information security in private blockchains

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Information security in private blockchains Dr Gideon Greenspan, Founder and CEO

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Page 1: Information security in private blockchains

Information security in private blockchains

Dr Gideon Greenspan, Founder and CEO

Page 2: Information security in private blockchains

Overview

•  Blockchain databases •  Internal risks •  External risks •  Mitigation strategies •  Summary

Page 3: Information security in private blockchains

Centralized databases

Client Server

Client

Request

Page 4: Information security in private blockchains

Blockchain databases

Node

Node

Node

Node Transaction

Block

Page 5: Information security in private blockchains

Blockchain databases

Node

Node

Node

Node Transaction

Block

Blockchain

Consensus created by validator nodes

Page 6: Information security in private blockchains

Ledgers in regular databases

Account number Balance

04823872 £ 229.94

20956298 £ 431.05

38103749 £ 183.67

Page 7: Information security in private blockchains

Ledgers in blockchains

Public key hash Balance

13B9cMd5Ch9fu6qU494gHTfAPFQfq3ZSGx £ 229.94

1FRZvSBc1cRFbmwbzNhhaQTyRJXRujN2Sq £ 431.05

1HDxhfeoSQmVNzTnZRLe2Z6nJ1LLAuGWpa £ 183.67

Page 8: Information security in private blockchains

Ledgers in blockchains

Public key hash Balance

13B9cMd5Ch9fu6qU4 94gHTfAPFQfq3ZSGx £ 229.94

1FRZvSBc1cRFbmwbz NhhaQTyRJXRujN2Sq £ 146.83

1FRZvSBc1cRFbmwbz NhhaQTyRJXRujN2Sq £ 284.22

Multiple entries for one account ⇒ concurrent distributed transactions

Page 9: Information security in private blockchains

Internal risks: regular node

•  What can a bad regular node do? ⤫  Spend somebody else’s money ⤫  Create more money ⤫  Spend own money twice ⤫  Flood the network (denial of service) ⤫  Censor transactions

•  Why are we so confident? ü  7 years of bitcoin history

Page 10: Information security in private blockchains

Internal risks: validator node

•  What can a bad validator node do? ⤫  Spend somebody else’s money ⤫  Create more money ⤫  Spend own money twice ⤫  Flood the network (denial of service) ⤫  Censor transactions ü  Delay transaction confirmation ü  Resolve conflicts with bias

Page 11: Information security in private blockchains

Internal risks: validator majority

•  What can a bad validator majority do? ⤫  Spend somebody else’s money ⤫  Create more money ⤫  Spend own money twice ⤫  Flood the network (denial of service) ü  Censor transactions ü  Delay transaction confirmation ü  Resolve conflicts with bias

Page 12: Information security in private blockchains

External risks: network violation

⤫  Denial of service – Peer-to-peer resilience

⤫  Wiretapping – Handshaking with digital signatures –  Extend to encrypted communication

⤫  Spoofing / Man-in-the-middle –  Impossible without key compromise – Transaction source irrelevant anyway

Page 13: Information security in private blockchains

External risks: host violation

Blockchain node

Centralized client

Centralized server

Read mine ✓︎ ✓ ✓︎︎ Read all ✓ ✕ ✓︎

Write mine ✓ ✓ ✓ Write all ✕ ✕ ✓

Page 14: Information security in private blockchains

Mitigation: Cold storage

•  Offline “cold” private key (air gapped) – Most funds stored in cold address – Refill “hot” address as necessary

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Page 15: Information security in private blockchains

Mitigation: Multisignature

•  Lock funds under n different keys – Stored on different nodes/devices

•  Require m of those keys to spend – Special type of ledger entry

•  Variations: – 1 of 2 for key loss – 2 of 2 for host security – 2 of 3 for escrow

Page 16: Information security in private blockchains

Blockchain security: summary

Confidentiality ▼

Integrity ▲

Availability ▲

*

* Watch: zero-knowledge proofs