Policy Paper

Information Sharing in the Law Enforcement Community

Information sharing in the law enforcement community is not only a vital task, it is a very

difficult one to accomplish. Many law enforcement agencies have failed to successfully share

important prudent information and intelligence amongst other active member’s in the law

enforcement community. In the days, weeks, months, even years leading up until the tragic

events that occurred on September 11th, 2001, research shows that law enforcement agencies

failed to recognize the importance of information sharing and intelligence. This major failure

was one of the main reasons why the attacks on 9/11 were so successful.

Fifteen years later, countless studies and commission reports, law enforcement agencies

at the federal, state, and local levels failed at improving the ability to effectively share

information throughout the law enforcement community. In today’s modern world, agencies

must be able to keep up with the fast paced criminal environment. Criminal enterprises and

terrorist organizations use various forms of technology in order quickly communicate, research,

plan and attack a specified location. Law enforcement agencies and its personnel must use these

technologies to its advantage so it is able to identify the vast amounts of criminal activity and

threats that exist today early and often. Law enforcement agencies must be committed to this

difficult task in order to improve preparedness and preventative measures relative to national

security. This policy memo identifies the areas in which law enforcement agencies have failed in

terms of sharing information and aims to provide the material needed in order to establish

effective information sharing practices and programs throughout all law enforcement agencies.

1

BRIEF HISTORY OF INFORMATION SHARING AND COLLECTION

In order to understand information sharing and how to improve it, it is necessary to

explain a brief history of the practice. Throughout history information sharing has played a very

important role in the law enforcement community. The act of sharing information and collection

dates back as early as the 1920s. Law enforcement agencies would collect information on

individuals suspected of engaging in criminal activity. The information was not often shared

with other agencies, rather kept in a file system and not disseminated. During World War II,

military branches would collect information and effectively share it quickly to the appropriate

individuals. Information sharing was very important during the war because it allowed various

branches of the military to fully understand the enemy and its practices.

Fast forward to the Cold War, information sharing became a little more complex

followed by much scrutiny. During the Cold War federal agencies were collecting large amounts

of information on individuals and groups that were suspected “Communists.” As Carter notes in

his book “Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement

Agencies,” he explains that during the Cold War era, “responding to expressions of public and

government concern, local law enforcement agencies began creating intelligence dossiers, known

as “Red Files,” on persons who were suspected Communists and Communist sympathizers”

(Carter, 32). During this time, agencies again would not collect and disseminate information to

other agencies. Agencies were simply collecting information on individuals that did not portray

any criminal predicate. This information was then kept on a file system for an undisclosed

period of time. Agencies were technically allowed to do this because there were no rules or

regulations put into place to protect civilians from unethical practices like the dossier system. It

2

was not until after the mid to late 70s where law enforcement agencies began to erase the

intelligence collection sector. In M.C. Waxman’s text “Police and National Security: American

Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11” he mentions that “following exposure

of abusive law enforcement surveillance tactics during the 1950s to 1970s, many police agencies

dismantled their intelligence collection units altogether.” (Waxman, 385) After this ‘era’ law

enforcement information collection and intelligence sharing practices started over from scratch.

INFORMATION SHARING FAILURES – PRE-9/11

As mentioned above, law enforcement agencies failed in many different categories in the

days, weeks, months, and years leading up until September 11th, 2001. Information sharing was

one of these large failures that ultimately led to the tragic deaths of thousands. The 9/11

Commission report published in 2004 points out many of the failures that happened before and

during the attacks of 9/11. On page 328 of this report, it states “the government’s ability to

collect intelligence inside the United States, and the sharing of such information between the

intelligence and law enforcement communities was not a priority before 9/11.” (Kean) In 2006

Miami Police Chief John F. Timoney stated “it was often the feeling at local law enforcement

prior to 9/11 that intelligence gathering was a Federal responsibility.” (Waxman, 385) Law

enforcement agencies and its personnel made too many assumptions in the time leading up until

9/11. Such assumptions led to poor communication and coordination efforts throughout the law

enforcement community. It is necessary to look back at the root cause of the problem so that

improvements to such policies can be made.

3

POOR COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION

Many agencies did not see the benefits to sharing information throughout the law

enforcement community. The general philosophy during this time was that agencies would “not

widely disseminate intelligence records out of concern that critical information would fall into

the wrong hands, thereby jeopardizing the inquiry as well as possibly jeopardizing undercover

officers, informants, and collection methods.” (Carter, 69)

Even on rare occasions when information was shared from agency to agency, there were

were several problems there as well. According to the journal “Re-forming Intelligence” by the

Center for National Interest, there was an “inadequate coordination and sharing of information

within the intelligence community, especially between the CIA and the FBI; the intelligence was

not always timely; and that estimates and analysis were often flawed.” (Chambliss, 80) Many

times agencies would hold back certain pieces of information when disseminating an intelligence

product. This may seem like a small issue, but leaving any information behind could sometimes

be the difference between a thwarted attack or a successful one. Policies and procedures did not

exist for this type of situation before 9/11. According to the “9/11 Commission Report,” the

FBI’s information systems were graded as poor. Kean writes, “analysts had difficulty getting

access to the FBI and intelligence community information they were expected to analyze. The

FBI’s information systems were woefully inadequate. The FBI lacked the ability to know what it

knew: there was no effective mechanism for capturing or sharing institutional knowledge.”

(Kean, 77)

Another example was in December of 2000. The CIA and FBI had a joint partnership in

attempting to identify individuals involved in the U.S.S. Cole bombing. The CIA and FBI had a

4

source that identified a few individuals that were indeed involved in the bombing. According to

the 9/11 commission report, the CIA failed to notify the FBI that the two individuals that were

identified knew each other. Because of this, the FBI did not start looking for the other ‘person of

interest’ until it was too late. This is “an example of how day-to-day gaps in information sharing

can emerge even when there is mutual goodwill.” (Kean, 267) Poor communication, lack of trust

in joint partnerships, and deficiencies in informational database technologies are the main

reasons why information sharing was almost non-existent before 9/11.

A NEW WAY FOREWARD? – POST 9/11 REFORM

Shortly after the attacks on 9/11, the failure to share information properly came to the

forefront. Attorney General John Ashcroft stated in November 2001 that “in order to meet this

new threat and to prevent future attacks, law enforcement officials at all levels of government—

federal, state, and local—must work together, sharing information and resources needed both to

arrest and prosecute the individuals responsible and to detect and destroy terrorist cells before

they can strike again.” (Waxman, 377) The first Secretary of Homeland Security Janet

Napolitano noted that “partnerships with state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies affect DHS’s

ability to identify threats and bolster preparedness before an incident, and that information

sharing between DHS and state and local governments is particularly critical to our security.”

(Waxman, 377) It is evident from these quotes that information sharing is imperative in order to

prevent and mitigate future attacks within our nations borders.

Since 2001, the law enforcement community has undergone some restructuring. In order

to improve upon the lack of information sharing, the federal government created various reforms

5

and established new agencies to assist with protecting our nations security. Agencies like the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Fusion Centers, Officer of the Director of National

Intelligence (ODNI), Transportation Security Administration and National Counterterrorism

Center (NCTC) were direct results of the catastrophic events on 9/11.

In 2004 the “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act” (IRPTA) of 2004 was

created. Section 1016 in the act states the creation of the Information Sharing Council,

Information Sharing Environment, Program Manager, and Terrorism Information. (IRTPA,

3665) Under this section it reads “the terms ‘‘information sharing environment’’ and ‘‘ISE’’

mean an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information, which approach may

include any methods determined necessary and appropriate for carrying out this section.”

(IRPTA, 3665) This section states that the President shall “create an information sharing

environment for the sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national

security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties; designate the

organizational and management structures that will be used to operate and manage the ISE; and

determine and enforce the policies, directives, and rules that will govern the content and usage of

the ISE.” (IRPTA, 3665) IRPTA was promising and seemed as if the ‘practice’ of information

sharing was going to be improved.

In order to create an efficient information sharing environment, strong partnerships must

be created. In the Information Sharing Environment text “A Brief History of the Information

Sharing Environment” it looks to “promote partnerships across federal, state, local and tribal

governments, the private sector, and internationally. Engagement, training and management

support are key to building the organizational capacity of our partners at all levels. Successful

engagement will help create a culture shift that will instill partners with an enduring commitment

6

to responsible information sharing.” (ISE, 9) Establishing joint partnerships among all levels of

law enforcement as well as the private sector will be highly beneficial to the overall information

sharing mission. In order to mesh together these joint partnerships and improve communication

functions, Fusion Centers were created.

In the journal “An Examination of the Effectiveness of State and Local Fusion Centers

Toward Federal Counterterrorism Efforts” fusion centers were created in order to alleviate

information and intelligence gaps between agencies. (Davis, 3) The centers were designed to

have a “bottom up approach that facilitates intelligence dispersal to all levels of law enforcement

in an effort to “connect all the dots” and eliminate the stovepipe effect present within the

intelligence community prior to 9/11.” (Davis, 3) In the beginning fusion centers seemed to fall

short of the overall anticipated mission the federal government had in mind. Some fusion center

throughout the country seem to still fall short of their mission due to lack of resources and man

power. Fusion centers should remain in tact because it provides a bridge between local law

enforcement agencies and federal law enforcement agencies that would not exist otherwise. It

will be explained later how fusion centers can be improved.

Fifteen years later, law enforcement agencies still struggle with the act of sharing

information. A recent study completed by Bruce Hoffman the text “The FBI: Protecting the

Homeland in the 21st Century” stated that “there is still wide room for improvement in the

Bureaus sharing practices with local law enforcement and the private sector.” (Hoffman, 111)

This review also found “lapses in communication, coordination, and collaboration among Joint

Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in FBI field offices; between FBI Headquarters and the field; and

between the Bureau and its federal, state, and local partners in law enforcement and

intelligence.” (Hoffman, 111) These lapses in communication and coordination is unacceptable.

7

Even after countless policy changes and guidelines, agencies like the FBI still cannot resolve the

lack of communication and coordination with other agencies.

THE CULTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

Trusting partnerships between law enforcement agencies are still an issue today. Federal

agencies are hesitant to share information to other agencies sometimes due to lack of trust. The

culture that still exists today can be broken down into a “buyer vs seller” concept. In the text

“International Politics of Intelligence Sharing,” the “sellers of intelligence can’t be sure that the

‘buyers’ will adequately protect what they receive, and ‘buyers’ cannot be sure of the veracity of

the intelligence they get from ‘sellers.’” (Webb, 1) This lack of trust between agencies provides

even more inefficiencies throughout the law enforcement community. Lack of trust between

agencies will only make information sharing that much more difficult. If agencies cannot trust

each other in terms of “buying and selling,” informational gaps will form and the overall risk of

criminal activity and terrorist attacks will rise exponentially. Informational gaps must be

avoided at all costs in order to preserve the stability of national security.

Informational gaps can also stem from other actions. The “the culture of agencies feeling

they own the information they gathered at taxpayer’s expense must be replaced by a culture in

which the agencies instead feel they have the duty to the information—to repay the taxpayers’

investment by making that information available.” (Kean, 417) What this is saying is that

instead of each agency protecting ‘what is theirs,’ agencies must do the exact opposite and share

this information to other agencies because it may be vital to do so. In order to have fluid

8

intelligence operations between federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, information

must be shared.

Another concept that is relevant to todays law enforcement community is called

“information asymmetry.” Gavin Clarkson points out in the text “Information asymmetry and

information sharing,” that “information Information asymmetry exists when a party or parties

possess greater informational awareness pertinent to effective participation in a given situation

relative to other participating parties.” (Clarkson, 828) In the current law enforcement culture,

federal agencies are the parties that ‘possess greater information awareness’ about a given topic

more so than local law enforcement agencies. Lack of information sharing creates this

asymmetrical system that exists today. Asymmetrical information sharing lacks partnerships and

flexibility that is needed in order to prevent and mitigate future criminal acts. If one agency has

more knowledge than another agency about a given topic but fails to share such information, it is

an injustice to the entire law enforcement community. In 2010 former Senator, now United

States Secretary of State John Kerry said “isolating information vital to protecting Americans

from terrorists within a single agency sacrifices the rigorous, multidisciplinary analysis required

to improve our odds of stopping the next attack. When one agency sits on intelligence essential

to another, whether out of ignorance or reluctance to share, the chance of system failure is

astronomic.” (Freedman, 4) Kerry’s quote goes hand in hand with the asymmetrical information

sharing concept Clarkson offers. Clarkson goes into much greater detail about the asymmetrical

system and it is beneficial to share it here:

“horizontal information asymmetry exists when valuable

information is scattered among similarly-situated entities.

While some of those entities may have more information

9

than others, no entity has the complete set of information.

External entities with access to greater information about

the information poor entities will have informational power

over any individual entity among the class possessing

scattered information and over the entire class as a

whole.” (Clarkson, 830)

Relating this concept back to law enforcement is very easy. The law enforcement

community is currently structured in such a way where information sharing is not placed on the

forefront. For example, just because one agency collects a piece of information does not

necessarily mean that it would be the right agency to analyze or act on it. (Jackson, 192) This is

why it is important to change the culture that exists in todays law enforcement. Although

Clarkson describes this as horizontal in nature, it really is a vertical hierarchy and information

tends to flow from the top down. The underlying concept Clarkson and Kerry present is

important to understand in order to improve the culture that currently exists within the law

enforcement community.

THE ISE: THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

Since the hierarchy is top down in nature, local law enforcement agencies tend to be

forgotten. Local law enforcement agencies play a vital role in the law enforcement community

and are essentially on the ‘frontlines’ when it comes to criminal and terrorist activity. There is a

common misconception that terrorism is just a ‘national security issue.’ Although terrorism is

definitely a national security issue, the main threat is happening within the jurisdictions of local

10

law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement agencies must be knowledgeable and aware of

what potential threats exist within their respective jurisdiction. In order for law enforcement

agencies to help mitigate future threats and attacks that could severely harm civilian life and

critical infrastructures, a solid plan must exist.

Waxman points out that “local police are often believed to be better suited to perform

counterterrorism functions because of their superior familiarity with their local communities”

and that “local police are positioned naturally to collect and process information about

communities and activities within.” (Waxman, 386) Since many local law enforcement agencies

are engaging in community oriented policing, it allows for vast information to be collected. Vital

pieces of information can be gained multiple ways as mentioned in the brief “Building on Clues:

Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and Characterize Terrorist Activity.”

Such information can be obtained from 911 calls and responses, direct reports of planning an

attack such as a ‘tip’, large purchases of explosives, weapons, chemicals or suspicious

surveillance of critical infrastructures. (Strom, 4) Law enforcement personnel must take this task

very seriously. It has been reported and I have physically seen law enforcement officers

disregard any real threat that exists within a given jurisdiction. The mentality that exists within

some officers is that ‘it won’t happen here.’ That mentality is one of the main reasons as to why

the 9/11 attacks were so successful. Threats still exist today and should not be taken lightly.

Proper education on these issues can help further stress the importance of local law agencies in

the war on terror.

There are many ways for law enforcement agencies to find clues that could prevent a

catastrophic event. Since law enforcement agencies are indeed on the ‘frontlines’ of these types

of events, it is so very important for the personnel and even the public to be educated on what to

11

look for regarding suspicious activity. Local law enforcement agencies should be the foundation

in the information sharing operations structure. In order to be successful in mitigating future

terrorist attacks, law enforcement agencies must disseminate vital information to surrounding

local agencies as well as to state and federal agencies. What this means is that local law

enforcement agencies have the power and responsibility to be aware of the current threats that

exist within their jurisdiction and to identify and investigate any known suspects or groups. If

law enforcement agencies act as the foundation to information sharing operations, it will

drastically help mitigate future terrorist plots and threats that exist within our country today.

Instead of having an asymmetric hierarchal structure that is ‘top down’ in nature, one

would think creating a reverse hierarchal structure that is ‘bottom up’ in nature would alleviate

this problem. This is not the case. By creating a linear path to information sharing (i.e. the

hierarchal structure) some agencies will be excluded from information sharing partnerships. In

order to solve this issue is to create a triangular structure. This ‘information triangle’ structure

would produce greater information sharing techniques and would provide a much more effective

and efficient way to share information across the law enforcement community. The triangular

structure will be explained in greater detail during the recommendation portion of this policy

memo.

CURRENT THREATS

Before going into the recommendation portion of this policy memo, it is necessary to

provide a quick overview of the current threats that exist today in national security.

12

Understanding the current threats that exist will assist in making improvements to the overall

structure of the information sharing environment.

The crime of today has changed drastically since the establishment of information sharing

practices. The results of criminal acts have not changed much, but the way criminals and

terrorists work in the days, weeks, months, and years leading up to an attack or other event has

drastically changed. Many technologies that exist today did not exist fifteen years ago.

Technologies like: the internet (it existed but much greater and complex now), smartphones,

tablets, interactive online gaming networks (Xbox Live, Playstation Network, social media

outlets (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, etc.), and drones did not exist fifteen years ago.

Individuals can communicate ideas, opinions, and plans very quickly and easily now with the

creation of these technologies. In general, the world wide web has given criminals and terrorist

organizations a much easier means to collect and disseminate information to its counterparts.

(Kean, 88) Every single year technology improves, new programs are developed. This swift

improvement of technology provides many opportunities and challenges for law enforcement

agencies. (Chau, 2)

The law enforcement community at all levels must be able to establish practices that help

identify criminal and terrorist threats during the planning stages so that attacks can be prevented.

Because of these technologies, it is vital that effective information sharing practices are

established throughout the law enforcement community. In the journal “Intelligence Reform:

The Logic of Information Sharing,” Calvert Jones states that “today’s rapidly evolving threats,

by contrast, call for ‘quick, imaginative, and agile responses. To develop this capability,

information must be shared more widely. Information should be set loose from the outdated

need-to-know standard for sharing that constricted its flow during the Cold War.” (384-385)

13

Agencies must rapidly share information efficiently and accurately throughout the law

enforcement community in order to keep up with the ‘rapidly evolving threats’ that exist today.

Information sharing is the Achilles heel in the law enforcement community and is “the nervous

system to a more collaborative, networked intelligence community better suited to today’s

threats.” (Jones, 385)

Technology is not the only thing that changes rapidly every year, criminals also rapidly

change and adapt as well. Throughout the United States there are thousands of individuals that

are extremist in nature. These individuals can also be called lone wolf terrorists or extremists.

Some of these individuals are heavily influenced by groups like ISIS and attempt to fight a

‘leaderless jihad.’ (Waxman, 406) Since lone wolves are very difficult to identify, it is important

for not only local, state, and federal agencies to share information but the public as well. Many

of the research that is completed on information sharing fails to mention how important the

general public can be. The general public and business owners must be educated in how to

properly identify suspicious activity or suspicious persons. If the general public and business

owners are trained properly in this area, it will limit the “oversaturation” of information.

Oversaturation occurs when too much irrelevant information is being shared. The challenge is to

“process better information and avoiding problems of too much information—addressing the

challenges of too many “dots’” (Patel, 47) In order to reduce this from happening, properly

educating and training the general public and law enforcement personnel is a must. A database

should also be created in order to quickly share information between business owners and law

enforcement agencies. More details will be provided in the recommendation section of this

policy memo.

14

POLICY OPTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CULTURE IMPROVEMENTS

a. This memo has provided vast amounts of information in regards to the current

toxic culture that exists within the law enforcement community. Federal, state,

and local agencies are failing to effectively share information efficiently with one

another. Failing to share information properly will result in increased criminal

activity and an increased chance of another successful catastrophic attack. The

Project Manager of the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) should be

responsible in creating the following items:

b. Provide incentives to agencies that share information correctly

i. “Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a

better balance between security and shared knowledge.” (Kean, 417)

ii. These incentives do not have to be of any monetary value in order to keep

spending at a minimum.

iii. Incentives could be in the form of issuing a congratulatory “time off”

b. Awards should be given out throughout the law enforcement community to

help establish a culture that intel analysts and other individuals are

rewarded for sharing information effectively and accurately.

i. Although reward programs do exist, there are zero ‘information sharing’

awards

ii. Rewards could be in paper form, pins, or recognition in a department

email

15

iii. Providing rewards and incentives will help increase participation efforts in

terms of sharing information

c. “Need-to-Know” culture must be replaced with “Need-to-Share” culture

i. As Kean writes on page 417 in the 9/11 Commission Report “There are no

punishments for not sharing information. Agencies uphold a “need-to-

know” culture of information protection rather than promoting a “need-to-

share” culture of integration.”

1. Establishing the ‘need-to-share’ culture is beneficial for all parties

involved.

d. Create a new Triangular Structure for joint partnerships and information

sharing

i. As mentioned previously, a triangular structure should be created in order

for information to be shared for effectively and efficiently.

ii. Each agency that has information must be willing to share it when

necessary

iii. By creating a triangular structure, no agency is above or below each other.

Every agency has the right to know.

iv. Creating this structure will build trust throughout the law enforcement

community.

e. Implementation Problems & Unintended Effects:

i. A problem that may arise from increasing participation efforts to

information sharing, it may cause agencies to “over-share” meaning that

the system would be over saturated with information that has little to no

16

importance

1. This over saturation can get in the way of high priority issues and

could lead to information & intelligence gaps

ii. How to mitigate issue:

1. Supervisors within each given agency should review information

before it is disseminated throughout the law enforcement

community.

2. Supervisors must not make a decision based off of any biases, but

rather the importance of the information and intelligence product.

3. The PM-ISE should implement a bi-annual conference every year

in a given location in order to establish continuity between law

enforcement agencies as well as providing opportunities for

individuals from each agency to network. By doing so, trust and

coordination efforts would be improved.

f. Overall, this recommendation provides little to no negative effects and could be

highly beneficial for all agencies. Since this is a ‘culture’ improvement, there are

no changes monetarily.

2. HOLD AGENCIES ACCOUNTABLE

a. Agencies must be held accountable if information is not being shared. This memo

has presented many examples as to why information sharing is so important and

what the negative effects it can have if not used properly.

i. Withholding information can lead to catastrophic events like 9/11 or the

Boston Marathon Bombing. That is why a zero tolerance policy must be

17

put in to place. Agencies must be held accountable for such failures.

b. Create a “Rules of Information Sharing Guideline.”

i. The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) already has guidelines about

implantation and privacy issues.

ii. A “rulebook” must be created that strictly states the rules of information

sharing as well as punishable acts if information is not properly shared

effectively.

1. Such punishments could be as follows: suspension with or without

pay and even termination

2. A zero tolerance policy must be established in this rulebook

iii. Annual audits should be conducted to make sure agencies remain on track

and achieve the information sharing goals

c. Implementation Problems & Unintended Effects:

i. There does not seem to be any unintended effects that would stem from

this move.

3. CREATE A UNIVERSAL DATABASE FOR LOCAL BUSINESSES AND

GENERAL PUBLIC

a. This database could be run by the Fusion Center in the given geographical area.

Fusion centers are the important bridge between federal, state, and local agencies.

Having the database set up and run through the Fusion Center, it will allow the

database to be accessed by all agencies in that given area.

b. The database would have a username, password, and company details. This will

provide law enforcement agencies the necessary information to understand where

18

resources must be assigned.

c. Local law enforcement agencies have the vast knowledge in its jurisdictional

boundaries. Since local law enforcement agencies are on the ‘frontlines’

essentially in terms of national security, it is necessary for local businesses to

share suspicious activities and known threats with local law enforcement

d. This would go along the same concept as the NYPD “Operation Nexus” database.

Local businesses can provide information on suspicious activity and suspicious

purchases.

e. This database would bridge the gap between law enforcement and the general

public. The idea behind this is that the more people who share and receive

information, there is a higher likelihood that a threat can be identified before an

attack occurs. (Carter, 69)

f. Implementation Problems & Unintended effects

i. Database could be over saturated with unimportant information if the

general public is not properly educated on the: who, what, where, when,

and how of reporting

ii. If Fusion Centers do not have the adequate staffing levels, database would

be rendered useless. Heavy influx of information is expected with this

database. This is the reason why there must be adequate staffing levels.

iii. Budgetary concerns: it is unknown the exact amount of monies that must

be allocated for such a database.

iv. Privacy concerns: civil rights activists may dislike this idea because

private companies would be assisting law enforcement agencies with

19

personal information such as ‘buyer information.’

g. How to mitigate issue

i. Provide free of charge classes a few times a year to educate the general

public and business owners on what kind of information to report and

when to report it

ii. This database should only be used by Fusion Centers that have adequate

staffing levels. Supervisors or the Director of the particular center would

be able to provide if the center has adequate staffing levels to run this

database

iii. Privacy concerns can be solved by being transparent. Information that is

being collected into the database must be investigated and analyzed before

either dissemination or purging. It is important to protect information “in

our care to safeguard citizens’ privacy and civil liberties, as well as to

shield our sources and methods. Our investigative agencies must wait until

the activities of the persons under investigation reach a level of validity

and clarity before the information is shared.” (DOJ, 5)

1. Agencies must follow the guidelines set forth by 28 CFR Part 23

that states that information can only be collected and kept if there I

reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal

activity. It also states that information cannot be collected and

kept because of political, religious or social views or affiliations

with any group unless again there is reasonable suspicion that the

group or individual is involved in criminal activity. (28 CFR Part

20

23, 23.20 (a)(b))

SELECTING A POLICY RECOMMENDATION

Reviewing the three recommendations and the individual challenges that exist within

each one, the policy that would be best would be recommendation number one: Culture

Improvements. Although the other two recommendations are important in order to increase the

efficiency of information sharing, recommendation number one provides greater results right

away. Changing the culture is the main issue in terms of information sharing. It evident that the

culture that has existed throughout the past fifteen years has been toxic. In order to improve

information sharing, the culture and ideology must change. Policy recommendation number one

provides the areas that need to be improved and explains how to do it. This recommendation

helps the entire law enforcement community while minimizing costs and improving overall

effectiveness of the information sharing program.

Appendix A:

Policy: Implement Culture Change throughout the entire information sharing environment.

21

Annotated Bibliography

1. 28 CFR Part 23 Executive Order. (n.d.). Retrieved March 29, 2016, from

https://www.iir.com/28CFR_Program/28CFR_Resources/Executive_Order/

a. 28 CFR Part 23 was an executive order put in place in order to protect the civil

liberties and privacies of U.S. Citizens. This order provides a guideline for law

enforcement agencies to follow so that further abused in collecting information is

eradicated.

2. A Brief History of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE). (n.d.). Information Sharing

Environment.

a. This journal provides all the information needed to fully understand the ins and outs

of Information Sharing Environment (ISE). One of the main concepts mentioned in

this journal is the idea of promoting partnerships across federal, state, and local

agencies. By creating strong, joint partnerships, criminal enterprises, threats and

attacks can and will be thwarted. The concepts provided in this journal proves to be a

beneficial source for this policy paper.

3. Carter, D. L. (2009). Law enforcement intelligence: A guide for state, local, and tribal law

enforcement agencies. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services.

a. Dr. Carter of Michigan State University created a detailed outline for local, state, and

federal agencies to follow in order to implement law enforcement intelligence the

correct way into their respective agencies. There are many pages within this

guideline that speaks about the importance of information sharing and what the

benefits are when it is implemented correctly. Since criminal acts, terrorism threats,

22

criminal enterprises are multijurisdictional, information sharing must be accurate,

secure, and readily available for all agencies that need it. Dr. Carters guideline has

been used by the Department of Justice and shared thousands of times to various

agencies throughout the country. This is a very important source in this research

paper.

4. Chambliss, S. (2005). Re-Forming Intelligence. Center for National Interest, (79), 79-83.

a. This particular journal focuses mainly on the adoption of human intelligence as

opposed to open source intelligence, etc. It does, however, make a great point as

to why there must be intelligence reform: “In addition, we found that there was

inadequate coordination and sharing of information within the intelligence

community, especially between the CIA and FBI; that intelligence was not always

timely; and that estimates and analysis were often flawed.” (Chambliss, 80) This

would be the only quote used from this journal, but I definitely think it is

worthwhile for citation purposes.

5. Chau, M., Atabakhsh, H., Zeng, D., & Chen, H. (2001). Building an Infrastructure for Law

Enforcement Information Sharing and Collaboration: Design Issues and Challenges.

a. With the rapid growth in technology and the use of the internet in the 21st century,

it is necessary to understand the challenges law enforcement faces in terms of this.

Information sharing can be shared much easier and more effectively now with the

current technology that exists. This article describes the studies done with the

Tucson Police Department and the databases that were created in order to help

share information much easier. This article is good for the research at hand for

this paper.

23

6. Clarkson, G., Jacobsen, T. E., & Batcheller, A. L. (2007). Information asymmetry and

information sharing. Government Information Quartely, 24, 827-839.

a. Clarkson and Jacobsen describe this idea of Informational Asymmetry and

Informational Sharing. This article does not directly mention law enforcement in

any capacity, but the concepts behind the informational asymmetry and

informational sharing fits perfectly in terms of this paper. Asymmetry is when

multiple agencies know things about a given topic but not the complete picture. It

is shown by three bubbles listed as “A, B, C” respectively. Each bubble has one

arrow pointing to the next bubble but it is only a one way relationship. This is

Asymmetry in terms of information sharing. This is the type of relationship that

must be avoided. The other figure shows bubbles “A,B,C” all connected with two

way arrows showing the continuity between all agencies, allowing more

informational flow between each other. These concepts are very beneficial in

understanding how to fix the information sharing problem that exists today

amongst law enforcement agencies.

7. Congress. (2004). Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Public Law.

a. IRPTA was created in 2004. This act established the Information Sharing

Environment (ISE) and provided a guideline for agencies to follow in order to

share information more effectively and efficiently. It is important to provide this

information for this policy because recommendations will be built off of this act.

8. Davis, T. (2014). An Examination of the Effectiveness of State and Local Fusion Centers

Toward Federal Counterterrorism Efforts. Intelligence and National Security Studies, 1-2

24

a. After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, there was a federal mandate that

information must be shared amongst local, state, and federal agencies. Shortly

after, Fusion centers were created in order to streamline information sharing

among all types of agencies on every level. There is a lot of negative things said

about fusion centers, but this article refutes those claims and comments that state

and local fusion centers have played very important roles in deterring terrorist

threats and acts from coming to fruition.

9. FBI Information Sharing & Safeguarding Report 2012. (2012). U.S. Department of Justice,

1-53.

a. This governmental report written and issued by the FBI in 2012 shows the steps the

agency has taken since 2001. The sharing of information is a main issue in report and

it describes the many steps the agencies has taken in the years leading up until this

document. The agency also provides the importance of civil rights and civil liberties

and the steps it also takes in order to protect these things. This is a great

informational guide that provides the steps the FBI has taken in order to improve its

overall efficiency.

10. Freedman, H. N. (2010). Assessing the Effectiveness of Post 9/11 Intelligence Information

Sharing. Defense Intelligence Agency.

a. Provides great insight into the effectiveness of information sharing post 9/11.

Freedman quotes John Kerry about isolating information sharing to one agency

instead of sharing it to agencies that need to know. This journal is a great source for

this paper because it shows proof that even other entities in the federal government

see that information sharing is an issue.

25

11. Hoffman, B., Meese, E., III, & Roemer, T. J. (2015). The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in

the 21st Century. 9/11 Review Commission, 1, 1-124.

a. The FBI was directed by the United States Congress to put together a commission

and provide research and evidence stating the progress made since 9/11. This

commission consisted of three researchers/authors that looked back within the

FBI and created assessments, analysis’s, and recommendations in regards to the

successes and failures of the FBI since 2001. There have been numerous failures

as well as successes that the FBI has been apart of. Information sharing has been

a failure and this article provides in-depth analysis in this area.

12. Jackson, B. A. (2009). The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society. Homeland

Security Program and the Intelligence Policy Center, 1-241.

a. In this journal it describes the current and future state of domestic intelligence

within the United States. Each chapter breaks domestic intelligence down into

multiple categories: the history, the current state, civil rights and civil liberties

protections, and information sharing. It is necessary to know these characteristics

of a domestic intelligence agency in terms of this paper. In order to make

improvements in this area, the overall structure of domestic intelligence must be

known so that we can dissect the problems inside and out.

13. Jones, C. (2007). Intelligence reform: The logic of information sharing. Intelligence and

National Security, 22(3), 384-401.

a. Jones writes a fantastic article in regards to information sharing and its

importance in the overall intelligence mission. Jones brings up the multiple

events that happened in history and what was learned from these events.

26

Intelligence has been around for a very long time and by providing pieces of

history of events when intelligence was used is necessary in order to understand

this improved policy. In addition to this information, Jones also explains the logic

of information sharing and how agencies go about improving this tough task. In

today’s modern world where crimes are happening at a rapid pace, information

sharing must be placed at the forefront in the missions of government agencies.

Swift, accurate information sharing is a must in order to prevent and mitigate

future attacks by an enemy.

14. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States., Kean, T. H., & Hamilton,

L. (2004). The 9/11 Commission report: Final report of the National Commission on

Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on

Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.

a. This final report that was released in 2004 is a great informational guideline to pas

and future issues in regards to homeland security and intelligence. In multiple

chapters it states that every level of law enforcement failed to recognize the

threats that existed in the days, months, and years leading up until September 11th,

2001. By looking through this guideline, it is a great tool to not only view the

multitude of failures that happened then, but also what can be learned from such

failures. This report makes various recommendations to help mitigate future

catastrophic failures. A large portion of the report also describes how law

enforcement agencies failed to properly share information between local, state,

and federal agencies. In review, the report portrays the importance of information

sharing and also provides recommendations in how to improve in this area.

27

15. Patel, F. (2011). DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: OUR RIGHTS AND SAFETY. Brennan

Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 1, 1-131.

a. Faiza Patel writes in this academic journal that domestic intelligence in America

is broken. Not only this, but agencies involved in the intelligence community

have violated and continue to violate civil rights and civil liberties of American

citizens. This article presents past and present abuses in terms of collection and

sharing of information. It is important to understand the history of the

intelligence process in order to make improvements and changes moving forward.

When creating recommendations and policy improvements or changes, history

sometimes cannot and should not repeat itself. This article provides information

that provides information about past issues and also helps provide information on

how to avoid such abuses in the future.

16. Strom, K., Hollywood, J., Pope, M., Weintraub, G., Daye, C., & Gemeinhardt, D. (2011).

Building on Clues: Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and

Characterize Terrorist Activity Final Report. Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 1-62.

a. This journal provides information about the poor coordination and communication

between local, state, and federal agencies in terms of counterterrorism procedures.

Since there is no standardization to the information sharing process among all

agencies, sharing falls by the wayside. This journal provides in depth details of its

findings on this issue and provides ways to improve this problem.

17. Waxman, M. C. (2009). Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and

Counterterrorism After 9/11. Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 3, 377-407.

28

a. This article is broken down into five important parts. Waxman provides great

insight in the failures of information sharing and partnerships between local, state,

and federal law enforcement agencies. Waxman also provides multiple

challenges that stems from improvements in this area: organizational challenges,

accountability challenges, and functional challenges. Many challenges exist still,

but Waxman provides answers to such challenges.

18. Webb, J., & Walsh, J. I. (2009). The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing.

Intelligence in Public Literature.

a. Webb provides a great ‘concept’ to bring to this policy memo. Webb’s concept is the

“buyer vs. seller” concept and it provides an interesting approach to broken

information sharing environment that exists today. Under this concept the sellers of

the intelligence product are weary of the buyers and vice versa. In other words,

Webb is stating that there is still a lot of trust issues that remain in the law

enforcement community.

29