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Individual understandings,perceptions, and engagementwith climate change: insights fromin-depth studies across the worldJohanna Wolf1∗ and Susanne C. Moser2,3

Public understandings and perceptions of, as well as engagement with, climatechange have garnered the interest of research and policy for almost three decades.A portion of this growing body of literature examines such perceptions in-depth,using largely qualitative methodologies, such as personal interviews, limited sam-ple size surveys, focus groups, and case studies. This area of research has beenconducted on different continents, with individuals of different cultural back-grounds and ethnic groups, and a variety of demographic characteristics. It hasexamined various aspects of the communication process, such as audience differ-ences, influence of framing, messages and messengers, information processing,etc.). This paper focuses on this subset of the climate change literature, highlightingsimilarities and differences across cultural, social, and geographical landscapes.Apart from demographic and regional differences, this literature also offers moredetailed insights into the effectiveness of different communication strategies andinto the cognitive and psychological processes that underlie public opinions. Theseinsights are generally not obtained through large-scale opinion surveys. Our reviewhighlights great variation and sometimes direct contradiction between these piecesof research. This not only points to a need for further refinement in our knowledgeof public understanding and engagement, but also simply to accept that no onetheory will explain the variation in human experience of climate change and actionin response to it. 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Clim Change 2011 DOI: 10.1002/wcc.120

INTRODUCTION

Individuals play an important role in respondingto climate change. Whether they are leaders in

government, business, or a neighborhood association,or members of the public at large, individuals areultimately the actors who initiate, inspire, guide,and enact the necessary cuts in greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions to slow down global warmingand who develop and implement the sustainedand sustainable adaptive responses to minimize its

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the onlineversion of this article.∗Correspondence to: [email protected] Institute and Faculty of Arts, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, Happy Valley-Goose Bay, NL, Canada2Susanne Moser Research & Consulting, Santa Cruz, CA, USA3Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University, PaloAlto, CA, USA

DOI: 10.1002/wcc.120

impacts. Recognizing these roles does not imply adisregard for the larger (enabling or constraining)contexts in which individuals act, nor do we meanto place inappropriate responsibility on individuals.There is forever a tension between structure andagency, which can only be acknowledged, but notresolved one way or the other. To the extent werecognize the critical role of individuals, however, inresponding to climate change, what matters is theirlevel of cognitive and emotional engagement as wellas how that engagement leads to, or is affected by,behavioral changes and civic and political activities.

The Backdrop: Insights from Large-ScaleOpinion SurveysA significant body of literature comprised of large-scale public opinion surveys is available, especiallyfrom highly developed nations such as the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, other European countries,

2011 John Wiley & Sons, L td.

Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange

Canada, and Australia. This literature helps torecognize widespread patterns of opinions, attitudes,levels of understanding, and concern among differentpublics. In instances where such surveys havebeen taken repeatedly over time, we also havesome understanding of long-term trends in theseindicators, as public communication of climate changehas made information available and shaped theseopinions and beliefs.1,2 In recent years, studies intoindividual understandings of climate change haveemerged using other methodologies and focusingon specific audiences, yet the fine-scaled insightsfrom these studies have not yet been reviewedand synthesized. It is the primary goal of thispaper to fill this gap. In synthesizing existinginsights about individuals’ role in climate change,we distinguish between understanding (acquiring andemploying factually correct knowledge of climatechange), perception (views and interpretations basedon beliefs and understanding), and engagement (a stateof personal connection that encompasses cognitive,affective, and/or behavioral dimensions, see below).We recognize that there is an inherent and unavoidabletension between our dual attempt to synthesize theinsights gained from this body of work—inherently amatter of generalization—and to illustrate the detailedinsights that can be gleaned from it. We try tobalance generalization and detail through overarchingfindings and examples in the text, but also a tablelisting a subset of studies and much longer, detailedsupporting information with the specific insights fromthe pertinent studies cited in this article.a

Evidence for the importance of individuals’understandings and perceptions is demonstrated bythe significant volume of literature that examinespeople’s views on and knowledge of the climateproblem.3–8 These scholars argue that how individualsunderstand climate change is important in shapingtheir responses, including their understanding of andsupport for policies that aim to address the problemand their willingness to change behavior.9 Some policyresponses indeed count on the active, behavioralinvolvement of individuals for their success. Forexample, to meet the ambitious UK emissions targetof 34% reduction below 1990 emissions by 2020,which lists ‘homes and communities’ as one areawhere efficiencies are thought to help meet the goals,engagement of individuals is absolutely essential.10

Similarly, Dietz et al.11 illustrate that a nontrivial‘wedge’ of US emissions reductions could be achievedthrough individual and household actions, if behaviorchange programs were designed and deliveredeffectively. In order to mitigate effectively, futureregulation, incentive programs, taxation schemes, and

other policies may enlist individuals to change energy-consuming habits, travel modes, leisure activities, andcould conceivably include calls for adjustments toindividuals’ food, lifestyle, and reproductive choices.

The majority of studies to date have examinedcollective, public perceptions of climate changeusing primarily quantitative data drawn from large,often nationally representative samples. The resultsof these studies suggest the following generalizedfindings: climate change is as yet perceived by mostpeople in developed countries as a distant threatthat is removed from their lives both spatiallyand temporally. More specifically, climate changerisks are perceived as nonpersonal, concerning thefuture, other places and people, and other species(plants and animals).6,12,13 While many risks sharethis pattern—whereby individuals view themselvesas less at-risk than they perceive others to be—theimplication of such a pattern is that mitigative actionis simply not perceived as particularly compellingor urgent. Previous studies have also found thatthe public commonly confuses or conflates climatechange with other environmental issues, especiallystratospheric ozone depletion, air pollution, andweather.3–8,14–20 This still holds true after 30 yearsof communicating climate change.1,2,21,22

The implication of these predominant yetincorrect mental models is that they set people up tobelieve in the wrong (or largely irrelevant) solutions(ozone-depleting substances in spray cans have longbeen banned), or to feel disempowered (if extremeweather events are acts of God, then there is nothingwe can do about them except cope). High levels ofawareness and varying levels of concern about climatechange coincide with still very limited knowledge inmany developed countries.2,4,23–26

Belief in the reality of climate change is waxingand waning, depending on concurrent events suchas particularly cold winters and other weatherextremes, or nonclimatic events like terrorist threats,economic recessions, or major public controversieslike that following the illegal retrieval and publicationof personal emails from the University of EastAnglia or discoveries of mistakes in the 2007report of the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange.24,27,28 Still, generally more than half thepopulation in surveyed developed countries ‘believe’in the science.27–30 At the same time, perceptions ofthe prevailing level of consensus among scientists varyconsiderably from year to year, but generally have notfundamentally changed since surveys started askingquestions about it more than 20 years ago.23,31

While evidence is not uniform, gender, age, andethnicity seem to affect the levels of understanding,


WIREs Climate Change Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement with climate change

perception of reality and urgency of climate change,the sense of responsibility to act, concern for thefuture, and—importantly—the roles different demo-graphic groups hold with regard to climate-relevantbehaviors (e.g., making decisions about consumptionlevels, food choices, the number of children, or impact-ful choices such as car purchases).32–36 For example,McCright37 found in a longitudinal review of GallupPoll data between 2001 and 2008 for the United Statesthat—contrary to expectations from scientific literacyresearch—American women actually have greater sci-entific knowledge of climate change than men do, yetthey underestimate their climate change knowledgecompared to men. Women express slightly greaterconcern about climate change than do men, and thisgender divide is not accounted for by differences inkey values and beliefs or in the social roles that menand women differentially perform in society.

There is emerging evidence from large-scalestudies suggesting that recent direct experience withweather-related disasters increases concern aboutclimate change,38 yet willingness to take adaptiveor mitigative behavior following such experiences isinconsistent, probably because of the many physical,psychological, social, and political influences on riskperception.38–41 Concern about climate change incomparison to other problems varies over time withinand among countries and by proposed policy solution.Often, climate change falls short, and sometimes by aconsiderable margin, when compared to other, moredirectly experienced environmental problems (such aswater or air pollution) or when listed against broaderconcerns such as the economy, health care, nationalsecurity, and other pertinent issues of public policy.42

Both the information the public receives and hearsabout climate change, and the appraisal of the risksfrom climate change lead to an overall low level ofconcern.43

The Added Value of In-Depth Studiesof Individual UnderstandingsOn the basis of this work, it has been suggestedthat current levels of awareness of and knowledgeabout climate change are insufficient in leadingto effective behavioral change. Support for climatemitigation policies varies significantly over time andfrom country to country, with the major emittingeconomies showing limited but not insignificantsupport for (hypothetical) climate policies.32,44–46

What is more difficult to discern from these studiesis how individuals explain the causes and impacts ofclimate change, how they process information, formtheir views and come to change their climate-relevant

behavior (rather than just expressing willingness todo so), and what the deeper motivations for, andbarriers to, actual behavioral changes and other formsof engagement are.

A small but growing number of studies haveexamined perceptions of climate change using smallsamples and mainly qualitative, in-depth methodolo-gies such as focus groups, personal semi-structuredinterviews, small-sized surveys using experimentalstudy designs, processes with participant observation(e.g., scenario discussions with visualization), expertelicitation, or case studies. This research offers severalcategories of insights into individuals’ understanding,perception and engagement with climate change thatcannot be obtained from large-scale surveys.

Deep insights into understandings, perceptionsand engagement among particular population seg-ments: Small-scale studies, by virtue of focusingon a small and particular subset of larger audi-ence segments or populations, provide insights intothe particular understandings, perceptions, and lev-els of engagement of the group studied, as wellas into the audience-specific barriers to more activeengagement. For example, such studies reveal differ-ences in individual understandings, perceptions andlevels of engagement among very young or olderstudents; youth versus older individuals; particularprofessional groups; particular urban or rural popu-lations, value/attitude-based segments (e.g., high/lowenvironmental values, ideologies or party affiliation)or a set of influentials considered critical to reachfor larger campaigns. Some studies also focus on,or allow insights into, the ways regional populationsdiffer from national averages, allowing for more tai-lored outreach campaigns. Cultural differences may beas significant as those among different demographicgroupings but may be glossed over (by averaging) innational samples. Studies of this sort can reveal cultur-ally resonant framings and reveal regional ‘hooks’ thatare of interest and meaning only to the regional pop-ulation. In sum, such differentiated insights provideessential information when trying to design commu-nication that is meant to resonate with a particularaudience segment.

Testing of the impact of different communicationstrategies and campaigns or policies designed tochange behavior: Some studies involve testingdifferences in receptivity to different communicationchannels, messengers, framings, or the use of differentcommunication vehicles (graphic, iconic, spoken,written communications). Typically it is only possiblein very careful experimental, comparative studies tounderstand what aspects have what particular impacton the audience. It is also more economical to test



a particular strategy at smaller scale, make necessaryadjustments after the testing phase and only then scaleup to a large-scale, national test or campaign. Researchthat examines behavioral responses to policies alsobenefits from in-depth approaches to help explainmotivations for behavioral change and whether/howthese connect with relevant policies.

Deeper insights into the cognitive and emotionalprocesses underlying responses to climate changeinformation: In-depth studies, such as interviews andfocus groups, or some experimental study designsallow researchers to more fully understand whyindividuals react the way they do to a particulartype of information or communication. They mayreveal underlying mental models, misunderstandings,belief systems, affective, and behavioral responses toclimate change information that offer greater leveragefor designing effective outreach and engagementcampaigns. Large-scale surveys, by virtue of the natureof standardized, often automated and fixed questionsand, in some cases, responses, do not allow forfollowing up to better understand the responses given.

Our synthesis of the existing in-depth qualitativestudies aims to provide an integrative review of thework conducted on individuals’ attitudes toward andopinions of climate change, focussing on studies linkedto understanding of climate change (science) and (toa lesser extent) GHG mitigation, but not adaptation(which will be the subject of a separate paper).

In the next section, we review in more detailwhy individuals’ views on climate change matter vis-a-vis societal responses to climate change. Section‘Selected Findings from In-Depth Studies on PublicUnderstanding’ reviews the findings from small andlargely qualitative studies that examine understand-ing, traditional knowledge, perceived responsibility,faith, and behavior in relation to climate change.Section ‘Synthesis: Individuals’ Understandings, Per-ceptions, and Engagement’ synthesizes the researchfindings focussing on the three aspects, understand-ing, perception, and engagement, and the final sectionoffers some suggestions for further research.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THEINDIVIDUAL IN CLIMATE CHANGE

Individual and Household EmissionsGHG emissions attributable to household andpersonal consumption as a percentage of totalnational emissions are highly significant in thosewestern societies that have contributed the majorityof emissions to date.47 Direct energy use by UShouseholds, for example, accounted for 38% of

overall US carbon dioxide emissions in 2005, or626 million metric tons of carbon, though differencesfrom state to state make generalizations as totheir sources within household use difficult.48–50 Bycomparison, this amount is larger than the emissionsof any entire country except China.11 A recent studyof both direct and indirect energy consumption byChinese households suggests that residents’ lifestylesand related economic activities contribute 30% oftotal carbon dioxide emissions.51 Of course, there aresignificant urban-rural differences in China that playa role for emissions;52 indirect emissions exceed directemissions for urban residents while direct emissionsare more significant in rural settings.51,52 Energyconsumption and income are strongly correlated inChina; higher income brackets emit significantly morethan low income brackets.52 Western developmentpathways, lifestyles and notions of progress haveset emerging economies on a path similar to thatof already industrialized countries and this willincreasingly translate into significant personal andhousehold emissions there unless rapid steps are takento decarbonize the economy.53 It is clear thereforethat individual and household emissions are significantcontributors to climate change.

The Engaged IndividualHaving established the importance of the individualin terms of contributing to climate change, it is alsoimportant to define what we mean by ‘engagement’. Ifwe assume that individuals are actors who contributeto climate change, need to deal with its impacts,and identify, develop, support, and implement climatesolutions, then involving them is not an optionbut an imperative. Engagement has been defined as‘a personal state of connection with the issue ofclimate change, in contrast to engagement solely asa process of public participation in policy making’.54

Individuals can be engaged on three levels: with theirminds, hearts, and hands. By implication, these waysof engagement can be achieved through rational-cognitive and affective means and practical actions.While much research remains to be undertaken inhow to increase, balance, and effectively motivate andsustainably engage on all of these levels, it is quitewell established that one-way communication tendsnot to foster deep cognitive engagement or systematicinformation processing and typically is insufficient tolead to sustained behavioral or political engagement.45

Deeper affective engagement with an issue is difficultto achieve through one-way communication, and evenharder to sustain, much less to control from theoutside.55 Dialogic processes can make up for some of



these deficits.56–58 Cultural narratives (stories) and theconstruction of meaning in social interaction tend totouch people more deeply, even if they are not deeplyknowledgeable about climate change, and can bettermotivate interest and sustain engagement.59–61

Knowledge of One’s Contribution to GHGEmissionsWhat then if individuals were aware of and knewhow their energy use and the products they consumecontributed to GHG emissions and thus to climatechange? Would they change their climate-significantbehaviors? Knowledge of climate change alone is com-monly considered a desirable but insufficient conditionfor mitigating GHG. More specifically, knowledge ofthe causes of anthropogenic climate change is gener-ally considered useful as it lays an initial foundationfor directing people to the right kinds of mitigativeactions. However, research has shown repeatedly thatknowledge, even of the causes of climate change, aloneis not enough to motivate and shape effective mitiga-tion outcomes due to cognitive, social, practical, andinstitutional barriers.54 Despite the continued relianceon information campaigns to mobilize action, commu-nication research has largely dispelled the knowledge-or information-deficit model of environmental educa-tion and communication.62–65 More knowledge of aproblem does not necessarily, directly, and by itselflead to change in behavior, and sometimes it can actu-ally hinder behavior change.66,67 At the very least,more concrete guidance and pragmatic help with howto realize changes in energy consumption are neces-sary. Typically, however, a range of enabling and sup-porting conditions must also be met, including socialand institutional support, policy and infrastructurechanges, and often clear signals from the market.32

The Role of Individuals in the PoliticalSystemMore generally, whether and what depth of under-standing is necessary for effective mitigation actionon climate change depends on what type of action issought and how we understand the political system.Of course, it could be argued that in governance sys-tems other than democracies, and in situations whereexclusive top-down policy making of the authoritarianstyle is considered favorable and feasible, only indi-viduals in leadership positions would be influentialactors on climate change. Action by individuals (andthe masses) then could—theoretically—result simplyfrom their enactment of the rules set in place by thosein power. Public understanding of climate change or

affective engagement would then be largely unneces-sary to motivate implementation of GHG mitigationmeasures. In practice, however, this type of dictatorialaction on climate change is extremely unlikely for atleast three reasons. First, top-down policy making hasbeen found to be less than effective without publicbuy-in given the unstable realities of party politics ofmost democracies.68,69 Political support for and pub-lic engagement in climate change policies are neededfor political leaders to realize emissions reductions.Second, in light of the now almost 20-year historyof largely unsuccessful international negotiations onemissions reductions under the UN Framework Con-vention on Climate Change, and the lack of effectiveaction by many national leaders to produce andimplement meaningful solutions, a ‘leaders-at-the-top-only’ solution is already not being realized andseems very unlikely in the consensus-based system ofthe UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.And finally, current discourses about bottom-up andinformed decision making, participation, and deliber-ation suggest that (overtly) authoritarian governancehas largely, with some notable exceptions, gone outof fashion.70 Given further that most major GHGemitting countries are in fact nominal democracies,at least some degree of electoral and political supportfor mitigation policies is a required (but probablyinsufficient) prerequisite for effective GHG reduction.These arguments do not preclude that a more strate-gic approach to communication may be needed toreach large-scale policy goals, and that it would bewise to employ the power of social relations to tar-get primarily influential elites who in turn reach wideraudiences.71,72 However, the political reality and bothnormative and strategic arguments suggest that indi-viduals at all levels play important roles in achievingthe radical reductions in GHG emissions that manynow view as necessary (see also Ref 73).

SELECTED FINDINGS FROM IN-DEPTHSTUDIES ON PUBLICUNDERSTANDING

We now turn to the results of in-depth, typicallysmall-scale studies on public understanding of climatechange from around the world, concentrating oncontextualisation of understanding, the importanceof direct and vicarious experience, traditional ways ofknowing, perceived responsibility, and the role of faithin determining climate-relevant behavior. Details ofthe studies reviewed, including geographical location,studied population, objectives, methods used, and keyfindings are included in Table 1, just a sample of the



types of studies we draw on in our discussion, and inthe supporting information.

Individual Understandings of ClimateChange Vary but Are AlwaysContextualized Within BroaderConsiderationsThere is strong evidence that individuals contextualizethe issue of climate change within much broader,though not necessarily environmental, perspectives.Focus group research conducted in Frankfurt,Germany and Manchester, United Kingdom, andother studies in Newcastle, Australia, as well as inRoxbury, Massachusetts and rural southern Oregon(United States), for example, suggest that participants’thinking about climate change transcends strictlyenvironmental issues and includes consideration ofglobal inequalities, fairness, and health or livelihoodconcerns in addressing the issue.75,85,86 Furtherevidence for this contextualisation is that Australianparticipants draw on scientific and local knowledgeand on moral and value-based considerations intheir responses to questions about climate change.75

This contextualization of climate change amongother issues also exists in developing countries. Forexample, among biosphere reserve managers climatechange threats were found to be less than illegalactivities such as poaching.87 These studies highlighthow individuals’ perceptions about climate changeare linked to equity, development, and perceivedeconomic power, where socio-political context andthe connection between management and science playan important role in risk perception.

Recent experimental research combining cul-tural theory and psychometric risk perception researchin the United States puts these findings into a broadercontext: People are not ‘blank slates’ receiving infor-mation about risks (such as climate change) andinterpreting them at face value. Rather, such infor-mation is always and inevitably filtered through pre-existing cultural worldviews (beliefs about how natureworks, what constitutes a ‘good’ and fair society, whatroles governments and individuals play respectively inbringing about such a society and how humans shouldinteract with nature, etc.). These worldviews influ-ence people’s uptake, understanding, interpretationof and response to climate change information.88–92

These findings are confirmed in in-depth cross-national studies,81 within-nation, cross-cultural sub-group studies12,93,94 as well as within-nation studiesexploring alternative explanatory drivers of attitudesand behaviors95,96 clearly reveal the influence of deep-seated values and beliefs about the workings of the

world—partly also reflective of differences in individ-ual personalities (e.g., more pessimistic or optimisticindividuals)97—on interpretations of climate change.Weber98 therefore concludes that social and moralframings of climate change may be more effectivethan purely cognitive-rational or affective appeals toget through to people.

In fact, research examining personal responses toclimate change highlights that there are some commonattitude types among publics around the world. Earlywork on cultural theory99 suggested that the four(or five) generalized types of cultural worldviewsheld by an individual (the solidarist, hierarchist,individualist, and egalitarian (as well as fatalist)predispositions)b have an effect on how climate changeis viewed.94,96,100,101 Increasingly, this is shown inempirical work. For example, Norwegian focus groupresearch suggests four typical response types (theacceptors, the tempered acceptors, the uncertain,and the skeptics).83 Some aspects of these typescorrespond to the egalitarian (acceptors and temperedacceptors) while the uncertain and the skeptics do notcorrespond well to cultural theory types. A study ofAustralian responses to climate change also suggeststhat there are four types of basic attitudes; concern,skepticism, apprehension, and action.102 In this case,the concern and action groups resonate with theegalitarian and the apprehensive resonate with fatalistviews, but the skeptics as well as aspects of theapprehensive do not easily correspond to culturaltheory typology. Research conducted in Canadaalso found four typical responses, the individualist(resonant with the egalitarian), the systemist (alsoresonant with the egalitarian), the skeptic (resonantwith the individualists of cultural theory), and theeconomist (a version of the egalitarian).84 Theseresults converge on several findings: they showsystematically varying levels of concern, the presenceof skeptical views in all societies studied, and somedegree of acceptance, ranging from solid to tempered.Most importantly, however, the cultural worldviewsof individuals fundamentally determine their attitudestoward climate change.

Direct and Vicarious Experience of ClimateChange Shapes Individuals’ ViewsThe imagery (as part of the larger set of elements thatmake up the framing of an issue) can play an importantrole in shaping how climate change is perceived byindividuals. In a UK study using a survey and focusgroups, participants who had seen the film ‘The DayAfter Tomorrow’ felt more concerned about climatechange than those who had not seen it.103 However,



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i-stru

ctur

edin

terv

iew

s,st

atis

tical

anal

ysis

ofth

ere

sults

—Pa

rtic

ipan

tsno

ticed

ava

riety

ofch

ange

sre

late

dto

clim

ate

chan

gein

sign

ifica

ntde

tail

—Vi

llage

rsha

dno

thea

rdof

clim

ate

chan

gean

dat

trib

uted

the

chan

ges

they

perc

eive

dto

loca

lphe

nom

ena

—Th

ere

wer

esi

gnifi

cant

dive

rgen

ces

betw

een

som

eof

the

perc

eive

dch

ange

sbe

twee

nvi

llage

s—

Varie

dex

plan

atio

nsfo

rthe

perc

eive

dch

ange

sin

clud

eco

smol

ogy,

mod

ern

life,

envi

ronm

ent,

polic

y,an

dbo

thlo

cal

and

outs

ider

s’re

ligio

usm

isco

nduc

t—

Wea

ther

isco

nsid

ered

alo

cal

phen

omen

onde

term

ined

larg

ely

bylo

cald

eitie

s.Ad

vers

eco

nditi

ons

are

ther

efor

ese

enas

are

sult

ofne

glec

tof

relig

ious

dutie

sor

abr

each

ofta

boos

—Ti

beta

nvi

llage

rsse

emco

ncer

ned

abou

tth

esa

me

issu

esas

scie

ntis

tsw

ithre

spec

tto

clim

ate

chan

geef

fect

son

glac

iers

,for

ests

,but

also

tour

ism

,en

ergy

use

and

tran

spor

tatio

n



TAB

LE1

Cont

inue

d

Stud

y(a

utho

r,ye

ar)

Coun

try/

loca

tion

Stud

ypa

rtic

ipan

tsSt

udy

aim

sM

etho

dKe

yfin

ding

s

—An

xiet

yan

dps

ycho

logi

cals

tres

sbe

caus

eth

ese

conc

erns

are

real

and

influ

ence

wha

tact

ions

are

cons

ider

edap

prop

riate

bype

ople

inth

ear

ea

Ferg

uson

etal

.,in

pres

s77U

SM

idw

est

Univ

ersi

typo

pula

tion

(n=

79)

Exam

ine

whe

ther

colle

ctiv

egu

iltfo

rthe

ingr

oup’

sco

llect

ive

GHG

emis

sion

sm

edia

tes

the

effe

cts

ofbe

liefs

abou

tthe

caus

esan

def

fect

sof

glob

alw

arm

ing

onw

illin

gnes

sto

enga

gein

miti

gatio

nbe

havi

or

Surv

eyin

expe

rimen

tal

desi

gnva

ryin

gca

uses

and

effe

cts

ofCC

—G

uilt

ishi

gher

whe

nre

spon

dent

sbe

lieve

that

CCis

hum

an-c

ause

dan

dw

illha

vem

inor

effe

cts.

—Co

llect

ive

anxi

ety

does

notm

edia

tesu

chbe

liefs

inth

eca

uses

and

effe

cts

ofCC

nort

hew

illin

gnes

sto

enga

gein

miti

gativ

ebe

havi

or

Gre

enet

al.,

2010

78To

rres

Stra

it,Au

stra

liaIn

dige

nous

Aust

ralia

nsTo

docu

men

tloc

alob

serv

atio

nsof

envi

ronm

enta

lcha

nge

rele

vant

ford

evel

opin

ga

bett

erun

ders

tand

ing

ofcl

imat

eim

pact

sin

the

Torr

esSt

rait

Wor

ksho

ps,i

nter

view

sw

ithel

ders

Torr

esSt

rait

indi

geno

usun

ders

tand

ing

ofen

viro

nmen

talc

hang

eis

supp

orte

dby

soph

istic

ated

know

ledg

eth

atco

vers

flora

–fau

na–c

limat

ein

tera

ctio

ns,

seas

onal

wea

ther

patt

erns

and

clim

ate,

and

indi

cato

rsof

seas

onal

chan

ge.

Joire

man

etal

.,20

1079

Uni

ted

Stat

es/

Nor

thw

est

Psyc

holo

gyst

uden

tsat

ast

ate

univ

ersit

yin

the

NW

US

(Stu

dy1

n=

93;

Stud

y2

n=

42);

mar

ketin

gun

derg

radu

ate

stud

ents

atst

ate

univ

ersi

tyin

NW

(n=

159)

Expl

ore

the

impo

rtan

cean

def

fect

ofex

perie

nce

and

heur

istic

son

belie

fofg

loba

lw

arm

ing

Wor

dse

arch

puzz

les

follo

wed

bybr

ief

surv

ey(in

dex)

—Si

gnifi

cant

posi

tive

corr

elat

ion

betw

een

the

outd

oort

empe

ratu

rean

dbe

liefs

ingl

obal

war

min

g—

Peop

lew

ere

mor

elik

ely

tobe

lieve

ingl

obal

war

min

gw

hen

they

had

first

been

prim

edw

ithhe

at-re

late

dco

gniti

ons.

—Pe

ople

wer

em

ore

likel

yto

belie

vein

glob

alw

arm

ing

and

mor

ew

illin

gto

pay

tore

duce

glob

alw

arm

ing

whe

nth

eyha

dfir

stbe

enex

pose

dto

ahi

ghvs

.alo

wan

chor

forf

utur

ein

crea

ses

inte

mpe

ratu

re



TAB

LE1

Cont

inue

d

Stud

y(a

utho

r,ye

ar)

Coun

try/

loca

tion

Stud

ypa

rtic

ipan

tsSt

udy

aim

sM

etho

dKe

yfin

ding

s

Ledu

c,20

0780

Pola

rreg

ions

Inui

teld

ers

(n=

unkn

own)

Gai

na

deep

erun

ders

tand

ing

ofth

eIn

uitn

otio

nof

‘Sila

’and

itsre

latio

nshi

pto

Wes

tern

notio

nsof

wea

ther

and

clim

ate

Dial

ogue

betw

een

Inui

tan

dsc

ient

ists

The

Inui

tcon

cept

ofSi

lare

fers

tom

ore

than

‘wea

ther

chan

ges’

buta

llude

sto

cultu

rala

ndsp

iritu

aldi

men

sion

sth

atin

terp

retc

limat

ech

ange

asth

ew

orld

’set

hica

lres

pons

eto

impr

oper

hum

anac

tions

Lore

nzon

iand

Hulm

e,20

0781

Rom

e(It

aly)

,N

orw

ich

(Uni

ted

King

dom

)

Adul

tsan

dhi

ghsc

hool

stud

ents

,n=

135

(Nor

wic

h)an

dn

=20

6(R

ome)

;Di

scus

sion

grou

ps(n

=10

,Ro

me

and

n=

19,N

orw

ich)

Cros

s-cu

ltura

lexp

lora

tion

ofen

viro

nmen

tala

ttitu

des,

pers

onal

view

son

clim

ate

chan

ge,a

ndop

tions

and

resp

onsi

bilit

ies

form

anag

ing

clim

ate

chan

ge

Surv

eyan

ddi

scus

sion

grou

pw

ithsu

bset

ofsu

rvey

resp

onde

nts

—Pa

rtic

ipan

tsfe

llin

tofo

urse

gmen

ts,

base

don

thei

rbel

iefs

abou

tCC:

deny

ing,

doub

tful,

unin

tere

sted

,and

enga

ged

—Pa

rtic

ipan

tsex

hibi

ted

stro

ngaw

aren

ess

ofcl

imat

ech

ange

and

mos

t,al

beit

with

som

ehe

sita

tion

and

skep

ticis

m,

ackn

owle

dged

ahu

man

cont

ribut

ion

—M

ostc

onsi

dere

dcl

imat

ech

ange

anin

trac

tabl

epr

oble

mdu

eto

scie

ntifi

cun

cert

aint

yan

din

effe

ctiv

eso

lutio

ns—

CCw

aspe

rcei

ved

tobe

dist

ant

—Im

agin

ing

long

-ter

mfu

ture

s(u

sing

scen

ario

s)pr

oved

diffi

cult;

two

deca

des

isfe

asib

le—

Myo

pia

was

reco

gniz

edan

dde

noun

ced,

butv

iew

edas

inev

itabl

e—

Rega

rdle

ssof

attit

udes

tow

ard

clim

ate

chan

ge,d

iscu

ssan

tssh

ared

the

hope

that

the

futu

rew

ould

bea

‘‘bet

ter

plac

e’’(

mor

efa

ir,eq

uita

ble,

less

envi

ronm

entd

isru

ptio

n)—

Aspi

ratio

nsw

ere

tem

pere

dby

pers

onal

expe

rienc

esan

dvi

ews

—Pa

rtic

ipan

tsbe

lieve

da

maj

orcr

isis

was

nece

ssar

yto

radi

cally

alte

rsoc

ieta

ltra

ject

orie

s—

Inco

nsist

ency

betw

een

scie

ntifi

cpr

ojec

tions

and

pers

onal

view

sle

adto

ques

tioni

ngof

scie

nce



TAB

LE1

Cont

inue

d

Stud

y(a

utho

r,ye

ar)

Coun

try/

loca

tion

Stud

ypa

rtic

ipan

tsSt

udy

aim

sM

etho

dKe

yfin

ding

s

Mor

ton

etal

.,20

1182

Uni

ted

King

dom

Stud

y1,

adul

tpar

ticip

ants

,fa

irly

wel

ledu

cate

d(n

=88

);St

udy

2,un

iver

sity

stud

ents

(n=

120)

Exam

ine

how

fram

ing

clim

ate

chan

gepr

edic

tions

diffe

rent

lym

ight

mod

erat

eth

ete

nden

cyfo

runc

erta

inty

toun

derm

ine

indi

vidu

alac

tion

Que

stio

n-na

ire,

expe

rimen

tald

esig

n,ve

rbal

debr

ief

—Hi

gher

unce

rtai

nty

com

bine

dw

itha

nega

tive

fram

e(h

ighl

ight

ing

poss

ible

loss

es)d

ecre

ased

indi

vidu

alin

tent

ions

tobe

have

envi

ronm

enta

lly—

High

erun

cert

aint

yco

mbi

ned

with

apo

sitiv

efra

me

(hig

hlig

htin

gth

epo

ssib

ility

oflo

sses

notm

ater

ializ

ing)

prod

uced

stro

nger

inte

ntio

nsto

act

—Ef

fect

sof

unce

rtain

tyw

ere

med

iate

dth

roug

hfe

elin

gsof

effic

acy

Rygh

aug

etal

.,20

1083

Nor

way

Mem

bers

ofva

rious

soci

alne

twor

ks(4

–8in

divi

dual

spe

rgro

up,n

=62

,24

men

and

38w

omen

)

Anal

yze

how

peop

lere

ason

abou

tand

mak

ese

nse

ofhu

man

-mad

egl

obal

war

min

g

10fo

cus

grou

ps—

The

dom

estic

atio

nof

clim

ate

scie

nce

know

ledg

eis

shap

edby

five

sens

e-m

akin

gde

vice

s:ne

ws

med

iaco

vera

geof

chan

ges

inna

ture

,pa

rtic

ular

lyth

ew

eath

er,t

heco

vera

geof

pres

umed

expe

rts’

disa

gree

men

tab

outg

loba

lwar

min

g,cr

itica

latt

itude

sto

war

dm

edia

,obs

erva

tions

ofpo

litic

alin

actio

n,an

dco

nsid

erat

ions

ofev

eryd

aylif

e—

Sens

e-m

akin

gal

low

sfo

ram

bigu

ity,

resu

lting

info

urau

dien

cese

gmen

ts:

the

acce

ptor

s,th

ete

mpe

red

acce

ptor

s,th

eun

cert

ain

and

the

skep

tics

Wol

feta

l.,20

0984

Cana

daRe

side

nts

ofVi

ctor

ia,B

Can

dSa

ltSp

ring

Isla

nd,B

C(In

terv

iew

s:n

=86

;Q

sort

:n=

38)

Toex

amin

eho

win

divi

dual

sco

ncei

veof

resp

ondi

ngto

clim

ate

chan

ge

Q-M

etho

dolo

gyin

clud

ing

inte

rvie

ws,

Q-s

orta

ndfo

cus

grou

ps

—Pa

rtic

ipan

tsvi

ewa

civi

c,no

n-re

cipr

ocal

and

non-

terr

itoria

lres

pons

ibili

tyth

atin

clud

esth

epr

ivat

esp

here

inits

rem

itfo

rres

pond

ing

tocl

imat

ech

ange

—Fo

urfa

ctor

sw

ere

iden

tified

;the

indi

vidu

alis

t,th

esy

stem

ist,

the

skep

tican

dth

eec

onom

ist

—Ev

enth

ese

enga

ged

and

know

ledg

eabl

epa

rtic

ipan

tsst

rugg

led

with

mak

ing

chan

ges

inth

eirl

ives

that

wou

ldtr

ansl

ate

into

effe

ctiv

eem

issi

ons

redu

ctio

ns



participants viewed extreme events as less likely afterhaving seen the movie.103 Research on visualizationtools and experimental interventions using icons andimagery suggest that such tools can help increaseknowledge and concern if the information embeddeddoes not overly appeal to negative emotions suchas fear.104–106 While offering significant potential toattract individuals’ interest, representations of climatechange that promote fear are generally ineffectivein motivating personal engagement because theyare often perceived as manipulative.106 The twoseparate studies examined in the paper both findthat nonthreatening visual representations that link toindividuals’ everyday emotions and concerns engagedmore effectively.106

Level of concern about climate change, however,cannot be solely explained with individuals havingbeen affected by impacts but rather from engagementwith the issue through cognitive, affective, behavioral,and moral means. Evidence from the United Kingdomsuggests that exposure to floods, as one type of climatechange impact, does not necessarily affect concernabout climate change.107 Therefore, even directexperience with impacts may not motivate behavioralresponses to mitigate emissions. Rather, the studyfinds that individuals with pro-environmental valuesare significantly more likely to address climate changethan those with other value orientations. Moreover,the direct experience with impacts may orientindividuals more toward taking adaptive actions,rather than focus on the root causes, as a study ofcommunities in Alaska showed where energy use andincome generated from energy production is so deeplywoven into people’s daily lives that they do not easilysee a way out.108

Traditional Ways of Knowing ShapePerceptions of Climate ChangeIndividuals in modern, heavily urbanized society livelargely disconnected from their natural environment.A ‘Human Activity Pattern’ survey conducted of theAmerican public in the late 1990s illustrated that 51%of the population spent no time outside in a normalday at all (except maybe for the short walk from thehouse to the car to the office and back), and another30% spent under one hour per day outside.109,110 Suchmodern lifestyles essentially disconnect individualsfrom directly experiencing changes in the environmentand instead make them completely dependent onmediated information about nature and climatechange (e.g., the news, TV documentaries, or storiesothers tell). By contrast, those working directlyon the land (or sea) and with natural resources,

and particularly many traditional societies, are stillimmersed in their natural surroundings and infact dependent on subsistence from the land andits resources. Thus, their direct experience andknowledge of the environment can be expected tobe quite different from that of urban dwellers.

Traditional ecological knowledge has beendefined as a ‘cumulative body of knowledge,practice, and belief, evolving by adaptive processesand handed down through generations by culturaltransmission, about the relationship of living beings(including humans) with one another and with theirenvironment’111 (p. 1252). Traditional knowledgeabout peoples’ environment including weather andclimate suggests not only that knowledge passeddown through generations is still used today butthat it can complement scientific knowledge andpotentially help to adapt to faster changes thanwould be associated with variability alone. Researchin Uganda, for example, points to a differentiatedand dynamic system of local climate knowledge thatis open to new information112 and similar resultsemerge from indigenous Australians78 and traditionalpeoples in the high Arctic.113 The authors arguethat the system could be used to inform climatescience because of its spatial scale and practicality.112

Also, Samoan classification of clouds and windsare consistent with western scientific classifications,which could be integrated into scientific knowledge.114

Kenyan pastoralists rely on indigenous knowledgeabout rainfall variability and use this knowledge asa framework within which they interpret scientificinformation such as meteorological forecasts.115

Various scholars working with traditional peopleshave thus argued that indigenous knowledge, theirways of life, with their differing value, governanceand belief systems must be better reflected in scientificassessments of climate change and that indigenouspeople need to be more closely involved in respondingto the challenges of climate change.116

In climate change research, traditional knowl-edge and observation of weather are often used to sub-stantiate and extend scientific evidence, for example,in data-scarce regions such as the Arctic.113,117–119

There is much less evidence on discrepancies betweentraditional knowledge and scientific understandingsor competing knowledge claims than there areattempts to substantiate scientific with traditionalknowledge.120 One example of such work exploresalternate ways of perceiving, explaining, and respond-ing to climate change. For example, in South Pacificsmall island developing states perceived risk fromcoastal flooding does not result in any increasedmigration away from the islands.121 Islanders do not



see climate change as a reason for concern, let aloneto move away, and those with intentions to migratedo not cite climate change as a reason.121 Similarly,perceived causes of climate change diverge from sci-entific knowledge among Senegalese smallholders andagricultural extension agents.122 Subjective percep-tion can also influence what farmers, for example,feel they need. Meze-Hausken123 has suggested thatrainfall needs among Ethiopian farmers in part deter-mine perceptions of changes in rainfall that divergefrom observed changes (see also Ref 124). Grothmannand Patt125 found farmers in Zimbabwe hesitant oreven resistant to change crops when a drought wasprojected, in part because they did not know how tocorrectly interpret climate-related probabilities. Thus,while disconnects are reconciled, there remains a gapin understanding how the discrepancies between sci-entific and traditional knowledge can be reconciled,and how alternate ways of understanding change canbe respected, while acknowledging the potential for avery different world as a result of climate change.

Ranging Views on Personal and CollectiveResponsibilityA number of small studies have examined howresponsibility for acting on climate change is perceivedby individuals. This research demonstrates thatpublics around the globe have formed diverse attitudesabout responsibility that are strongly influenced bylocal cultural dynamics, religious dimensions, andethics.

In the mid-1990s, Hinchliffe126—based oninterviews with individuals in the United Kingdomabout an energy saving campaign—argued thatappealing to individuals as the primary site of actionis ineffective. More recent evidence suggests thatsome individuals openly acknowledge a moral75 orcivic84 responsibility for acting on climate change. Inneither case is this responsibility necessarily viewedas contingent on action from political actors orgovernments. In fact, a study of Canadian individualssuggests that those who act on climate change doso because they feel let down by their governmentwhich is not committing to meaningful emissionreductions.84 A comparative study of British andSwedish students, however, showed distinctly differentassignments of responsibility for causing climatechange (individual consumer behavior, policies,market structures, lifestyles) and resulting differingexpectations of individual versus government actionsto solve the problem.127 Thus, while a higherpercentage of British students than Swedish studentssaw individuals as the main cause of global warming

and government lagging far behind, youth fromboth countries put their hopes in the governmentto solve the problem.127 Interestingly, a focusgroup-based study from New Zealand found thatwhen discussing individual responsibility for GHGemissions, tourists distinguished between their traveland their everyday life, with greater responsibilityfor mitigation perceived in everyday life.128 Thevalue of freedom to travel is firmly established inthe minds of many tourists and limiting travel isconsidered unacceptable.128 While these may seemlike contradictory results, context-specific cognitivedissonance and its resolution could explain why thereare situations in which individuals admit and act on aperceived responsibility and others in which they donot.129

Framing is critical in its function to allocateresponsibility for taking action. For example, ifclimate change is framed as a scientific matter,many lay people do not feel directly included oraddressed (since science falls under the purview of‘experts’, i.e., others). Similarly, if it is framed as amatter of technological innovation, researchers andengineers are perceived as the primary actors. Inframes that rely on the notion of environmentalstewardship (as in many religious communicationson this topic), individuals and communities feelmore directly implicated.130 The imagery, language,messengers, and stories used in different framescan thus underscore or detract from an individual’ssense of responsibility. For example, among theparticipants in the aforementioned UK focus groupstudy that examined the effects of the movie‘The Day After Tomorrow’, viewers experienced anincreased motivation and sense of responsibility to actpersonally on climate change.103 While participantsgenerally felt that public concern could not leadto action without the aid of political support, theyarticulated a collective human responsibility for thecauses of climate change.103

The discourse surrounding certain behaviorsalso affects how individuals negotiate responsibility.As argued by Butler,131 evidence from focus groupdiscussions in the United Kingdom suggests amoralization of certain individual behaviors that havecome to be associated with climate change, andthereby creating an individualized responsibility. Inparticipants, this discourse produced feelings of guiltbut not a change in behavior.131 This is not surprisingin light of studies on guilt appeals, which typically findthat ‘Responses to guilt [. . . , ranging from resentmentto rationalization to a search for self-affirmation] aimprimarily at maintaining one’s sense of a moral self,



and may or may not also motivate behavior that endsor rectifies the guilt-invoking action’55 (p. 71).

Religious Beliefs Shift Perceived Agencyon Climate ChangeBelief in a higher spiritual being plays an importantrole in determining whether people believe that humanaction can influence the climate or the weather. Thisinsight has emerged from research in Tibet, Fiji, partsof Africa, Central America, Polar regions, and theUnited States. Donner in fact, traces these deeplyheld beliefs about the skies as the ‘domain of theGods’ back throughout the ages and many cultures.132

The implication of beliefs in a higher power beingresponsible for weather extremes (and any possiblechanges therein) is that people or governments arenot perceived as having any control, influence orresponsibility for that which is in God’s hands.Particularly, if climatic change is interpreted as Godteaching people a lesson or punishing sinners, publicacceptance of climate policy may be undermined.

For example, among Tibetans there is abelief that the mountain deities have been angeredcausing the climate to change76 (see also Ref. 133).Donner132 showed, that the perceived role of Godin affecting the weather is common also amongFijian peoples. Even in western(ized) societies, extremeweather events are still often viewed as ‘acts ofGod’.134 Similarly, participants of the results fromthe Tuvaluan study explain their findings with the‘‘special relationship Tuvalu shares with God anddue to the promises of God made to Noah in thebible121 (p. 109). Leduc80 found through a carefullyfacilitated dialog between Inuit and scientists thatthe Inuit concept of ‘Sila’—inadequately translatedas ‘weather changes’—actually alluded to a culturaland spiritual dimension of the observed changes inweather and climate, namely nature’s response toimproper human action.80

In Africa similarly strong beliefs in the hand ofGod in changing the climate are apparent. Researchconducted by the BBC World Service Trust in10 Sub-Saharan countries (DR Congo, Ethiopia,Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan,Tanzania, and Uganda) illustrates that most ruralpopulations in these developing countries have littleawareness and understanding of the concept of climatechange (and only slightly more so of ‘global warming’)even though they are already contending with itsimpacts. While specific findings vary from countryto country, key insights gained from interviewswith individuals in rural Ethiopia are illustrative.74

Generally, knowledge of climate change and global

warming is very low in Ethiopia with very fewrecognising the terms or the concepts. Most Ethiopiansinterpret the term ‘climate change’ to literally mean‘weather change’, largely because the term ‘climate’ islittle used or understood. Instead of linking climatechange or global warming to the warming of the Earthas a result of the emission of GHG, the majorityof Ethiopians connect it to localized increases intemperature caused by local activities that producevisible pollution or smoke, such as the burning offirewood for fuel. For the few Ethiopians in urbanareas even aware of human-caused climate change,global warming is inaccurately associated with theirprior knowledge of ozone depletion.74

Regardless of people’s awareness and under-standing of climate change, Ethiopians recognize thattheir weather is changing and that these changes (suchas erratic and insufficient rainfall, dwindling watersources, failed harvests and dying livestock) are pro-foundly affecting their lives. They explain that theland simply cannot support them anymore. More-over, most Ethiopians, regardless of their religion,feel that God alone has the power to change theweather. This ‘God frame’ leaves little if any roomfor human activity as a cause, and therefore for arole for humans in mitigating emissions. While suchdiffering explanations of change need to be respected,they raise questions about whether and how to helpprepare strongly belief-based societies for adaptationor convince them of ‘green’ development pathways.

The pervasiveness of some version of the‘God frame’ across cultures and time has importantimplications for public engagement and policydevelopment: (1) the impacts of a changing climatecan be viewed as punishment for people’s climate-irrelevant actions, and (2) there is nothing one cando but cope. In terms of mitigation (including low-carbon development) and adaptation, this has seriousimplications for those countries where such beliefs arepervasive.

Questions of faith, it is important to note, arenot only relevant in less-developed, less-Westernizednations. Even in highly developed nations like theUnited States, faith-based beliefs play an importantrole in problem understanding, raising concern,and motivating practical engagement.130,135–138 Mostinteresting for the purposes of understandingthe relevance of religious beliefs for individuals’understandings, perceptions, and engagement here isthat studies of religious discourses in the United Statesillustrate how climate change is framed as a directand severe threat to God’s creation and to notions ofsocial justice, that is, a violation of the dictum to ‘lovethy neighbor’, and, in turn, acting on these threats is



promoted as ‘God’s work’.136 Thus, climate change asframed in not just conservative-evangelical, but alsomore progressive-religious terms—regardless of therelative lack of a direct experience with climate changeimpacts—has become a salient and immediate issuewith morally motivated, personal responsibility. Thediscussion here of the various ways in which climateis being associated with God, however, illustrates thatfaith can help or hinder active engagement with theissue.

The (Missing) Link Between Understandingand BehaviorThere is now much evidence on the gap betweenknowing about climate change and changing behaviorto help mitigate.139,140 Qualitative research hasexplored this disconnect and provides valuableinsights into how it can be addressed. Lack of asense of urgency vis-a-vis other, more immediate andpressing issues certainly play a role. But denial isalso important in remediating the cognitive dissonancethat climate change can induce.141 Recognizing one’scontributions to the problem, and thus acknowledgingfeelings of complicity and guilt, may or may not leadto remedial action regarding climate change.55,142 Assuggested by Whitmarsh,143 there is an asymmetryof behavioral intentions and the actual effects ofbehavior in terms of emission reductions. Behaviorin response to climate change consists largely oftoken actions that can broadly be described asenvironmental (e.g., recycling) but that do little toreduce GHG emissions.143 This has been attributed toa lack of knowledge about how to reduce emissionseffectively143 (see also Ref 103). Further, there aresignificant social, institutional and practical barriersto public engagement.44,45,54 Thus, even people whowant to mitigate are faced with obstacles or changetheir behavior in ways that are unlikely to yieldeffective emission reductions.84

An area of growing interest to researchersis the affective dimension of climate change, asit is believed to provide a critical link betweenknowledge and attitude on the one hand, andaction on the other.40,98,144–147 In Canada, evidencefrom research into ecological citizenship suggeststhat ecologically minded individuals are not onlycognitively and behaviorally but also affectively moreengaged.148 Similar findings emerged for some, butnot other studies of pro-environmental behaviorsin Britain.149,150 Even those most motivated to actstruggle with making their actions meaningful interms of emission reductions.84 Individuals tendto be more effectively engaged emotionally by

positive messages, while appealing to fear hasbeen found to be largely counterproductive.106

But in order to overcome obstacles and barriersto action and change, path-dependent institutionalstructures, market signals, organizational cultures,and policy-making procedures need to be adjustedor reinvented.151

SYNTHESIS: INDIVIDUALS’UNDERSTANDINGS, PERCEPTIONS,AND ENGAGEMENTThe in-depth studies cited above provide considerableexplanatory power in understanding people’s thoughtprocesses, barriers, and what might serve to motivatepeople to act on climate change.

UnderstandingAcquiring and employing factually correct knowledgeof climate change was defined above as understandingclimate change. Individuals’ understanding of climatechange is still limited according to the small-scale studies reviewed here. Part of the reasonmay be lack of focused education on climatechange, powerful cultural, and perceptual filtersthat screen out new and challenging informationwhile selectively letting other bits in, peripheralinformation uptake through the media, and lack ofdirect immersion in natural environments amongpeople in industrialized countries. Evidence ontraditional knowledge systems suggests that theyoften complement western scientific knowledge andhave been used to substantiate scientific evidence, forexample, in the rapidly changing Arctic. However,some ways of understanding diverge from scientificevidence and there is much less research on this thanon convergent or complementary ways of knowing,and on the consequences of divergent knowledgesystems and beliefs. In some places knowledge ofclimate change or the concept it represents is verylimited. Yet, where this lack of knowledge coincideswith a climatically exposed livelihood, individualsrecognize that the weather or other aspects ofnature is changing and that these changes areaffecting their lives. What the review of numerousin-depth studies also reveals is an inconclusiverelationship between the level of education and thelevel of understanding of climate change; the relativerole of understanding in raising concern and inmotivating action. Clearly, individuals enact climate-relevant behavior without or with an incompleteand sometimes misguided understanding of climatechange, while others understand the problem full welland do or do not act to reduce their emissions.



PerceptionsIn terms of perception, that is, the views andinterpretations of the climate issue based onbeliefs, experiences, and understanding, the evidencefrom in-depth studies reviewed here suggests thatindividuals’ perceptions of climate change are stronglycontextualized and encompasses other, not necessarilyenvironmental, issues. Positionality in society (asindicated by gender, age, socioeconomic status, andother social variables) may play an important role inthese differentiated judgments of climate change byvarious groups, but evidence about how much of adifference it makes in different contexts is not uniform.The observed perceptions also explicitly accounts forethical and moral dimensions, such as those relatingto equity, development, and economic power. Climatechange is perceived through the lenses of pre-existingcultural worldviews. This means that perception ofthe issue is strongly determined by beliefs held byindividuals about the functioning of nature and whatwould constitute a ‘good life’, fairness, and theappropriate role of individuals versus markets and thegovernment. Accordingly, evidence from developedcountries on differences in individuals’ perceptionsconverges on systematically varying levels of concern,the presence of skeptical views in all societies studied,and some degree of acceptance, ranging from solid totempered.

Perception of climate change is also shaped bythe framing used in climate change communications,particularly the imagery and stories employed, whichcan help increase knowledge and concern if theembedded emotions do not overly emphasize (i.e.,manipulate) negative feelings such as fear, guilt orhopelessness. Negative affective appeals seem largelycounterproductive, especially when unaccompaniedby messages that build listeners’ sense of efficacy,hope, and optimism about the future. How climatechange is framed can fundamentally affect howthe issue is perceived. For example, appeals toparenthood and hero’s stories, such as that foundin the film ‘The Day After Tomorrow’, can shapeperception, but such demographic variables, includingparenthood, do not show consistent evidence forpeople’s concern and intentions to reduce personalemissions. Moreover, concern about climate changedoes not necessarily stem from having been affectedby the effects of climate change directly; in fact,evidence is inconclusive as to whether those directlyimpacted by events such as floods are as or morelikely than others to attempt mitigation of GHG.Some limited evidence suggests that individuals openlyacknowledge a responsibility, either moral or civic, foraddressing climate change. While one may hypothesize

that notions of responsibility and motivation to actare similarly shaped by the deeply held culturalworldviews, further research is needed to discern thereasons.

EngagementIn this article, we defined engagement as a stateof personal connection that encompasses cognitive,affective and/or behavioral dimensions. The studiesreviewed here suggest that denial as well as distancingand an active disconnect between recognizing causesand assigning responsibility for action play importantroles in mitigating the cognitive dissonance climatechange causes in individuals. There is evidence foran asymmetry of intentions and actions in partdue to insufficient practical knowledge about howto reduce emissions effectively. Incorrect mentalmodels (such as global warming being the resultof the ozone hole) or the cross-culturally common‘God frame’ can effectively hinder or, as seenin evidence from US progressive Christian beliefs,promote individual engagement; this has significantimplications for mitigation and adaptation. Onthe other hand, there is no direct or uncontestedlinkage between a correct understanding of climatechange and active engagement either, and a widevariety of framings can motivate action withoutdeep, scientifically correct understanding. Even whereindividuals perceive a sense of personal responsibilityand show a willingness to act, many experience asense of futility in light of the barriers they face, thelack of government leadership and facilitative policies,and the immensity of this ‘global’ problem versusindividual actions. Affective engagement with climatechange requires further research; clear is, however,that negative emotions such as fear—unmitigatedby communication on how to translate worry andconcern into effective remedial action—are more likelyto disengage individuals, while positive emotions helpinspire and motivate people. Limited evidence suggeststhat ecologically minded individuals feel and aremore actively engaged—pointing to the importanceof identity in pro-environmental behavior—but stillstruggle to make changes in their lives that wouldreduce their emissions effectively.

FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

Suggesting broad-stroke research directions for small-scale studies is hampered by the same dilemma asunderlies this synthetic review: the juice is in thedetails. As the studies reviewed here, future researchin this area will continue to be highly contextual,



focus on specific audiences and employ a wide varietyof approaches, framings, and participants, in diversesettings. Specific questions are virtually endless due tothese differences. Nevertheless, we attempt to providesome categorical suggestions.

First, in-depth studies focused on understandingallow us to learn how people process information,how they make sense of it in a very contextualizedfashion, how they do or don’t learn, and thus—prag-matically—how stubbornly hindered climate changecommunication and education is vis-a-vis pre-existingmental structures, and in turn, what possibilities thereare to tap into people’s prior understandings. Futureresearch should be more explicitly interdisciplinary,joining forces between learning and communicationsexperts, and examine how understanding differs notjust by socio-demographic or cultural groups, but bylearning contexts. For example, what settings allowfor better uptake, systematic processing, and improvedassimilation of new information? What sequence ofinformation is most conducive to improving people’sunderstanding without overwhelming them cogni-tively or affectively? How can selective informationuptake in highly polarized contexts be circumvented?

Second, in-depth perception studies lead usinto the inner workings of people’s beliefs andemotions. Evidence cited above is inconclusive as towhat experiences and mental processes lead to whatperceptions, and how they do or do not motivate moreactive engagement. Future research should examinehow and what could stabilize or change individuals’perceptions. While more seems to be understoodabout how people maintain certain beliefs, whatinternal processes and/or outside events can changethem? Again, interdisciplinary research might yieldinteresting insights, for example, on how stages inhuman/personal development (not just chronologicalage), life experiences, levels of maturity, social roles,or personality types affect beliefs and perceptionsof climate change. What psychological capacities areneeded for people to confront the ‘inconvenient truths’of climate change?

Third, with regard to engagement, past researchhas established how difficult it is to actively engagewith climate change. While much has been said aboutthe value-attitude-action gap, and the lack of directlinkages between understanding, perceptions andbehavior, more needs to be understood about thosewho do make changes in their lives. In fact, cuttingacross these three focus areas of research, we foundthat much of the research we report on here is focusedon what is lacking and what does not work. One of thegreat advantages of small-scale studies is the relativelylow cost for testing out alternative approaches to

public communication and engagement. We believe,therefore, that more such smaller, in-depth studies areparticularly well suited to examine what does workin terms of cognitively, affectively, and behaviorallyengaging individuals. Already, many campaigns areunderway, but often they lack pre-interventionestablishment of baselines, monitoring, and post-intervention evaluation. These campaigns offer ready-made opportunities to further our understanding oneffective communication. More importantly, maybe,the fact that we find such significant differences, andsometimes opposite findings from studies of differentpopulations, suggests that one-size-fits-all campaignsare doomed, if not to fail, at least to only reachlimited goals with far smaller audiences than intended.‘Retail’ communication approaches on the basis ofbetter understanding of particular target groups maythus be more promising.

Such subgroups may be selected on thebasis of strategic considerations, that is, withan eye to bigger impact. For example, expertsincreasingly recommend that campaigns should targetopinion leaders—individuals considered particularlytrustworthy by specific segments of the population(e.g., local political leaders, civic leaders, business, orreligious leaders). Thus an area of valuable researchwould be to focus attention on the understandings,perceptions and the barriers and motivations of elites,policy-makers, business leaders, and other influentials.This would help set in motion much wider publicsupport for climate action. Effectively reaching suchpolicy elites may also help in facilitating high-levelaction that can remove some of the barriers the widerpublic faces.

On the basis of the insights reported here, wehypothesize that many publics seem ready to act iftheir leaders were to take some bold action at thepolicy level. It is possible, and worth examiningmore specifically, that people feel paralyzed notjust or maybe not as much by the magnitude andcomplexity of the climate change threat (i.e., the threatappraisal), but by not being able to do much aboutthe ossified structures that constrain their actions(election systems, energy systems, transportationinfrastructure, markets, etc.), and not because theydo not want to help address climate change. Inother words, they may disengage because of theirnegative (but not at all irrational) appraisal of capacityand efficacy. Specifically investigating such questionsmight produce helpful results to bring to the attentionof leaders who claim they do not have enough backingin the electorate.

Finally, while it is quite common in manywestern societies that only small percentages of



populations are civically active and that participa-tion in elections in many democracies is lessening,more research on engagement is necessary to betterunderstand what would (again) or already does moti-vate people to engage in civic or political actions onclimate change.

It has been our own experience in reviewingthis literature of in-depth studies that a deeper under-standing of individuals’ responses to climate changehas resulted in a more compassionate understandingof people’s reaction to this daunting challenge. It isfrom there, maybe, that a more civil conversation canbe had.

NOTESa The supporting information table lists 68 in-depth,often small-scale studies reviewed for this paper.The three principal criteria for inclusion are: (1) asubstantive focus on understanding, perception, orengagement with climate change; (2) an emphasis onmitigation behavior or generic issues related to under-standing of climate change, rather than on adaptation

behavior; and (3) the study does not report on a large-scale survey of nationally representative populations.While we do not claim this to be an all-encompassingreview, the reader will find detailed insights in thesestudies that helps us better understand human cog-nitive, affective, and behavioral responses to climatechange. In the ‘Findings’ column of the supportinginformation we briefly summarize what if anythingis different from the large-scale, quantitative stud-ies/surveys, what is surprising, and/ or what offersdeeper insights.b Cultural theorists distinguish cultural subgroupswithin a 2 × 2 matrix, clustered by people’s adherenceto two fundamental dimensions of what is perceivedas a ‘good’ and just society, for example, a highlystratified society with strong emphasis on loyalty toone’s peer group would be a high grid/high groupor ‘hierarchist’ society. A minimally stratified soci-ety with strong emphasis on individuals standing outfrom the group would be an ‘individualist’ society.Some researchers see little evidence for fatalism as acultural type and thus drop that category; others addsolidarism as an alternative, resulting in inconsistentnumbers of groupings.

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