inpro review for regulatory aspect in indonesia

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INPRO Review for Regulatory Aspect in

Indonesia

Technical Meeting to Updating the Review of the INPRO

Methodology, 15-17 November 2016

Djoko Hari Nugroho

Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency of Indonesia

(BAPETEN)

Introduction

Regulatory Approach

INPRO Draft Review

Outline

Aceh

92,31%Sumut

91,03%

Sumbar

80,14%

Riau

84,54%

Sumsel

76,38%

Bengkulu

83,47%

Babel

95,53%

Lampung

81,27%

Jakarta

99,61%

Banten

92,93%

Jabar

86,04%

Jateng

88,04%

Jambi

80,70%

DIY

82,26%

Jatim

83,55%

Bali

85,17%

NTT

58,91%

Kalbar

79,77%

Kalsel

83,75%

Kaltim

91,71%

Sulut

85,53%

Sulteng

75,58%

Sulsel

85,05%

Malut

90,52%

Maluku

82,22%

Papua

43,46%

CATEGORY

> 70 %

50 - 70 %

< 50 %

Sulbar

74,11%

Kepri

74,06%

Sultra

66,78%

Papua Barat

77,81%

Kalteng

67,23%

NTB

68,05%

Gorontalo

74,65%

Kaltara

69,64%

Electrification Ratio (2014)

NEC : Energy Mix Target

4

Source : Secretary General of National Energy Council

Projection of Energy Supply & Contribution Ratio

5Source : Energy Outlook - BPPT, 2016

Current Issues

(Gen-IV):

• SFR

• LFR

• GFR

• VHTR

• SWR

• MSR

HTGR-BATANr

Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency of Indonesia (BAPETEN)

• Main function of BAPETEN (Act no. 10 / 1997):

– To regulate the utility of nuclear energy through managing regulation, licensing and inspection, with the aim to ensure the welfare, security and peace of people, to assure the safety and health of workers and public, and the environmental protection, and to prevent diversion of purpose of the nuclear material utilization

The Role of BAPETEN

BAPETEN

TENORM

Nuclear Research Reactors(BATAN)

� RSG-GAS (30 MW)

� TRIGA-2000 (2 MW)

� KARTINI (100 kW)

Nuclear InstallationsBATAN

� Nuclear Installations non

ReactorNon-BATAN

� RR Fuel Element Prod. Inst.

� Yellow Cake Prod. Inst.

NPPNuclear Materials

At Reactor and Non Reactor

Medical and Industries� X-Ray

� Therapy Facilities

� Irradiator

� Radioactive Sources

� Etc

Regulatory Infrastucture in Indonesia

MEMR

Industry, Hospital BATAN

Nuclear Application:

- Industrial, and

- Medical purposes

R&D

Other Applcations

Nuclear Power

Plants (NPPs)

BAPETEN

PRESIDENT RoI

NEC

MoI, MoH, etc.

ELECTRIC

COMPANY

Regulatory Supervison Framework

Licensing Inspections Regulations

Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN)

to ensure SAFETY AND SECURITY of Nuclear Utilizations

Research Center and

Technical Support

Emergency Preparedness and

Engineering Center

Regulatory Function

REGULATIONREGULATION

LICENSING INSPECTION

TECHNICAL

SUPPORTS

• Regulatory control is

performed through 3

main function, i.e.:

Regulation,

Licensing, and

Inspection.

Technical Supports

• provides assessments

and recommendations

regarding the

regulation, licensing

and inspection

Structure of Organization

President of RI

Dit. for Regulation of RFRM

Center for Reg. Ass of NIM

Center for Reg. Ass. of RFRM

Dit. for Regulation of NIM

(Nucl. Installation &

Materials)

Dep. for Nuclear

Safety Assessment

Dit. for Licensing of RFRM

Dit. for Inspection of NIM

Dit. for Inspection of RFRM

Dit. for Engg.& Em.Prep.

Dit. for Licensing of NIM

(Nucl. Installation &

Materials)

Dep. for Licensing

and Inspection

Chairman of

BAPETEN

Bureau for Leg. & Org.

Planning Bureau

General Affairs

Executive Secretary

Training and Education Unit

Internal Auditor

HIERARCHY OF LAW & REGULATION

Authoritative Regulations

Chairman BAPETEN Decree

Government

regulations

Presidential

Decree

LAWBasic principles in safety arrangement for the development and

beneficial use of nuclear energy.

Nuclear Energy Act 10 Year 1997, Chapter II Articles 3

•Government Regulation on “Nuclear Installations and

Nuclear Materials Utilizations Licensing” No. 2 Year 2014

(Further requirements on the design safety of nuclear

reactors and on the preparation of the documents submit

for licensing)

Regulation based on Law

•Government Regulation on “ Safety and Security of

Nuclear Installations” No. 54 Year 2012

Guidelines

Licensing

Inspections

� Main Data Reactor Evaluations Instructions Document

� Safety Analysis Report Evaluations Instructions Document

� Design Nuclear Reactor Inspections Instructions Document

INTRODUCTION

Hierarchy of Legislation System

Act No.101997

GR No.46 Year 2009Nuclear Liability

GR No.54 Year 2012Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation

BCR No.6 Year 2012Software for Computer Based System

Important to Safety in NPPNS-G-1.1

BCR No.3 Year 2010Design of Fuel Handling and Storage

System For NPPNS-G-1.4

BCR No. 1 Year 2012Protection Against Internal Fires and

Explosion In the Design of NPPNS-G-1.7

BCR No.7 Year 2011Design of Emergency Power System for NPP

NS-G-1.8

Draft BCR No….Year….Design Safety of NPP

BCR No.2 Year 2012Protection against Internal Hazard Other

Than Fire and Explosion Design of NPPNS-G-1.11

BCR No.3 Year 2011Safety for NPP Design

NS-R-1

BCR No.6 Year 2008External Human Induce Event in Site

Evaluation for NPPNS-G-3.1

BCR No.3 Year 2008Dispersion of Radioactive Material in Air

And Water and Consideration of PopulationDistribution in Site Evaluation For NPP

NS-G-3.2

BCR No.4 Year 2008Geotechnical Aspect of Site Evaluation and

Foundation for NPPNS-G-3.6

BCR No.5 Year 2007Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installation

NS-R-3

GOV. REGULATION BAPETEN CHAIRMAN REGULATIONS

Legend

In Preparation

In Reviewing & Assessment Process

Published

Act

Per – June 2016

GR No.29 Year 2008Licensing the use of

Ionizing Radiation Sources andNuclear Materials

GR No.33 Year 2007Safety of Ionizing Radiation &Security of radioactive sources

BCR No.4 Year 2008Geotechnical Aspect of Site Evaluation and

Foundation for NPP

BCR No.8 Year 2013Seismic aspect of Site Evaluation

for Nuclear InstallationSSG-9

SITING CONSTRUCTION DESIGN

GR No.2 Year 2014Licencing on Nuclear Installation

And Nuclear MaterialUtilization

Draft BCR No.... Year ....Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installation

GR No.61 Year 2013Management of Radioactive

Waste

GR No.58 Year 2015Radiation Safety and Security in

Transport of Radioactive Source

BCR No.6 Year 2014Meteorological and Hydrological aspect of

Site Evaluation for Nuclear InstallationSSG-18

BCR No.5 Year 2015Volcanology aspect of

Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installation

BCR No.3 Year 2008Dispersion of Radioactive Material in Air

And Water and Consideration of PopulationDistribution in Site Evaluation For NPP

BCR No…Year….Construction for NPP

Government Regulation

• GR No 54/2012 provides the general provisions governing the safety and security of nuclear power plants and responsibilities of licensees. It also provides provisions for a national nuclear emergency preparedness and response system.

• GR No 2/2014 defines the licensing stages for nuclear power plants. It contains the provisions for applications for different licensing stages; documents to be provided along with these applications; review and assessment; and decision making mechanisms, for the different licenses issued by BAPETEN

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Licensing of Nuclear Reactors

I. LICENSE FOR CONSTRUCTING OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

a. License of Site; and

b. License of Construction

II. LICENSE FOR OPERATING OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

a. License of Commissioning; and

b. License of Operation

III. LICENSE OF DECOMMISSIONING

LICENSE REQUIREMENTS :

a. ADMINISTRATION

b. TECHNICAL (ENVIRONMENT LICENSE); and

c. FINANCIAL (apply for commercial NPP and Non-power Reactors)

MULTI STEPS (5 Steps):

– Site License

– Construction License

– Commissioning License

– Operating License

– Decommissioning License

Before construction license application, the applicant shall request a designapproval from BAPETEN Chairman with requirements :

1. Detail Design of Nuclear Reactor; and

2. Safety Analysis Report.

• Application to construct nuclear reactor must include Safety Analysis Report document

• BAPETEN will evaluate the document and publish the Safety Evaluation Report

Safety Evaluation

Applicant

Evaluation by

BAPETEN

BCR 3/2011 provides design requirements for safety design of

nuclear power plants

Article 2 :

(1)This BCR aims to provide safety requirements for license holders to ensure the design and safety analysis of the reactor design so that power can be operated safely in all conditions.

(2) safety requirements in design as referred to in paragraph (1) shall include:

a. General design requirements; and

b. Special design requirements.

(3) The condition of the installation as referred to in paragraph (1) shall include:

a. normal operation;

b. anticipated operational occurrences; and

c. design basis accidents and beyond design accidents 19

Regulation on Design Requirement

Article 3

• The licensee must ensure that the power reactor is designed with a high degree of reliability to achieve the objectives of nuclear safety.

Article 4

• The licensee must ensure that power reactors are designed with a high degree of reliability to achieve the objectives of nuclear safety

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Article 5

(1) The purpose of nuclear safety as referred to in Article 4 includes general purpose and special purpose nuclear safety.

(2) The general purpose of nuclear safety as referred to in paragraph (1) is to protect workers, the public and the environment is done through the efforts of an effective defense against the onset of radiation hazards in power reactors.

(3) The specific objectives of nuclear safety as referred to in paragraph (1) covers the radiation protection objective and a technical safety objectives.

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(4) The purpose of radiation protection referred to in paragraph (3) include:

a. ensure the radiation exposure of any installation conditions or any release of anticipated radioactive substances from the plant as low as that in practice can be achieved and under the specified dose limiting; and

b. ensure mitigation of the radiological consequences of an accident caused during the operation of power reactors.

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(5) technical safety objective referred to in paragraph (3) are:

a. to prevent the occurence of accidents during the operation of power reactors as well as to mitigate the radiological consequences if accidents still happen;

b. to ensure the high level of confidence that all the accidents that have been considered in the design of power reactor provides the lowest possible risk; and

c. to ensure that accidents with serious radiological consequences have a very small probability.

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• Article 6 :

The effective defense which articulated in the Article 5, paragraph 2 above is realized through the implementation of defense in depth to meet basic safety function of the reactor

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Article 7 :

Defense in Depth as referred to in Article 6 include:

a. level 1, failure prevention and anticipated operational occurrences performed with conservative design, construction and operation of high quality;

b. level 2, prevention of the development of anticipated operational occurrences into accidents through control of anticipated operational occurrences and failure detection is performed by the control system, restrictions and protection as well as other surveillance features;

c. level 3, control design basis accident conditions to bring the reactor to a controlled state and maintain the confinement of radioactive substances with the engineered safety features and accident procedures; 25


d. level 4, to control of the severe conditions to keep the lowest possible release of radioactive material, including propagation prevention of accidents and mitigation of severe accidents is conducted with additional effort and accident management;

e. Level 5, mitigating the radiological consequences of a significant release of radioactive material, which is conducted by the nuclear emergency response measures both inside and outside the site.

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Article 8 :

Basic safety function of the reactor as referred to in Article 6 include:

a. controlling the reactivity;

b. transfer heat from the reactor core; and

c. confine the radiation and radioactive substances.

Article 9 :

(1) Basic of the reactor safety functions referred to in Article 8 must be carried out during operation status, during and after going DBA, and accidents that exceed the specified DBA.

(2) The permit holder must identify the structures, systems and components required to perform safety functions referred to in paragraph (1) in accordance with the specified PIE.

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Article 10 :

(1) The license holder must establish the current codes and standards to structures, systems and components important to safety.

(2) In the case of used codes and standards different structures, systems and components are different, a license holder must ensure equality of codes and standards in accordance with the classification.

(3) Codes and standards referred to in paragraph (1) and (2) must meet the applicable standards in Indonesia.

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Article 13 :

• Conservative design should be applied, and good engineering practices must be followed for the entire power reactor operating conditions so as to ensure there is no significant damage to the reactor core and radiation exposure remains below the limiting value

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Article 14 :

• Power reactor which couples to the heat utilization installation and / or water desalination installation must be designed to prevent the transfer of radioactive substances from nuclear reactors to the heat utilization installation and / or water desalination installation under normal operating conditions, anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions.

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Article 15

(1) The license holder shall establish an independent team outside of the designer.

(2) The license holder and the team responsible for the integrity of the power reactor design for the lifetime of the reactor.

(3) In carrying out its responsibilities, the team assigned to conduct the confirmation of design in achieving safety objectives and requirements.

(4) In determining the team referred to in paragraph (1) The license holder remains responsible for the safety.

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Article 31

(1) power reactor should be designed to consider the operator actions that may be needed to diagnose the state of the installation and to shutdown at the right time.

(2) To support the operator actions, the design should provide instrumentation system for monitoring the state of the installation and control the operation of the equipment manually.

Article 32

Any equipment necessary for manual actions must be placed at appropriate locations so as to facilitate operator access.

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Article 33

(1) power reactors must be designed to anticipate accidents beyond the design basis and severe accidents through prevention and mitigation measures.

(2) In anticipation of accidents as referred to in paragraph (1), should be considered:

a. identification of the sequence of important events that tend to accident through a combination of probabilistic methods, deterministic, and includes technical considerations;

b. Assessment of the sequence events as described in the a based on the established criteria to determine the accident;

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c. evaluation of potential design changes or procedural changes that can reduce the probability of occurrence or mitigate the consequences of accidents were determined as described in paragraph b;

d. Maximum design capabilities including the use of reactor safety systems and other systems which go beyond its functions, as well as the use of an additional system to restore the installation to a controlled state and or mitigate the consequences of severe accidents;

e. use of available means and or support from other units at one site if there is more than one reactor unit; and

f. determination of accident management by considering the most dominant accident.

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Regulation Improvement

Reason of improvement :

• NS-R-1 has been revised to IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. SPECIFIC SAFETY REQUIREMENTS SSR-2/1 in 2012.

• There are some fundamental changes that need to be observed parts that undergo changes when the standard SSR-2/1 will be adopted in the BCR.

• Several current issues that need attention, i.e. BATAN planned to utilize HTR in Indonesia and safety aspects of nuclear reactors after Fukushima accident

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Area of Improvement

(I) the emphasis on the independence and effectiveness of the different levels in the DID to prevent the release of radioactive materials massively,

(Ii) the more stringent requirements related to external hazards,

(Iii) the specific requirements of the support system and auxiliary system,

(Iv) revision and the new definition, eg Design Extension Condition,

(V) expansion of basic coverage design explicitly to include severe accidents in the design,

(Vi) the radiological consequences qualitatively acceptable to accident conditions (DBA and DEC),

(Vii) the design requirements that take into account the mitigation measures for severe accidents,

(Viii) the provision of design, which requires all the conditions for potentially cause radioactive releases early and massive can be eliminated. 36

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Regulation Improvement

INPRO Document Draft Review

UR1 Robustness of design during normal operation:

The nuclear reactor assessed should be more robust relative to a reference design regarding system and component failures as well as operation.

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UR2 : Detection and Interception AAO and Failures The nuclear reactor assessed should detect and intercept deviations

from normal operational states in order to prevent AAO from escalating

to accident condition


CR2.1 I&C : systems and inherent characteristics

IN2.1: Capability of I&C system to detect and intercept and/or inherent characteristics of the nuclear reactor assessed to compensate deviations from normal operational states

INPRO has defined the following evaluation (EP) parameters for CR2.1:

• EP2.1.1: continuous monitoring of plant health.

Computerized aids to operators. State-of-the-art I&C systems are

digital -> computer security issues which should be anticipated

Taking advanced system modeling and computer capabilities into account, advanced control systems including expert systems (artificial intelligence methods) could be implemented in the longer term -> maturity of technology vs conservativisme issues


Nuclear Facilities (publically known attacks)

Multiple computer security incidents have impacted nuclear facilities

Monju NPP

(Japan)Compromise of

control room

computer and release

of information

(2014)

Korea Hydro and

Nuclear Power

(KHNP) Computer compromise

and release of NPP

documents

(2014)

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Gundremmingen

NPP

(Germany)Computer virus’s

found on plant IT

systems and media.

(2016)

Soure : IAEA Course in Computer Security

4.4.2. Criterion CR2.2: grace period after AOO and failures

Indicator IN2.2: Grace period until human actions are required

In case of deviations from normal plant states, the time period for the operator to cope with such deviations can be divided into three different time periods:

1) Time to detect; 2) Time to diagnose the deviations and to initiate the necessary counter measures; and 3) Time for manual control actions, i.e. time for a repair or other measures.

• It is common practice to assume that within a time period of no longer than 30 minutes the operator will have detected and identified the situation sufficiently to perform appropriate manual actions based on the fact that operators are trained to cope with anticipated operational occurrences. Therefore, the design of the reactor should be such that all necessary safety related actions within this time period are automated.

• Issue of diversification between digital & analog RPS based on the level of confidence 42


Automation Level

Sheridan’s Automation Level

43Automatic fault detection and diagnosis -> using artificial intelligent

Human-Machine Collaboration

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Attribute Human Capabilities Machine Capabilities

Speed Slow Superior

Power Weak Superior in level & consistency

Consistency Unreliable learning and fatigue Ideal for consistent, repetitive

action

Information

Capacity

Primary single channel Multichannel

Memory Better for principles and

strategies, access is versatile and

innovative

Ideal for leteral reprodution,

access restrictedand formal

Sensing Wide range, multi function,

judgement

Good at quantitative assessment,

poor at pattern recognition

Perceiving Copes with variation better,

susceptible to noise

Copes with variation poorly,

susceptible to noise

Source : IEEE Intelligent System

4.4.3. Criterion CR2.3: inertia

Indicator IN2.3: Inertia to cope with transients.-> stability

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THANK YOU

inpro review for regulatory aspect in indonesia

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