informal federalism: self-governance and power sharing in afghanistan

Informal Federalism Self-Governance andPower Sharing in Afghanistan

Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili

University of Pittsburgh jmurtazpittedu

Although the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan establishes a highly centralized political system

this article suggests Afghanistan is an informal federation in which customary organizations com-

prise a legitimate level of government capable of providing many public goods and services at the

village level Despite the absence of formal village government governance in practice involves

extensive power sharing between district government officials and customary representatives

appointed by villagers themselves The effectiveness of such self-governing customary arrange-

ments is anticipated by the work of Elinor Ostrom while the finding that day-to-day relations

between levels of government are based in local norms rather than parchment institutions of the

state demonstrate the continued insight of Vincent Ostrom into intergovernmental relations

The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan establishes a highly centralized system

of government in which local government officials have almost no independent

authority Despite formal centralization self-organized customary organizations

represent a de facto level of village government Local government in practice

involves extensive power sharing between district governors the lowest level of

formal government authority and self-governing village-based customary organi-

zations This article analyzes the nature of power sharing between the state and

customary authorities in rural Afghanistan by describing its characteristics as well

as specifying the conditions for its emergence maintenance and breakdown

This article draws on evidence from fieldwork conducted in 2006ndash2008 across six

provinces of Afghanistan and three follow-up trips in 2011ndash12 to articulate the

political relationship between customary governance organizationsmdashinformal polit-

ical organizations whose legitimacy is independent of the state which aggregates

interests and adjudicate conflicts outside of formal political institutionsmdashand formal

government officials at the district level The fieldwork illustrates that customary

forms of village governance which generally divides political authority between

community-selected village representatives (maliks) consensus-based councils (shuras

or jirgas) and religious arbiters (mullahs) has separate functions from that of the

state in terms of dispute resolution and public goods provision The jurisdictional

PubliusThe Journal of Federalism volume 44 number 2 pp 324^343doi101093publiuspju004AdvanceAccess publication February 8 2014 TheAuthor 2014 Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of CSFAssociates Publius IncAll rights reserved For permissions please email journalspermissionsoupcom

at Periodicals Dept U

niversity Libraries N

orthern Illinois University on Septem

ber 4 2014httppubliusoxfordjournalsorg

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division of authority between district governors and customary authority as well as

the independent sources of legitimacy of customary officials and their capacity to

govern directly resemble political relations in federations where multiple levels of

government share power In Afghanistan however customary organizations have no

formal state mandate yet often serve as key partners in the federal arrangement For

this reason Afghanistan can be described as a federation in practice or an informal

federation In addition customary authorities often partner with formal district

governments in relationships that are collaborative rather than adversarial

The findings regarding norms of power sharing in the Afghan countryside are

anticipated by the work of Vincent Ostrom who noted that the modern study of

public administration focuses almost exclusively on creating forms of hierarchical

control that regard political and associational life outside such hierarchy as

lsquolsquofragmentedrsquorsquo (V Ostrom 2007) In contrast Vincent Ostrom saw legitimacy in

what appears to be organizational incoherence arguing that societies lsquolsquoare capable

of establishing good government by reflection and choice in a political system

characterized by substantial fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdic-

tionrsquorsquo (V Ostrom 2007 113) According to this perspective there is a certain virtue

of the untidy appearance of self-governing schemes and norms that shape relations

between multiple levels of authority (V Ostrom Tiebout and Warren 1961)

More generally these informal political arrangements in Afghanistan constitute

what Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom termed a lsquolsquopolycentric political systemrsquorsquo in

that these centers of power are formally independent of one another This article

integrates insights from the literature on polycentric governance as well that of self-

enforcing federalism to understand the origins breakdown and maintenance of

informal political relationships in rural Afghanistan Polycentrism shows us that

it is possible to have multiple levels of governmentmdashboth formal and informalmdash

within a single polity while the federalism literature shows us how these

polycentric units collaborate (E Ostrom 2005)

This study complements earlier work on village governance and the state in

Afghanistan by explicitly characterizing the country as a polycentric system of

governance Based on fieldwork in Northern Afghanistan in the 1970s Thomas

Barfield described relations between the state and villages as a lsquolsquoweak link on a rusty

chainrsquorsquo (1984) Several important studies consider the interplay between customary

law and state courts in promoting justice (Coburn 2013 Shahrani 1998) Another

perspective on center-local relations focuses on the extent of warlord governance at

the provincial level showing that warlords can be effective governors (Giustozzi

2009) As Mukhopadhyay (2013) explains former warlords often become effective

lsquolsquostrongman governorsrsquorsquo because they can transcend constraints imposed by the

state Finally there is an important and growing literature considering how local

decision-making procedures including the extent to which lsquolsquotraditionalrsquorsquo actors

Self-Governance and Power Sharing in Afghanistan 325





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participate in development projects influence outcomes such as government

legitimacy and gender equity (Beath Christia and Enikolopov 2013)

None of these earlier studies explicitly consider power sharing between multiple

levels of government Barfieldrsquos study considered whether the state can control

villagers rather than reciprocity between villages and lower-level state officials

Studies of legal pluralism alert us to the interplay of formal and informal norms

but generally confine customary authorities as lawgivers thereby neglecting their

broader political significance Warlord governance is an important phenomenon

although warlords typically do not play important roles in day-to-day village

governance Finally impact evaluations of development projects confine analysis

to comparisons of customary governance versus aid projects in the lsquolsquoefficiencyrsquorsquo of

public goods provision within villages rather than the relationship between

customary representatives and higher levels of government

By focusing on norms of power sharing in rural parts Afghanistan this article

clarifies an important missing piece in studies of Afghan politics It casts doubt

upon pessimistic visions of customary and formal orders locked in perpetual wars

of elimination Although Afghanistan seems to be an exemplary case of conflict

between customary and lsquolsquorationalrsquorsquo order customary representatives and state

officials often govern alongside one another through norms that are effective yet

whose origins lie outside the formal constitutional structure

Formal Government in Post-Taliban Afghanistan

The Afghan state has been highly centralized since King Abdur Rahman sought

to decimate customary authority as a state-building strategy during his ruthless

reign from 1880 to 1901 Since then most leaders have either sought to co-opt or

eliminate customary authority (Edwards 2002) The 2004 Constitution maintains

the same centralized system of subnational governance as under previous

monarchies where all local officials are appointed by the central government1

Afghanistan has four levels of government national provincial district and

village Each of the thirty-four provinces has a governor appointed by Kabul

District governors (woluswals) are appointed by the president sometimes in

consultation with the provincial governor There are around 400 districts2 Formal

village government called for in the Constitution has not been created Although

the Constitution calls for elected district and village councils elections have not

been held There have been elections for provincial councils yet these councils have

no budgetary authority and have no oversight over provincial governors

District governors enjoy very little formal autonomy reporting directly to

provincial governors who in turn report to the president3 The selection procedure

for provincial and district governors is unclear Based on my own observations and

interviews with officials responsible for appointing district governors (as exact

326 J B Murtazashvili





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figures are unavailable) district governors are usually not from the districts they

serve serving for indefinite periods and are removed and rotated from one district

to another with little warning

Immediately after 2001 the international community focused most of its

attention on strengthening the national government with the hope that national

capacity would trickle down to provinces and districts Donors and the Afghan

Government began to pay more attention to subnational governance as the United

States and coalition partners viewed local politics as central to an effective

counterinsurgency strategy (Nagl et al 2007) Beginning around 2007 donors

began partnering with Afghan ministries to create ad hoc district councils

throughout the country as part of a governance strategy to defeat an insurgent

Taliban and to distribute development assistance (Saltmarshe and Medhi 2011)

Faced with a rising insurgency such efforts were mainly concerned with buying

loyalty rather than governing The lsquolsquotraditionalrsquorsquo leaders who participated in these

councils often received a healthy stipend leading to intense competition between

community members and the government as to who might constitute an lsquolsquoelderrsquorsquo

As the goal was mainly aid delivery efforts to create district councils did not lead

to a viable source of governance Importantly there is no formal representation of

villages in the political system even though 80 percent of the population lives in the

estimated 20000ndash40000 villages Center-local political relations both formal and

informal are summarized in table 1

Research Methodology

The fieldwork was conducted in thirty-two villages across seventeen districts in six

provinces Provinces were selected to capture geographic and ethnic diversity

Provinces included Balkh (Nahri Shahi Dawlatabad Districts) Bamiyan (Panjab

Bamiyan Center Sayghan Shibar Districts) Herat (Karokh Anjil Pashtun

Zarghun Guzara Districts) Kabul (Paghman Guldara Qarabagh Districts)

Kunduz (Imam Sahib Khanabad Districts) and Nangarhar (Behsod Surkhrod

Districts) Kandahar was also selected but security deteriorated significantly during

the period of research making fieldwork untenable As Kandahar is a mostly

Pashtun district Pashtun communities in the remaining districts were oversampled

to ensure the data closely resembled the overall ethnic composition of Afghanistan

In each district research was conducted in one village close to the district center

and another one farther away At the time of research all districts were lsquolsquosafersquorsquo for

civilian travel Although this may have introduced bias into selection several years

later half these districts were insecure

The fieldwork produced more than 3000 pages of transcripts from interviews

conducted by the author and six Afghan researchers who came from a wide range

of ethnic groups each fluent in both Dari and Pashto under the auspices of a






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Kabul-based research organization the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Interviews and focus groups were transcribed from notes taken during the course of

interviews

It may seem that asking about government officials is a sensitive topic in

Afghanistan yet informants were quite willing to discuss their attitudes and rarely

hesitated to criticize local authorities Rather the potential source of lsquolsquodesirability

biasrsquorsquo arose from beliefs that researchers had come to bring aid projects Thus

many informants heaped enormous praise on aid during interviews Researchers

developed techniques to overcome this such as initially asking informants to

provide oral histories something rarely done by rapid aid appraisals In addition

team member met each day team to detect inconsistencies in stories told by

informants in communities

The Federal Dilemma in Afghanistan

A federation is conventionally defined by power sharing between multiple levels of

government Formally federalism is defined by three characteristics These include

geopolitical division subunits with independent bases of authority and govern-

ments at each level with the capacity to directly govern citizens within its

jurisdiction (Bednar 2008 18ndash19)

Table 1 Political representation in Afghanistan

Level Number of units Formal political

representative

Selection

method

Key informal

players

Province 34 Executive authority

Provincial governor

Appointed by

president

Warlords

Legislative authority

Provincial council

Elections

District 400 Executive authority

District governor

Appointed by

president

Warlords

Commanders


District council

Elections have

yet to be held

Maliks

Mullahs

Village 20000ndash40000 Executive authority

None specified in

constitution or

existing legislation

ndash Maliks

ShuraJirgas

Mullahs

Commanders


Village council

Elections have

not yet held






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On paper Afghanistan is hardly a federation as formal government is

centralized To the extent that village-based customary organizations are a de facto

level of government Afghanistan resembles an informal federation Applying the

definition we will see that customary governance operates at the village level which

is distinct from district and provincial jurisdictions sources of customary authority

are usually independent of the state as its origins lie in custom and customary

organizations have capacity to govern directly

Scholars of Afghanistan have long understood the country is beset with

independent sources of customary authority beneath a weak state (Shahrani and

Canfield 1984) Nonetheless it was far from clear the extent to which customary

authorities weathered thirty years of warfare One contribution of the fieldwork was

to show that village governance is not only persistent but also that it consist of a

competitive balance of authority between three distinct organizations maliks

shurasjirgas and mullahs4 Maliks (sometimes called arbabs wakils namayenda or

khans) are village representatives usually selected by consent of villagers In the

past governments sought to co-opt or appoint maliks as part of a strategy to

control villages Afghans describe the malik (usually) not as a headman but a first

among equals who represents the community to outsiders such as aid organizations

or the state Shuras (an Arabic Koranic term jirga in Pashto) are deliberative

councils convening on an ad hoc basis to decide matters of collective importance

Villagers rarely use the term shura but instead refer to meetings of lsquolsquowhite beardsrsquorsquo

(rish-i safidan spingeri) although many lsquolsquowhite beardsrsquorsquo were simply men thirty or

older Mullahs are religious leader and usually arbitrate family disputes

In addition to serving as the only government at the jurisdictional level of the

village the legitimacy of customary organizations comes from citizens not the

state As a malik in Herat Province explained

We are citizens of Afghanistan if the government doesnrsquot support us then

the people will support us We behave justly and we are doing our work

with the help of the people We resolve the problems of people and we are a

bridge between people and the woluswal5

These differences in legitimacy were reflected in the power-sharing arrangements

between customary representatives and district governors In most districts in the

study there were long-standing informal district councils chaired by the woluswal

who met regularly with maliks This is why community members often referred to

their malik as a lsquolsquobridge between the people and the governmentrsquorsquo repeatedly during

interviews The malik appeared to represent communities to the government rather

than the other way around

Finally customary organizations are effective in providing local goods

including dispute resolution between neighbors and management of access to

natural resources (Nojumi Mazurana and Stites 2008 Brick 2008) As customary






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organizations appear capable of governing directly there is a case to be made

that Afghanistan is a federation in practice These dimensions are summarized in

table 2

Although this description suggests Afghanistan resembles a federation the

stability of a federation requires a balance of authority between central and local

governments The notion of self-enforcing federalism begins by observing that

federations are inherently unstable because they seek to balance authority between

multiple levels of government (Bednar 2005) In order to persist a federation must

overcome its central dilemma which is assuring the central government is powerful

enough to provide public goods yet not so strong as to use its strength to engage

in predatory behavior (de Figueiredo and Weingast 2005)

In Afghanistan the lsquolsquofederal bargainrsquorsquo involves an implicit promise by district

governors to provide public goods (such as honest brokering of disputes basic

security and to forgo corruption) in exchange for information from maliks who in

turn rely on citizens regarding security issues Drawing on insights from theories of

stability and breakdown of formal federations several conditions must be satisfied

in order for informal power-sharing arrangements to prevail

First district governors must be strong enough to provide some public goods

Improvements in public goods provision is a central feature of demand-side

explanations for increasing centralization of state authority and a main reason why

local power brokers accept centralization (Hechter 2001) An implication of the

public goods rationale is that there are few reasons for communities to accept a

lsquolsquohigher political powerrsquorsquo unless district governors can deliver on promises to

provide public goods

Second district governors must be constrained from expropriating wealth from

communities Numerous and overlapping constraints on central governments yield

Table 2 Defining the informal federation

Dimension of federalism Satisfied

Geopolitical division Yes Customary organizations have jurisdictional authority at the

village level while formal state authority operates at the district

and provincial levels

Subunits with independent

bases of authority

Yes Customary authorities derive legitimacy from custom and

tradition while the state derives its authority from the

constitution

Governments with capacity

at each level

Yes Customary governance provides public goods and the

nature and characteristics of those goods typically differ from

those provided by district governors






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more effective federal governance (Bednar 2008) The constraints are expected to

translate into more effective public goods provision

Third customary representatives require both incentives and capacity to uphold

their end of the bargain As village leaders are lsquolsquorationalrsquorsquo they will have a tendency

to act in bad faith (Popkin 1979) When customary leaders cannot be trusted by

the state or community members or when they have short time horizons due to

factors such as political uncertainty power sharing may not emerge (Olken 2007)

Applied to Afghanistan these theories suggest that power sharing between the

state and customary organizations is expected to depend on the ability of district

governors to provide public goods constraints on district governors as well as

constraints on village leaders Unlike most studies of federations which focus on

stability or breakdown of national systems my model of informal federalism

recognizes that federal bargains occur locally and that within a single country

federalism may be stable in some regions but break down in others Political

relations in each district between customary governance and the central

government provide several opportunities to explore why Afghanistanrsquos informal

federation is stable and when it breaks down

Studies relying on ethnographic data face challenges in measuring outcomes and

explanatory variables The dependent variable is a successful federal bargain which

is measured by provision of public goods by the district governor respect for

community autonomy by district governors and by customary leaders sharing

information with district governors regarding security These outcomes will be

measured qualitatively rather than quantitatively with conclusions discerned from

dozens of interviews in each district The lsquolsquoindependent variablesrsquorsquo which include

constraints on district governors and customary representatives are also measured

using field data

The concept of informal federalism reflects growing recognition that informal

political institutions are important in many countries characterized by weak formal

rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2004) For example Lily Tsai (2007) illustrates how

common temple affiliation generates social capital which engenders greater

accountability of local government officials in an authoritarian context The

conceptual framework and empirical evidence complements existing studies by

showing the conditions under which informal norms can yield power sharing

between communities and the state in an environment of extraordinary state

weakness

Dynamics of Decentralized Governance in Rural Afghanistan

Four case studies constructed from interviews focus-group discussions and field

observations illustrate the dynamics of stability and instability of informal federal

relations The first case illustrates successful power sharing and the emergence of






Dow

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informal federalism while the three other cases illustrate various ways such norms

break down

These cases were selected from a universe of seventeen cases (one from each

district visited) There were nine cases of successful power sharing This case of

successful power illustrates the key features of power sharing in rural Afghanistan

as well as how customary governance operates There were eight cases that involved

breakdown of power sharing The three cases were selected because they illustrate

three different mechanisms of breakdown in the first case of failed power sharing

district governors were unconstrained in the second the district governor was too

weak in the third customary governance structures broke down In addition the

third case demonstrates breakdown and reassertion of power sharing

GoverningTogether Federal Norms in Guldara District Kabul

The center of Guldara District only an hour drive north of Kabul is nonetheless

quite isolated due to mountains sweeping across the district The district population

is around 25000 split between Tajiks and Pashto-speaking Kuchi nomads who

settled in the district long ago Tajiks live in the mountainous areas on the districtrsquos

western edges Kuchis reside on the flat arid land in the east Many Tajiks served as

fighters in the anti-Soviet anti-Taliban Northern Alliance The district experienced

heavy fighting during decades of war As one malik put it lsquolsquoWe should rename our

district ranjdara (lsquovalley of sufferingrsquo) not Guldara (lsquovalley of flowersrsquo)rsquorsquo

Both groups convened customary village councils which they referred to

as lsquolsquowhite-beard councilsrsquorsquo (rish-e safidan spingeri) or simply lsquolsquowhite beardsrsquorsquo to

resolve internal community issues Each group also had a malik which they seemed

very satisfied with largely because they were responsible for selecting him The Tajik

malik described his work resolving conflicts and providing security to the community

(illustrating the capacity of customary governance in the informal federation)

We had some conflicts with [the Kuchi] tribes who had good relations with

the Taliban Our people suffered a lot under the Taliban But eventually we

solved our problems with this neighboring community and now have good

relations with them Sometimes they have disputes in their village and

they will call me over for my advice I even work with them to help them

resolve their internal issues6

The malik in the Kuchi community who was only twenty-nine years old was

one of the few literate people in the village He believed one of his most important

responsibilities was representing community interests to the district governor He

visited the district government office to exchange information about security at

regularly scheduled meetings while the woluswal informed him about new aid

projects in the area7






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The woluswal in contrast to the maliks themselves understood maliks to be an

arm of the state Like many woluswals I spoke with he viewed the introduction of

the malik to him as a contract signifying community ties to the state

We have divided our districts into five parts or five valleys Every division has

one representative The five representatives of these valleys meet with each

other once a month They are a formal part of the government The

maliks in our district have a stamp which I issue to them They come

frequently to the district center to discuss some village problems with us and

we try to help them as much as we are able They [maliks] are registered

in the government but they donrsquot have a government salary They just work

for the people and they want to serve the people8

The division of the district into five administrative units was not called for by

law but was a management strategy developed by the woluswal Although there is

no law requiring maliks to have stamps this practice commonly employed by

woluswals

The maliks explained that they share information about security with their

woluswal at their regular meetings9 In exchange for this information about

security maliks expect the woluswal to resolve disputes that transcend several

communities Indeed this woluswal helped resolve tension between Tajiks and

Kuchis in the community who were on opposing sides during Taliban rule

A Kuchi male elder remarked on the evenhandedness of the Tajik woluswal

We like the woluswal Even though he is Tajik he has worked very nicely on

our behalf He made peace among the people and he has helped everyone

When he sees old men carrying water up the mountain he will always stop

and help them He is an example of a very good person10

Although Guldara District sat on the verge of conflict and chaos in 2001 the

district governor quickly diffused tension even though he was a partisan during

previous conflicts Because the governor was trusted by each of these groups both

sides were willing to share information about regional security threats11

This case illustrates informal federalism at work in Afghanistan District officials

and customary representatives have authority to act within their jurisdictions

Moreover the relationship between the two levels (village and district) is one of

reciprocity whereby the district government provides larger-scale public goods in

exchange for information from maliks This relationship is robust and common

throughout the countryside even though it is entirely informal as anticipated by

theories of polycentric governance that suggest much governance occurs outside the

parchment rules of the state

This case also illustrates the conditions for successful power sharing between

district governors and customary officials First the ability of the district governor






Dow

nloaded from

to provide the public good of dispute resolution brought different groups to the

table The district governor also had longer time horizons because he was from the

district he served As a result he understood that transgression on his part would

almost certainly result in retribution against his family Finally the maliks had

incentives to work for citizens because villagers had a say in selecting them

UnconstrainedWoluswals Karokh District Herat Province

The governance situation in Karokh District Herat Province proved to be quite

different from Guldara Karokh which has around 90000 people is a majority

Tajik region although there are significant Uzbek and Pashtun communities

Rather than shared governance this case illustrates how lack of constraints on the

district governor can lead to a breakdown of power sharing

The role of customary representatives in Karokh which they called arbabs is

similar to maliks in Guldara However in Karokh many arbabs were killed because

representatives of the communist government which came to power in late 1979

viewed them as obstacles in their efforts to collectivize agriculture After the fall of

the Taliban regime communities reconstituted customary governance as one of the

arbabs explained

In every village there was an arbab who was a large landowner he ruled the

village like a padshah (king) Now arbabs donrsquot have as much strength the

people are choosing the arbabs themselves as representatives to the woluswal

If the arbab does not work on behalf of the people the people will send him

back and take away his power Now the people are not afraid of the arbab

but in the past the people were afraid of them12

Another arbab indicated they are both empowered and constrained by the citizens

lsquolsquoEverything is in the hands of people themselves they can select an arbab and fire

him from his postrsquorsquo13 Selected by citizens and dependent upon them for salary and

status arbabs have incentives to act on behalf of their constituents Most arbabs

understand that if they do not act in good faith they will not be selected for service

in the future Just as the community depends on arbabs for dispute management

accessing government resources and liaising with the outside world arbabs depend

on their constituents for support status and sometimes for their salary In Karokh

villagers paid arbabs with wheat from their harvest only if they were satisfied with

their service

Unlike Guldara relations between the district governor and maliks were poor in

Karokh According to a male shopkeeper

The people are not happy to go to the woluswali If they try to go there they

know theyrsquoll have to spend a lot of money All of them [government






Dow

nloaded from

officials] are corrupt When the woluswal first arrives and is new they are

good for a few days but then they just become corrupt14

A woman described how the incompetence of the woluswal led residents to avoid

the government

In our village we resolve issues like fights and other things But if we canrsquot

resolve these issues we should go to the woluswal Thankfully we havenrsquot had

any issue in the past two years where we had to go to the woluswal Now the

arbab tries to resolve issues [that arise] between several villages Last year

there was a fight between two villages over water Instead of going to the

woluswal we went all the way to Herat City [about 30 miles away] to discuss

the issue with the provincial government because we didnrsquot want to go to the

woluswal15

Observations in the district government office verified villagersrsquo sentiments During

my visits there were no officials at work or citizens waiting to consult with

officialsmdashsomething common in districts characterized by effective power sharing

The district governor summoned several arbabs to his office to speak with me

placing one of his staff members to eavesdrop on the conversation The arbabs were

aware of this and whispered critical comments about the woluswal Despite the

obvious tension in the air the woluswal claimed relations were good16

In contrast to account offered by the woluswal villagers complained of

unresolved disputes that demanded outside mediation They also refused to share

information with the government about security issues A local policeman

summarized the situation

The woluswal is only looking out for himself Hersquos only looking to create

problems for the people He tries to use the arbabs for his own purposes But

we donrsquot let it happen Our people have made our own council [shura] by

ourselves and it belongs to us not to the government The arbab belongs to

us not to the government17

Besides the failings of the woluswal several villagers and some maliks reported that

other maliks began to collaborate with the woluswal to plunder citizens In these

communities maliks lost their legitimacy In case studies in northern Afghanistan

Wilde and Mielke (2013) find that maliks simply serve as a corrupt arm of the state

and warlords Although I did find instances where predatory maliks contributed to

the breakdown of power sharing between communities and the state corruption on

the part of the woluswal contributed to predation by maliks I found corrupt maliks

to be an exception In such cases where maliks were unreliable villagers excluded

maliks from shuras and mullahs assumed more important roles as governance had

to go on






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nloaded from

In Karokh the main obstacle to power sharing was the absence of constraints on

the woluswal Several informants said that the woluswal engaged in corruption

because he was not from the district He was from another district in Herat and

had already served as woluswal in two other districts in the province He knew he

would be rotated out shortly had short time horizons Due to the absence of ties to

the community residents believed he had few incentives to serve the people

WeakWoluswals Guzara District Herat Province

The third example is from Guzara District with a population of approximately

125000 also in Herat Province For many years after 2001 Guzara District was

stable However a decades-old conflict between two Pashtun tribes threatened this

peace The district governor was willing to work for the people but lacked the

capacity to provide the public good of security As a consequence communities

seem to have overwhelmed the state

According to the woluswal a conflict between two Pashtun qaums [tribes or

solidary groups] over land consumed the district Over the years insurgent groups

had taken advantage of these disagreements providing both sides with weapons18

The woluswal conveyed the nature of the conflict

There is a dispute going on between two tribesmdashthe Alizai and Popalzai

These two qaums have a lot of weapons They fight with each other a lot We

donrsquot even know what they are fighting about anymore They are killing each

other The government cannot control them19

Instability had increased as the qaums were robbing cars on the road at

gunpoint Just the week before he said two Afghan nongovernmental organization

workers were kidnapped for two days before being rescued

Due to security concerns this was the only of seventeen districts visited where a

government official refused requests to conduct fieldwork Although research was

restricted to interviews and observations in the government compound these data

provided insight into a revolving door of district governors in Guzara each unable

to impose order on the qaums

Instability arising from feuds was exacerbated by a separate insurgency brewing

in the district led by a Tajik named Ghulam Yahya who was allied with Ismail

Khan a famous Northern Alliance lsquolsquowarlordrsquorsquo from the region During the civil war

in the 1990s Ismail Khan appointed Yahya as mayor of the provincial capital

Herat City After 2001 Yahya took a post in the provincial government but was

fired in 2006 and found himself suddenly cut off from provincial government

spoils Yahya fled with some followers to his hometown in eastern Guzara

According to the district governor lsquolsquoRecently the Yahya people have been upset






Dow

nloaded from

with the government Before Ghulam Yahya had a government position but he lost

that job Now he doesnrsquot have a job and is angry with the governmentrsquorsquo20

Disorder resulting from qaum feuds created an opening for Yahya to establish

camps in the district Yahya said he invited followers of the Taliban and Al Qaeda

to the district telling Al Jazeera that he allowed Arab fighters passage in Guzara21

Al Jazeera labeled him salaciously (and incorrectly) as a lsquolsquoTajik Talibanrsquorsquo to provide

evidence that the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan had gained followers among

non-Pashtuns

In February 2008 followers of Ghulam Yahya shot and killed the woluswal of

Guzara interviewed here along with his young son

In this district the woluswal was not strong enough to provide basic law and

order Although arbabs may have been willing to cooperate and the district governor

wanted to provide security the government had no capacity to reciprocate The

informal federal bargain broke down as warring groups overpowered and weakened

arbabs and ultimately overwhelmed the district government

Breakdown and Reassertion Shibar District Bamiyan Province

Events from Shibar provide insight into the breakdown and reemergence of power

sharing between villages represented by customary authority and the state The

population of Shibar District is close to 30000 and is mostly Shirsquoa Hazara but

there is a significant Ismaili population As in Karokh the Soviet-backed

Communist government executed arbabs during their rule in the 1970s and 1980s

undermining an important source of community-based collective action that could

organize against an aggressive state In the 1980s communities were also ravaged

by anti-Communist mujahedeen warlords In the 1990s the Taliban imposed a

particularly harsh social order on the Shirsquoa and Ismailis as non-Sunnis levying the

jizya (a tax reserved for non-Muslims) believing the Shirsquoa and Ismailis to be

apostates A Hazara female elder described the breakdown of the arbab system

He [the arbab] was very respectful of the people If someone did anything

wrong in the village the arbab would fine them His presence was good

It kept order in our village [However] during the war with the mujahedeen

the warlord groups and commanders harassed the people a lot Our people

didnrsquot respect these warlords22

After the fall of the Taliban government villagers returned to their communities

and reconstituted customary governance but used new titles to describe such

governance

The leaders of our villages are just called rais (lsquolsquoleaderrsquorsquo) That is the word

the people give to these people In the past they were called arbab






Dow

nloaded from

The government did not give the name arbab to these people This is

something the people chose themselves23

Individuals in Shibar did not speak of maliks or arbabs but instead spoke of rais or

namayenda (lsquolsquorepresentativersquorsquo) selected by the people to represent their interests to

the government An illiterate male farmer described the role these individuals play

in dispute resolution similar to maliks and arbabs in Guldara and Karokh

In our village we have an elder (rish-e safid) Everyone in our village has

faced some challenges in life They go to this elder He resolves the disputes

for them He resolves any issue facing the village If the people in the village

arenrsquot satisfied with the decision of the elder then they go to the woluswali

for help24

Once the post-2001 government was established many woluswals began to search

for organizations and individuals to fill the void left by arbabs in those areas where

they were executed The woluswal in Shibar was aware of his inability to rule

villages directly and relied on village rais and lsquolsquoeldersrsquorsquo As he explained

People are coming directly to me If there are problems we then gather

the elders of the villages If there is a dispute between the people then I will

contact the elders If I want to rebuild secondary roads between villages then

I contact them and invite them to the woluswali and then they tell the people

in the villages of the plans If we want to talk about poppy issues I collect

the elders I even discuss security issues with the elders and they help me25

Governance in Shibar District came full circle Informal norms of power sharing

that had long existed in the district broke down during the war enabling

governments to expropriate wealth and govern ruthlessly After 2001 power sharing

reemerged as villages reorganized themselves Self-organization allowed communi-

ties to represent their interests to the state but perhaps most importantly provided

a bulwark to protect communities from government predation

The Significance of Informal Federalism

Although the case studies only considered a single case of effective power sharing

this outcome was not unusual occurring in around half of the districts visited

during fieldwork In these districts customary representatives petitioned the

government to help provide certain public goods and in exchange provided

governors with information In districts where relations between customary

representatives and the government were poor it was usually because woluswals

were unconstrained although it could also happen because customary authority

broke down either due to violence or because they became predatory Villagers in






Dow

nloaded from

these districts believed that corrupt district governors were responsible for violating

the implicit social contract that woluswals provide certain public goods in exchange

for communities to cede some of their autonomy to the district governor

These informal norms of power sharing provide insight into the political

foundations of insecurity in Afghanistan Erosion of constraints on district

governors and weakening of village-based customary governance contributes to

insecurity When district governors are predatory and unconstrained villagers cease

cooperation with the government in security affairs while breakdown of customary

governance means that district governors struggle to call on citizens to provide

information regarding insurgent activity The breakdown of these federal norms

helps us understand why the security situation in the country has deteriorated in

the years following 2001 If district government officials are predatory and

unwilling to respect citizen rights then communities will withdraw from their

willingness to cooperate with the state Maintaining and strengthening these power-

sharing norms is thus a potentially important way to improve state-building

prospects in the country

Conclusion

The self-governance approach pioneered by Elinor Ostrom (1990) anticipated the

power of customary organizations in Afghanistan to govern village affairs despite

profound state weakness In nearly every village visited during fieldwork in rural

Afghanistan villagers reported that they are able to provide small-scale public

goods building projects and resolving conflicts without the help of the state or aid

projects Simultaneously customary organizations interact with the state in

important ways Vincent Ostrom wrote that scholars of federalism should pay less

attention to lsquolsquoforms of government and what governments are supposed to do and

a much greater preoccupation with the languages and cultures of covenanting

societies and about the patterns of order in covenanting societiesrsquorsquo (1995 59) As

anticipated his insights into the lsquolsquocovenanting societyrsquorsquo formal political relations in

Afghanistan tell us little about governance in practice Rather than centralization

governance in Afghanistan is much closer to a federation one in which customary

representatives of villages govern together with formal officials at the district level

The case studies presented in this article illustrate why power-sharing works and

when it breaks down In a little more than half of the seventeen districts visited I found

robust cooperation between customary and formal officials usually when district

governors were from the region where they governed and villagers had a say in selecting

their representatives Unfortunately these relationships often break down either

because district governors face few constraints or are not tied to communities or more

rarely when village representatives did not work on behalf of citizens This suggests that

accountability of district government can increase if villagers have a voice in selecting






Dow

nloaded from

district governors Finally given the ubiquity of customary governance illustrated here

as well as in nationally-representative survey data (Murtazashvili 2012) efforts to

create new formal village government may be unnecessary

Customary authorities have been the primary target of communists mujahedeen

warlords and the Taliban because of the legitimacy they possess The Taliban

during their formal rule from 1996 to 2001 worked to undermine customary

governance and promote their own network of village based-religious leaders In

post-2001 Afghanistan in areas it contests The Taliban have continued its assault

on customary authority assassinating local notables in large numbers The cases

here show that villagers are adept at reconstituting and regenerating these

informal relationsmdashboth within their communities and between the community

and the statemdashonce violence ceases which bodes well for the future of informal

federalism

The presence of these informal relationships and their general stability suggests

that a increased decentralization of power is a viable political option in the country

In particular the evidence shows that prospects for state building may improve by

closing the gap between formal constitutional structures and political relations as

they are actually practiced Such a narrowing of the gap between the formal rules

and those in practice could likely strengthen these norms of power sharing and in

the process improve prospects for peace in a country that has too often ignored the

virtues of federalism

Notes

This research was supported by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

(AREU) through generous support from the Japanese International Cooperation

Agency I am extraordinarily grateful to Ghulam Sakhi Frozish M Hasan Wafaey

Nasreen Quraishi Gulalai Karimi Fauzia Rahimi and Abdul Hadi Sadat for their

courageous research assistance on this project This paper benefited from the

careful and encouraging comments of Elinor Ostrom and participants in the Policy

Workshop at Indiana University Paul Fishstein Hamish Nixon Paula Kantor

Adam Pain and Deborah Smith at AREU provided enormous support for this

project Ilia Murtazashvili Melanie Manion Scott Gehlbach Edward Friedman

Dave Weimer Dan Bromely and Meina Cai also provided important feedback on

earlier drafts of this paper Finally I wish to thank the invaluable comments of the

anonymous reviewers for extremely constructive guidance

1 Article 137 of the Constitution of the Government of the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan

2 The exact number is not clear even to officials in the government agency responsible for

administering local government Interview Afghan Government Official Kabul

Afghanistan July 2011






Dow

nloaded from

3 In some parts of the country that are under insurgent control or are heavily contested

government presence is limited to a district police chief A district governor would rarely

travel to such districts

4 The names of these organizations vary by region and ethnic group but the author found

that this constellation of organizations in general terms was present in most villages

5 Focus Group Discussion Maliks Karokh District Herat Province

6 Interview Malik Village 2 Guldara District Kabul Province


8 Interview District Governor Guldara District Kabul Province


10 Interview Farmer Village 1 Guldara District Kabul Province




14 Interview Male Shopkeeper Village 1 Karokh District Herat Province

15 Interview Female Homemaker Village 1 Karokh District Herat Province Long lines

outside government offices is a measure of effective governance as it is costly for

individuals who must travel long distances to visit government offices and wait in line

If individuals do not expect officials to resolve problems fairly or without predation

they will avoid government offices

16 Interview District Governor Karokh District Herat Province

17 Interview Policeman Village 1 Karokh District Herat Province

18 Interview District Security Commander Guzara District Herat Province

19 Interview District Governor Guzara District Herat Province


21 lsquolsquoAfghan Mayor Turns Taliban Leaderrsquorsquo October 17 2008 Al Jazeera English Service

httpwwwaljazeeracomnewsasia200810200810173815406492html

22 Interview Female Homemaker Village 2 Shibar District Bamiyan Province

23 Interview Male Farmer Village 1 Shibar District Bamiyan Province


25 Interview District Governor Shibar District Bamiyan Province

References

Barfield Thomas 1984 Weak links on a rusty chain structural weaknesses in Afghanistanrsquos

provincial government administration In Revolutions and rebellions in Afghanistan

Anthropological perspectives ed M Nazif Shahrani and Robert Canfield 170ndash83 Berkeley

University of California Press

Beath Andrew Fotini Christia and Ruben Enikolopov 2013 Empowering women through

development aid Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan American Political

Science Review 107 (3) 540ndash57

Bednar Jenna 2005 Federalism as a public good Constitutional Political Economy 16 (2)

189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from

mdashmdashmdash 2008 The robust federation Principles of design New York Cambridge University

Press

Brick Jennifer 2008 Final report Investigating the sustainability of Community Development

Councils Kabul Afghanistan Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Coburn Noah 2013 Informal justice and the international community in Afghanistan

Washington DC United States Institute of Peace Press

De Figueiredo Rui and Barry Weingast 2005 Self-enforcing federalism Journal of Law

Economics and Organization 21 (1) 103ndash35

Edwards David B 2002 Before Taliban Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad Berkeley University

of California Press

Giustozzi Antonio 2009 Empires of mud War and warlords of Afghanistan New York

Columbia University Press

Hechter Michael 2001 Containing nationalism New York Oxford University Press

Helmke Gretchen and Steven Levitsky 2004 Informal institutions and comparative politics

A research agenda Perspectives on Politics 2 (4) 725ndash40

Mukhopadhyay Dipali 2013 Warlords strongman governors and the state in Afghanistan

New York Cambridge University Press

Murtazashvili Jennifer Brick 2012 Survey on political institutions elections and democracy in

Afghanistan Washington DC Democracy International and United States Agency for

International Development

Nagl John David Petraeus James Amos and Sarah Sewall 2007 The US ArmyMarine

Corps counterinsurgency field manual Chicago University of Chicago Press

Nojumi Neamatollah Dyan Mazurana and Elizabeth Stites 2008 After the Taliban Life and

security in rural Afghanistan New York Rowman and Littlefield

Olken Benjamin A 2007 Monitoring corruption evidence from a field experiment in

Indonesia Jounral of Political Economy 115 (2) 200ndash249

Ostrom Elinor 1990 Governing the commons The evolution of institutions for collective

action New York Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 2005 Understanding institutional diversity Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Ostrom Vincent 1995 Where to begin Publius 25 (2) 45ndash60

mdashmdashmdash 2007 The intellectual crisis in American public administration 3rd ed Birmingham

UK University Alabama Press

Ostrom Vincent Charles M Tiebout and Robert Warren 1961 The organization of

government in metropolitan areas A theoretical inquiry The American Political Science

Review 55 (4) 831ndash42

Popkin Samuel 1979 The rational peasant Berkeley University of California Press

Saltmarshe Douglas and Abhilash Medhi 2011 Local governance A view from the ground

Kabul Afghanistan Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit






Dow

nloaded from

Shahrani M Nazif 1998 The future of the state and the structure of community

governance in Afghanistan In Fundamentalism reborn Afghanistan and the Taliban ed

William Maley 212ndash42 New York NYU Press

Shahrani M Nazif and Robert Canfield eds 1984 Revolutions and rebellions in Afghanistan

Anthropological perspectives Berkeley University of California Press

Tsai Lily 2007 Accountability without democracy Solidary groups and public goods provision

in rural China New York Cambridge University Press

Wilde Andreas and Katja Mielke 2013 Order stability and change in Afghanistan From

top-down to bottom-up state-making Central Asian Survey 32 (3) 353ndash70






Dow

nloaded from

division of authority between district governors and customary authority as well as

the independent sources of legitimacy of customary officials and their capacity to

govern directly resemble political relations in federations where multiple levels of

government share power In Afghanistan however customary organizations have no

formal state mandate yet often serve as key partners in the federal arrangement For

this reason Afghanistan can be described as a federation in practice or an informal

federation In addition customary authorities often partner with formal district

governments in relationships that are collaborative rather than adversarial

The findings regarding norms of power sharing in the Afghan countryside are

anticipated by the work of Vincent Ostrom who noted that the modern study of

public administration focuses almost exclusively on creating forms of hierarchical

control that regard political and associational life outside such hierarchy as

lsquolsquofragmentedrsquorsquo (V Ostrom 2007) In contrast Vincent Ostrom saw legitimacy in

what appears to be organizational incoherence arguing that societies lsquolsquoare capable

of establishing good government by reflection and choice in a political system

characterized by substantial fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdic-

tionrsquorsquo (V Ostrom 2007 113) According to this perspective there is a certain virtue

of the untidy appearance of self-governing schemes and norms that shape relations

between multiple levels of authority (V Ostrom Tiebout and Warren 1961)

More generally these informal political arrangements in Afghanistan constitute

what Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom termed a lsquolsquopolycentric political systemrsquorsquo in

that these centers of power are formally independent of one another This article

integrates insights from the literature on polycentric governance as well that of self-

enforcing federalism to understand the origins breakdown and maintenance of

informal political relationships in rural Afghanistan Polycentrism shows us that

it is possible to have multiple levels of governmentmdashboth formal and informalmdash

within a single polity while the federalism literature shows us how these

polycentric units collaborate (E Ostrom 2005)

This study complements earlier work on village governance and the state in

Afghanistan by explicitly characterizing the country as a polycentric system of

governance Based on fieldwork in Northern Afghanistan in the 1970s Thomas

Barfield described relations between the state and villages as a lsquolsquoweak link on a rusty

chainrsquorsquo (1984) Several important studies consider the interplay between customary

law and state courts in promoting justice (Coburn 2013 Shahrani 1998) Another

perspective on center-local relations focuses on the extent of warlord governance at

the provincial level showing that warlords can be effective governors (Giustozzi

2009) As Mukhopadhyay (2013) explains former warlords often become effective

lsquolsquostrongman governorsrsquorsquo because they can transcend constraints imposed by the

state Finally there is an important and growing literature considering how local

decision-making procedures including the extent to which lsquolsquotraditionalrsquorsquo actors






Dow

nloaded from













































Dow

nloaded from













































Dow

nloaded from



interviews


















representative

Selection

method

Key informal

players


Provincial governor

Appointed by

president

Warlords


Provincial council

Elections


District governor

Appointed by

president

Warlords

Commanders


District council

Elections have

yet to be held

Maliks

Mullahs


None specified in

constitution or


ndash Maliks

ShuraJirgas

Mullahs

Commanders


Village council

Elections have

not yet held






Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from



table 2






























bases of authority



constitution


at each level









Dow

nloaded from


























using field data









weakness










Dow

nloaded from


break down










































Dow

nloaded from















woluswals






























Dow

nloaded from

















arbabs explained
















their service










Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from













































Dow

nloaded from













































Dow

nloaded from



interviews


















representative

Selection

method

Key informal

players


Provincial governor

Appointed by

president

Warlords


Provincial council

Elections


District governor

Appointed by

president

Warlords

Commanders


District council

Elections have

yet to be held

Maliks

Mullahs


None specified in

constitution or


ndash Maliks

ShuraJirgas

Mullahs

Commanders


Village council

Elections have

not yet held






Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from



table 2






























bases of authority



constitution


at each level









Dow

nloaded from


























using field data









weakness










Dow

nloaded from


break down










































Dow

nloaded from















woluswals






























Dow

nloaded from

















arbabs explained
















their service










Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from













































Dow

nloaded from



interviews


















representative

Selection

method

Key informal

players


Provincial governor

Appointed by

president

Warlords


Provincial council

Elections


District governor

Appointed by

president

Warlords

Commanders


District council

Elections have

yet to be held

Maliks

Mullahs


None specified in

constitution or


ndash Maliks

ShuraJirgas

Mullahs

Commanders


Village council

Elections have

not yet held






Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from



table 2






























bases of authority



constitution


at each level









Dow

nloaded from


























using field data









weakness










Dow

nloaded from


break down










































Dow

nloaded from















woluswals






























Dow

nloaded from

















arbabs explained
















their service










Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from



interviews


















representative

Selection

method

Key informal

players


Provincial governor

Appointed by

president

Warlords


Provincial council

Elections


District governor

Appointed by

president

Warlords

Commanders


District council

Elections have

yet to be held

Maliks

Mullahs


None specified in

constitution or


ndash Maliks

ShuraJirgas

Mullahs

Commanders


Village council

Elections have

not yet held






Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from



table 2






























bases of authority



constitution


at each level









Dow

nloaded from


























using field data









weakness










Dow

nloaded from


break down










































Dow

nloaded from















woluswals






























Dow

nloaded from

















arbabs explained
















their service










Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from



table 2






























bases of authority



constitution


at each level









Dow

nloaded from


























using field data









weakness










Dow

nloaded from


break down










































Dow

nloaded from















woluswals






























Dow

nloaded from

















arbabs explained
















their service










Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from



table 2






























bases of authority



constitution


at each level









Dow

nloaded from


























using field data









weakness










Dow

nloaded from


break down










































Dow

nloaded from















woluswals






























Dow

nloaded from

















arbabs explained
















their service










Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from


























using field data









weakness










Dow

nloaded from


break down










































Dow

nloaded from















woluswals






























Dow

nloaded from

















arbabs explained
















their service










Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from


break down










































Dow

nloaded from















woluswals






























Dow

nloaded from

















arbabs explained
















their service










Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from















woluswals






























Dow

nloaded from

















arbabs explained
















their service










Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from

















arbabs explained
















their service










Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from




the government








woluswal15


























to go on






Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from











































Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































Dow

nloaded from

















Conclusion




























Dow

nloaded from













federalism









Notes














Afghanistan









Dow

nloaded from
































References









189ndash205






Dow

nloaded from


Press








of California Press


































Dow

nloaded from















Dow

nloaded from








non-Pashtuns



























governance








Dow

nloaded from











for help24































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informal federalism: self-governance and power sharing in afghanistan

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