larly notable. Th is coastal cou ntry was wildand rugged , similar to the ir own Morocco,. H ere their prowess asnight fighters and ruthlessness with knives made them famous.

Th e 4th Tab or was attached t the 3d In fa n try Division of theUnited States Seventh Army in the Sicilian Campaign, with the mission of pro tectin g the rig h t (n or th) flank of the division. In thedrive on Palermo it marched and fought without rest over 72 milesof unbelievably difficult terrain in something less than 4 days andnigh ts. La ter assignments were to the 1st and to the 9th In fan tryDivisions. Fr om the Fre nch after-action rep ort the following account is taken:On the night of 28-29 July, the 4th Tabor, then attached to the 1stInfantry Division, received orders to occupy Monte Caniglio without delay.This mountain is 3,500 feet high with precipitous slopes falling sheerfrom the peak to a small plateau at an altitude of 3,000 feet. The descentfrom the plateau to the adjacent valley is abrupt, over rocky terrain

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Goum, officers are usually French, as are most o f the NCO's. This lieutenant,being decorated, wears the robe of the Ooumier over his French uniform.

The 66th Goum was directed to make the in itial a ttack. There wasno moon and a low hanging fog covered the hills. Exact enemy locationswere not known. Following a night march, the Goum reached the baseof the objective at 0645 hours. The Goum commander w as informed bya civilian that the mountain was occupied by the Germans in force.The advance was started at once in column of platoons.The 1st (leading) Platoon came under small-arms fire immediately.The 2d Platoon was committed on the right of the 1st Platoon, and theGoum advanced rapidly up the mountain, across the plateau and towithin a few yards of the enemy position. Heavy losses were sustainedby the frontal and flanking fire of enemy au tomatic weapons at close range.


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The 1st Sergeant was kil led and the Goum commander seriously wounded.The Goum was forced to withdraw a short distance to the plateau.The mountain had been enshrouded in fog which l if ted at about thistime (0815 h ou rs ). The 68th Goum, from a position on the right, imm ediately attac ke d the enemy left. Th e 3d Plato on of th e 66th, which h adnot been committed, attacked the enemy right on the init iative of the =. platoon com mander. This double envelopment w as supported by theTabor m orta rs . The Germans a t tempted to with draw but were unableto do so.The attack w as pressed home, and the posit ion stormed. Some of theenemy ma y hav e escaped. No pris on ers we re tak en. Mission accomplished.Three Tabors of Goums also figured prominently in the expulsionof the Ge rmans from C orsica. Goum iers distinguished themselvesalso in Italy and in Southern France.Like our airborne troops, Goums are handicapped in position warfare by lack of heavy weapons and organic sup por t. The Moroccanshave shown us, by their hardearned successes, the great value of lightinfantry detachments, hardened and trained for operations over difficult terrain and used for foot reconnaissance in mountainous areasand on wide fronts. The hardih ood and prowess of the Goumier setsa standard of scouting and patrolling which it will be hard for ourforces to meet.Since the end of ho stilities the Goums have been reduced in strengthand are resum ing the ir role of soldier-policemen in Morocco. SomeGoums have reverted to inactive or reserve statu s. If Fr an ce fightsagain in mountainous country, she will doubtless call once more uponher fierce Moroccan hillmen, the Goums.


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Special Assault Units Used in Battle for BerlinIn the battle for Berlin, a large city converted by the Germans intoa fortress for a last ditch stand, the Russians used massed mechanizedunits in street battles. How ever, Soviets do not recommend tha t ta nk

units be sent into the city, where movement is usually restricted andchannelized, barricades and obstacles easily prepared, and every building becomes a potential strongpoint and direct-fire gun emplacement,but the lessons learned during the battle of Berlin are worthy ofattention.W rit in g in "Red S tar ," an official R ed Arm y publication, a Major N.Novskov details w hat w as found in B erlin , the difficulties encountered,and some of the methods used to overcome the stubborn German

defense.For the battle of Berlin, the Russians organized combined assault -detachments, consisting of one tank battalion, a rifle battalion, a compa ny or plato on of engineers, a ba ttalion of art ille ry (no t less th an 122millimeter), and a platoon of flame throwers.Fundamentally, the defense of Berlin was based on three defensivebelts, with intermediate strongpoints: the outer ring of defense alongthe line of lakes and canals; the ring of defense in the outskirts andsuburbs; and an inner ring in the city proper.The Germans had expected the assault to be made from the Eastand had concentrated the ir defenses in th at area. Soviet tan k units,however, attacked from the south, cutting off the Berlin garrison fromthe southern G erman armies which were to have constituted its defensein th at sector. Th e attac k in the southern sector moved swiftly, w iththe Soviets by-passing the main centers of resistance and drivingquickly through the outskirts and into the suburbs.

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"Berlin shall remain Germ an!" that's wha t the sign on the wall claims, but thecrew of this Red Arm y 122-mm self-propelled gun had something else to say aboutit. It was with artillery of this type that the Red Atmy fought into Berlin.One big obstacle that had to be countered in this first phase was thecrossing of the Teltow Canal, where the Germans had demolished allthe bridges or had prepared them for demolition. After a thoroughreconnaissance, a well organized and coordinated assault was madeon the cana l and a crossing effected.In the suburbs, the tanks had a certain degree of maneuverability,

due to the larg er nu mb er of garde ns, squares, pa rk s, and athletic fields.They were able to by-pass and envelop separate centers of resistance,to attack some defense fortifications from the rear, and to completeenv elopin g movements in some cases. Once enveloped, the defensezones in this area quickly collapsed.In the center of the city, the nature of the fighting was quite different from the fighting in the subu rban area. M any-storied b uilding sin solid masses reduced the ma neu verab ility of tank units . T he onlyavenues of advance were along the streets from building to building.Maneuver was not entirely prohibited, however, for heavily barricadedstreets and stro ng po ints could be enveloped by way of adjacentbuildings.During the battle for the center of the city, the tanks were used ina sup po rting role to reinforce the infa ntry and artillery. Th e infan trycleared the buildings of antitank gunners who were concealed in the10


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basem ents or in the lower floors. A fter the bu ildings had been cleared,the tanks would advance.It was in this battle for the center of the city that the combinedassault detachm ents proved their w orth. T he combined detachme ntwas able to attack with well protected flanks, and could maneuverwithin the limits of two or three buildings.The general plan of operations of the assault detachments was asfollows: If the detachment met with obstructions, it by-passed theobstruction, or the sappers would blow up the obstacle under thecover of tank and infan try fire. A t the same time, the artiller y placedfire on the buildings beyond the obstruction, thus blinding the enemydefense and pro vidin g ad ditional cover und er which the flame thro w ersset the bu ildings afire. After dem olition of the obs truction , the tan ksthen rushed forward and tried to get past the enemy defense zone,while the inf an try cleared the enemy from the zone itself. Flanks wereprotected along the side streets by self-propelled mounts or by tanks.Th is basic plan w as, of course, subject to variation. De pend ingupon a num ber of elements, such as the na ture of the enemy fortifications, the enemy power of resistance, and the composition of the attacking elements, the tank battalion can attack along two or three

streets. Major Novskov asserts th at it is better to attack along three

A group of Soviet 152-mm self-propelled gun-how itzers halt on the side of anavenue during the fight for Berlin. The Red Army broke into the German capitalby using detachmen ts of tanks, assault guns, infantry, and support troops.

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Red Army T-34 tanks rendezvous in the rubble of a Berlin square. During combatin the city, Soviet tank battalions, supported by infantry, assault guns, andengineers, attacked on an average front of two to three city streets wide.streets, keep ing the reserve in the center. W hen th e atta ck is successful along any of the streets, the attacking force is then able tomaneuver and envelope the stronger po rtion of the defensive zone. Atank attack along a larger number of streets leads to a dispersal offorce and a reduction in the rate of attack.Each tank brigade ordinarily had as a main objective the envelopment of from four to six bui lding s. I n the accomplishment of itsmission it was found to be of special importance to have a mobilereserve capable of commitment in the direction of the main effort.Major Novskov states that the boldness of the tankmen played agreat role in the street battle s. W hen artificial obstruction s were notpresent, the tanks, with motorized infantry dismounting at high speed,dashed through cerain buildings to intersections, squares, or parks,where they took up positions and waited for the infant ry. W hen theinfantry had cleared the enemy from the buildings that had beenpassed by the tanks, the tanks again moved forward in the samemanner. W hen a defended obstacle was encoun tered, the tan ks firsttrie d to by-pass it. W hen it proved to be impossible to by-pass theobstacle, and only when it was impossible, they would begin assaultoperations.12


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An example of the action of one assault group is cited by MajorNovskov. "W hile attac king in the direction of the Rin gba hn (looprailroad), the tank battalion was stopped in the northern part ofM ecklenburgische S trasse by a reinforced concrete wall 8 me ters w ideand 2.5 m eters high . The bar ricade was protected by stro ng machinegun and autom atic fire and also by anti tan k grenad e launchers in stalledin houses at the barricade itself. Th ere were no detours. Th e comm ander decided to break thro ug h the obstacle. H e first sent out agroup of submachine gunners whose mission was to annihilate thegrenade launchers, which was accomplished in a short period of time.Then 122-millimeter guns opened fire on the houses where the enemyfiring poin ts were located. Th e tan ks , advan cing simultaneously withthe artillery, also opened fire on the buildings on the other side of thebarric ade . U nde r cover of the artille ry and tan k fire assault engineersclimbed up to the bar ricad e with explosives. A fter th ree explosionsin the barricad e, a breach was'made throu gh which tanks an d infa ntryrushed. Th e well organized m utua l sup port gua ran teed the successof the attack."

In the case of Berlin, used as an example of a large modern cityturned into a fortress, the Russians emphasize the importance ofmobile reserv es; the forma tion of cooperating teams of tank s, in fan try,artillery, and engineers; the importance of heavy artillery ("not lesstha n 122-m illimeter") ; and the fact th at m aneuver thou gh restrictedby the channelized avenues of advance, can still be performed on alimited scale.The Soviets further note that the use of massed tanks in the streetsof a modern city is not recommended, but that it has been done, andtanks can be used effectively if it is done correctly.They emphasize the importance of not dispersing the attac kin g forcetoo greatly, and of attacking on a relatively narrow front for each

assault detachment.

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SWEDEN TURNS TO JETSNew Planes Revamping Air Force

During World War II, no other European neutralwas. in such a precarious position as Sweden. Stra-tegically located across the Baltic Sea from Ger-many, there was every possibility that Swedenmight have become another battlefield for the Naziand Red Arm ies. As a result, Sweden has learneda lesson , and is making provisions for future securityin the age of modern weapons and warfare.

Not all the planning for a postwar military establishment, basedupon the lessons learned in World War II, is being done by the so-called "major" powers. The military leaders of Sweden, who maintained a precarious neutrality during the recent conflict, apparentlyhave not been oblivious to the fighting which took place practically ontheir doorstep. Instead, they have been quick to recognize the significance of new weapons and military techniques developed by thebelligerents in the recent world conflict.Chief of these has been the jet-propelled plane, just coming into itsown at war's end. The Swedes have watched its development byother nations, have seen the introduction of the atomic bomb to warfare, and as a result they are now on the threshold of revampingtheir air force to conform to a Swedish estimate of the future of airpower.The role of the Swedish Air Force in the event of a war would beprimarily a defensive one. The strategic defense of Sweden by theAir Force is based on a fast and highly maneuverable striking forceof fighter, attack, and dive-bomber aircraft based at widely scatteredmilitary airfields. W ith this in mind the tactical doctrine of the AirForce has been based on the development of a swift, low-level attacking force utilizing the maximum number of available aircraft ininitial blows, the heaviest aircraft employed being the Swedish mediumbomber, the B-18. Some changes in existing tactics were formulated around the newly developed J-21 fighter aircraft together withthe attack and dive-bomber version, the B-21 . Certain additional14


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variation s in the employment of the A ir F orce to include the use of therecently purchased British jet-propelled "Vampire" aircraft are causing revisions and modifications in the tactical and strategic doctrines und er consideration by the A ir Staff. Since these d octrines w illnot be completed until the operational capabilities of the "Vampire"are familiar to the Air Force Staff Section charged with the formulation of the doctrines, it is difficult at this time to foretell precisely theextent to which the Air Force may have to go in order to adapt itspresent organization, strategy, and tactics to include the use of jet-propelled aircraft*

It may be well to note at this point that General Jung, Chief ofthe Swedish Armed Forces, has withheld submission of the second5-Year Plan for the expansion of the national defense system dueto certain "changed circumstances." Gro unds for alterations in theplan include the introduction of the atomic bomb, the uncertainty ofthe international situation, and attempts by the United Nations toprevent milita ry conflicts. Th e defenses of Sweden will have to bead ap ted to these new developments. I n this connection statemen tsmade by Lieutenant General Nordenskiold upon his return fromtrips to Great Britain and the United States in the fall of 1945 arequite interesting . H e seemed to be of the opinion at th at time th atthe use of the atomic bomb would have no restraining influence on thedevelopment of conventional aircraft, including those with jet propulsion units.

A secret appropriation for research and development in the fieldof jet propulsion was made by the Swedish Parliament late in 1944.In September of 1945 the Koyal Swedish Air Force established a jetpropulsion research section in the engine department of the Materiel.Division. T hi s section is charged with the responsibility of conducting critical and exhaustive investigations as to the possibilities ofjet propulsion engines and is working on the problem in conjunctionwith civilian engine and aircraft ma nufac turers. Je t engine researchis presently handled by two civilian manufacturersSvenska TurbineAktiebolaget Ljungstrom at Finspang and /Svenska FlygmotorAktiebolaget at T ro llh atta n. Both of these factories have built jetengines, the component pa rts of which are now underg oing tests. Noofficial information has been released as to the current progress ofjet engine development in Sweden since the project is classified asSecret. T he J- 2 1 fighter aircra ft is to be used as a flying test-bed forjet propulsion investigation.THE J-21 FIGHTER

The J-21 fighter is a single-seat, low-wing, cantilever aircraft withtwin-booms and tricycle undercarriage, somewhat similar to the U. S.P-38 . The main wheels retract into their respective booms and the15


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nose wheel into the forw ard pa rt of the nacelle. The nacelle is ofmonocoque construction and accomodates the pilot, part of the forwa rd armam ent, and the pusher engine. Th e square-tipped wingshave dihe dra l and are sligh tly taj)ered. Th e aircra ft has a w ing spanof 38 feet, is 34 feet in len gth and ha s a he igh t of 15 feet. There isa high-set tailplane between the booms and the fins and rudder areapproxim ately egg-shaped. The airplane is powered with a Daim ler-Benz 605-B, inverted-V liquid-cooled, inline, 1,450 horsepower enginedr ivi ng a three-blade pusher airscrew. The engine is mo unted in there ar of the nacelle. Th e ra dia to r, coolers and air intake are in the leading edge of the w ing between the booms. A self-sealing rubber fueltank is located imm ediately behind the pilot and in front of the engine.Th e bomb racks, installed in the w ing outboard of each tail boom, may

This is the Swedish J-21 fighter. It ha s a wing span of 38 feet, is 34 feet long,.and is powered by a l,J/50-horsepoiver, liquid-cooled, inline engine which drivesa three-blade pusher airscrew.

be used either for bombs or aux iliary fuel tank s. Th e 20-mm thickarmor plate incorporated in the design of the airplane is locatedahead of and behind the pilot. Sta nd ar d armam ent of the J- 2 1consists of two 13.2-mm machine guns and one 20-mm cannon mountedin the nose and one 13.2-machine gun located in the root of each tailboom in the leading edge of the wing.The present policy of the Royal Swedish Air Force is to develop theJ-21 into a jet-propelled type thus eliminating the expense of maintai nin g several different types of aircr aft. Conversion of the aircra ftshould en tail no gre at difficulty in view of the fac t th a t it was origin allydesigned for hig h speeds. One of the most significant changes willbe the displacement of the air intake to the fuselage. Altho ughthe development of the Swedish jet propulsion unit has made excellentprogress, no complete engine has been constructed to date . F or this

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The J-21 fighter is to be used as a flying test-bed for jet propulsion investigation.When in flight, the main whee ls retract into their respective boom s and thenose wheel into the forward part of the nacelle.reason the Air Force determined to purchase a number of DeHavilland"Goblin" turbo-jet engines from Great Britain in order to test theflight possibilities of the proposed jet-propelled version of the J-21.This version has been designated as the J-21R and will resemble theBritish "Vampire" to some extent.THE "VAMPIRE"

The British DeHavilland DH 100 "Vampire" is a single seat,midwing, twin-boom aircraft of mixed metal and wood construction,propelled by a single D eH avillan d "Go blin" turbo-jet un it. Most

Standard armament of the J-21 consists of two lS.2-mm m achine guns and one20-mm cannon mounted in the nose of the aircraft, and one 13.2-mm machinegun at the root of each tail boom in the leading edge of the wing.

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characteristic feature of this jet-propelled fighter is the cross boomraised high on the vertical fins to avoid the hot discharge from thejet cone ejection outlet at the rear of the fuselage nacelle. W in g rootsare thickened at the leading edge to provide for air intakes whichcombine in the turb ine cham ber. W in g spaji is 40 feet, length is 30%feet, heigh t is 9% feet and w ing area is 258 square feet. F ir s t flightof the prototype was in September 1943 and by the spring of 1944the maximum speed was above 500 miles per hou r. W hile con tinuouslevel speed is listed a t over 540 miles pe r hour it is not believed capableof matching the 600 plus miles per hour speed of the U. S. LockheedP- 80 "Sh ootin g Sta r." Th e still-air rang e of the M ark I series is 500miles at sea level at 400 miles per hour, or 1,050 miles at 30,000 feetat 450 miles per hour. Th e latest M ark I I ty pe is rep orted to have arang e of 1,400 miles. A maxim um ceiling of 50,000 feet and serviceceiling of 45,000 feet necessitates complete cockpit pressurization.Although it was originally designed as a land-based interceptor, theRoyal Navy has been testing it for carrier use, the first successfulope ration of thi s na tur e being reported in December 1945. Th ere areno reports of the "Vampire" engaging in combat although it wasthought to have been kept in readiness for the German long-rangejet fighter and was equipped with four 20-mm cannon.The Royal Swedish Air Force has concluded negotiations with theDeHavilland Aircraft Company Ltd. of Great Britain for the purchase of approximately 75 DeHavilland DH 100 "Vampire" jet-propelled fighter airc raft. Deliveries of the airc raf t are scheduled tosta rt the end of A pr il of thi s yea r. Ac cording to an announcementby the Chief of the Air Force, the BraavaMa Air Wing stationed atNorrkoping will be the first air wing to be completely equipped withthe jet-propelled machines. T he Swedish J- 2 2 fighter airc raft nowin use by the Wing are to be placed on a reserve status and will bereplaced by the "V am pire s." A series of check flights in the J - 2 1fighter, employing the same flying techniques used in flying the"Vampire," will be a prerequisite to operation of the jet-propelledmachine. Indication s are th at personnel from the Braavalla A irWing will probably be sent to England for additional special training in flying the jet airc raft.In addition to the contract for the purchase of the "Vampire" aircraft, two other con tracts were signed in Fe br ua ry of this year. Oneof these provided for the purchase of an unknown number of DeHavilland "Goblin" turbo-jet engines to be used in the "Vampire" and inthe flight testing of the J-2 1R . Th e th ird contract provided for theproduction rights of the engines under license to the Swedish aero-engine manufacturers Svenska Flygmotor Aktiebolaget of Trollhat

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The B ritish DH 100 "Vam pire," propelled by a single turbo-jet un it, has been purchased by the Royal Swedish Air Force. Wing span is 40 feet, length 30y2 feet.Con tinuous level speed is listed at over 540 miles per hour, with a service ceilingof 45,000 feet in altitude.

tan . Th is produc tion license was sough t by Sweden in order to beindependent of foreign supply, should the development of a Swedishjet-propulsion unit require more time than was originally foreseen.Sweden has sent several aeronautical engineers to the Hatfield andLondon factories of the DeHavilland Company to study the enginemore thoroughly.SWEDISH AIR FORCE

The Royal Swedish Air Force, a separate branch of the ArmedForces, has been ope rating un til the present tim e as a militia force consisting of reserve personnel (officers, noncommissioned officers, andflying crews) trained during their regular period of military serviceand subsequently called up anua lly for refresher courses. However,

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the rapid progress made by aviation industry all over the world in thedevelopment of more complex types of airc raft du rin g the past severalyears has brought to the fore in Sweden a realization of the necessityfor a good supply of highly qualified pilots.Th e A ir Staff has been w ork ing on plans for th e creation of a standing air force composed of perm ane nt personn el. These plans are expected to be an integral part of the new Swedish defense plans whichwill be crystallized and ratified by the Defense Committee and thePa rliam ent w ithin the next few months. According to statements byLt. Gen. Bengt Nordenskiold, Gommander-in-Chief of the Air Force,in support of the proposal for a change-over to a standing force, experience has shown that the pilot training given to reserve and conscript personnel during the first term of service cannot be maintainedadeq uately with the system of refresher maneuvers now in effect. Asit is not considered possible to increase these maneuvers to a sufficientextent, Nordenskiold maintains that it is necessary to abolish completely the m ilitia or reserve air force and intro duce a category of regular air force pilots. Th e establishmen t of regu lar air force pilots asproposed by Nordenskiold calls for the recruiting of trainees 18 yearsof age for a 6-year service period w ith the Ai r Forc e. D ur in g thisperiod the recruits will be trained without promotion to the rank ofofficer. U po n the conclusion of the 6 years they will eith er continueas officers on active service or leave the A ir Force en tire ly. By th ismethod of constantly keeping a certain number of pilots under training it is expected that the high degree of technical skill required in theoperation of the latest types of aircraft, with particular referenceto the jet-propelled machines, will be reached.Although the over-all efficiency of the Royal Swedish Air Force ishigh, the combat efficiency is difficult to determine inasmuch as theA ir Force has never been combat tested. A t present the active Ai rForce officers are highly proficient in all branches of the Air Force anddem onstrate superior skill in ha nd lin g aircr aft. Th e reserve and enlisted pilo ts ra nk somew hat below the active pilo ts in proficiency. I norder to increase the combat efficiency of the Air Force as a whole, theAir Staff has recently adopted the policy of maintaining all flyingpersonnel on an equal basis.

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The largest groun d army of the present day is the Ked Arm y. Wemay better understand it and its capabilities if we know somethingabout the individual soldier in that army; his origin and civiliantraining, what he gives and what he gets during his military service,and how and wh at he is taug ht in the a rmy.Th e Red Arm y soldier is first of all a Russian. H e is the p roductof the special way of life that exists in the U. S. S. R. as the result ofhe ritage from the past and of present conditions. Some 180 nationali-ties are included in the U . S. S. R. Th e Krasnoar meets (the RedArmy soldier) may be any of these nationalities, for every male

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citizen of the U . S. S. R. is equally liable for m ilit ary service. U nd erthe Universal Military Service law of 1939, all male citizens "regardless of race, nationality, religious belief, educational qualifications,social origin, and position" are subject to military service.The Soviet Constitution, as well as the Universal Military ServiceLaw, emphasizes the liability of every citizen for military service,for Arti cle 133 states th at "the defense of th e fath erla nd is the sacredduty of every citizen of the U. S. S. R."But from whatever nationality among the Russians he may come,the Red Army recruit goes into the actual military establishmentalread y prepa red to carry out his duties as a soldier. H e has beena part in a gigantic training program since the first grade of school.Th e average Red A rm y soldier has completed 10 years of schoolingif he is from one of the major c ities. If he is from a ru ra l d istri ct,he will probab ly have had at least 7 years of schooling. A ll d uringthese school years, he has been indoctrinated with the thought thatm ilitar y service is an honor and a pa trio tic obligation. H e has beengiven military drill, and has had his body built up through exerciseall thro ug h the first 7 years of school. Fr om th e eigh t th ro ug h th etenth grade s, he has been given preconscription t rai ni ng th at is similarto our C. M. T. C. prog ram , but more intensive. Th e program includessome small-arm range training, 2 weeks of summer military camps,and some company tactics. In short, the Red Arm y soldier gets alarge share of what we call "basic training" before he enters the army.

The recruit is called for his period of military service at the ageof 19, or at 18 if he has finished mid dle school (com parable to ou r h ighschool) a t tha t age. C ertain deferments are gra nte d to those no t physically fit and to scientists, rural school teachers, and certain essentialworkers.In the arm y, he serves a period of 2 years. Follo w ing the periodof active service he goes on an "extended furlough." D ur in g th at tim ehe may go home and hold a job, but is subject to immediate recall incase of emergency, and is subject to brief tr ai n in g perio ds. Th e periodof extended furlough lasts from the end of the period of active service, until such time as a total of 5 years of military service is completed.During his period of active service, the soldier undergoes an intensive pro gra m of tra in in g. H e receives tra in in g in weapons andtactics, plus a large amount of subjective training and politicalindoctrination.Th e noncomm issioned officer in the Red A rm y is a prod uc t of schoolsth at are similar in purpose and operation to our own regim ental NCOschools. Noncom missioned officers m ust serve a period of 3 years ,rathe r tha n 2 as do the private s. M ost students of the noncommissioned schools are selected from among volunteers, though some maybe detailed to the school. Before W orld W ar I I , the NC O schoollasted for 9 m onth s. D ur in g the war, the time was reduced to 322


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The average Red Army recruit enters military service with a good backgroundof preinduction training. He is also well indoctrinated politically, but as aperson he is not unlike many an Americal G. I-mo nths. The working clay was increased however from 8 hours to 10to 12 hours.Officers m ay come from the rank s or from civil life. In eithe r case,the officer is the p rodu ct of a series of officer schools. Entra nce tothe schools is based on educational qualifications or upon the passingof an entrance exam ination. If successful, the cand idate will gradu ate as a junio r lieutenant after 2 years. D urin g the war, the periodwas reduced to 6 months. F urth er m ilitary edu cation is highly selective and competitive and the officer must show his worth before he isadmitted to the higher service schools.Discipline is strict in the Red Army, though under combat conditions there was not too great a difference made between com pany -gradeofficers and enlisted men. A deliberate effort is being made to fosteran officer corps, and officers are now receiving many privileges thatwere not accorded to their predecessors before the beginning of WorldWar I I .The Red Army infantryma n travels light. H e has a minimum ofpersonal equipm ent. Te nts are seldom used and shelter is improvised

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The Red Army infantryman travels light. He has a minimum of personal equipment. His uniform is simple and comfortable, consisting primarily of a pullover jacket, baggy trousers, and high-top boots.from local m ateria ls. He has been tau gh t the elimination of nonessentials, and improvisation to meet his needs.Normally the infantryman is armed with a rifle, carbine, or submachine gun. Th e water-cooled M axim is the stan da rd heavy machinegun, while the M1927 Degtyarev is the standard light machine gunused by the, in fa nt ry squad. Some auto m atic rifles are car ried . A llsmall arm s are caliber 7.(52 m illim eter. "While many m or ta rs a re usedin the Red Army, it is not normally considered an infantry weaponand the m or tar crew does not come from the infantry . Th e RedArmy infantrymen's weapons are good, and he has proven that he canuse them effectively and well.Thou gh m any an Am erican G. I. will gr un t derisively when told th atother people w alk more than he does, it is true th at the Soviet infan tryman mu st depend upon his feet for much of his tran sp orta tion . Thereare not as m any vehicles assigned to infan try units in the Red A rm y asin the U. S., and the m ajority of those assigned must be used for supp ly,and as prime movers for artillery and antiaircraft guns, and to haulammunition.The Red Army soldier has, like his American counterpart, beengran ted many benefits as a veteran. D ur in g his active service career,however, his pay appears to be a pittanc e by U. S. stan da rds . The24


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Red Army private receives a total of 600 rubles per year, which is verydifficult to access in U. S. dollars, since purchasing power of the rubleto the average Soviet citizen is almost nil. Pay scales rang e fromthat of the private to that of a General of the Army, which is 60.000rubles per year. The equivalent of a pr ivate first class receives 1.000rubles per yea r; a corpo ral, 2,000 rubles ; a sergeant, 3,000 ruble s; a firstsergean t, 4,200 rub les. The discrepancy between officer and enlistedpay is gr ea t. The first lieutenan t receives 12.5 times the pay of aprivate, or 7,700 rubles per year.The base pay of Red Army personnel is computed according to theposition held, as well as the rank . F o r instance, a cap tain's base paymay vary from 8,700 rubles to 9,600 rubles depending upon whether

Not all the Soviet G. I.'s a re men. Wom en, such as the soldier xhoicn here (above,right) have a place among Red Army ground troops. Although most w omensoldiers arc in service and m edical units, some have played a combat role.IS


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he is an infantry company commander or a mortar company comm ander. E x tr a pay is given for long service.Certain units receive higher pay tha n others. Gu ards units, whichhave distinguished themselves in action, receive double pay in therank s. Th ere are add ition al kinds of extra pay for front-line service,up to 100 percent increase over base pay. F o r instance, in 1942, an titank gunners received an increase of 100 percent in their base pay(officers 75 percent) and also got bonuses for each enemy tankdestroyed.Certain extra pay benefits are given those who hold decorations.Decorations also carry with them other benefits, such as free transportation on public conveyances and one round trip ticket per year onthe railroads.As a part of his pay, the soldier receives, in addition, a ration ofcigarettes and vodk a, movie and the ate r tickets, and free to ilet articles.The uniform of the Red Army soldier is simple and comfortable.The overhanging shirt, secured at the waist by a wide belt, and theoverseas cap with the Red Star emblem are familiar objects to thereader of the daily pape r. However, du ring the w ar a wide m ixtureof military and civilian clothing was necessary.Officers and men wear similar uniforms in the field, but an effort isbeing made to provide a distinctive officer uniform for garrison andoff-duty use.Both officer and enlisted men wear shoulder boards which carry theran k insignia and the color of the branch of service or gra de . Olivedrab boards are supposed to be worn in the field, but quite often thebrig hte r, dress boards were used. I n combat, the Red Arm y menpreferred the overseas cap to the helmet, and the overseas cap was moreoften worn.Various special units have their own distinctive insignia and dress.The winter uniform includes the well-known parka and white over-pants . Fur hats, padded jackets and overcoats are common articlesof winter issue.Guards badges, signifying crack organizations, and wound stripesare wo rn on th e rig ht- ha nd side of the blouse. O ther decorations areworn on the left. The Red Ar m y man wears the medal, rat he r thanthe ribbon as do the U. S. troops.The rations of the Red Army are not elaborate, but are nourishingand heavy. St an da rd are rich soups and stews of vegetables and meat,garnished w ith sour cream if possible. One common dish is "ka sha,"a sort of po rrid ge of buckw heat. I n time of wa r, living off thecountry is an established practice of the Red Army.During his entire army career, and before and after, the Red Armyman is subjected to instruction in the doctrines and political philosophy of the Com mun ist P a rt y . M any hou rs of the preco nscriptiontraining are devoted to political subjects, and during his army career26


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the soldier hears lectures, sees films, and reads literature preparedto educate him in the accepted Soviet political though t. In addition ,he receives much instruction in the history and traditions of the RedArm y. H e is also tau gh t to hat e the enemy throug h lectures and filmson enemy atrocities . H e hea rs much of heroic acts of the Red A rm yand of individual Red Army soldiers.Women play a definite p a rt in the Red Arm y. M any service troopsare women, and much of the cooking of infantry units is done bywomen. As distingu ished from purely the service troop s, manywomen have been used as snipers and in guerrilla fighting. There havebeen some instances of women being used as combat unit commanders.Red Army nursing personnel quite often operate much closer to theactual fighting than is customary in other armies, and there have beenmany instances of the nurses accompanying units in combat, much asour battalion aid men do.This end product of a continuous training ej^cle, the Red Armysoldier, is a hard, determined, courageous individual who is eager todefend Russia. Th is obligation has been poin ted up by the oath thathe now takes individually, and not collectively as was the past practice.Usually on Red A rm y D ay, the 1st of M ay, the Krasnoarmeets rededi-cates himself by repeating his enlistment oath.

Chow in the Red Arm y is not elaborate, but is nourishing and heavy. _ Standardare rich soups and stews o f vegetables and meat. One comm on dish is "kasha,"a sort of buckivheat porridge.27


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There are a great number of men prepared to carry out the provisions of tha t oath. The present strength of the Red Army is near the6,000,000 mark, and behind the men on active service are large numbers of reservists, many of whom are combat veterans of WorldWar II.

"The officer is a leader and a teacher. Besides his knowledgeof m en and his sense of justice he m ust be distinguished by hissuperior knowledge and experience, his earnestness, his self-control and high courage."The example and personal conduct of officers and nonco mmissioned officers are of decisive influence on the troops. Theofficer who in the face of the enemy is cold-blooded, decisive,and courageous inspires his troops onward. The officer m ustlikewise find th e way to the hearts of his subordinates and gaintheir trust through an understanding of their feelings andthoughts and through never ceasing care of their needs."FromTruppenfuhrung (Troop leading), German Field Service Regulations.

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Careful Reconnaissance Training Paid Off For Sixth Army UnitOn the 22d of O ctober 1944,2 days a fter the invasion of Leyte by seaborne troops of the U. S. Six th A rm y, a small rubber boat c arry ing fiveor six men grounded on a beach near the village of Ipal on the northcoast of the island of M indanao in the Ph ilipp ine Archipelago. Th emen were not castaways who had drifted ashore on an enemy-heldisland. R ath er, they were a grou p of specially-trained scouts underthe command of Lieutenant William E. Nellist.Since, the Ip al po rtion of M indanao the S urigao Peninsulaoverlooks Leyte from the south, it was to the best interests of the SixthArmy Commander, General Walter Krueger, to obtain all possibleinformation regarding enemy forces and installations on that part ofM indanao. T his was the task of the "Nellist M ission." D uri ng the4 days tha t followed the lan ding, Lieutena nt Nellist and his men accomplished the following: They made a thorough study of nearby beachareas to determine their suitability for possible subsequent landings;they surveyed and rep orted on the inland areas behind the beaches; theydetermined the size and probable capabilities of enemy forces in thearea ; they gathered inform ation pe rtain ing to the food and water supplies of the area, and to installations then erected by the enemy; theylocated ammunition dumps; they located small minefields in the waterareas adjacent to the area; and they prepared accurate maps to pinpoint the intelligence obtained. A fter 4 days of thoro ugh reconnaissance, the team of scouts was evacuated according to p lan , and return edto army head qua rters with the intelligence they had gathered.In short, the Nellist Mission was an exemplary piece of combat intelligence work.

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The Alamo Scouts worked in teams of five or six men. Their mission was recon-naissance, reconnaissance by stealth. They were trained to use their weapons, butonly in self defense. Their primary job ivas finding out what tcent on behindenemy lines, without the Japs d iscovering the presence of the team in, the area.Bu t who is Nellist, and who are the men he worked w ith? Howwas his p at ro l able to op era te so efficiently and on a mission so farremoved from the other tactical activities of the Sixth A rm y? Theanswers to these questions is the story of one of the most active, butlittle known, combat intelligence units to operate in the Pacific duringW orld W ar I I . It is also a lesson in how men m ay be selected andtrained for one of the primary requisites of combat intelligencegoodreconnaissance.Lieutenant Nellist and his men were a team of what was known inthe Southwest Pacific as "'Alamo Scouts," the word "Alamo" being thecode name for the Sixth Arm y. Th e idea of a special reconnaissanceunit to operate for, and under the command of, the army commandercan be attrib ute d to General K rueg er himself. At tha t tim e, Decemberof 1943, Six th A rm y he adqu arte rs was located on littl e GoodenoughIsla nd , just no rth of the eastern tip of New Guinea. In the samemonth, the Alamo Scout Training Center was established on nearbyFergusson Islan d unde r the direction of the Sixth A rm y G-2. Theofficers who were concerned with the selection and training of personnel for the Alamo Scout unit started with the theory that any malewho wears the army uniform can be designated as a "scout," but thatthere are comparably few who can be capable and dependable in thatcapacity. Reconnaissance, as it was envisioned for the Alam o Scoutunit, was a specialized military service requiring particular tem

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pera m ent and talen t. I t was believed, however, th a t men possessedof the proper qualities were not so rare as to discourage the project.Consequently a call for volunteers, both coihmissioned and enlisted,was made throughout the troops of the Sixth Army.In selecting men for training from among the volunteers who responded, the Sixth Army G-2 was guided by this thought:Foremost of the requisites of a good scout is that he be intelligent.This does not mean "well educated." He need not hold a degree, he neednot even have completed high school, though experience has proved thatthe better scouts are men who have at least completed high school. Hemust have "horse sense"be able to think logically and make sound deductions.Physically, a scout need not be a big man nor have the frame of an athlete. He must be strong enough to withstand fatigue on arduous marchesand he must have no physical defects or debilitating diseases. His vision

must be clear without the use of glasses and he must be a capable swimmer. This does not mean tha t he be merely able to swim. It means tha the must be able to swim in rough surf or over distances up to at least a halfmile. His physical vigor and resistance must be such that he is able totravel for weeks without the need of medical attention, since normally itwill be impossible for him to get such attention.Hand-in-hand with his intelligence and physical fitness, a scout needscourage and an attribute which may be called daring or a spirit of adventureand this is to be distinguished from recklessness and lack of reasonable judgment.Scouts are often called upon to make marches over tortuous terrain, upto 30 or 40 miles with lit tle rest and li ttle food. Trails and easy goingare normally forbidden him since he must not be seen. A man w ithoutgrit cannot do it. It takes courage, too, to get into a rubber boat with fiveor six other^men. paddle silently through darkness and land on an enemyshore where there are no friendly troops. Scout teams never know whetherthey have gone undetected or whether they are paddling into the hands ofan alert enemy. They do know that, if they are caught, there is virtua llyno hope for assistance. They must dare the risk.Being naturally observant is part of a scout's equipment, and in thisrespect, men from small communities and rural areas seem most gifted.City-bred men are not excluded, however. Some of them have made excellent scouts. In basic train ing , all soldiers get instruc tion in scouting andpatro lling, the use of the compass, and the use of cover and concealment. Ifthey have not shown a natural aptitude for these subjects, it is not likelythat they would make good scouts and time does not permit "starting fromscratch."Proper temperament or personality is the last requisite, but certainly not the least important. Teamwork is the key to successful scouting and

not every man is willing or temperamentally suited to. mold himself intopa rt of a small unit. Certainly initiative and individuality are desirable,since no one wants to work with a "deadhead," but a scout must harmonizehis individualism with tha t of other members of his team. Being bellicose,loud, "mouthy"being self-centered, contemptuous of others' opinions,unamenable to compromise, he will not succeed in this field.Thu s the Sixth A rm y G -2, when he issued a call for volunteers fromtroops then in the Southwest Pacific, had a pretty good idea as to the

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It was not unusual for an Alamo Scout team to precede an invasion force by severaldays into an enemy held area. In the Southwest Pacific, this meant night landingsin rubier boats on hostile shores an operation demanding plenty of courage.

type of men who were wanted for th is new un it. H e also knew howthey would be traine d, and laterem ployed to the utmost advantage.In response to the call for volunteers, applications were receivedfrom every type of un it and org aniz ation . Th ere were infantrymen,cavalrymen, engineers, paratroopersline privates, platoon sergeants,radio men, clerks, and drive rs. F ro m these a selection was made.Of the officers who volunteered, preference was given to the juniorgrades. Th is was not only because they were younger, but becausetheir job, com mand of a six-m an team , did not seem to call for officersof a hig he r ran k. The selection of officers was made with p ar ticula rcare. The officer scout leader, because of the method in which thescouts were to work, had to be able to hold the respect and confidenceof his men, and yet live and work with them in the closest of relationships. Th e officer held the role of the elder broth er. H e had to bethe guide, the stabilizing influence, but he could not use the arbitrarylast word of command, since each scout team planned and worked to

gethe r. In fact, when a team was in the field, it would have beendifficult for the casual observer to pick the officer leader from amonghis men.Of the first group of applicants, some 5 officers and 26 enlisted menwere selected and sent to the Alamo Scout Training Center on Fergusson Island.Since most of the subjects incorporated in the training program

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were not new to the potential scouts, 6 weeks proved to be sufficienttime in which to tra in each m an. The first Sy2 weeks of training wasspent mostly in the classroom studying such subjects as map and aerialphotograph reading, sketching, radio techniques, and message writing.Field work included, besides all the finer points of scouting and patrolling, the use of the compass, the handling of rubber boats, night landings with these craft, and beach reconnaissance. M arksm ansh ipwith all small arms was a requisite, and candidates for the AlamoScout unit were put through a conditioning program of vigorousphysical tra in ing . Th is included exercise, hikes, and swimming thelatter giving emphasis to underwater work.Instructors at the training center discovered that although allsoldiers are instructed in the rudiments of scouting and patrollingas part of their army training, surprisingly few of the volunteers werewell-versed in the techniques of reconnaissance when they enteredthe Alam o Scout school. A t interva ls du ring the tra in in g period,the officer students were called into consultation and asked to ratethe men who were assigned to them. Six-man teams were the s tan da rdworking unit of student scouts, and the personnel of these teams wererotated and chang ed-abou t weekly. W hen it became appa ren t tha ta student was not qualifying, he was relieved from duty at the schooland was return ed to his original organization. Thro ugh out the

Alamo Scouts learned to travel with a minimum of equipment. The standardwardrobe included little more titan fatigue hat, face paint, camoufluye suit, anindividual weapon with a minimum of ammunition and some web equipment.33


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During their existence as a unit, the Alamo Scouts performed over 60 combatintelligence missions. The information they delivered to the Sixth Army G-2 wasinvaluable, often resulting in the saving of American lives, and the destruction ofJapanese troops and installations.whole of the instruction, every attempt was made to instill an espritde corps among the students, and to give them a desire to qualify asa full-fledged Alamo Scout.The last 2 weeks of the training period was devoted to field workand problems approximating as closely as possible the actual types ofmissions the scouts would be called upon to perform "'when the chipswere down."W hen the 6 weeks of tr ai ni ng were over, the enlisted men studentswere given ballots on which they wrote, in order of preference, thenames of three officer students they would be most willing to followon a mission. By the same means, each officer s tuden t nam ed the sixmen he would most like to have on his scout team . Th e scout instructors added their own observations, and from this aggregate of opinionthe top men and officers were retained as scouts, the others returnedto their units.From the first class through the training center, four scout teamswere organized. On the whole, eig ht such classes were held fromtime to time, and from them came a total of 10 capable scout teams.These were the Alamo Scouts.The first combat mission of the Alamo Scouts was performed on34


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2G Fe br ua ry 194o, in the A dm iralty Isla nd s. Fro m then on the unitwas a going concern. Nigh t land ing s and secret reconnaissance missions then preceded nearly every one of the many seaborne invasionsstaged by the troops of the Six th Arm y. A lthou gh the scouts functioned primarily for the Sixth Army commander, teams were often"loaned" to task force commanders for specific operations.As the Sixth Army moved west along the New Guinea coast, andthence north to the Philippines, many lessons were learned throughactua l op era tion al experience. Some of the first scouts to be sent outcarried too much food. Scou ting far from friendly troops, and oftendeep in enemy-occupied territory, kept nerves in such a state of tensionthat much food was ne ithe r desired nor necessary. A t first it wasa standard practice to deflate and hide the rubber boat, but the whistling noise made by the escaping aira noise that might have betrayed the presence of the patrol at night to nearby enemy troopsseemed to make it more advisable to have a contact crew return theboat to a w aiting P T craft. I t was learned thro ugh experience thatscouts should carry only the bare necessities of their trade, and thatit was necessary to plan each mission down to the finest detail.

W hen the Sixth A rm y was ope rating in the New G uinea area, AlamoScout missions were confined prim ar ily to reconnaissance . B ut afterthe initial landings in the Philippines, the scouts took over another,and, in some way s, larg er assignment. I t was realized tha t the manygue rrilla units scattered througho ut the islands offered a fine poten tialsource of intelligence in addition to their role of harassing the enemy.For this reason, Alamo Scout teams on many occasions were sent to

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distant areas, nominally enemy controlled, and there coordinated theactivities of rival guerrilla bands, established efficient guerrilla intelligence collecting systems, and relayed this intelligence by radio backto the Sixth Arm y G-2.On the whole, the Alamo Scout unit performed more than 60separate combat intelligence missions similar to that of LieutenantNellist and his team . I n so doing, they pro ved th at the idea of. anarmy reconnaissance unit was not only sound, but often extremelyvaluable. An d despite w ha t was with out d oubt a hazardou s business, the careful selection of personnel, the conscientious trainingand, they w ill admit, luck the unit w as able to finish t he w ar w ithouta single scout killed on any of the missions they perfo rm ed.During their existence as a unit, the information provided by thescouts to their commanding general saved lives, altered plans ofattack, and led to the destruction of enemy installations, troops, andshipp ing. They p artic ipat ed, successfully, in two prisoner rescueraids, and over a period of time bro ug ht in some 60 Japan ese prisonersfor questioningnot a mean feat in itself.In short, the Alamo Scouts, before they were disbanded at the endof the war, earned the tribute of their Army Commander, GeneralKrueger: "This little outfit has never failed the Sixth Army."

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The Nazi^Kamikazes

German LeadersFailed to Recognize aNew Counteramphibious TacticOne of the most hushed up secrets of the war, back before the surrender of Japan, was the damage and inconvenience caused by thesuicide-bent Kamikaze pilots of the Jap ane se A ir Force. Troop s whosailed to the invasion of Okinawa remember the BaJca bomb, thewinged aerial torped o with its hum an pilot. B ut not un til the endof the war, when intelligence officers began nosing around in theformer Nazi domain, was it disclosed that a small group of fanaticalNazis had also organized a suicide corps for the purpose of breakingup the seaborne invasion of the continent with a German version of

the Japanese Baka. In fact, there is much evidence to indicate that the Nazi suicidistswere laying their plans long before their Japanese allies conceivedthe idea for th is unc onv entional tactic. Only bureau crat ic inefficiency, and disinterest in official circles as high as Hitler himself,f orstalled the appe aranc e of Nazi Kamikazes in the air over Normandyon D-day.The inception of this strange project goes back to the year 1943,when the fortunes of war were beginning to turn against the hithertovictorious Germ an A rm y. A t th at time, many people in Germanywere beginning to see that the Fatherland would ultimately go downto defeat, unless some miraculous event produced a severe set-backto the Allied cause. Am ong these think ing Germ ans was a smallgroup of idealists who were determined to do something about it.These people, who at first numbered no more than 30 or 40 persons,came toge ther from all walks of life. Some of them were from theArmy, others were civilians, and one of the leaders was a well-knownGerman woman flyer.

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It was the common belief of these people that the war was lostunless a most decisive blow could be struck a ga ins t th e Allies. Theybelieved that this could only be accomplished by the complete disruption of the eventual Allied assault upon the continent, thus convincingthe Allied leaders that Germany was secure and impregnable withinher "fortress Europe."AN IDEA IS BORN

From this line of reasoning, the idea of a suicide corps was born.It was thought that a weapon could be devised in the form of a flyingbomb which, when piloted to its target, could sink a large warshipor troo p tra ns po rt. En ou gh of these, the idealists believed, couldcompletely wreck any seaborne invasion with an expenditure of lessth an 1,000 volunteer pilots. Th e mem bers of this strang e groupwere ready to volunteer. They asked only th at they be given a weaponwhich would be certain to achieve its end, and they felt there werepersons among their membership who had the skill to design such aweapon.B y October 1943, un de r the leade rship of the wom an flyer, a doctorof the Institute of Medical Aeronautics at Rechlin, and a first lieutenant of the Luftwaffe, organizational plans had advanced to a pointwhere it was necessary to obtain official recognition and cooperationin conducting the project furth er. Because of her unique positionin German aviation circles, this duty fell to the aviatrix.The woman first presented the idea to the Luftwaffe High Command, and met with immediate rebuff. The German Air Force wasnot interested in an idea they considered to be the unstable reasoningof a grou p of psychopa ths. A fter m uch delay, the Luftwaffe wasby-passed, and the aviatrix went directly to Field Marshall Milch, atth at time the head of the Germ an A ir M inistry. Ag ain no progresswas made.After more weeks had passed, the woman determined to exploit herposition and reputation in German aviation circles, and succeeded ingainin g a he arin g before the Germ an Academy of Aero nautics. Th isAcademy had the power to assemble the necessary scientists, technicians, and air tactical authorities, and eventually a meeting was

called by the Director of the German Aeronautical Research Council.After a lengthy conference, the committee of authorities decided thatthe idea was indeed operationally sound.With this authoritative evidence in hand, the next step before thegroup of idealists was to obtain official support and leadership forthe suicide pla n. Ap plication was m ade for an interview with H itle r,and in Fe b ru ar y 1944, the wom an leader of the project was summonedto Berchtesgaden for a 3-hour discussion with the Fuehrer.

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INTERVIEW WITH HITLERH it le r did not app rove . H e objected to the philosophy of suicideentailed in the plan, and pointed out that there was no precedent inGerm an his tory like it. Therefore , he said, the whole idea was no t inkeeping w ith the charac ter of the Germ an people. Th e wom an coun

tered this with the argument that never before in German history hadthe fate of the country been in such a preca rious position . Th is, apparently, was the wrong thing to say, for Hitler replied emphaticallytha t the position was not precarious, and that if it ever became so, thenhe, H itle r, would personally give the orders for such desperate measuresto be take n.The interview was anything but successful, but before she left, theaviatrix did obtain Hitler's permission to continue with the development and planning so that the organization would be ready to operateif ever the Fuehrer felt the time had come to take such desperate steps.His parting remark was to the effect that he did not want to be bothered with the idea again until the time for action was ripe.Meanwhile the group of suicide volunteers had grown to about 70or 80 mem bers. As yet no concerted recruit ing effort had been made,and such volu nteers as were accepted were a very select grou p. Onceaccepted, a candidate for membership in the suicide corps was required to take a pledge to the effect that "I hereby volunteer as a pilotof the man ned glider-bom b. I am convinced th at this action will endwith my death."On the basis of Hitler's permission to continue with the development of the program, the matter was laid before the Chief of theGeneral Staff of the Ge rm an A ir Force. H e half-hea rtedly assignedthe official direction of the project to the commander of a Luftwaffebomber wing that was engaged in all sorts of special operations andclandestine activities. A t first it appeared th at the pla n was finallyon the road to fruition, but it soon became evident that the newcommander accepted the assignment mostly because he saw in it themeans of receiving the glory and credit which would be brought bythe self-sacrifice of the volunteers under him.THE WEAPON

But at the same time, the German Air Ministry was ordered toperfect the technical preparations which would be necessary to putthe plan in to effect. The Messerschmitt 328, originally designed asa fighter or fighter bomber, was selected as the flying weapon to beused by the volunteers. Pro duc tion of the plane was ordered, butproceeded so slowly that the volunteers began to suspect that somesort of official sabotage was afoot. As a result , the suicide groupbegan to look around for another weaponone which was easy toproduce and would be available on sho rt order. Th e V - l "buzz bom b,"

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This is the Nazi version of the Japanese "Baka" bomb . It is driven by a typicalV-l jet engine. Carrying a load of explosive in the nose of this craft. Nazisuicide pilots planned to wreak destruction among our D-day fleet with thisiveapon. Although the weapon was developed, the plan went astray throughofficial indifference and bungling amo ng the higher echelons of the Nazi comm and.rebuilt to ca rry a pilot, was decided upon. In less th an 3 weeks, fourtypes of this piloted missile were ready for testing.Contrary to the wishes of the volunteer group, the Luftwaffe testingdivision insisted upon using thei r own pilots for the test flights. Thetw o Luftwaffe men were soon seriously injured, and it was then thatthe woman pilot was called in and permitted to do the test flying.I t was not an easy proposition. In order to tra in the suicide pilots.a two-seater "buzz bom b" had been bu ilt. Of course, it was necessaryto land this model, if trainees were to be kept alive for the D-daymission. But since it was necessary to glide to a lan din g w ithoutpower, and since the m issile was not of conventional a ircr aft or gliderdesign, the approach to the runway was necessarily steep, and landing had to be made at speeds app roa ch ing 155 miles per hou r.

But as the technical development of the weapon went on with fairsuccess, the rest of the pro gra m began to go ast ray throu gh the bungling of the Luftwaffe officers pu t in cha rge of the voluntee rs. A lthoughthe suicide group at first believed the Luftwaffe wing commandertheone who had been appointed their official leaderwas fully behindtheir plan, it soon became evident that he had little sincere interest inthe projec t. W ha t was worse, he app ointed a staff of other Luftwaffeofficers to responsible plan ning and opera tiona l positions. These officers apparently had no conception of the original mission of the40


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volunteersto destroy the eventual Allied invasion fleet. Instead,they were continually fostering half-baked ideas, such as suicideattacks upon Soviet amm unition trains on the Ea stern Fro nt . Although the volunteers were willing to give their lives to deliver asmashing blow to the Allies, they were reluctant to die on some comparatively non-essential mission. Meawhile the tra in in g programhad also bogged down. Much tim e was spent in physical educationand pistol shooting, but little attention was paid to establishing asound flight tra ini ng progra m . The Luftwaffe Lieutenant, one ofthe original volunteers and who had been the spark plug behind thewhole idea, found himself helpless because of his low rank . Altho ughhe tried repeatedly to make improvements, he could do nothing buttake orders.Again the woman flyer was called upon to use her influence to tryand revive the rapid ly failing program . This time she went to Him m ler, in hopes that he might be able to do some good for the cause ofthe suicide volunteers. H imm ler was not much help. H e was notopposed to the suicide idea, but he was of the opinion that the membership of the corps should be made up of criminals and the incurablydiseased. H e offered to tak e over the pro gra m if one of his officerswas perm itted to assume the leadership of the entire plan . I t wasevident that under Himmler the plan would not receive any bettertreatment than it was getting under its present supervision, so hisoffer was turned down.D-DAY ARRIVES

About this time, the Allies took a hand in things by staging theirinvasion in No rm andy . Ne ither the suicide weapon, nor adequatelytrained suicide pilots were available, greatly because of the mishandling the whole program had received from its selfish or uninteresteddirectors. Th e disap poin tm ent of the volunteer grou p was profound.W ithin 6 or 7 days after D-d ay, they realized t ha t the invasion w as asuccess, and that the moment for which they had been preparing hadpassed.

But, several days after the invasion had started, and all otherefforts to halt it had failed, Herman Goering suddenly rememberedthat somewhere in his Luftwaffe there was a group of pilots who hadvolunteered for a suicide mission. I n due course, Goering reached thecommander of the bomber wing under whom the volunteers had originally been placed. The com mander, a colonel, imm ediately declaredth at the gro up was ready for action. The volunteers were astounded.They knew that no planes or "buzz bombs" were available, and thatonly a few of the men had any m ore th an t he briefest of preflight tr ain ing. Nonetheless, th e comm ander and his technical assistants, without consulting the volunteers, set to work on plans to use a Foche

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Wulf 190, carrying a 4,000-pound bomb, to crash into selected targets.Now no one in the German Air Force had ever flown this plane withsuch a large bomb load, and it was highly doubtful that the planewould be able to get off th e ground witho ut crashin g. Consequently,regular test pilots declined the honor of testing this experimentalmakeshift. U nd aun ted, the comm ander announced th at his suicidepilotsnone of whom had ever flown an FW 190, if any other planewould within the next few days conduct the test flights themselves.If they were killed, he said, their names and loyal sacrifice would berecorded in German history with the same honor they would havereceived if they had crashed their plane onto the deck of an enemyship. Any enthusiasm that had remained among the volunteers disappeared completely at this point.

Fortunately for these men, Hitler heard about the plans forusing the FW 190, and ordered the project abandoned. Th e bombercommander was removed, eventually, and his successor set about trying to salvage some of the finer ideas of the orig ina l project. B ut bythen it was too late. The Allies were established in force on the continent, the hour to strike had passed, and so the group of suicide volunteers was disbanded."And so," to quote the woman flyer, "did an idea that was born of"fervent and holy idealism , only to be misused and m ismanaged at everyturn by people who never understood how men could offer their livessimply for an idea in which they believed."CONCLUSION

Were it not for the grievous damage done to our fleet units a yearlater by the Japanese Kamikaze corps, this Germ an project m ightbe passed off as just another unconventional tactical venture which theGerm an leaders were sm art enough to recognize as no thin g but foolishness. But in the light of our later experience with the Japanese, it ispossible to draw the conclusion that the Nazi command failed to realizethey were being offered an impressive counterweapon to seaborne invasion. I t is useless, in retrosp ect, to atte m pt a reconstruction of whatm igh t have happ ened off No rmany on D-day, if the Nazi command hadrecognized the potentialities of these volunteers and their pilotedbomb. Although it is unlikely that the suicidists could have thusdefeated the invasion, the introduction of such an unconventionaltactic, if exploited on the scale later used by the Japanese, would certainly have offered another serious threat to an already difficult amphibious operation.

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SovietHand Grenades

With the possible exception of the trench knife, noweapon is as personal to the individual soldier as ishis hand grenade. In World War II, the grenadenearly replaced the rifle as the ground soldier'sbasic weapon. For exponents of the hand-thrownexplosive, here is a round-up of Soviet grenades andhow they work.

The hand grenade is not a new weapon. During World War I,grenades were used a great deal in the trench and position warfare ofthat conflict. Early in World W ar I, the British instructed theirtroops in methods of improvising hand grenades from empty jam tins,filled with explosive and scrap metal, a detonator inserted, and thewhole thing wrapped tightly with wire. Then the British developedthe Mills Bomb, a lemon-shaped grenade, very similar to those in usetoday.But World War I grenades were not the first. Grenades of onesort or another were used long before the Kaiser started his march in1914. The United States, a relative newcomer in the army business,used grenades in the Kevolution, as did the British . Even those wereJohnnie-come-lately grenades.Grenades, in spite ofor perhaps because oftheir early origin,have had an up-and-down history. After the Eevolution, grenadespractically vanished from the scene as the powers-that-be decided thatthe grenade was outmoded as a weapon. World War I , with its trenchwarfare and long stalemates, forced the grenade out of retirement andinto an improved status.The grenade, proven to be one of the most valuable of weapons tothe individual soldier, is well worth study. I t is not enough that thesoldier should be able to pull the pin and throw his own type of grenade; he should be able to make use of enemy grenades and those ofhis allies. Pick ing up an unknown type of grenade and trying to useit can be a dangerous business. For that reason, every soldier shouldbe interested in the grenades of other countries. The following is a

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description of the grenades used by the Red Arm y soldier. (See "TheRed Army Infantryman" in this issue of the Intelligence Bulletin.)Soviet grenades are generally similar to those of most of the othernations. The principle of operation is the same, though the detailsmay differ sligh tly. There are Russian types that to the casualobserver would appear to be just like our own grenade s. Oth er Russian models would remind the E T O vet of the German grenades. Eachtype presents its own peculiarities.M1914/30 DUAL-PURPOSE STICK GRENADE

The Red Army's M1914/30 grenade may be recognized by its cylindrical, crimped, sheet-steel head, with a tapering section that joins ametal hand le. Th is hand le is slotted on one side, and a firing leveris fitted in th is slot. Th is firing lever, if the grenade is not a dudwhich has been th row n, w ill be locked in place by a sliding-ring safety.If the serrated, cast-iron, fragmentation jacket is left on the grenade,it must be used as a defensive grenade, and thrown only from cover.If the fragmentation jacket is removed, the M1914/30 may be utilizedas an offensive grenade.This weapon is issued to Soviet troops without the detonator-delayassembly being assembled to the grenade. To arm the grenade, thesafety ring is slipped off the handle, and the firing lever is presseddown into its slot. Then the safety bar, which

intelligence bulletin ~ jun 1946

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