influence of self-reported distress and empathy and egoistic versus altruistic motivation for...

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology1983, Vol. 45, No. 3, 706-718

Copyright 1983 by theAmerican Psychological Association, Inc.

Influence of Self-Reported Distress and Empathy on EgoisticVersus Altruistic Motivation to Help

C. Daniel Batson, Karen O'Quin, Jim Fultz, and Mary VanderplasUniversity of Kansas

Alice M. IsenUniversity of Maryland

The authors propose that a distinction should be made between two differentemotional responses to seeing another person suffer—personal distress and em-pathy. Moreover, they propose that these different emotions lead to two differentkinds of motivation to help: Personal distress leads to egoistic motivation; em-pathy, to altruistic motivation. Three studies were conducted to assess the valueof these distinctions. Across the three studies, factor analysis of subjects' self-reported emotional response indicated that feelings of personal distress and em-pathy, although positively correlated, were experienced as qualitatively distinct.Moreover, the pattern of helping in Studies 1 and 2 indicated that a predominanceof personal distress led to egoistic motivation, whereas a predominance of em-pathy led to altruistic motivation. Results of Study 3, in which the cost of helpingwas made especially high, suggested an important qualification on the link be-tween empathic emotion and altruistic motivation. In that study, subjects re-porting a predominance of empathy displayed an egoistic pattern of helping.Apparently, making helping very costly evoked self-concern, which overrode anyaltruistic impulse produced by feeling empathy.

What is the role of vicarious emotionalresponse in motivating helping behavior?Some researchers (Batson & Coke, 1981; Bat-son, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch,1981; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978) havesuggested that witnessing another person inneed can lead to two qualitatively distinctemotional responses: personal distress andempathy. Moreover, they have suggested thatthese distinct emotional responses can leadto two qualitatively different kinds of moti-vation to help: Personal distress produces anegoistic desire to reduce one's own distress;empathy, an altruistic desire to reduce thedistress of the person in need.

Other researchers have treated these twoemotional reactions as one, speaking of "em-pathic pain" or "empathic distress" (Hoff-man, 1981). Typically, these latter researchersalso minimize any difference between egois-

Virginia Pych and Pat Schoenrade made helpful com-ments on an earlier draft of this manuscript.

Requests for reprints should be sent to C. Daniel Bat-son, Department of Psychology, University of Kansas,Lawrence, Kansas 66045.

tic and altruistic motivation. For example,Hoffman (1981) suggested, "Empathy maybe uniquely well suited for bridging the gapbetween egoism and altruism, since it has theproperty of transforming another person'smisfortune into one's own feeling of distress.Empathy thus has elements of both egoismand altruism" (p. 133).

Is there any basis for the claim that distressand empathy are experienced as qualitativelydistinct emotions? More importantly, is thereany evidence that these two emotions, if dis-tinct, lead, respectively, to egoistic and al-truistic motivation?

There is historical precedent for affirma-tive answers to each of these questions. Wil-liam McDougall (1908) long ago made a dis-tinction between "sympathetic pain" (i.e.,personal distress) and "the tender emotion"(i.e., empathy), contending that the formerled to concern for one's own welfare, the lat-ter to concern for the welfare of others. Thesedistinctions are reflected in McDougall's in-triguing if somewhat fanciful interpretationof the parable of the Good Samaritan:

706

DISTRESS AND EMPATHY 707

No doubt the spectacle of the poor man who fell amongthieves was just as distressing to the priest and the Levite,who passed by on the other side, as to the good Samaritanwho tenderly cared for him. They may well have beenexquisitely-sensitive souls, who would have fainted awayif they had been compelled to gaze upon his wounds.The great difference between them and the Samaritanwas that in him the tender emotion and its impulse wereevoked, and that this impulse overcame, or prevented,the aversion naturally induced by the painful and, per-haps, disgusting spectacle, (p. 65)

Although intriguing, one can hardly takeMcDougall's distinctions at face value. Oneneeds empirical evidence. And before seekingevidence, one needs to be clear what is andis not involved in the claim that distress andempathy are qualitatively distinct.

It is not necessary that distress and em-pathy be mutually exclusive emotional re-actions (negatively correlated), or even thatthey be independent reactions (uncorrelated),to conclude that they are qualitatively dis-tinct. For a little reflection suggests that evenif these emotions are distinct, any measuresof them will almost certainly be correlatedpositively. There are at least three reasons toexpect a positive correlation. First, bothemotions are evoked by witnessing others inneed; so situational variables that affect theintensity of one emotion—for example, theseverity, ambiguity, and proximity of theneed—should also affect the intensity of theother. Second, both distress and empathy areemotions; so both should be similarly af-fected by general individual differences inemotionality or in readiness to report emo-tion. Third, these emotions are typically mea-sured by self-reports on adjective ratingscales, with adjectives reflecting the differentemotions intermixed. Using this form ofmeasurement, response-set biases could eas-ily produce a positive correlation betweenreports of the two emotions.

Evidence That Personal Distress and .Empathy Are Distinct Emotions

If self-reports of distress and empathy arealmost certainly positively correlated, how isone to determine whether these emotions areexperienced as qualitatively distinct? Threestrategies can be suggested. First, one couldfactor analyze individuals' self-reported emo-tional responses to witnessing another's dis-

tress to see if adjectives reflecting personaldistress load on a different factor from ad-jectives reflecting empathy. To provide astrong test of this possibility, one shouldprobably use an orthogonal rotation, whichforces independence of the two factors. Ifdistress and empathy adjectives are consis-tently found to load on separate orthogonalfactors, then one has rather clear evidencethat subjects make a qualitative distinctionwhen reporting the two emotions.

Employing this logic, Batson and Coke(1981) reported factor analyses of subjects'emotional responses in four different studies.In each, participants heard an audiotape ofa radio newscast that included an interviewwith a person in need. After hearing the tape,participants were asked to indicate theiremotional reaction to the newscast by ratinga number of adjectives. Some of these adjec-tives reflected personal distress (e.g., alarmed,upset, worried, disturbed, distressed); othersreflected empathy (e.g., empathic, concerned,warm, softhearted, compassionate). Factoranalyses of responses in each study revealeda consistent tendency for the distress and em-pathy adjectives to load highly on separate,orthogonal factors. Archer, Diaz-Loving,Gollwitzer, Davis, and Foushee (1981) rep-licated one of these studies. They also foundthat distress and empathy adjectives loadedhighly on separate factors, although they usedan oblique rather than an orthogonal rota-tion.

A second strategy for providing evidenceof a qualitative distinction between distressand empathy would be to show that each canbe experimentally manipulated independentof the other. If the two emotions are not qual-itatively distinct, then it should not be pos-sible to affect the experience of one withoutalso affecting the experience of the other.

Employing this logic, Batson et al. (1981,Experiment 2) attempted to manipulate dis-tress and empathy independently, using amisattribution technique. They had partici-pants watch over closed-circuit television(actually a videotape) while a young woman,Elaine, received electric shocks. Her reac-tions made it clear that she found the shocksquite uncomfortable. To manipulate partic-ipants' emotional response to watching

708 BATSON, O'QUIN, FULTZ, VANDERPLAS, ISBN

Elaine, they were given a drug capsule (ac-tually a placebo) in the context of anotherstudy. Some were told that as a side effect,the drug would create a feeling of "warmthand sensitivity"; others, that it would createa feeling of "uneasiness and discomfort."Batson et al. reasoned that if watching Elainesuffer elicited feelings of both personal dis-tress and empathy, and if these feelings werequalitatively distinct, then participants in-duced to misattribute their feelings of warmthand sensitivity (empathic feelings) would per-ceive their emotional reaction to Elaine tobe predominantly that of personal distress.In contrast, participants induced to misattri-bute their feelings of uneasiness and discom-fort (distress feelings) would perceive theiremotional reaction to Elaine to be predom-inantly that of empathy.

Participants' responses to two items on apostexperimental questionnaire were quiteconsistent with this reasoning. The first itemasked subjects how much uneasiness theyexperienced as a result of observing Elaine;the second, how much warmth and sensitiv-ity. Participants who were told that the pla-cebo would make them feel warm and sen-sitive reported experiencing a relative pre-dominance of uneasiness as a result ofwatching Elaine; those told that the placebowould make them feel uneasy reported a rel-ative predominance of warmth and sensitiv-ity. This successful independent manipula-tion of perceived distress and empathy wasentirely consistent with the suggestion thatthese emotional states are qualitatively dis-tinct.

A third strategy for demonstrating that thetwo emotions are qualitatively distinct wouldbe to look for evidence of the motivationaldifferences claimed to result from the twoemotions. If the two emotions evoke recog-nizably different types of motivation, thenthey must be distinct. Ultimately, evidenceof this kind is the most crucial. For, even ifone was to find evidence that the emotionswere experienced as distinct, but one foundno evidence that the difference had any im-pact on motivation or behavior, the distinc-tion would be of limited interest. Is there,then, any evidence that distress leads to egois-tic and empathy to altruistic motivation tohelp?

Evidence That Distress Leads to Egoisticand Empathy to Altruistic Motivation

Evidence of this motivational difference isharder to find than evidence that the emo-tional states are qualitatively distinct. Thismay be due, in part, to a pervasive assump-tion that it is not possible to distinguish em-pirically between egoistic and altruistic mo-tivation (see Rushton & Sorrentino, 1981).However, building on the earlier work of Pi-liavin and Piliavin (Note 1), Batson and Coke(1981) claim to have developed a procedurefor distinguishing these two types of moti-vation. Their procedure involves varying theease with which a potential helper can escapewitnessing the victim's need without helping.If the motivation to help is egoistic and help-ing is moderately costly, then making it easyto escape should reduce the rate of helping.For if the potential helper's motivation isegoistic, then his or her ultimate goal is tominimize personal distress, and escape wouldbe the least costly way to reach this goal.However, if the motivation to help is altruisticand helping is moderately costly, then mak-ing escape easy should not reduce the rate ofhelping. For if one's motivation is altruistic,then his or her ultimate goal is to minimizethe other's rather than one's own distress, andto escape brings one no nearer this goal.

Applying this logic to the present problem,if feeling personal distress leads to egoisticmotivation but feeling empathy leads to al-truistic motivation, then we would expectthat making it easier for potential helpers toescape without helping would reduce the rateof helping among those feeling a predomi-nance of personal distress, but not amongthose feeling a predominance of empathy.Across the four cells of an emptional response(distress vs. empathy) by escape (easy vs. dif-ficult) design, we would expect a one-versus-three pattern of helping. The ;rate of helpingshould be relatively low in the distress-easy-escape cell and relatively high in the otherthree. This one-versus-three pattern of help-ing, if observed, would provide empirical ev-idence that personal distress evokes egoisticand empathy evokes altruistic motivation tohelp.

However, what if, as Hoffman (1981) sug-gested, distress and empathy lead to the same


type of motivation to help? Then we wouldexpect an escape manipulation to have thesame effect on helping among those feelinga predominance of empathy as among thosefeeling personal distress. There would be amain effect for escape h\each emotional-re-sponse condition. There might also be a maineffect for emotional response, with empathyleading to more helping than distress, be-cause there is evidence that empathy can in-crease helping (see Batson & Coke, 1981, fora review). Therefore, if distress and empathylead to the same type of motivation to help,we would expect to observe one or two maineffects; we would not expect the one-versus-three pattern predicted above.

The only direct test of whether an Emo-tional Response X Escape design producesa one-versus-three or a main-effect patternof helping is the experiment reported by Bat-son et al. (1981) using the emotion-specificmisattribution technique. Results of that ex-periment conformed to the one-versus-threepattern. Subjects led to perceive their reac-tion to Elaine to be predominantly that ofdistress helped less when escape was easythan when it was difficult; subjects led to per-ceive their reaction to be predominantly thatof empathy were just as likely to help whenescape was easy as when it was difficult.

However, the results of one experiment arenot enough evidence to support the boldclaim that feeling personal distress producesegoistic whereas feeling empathy producesaltruistic motivation to help. More evidenceis needed.

The Present Research '

Because the Batson et al. (1981) experi-ment involved manipulation of emotionalresponse, the most valuable complementaryevidence would seem to come from assessingthe nature of the motivation to help evokedby naturally occurring emotional responsesto a person in need. Of course, such a re-search strategy has both strengths and weak-nesses. The major strengths are that (a) em-ploying naturally occurring emotion involveslittle experimental demand (Orne, 1962) and(b) effects due to naturally occurring emotionhave more ecological validity. The majorweakness is that if we only measure and do

not manipulate emotions, then there mightbe some other difference between those in-dividuals reporting a predominance of per-sonal distress and those reporting a predom-inance of empathy that is actually the causeof any observed effects. Fortunately, thisweakness is not as serious in the present caseas it often is, because we already have evi-dence that, when crossed with an escapemanipulation, a manipulation of emotionalresponse produces the predicted one-versus-three pattern (Batson et al., 1981, Experi-ment 2). If we also find that naturally oc-curring emotion produces this same one-ver-sus-three pattern, then in combination withthe previous research, we would have ratherstrong evidence that personal distress leadsto egoistic but empathy to altruistic moti-vation.

To examine the nature of the motivationto help evoked by naturally occurring per-sonal distress and empathy, we used the sameresearch paradigm as Batson et al. (1981),with two changes. First, we did not attemptto manipulate emotional response, only tomeasure it. Second, we extended the para-digm to include a male victim, Charlie, aswell as the female, Elaine. This second changeallowed us to include both male and femalesubjects, whereas Batson et al. (1981) limitedtheir sample to women.

In; the present research, then, men and,women were confronted with a same-sex per-son in need under conditions in which, with-out helping, it was either easy or difficult toescape continued exposure to that person'ssuffering. Before becoming aware that theywould be given an opportunity to help, sub-jects were asked to report their emotionalresponse to seeing the other person. Based onthen* reported emotional response, subjectsin each escape condition were divided intotwo groups, those who reported feeling a rel-ative predominance of personal distress andthose who reported a relative predominanceof empathy.

A one-versus-three pattern of helping waspredicted. Subjects who reported a relativepredominance of distress were expected to beless likely to offer help when escape was easythan when it was difficult, but subjects whoreported feeling a relative predominance ofempathy were not.


Study 1

MethodSubjects. Forty students in an introductory psychol-

ogy course at the University of Kansas served as subjects,partially fulfilling a class requirement. Twenty (10 men,10 women) were assigned to each of the two experimentalconditions (easy and difficult escape) by use of a ran-domized block procedure. Four additional students—two from each experimental condition—were excludedfrom the sample and replaced, because they expressedsuspicion about the confederate.

Procedure, The procedure was essentially the sameas that used by Batson et al. (1981, Experiment 1), soonly the experimental manipulation and measures aredescribed in detail.

Subjects were placed in the role of an observer. Theywere to watch over closed-circuit television (actually vid-eotape) as another same-sex participant (Elaine for fe-male subjects, Charlie for males) in the role of workerperformed a sequence of 2-minute digit-recall trials, re-ceiving mild electric shocks at random intervals. Afterobserving, subjects were to report their impressions ofthe worker.

Ease-of-escape manipulation. Instructions that subjectsread before beginning to observe contained the experi-mental manipulation. Subjects in the easy-escape conditionread, "Although the worker will be completing betweentwo and ten trials, it will be necessary for you to observeonly the first two." Subjects in the difficult-escape con-dition read, "The worker will be completing between twoand ten trials, all of which you will observe." Unknownto subjects at this point, the worker would elect to do 10trials, but after the first 2, subjects would be given a chanceto help the worker by taking the remaining trials in her(his) stead. Therefore, subjects in the difficult-escape con-dition who chose not to help expected to have to watchthe worker undergo eight more shock trails; subjects inthe easy-escape condition did not.

Self-reported emotional response to the worker's dis-tress. Near the end of the second trial, the assistantadministering the shocks interrupted the procedure andasked if the worker, who was showing obvious signs ofdiscomfort, was all right. The worker hesitantly said yesbut asked for a glass of water before going on. The as-sistant readily agreed and left to get the glass of water.1

During this break, the experimenter entered the ob-servation room and gave the subject an emotional-re-sponse questionnaire, explaining that because there wasgoing to be a short delay, the first observation question-naire could be completed at that time. The emotional-response questionnaire consisted of a list of 28 adjectivesdescribing emotions. Eight of these adjectives had beenfound in past research (Batson & Coke, 1981; Coke etal., 1978) to reflect feelings of personal distress (alarmed,grieved, upset, worried, disturbed, distressed, troubled,perturbed); six others had been found to reflect feelingsof empathy (sympathetic, moved, compassionate, warm,softhearted, tender).2 Subjects were asked to indicate on7-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) how muchthey were experiencing each emotion as a result of ob-serving the worker.

After 90 sec, the experimenter returned and collectedthe questionnaire, as action on the tape resumed. Theassistant asked if the worker had ever before been both-ered by shock, and Elaine (Charlie) confessed to havinghad a traumatic experience with shock as a child. (Thisinformation was provided to ensure that subjects wouldview the worker's extreme reaction to the shocks as atyp-ical and would not expect to find the shocks as unpleas-ant if they chose to take the worker's place.) Hearing this,the assistant suggested that the worker not go on withthe trials. However, Elaine (Charlie) expressed a firmdesire to continue: "I started; I want to finish. I'll go on.. . . I know your experiment is important, and I wantto do it." At this point, the assistant hit upon an idea,Because the observer was also an introductory psychol-ogy student, maybe she (he) would be willing to helpElaine (Charlie) by trading places. Elaine (Charlie)agreed to have the experimenter ask the observer, andthe tape ended with the assistant turning off the videoequipment to go check about this possibility.

Helping response. About 20 sec later, the experi-menter entered the observation room and, appearingrather agitated, sat down and said:

First of all, let me say that you're under no obligationto trade places. I mean, if you would like to continuein your role as observer that's fine; you did happento draw the observer role. If you decide to continueas the observer, ([easy-escape condition] you've fin-ished observing the two trials, so all you need to dois answer a few questions about your impression ofElaine (Charlie) and you'll be free to go) ([difficult-escape condition] I need you to observe Elaine's (Char-lie's) remaining trials. After you've done that and an-swered a few questions about your impression ofElaine (Charlie), you'll be free to go.). If you decideto change places with Elaine (Charlie), what will hap-pen is that she (he) will come in here and observe you,and you'll do the aversive conditioning trials with theshocks. Then you'll be free to go.

What would you like to do? [Experimenter gets re-sponse from subject.] OK, that's fine. [If subject in-dicates a desire to trade places with the confederate,the experimenter continues.] How many trials wouldyou like to do? Elaine (Charlie) will go ahead and do

1 The worker, assistant, and experimenter were all thesame sex as the subject to eliminate any effect on helpingresponses of sex role related norms or demand charac-teristics (Orne, 1962).

1 Two adjectives that had been included on the em-pathy list in previous studies—empathic and con-cerned^—were dropped. Empathic was dropped becauseprevious research indicated that many subjects did notknow what it meant. Concerned was dropped becauseit had proved to be ambiguous; some subjects interpretedit as concern for the victim, others as self-concern. Giventhe omission of empathic from the empathy list, onemight argue that the list should be renamed. We retainedthe name to maintain continuity with previous researchand because, to our knowledge, the nature of the emotionbeing measured remains the same.


any of the eight remaining trials that you don't wantto do. [Experimenter gets response.] Fine.

The experimenter then rose to leave, ostensibly to tellthe assistant what had been decided. However, beforeleaving, the experimenter gave the subject an impressionquestionnaire to complete.

Ancillary measures. Consistent with the cover story,this questionnaire assessed subjects' impressions of theworker; it also permitted a check on the possibility thatsubjects in the easy-escape condition would either derogatethe worker or perceive the worker's need.for help to beless severe. To check for derogation, subjects were askedto rate the worker's attractiveness and likability; to checkperceived severity of need, subjects were asked to rate howuncomfortable they thought the shocks were for the worker.All ratings were on 7-point scales, with higher values in-dicating more of the characteristic.

Debriefing. After a few minutes, the experimenterreturned and conducted a thorough debriefing. Afterdebriefing, subjects were thanked for their participationand excused.

Results and Discussion

Perception of the worker's need. Subjectsin both experimental conditions perceivedthe worker to be in considerable need of help.The overall mean response to the questionof how uncomfortable the shocks were forthe worker, rated on the scale of 1 to 7, was5.33. Mean responses did not differ reliablyacross conditions.3

An index of predominant emotional re-sponse: Personal distress versus empathy. Toprovide an index of emotional response tothe worker's distress, we first perfof med a fac-tor analysis (principal-components analysiswith varimax rotation) on subjects' ratingsof the emotional-response adjectives. Consis-tent with the past research, distress and em-pathy adjectives tended to load on separate,orthogonal factors. Therefore, we createdseparate indexes of self-reported distress andempathy by averaging responses to each ad-jective that met two criteria: (a) it loadedhighly (.60 or higher) on the relevant factor,and (b) it received responses from virtuallyall subjects. The second criterion was nec-essary because a number of subjects did notfinish the emotional-response questionnaire,producing many missing responses for ad-jectives near the end. Six adjectives met thecriteria for the distress index: alarmed,grieved, upset, worried, disturbed, and per-turbed (Cronbach's alpha = .94); three met

the criteria for the empathy index: sympa-thetic, moved, and compassionate (Cron-bach's alpha = .79). Only three subjects didnot respond to all nine of these adjectives.Mean score on the distress index was 3.99 onthe 7-point response scale; mean score on theempathy index was 4.03. There were no re-liable sex differences on either (ts < 1).

Next, we created a single index of emo-tional response by subtracting each subject'sscore on the distress index from his or herscore on the empathy index. This differencescore seemed to be the most theoreticallymeaningful measure of emotional responsefor two reasons. First, the logic underlyingthe research design was that if personal dis-tress leads to egoistic motivation and em-pathy to altruistic motivation, then undereasy-escape empathic feelings should lead tohelping, whereas distress feelings should not.However, what if an individual was feeling afairly high degree of both distress and em-pathy? Presumably, such an individual wouldbe in conflict, feeling some pressure to helpand some to escape. Under these conditions,it seemed reasonable to expect that the per-son's behavior would be determined by thepredominant emotional response. A differ-ence measure would provide an index of thisrelative predominance. Second, a related rea-son for employing a difference measure wasdiscussed earlier: Self-reports of the twoemotions were expected to be positively cor-related. Consistent with this expectation, re-sponses on the distress and empathy indexes

3 With one exception, analyses of variance with sexas a factor revealed no reliable sex main effects and nointeractions between sex and any other independent vari-able. The one exception was a sex difference in amountof reported emotional response in Study 3. Therefore,with this exception, all reported analyses are collapsedacross sex. Of course, in interpreting the general absenceof sex effects, it should be recalled that male and femalesubjects witnessed the suffering of a different worker.Unintended differences between the videotapes of themale and female victims may have affected subjects'emotional response.

It should also be noted that the data reported in thispaper were collected in the context of a larger projectexamining the effect of good mood on altruistic moti-vation. Because, however, the mood manipulation hadno apparent effect on self-reported emotional response,either distress or empathy, this manipulation is not con-sidered in the present report.

712 BATSON, O'QUIN, FULTZ, VANDERPLAS, 1SEN

Table 1Proportion of Subjects Agreeing to Help Elaine(Charlie) in Each Condition of Study 1

Predominantemotional response

Ease of escape Distress Empathy

Easy

K

Difficult

«

.40(2.70)10

.89(5.89)9

.70(4.30)10

.63(5.00)8

Note. The numbers in parentheses are the mean numberof shock trials (from 0 to 8) subjects in each conditionagreed to take for Elaine (Charlie).

had a correlation of .38 (p < .02, one-tailed).This correlation presumably reflected the ef-fects of either general emotionality or re-sponse set, but these factors were irrelevantto our present concern. By taking the differ-ence between each subject's score on the em-pathy and distress indexes, we could obtaina measure of predominant emotional re-sponse adjusted for these irrelevant effects.

We predicted a one-versus-three pattern ofhelping, depending on subjects' predominantemotional response to the worker's suffering(personal distress vs. empathy) and the easeof escaping without helping (easy vs. diffi-cult). The simplest way to test this predictionseemed to be to perform median splits on theemotional-response index, permitting us toidentify those subjects whose emotional re-sponse was predominantly that of distressand those whose response was predominantlythat of empathy. Then we could create therelevant 2 X 2 factorial design. Accordingly,median splits were performed and this 2 X2 design created. The splits were done sepa-rately under easy and difficult escape to keepthe cell sizes as equal as possible.4

Rate of helping in each condition of the 2 X2 design. Proportions of subjects who of-fered to help the worker in each condition ofthis 2 X 2 design are presented in Table 1.As recommended by Langer and Abelson(1972) and Winer (1971, pp. 399-400), thesedichotomous data were converted to a nor-mal approximation by an arc sine transfor-mation, and an analysis of variance was per-

formed. This analysis revealed a marginallysignificant Emotional Response X Escape in-teraction, x2(l) = 3.59, p < .06; neither maineffect approached significance.

The marginal interaction was of the formthat would be expected if a relative predom-inance of distress led to egoistic and a relativepredominance of empathy led to altruisticmotivation to help; the proportion of helpingwas lower in the distress-easy-escape condi-tion than in the other three (Table 1). Aplanned comparison contrasting this cellwith the other three was marginally signifi-cant, x2(l) = 3.56, p < .06, and accountedfor all reliable between-cell variance, residualX2(2) = 2.04, p > .30. Finally, individual be-tween-cell comparisons revealed that, as pre-dicted, the proportion of helping in the dis-tress-easy-escape condition was significantlylower than in the distress-difficult-escapecondition (z = 2.34, p < .01, one-tailed) andlower, although not significantly so, than ineach empathy condition. There were no re-liable differences among the proportions inthe other three conditions (all zs < 1.40).

Although this 2 X 2 analysis using mediansplits had the advantage of rendering our re-sults easily comparable with those reportedby Batson et al. (1981), there was a dangerthat by using median splits we would loseinformation. Therefore, we also computedpartial correlations (point biserials) betweenscores on the empathy index and helping,controlling for scores on the distress index,and between scores on the distress index andhelping, controlling for scores on the empa-thy index. (Partial correlations were used toadjust for the previously noted positive cor-relations between the empathy and distressindexes.) Consistent with the prediction thatfeeling more empathy would lead to morehelping under easy escape, whe^as feeling-more distress would, if anything, lead to less,these correlations revealed a significant pos-

4 Subjects in the easy-escape condition reported feel-ing more empathy (and more distress) than did subjectsin the difficult escape condition, ?(36) •» 2.35, p < .025,two-tailed. This difference was not unexpected, for it wasthought that difficult-escape subjects might try to min-imize their emotional response to observing the workersuffer, because at the point that their emotional responsewas measured they could anticipate having to watch theworker endure eight more shock trials.


itive correlation between the empathy indexand helping for subjects in the easy-escapecondition, rpb(17) = .39, p < .05, one-taUed,and a nonsignificant negative correlation be-tween the distress index and helping, rpb(17) =-.08. These same partial correlations in thedifficult-escape condition were -.27 and .31for the empathy and distress indexes, respec-tively.5

The mean number of shock trials that sub-jects in each condition of the 2 X 2 designvolunteered to take are presented in paren-theses in Table 1. As can be seen, this mea-sure produced a pattern of results similar to,but weaker than, that of the dichotomousmeasure; subjects in the distress-easy-escapecondition offered to take fewer trials thansubjects in the other three conditions, F(l,33) = 3.07, p < .09.

Turning to possible alternative explana-tions for these results, the observed one-ver-sus-three pattern did not appear to be a resultof a ceiling effect in the empathy-difficult-escape condition (see Batson et al., 1981, fora discussion of this alternative explanation).For both the dichotomous and scaled mea-sures, the amount of helping in the empathy-difficult-escape condition was not extremelyhigh, and for the dichotomous measure it waslower, although not significantly lower, thanthe amount in the empathy-easy-escape con-dition.

Nor was there any evidence that derogationof the worker or differential perception of theworker's need could account for the observedrelation between emotional response andhelping: There was no evidence that the workerwas perceived to be less attractive or less likablein the distress-easy-escape condition, and co-variance analyses indicated that ratings of at-tractiveness and likability could not accountfor the one-versus-three pattern of helping. Fi-nally, there were no reliable differences acrossconditions in perceptions of how uncomfort-able the shocks were for the worker.

In sum, the results of Study 1 conformedto the one-versus-three pattern that would beexpected if self-reported distress was asso-ciated with egoistic but empathy with altruis-tic motivation. Subjects who reported feelinga predominance of distress were likely to helponly when it was difficult to escape withouthelping, suggesting that their ultimate goal

was to reduce their own distress. In contrast,subjects who reported feeling a predomi-nance of empathy were as likely to help whenit was easy to escape without helping as whenit was difficult, suggesting that their ultimategoal was to reduce the worker's distress.

The major reservation about the results ofStudy 1 was that the predicted one-versus-three pattern was not especially strong; it at-tained only marginal statistical significance.Therefore, to reassure ourselves that it wasnot a chance finding, we decided to conducta second, replication study, making a fewmethodological improvements. We also de-cided to test the limits of the apparent rela-tion between self-reported empathy and al-truistic motivation by conducting a thirdstudy; in this study subjects were told that theshocks the worker was receiving, and thatthey would receive if they wished to help,were relatively painful. We reasoned that thisinformation would increase the cost of help-ing, and as a result, even among subjects re-porting a predominance of empathy, it woulddirect concern away from the worker's needand toward their own need, eliminating thealtruistic impulse to reduce the worker's dis-tress. Studies 2 and 3 were run simulta-neously by the same experimenters, and sub-jects were randomly assigned to one study orthe other.

Study 2

MethodSubjects. As in Study 1, 40 introductory psychology

students at the University of Kansas served as subjects,partially fulfilling a class requirement. Twenty (10 men,10 women) were assigned to each of two experimentalconditions (easy and difficult escape) by use of a random-ized block procedure. Three additional students—one inthe easy- and two in the difficult-escape condition—wereexcluded from the sample and replaced because they ex-pressed suspicion.

1 To check further the appropriateness of the 2 X 2analysis based on median splits, we performed a multipleregression analysis using the empathy index, distress in-dex, and escape manipulation (contrast coded) as pre-dictors. In none of the three studies did this regressionanalysis reveal any significant main effects or interactionsnot revealed by the 2 X 2 analysis. This fact, plus theredundancy of the regression analysis with the partialcorrelations reported in the text, made it unnecessaryto report it.

714 BATSON, O'QUIN, FULTZ, VANDERPLAS, ISEN

Procedure. The procedure was the same used in Study1, with three changes. First, before beginning, subjectswere provided with additional information about theelectric shocks to be used during the work period. Fourdifferent shock levels were described: 1 = minimally un-comfortable (minimum level of shock perceived as at allaversive); 2 = moderately uncomfortable; 3 = minimallypainful; 4 = moderately painful (maximum level ofshock; clearly painful but not harmful). The shock levelused was to be randomly selected, the worker being in-formed of the level, but the observer not. This additionalinformation permitted the experimenter later to specifythe severity of the shocks that subjects would receive ifthey chose to help—minimally uncomfortable (Level 1)in Study 2, moderately painful (Level 4) in Study 3.

Second, in Study 1 subjects drew the observer role; inStudies 2 and 3 the experimenter assigned them to thatrole, ostensibly by a random procedure. This change wasintroduced to eliminate any chance that subjects wouldfeel responsible for the worker's distress.

Third, two changes were made in the way the oppor-tunity to help was presented. Instead of being given achance to "trade places" with the worker, subjects weregiven a chance to "take Elaine's (Charlie's) place." Nomention was made of having the worker watch the sub-sequent trials if the subject decided to help. This changeeliminated any chance that subjects would help so as tobe seen and appreciated by the worker. The other changewas to inform the subject that the shocks being used wereat the minimally uncomfortable level. Just before askingfor the subject's decision about taking the worker's place,the experimenter said,

Before you decide, I should tell you that the shocksElaine (Charlie) has been getting, and that you wouldreceive if you took her (his) place, are Level 1 shocks.They're the lowest level of shock that would be per-ceived as at all aversive.

The remainder of the procedure was identical to thatused in Study 1.


Perception of the worker's need. As inStudy 1, subjects in both experimental con-ditions perceived the worker to be in consid-erable need of help. The overall mean re-sponse to the question of how uncomfortablethe shocks were for the worker was 6.06, withno reliable differences across conditions.

Index of predominant emotional response:Personal distress versus empathy. Separatedistress and empathy indexes were computedemploying the same adjectives used in Study1. The reliabilities of these two indexes (Cron-bach's alpha) were .86 and .88, respectively;mean scores were 5.05 and 5.34, respectively(with no reliable sex differences on either);and the two indexes were again positively cor-




Easy

nDifficult

n

.25(1.25)8.89

(4.89)9

.86(5.00)7

.63(3.75)8


related, r(30) = .75, p < .001. As before, weconstructed a single index of emotional re-sponse by subtracting each available subject'sscore on the distress index from his or herscore on the empathy index. Median splits onthis emotional response index, computed sep-arately under easy and difficult escape, againproduced a 2 X 2 factorial design.

Rate of helping. The proportion of sub-jects who offered to help the worker in eachcondition of this 2 X 2 design are presentedin Table 2. These dichotomous data wereagain converted to a normal approximationby an arc sine transformation. Analysis ofvariance of the transformed data revealed ahighly significant Emotional Response X Es-cape-interaction, x2(l) = 7.60, p < .01. Nei-ther main effect approached significance(X2s < 1.55).

The planned comparison contrasting thedistress-easy-escape cell with the other threecells was also highly significant, x20) = 8.15,p < .005, and accounted for all reliable be-tween-cell variance, residual x2(2) = 1.88, ns.Individual between-cell comparisons re-vealed that, as predicted, the proportion ofhelping in this cell was significantly lowerthan in the distress-difficult-escape cell (z =2.82, p < .001, one-tailed) and the empathy-easy-escape cell (z = 2.63, p < .005, one-tailed) and lower, although not significantlyso, than in the empathy-difficult-escape cell(z = 1.55, p < .08, one-tailed). There were


no reliable differences among the other threecells (all zs < 1.30).

Once again, partial correlations revealeda positive correlation between the empathyindex and helping for subjects in the easy-escape condition, rpb(12) = .31, and a nega-tive correlation between the distress indexand helping, rpb(12) = -.41, although neithercorrelation differed reliably from zero. Thesesame partial correlations in the difficult-es-cape condition were -.26 and .06 for the em-pathy and distress indexes, respectively.

The mean number of shock trials that sub-jects in each condition of the 2 X 2 designvolunteered to take are presented in paren-theses in Table 2. This measure produced apattern of results similar to that of the di-chotomous measure. The Emotional Re-sponse X Escape interaction was significant,F(l, 28) = 4.26, p < .05, and neither maineffect approached significance (Fs < 1.25). Aplanned comparison revealed that the meanin the distress-easy-escape condition was sig-nificantly lower than the means in the otherthree cells, F(l, 28) = 5.84, p < .03, andaccounted for all reliable between-cell vari-ance, residual F(2, 28) = .68, ns. Moreover,this mean differed reliably from the mean inthe distress-difficult-escape cell and the em-pathy-easy-escape cell, /s(28) > 2.15, ps <.02, one-tailed, and marginally from themean in the empathy-difficult-escape cell,f(28) = 1.50, p < .08, one-tailed.

Turning to possible alternative explanationsfor the observed pattern of results, once againthe findings did not appear to be caused by aceiling effect. For both the dichotomous andscaled measures, the amount of helping in theempathy-difficult-escape condition was notextremely high and was lower (although notsignificantly lower) than the amount in theempathy-easy-escape condition. Again, therewas no evidence that the worker was perceivedto be less attractive or less likable in the dis-tress-easy-escape condition, and covarianceanalyses indicated that the ratings of attrac-tiveness and likability could not account forthe obtained pattern of helping. There wereno reliable differences across conditions inperceptions of how uncomfortable the shockswere for the worker.

In sum, the results of Study 2 showed a

pattern very much like that of Study 1 butwere stronger, providing even clearer evi-dence that self-reported distress leads toegoistic and empathy to altruistic motivation.

Study 3

Testing the Limits of the Empathy-Altruism Relation

Having obtained further evidence that em-pathy can evoke altruistic motivation, weturned our attention in a third study to thequestion of limits on the empathy-altruismrelation. In this study, subjects were told thatthe shocks they would receive if they wishedto help were relatively painful. We reasonedthat this information would increase the costof helping and would direct attention awayfrom the worker's need and toward the sub-ject's own need to avoid pain. Previous re-search suggested that affect may influencehelping through its influence on direction ofattention (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978).In Study 3, we expected that the attentioneven of subjects experiencing a predomi-nance of empathic emotion would be focusedon their own need. Therefore, we predictedthat the altruistic impulse to reduce theworker's distress would be lowered or elimi-nated, even among predominantly empathicsubjects.

Method

Subjects. As in the first two studies, 40 introductorypsychology students served as subjects, partially fulfillinga class requirement. Twenty (10 men, 10 women) wereassigned to each of the two experimental conditions (easyand difficult escape) by use of a randomized block pro-cedure. Eight additional students—four from each ex-perimental condition—were excluded from the sampleand replaced because they expressed suspicion.

Procedure. The procedure of Study 3 was identicalto that of Study 2, except that subjects were informedthat the shocks being used were at the highest level—moderately painful. Just before giving subjects thechance to help, the experimenter said,

Before you decide, I should tell you that the shocksElaine (Charlie) has been getting, and that you wouldreceive if you took her (his) place, are Level 4 shocks.They are clearly painful, but of course not harmful.

In all other respects, the procedure was identical to thatof Study 2.

716 BATSON, O'QUIN, FULTZ, VANDERPLAS, ISEN




Easy

nDifficult

n

.50(3.13)8

.67(3.89)9

.14(.29)7

.60(3.30)10



Perception of the worker's need. Subjectsin both experimental conditions perceivedthe worker to be in considerable need of help.The overall mean response to the questionof how uncomfortable the shocks were forthe worker was 6.32, with no reliable differ-ences across conditions.

Index of predominant emotional response:Personal distress versus empathy. Separatedistress and empathy indexes were computedemploying the same adjectives used in the firsttwo studies. The reliabilities of these two in-dexes (Cronbach's alpha) were .91 and .90,respectively, and as was true in the first twostudies, the two indexes were positively cor-related, r(32) = .39, p < .03. Unlike the pre-vious studies, however, in Study 3 womenscored significantly higher on both the dis-tress (M = 5.00) and empathy (M = 5.33)indexes than did men (Ms = 3.92 and 4.25respectively; ts > 2.10, ps < .05). This sexdifference is not easily explained, because theprocedures of Studies 2 and 3 were identicalup to the point that emotional response wasassessed. It may be a chance finding.

Once again, we constructed a single indexof emotional response by subtracting eachavailable subject's score on the distress indexfrom his or her score on the empathy index.(There was no sex difference on this combinedindex; t < 1.) Median splits on the emotionalresponse index, computed separately for easy-

and difficult-escape conditions, produced a 2 X2 factorial design.

Rate of helping. Proportions of subjectswho offered to help the worker in each con-dition of this 2 X 2 design are presented inTable 3. Clearly, these data did not follow thepattern that would be expected if self-re-ported empathy were producing altruisticmotivation. Analyses confirmed this impres-sion. An analysis of the arc sine transformeddata revealed only a marginally significantmain effect for escape, x2(l) = 3.73, p < .06.Neither the main effect for emotional re-sponse, x2(0= 1-82, nor the interaction,X2( 1) = .90, approached significance. Theplanned comparison contrasting the distress-easy-escape cell with the other three cells wasnot significant, x2U) < 1> but the residualwas, x2(2) = 6.40, p < .04. This significantresidual was due to a reliable difference be-tween the empathy-easy-escape and empa-thy-difficult-escape conditions (z = 2.04, p <.025, one-tailed), suggesting that in the em-pathy conditions the motivation to help wasegoistic. Presumably, this was because thehigh cost of helping in Study 3 directed em-pathic subjects' attention back upon them-selves, replacing concern for the victim withself-concern.6

Factor Analysis of Emotional-ResponseItems Across Studies 1, 2, and 3

The specific items used to measure per-sonal distress and empathy in these threestudies were restricted by the fact that sub-jects did not always have time to completethe emotional-response questionnaire. Bycombining data from all three studies, how-ever, we were able to obtain a large enoughsample to permit a meaningful examinationof the factor structure underlying ratings ofall eight personal-distress and all six empathyadjectives. A principal-components analysiswith varimax rotation of these 14 adjectives

6 As would be expected, partial correlations betweenhelping and the empathy and distress indexes were verydifferent from those observed in Studies 1 and 2. In theeasy-escape condition, the correlations were -.37 and.66 for the empathy and distress indexes, respectively;in the difficult-escape condition these same correlationswere -.28 and -.07, respectively.


revealed a two-factor structure. The two fac-tors accounted for 73% of the variance andall eigenvalues above 1. Factor loadings foreach adjective are presented in Table 4,7 Ascan be seen, all eight distress adjectivesloaded on one factor; all six empathy adjec-tives loaded on a second, orthogonal factor.Apparently, subjects' self-reports of their vi-carious emotion reflected two qualitativelydistinct conceptual dimensions; the first welabeled personal distress and the second, em-pathy.

Combining the results of this factor anal-ysis with the results of previous factor anal-yses, we find a consistent qualitative distinc-tion between subjects' reports of personaldistress and empathy in six different data sets:the four summarized by Batson and Coke(1981), the one reported by Archer et al.(1981), and the present one. Combining theresults of these six different factor analyseswith the results of the experiment in whichthese two vicarious emotions were manipu-lated independently (Batson et al., 1981, Ex-periment 2), it seems clear that the time hascome to stop speaking of empathic pain orempathic distress. It is time to recognize in-stead, as McDougall (1908) suggested longago, that personal distress and empathy aretwo quite different emotional responses toanother's suffering.

Implications

But so what if distress, and empathy aredistinct vicarious emotions? This distinctionassumes considerable importance if7 asMcDougall also suggested, they evoke differ-ent types of motivation to help, one egoisticand the other altruistic. Our results indicatethat McDougall was right again. In bothStudy 1 and Study 2, subjects who reportedexperiencing a predominance of personal dis-tress helped less when it was easy to escapewithout helping, suggesting that their under-lying motivation was an egoistic desire to re-duce their own distress. In contrast, subjectswho reported experiencing a predominanceof empathy were as likely to help when escapewas easy as when it was difficult, suggestingthat their underlying motivation was an al-truistic desire to reduce the distress of the

Table 4Varimax-Rotated Factor Structure for EightDistress and Six Empathy Adjectives for Subjectsin Studies 1, 2, and 3

Factor

Adjective Distress Empathy

DistressAlarmedGrievedUpsetWorriedDisturbedPerturbedDistressedTroubled

EmpathySympatheticMovedCompassionateTenderWarmSofthearted

.80"

.72"

.89"

.81"

.90"

.68°

.86°

.87°

.20

.40

.17

.36

.15

.29

.19

.30

.28

.39

.24

.11

.28

.32

.82"

.72"

.90"

.74'

.66"

.86"

Note, Adjectives from the two lists were intermixed andimbedded in a total list of 28 adjectives. N = 88.• Denotes highest factor loading for the adjective.

person in need. Far from suggesting that weminimize differences between these two mo-tivational states, by speaking, as Hoffman(1981) did, of "bridging the gap between^egoism and altruism," the results of Studies1 and 2, especially when combined with theresults of Batson et al. (1981, Experiment 2),

7 Principal-components analysis was used because itis designed to decompose unique as well as commonvariance across items.' However, to see whether the two-factor solution was limited to a principal-componentsanalysis, we also performed a principal-axis analysis. Ityielded a virtually identical factor structure; in no casedid a factor loading in the two analyses differ by morethan .08. Moreover, personal-distress and empathy ad-jectives formed distinct clusters in each analysis, andthey remained distinct regardless of whether an orthog-onal or oblique rotation was employed. Separate factoranalyses performed for each sex revealed that the factorstructure for both men and women was very similar tothat reported in Table 4.

Finally, a goodness of fit test using maximum-likeli-hood factor analysis (Lawley & Maxwell, 1971) producedfurther evidence that personal distress and empathy wereexperienced as qualitatively distinct. Comparison be-tween a one- and a two-factor solution (principal com-ponents) revealed that the latter was far superior; thediiference in goodness of fit was x2( 13) «= 212.0, p < .001.


suggest that there is a real and importantdifference in the nature of the motivation tohelp evoked by feelings of personal distressand empathy, a difference that under certaincircumstances (i.e., easy escape) has impor-tant behavioral consequences.

Finally, the results of Study 3 impose animportant qualifier on the empathy-altruismrelation. They suggest that the altruistic mo-tivation that blossoms from empathic emo-tion is a fragile flower, easily crushed by self-concern. In Study 3, the cost of helping wasmade relatively high, and as predicted, thisled to an egoistic pattern of helping evenamong subjects reporting a relative predom-inance of empathy. When helping was verycostly, even predominantly empathic subjectswere less likely to help when it was easy toescape. Presumably, the high cost of helpingdirected these subjects' attention away fromconcern for the other person and towardthemselves. This self-concern crushed anyaltruistic impulse that may have been evokedby feeling empathy.

Reference Note1. Piliavin, J. A., & Piliavin, I. M. The Good Samaritan:

Why does he help? Unpublished manuscript, Univer-sity of Wisconsin—Madison, 1973.

ReferencesArcher, R. L., Diaz-Loving, R., Gollwitzer, P. M., Davis,

M. H., & Foushee, H. C. The role of disposition^

empathy and social evaluation in the empathic me-diation of helping. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 1981, 40, 786-796.

Batson, C. D., & Coke, J. S. Empathy: A source of al-truistic motivation for helping. In J. P. Rushton &R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Altruism and helping behav-ior. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981.

Batson, C. D., Duncan, B. D., Ackerman, P., Buckley,T., & Birch, K. Is empathic emotion a source of al-truistic motivation? Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 1981, 40, 290-302.

Coke, J. S., Batson, C. D., & McDavis, K. Empathicmediation of helping: A two-stage model. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 1918,36, 752-766.

Hoffman, M. L. Is altruism part of human nature? Jour-nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1981, 40,121-137.

Isen, A. M., Shalker, T. E., Clark, M., & Karp, L. Affect,accessibility of material in memory, and behavior: Acognitive loop? Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, 1978, 36, 1-12.

Langer, E. J., & Abelson, R. The semantics of asking afavor: How to succeed in getting help without reallydying. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1972, 24, 26-32.

Lawley, D. N., & Maxwell, A. E. Factor analysis as astatistical method (2nd ed.). New York: AmericanElsevier, 1971.

McDougall, W. Introduction to social psychology. Lon-don: Methuen, 1908.

Orne, M. On the social psychology of the psychologicalexperiment: With particular reference to demandcharacteristics and their implications. American Psy-chologist, 1962, 17, 776-783.

Rushton, J. P., & Sorrentino, R. M. (Eds.). Altruism andhelping behavior. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981.

Winer, B. J. Statistical principles in experimental design(2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.

Received April 26, 1982 •

influence of self-reported distress and empathy and egoistic versus altruistic motivation for...

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