indonesia's changing strategic...

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Indonesia's strategic environment is Indonesian Navy in could play a central role in increasingly changing in fundamental and rapid helping Indonesia circumnavigate these currents. ways. To continue holding on to outdated My assessment, however, part ways with the assumptions—that the country's external traditional premise that our strategic environment environment will continue to be benign, for can be viewed through a concentric circle example—would be strategically unsound and emanating from Java (or Jakarta) as the “center of ultimately counter-productive. We should also gravity” to Southeast Asia, East Asia and the Indo-acknowledge, however, that our limited tools and Pacific, and then the rest of world. Departing from information processing capabilities often entail this so-called Mandala outlook does not imply that that we have no choice but to embrace we should abandon the Archipelagic Outlook uncertainties. This article is therefore a more (Wawasan Nusantara). The conflation between circumscribed exercise at “crystal ball gazing” into Wawasan Nusantara and Mandala is perhaps an some of the most salient strategic currents that can unfortunate byproduct of the New Order's legacy and will affect Indonesia within the next decade. that injected the Dual Function and National These currents may not be of our making, but they Resilience doctrines into our geo-strategic and geo-are within our reach to steer. Furthermore, the political thinking and clouds our strategic

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By Evan A. Laksmana*

1. Some of these assumptions, unfortunately, can still be found in the 2008 Defense White paper published by the Ministry of Defense.2. This concentric circle outlook has been traditionally the view of both defense and foreign policymakers in Indonesia since President Suharto's

New Order. See the discussion of this outlook in Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994). For a re-assessment of the concentric circle model, see Hadianto Wirajuda, “Rethinking RI's foreign policy concentric circle”, The Jakarta Post, April 11, 2010.

INDONESIA'S CHANGINGSTRATEGIC CURRENTS INDONESIA'S CHANGINGSTRATEGIC CURRENTS

JURNAL MARITIM INDONESIA November 2015 Edisi-4

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assessment foundations. Furthermore, the rapid so-called “peace dividend” of the post-Cold War development of military technology (dubbed the era effectively ended the day the US responded to Revolution in Military Affairs or Revolusi Krida the 9/11 attacks by invading Afghanistan and Iraq. Yudha) and the exponential growth in political, The chain of events after and surrounding those economic, and social inter-dependence driven by wars has left the international order shaken, globalization suggest that a rigid plea for the regional powers restlessly emerging, and concentric circle outlook may hinder us from a American political and military supremacy realistic assessment of our strategic environment. eroding. With these conditions in mind, it is not

This article argues that there are five inter- difficult to argue that the return of great power related defining trends and fault lines of conflict politics will define the nature and shape of that will shape Indonesia's strategic environment international politics at both the global and in the near future: (1) the return of great power regional levels. The US-China strategic politics; particularly the US-China strategic competition in particularly has been re-structuring competition and Russia's growing challenge to the t h e s t r a t e g i c l a n d s c a p e o f t h e I n d o -global order, (2) the revival of nationalist forces Pacific—Indonesia's primary geo-strategic area of exacerbating territorial disputes (both maritime operations.and land) in the region at a time when generational America's recent “pivot” or “rebalance” to the leadership transition remains patchy and region—through the recently concluded Trans-incomplete, (3) the growing nexus of traditional Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the military and non-traditional security issues, (4) the realignments of the Pacific Command—is changing role and force mixture of regional armed cyclically both a cause for and consequence of forces, and (5) ASEAN's growing maturity as a China's growing military power and increasing driver and shaper of regional order and security aggressiveness in the region. Particularly troubling architecture. has been China's behavior in the East China and By way of outline, the following section will first South China Seas in recent years, which has elaborate these key trends and how each of them elevated Washington's concerns over its pacific will affect Indonesia. The second section will economic and security ties and prompted regional suggest the centrality of the Indonesian Navy in countries to demand a stronger US military any response that Jakarta should consider given presence. In turn, a more muscular naval posture the changing strategic environment. Finally, I will and development led by the US and its allies in the offer some concluding thoughts about the broader region have further sparked Chinese aggressive implications of these trends for Indonesia's defense policies, including the building of “artificial policymaking and strategic assessment process. islands” in the South China Sea in recent years. In

this instance, Indonesia clearly has several Changing Strategic Currents strategic imperatives attached to the maintenance

First and foremost, it should be clear that the of order and stability in the South China Sea.

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3. A discussion of the region's RMA trends can be found in Emily Goldman and Thomas Mahnken (eds), The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

4. See the discussion of these developments in Robert Beckman, “The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea,” The American Journal of International Law Vol. 107, No. 1 (January 2013), pp. 142-163; Yi-Hsuan Chen, “South China Sea Tension on Fire: China's Recent Moves on Building Artificial Islands in Troubled Waters and Their Implications on Maritime Law” Maritime Safety and Security Law Journal Vol. 1 (2015): pp. 1-15

5. See Evan A. Laksmana, “Jakarta Eyes the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, February 23, 2011


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Meanwhile, Japan's gradual “normalization” hand, as a rising tide lifts all ships, China's military as a regional military powerhouse, Russia's modernization trends over the past two decades increasing defense ties with regional militaries has spurred, directly or indirectly, a growing re-(even as it annexed Crimea, invaded Ukraine, and armament and spiked defense spending among intervened in Syria), and India's ongoing policy to almost all regional countries—from India to the continue “looking to the East” while engaging in a Philippines. In Southeast Asia alone, defense multi-billion dollars arms spree are increasingly spending climbed by 13.5 percent annually over-crowding Indonesia's strategic environment. between 2005 and 2008 and might rise to rise to $40 The presence of regional flashpoints, such as the billion by 2016. But on the other hand, historical South China Sea, further suggest that the region's animosities and unresolved boundary disputes are strategic currents cannot be disentangled from intermingling with new security challenges such as these powers' behaviors. Indeed, within the next maritime piracy, human trafficking, terrorism, and decade, as the rivalries among regional powers climate change. (e.g. Japan vs. China, India vs. China) and between Climate change in particular provides a the US and China continue to dictate the regional “double jeopardy”: a burden multiplier over order 'terms of reference', Indonesia's leadership regional countries' natural resources and socio-and ASEAN's centrality will increasingly come economic infrastructure and a threat multiplier into serious question. over their environments. In the South China Sea,

Under these conditions, a timid and lackluster climate change-induced rising sea levels might foreign policy by Jakarta—which some observers exacerbate the complicated disputes as have claimed to be President Jokowi's current international law provides no specific answer to mode of operations—is the last thing that the the question of what would happen to EEZ claims country needs . What we need, instead, is an should an island used as a baseline be submerged. energetic yet measured, ambitious yet targeted, Indonesia's defense planners should pay close and consistently pro-active foreign policy led by attention to the different ways in which the South the country's best diplomats ready to stay on top of China Sea may shape Indonesia's strategic the day-to-day critical regional and global affairs, environment beyond whether or not China is rather than reverting to old clichés as we retreat claiming the Natunas. Climate change, after all, can comfortably inward. As we shall discuss in the next change the TNI's mission demand as it section, the Indonesian Navy also has a central role dramatically increases the need to deploy to play here alongside their counterparts in humanitarian relief and regional disaster response Pejambon. in the coming decades. Low-level conflicts

Second, when it comes to specific policy resulting from migratory increase and state challenges, it is hard to deny the strategic failures could also strain the TNI's ability to quell importance of the growing nexus of 'traditional' internal unrest—and as extreme weather events and 'non-traditional' security issues. On the one increase, epidemic diseases and humanitarian

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6. For details on these developments, see for example Brahma Chellaney, “Why Japan Should Rearm”, Project Syndicate, October 19, 2015; Danielle Rajendram, India's New Asia-Pacific Strategy: Modi acts East (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2014)

7. For a critical review, see for example, Donald Weatherbee, “The Incredible Shrinking Indonesia”, PacNet, September 23, 2015.8. See for example Andrew H. Tan, The Arms Race in Asia: Trends, Causes and Implications (London: Routledge, 2013)9. See the discussion in Evan A. Laksmana, “Double Jeopardy: Climate Insecurities and Their Implications for Asian Armed Forces,” Defence

Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2011): pp. 271-296. 10. See for example, Alain Dupont, “The Strategic Implications of Climate Change,” Survival, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2010): p. 36.


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disasters will follow amidst resource scarcity. assuming that a defense transformation is our next Third, given the sets of circumstances above, it step, Indonesia's defense planners and

is not surprising that regional armed forces are also policymakers should watch these developments changing—organizationally and operationally. closely.The regional militaries' force posture mixture, in Fourth, despite the evolving nature of security particular, is slowly changing. During the Cold challenges and the role of regional armed forces, War, most militaries are either designed strictly for regional institutions still matter a great deal for the external threats and conventional wars, or to fight foreseeable future. How ASEAN in particular will internal insurgencies and perform domestic reshape and drive the regional security policing. In the past decade or so, more militaries architecture of the Indo-Pacific through deeper and have been focusing on achieving a 'full spectrum' broader cooperative mechanisms will be as critical force that can execute a wider range of missions as Jakarta's growing bilateral or trilateral security from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, cooperation efforts. All in all, Jakarta has signed 86 maritime and counter-piracy patrols, naval bilateral defense and security agreements with 31 interdictions, cyber warfare, all the way to anti- countries between 1999 and 2014. access and peacekeeping operations. The nature of Yet, the regional trends of defense this transition—how fast, how manageable, how institutionalization have been growing as well. disruptive, and how much it will cost—will shape While not initially designed as a NATO-like the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape by virtue of the defense community, ASEAN and the ASEAN growing importance of regional armed forces in Regional Forum (ARF) has conducted on average defense diplomacy and intra- and inter-regional fifteen defense and security-related meetings security cooperation. annually since 2001. The expansion of ARF's

Indonesia should pay attention to this trend if activities such as the establishment of the ARF it wishes to continue playing a leadership role, Disaster Relief Exercise, and the advent of new through ASEAN or otherwise, in shaping and multilateral defense forums such as the ASEAN crafting the region's nascent security architecture. Defense Ministers' Meeting, all suggest how Understanding why and how regional militaries increasingly crucial ASEAN will be in providing a are changing their outlook and role can go a long venue for multi-layered and multi-faceted regional way in adjusting our strategic preferences and security cooperation. Taken as a whole, Southeast expectations over the region's future. The Asia appears increasingly interested in ensuring Indonesian military should also pay attention to that it will no longer become another “playing these trends as it continues to build on the field” for the great powers through these accomplishments of the post-Suharto military interlocking defense institutional arrangements. reforms. We can debate whether recent The process of Southeast Asia's maturity even developments in civil-military relations under as the interest of extra-regional powers grow will President Joko Widodo and the resurgence of civic be fluid and might take detours and unexpected action programs, for example, puts the military on turns along the way however. As such, Indonesia the wrong side of these trend. But in any case, needs to ensure that its foreign policy leadership

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11. See the discussion in Evan A. Laksmana, “Climate change is also a defense and security problem,” The Jakarta Post, November 2, 2009. 12. For more details, see for example Evan A. Laksmana, “Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in

Southeast Asia,” Asian Security Vol. 8, No. 3 (2012): pp. 251-27


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What role for the Navy?can re-establish ASEAN's centrality in driving the With all of these changing strategic currents in process of regional security architecture building.

mind, how can we consider assess the role of the A foreign policy that only caters to narrow Indonesian Navy in helping Indonesia domestic interests, such economic investments and circumnavigate these trends? First, the Navy's overseas citizens' protection, as important as they ability to 're-balance' its forces—from one that used may be, is an outdated notion at a time when to reflect the aphorism “transporting armies to regional powers are emerging and great power safeguard internal security” to one that safeguards politics are making a comeback. While it is true that and effectively controls Indonesia's geostrategic foreign policy begins at home—and that maybe all maritime domain (including but not exclusively its politics really is local—the strategic environment Sea Lines of Communications) would be the first also deserves our full attention and careful order priority. Naval planners could begin by planning and assessment processes. As such, the systematically engaging difficult organizational idea that Jakarta should care less about its questions, such as whether maritime law neighbors and downplay ASEAN might not be the enforcement should be completely left to the coast best course of action for the foreseeable future. guards. The development of the Navy as a naval Finally, the burden of history and the uneven power will determine Indonesia's ability to fully generational leadership among the regional take advantage of its geostrategic position that lies leaders will also shove and shape Southeast Asia's at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region. The strategic landscape. For all the progress the region foundation of a coherent and decisive foreign has witnessed in terms of political democratization policy begins with a strong navy supporting the and economic development, many of the region's country doing what it does best and what it top leaders cut their teeth during the heyday of the supposed to do. Cold War. While historical animosities often

Second, given the maritime nature of the Indo-simmer under the surface among individual Pacific, navy-to-navy communication and countries—such as those between Cambodia and cooperation is a significant force multiplier. Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, or Indonesia Improving personnel planning and development, and Malaysia—the role of the political leadership education and training, and better engagement in ensuring amicable and mutually beneficial with Indonesia's broader foreign policy relations among regional countries will be critical. community can assist the navy in executing one of Narrowing the gap between the rapidly changing its key doctrinal missions: naval diplomacy. This regional dynamics and the strategic mindset of function is critical not only in terms of providing political leaders raised during the Cold War could navy-to-navy strategic trust building and comfort. determine how well regional countries can But such activities are also crucial to further respond to day-to-day policy challenges, whether institutionalize the region's nascent maritime and in the South China Sea or over the refugee crisis at naval security architecture. Deepening CUES, for sea. instance, can be critical in ensuring that incidents at

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13. See for example, J. Patrick Boyd, et. al., Emerging Leaders in East Asia: The Next Generation of Political Leadership in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008).

14. See the discussion in, Sam Bateman, “The Future Maritime Security Environment in Asia: A Risk Assessment Approach,” Contemporary


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sea in disputed areas such as the South China Sea military comeback tour, Russia's resurgent do escalate beyond our control. All in all, the expansionism, and America's ambivalent Navy should strive to be center of a regional web of rebalance to the region given its commitments in naval engagements and diplomacy, rather than the Middle East and Central Asia, are all clear signs being a passive partner. that great power politics has returned in full force.

Finally, should the Navy be able to accomplish Regional states and militaries have been the two challenges mentioned above, it can haphazardly trying to adjust even as deep-seated effectively become a regional 'veto player' in terms nationalism, territorial disputes, and an of shaping and developing a stable regional order increasingly outdated political leadership in the Indo-Pacific. A decisive naval capability, in generation is facing exponentially complex short, will allow Indonesia to play a more effective economic, social, and political strategic challenges role as a regional balancer. Once again, the as regional institutions remain in question. But of supremacy of foreign policy remains part of the course, when it comes to precisely predicting core principles in which the Navy can play a more future strategic issues, even the best observers active regional diplomatic role. This can be done, have to acknowledge that we are all often nothing for example, through the Navy's leadership role in more than blind oracles.various ASEAN-related maritime security forum But the above analysis also shows that, as a and defense diplomatic activities. After all, any matter of foreign policy and naval strategy, there new or innovative proposals pertaining to the are different policy options we could consider to South China Sea can also be further justified when ensure that Indonesia can better circumnavigate framed within the broader ASEAN context and these strategic currents. Foreign policy begins at development—a notion we have yet to fully the top, however. Our president needs to pay more explore. attention to foreign policy and empower the

foreign ministry. However, no foreign policy in a Conclusions region distinctly characterized by the maritime

The preceding analysis shows that Indonesia's domain can ever be decisive and coherent without strategic environment is rapidly changing. Some of the support of the navy. Our Navy therefore can the trends are harder to grasp and others are still and should play a role in stabilizing and managing full of uncertainties and beyond our grasp to fully Indonesia's geo-strategic environment as well. control. China's muscle flexing, Japan's gradual

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*Biography The writer is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta and currently a doctoral candidate at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, New York. He previously taught at the Indonesian Defense University. He tweets at @EvanLaksmana


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