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INDONESIA BriefingJakarta/Brussels, 10 October 2001

INDONESIA: VIOLENCE AND RADICAL MUSLIMS

OVERVIEW

The destruction of the World Trade Centre and partof the Pentagon by terrorists has again focusedinternational attention on radical Muslims and theirpotential to engage in acts of terrorism. Osama binLaden’s al-Qaida organisation is said to have cellsin 34 countries including the United States, mostEuropean countries, and various countries in theArab world. Informed observers have alsospeculated that al-Qaida has a presence in severalSoutheast Asian countries, including Malaysia, thePhilippines and Indonesia. At the very least it hasbeen claimed that Osama bin Laden has ‘links’with radical Islamic groups in these countriesalthough the exact nature of these links has notbeen specified.

The U.S.-led air strikes against military targets inAfghanistan – accompanied by inevitable civiliancasualties – have outraged public opinion inlargely Muslim Indonesia and presented PresidentMegawati Soekarnoputri’s government with a hugedilemma. Megawati recently completed asuccessful visit to the U.S. and obtained PresidentGeorge W. Bush’s support for increased economicassistance as well as a relaxation of restrictions onmilitary co-operation. Although the Indonesiangovernment condemned the 11 September attacksand ‘pledged to cooperate with the internationalcommunity in combating terrorism’, it hasrefrained from endorsing the current U.S.-ledmilitary campaign.1 On the one hand, thegovernment does not want to prejudice itseconomic relationship with the U.S. but, on theother, it cannot afford, in the new democratic era,

1 Joint Statement between the United States of Americanand the Republic of Indonesia, Washington, 19 September2001.

to ignore the sentiments of a large part of itspopulation.

In a statement issued on 8 October, the government‘urged that the operations that have started shouldtruly be very limited in the use of force, in itstargets and in its timing, and thus reduce orminimise casualties among those who areinnocent’.2 Earlier, the government had warnedthat the U.S. response should ‘be proportional,have precise targets, not exceed proper limits, andavoid creating a new human tragedy’.3 Thegovernment also called on the UN to adopt acollective response to the crisis.4

During the weeks before the attacks onAfghanistan, radical Muslim organisations hadbeen rallying their supporters in the streets ofJakarta and other major cities. After the aircampaign began, demonstrations became largerand more widespread. The main targets are theAmerican embassy and its consulates wheredemonstrators, carrying banners with slogans suchas ‘America is the Great Terrorist’ and ‘Osama MyHero’, have burnt the U.S. flag and chanted anti-American slogans. More ominously, someorganisations are threatening to carry out what theyterm ‘sweeping’ of U.S. citizens together withcitizens of allied nations. The aim of the‘sweeping’ would be to drive such foreigners outof Indonesia. The U.S. ambassador, RobertGelbard, publicly declared his lack of confidencein the police and permitted embassy staff to leave

2 ‘PBB Harus Ambil Langkah Bersama’, Kompas, 9October 2001.3 ‘Pemerintah Larang “Sweeping”’, Kompas, 5 October2001.4 ‘PBB Harus Ambil Langkah Bersama’, Kompas, 9October 2001.

Indonesia: Violence and Radical MuslimsICG Indonesia Briefing Paper, 10 October 2001

Indonesia.5 So far demonstrations have beenrestrained and relatively small. On the first twodays after the raids on Afghanistan, a thousand ormore demonstrated at the U.S. embassy in Jakartawhile smaller numbers protested in other cities.

Although the radical Muslim organisations havetaken the lead in opposing the U.S. attacks onAfghanistan, their sentiments are widely sharedwithin the Muslim community. Leaders of themoderate Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and theMohamadiyah have issued statements condemningthe American action and the semi-official MajelisUlama Indonesia (MUI – Indonesian Ulamas’Council) has called for the suspension ofdiplomatic relations with the U.S..6 The foreignaffairs commission of the parliament has describedthe attack as ‘brutal’ and in conflict withinternational law and humanitarianism.7 Thenegative reaction, however, is not limited toMuslim opinion and has also been expressed bysecular groups.8

The government is naturally concerned thatconflict in Afghanistan could boost domesticsupport for Islamic radicalism. In recent yearsIndonesia has experienced an increasing number ofterrorist attacks – particularly bombings. While byno means all terrorism can be linked to radicalMuslims, some attacks – such as those on churches– were quickly blamed on Muslim groups. Two ofthe biggest bomb blasts – one aimed at thePhilippine ambassador to Indonesia and another atthe Jakarta Stock Exchange building – were alsolinked to Muslim groups. Much lower on the scaleof violence, radical Muslim vigilante groups haveoften taken the law into their own hands byattacking night-clubs, gambling centres and

5 ‘Dubest Kecewa terhadap Polri’, Kompas, 28 September2001.6 ‘PBB Harus Ambil Langkah Bersama’, Kompas, 9October 2001.7 Detikcom, 8 October 2001.8 In the wake of the initial terrorist attacks in New Yorkand Washington, the English-language Jakarta Post, whichhas never shown sympathy for radical Islam, stated:‘Following the revulsion that came with watching thehorrific scenes of last week’s attacks in New York andWashington, the world is not quite ready to witnessanother round of grisly killing of innocent civiliansanywhere in the world. It that should happen, then thisbecomes solely America’s war, and the rest of the worldwill have no part in it’. Editorial, Jakarta Post, 17September 2001.

brothels in various part of Jakarta and in othercities, and in Central Java last year one groupattempted to drive American tourists from the cityof Solo (also known as Surakarta).

Muslims have also been involved in violentconflicts in various regions of Indonesia. It isestimated that around 5000 people have been killedin Muslim-Christian conflict in Maluku and NorthMaluku since January 1999; hundreds have beenkilled in continuing Muslim-Christian violence inPoso in Central Sulawesi; the separatist guerrillasof the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM - AcehFreedom Movement) are Muslims fightinggovernment forces in Aceh; and Muslims haveparticipated in dozens of smaller outbreaks ofviolence in other parts of Indonesia.

International concern has been focussed on thepossibility that Muslim violence in Indonesiamight be associated with terrorist organisationsbased in the Middle East but so far, at least, thereis little firm public evidence to demonstrate suchlinks. Several hundred Indonesians joined theIslamic resistance to the Soviet Union’s occupationof Afghanistan in the 1980s and others haveapparently received ‘training’ in that country sincethen but neither the numbers nor the nature of the‘training’ are clear.9 It has also been claimed thatOsama bin Laden’s network has provided financialsupport to a minority Muslim militia in Maluku.10

In any case, much of the violence in Indonesiainvolving Muslims can be adequately explained indomestic terms – although there is some evidenceof limited involvement of foreigners.

As this paper will show, radical Islam in Indonesiais still quite weak and the goal of its proponent ofturning Indonesia into a state based on Islam is farfrom achievement. Nevertheless, Indonesia’sdemocratic transition is being accompanied by acrisis of lawlessness that has allowed many groups– including radical Muslim groups – to flaunt thelaw by engaging in violent behaviour withimpunity. Needless to say, however, it is not only

9 According to one report, a military intelligence sourceestimated that 800 Indonesians had fought in Afghanistanin the 1980s. A spokesman for the Laskar Jihad estimatedthat the number was more than 400. Tempo, 7 October2001, p.23. One prominent Muslim scholar, however,wonders how many actually went further than Peshawar inPakistan. ICG interview, October 2001.10 ‘Yang Menanti Berkah Osama’, Tempo, 30 September2001, p. 25.


explicitly Muslim groups that have beenresponsible for growing violence.

I. ‘RELIGIOUS’ VIOLENCE ININDONESIA

Violence perpetrated by Muslim radicals is not anew phenomenon in Indonesia and was commonfrom time to time during Soeharto’s authoritarianNew Order. In fact it is often argued that theSoeharto regime’s severe repression of politicalIslam contributed to the radicalisation of Muslimdissent. While the Muslim mainstream haswelcomed the democratisation of Indonesia sinceSoeharto’s fall, a small radical fringe has resortedto intimidation and violence. Such violence hasincluded bombing and various forms of local-levelviolence against Chinese, Christians and ‘vice’.Muslims have also been involved in communalviolence in various parts of Indonesia. Communalconflict, however, always has local roots that areusually unrelated to radical Islamic aspirations –although radicals can sometimes aggravate suchconflict.

A. BOMBING

The throwing or planting of bombs to furtherpolitical goals was not unknown in the past butsince the fall of the New Order regime in May1998, bomb explosions have become morecommon. Between May and the end of 1998, sixbombings were recorded, followed by nine in 1999and twenty in 2000.11 Not all bombings, of course,have been the work of Muslim organisations. Infact several major bomb explosions took placeimmediately before various members of theSoeharto family faced legal proceedings –interrogation in the case of the former president’sson, Tommy, and the opening of his trial in thecase of Soeharto himself – and were apparentlyintended by their supporters to intimidateprosecutors and judges. Others are simplyunexplained.

Major bombing attacks that had Islamic links wereof three types. The first category involvedbombings carried out by supporters ofindependence for staunchly Islamic Aceh.Secondly, a powerful bomb was used in an attemptto murder the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia,presumably at the behest of Muslim separatists in

11 ‘Bombings after 1998 have not been resolved’, JakartaPost 19 January 2001.


the Philippines. And thirdly, a series of churchbombings received at least marginal support from aradical Malaysian group. The affiliations of theirIndonesian partners have yet to be identified.

The first category of bombing was carried out bysupporters of Aceh’s independence. The biggestbomb explosion in Indonesia during the last fewyears occurred on 13 September 2000 in thebasement car-park of the Jakarta Stock ExchangeBuilding – which also houses the offices of theWorld Bank. A powerful explosion killed tenpeople, injured 34 and wrecked more than onehundred cars but caused no serious structuraldamage to the building itself. Eventually eightpeople were charged in this case and a related caseinvolving a grenade thrown into the grounds of theMalaysian embassy. However, only six wereconvicted as two remained at large following therecapture of two of four who had managed toescape from prison. The key figures in the plot,including three soldiers with bomb-assemblingskills, were Acehnese although GAM deniedpolice claims that they were members of themovement.

Despite the successful conclusion of the trials,public suspicion that the full story had not beentold was widespread. No evidence was presented toshow that Tengku Ismuhadi, the leader of thegroup, really was a GAM member while the linkbetween the struggle for Acehnese independenceand the grenade attack on the Malaysian embassy(and another planned attack on the U.S. embassy)was never explained. Observers also noted thehuge gap in the sophistication of the powerfulbomb explosion at the stock exchange and thesimplicity of the grenade attack on the Malaysianembassy and the naivety of the plan to throw agrenade over the fence of the heavily guarded U.S.embassy. Scepticism was also expressed about theseries of ‘coincidences’ that led to the arrest of thesuspects.12

Another Aceh-related bomb explosion took placeon 10 May 2001 at a student boarding house inJakarta. The boarding house was occupied byAcehnese, some of whom were apparentlyassociated with the Aceh Referendum Information 12 ‘Keganjilan yang Terus Menyelimuti Kasus Bom BEJ’,Koran Tempo, 20 July 2001; ‘Bom BEJ dan SejumlahAneh’, editorial, Tempo, 8 October 2000. This issue ofTempo also includes several articles raising questionsabout the case.

Centre (SIRA), a student-based movement callingfor a referendum on Aceh independence. AlthoughSIRA maintains a distinct identity, the police andmilitary tend to regard it as part of the GAMnetwork. Three people were killed in theexplosion. It seems that a bomb had beenassembled in the house but had explodedprematurely.13

There was no indication that the Aceh-linkedexplosions had any foreign backing. But a massiveexplosion on 1 August 2000 in front of the home ofthe ambassador of the Philippines is inexplicablewithout foreign involvement. The ambassador,whose car was blown up as he returned for lunch,was badly wounded in the attack which killed twounconnected passers-by. No progress has beenmade in identifying the perpetrators but it is widelyassumed that the bombing was carried out at thebehest of Muslim rebels in southern Philippines. Itis possible that the perpetrators were Filipinos butit is hard to believe that such a massive bombingcould have been accomplished without localsupport. Naturally suspicion has fallen on Muslimradicals but in the absence of evidence it is no lesspossible that professional criminals were paid tokill the ambassador.

Churches were the targets of several bombingattacks. On 28 May 2000 in Medan, NorthSumatra, an explosion at a Protestant churchinjured at least 47 people while bombs found intwo other churches had failed to explode. Threemonths later another church was damaged in abomb explosion in Medan.14

The most extensive bombing attacks on churchesoccurred on Christmas eve, 2000, when bombsexploded at roughly the same time in or nearchurches – both Catholic and Protestant – in tenIndonesian cities in six provinces in Sumatra, Javaand Lombok. Among the churches were six inJakarta, including the Catholic cathedral. In severalplaces police were successful in defusing bombsplaced in churches or sent as ‘Christmas parcels’ tothe homes of clergymen. Eighteen people werekilled and another 36 suffered severe injuries.

13 ‘Police say SIRA activists involved in Guntur blast’,Jakarta Post, 14 May 2001.14 ’47 Injured in Medan Church Blast’, Jakarta Post, 29May 2000; ‘Medan Church Bombs Linked toProvocateurs’, Indonesian Observer, 21 August 2000.


Not all the victims, however, were targets. Amongthose killed or injured were several involved inassembling or delivering bombs. One of thesurvivors of a premature explosion had a mobilephone in which numbers were recorded showingthat he had been in contact with people in Malaysiaand Afghanistan.15 In Bandung, West Java, theaccidental explosion of a bomb being assembled ina house enabled police to capture four members ofthe plot including a religious teacher, Iqbal, whowas regarded as the ringleader of the Bandunggroup. Iqbal was later sentenced to fifteen yearsimprisonment together with three others.16 InMedan, North Sumatra, a man was sentenced toeleven years imprisonment for assembling thebombs that were sent to churches in North Sumatraand Riau. He claimed that the bombs had beenordered by a representative of GAM who had paidhim Rp 28 million (U.S$2800) to assemble anddeliver the bombs.17

Seven months later, two churches in East Jakarta –one Catholic and one Protestant – were the targetsof bomb attacks on 22 July 2001 in which fivewere injured in one case and 64 in the other. Policewere able to achieve a breakthrough a week laterwhen an almost identical bomb exploded at theentrance of the Atrium shopping mall in CentralJakarta on 1 August. The Atrium mall was not thetarget as the bomb had exploded prematurely,seriously injuring six, including the bearer of thebomb who was taking it to another target.18

Although the police initially blamed GAM for theattack and arrested 57 Acehnese suspects, theMalaysian government identified one of the injuredas Taufik Abdul Halim, also known as Dani, amember of the Malaysian Mujahidin, who hadjoined a group of nine conducting jihad inIndonesia. Dani, aged 26, had reportedly recentlyreturned to Malaysia from Pakistan. In Malaysiathe group, with about fifty members, was said tohave had contact with the Taliban in Afghanistanand was accused of blowing up a church and a

15 ‘Malam Kudus, Ramai Bom’ and ‘Jaringan Bom Laknatdi Malam Kudus’, Tempo, 14 January 2001.16 ‘Otak Pengeboman di Bandung Divonis 15 TahunPenjara’, Koran Tempo, 24 July 2001.17 ‘Bomb blast convict gets 11 years’ imprisonment’,Jakarta Post, 14 August 2001. Police earlier claimed thathe received Rp 160 million. ‘Eight named suspects inbombings’, Jakarta Post, 17 January 2001.18 ‘Bom Meledak di Jakarta, GAM Dituding,’ Tempo, 12August 2001.

Hindu temple in Malaysia.19 In Indonesia, Danisaid he had been working with an Indonesiangroup.20 The evidence so far does not suggest thatMalaysian involvement was more than marginal.

Six weeks later, following their interrogation ofDani, the police captured thirteen men in a groupof fifteen, one of whom was Malaysian,undergoing self-defence and military-style trainingin a village near Pandeglang in Banten province.The group called itself the Forum Studi KajianIslam (Foski – Islamic Studies Forum). Reportedlysome among them admitted to involvement in theChristmas Eve bombings and one claimed to havefought alongside Muslims in Ambon. Another wasquoted as saying that ‘After our training, we wantto join the jihad in Ambon and Poso’.21

The spate of Muslim-connected bombing causedconsiderable concern but was the work of a verysmall number of people. The Acehnese groupapparently behind the stock exchange blast did notappear to have formal ties to the mainstream ofGAM although they may have had informal linkswith elements within GAM. The bombing of thePhilippine ambassador’s home appeared to be aone-off attack sponsored from outside Indonesia.The church-bombing group, however, seemed tohave a wider network within Indonesia – rangingfrom North Sumatra to Lombok, and aninternational connection with a similar group inMalaysia and perhaps elsewhere. But there was noindication to suggest that the Indonesian group wasespecially large or that it was acting at the behestof international terrorists.

B. LOCAL VIOLENCE

Apart from major bombing attacks, outbreaks ofviolence and intimidation involving Muslims hastaken place from time to time. In some casesradical Islamic organisations have played a role butusually these conflicts are related to particularlocal circumstances and issues.

19 ‘Atrium Plaza Bomber Malaysian: KL ministry,’JakartaPost, 14 August 2001; ‘ Jakarta Post 18 August 2001.20 ‘Menunggu Perintah Abbas’, Gatra, 22 September 2001.21 ‘Komplotan Pengebom Atrium Ditangkap’, KoranTempo, 15 September 2001; ‘Kakinya Ditembak diHalaman Kantor Polisi’, Koran Tempo, 21 September2001; ‘Jalur Bom Pandeglang-Malaysia’, Tempo, 23September 2001: ‘Gerombolan Bukit Pandeglang’, Gatra,22 September 2001.


1. Anti-Chinese Rioting

Indonesia has a long history of periodic violenceagainst the Chinese community which has alwaysplayed a prominent role in the economy. AlthoughChinese make up only 3 to 4 per cent of thenational population, they are heavily concentratedin urban areas where their business activities rangefrom huge national conglomerates to retail trade insmall towns. It has been the small shop-keepersand traders who have been the main victims ofanti-Chinese violence. Many indigenousIndonesians resent the relative wealth of theChinese while rioters and looters find Chineseproperty an attractive target. During the Soehartoera, the symbiotic ties between the military andbureaucratic elite on one hand and the Chinesebusiness community on the other aggravated anti-Chinese sentiments outside the elite.

Anti-Chinese sentiments have been particularlystrong in parts of the Muslim community that hadhistorically been engaged in a losing competitionwith Chinese business. To this was added theirsuspicion of non-Muslims, especially Christians.22

In particular many Muslims believe that Christianmissionary activity is financed by Chinese donorsas well as international organisations. Anti-Chinesethemes have often been taken up in Muslimpublications. This is not to say, of course, that anti-Chinese sentiment is a monopoly of orthodoxMuslims but only that it has been more marked inthat community.

Anti-Chinese rioting was not uncommon duringthe three decades of rule by Soeharto’s New Order.Often trivial incidents, such as a traffic accident,led to attacks on shops, churches and temples. Inmany cases, riots broke out shortly after theweekly Friday prayers in mosques. These clashes,however, were usually controlled quickly partlybecause local military and police units dependedon regular financial contributions from localChinese business.

During the last few years of the Soeharto era anti-Chinese rioting – in which radical Islamic groupswere often involved but not necessarily the maininstigators - became more common and appearedto be related to rivalries between military factions

22 Chinese are divided among Christians, Buddhists andConfucianists. The Chinese, however, make up only aminority of Indonesia’s Christian community.

over the coming succession. From late in 1996 aseries of anti-Chinese riots broke out in manysmall towns of Java and elsewhere – Situbondo inEast Java in October 1996, Tasikmalaya in WestJava in December 1996, Rengasdengklok in WestJava in January 1997, Pekalongan in Central Javain March 1997, Kadipaten in West Java in June1997 and Ujungpandang in Sulawesi in September1997. Following the economic collapse in the wakeof the Asian monetary crisis in late 1997 and theapproaching presidential election in March 1998,small-scale anti-Chinese rioting virtually sweptthrough the country as the rhetoric of militaryofficers in the so-called ‘green’ faction adopted anincreasingly anti-Chinese tone.23 AlthoughSoeharto was re-elected, his last term did not lastlong. In the week after a large anti-Chinese riot inMedan in North Sumatra in May, three days ofrioting destroyed much of Jakarta’s Chinesebusiness area as well as enterprises associated withthe president’s cronies and children. The politicalconsequence was that on 21 May the presidentresigned in favour of his vice president, B. J.Habibie.

Although anti-Chinese riots in small townscontinue to break out from time to time, theirfrequency has declined drastically and nosignificant clash has taken place in a major citysince the fall of Soeharto.

2. Attacks On Churches

Muslim attacks on churches have also beencommon in Indonesia’s history. Usually suchattacks arise from particular local circumstancesrather than as part of a broad campaign by radicalMuslims – although the rhetoric of radicalMuslims can contribute to an atmosphere whereChristians churches and other institutions becometargets. In many cases attacks on churches cannotbe separated from anti-Chinese violence or conflictbetween members of rival communities, such as inMaluku. A common issue sparking local attacks onchurches is missionary activity on the part ofChristians trying to convert Muslims.

Often conflict between Muslims and Christians inone part of Indonesia can trigger clashes in otherregions. In November 1998 a brawl betweenMuslims residents in Ketapang, Jakarta, andAmbonese Christian gang members at an illegal

23 Green is often regarded as the colour of Islam.


gambling hall resulted in a dozen or so Christiansbeing killed and was followed by attacks on 27churches and schools in the area.24 A week laterChristians in predominantly-Christian Kupang inWest Timor destroyed mosques, shops and homesin districts inhabited by the Muslim minority.

The upsurge in fighting in Maluku in late 1999 andearly 2000 provided the occasion for Muslimattacks on churches and Christians in other distantregions. In late 1999 Christian fighters had beengetting the better of their Muslim rivals in parts ofMaluku and Muslim casualties were rising. Inresponse in January 2000 churches were attackedin Mataram, Christian motorists were attacked inSouth Sulawesi and Muslim youths threw stones atchurches in Yogyakarta after a rally to protestagainst anti-Muslim violence in Maluku.

For the period 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000,Christian groups recorded 135 attacks on churchesand other Christian facilities but, as the U.S. StateDepartment’s Report on Religious Freedom inIndonesia notes, ‘the reports ranged in severityfrom broken windowpanes to total destruction’.25 Italso needs to be noted that much of this violenceoccurred in Maluku and Poso (Central Sulawesi)where Christians were also destroying mosques.

In most cases attacks on churches and Christianshave arisen from particular local circumstances andwere not always motivated primarily by religiousconcerns. Despite their suspicions of Christians,none of the prominent radical Muslimorganisations have launched one-sided campaignsof violence against churches and Christians duringthe last few years. Organised inter-religiousviolence usually involves ‘war’ conducted by bothsides as in Maluku and Poso.

3. ‘Anti-Vice’ Campaigns

In the past radical Muslims organisations haveoften carried out campaigns against prostitution,gambling, alcohol, drugs and so on. These

24 The Western press tended to portray this incident as acase of persecution of Christianity. The ‘Christians’ in thiscase, however, were not pillars of the local church butpetty criminals who happened to have been born into theChristian community of Maluku. Similar gangs of MuslimAmbonese also operate in Jakarta.25 U.S. Department of State, 2000 Annual Report onInternational Religious Freedom: Indonesia. 5 September2000.

campaigns have sometimes resulted in physicalattacks on massage parlours, bars, night-clubs,discotheques, casinos and other centres of‘entertainment’. Sometimes the campaigns arecarried out spontaneously by Muslim residents inneighbourhoods where such centres have beenestablished but in other cases radical Muslimorganisations have conducted the attacks.

These attacks usually peak during the periodleading to, and during, the month of Ramadhan –the Muslim fasting month. On 14 December 1999– during the fasting month – the radical group,Front Pembela Islam (FPI – Front to DefendIslam) occupied the office of the Jakarta regionalgovernment in response to a government decisionto close entertainment centres during the first twodays of Ramadhan. The FPI demanded that ‘placesof sin’ should be closed for the entire month. TheFPI had already attacked four such places –including a massage parlour, a discotheque and abilliard hall – in Jakarta and had burnt downdozens in the nearby city of Bogor.26 In April 2000the FPI launched a new series of raids whichincluded damaging a karaoke bar and woundingthree female prostitutes and a transvestite in amachete attack.27 In June night clubs and karaokebars in several parts of Jakarta were raided by theFPI which demanded that they close as a mark ofrespect for the Prophet Mohammad’s birthday thefollowing day. After another attack in September –in which the raiders injured seven people andshaved the head of a woman – one of the FPIleaders, Reza Pahlevei, justified the action. ‘Weobserved the area previously and later identifiedseveral bars and cafes as our target since theseplaces were used for vice activities’, he said.28 InNovember dozens of FPI members in green andwhite robes destroyed restaurants, cafes and smallkiosks and smashed bottles of alcohol in Depok onthe outskirts of Jakarta. ‘How dare the operators ofthe cafes open their business on the day beforeRamadhan?’, one of the FPI leaders asked.29

A similar attack on cafes took place during themonth of Ramadhan in Solo in December 2000. In 26 ‘Antara Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar dan AncamanSARA’, Tajuk, 2:22, January 2000.27 ‘Police finally act to stop raids by groups atentertainment centers’, Jakarta Post, 8 January 2001.28 ‘Seven injured in FPI attack on Tebet cafes, bars’,Jakarta Post, 4 September 2000.29 ‘FPI vandalism and terror strike Depok,’ Jakarta Post,27 November 2000.


the attack bottles of alcohol were smashed and arefrigerator damaged. In this case the perpetratorswere members the Laskar Jihad (LJ). According tothe LJ leader, Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘We told them… politely to shun immoral acts, but they ignoredus and challenged us, so we have to fight themback.’30 In Makassar, in South Sulawesi, anorganisation called Laskar Jundullah, led thecampaign. Hundreds of bottles of liquor and‘pornographic’ video discs were destroyed inseveral raids.31 In Riau a group calling themselvesthe United Malay Laskar Jihad burnt down asmany as 100 buildings that they claimed were usedfor prostitution.32

Initially the police failed to take action against theraids – although they clearly conflicted with thelaw. After one of the attacks in Jakarta in June2000 the police chief for South Jakarta, Lt. Col.Edward Aritonang, explained that ‘We didn’tarrest the perpetrators of the damage because weconsidered the psychological aspect. Our forceswere not equal to theirs. We only attempted tomake sure that their destruction did not spread’.33

In Surakarta the district police chief provided asimilar excuse, namely that the police avoidedtaking action against the LJ to prevent casualties.34

By the end of the year, however, the police’sfailure to curb the Muslim radicals was worryingmoderate Muslims. Nadjamuddin Ramly, a leaderof the Muhammadiyah youth association,described FPI’s behaviour as ‘criminal’ and saidthat the ‘police should arrest the people whocommit such acts’.35 This was backed by theJakarta governor, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sutiyoso, who saidthat ‘The police should have done their jobs andput an end to such attacks’.36

During Ramadhan at the end of 2000, the policefinally detained 58 FPI members after they had

30 ‘Jihad Force declares “war”’, Jakarta Post, 23 December2000.31 ‘Nightspots vandalized for ignoring rules’, Jakarta Post,8 December 2000.32 Detikworld, 23 December 2000.33 ‘FPI Rusak Kantor Komnas HAM dan Kafe Jibani’,Kompas, 24 June 2000.34 ‘ Laskar Jihad “Sweeping” Dua Kafe di Solo’, Kompas,18 December 2000.35 ‘Muslim activists condemn FPI’s violent raids’, JakartaPost, 1 December 2000.36 ‘Police must prevent attacks on entertainment centers’,Jakarta Post, 2 December 2000.

wrecked a pinball arcade and injured six guards.37

A few days later police fired at the tires of a truckcarrying FPI men who had just completed a raid.‘It was such an uncivilised act’, complained theFPI’s chairman.38 But it was only after a man waskilled while trying to stop FPI men who werecutting the hair of three women they suspected ofbeing prostitutes that the police seemed moreserious. Two days later three police were injuredwhen FPI members attacked a police station atKarawang, ninety kilometres east of Jakarta.39

However, no FPI activists have been charged inrelation to these matters.

The FPI justified its raids on the grounds that thepolice had failed to uphold the law, particularly arecently adopted regulation in Jakarta requiringplaces of entertainment to close during the fastingmonth. According to the FPI, they were obliged totake action to ensure that the law was respected.

4. Political Action

Muslim radical groups also occasionally launchedpolitical protests which sometimes involvedintimidation and violence. In January 2000 the FPIhad held a peaceful demonstration at the office ofthe National Commission on Human Rights todemand its dissolution for failing to deal with theviolence in Maluku.40 Five months later, followingthe release of what was deemed a biased report byan investigation commission into the shooting ofMuslim demonstrators at Jakarta’s port, TanjungPriok, in 1984, the Human Rights Commissionbecame the target of further protests.41 In June2000 the Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim AntarKampus (HAMMAS - Inter-University MuslimStudents Association) smashed a few windows atthe Commission’s office, followed a few days laterby a larger attack by the FPI which mobilised threetruck-loads of protestors armed with sticks andstones. Apart from protesting about the Tanjung

37 ‘FPI to finally face action from police’, Jakarta Post, 8December 2000.38 ‘Police fire at FPI truck after game centers attacked,’Jakarta Post, 12 December 2000.39 ‘Police to summon FPI leaders over brutal attack,’Jakarta Post, 16 December 2000.40 ‘FPI Minta Komnas HAM Dibubarkan’, Kompas, 11January 2000.41 This report is discussed in Indonesia: Impunity versusAccountability for Gross Human Rights Violations, ICGAsia Report No. 12, Jakarta/Brussels, 2 February 2001. p.9.


Priok report, the FPI accused the Commission ofbeing anti-Muslim because it had set up enquiriesinto human rights violations in East Timor whereChristians were killed but had failed to do so inMaluku where, according to them, Muslims werethe main victims. Although police had been sent toguard the building, they were outnumbered by theattackers.42

Radical Muslims continued to be concerned abouta revival of communism in Indonesia, especiallyafter President Abdurrahman Wahid proposed thelifting of the ban on communism early in 2000. InMarch 2000, the FPI held a rally in the centre ofJakarta in which banners were carried with sloganslike ‘We are ready to slay communists’ and ‘Weare ready to behead communists’.43 A year later,the Aliansi Anti-Komunis (AAK -Anti-CommunistAlliance, consisting mainly of radical Islamicorganisations but also the Front Merah Putih (Redand White Front) headed by the East Timoresemilitia leader, Eurico Gutteres, embarked on a‘sweeping’ campaign aiming to rid bookshops of‘communist’ books.44 After the books, theAlliance’s leaders threatened to begin ‘sweeping’people but the campaign quickly ran out of steam.

Radical Muslims also regularly demonstrated at theU.S. embassy in Jakarta and consulates elsewherein protest against American policies, most oftenU.S. support for Israel. After a series of clashesbetween Israeli security forces and Palestinians inOctober 2000, the U.S. embassy was subjected toalmost daily demonstrations by Islamic groups. InSolo, Central Java, an Islamic group calling itselfLaskar Islam Hizbullah, went to various hotels inthe city in search of American guests. They toldhotel managers that Americans would be given 48hours to leave the country.45 As it happened, therewere no Americans – or at least their presence wasnot revealed – in the hotels that the group visited.During that week the U.S. embassy in Jakartaclosed its public service section and the followingweek closed the entire embassy for two days ‘inresponse to a credible threat to the embassy’ –

42 'FPI members attack rights commission headquarters',Jakarta Post, 24 June 2000; 'FPI Rusak Kantor KomnasHAM dan Kafe Jimbani', Kompas, 24 June 2000.43 ‘FPI activists rally against communism’, Jakarta Post, 19March 2000.44 ‘”Sweeping” Buku Berbau Kiri Tetap Akan Berlanjut’,Kompas, 8 May 2001.45 ‘Men sweep hotels in Surakarta’, Jakarta Post, 30October 2000.

according to an embassy statement. Although theaction in Surakarta did not lead to violence, it wasunderstood to imply a threat of violence.

C. COMMUNAL VIOLENCE

Apart from specific acts of violence carried out byradical Muslims, separatist and communal conflicthas – as is hardly surprising in a country where 87per cent of the population is Muslim – involvedMuslims. The driving force in much of thisconflict, however, is not directly religious althoughreligious motivation is often closely entwined withethnic, economic and cultural grievances.

It is common, for example, for the separatiststruggle in Aceh – whose people describe theirprovince as the ‘Verandah of Mecca’ - to be seenas motivated by religious extremism. In reality,however, GAM does not espouse a distinctivebrand of radical Islam that is not shared by mostother Acehnese. Rather, GAM is the currentexpression of long-standing resentment againstrule from Jakarta that first appeared in the 1950s –long before the present international concern aboutfundamentalist Islam appeared. GAM’s resistanceto Jakarta rule is motivated more by Acehnesenationalism than by Islamic ‘fundamentalism’.46

Many Acehnese are angry because they receivedlittle benefit from the exploitation of theirresource-rich province by Jakarta, they havesuffered from the often brutal behaviour of themilitary and police, and believe that their culture isnot sufficiently respected. Both the Habibie andWahid governments tried to win the sympathy ofthe Acehnese by offering the right to implementsyariah law but their offers were treated withcontempt by GAM leaders and not much interestfrom local government leaders. It is possible thatGAM receives some external support from MiddleEastern groups in the mistaken belief that GAM isessentially an Islamic movement and it seems thatsome GAM commanders received military trainingin Libya in the 1980s or in other Muslim countriesmore recently. But the goals of GAM are limited toAceh and do not involve the ‘Islamisation’ ofIndonesia, let alone participation in an Islamicstruggle against the West. On the contrary, its

46 See Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring LastingPeace, ICG Asia Report No. 17, 12 June 2001, and Aceh:Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?, ICG Asia Report No18, 27 June 2001.


leaders have often expressed the hope that Westerncountries would intervene on their side.

Muslims have also been involved in ‘religious’conflict in other parts of Indonesia during the lastfew years, most notably in Maluku and Posodistrict in Central Sulawesi. In these regions virtual‘wars’ have taken place between relatively evenlybalanced Muslim and Christian communities. InMaluku the initial conflict that broke out inJanuary 1999 involved Christian Ambonese andMuslims from nearby Sulawesi who had migratedto Maluku – and other parts of Indonesia – in largenumbers during the previous three decades.However the conflict was soon transformed into abattle between indigenous Christians and Muslimsin circumstances where the capacity of the securityforces to maintain public order had deteriorateddrastically.47 This conflict can only be understandin the context of entrenched rivalries between twocommunities in which both sides committedatrocities against each other. The AmboneseMuslims were not motivated by an especially‘fundamentalist’ version of Islam – although thiscould not be said of an Islamic militia, the LJ,which went to Maluku from Java to fight alongsidethe local Muslims whom they believed werecoming out worst in the fighting.

In Poso the vicious fighting that broke out betweenMuslims and Christians in 2000 took place in thecontext of large-scale migration of Muslims towhat had previously been a predominantlyChristian region. As the local Christians fell behindeconomically and lost their political predominance,the conflict broke out – again in circumstanceswhere the national security forces were no longercapable of effective action.

In other major cases of communal violenceinvolving Muslims in recent years, Muslimcommunities have been on the losing side. In bothWest and Central Kalimantan, Muslim Maduresehave been driven from regions to which they hadbeen migrating for several generations. But inthese cases the conflicts were clearly motivated byethnic rather than religious sentiments. Althoughthe initial attacks on the Madurese minority inWest Kalimantan in 1997 were launched byChristian and ‘traditional’ Dayaks, indigenousMuslim Malays soon joined the Dayak struggle

47 See Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos inMaluku, ICG Asia Report No. 10, 19 December 2000.

against the Muslim Madurese. In CentralKalimantan many of the Dayaks leading thecampaign to force Muslim Madurese to flee fromthe province were themselves Muslim.48

48 See Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons fromKalimantan, ICG Asia Report No. 19, 27 June 2001.


II. THE RADICAL MINORITY

Radical Islamist organisations have a long historyin Indonesia although they have never been evenremotely close to taking control of the government.Although 87 per cent of Indonesians are Muslim,the historical spread of Islam in Indonesia was farfrom even and, particularly in the pre-colonialkingdoms on Java, Islamic precepts often co-existed alongside traditional Javanese beliefs andpractices. On the other hand, particularly along thenorthern coast of Java and in the outer islands,Islam was practised in a more orthodox form.49

The varying commitment to orthodox ‘MiddleEastern’ Islam continued to influence Indonesianpolitics after independence and remains relevanttoday. Many Javanese continue to be suspicious oforthodox political Islam and together with theChristian and Hindu minorities have alwayssupported ‘nationalist’ political parties opposed toidentifying the state with Islam. In quite differentways, President Megawati Soekarnoputri andformer President Soeharto, like Megawati’s father,President Soekarno, have represented the‘nationalist’ stream with roots in that part of theJavanese community that has combined adherenceto Islam with acceptance of traditional Javanesereligious values.

Orthodox Muslims can be divided, very broadly,into two streams – the traditionalists whoseunderstandings of Islam rely on traditions handeddown over the centuries, including traditionsderived from Java itself, and the modernists whoargue that the only true basis of Islam is the Koranand the example of the prophet Mohammad. Theleading organisational expression of traditionalIslam is the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) which is basedin Java and was led for many years by formerPresident Wahid. The largest organisation in themodernist stream is the Muhammadiyah which waspreviously led by Amien Rais, currently thespeaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly(MPR). (It is worth bearing in mind that inIndonesia Moslems labelled ‘traditionalists’ aregenerally regarded as more liberal and comfortablewith a secular state, while ‘modernists’ aregenerally regarded as more conservative and infavour of a greater role for Islam in government.)

49 The classic study of this topic is Clifford Geertz, TheReligion of Java, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960.

During the first decade of the Indonesian republic,the main political representative of modernistIslam was the Masyumi party. Although it wononly 21 per cent of the votes in Indonesia’sdemocratic election in 1955, the Masyumi was thesecond largest party and several coalitiongovernments during the 1950s were headed byMasyumi leaders. The party, however, was bannedby President Soekarno after the participation ofsome of its leaders in a revolt in Sumatra in the late1950s. President Soeharto shared his predecessor’sdistrust of the assertive political Islam that theMasyumi propounded. Under Soeharto, the formerleaders of the Masyumi were excluded frompolitical influence and party supporters weresometimes imprisoned.

It was among modernist Muslims who feltpersecuted during the New Order era that many oftoday’s radical Islamic organisations have theirorigins. Forced to withdraw from the politicalarena, some of the Masyumi leaders formed theDewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII -Indonesian Islamic Faith-Strengthening Board) inorder to raise Islamic awareness in the communityand provide a stronger foundation for an Islamicfuture in the long run. The DDII became a majorsupport base for ‘fundamentalist’ thinking inIslamic circles. It aspired ultimately to a form ofIslamic state in which pious Muslims would runthe government according to Islamic norms and itcalled for constitutional recognition of the so-called Jakarta Charter which requires Muslims toobserve the syariah. The DDII constantly warnedagainst the efforts of missionaries to ‘Christianise’Indonesians and they were always suspicious ofthe Chinese community and its domination ofbusiness. Internationally their chief concern wasthe Palestinian issue and what they perceived asIsrael’s illegal occupation of Palestinian land.Much of their anger was directed at the UnitedStates as Israel’s chief international supporter.

In 1987 the DDII sponsored the Komite Indonesiauntuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam (KISDI -Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with theIslamic World) primarily to channel support to thePalestinian cause. During the 1990s, KISDIbecame an influential but fringe part of thepolitical scene. As Yugoslavia broke up, KISDIcampaigned for support to Muslims in Bosnia. Italso supported the Muslims in Kashmir in theirefforts to free themselves from India and theMuslims of Mindanao fighting for independence


from the Philippines. Closer to home, KISDIshowed no concern for the human-rights abusesperpetrated by the Soeharto regime in largelyCatholic East Timor but protested when membersof the immigrant Muslim minority, whichsupported the Indonesian military, became targetsof the pro-independence movement. It also showslittle sympathy for Muslim Acehnese fighting forindependence from Indonesia.

Since the beginning of the 1990s PresidentSoeharto had been attempting to win overmodernist Islamic support – partly to balance theincreasing independence of the military. As part ofthis endeavour, his son-in-law, the then Lt. Col.Prabowo Subianto, approached some of theMuslim radicals in KISDI. The KISDI leadersresponded positively, seeing support for the regimeas providing a channel for Islamic influence. Whenthe Soeharto regime crushed Megawati’s wing ofthe Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI – IndonesianDemocratic Party) in 1996, KISDI and the DDIIechoed the military view that a communist revivalstood behind the protests against the military attackon Megawati’s supporters. During the economicand political crisis that led to President Soeharto’sresignation in May 1998, KISDI leaders – with theblessings of Prabowo, now a Lieutenant-General incommand of Kostrad (Army Strategic ReserveCommand) – had been mobilising support todefend the regime against various Chinese, Jesuitand communist plots. The downfall of Prabowo, afew days after Soeharto’s resignation in May 1998deprived KISDI of a key patron in the military butit continued to support the new Habibiegovernment and co-operated with elements in themilitary in mobilising tens of thousands of ruralyouths armed with bamboo spears to confront anti-Habibie and anti-military demonstrators at theMPR session in November 1998. Although KISDIitself does not have a mass membership, itcontinues to influence radical Islamic opinionthrough its association with the DDII and itspublications. One of its leaders, AhmadSumargono, is now a prominent member ofparliament representing the Partai Bulan Bintang(PBB - Crescent and Star Party ).

One of the most prominent radical Islamicorganisations today is the FPI which was formed inAugust 1998 and now claims branches in 22provinces. Based in Jakarta, the FPI is led byHabib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, a religiousteacher of Betawi-Arab descent in his late 30s who

was educated in Saudi Arabia.50 Like HabibRizieq, many of the FPI’s top leaders have Arabblood. The FPI’s stated goal is the fullimplementation of Islamic law although it supportsIndonesia’s present constitution and avoids callingfor an ‘Islamic state.’51 The FPI has a paramilitarywing called Laskar Pembela Islam whose membersare drawn from rural religious schools andunemployed youth and organised along militarylines.52 The FPI is well-known, as noted above, fororganised raids on bars, brothels and gamblingcentres. The FPI justifies these raids on thegrounds that the police are not capable ofupholding laws against prostitution and gambling,so it is the duty of Muslims to take their ownaction. They claim that they inform the policebefore the raids. Sceptical observers, however,believe that the police often turn a blind eye to FPIattacks which remind the operators of the bars,brothels and casinos of their vulnerability andtherefore make them more willing to paysubstantial sums of protection money to the policeor sometimes the military. Some sceptics alsobelieve that it is not impossible that some of thismoney finds its way back into FPI coffers. SinceDecember 2000 when police began to take actionagainst FPI raids, the organisation has concentratedon pulling down posters advertising alcoholicdrinks and soap advertisements featuring a semi-naked Indonesian actress, thus avoiding thephysical clashes that sometimes accompanied itsearlier raids. It is the FPI that has taken the lead inthreatening ‘sweeping’ actions to drive Americansout of Indonesia due to the U.S. attacks onAfghanistan.53

FPI leaders have maintained contact withIndonesia’s political elite through the Habibcommunity based at the Islamic Centre in Kwitang,

50 The name ‘Habib’ indicates a direct descendant of theProphet Mohamed. ‘Betawi’ refers to the indigenousinhabitants of Jakarta – known as Batavia during thecolonial period.51 ICG interview with Habib Rizieq, October 2001.52 New recruits are also provided with special supernaturalpowers to protect them against injury.53 Habib Rizieq has lately been distancing himself fromdirect responsibility for possible attacks on foreigners.After meeting the Jakarta police chief, he said: ‘FPIleaders are all intellectuals but I’m afraid FPI members atthe grassroots level are not. What if they meet anAmerican on the street and then beat and abduct him?That’s what we want to prevent by carrying out theseactions’. ‘Gelbard seeks police protection for US citizensand facilities’, Jakarta Post, 22 September 2001.


Jakarta. This year’s commemoration of the ProphetMohamed’s birth in June was attended by theSpeaker of the MPR, Amien Rais, the Speaker ofthe parliament, Akbar Tanjung (of Golkar)President Megawati’s husband, Taufik Kiemas,and former Commander of the Armed Forces,General Wiranto. Of Wiranto’s presence, HabibRizieq told the press that ‘Since the time that hehad only one star, then two, then three, then fourand was then dismissed, he has always attendedthis meeting’.54 Another FPI associate, Habib AliBaagil, claimed to be a close friend of GeneralWiranto and Wiranto’s ally, the former Kostradcommander, Lt. Gen. Djadja Suparman.55 It is notsuggested, however, that Wiranto and othermilitary officers – or other guests at thecommemoration - share the goals of FPI but onlythat they have found it useful to maintain contactswith Islamic organisations that have the capacity tomobilise supporters in the streets.

The LJ is another radical Islamic group that hascome to prominence since the fall of the NewOrder. The LJ is the paramilitary wing of theForum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah(Communication Forum of the Followers of theSunnah) established in Yogyakarta, Central Javaearly in 1998. The LJ was formed on 30 January2000 in response to religious violence in Malukuthat broke out in January 1999 and had intensifiedin the last weeks of December 1999 and January2000. Believing that the Muslim side was gettingthe worst of the fighting in Maluku, the LJarranged for military training to be given tovolunteers at a training camp near Bogor, not farfrom Jakarta. Although President Wahid orderedthat their camp be closed and that the militia beprevented from going to Maluku, the LJ sentseveral thousand men to Maluku during the monthsafter April 2000. The arrival of the well-armed LJin Ambon resulted in renewed fighting and a sharpincrease in casualties, especially among Christians.

The conclusion is unavoidable that the LJ receivedthe backing of elements in the military and police.It was obviously military officers who providedthem with military training and neither the militarynor the police made any serious effort to carry outthe president’s order preventing them from goingto Maluku. And, once in Maluku, they often

54 ‘Kita Tetap Tegs, Tolak Presiden Perempuan’, KoranTempo, 23 June 2001.55 ‘Baagil di Balik Bom?’, Tempo, 1 October 2000. p. 26.

obtained standard military arms and on severaloccasions were openly backed by militarypersonnel and indeed units.56

It has never been revealed exactly who in themilitary provided the necessary support.Speculation has centred on retired senior officersand serving officers who, it was believed, wantedto create conditions that would lead to theoverthrow of President Wahid. Other officers mayhave just preferred to avoid confrontation with anIslamic group fighting for a cause that attractedmuch sympathy from Muslims throughoutIndonesia. In Maluku itself there was no shortageof both military and police officers willing to fightfor the Muslim cause against Christians in aconflict in which, in early 2000, at least a thousandand possibly several thousand Muslims had beenkilled and tens of thousands were forced to flee theprovince.

Like the FPI, the leaders of the LJ often had Arabicforebears. The LJ commander, Ustaz Ja’far UmarThalib is of Madurese-Arab descent and hadstudied in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan beforejoining the Islamic resistance forces in Afghanistanin the late 1980s. The LJ also called for theimplementation of Islamic law and in March 2001Ustaz Ja’far officiated at the stoning to death of anadulterer in Ambon. Although arrested after thisincident, he was soon released by the police whoperhaps feared retaliatory violence from hisfollowers if he had been charged in court.

Unlike Muslim activists who carry pictures ofOsama bin Laden in demonstrations, the LJ leader,Ja’far Umar, is openly dismissive of bin Ladenwhom he labels as ‘khawarij’ – a reference to agroup which split away from the main body ofMuslims after the death of Mohammad.57 Ja’farUmar claims that he once met bin Laden inPakistan in the 1980s but found him lacking insound Islamic knowledge. The LJ leader said thathe rejected an offer of funds from an associate ofbin Laden.58

56 See Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos inMaluku, ICG Asia Report No. 10, 19 December 2000.57 For Muslims ‘khawarij’ has the sort of connotations thatthe eptithet ‘Trotskyite’ once had for orthodoxcommunists.58 ‘Yang Menant Berkah Osama’,Tempo, 30 September2001, p.25.


KISDI, FPI and LJ are only three of the mostprominent radical Islamic organisations. Othersinclude the university-student organisations,HAMMAS and Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa MuslimIndonesia (KAMMI – Indonesian Muslim StudentsAction Front), and the youth organisation,Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI – Islamic YouthMovement). Several radical movements areassociated with political parties such as GerakanPemuda Ka’bah (GPK – Ka’bah YouthMovement) linked to the Partai PersatuanPembangunan (PPP – United Development Party)and Pemuda Bulan Bintang (Crescent and StarYouth) linked to the PBB. Many ‘laskar’ groups,however, are limited to particular towns or regions.For example, it was reported that about 40 suchorganisations have appeared in the city ofYogyakarta, in Central Java, alone.59 In Solo thereare at least sixteen organisations.60

In common with ‘fundamentalist’ groups in allreligions, the Muslim radicals have never beenunited in a single organisation and are oftensharply divided over doctrinal and other issues thatoutsiders would regard as insignificant.Nevertheless, there are common themes that areregularly taken up by the radicals. Ultimately theyaim to establish some kind of ‘Islamic State’ inIndonesia or at least achieve constitutionalrecognition of the ‘Jakarta Charter’ that requires allMuslims to practise their religion according to thesyariah including the implementation of Islamiccriminal law. They are extremely suspicious ofChristian churches and very sensitive to Christianproselytising which they believe is financed byforeign interests bent on ‘Christianising’ Indonesiaand weakening Islam internationally. Otherinternational concerns are opposition to Israel –which leads to anti-Americanism – andcommunism. (Banners carried in demonstrationsare sometimes targeted at a bizarre Christian,Communist and Zionist alliance). The U.S. is alsooften seen as locked in an international strugglewith Islam. Within Indonesia their focus has beenon the crushing of vice in the form of prostitution,gambling and the drinking of alcohol. On twopolitical issues they were fully united: oppositionto the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid whomthey considered to have sold out to secularism and

59 ‘Many “revolutionary” bodies have their home base inYogya’, Jakarta Post, 25 June 2001.60 ‘Ormas Islam Solo Serukan Boikot Produk AS’,Kompas, 6 November 2001.

opposition to the presidency of Megawati becauseshe is a woman.

It should be remembered, however, that theseradical organisations are not especially largealthough, in the current state of weak enforcementof law and order, they have the potential to causeconsiderable disturbances. As we will note below,the Muslim political parties that also raise thesetypes of issues have not been able to mobilisewidespread electoral support and, in any case,many of their leaders often disapprove of themethods used by the radicals.

It is openly admitted by radical organisations thatthey maintain links and receive some funding fromforeign, especially Middle Eastern, Muslimorganisations. Many leaders and supporters ofradical Indonesian organisations have visited otherMuslim countries and in some cases obtained‘training’ abroad. Much of this training, however,has been concerned primarily with religiousstudies. It is possible of course that some havereceived training in ‘terrorist’ methods although itis instructive to note that the group that exploded abomb at the Jakarta Stock Exchange did not seekthe assistance of foreign-trained terrorists butsimply recruited three members of the Indonesianmilitary. Dani, the Malaysian who had returnedfrom Pakistan and carried the bomb that explodedat the Atrium shopping mall, admitted that he hadbeen to Maluku but explained that his main job hadbeen to teach children whose school had beenwrecked in the communal violence.61 This is not tosay that foreign-trained terrorists have not enteredIndonesia but their role in recent violence has notbeen obvious.

It is also necessary to point out that it is not onlyMuslim radicals who have formed ‘militia-type’organisations. In the past the Golkar (and themilitary) fostered similar organisations such aPemuda Pancasila and Pemuda Panca Margawhile PDI-P has what it calls Satgas to combat itsopponents in the streets. And the moderate Muslimorganisation, NU, maintains Banser to confront itsenemies.

61 ‘Menunggu Perintah Abbas’, Gatra, 22 September 2001.


III. THE MODERATE MUSLIMMAINSTREAM

The moderate Muslim mainstream is representedby Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organisations,the traditionalist NU and the modernistMuhammadiyah, both of which boast membershipsin the tens of millions. The NU has never been acohesive organisation and rests on a network ofpesantren (Islamic schools) spread through therural areas of Java and other regions. The kiyaiwho head these pesantren are largely independentof the organisation but tied together by theirtraditional way of life and their traditional way ofinterpreting Islam. The NU’s approach is generallypragmatic, tolerant and pluralist. On the otherhand, the Muhammadiyah is a more modern andurban organisation which also runs a network ofschools, hospitals and other welfare institutions.The Muhammadiyah is now well represented in thebureaucracy and the professions. Although someelements in the youth wing of Muhammadiyahsometimes tend to adopt radical positions, theorganisation is usually quite pragmatic in itsapproach to politics. Members of the twoorganisations can be found in various politicalparties although there is a concentration of NUmembers in the PKB and to some extent PPP whileMuhammadiyah members are spread betweenGolkar, PPP, PAN and Partai Keadilan (PK –Justice Party).

The political strength of moderate Islam isreflected in the poor electoral performance of theparties that identified with radical approaches inthe 1999 election – the first free election since1955. Neither of the two leading parties – the PDI-P led by Megawati Soekarnoputri and Golkar, thegovernment party of the New Order – are explicitlyidentified with Islam and both accommodateChristians and other non-Muslims in their ranksalthough naturally most of their leaders andmembers are Muslims. These parties, which won34 and 23 per cent of the votes respectively,together make up a clear majority in the nationallegislative institutions. Former President Wahid’smoderate PKB, based on the NU, won 13 per cent.Amien Rais’s PAN, which gained much of itssupport from the Muhammadiyah, also includednon-Muslims in its leadership and won 7 per cent.The three main exclusively Islamic parties – PPP,PBB and PK – whose support base included the

radical constituency, together won only 14 percent.

The predominance of moderate Islam can be seenin the revived debate over the so-called JakartaCharter, the original preamble to the constitutionthat was prepared before Indonesia’s proclamationof independence in 1945. At the last moment sevenwords were removed from the preamble and thusexcluded from the constitution. The seven wordsrequired Muslims to observe the syariah. Duringthe last half-century the Islamic-based parties havebeen attempting periodically to have the sevenwords reinstated but without success. UnderSoeharto support for the Jakarta Charter wasconsidered subversive and could be punished withyears of imprisonment.

Since the fall of Soeharto the debate over theJakarta Charter has been revived but it has beenvery one-sided. The NU, still under the guidance offormer President Wahid, is committed to a policyof religious pluralism and opposes theidentification of the state with Islam while theMuhammadiyah’s chairman, Ahmad Syafi’iMa’arif, has said that ‘Implementing the JakartaCharter will only add more burden to the countrywhich is now on the brink of collapse.’62 Ratherthan attempting to reinstate the Jakarta Charter asthe preamble to the constitution, the PPP, PBB andPK with the possible support of some members ofPAN are now proposing to amend the constitutionby including the ‘seven words’ in Article 29 onreligion. But the PDI-P and Golkar, as well as themilitary representatives in the MPR, are firmlyopposed, as is the traditionalist PKB. Rejected bymore than three-quarters of the MPR, there is nopossibility that such an amendment could bepassed and therefore no possibility that Indonesiawill become an Islamic state.

62 ‘Syafii declares stance on Islamic law’, Jakarta Post, 6September 2001.


IV. CONCLUSION

Radical Islam continues to represent a smallminority of Indonesians but it has the capacity tomobilise people in the streets on specific Islamicissues. Like other groups, some of the radicalshave also expressed their sympathy for thethousands of people killed in the terrorist attacks inNew York and Washington – although they areoften inclined to believe that the terrorists were notArabs but possibly Americans (an Oklahoma Citybombing scenario) or, according to one populartheory, Israeli intelligence agents.

The American campaign in Afghanistan has giventhe radicals the opportunity to take the lead inexpressing the concerns not only of their ownfollowers but also of moderate Muslims and otherIndonesians who, while supporting internationalmeasures directed specifically against terrorists,are opposed to their country siding with themilitary invasion of a Muslim country, especiallywhen this is accompanied by civilian casualties.

Reflecting this sentiment before the U.S.campaign, the semi-official MUI issued a jointstatement together with 32 Islamic organisations –both moderate and radical - calling on Muslimsthroughout the world to prepare for jihad ifAfghanistan was attacked. However, the MUIleaders explained that they were using the term‘jihad’ in the normal broad sense of spiritualstruggle and not in the limited sense of ‘holy war’.The MUI statement also opposed the ‘sweeping’plans of the radicals.63

Meanwhile several radical organisations areregistering youths to be sent to fight inAfghanistan. Several thousands have already beensigned up but these organisations do not seem tohave the financial and administrative capacity toactually put trained forces in the field. When asimilar registration of volunteers for Bosnia wascarried out by the GPI in 1994, only eighteventually reached the battle-field.64 On the otherhand, moderates are calling on Muslims to expresstheir jihad in the form of money and medicine forthe growing number of refugees in Afghanistanand Pakistan.

63 ‘MUI: Umat Islam Jangan Lakukan Penganiayaan’,Kompas, 26 September 2001.64 ‘Jaringan Alumni Afganistan’, Tempo, 7 October 2001.

The future behaviour of the Indonesian Muslimcommunity will depend on how the U.S. and itsWestern partners deal with the Afghan problem. Ifthe U.S. can limit its response to measures thatenable it to capture those responsible for theterrorist attacks in New York and Washingtonwithout causing devastation among civilian non-combatants, the Indonesian Muslim reaction islikely to be manageable.65 But the more civiliancasualties there are in Afghanistan and othercountries accused of ‘harbouring’ terrorists, themore difficult it will be to guarantee that violencewill not take place.

President Megawati will be hoping that theAmerican response is limited. Having justcompleted a successful visit to the U.S. andreceived promises of economic assistance and arelaxation of restrictions on military ties, she wantspotential foreign investors to regard Indonesia onceagain as a safe and profitable place to put theirmoney. Nothing could be more harmful to thatgoal than massive Islamic demonstrations againstthe West, attacks on Western property and, worstof all, physical violence against Westerners inIndonesia.

Nevertheless, even in the worst case, there is nolikelihood that the present crisis will result in theemergence of a radical Islamic regime in Jakarta.

Jakarta/Brussels. 10 October 2001.

65 According to a military intelligence officer, the securityforces are less concerned about direct Muslim violencethan with the possibility that disturbed conditions mightprovide opportunities for criminal elements to instigaterioting and looting. ICG interview. October 2001.


ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private,multinational organisation committed tostrengthening the capacity of the internationalcommunity to anticipate, understand and act toprevent and contain conflict.

ICG’s approach is grounded in field research.Teams of political analysts, based on the groundin countries at risk of conflict, gather informationfrom a wide range of sources, assess localconditions and produce regular analytical reportscontaining practical recommendations targeted atkey international decision-takers.

ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officialsin foreign ministries and internationalorganisations and made generally available at thesame time via the organisation's internet site.ICG works closely with governments and thosewho influence them, including the media, tohighlight its crisis analysis and to generatesupport for its policy prescriptions. The ICGBoard - which includes prominent figures fromthe fields of politics, diplomacy, business and themedia - is directly involved in helping to bringICG reports and recommendations to theattention of senior policy-makers around theworld. ICG is chaired by former FinnishPresident Martti Ahtisaari; former AustralianForeign Minister Gareth Evans has beenPresident and Chief Executive since January2000.

ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels,with advocacy offices in Washington DC, NewYork and Paris. The organisation currentlyoperates or is planning field projects in nineteencrisis-affected countries and regions across fourcontinents: Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, theDemocratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone,Sudan and Zimbabwe in Africa; Burma/Myanmar,Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistanin Asia; Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia,

Montenegro and Serbia in Europe; and Colombiain Latin America.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitablefoundations, companies and individual donors.The following governments currently providefunding: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland,France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg,the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of China(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom. Foundation and private sector donorsinclude the Ansary Foundation, the William andFlora Hewlett Foundation, the Charles StewartMott Foundation, the Open Society Institute, thePloughshares Fund, the Sasakawa Foundation,the Smith Richardson Foundation, the FordFoundation and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

October 2001

Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims ICG Indonesia Briefing Paper, 10 October 2001

ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES Martti Ahtisaari, Chairman Former President of Finland

Stephen Solarz, Vice-Chairman Former U.S. Congressman

Gareth Evans, President Former Foreign Minister of Australia

Morton Abramowitz Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Kenneth Adelman Former U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN

Richard Allen Former Head of U.S. National Security Council and National Security Advisor to the President

Hushang Ansary Former Iranian Minister and Ambassador; Chairman, Parman Group, Houston

Louise Arbour Supreme Court Judge, Canada; Former Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia

Oscar Arias Sanchez Former President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize, 1987

Ersin Arioglu Chairman, Yapi Merkezi

Paddy Ashdown Former Leader of the Liberal Democrats, United Kingdom

Zainab Bangura Director, Campaign for Good Governance, Sierra Leone

Alan Blinken Former U.S. Ambassador to Belgium

Emma Bonino Member of the European Parliament; former European Commissioner

Maria Livanos Cattaui Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce

Eugene Chien Deputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan

Wesley Clark Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques Delors Former President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Former Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot Erler Vice-President, Social Democratic Party, German Bundestag

Mark Eyskens Former Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi Funabashi Journalist and author

Bronislaw Geremek Former Foreign Minister of Poland

I.K.Gujral Former Prime Minister of India

Han Sung-Joo Former Foreign Minister of Korea

El Hassan bin Talal Chairman, Arab Thought Forum

Marianne Heiberg Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Elliott F Kulick Chairman, Pegasus International

Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Novelist and journalist

Todung Mulya Lubis Human rights lawyer and author

Allan J MacEachen Former Deputy Prime Minister of Canada

Barbara McDougall Former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada

Matthew McHugh Counsellor to the President, The World Bank

Mo Mowlam Former British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

Christine Ockrent Journalist

Timothy Ong Chairman, Asia Inc magazine

Wayne Owens President, Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Co-operation

Cyril Ramaphosa Former Secretary-General, African National Congress; Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd

Fidel Ramos Former President of the Philippines

Michel Rocard Member of the European Parliament; former Prime Minister of France

Volker Ruhe Vice-President, Christian Democrats, German Bundestag; former German Defence Minister

Mohamed Sahnoun Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

William Shawcross Journalist and author

Michael Sohlman Executive Director of the Nobel Foundation

George Soros Chairman, Open Society Institute

Eduardo Stein Former Foreign Minister of Guatemala

Pär Stenbäck Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald Stoltenberg Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O Taylor Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van Thijn Former Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; former Mayor of Amsterdam

Simone Veil Former Member of the European Parliament; former Minister for Health, France

Shirley Williams Former British Secretary of State for Education and Science; Member House of Lords

Grigory Yavlinsky Member of the Russian Duma

Mortimer Zuckerman Chairman and Editor-in-Chief, US News and World Report

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✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

✈

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Padangsidempuan

Langsa

Tebingtinggi

Kotabumi

Tanjungredep

Balikpapan

Pare Pare

Ternate

SorongManokwari

Biak

Merauke

Wamena

Timika

Darwin

Lahat

Sungaipenuh

Payakumbuh Gorontalo

Medan

Banda Aceh

Padang

Pekanbaru

Jambi

Palembang

Bandar Lampung

BandungSemarang

Denpasar

Matara

m

Kupang

Unjungpandang

Kendari

Manado

Palangkaraya

SamarindaPaluPontianak

Ambon

Jayapura

Yogyakarta

Bengkul u

Su

rabaya

Banjarmasin

Kuala Lumpur

Bangkok

Phnom Penh

Manila

Dili

Bandar Seri Begawan

Jakarta

I N D I A N O C E A N

S O U T H C H I N A

S E A

J A V A S E A

AN

DA

MA

NS

EA

Gu

lfof

Thailand

Strait

of Malacca

B A N D A S E A

T I M O R S E A

ARAFURA SEA

Gulf of

Carpentaria

C E R A M S E A

MO

LU

CC

AS

EA

C E L E B E S

S E A

S U L U S E A

PA

CI

FI

CO

CE

AN

Mak

assa

rS

trai

tSelat Sunda

BALI SEA

S A V U S E A

Selat Karimata

Selat Madura

Telu

kB

one

Teluk Tomini

Teluk Cenderawasih

PROVINCES OF INDONESIA

1

2

34

5

6

7

8

926

11

1210

13

1415

16 17

18

19

21

20

22

2324

25

Sulawesi(Celebes)

Java

Sumatra

Sumba

Sumbawa Flores

Wetar

Timor

CeramBa

li

Lombo

k

K a l i m a n t a n

Borneo

New Gu inea

Halmahera

BangkaBilliton

Madura

Nias

Simeulue

Natuna Besar

Siberut

Yamdena Dolak

KepulauanAru

Alor

Buton

Muna

Peleng

KepulauanSula

Yapen

Morotai

Kepulauan Talaud

Sangihe

Biak

Obi

Waigeo

Misool

Buru

RotiSawu

Cartier I.

Ashmore Is.

Christmas I.

Bacan

G r e a t e r

S u n d a I s l a n d s

Mo

lu

cc

as

L e s s e r S u n d a I s l a n d s

Pagai SelatanPagai UtaraSipura

Enggano

KepulauanLingga

KepulauanRiau

Laut

KangeanSelajar

Babar

Salawati

SINGAPORE

MALAYSIA

MALAYSIA

VIET NAMCAMBODIA PHILIPPINES

THAILANDLAO P.D.R.

AUSTRALIA

PAPU

A N

EW G

UIN

EA

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

East Timor

(AUSTRALIA)

(AUSTRALIA)

(AUSTRALIA)

0 250 500 750 1000 km

0 250 500 750 mi

Map No. 4110� UNITED NATIONS June 1999�

Department of Public Information Cartographic Section

INDONESIA1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

ACEH

BALI

BENGKULU

IRIAN JAYA

JAKARTA RAYA

JAMBI

JAWA BARAT

JAWA TENGAH

JAWA TIMUR

KALIMANTAN BARAT

KALIMANTAN SELATAN

KALIMANTAN TENGAH

KALIMANTAN TIMUR

LAMPUNG

MALUKU

NUSA TENGGARA BARAT

NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR

RIAU

SULAWESI SELATAN

SULAWESI TENGAH

SULAWESI TENGGARA

SULAWESI UTARA

SUMATERA BARAT

SUMATERA SELATAN

SUMATERA UTARA

YOGYAKARTA

PROVINCES OF INDONESIA

INDONESIA

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

National capital

Provincial capital

Town, village

International boundary

Provincial boundary

Main road

Secondary road

Railroad

Major airport

✈

Equator

10°

0°

10° 10°

0°

10°

110° 120° 130°

100° 110° 140°130°120°

International Crisis Group

International Headquarters149 Avenue Louise, 1050 Brussels, Belgium · Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 · Fax: +32 2 502 50 38

E-mail: [email protected]

New York Office400 Madison Avenue, Suite 11C, New York 10017 · Tel: +1 212 813 08 20 · Fax: +1 212 813 08 25


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Paris Office51 Rue Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 75001 Paris, France · Tel: +33 1 44 88 60 20 · Fax: +33 1 44 88 24 26


All ICG reports are available on our website: www.crisisweb.org

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