Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1992 - 1995

The role of the intelligence and security services

Dr. Cees Wiebes

Lit Verlag, Berlin/London

This is a background report serving as an appendix to the report Srebrenica, a ‘safe’ area, produced by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD).See for an English version of this report: www.srebrenica.nl

Overview of reportMain report: Srebrenica, a 'safe’ area. Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a Safe Area (11 July 1995) (NIOD) ISBN 90 5342 716 8Background report: Intelligence and the war in Bosnia, 1992-1995. The role of the intelligence services (C. Wiebes) ISBN 90 5352 742 7Background report: Western perceptions and Balkan realities (B. Naarden) ISBN 90 5352 743 5Background report: History, memory and politics in Eastern Bosnia (G. Duijzings) ISBN 90 5352 744 3Background report: Dutchbat III and the population: medical issues / Resupply by air (D.C.L. Schoonoord) ISBN 90 5352 790 7Set of main report + 4 background reports including CD-ROM with extra background reports ISBN 90 5352 745 1

English translation: Taalcentrum-VU, Amsterdam

© 2003 Dr Cees Wiebes

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored digitally or made public in any way whatsoever, either digitally mechanically, via photocopies, recordings or any other means, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

List of Acronyms and Terms

Introduction

Chapter 1: THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE 1. Introduction2. A definition of intelligence 3. Intelligence and UN peacekeeping operations4. Intelligence within the existing UN culture5. Intelligence support for UN peacekeeping operations6. The Military Information Office in Zagreb7. Conclusions

Chapter 2: THE WESTERN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA

1. Introduction2. The Western intelligence mindset3. The problems regarding intelligence liaison between Western intelligence

services4. The perception and information position of the Western intelligence services5. Conclusions

Chapter 3: THE NETHERLANDS INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA

1. Introduction2. The Foreign Intelligence Service3. The National Security Service4. The Military Intelligence Service (MIS)5. Intelligence gathering in the enclave under Dutchbats I, II and III6. The collaboration between MIS/CO and MIS/Army7. The output of the MIS/Air Force8. Support from UNPROFOR for the MIS9. Intelligence and the senior levels of the Ministry of Defence10. The MIS and Military Security11. Conclusions

Chapter 4: SECRET ARMS SUPPLIES AND OTHER COVERT ACTION1. Introduction2. Arms supplies to the Bosnian Muslims3. Secret arms supplies to the Bosnian Muslims 4. Military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs5. The deployment of mercenaries, advisers and volunteers6. Special Forces in Bosnia7. Conclusions

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Chapter 5: THE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE WAR OF THE WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN AND AROUND BOSNIA

1. Introduction2. The advantages and disadvantages of Signals Intelligence3. The most important Western Signals Intelligence organizations4. The international exchange of Signals Intelligence5. The results of Signals Intelligence in Bosnia6. Dutch Signals Intelligence in the Bosnian conflict7. Conclusions

Chapter 6: THE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE WAR OF THE WARRING FACTIONS

1. Introduction2. The Signals Intelligence War of the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs3. The Signals Intelligence operations of the Bosnian Muslims 4. Was the ABiH Signals Intelligence of the Bosnian Muslims real-time?5. UNPROFOR and Dutchbat as a target for communications intelligence 6. Conclusions

Chapter 7: IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE IN BOSNIA1. Introduction2. What instruments could be used and were used for imagery intelligence?3. Who was the imagery intelligence shared with?4. How were Albright’s satellite photos discovered?5. What photos were taken and on which dates?6. Conclusions

Chapter 8: WAS ‘SREBRENICA’ AN INTELLIGENCE FAILURE?1. Introduction2. What is an intelligence failure?3. Strategic prior knowledge4. The attack on Srebrenica5. The intelligence situation of UNPROFOR6. Did The Hague have prior knowledge?7. The foreign intelligence services8. Conclusions

Consulted ArchivesReferences: books & articlesIndex

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Acknowledgements

My thanks go first of all to the entire Srebrenica team, the members of which were

prepared to read the text contributions critically and to provide them with commentary. I

would particularly like to thank my intelligence ‘buddy’ Dr Bob de Graaff for this. My

gratitude is primarily directed, however, to my colleague and fellow Tuzlak, Dr Dick

Schoonoord, with whom I have undertaken many journeys and whose definitive texts for

the Srebrenica report constitute such a rich and valuable source. His contributions to Part

III of the main Srebrenica report were absolutely indispensable to this study.

Due to the specialist nature of this research and the imposed confidentiality, there

was very little opportunity to exchange ideas with civil servants, other researchers and

authors. I thus valued even more highly the trust shown to me by Matthew Aid, Richard

Aldrich, Mats Berdal, Richard Connaughton, Timothy Crawford, Volker Foertsch, Nik

Gowing, Alf Jacobson, Jan Kleffel, John Morrison, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, Lord

David Owen, Jeffrey Richelson, Tim Ripley, Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, Katherine

Schwering, Michael Smith, Milos Stankovic, Jan-Inge Svensson, Renaud Theunens,

Mark Urban, Pasi Välimäki and James Woolsey. In particular I would like to

acknowledge Ric Morgan. My thankfulness to him is enormous.

My thanks also go to Michael Herman, who organized a ‘Under Chatham House

Rules’ seminar at St. Anthony’s College in Oxford specially for this research project. I

must also thank Ted Kelly, the archivist at the Canadian Foreign Ministry in Ottawa and

the Department of Peacekeeping of the Ministry of Defence.

Finally, I extend many thanks to all the officers who work or worked for

domestic and foreign intelligence and security services and who were prepared to talk to

me on a confidential basis. These persons have supported the Srebrenica project in its

attempts to track down and clarify vague indications or unclear formulated questions.

This applies particularly to the many members of the Netherlands Military Intelligence

Service. Without the help of the Dutch and the international intelligence communities

this book would not have been written.

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List of Acronyms and Terms

ABiH Armija Bosna i HercegovinaAPC Armoured Personnel CarrierATM Air Task MessageAWACS Airborne Warning and Control SystemBfV Bundesamt für VerfassungsschutzBHC Bosnia-Hercegovina CommandBID Buitenlandse InlichtingendienstBND BundesnachrichtendienstBSA Bosnian Serb ArmyBSS British Security Services OrganizationBTF Balkan Task ForceBVD Binnenlandse VeiligheidsdienstCAOC Combined Air Operations CentreCDS Chief of the Defence StaffCEE Central and Eastern EuropeCENTCOM Central Command (US)CFIOG Canadian Forces Information Operations GroupCI Counter Intelligence CIA Central Intelligence AgencyCIC Current Intelligence CentreCINCSOUTH Commander in Chief Southern Europe (NATO)CIR Comité Interministériel du RenseignementCOMINT Communications Intelligence COS Chief of StaffCOS Chief of Station (CIA)CSE Communications Security EstablishmentCVIN Committee on the United Intelligence Services in the NetherlandsDARO Defense Airborne Reconnaissance OfficeDCBC Defence Crisis Management CentreDDIS Danish Defence Intelligence ServiceDFC Deputy Force CommanderDGSE Direction Generale de la Securité ExterieureDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDIS Defence Information SummaryDIS Defence Intelligence StaffDMZ Demilitarized ZoneDND Department of National DefenseDPA Department of Political AffairsDPKO Department of Peace Keeping OperationsDRM Direction de Renseignement MilitaireDSF Deployed Shed FacilityDSD Defence Signals DirectorateDST Direction de la Surveillance du TerritoireECMM European Commission Monitoring MissionELINT Electronic IntelligenceERRF European Rapid Reaction ForceESDI European Security and Defence Identity

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ESDP European Security and Defence PolicyEU European UnionEUCOM European Command (US)FBI Federal Bureau of InvestigationFC Force CommanderFISINT Foreign Instrumentation Intelligence FRY Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)GCHQ Government Communications HeadquartersGPS Global Positioning SystemGMO Gratis Military OfficersHF High FrequencyHIC High Intensity ConflictHUMINT Human IntelligenceHV Hrvatska VojskaHVO Hrvatsko Vijece OdbraneIAEA International Atomic Energy AuthorityICFY International Conference on the Former YugoslaviaICRC International Commission of the Red CrossIDB Inlichtingendienst Buitenland IFOR Implementation Force (NATO – Bosnia)IMINT Imagery Intelligence INTERFET International Force East TimorIOB Intelligence Oversight Board JAC Joint Analysis Center JARIC Joint Aerial Reconnaissance Intelligence CentreJCO Joint Commission ObserverJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJIC Joint Intelligence CommitteeJNA Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija KFOR Kosovo ForceKLA Kosovo Liberation ArmyLIC Low Intensity ConflictLOCE Linked Operational Intelligence Centre EuropeMIC Mid Intensity ConflictMICIV Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security ServicesMID Militaire InlichtingendienstMIO Military Information OfficeMIS Netherlands Military Intelligence ServiceMPRI Military Professional Resources IncorporatedMSC Military Staff Committee of the United NationsMSF Médecins sans FrontièresNAC North Atlantic CouncilNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationNETHNIC Netherlands National Intelligence CellNFZ No Fly ZoneNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationNIE National Intelligence EstimateNIMA National Imagery and Mapping AgencyNORAD North American Air Defense AgreementNPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center

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NSA National Security AgencyNRO National Reconnaissance OfficeNSC National Security CouncilOP Observation PostOPSTINA District of local government in Bosnia HerzegovinaORCI Office for Research and the Collection of InformationOSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in EuropeOSINT Open Source Intelligence OVIC Operational Sigint Centre in the NetherlandsPDD Presidential Decision DirectivePGP Pretty Good PrivacyPHOTINT Photo Intelligence PJHQ Permanent Joint HeadquartersPRD Presidential Review DirectiveRADINT Radar Intelligence RM Royal MarinesRS Republika SerpskaSACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)SAM Surface to Air MissileSAS Special Air ServicesSAT Southern Air TransportSATINT Satellite IntelligenceSBP Staff Bureau Foreign Political DevelopmentsSBS Special Boat ServicesSCS Special Collection ServiceSEAD Suppression of Enemy Air DefenceSFOR Stabilisation Force (NATO – Bosnia)SGR Service Generale de ReinseignementSHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)SHED Special Handling and Evaluation DetachmentSIE Special Intelligence EstimateSIGINT Signals Intelligence SIS Secret Intelligence ServiceSISMI Servizio Informazioni e Sicurezza MilitareSNE Sector North EastSPOT Système Pour l’Observation de la TerreSVIC Strategic Sigint Centre in the NetherlandsSWENIC Swedish National Intelligence CellTAB Tuzla Air BaseTACRECCE Tactical Air ReconnaissanceTACSAT Tactical Satellite Radio TIVC Royal Netherlands Navy Technical Information Processing CentreTWRA Third World Relief AgencyUAV Unmanned Aerial VehicleUN United NationsUNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer ForceUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNHCR United Nations High Commission for RefugeesUNMIK United Nations Mission in KosovoUNMO United Nation Military Observer

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UNOSOM United Nations Operation in SomaliaUNPROFOR United Nations Protection ForceUNPF United Nations Protection ForceUNSCOM United Nations Special Commission in IraqUSMC United States Marine CorpsVHF Very High FrequencyVJ Vojska JugoslavijaVOPP Vance Owen Peace PlanVRS Vojska Republika SrpskaWEU Western European Union

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Introduction

Sarajevo was a nest of spies at the time of the war in Bosnia.

Everyone spied on everyone: the warring parties as well as the

countries of the UN peacekeeping force.1

On 3 March 1994, 570 Dutch peacekeepers formally relieved the Canadian soldiers

who had been stationed in Srebrenica since 1993. Within the framework of the United

Nations peace mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Dutch unit arrived there as part of

the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The Dutch battalion (Dutchbat)

was placed in a small town located in East Bosnia in a deep valley with steep

mountainsides, close to the river Drina. Except for a couple of days in April 1992, the

Bosnian Muslim Army, the Armija Bosne i Hercegovine (ABiH), had control of the

town – which was declared a Safe Area by the UN Security Council on 6 May 1993 –

for three years of the war. However, Srebrenica was never completely demilitarized

and small-scale confrontations around the enclave would continue to take place for

more than two years. A Bosnian-Serb attack on Srebrenica started on 6 July 1995. The

ABiH was not in a position to defend the enclave, and the Dutch soldiers had neither

the resources nor the mandate for the purpose.

When on 11 July the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica was captured by the

Bosnian Serb Army, the Vojska Republika Srpska (VRS), under the leadership of

General Ratko Mladic, an ethnic cleansing operation began in which a large proportion

of the Muslim men would be executed. Between 6 and 20 July, the Bosnian Serbs

gained control of ‘the safe areas’ Srebrenica and Zepa, and drove out tens of thousands

of Bosnian Muslims. Under the eyes of Dutchbat, the women, children and elderly

were deported to Bosnian territory. Out of view of the Dutch peacekeepers, more than

10,000 men and boys, walking in a long line, tried to get from Srebrenica to the area

around Tuzla, which was under the control of the Bosnian government. Several

thousands became the victim of encounters with the Bosnian Serbs or fell into the

hands of the VRS during that journey. They were killed in a horrifying way.

This study is an appendix to the Srebrenica report by the Netherlands Institute

for War Documentation (NIOD). A central position in the study is occupied by the

1 'Sarajevo zat vol spionnen in oorlog' ('Sarajevo was full of spies during war'), Het Parool, 24/04/98.

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role of national and international intelligence and security services in the war in

Bosnia in general and Srebrenica in particular.

From the outset, much remained unclear regarding the fall of the enclave,

something, which was also considered on 18 August 1995 in the Dutch Ministerial

Council. A minister was of the opinion that more information should be made

available about the events before and after the fall of Srebrenica. According to this

minister, this also applied to the role of the Western intelligence services prior to the

attack on Srebrenica.2

This investigation sets out to satisfy this wish. The study has three objectives.

Firstly, it is the intention to present in as much detail as possible the information

position of the most important Western intelligence and security services during the

war in Bosnia. The relevant question is what opportunities these services had for

following the developments in East Bosnia. Secondly, this study sets out to examine

whether these services were used in the armed conflict around Srebrenica. Finally, an

objective of this investigation is to establish the information position of the Dutch

intelligence and security services: were these services in a position to support the

Dutch peacekeepers in Bosnia satisfactorily?

These three objectives lead to the question: did the Western intelligence

services have prior knowledge of the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica? If the answer

is no, the next question is why not? Was it an intelligence failure? However, if there

was prior knowledge, the question then is what was done with this information, and

whether that intelligence could not have prevented the attack on Srebrenica and the

subsequent executions.

It was no simple matter to try to obtain answers to the above questions and to

satisfy the above objectives. Foreign intelligence and security services were not

prepared to provide the NIOD investigators with direct access to the intelligence they

had gathered. Fortunately, some services were prepared to provide some degree of

insight into their information position through confidential briefings or background

discussions. For the Srebrenica report by the Netherlands Institute for War

Documentation (NIOD) more than 900 persons were interviewed. Ultimately, as

regards this study off-the-record discussions were held with one hundred people in the

Netherlands and other countries: many were officers who were involved in intelligence

2 Objectivized summary of the minutes of the Ministerial Council meeting of 18/08/95, prepared for the purposes of the present NIOD study.

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work in Bosnia. This involved not only many former or still active staff of intelligence

and security services, but also responsible ministers, politicians, diplomats and officials

that acted as recipients of intelligence products concerning Bosnia.

Inevitably, these one hundred off-the-record interviews did have consequences

for the references of this study. This is why in the acknowledgement of sources, this

study regularly has to resort to references such as 'Confidential interview'.3 Staff of

foreign intelligence and security services were prepared to speak to the NIOD on

condition that their identities were protected in view of privacy considerations,

because disclosure of their names and identities could considerably impede their work

as analysts or operators in the future, or make it completely impossible, or because the

prevailing legislation in their country did not permit it. Anonymity was promised by

the NIOD to a large number of current and former staff of services in the Netherlands

and other countries for reasons of their own. It was therefore necessary to opt for the

footnote form that has been used. The most important consideration in making this

choice was that the main issue was to reconstruct a general picture and not to establish

the specific influence of individual people on the course of events.

Moreover, there will be regular references to ‘Confidential information’. In

general, these are written sources that the archive controller still considers to be

confidential, or documents that have been passed to the NIOD privately, but which are

still classified as ‘secret’ in the country concerned. It goes without saying that every

effort has been made to verify the statements by means of supplementary interviews,

background briefings or archival research whenever this was permissible.

History is a discussion without end. This is all the more true for the history of

intelligence and security services, the archive material of which is subject to far longer

terms than other government archive material before disclosure is permitted. Researchers

are generally not given access to catalogues, but have to ask for relevant documents more

or less in the dark. Also because of confidentiality agreements imposed on staff does

information on intelligence and security services reach researchers, and consequently the

public, and then after a much longer period than in other cases. Whereas, with history of

other kinds, the picture of the subject generally changes in the course of time only as a

result of new points of view. In the case of the history of intelligence and security

services, new information can continue to lead to an adjustment of the picture for far

longer.

3 The number in brackets after the Confidential interview note refers to the interviewee concerned.

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Fortunately this was not the case in the research for this study where Dutch

archives were concerned.4 Generous access was given to the archives by the

Netherlands intelligence and security services, especially the Military Intelligence

Service (MIS), where the author was able to make independent selections. In a number

of cases, more detailed agreements had to be made for specific sources. These cases

were concerned with the unity of the Crown, the private lives of those involved and

the Netherlands national security and security of the state. The latter point was

especially relevant to sources for the activities of Dutch and other intelligence and

security services. In particular, the identity of informants, the origin of information

that was gathered by these services and the relationship of trust with foreign

counterpart services had to be protected. An additional study of related archives was

also carried out in the Netherlands, for example at the Cabinet Office, Foreign Affairs,

Defence, and Justice. Comprehensive research in the archives of the United Nations in

Geneva and New York sometimes yielded additional background material.

It was also possible to speak freely with a large number of staff of the MIS and

the Netherlands National Security Service (BVD). In addition to the usual privacy

considerations, the fact that disclosure of their names and identities would impede or

make impossible their future work as analysts or operators with intelligence and

security services it was necessary to opt for referring to these more than thirty

interviews as ‘confidential interviews’.

Finally, we must not omit to mention that much information for this study was

obtained from open sources. Historical research is usually based on all available

literature on the events to be studied. At the start of this investigation, it was expected

that a large number of publications would not be relevant. However, it turned out that

articles in daily and weekly newspapers and some books actually contained more

information than originally thought. This concerned the history of the Balkans in

general and how this was represented, as well as the history of the conflict in

Yugoslavia. Some of those involved wrote memoirs. In addition, private and

government archive collections in Canada, the United States and several Western

European countries were studied. Against this background it is only possible to state that

the author has attempted in all good faith to verify the data issued to the institute. The

possibility of errors cannot be ruled out. But this should not discourage anyone from

writing about the role of intelligence and security services.

4 De Graaff & Wiebes, Villa Maarheeze, pp. 9 - 25.

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Dr. Cees Wiebes Amsterdam, 1 February 2003

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