THE INDIANCONSTITUTION ANiNTRODUCTORYSTUDY BY A.RANGASWAMIIYENGAR,B . ~ . ,B.L Assist}ntEditor,"TheHlndu" SecondEdition-Revised andEnlarged MADRAS;G.C.LOGANADHAMBROS. MOUNTROAD (AllRlghJjReservedl Madra,;G.C.Loga,zadhamBros. The"GuardumPress:'MOtmtRoaq TO THEMEMORYOf' thelateDewanBahadur 5.5rinivasaraghavaIyengar,C.I.E. MYUNCLE WHOSEST,tJDYOFINDIANPROBleMS WASANINSPlfilNGANDINVALUABLEeXAMPLE TOALLTHOsEWHOKNEWHIM PREFACE' TO'I'HEFIRSTEDI'rION 'rhisbookis intended to meetademandwhich islikelytobeincreasingly feltwith thewidening of the politicallifeoftheIndian peopleby tho inaugu-rationofthonewReformScheme,Accesoibloinfo 1'-m>1tionontheconstitutional aspectsofthe Govern-, montXEC y:nvE PAGE 1 24 36 45 79 98 114 132 143 165 181 xii CHAPTER XII THECOURTSANDTHECONSTITUTION ... CHAPTER XIII FINANCE CHAPTERXIV BUDGETSANDBUDGETAHYRULES CHAPTER XV THENATIVESTATllS CHAPTERXVI CONCLUSION APPENDIX A.-CONSTITUTIONALDOCmmNTS I. TheEastIndiaCompany1772 II. GovernmentofIntlhLAd,1833 III. Do,10

IY.TheImlianCouncilsAct,IS01.. V.AmendingandHevising Ii)ThoGovernmentofIndiaAct,1865 (indodo1869 (iii) TheIndianCouncilsAct(iv)dodo1870' (v)dodo1871 (vi)dodo1874 (viilTho CouncilofIndiaAct1876 (viii)TheIndia.nCouncilsAct1892 (ix)dodo1904 (x)The Council ofIndia Act1907 (xi)TheIndianCouncils..I.e'1909 (xii IThe Govel'OmentofIndia Act,1912 VI. QueenVictoria.'sProclamation1858 VII. LordReformDespatch ". VIII. TheHesolutiononthe Reforms,1909 IX. The Resolutionon Local SelfGovernment, 1882 rAGE 193 201 200 221 244 IX xi xxxii liii liv Iv Ivi lix Ix !xi lxii Ixvi lxvii lxvii lxxiii lxxvi lxxix xcv civ xiii B.-THE LEGISLATL'RES 1.GENEHAL".cxvi II.THECONSTITuTIONOFTHECOUNUlLS-(i ITheRegulations... cxviii (ii)TheClassitioationofMembers...cxxv (iii)TheElectoratesandt.heElectoralAreas...cxxvii (iv)TM ElectoralFranchise... oxxxiii (v)ElectoralProcedureclvi III.PHACTICEA>lDPHOCEDuREOFTHELEGISLA-TURES-(iIRulesfortheConductofLegislativeBusiness intheImperialLegislativeCouncil (ii)InstructionstoLooal Governmentsregal'ding olix LegislationinLocalCouncilsclxvii (iii)RulesfortheConductofLegislativeBusi-ness intheProvincialLegislativeCouncil!:).clxxi (iv)ExtractsfromLegis11.t.ivoStandingOruers... clxxxiv (v)Rule>;lorthc>Diseussionofthe Builgetcxelx (vi)Rulss for the Discussion ofofGeneral PublicInterestccxvi (ii)RulesfortheAskingofQuestionsccxxi THEINDIANCONSTITUTION CHAPTERI BRITISHSOVEREIG;)[TYOVERINDIA TheConstitutionofBritishIndiais,inastrictsense, Introductory "made";yetit cannotbedeniedthatit hasalsoHgrown."UnliketlieBritish Constitution,itowesitsorigintodefinitestatutesofthe ImperialParliamontof Great Britain andIreland;butlike the BritishConstitution,itsprogressandpresentcharacter have notbeen dueto anyinnovationorrevolution,but tochangesconsciouslymadebyBritishadministratorstosuit thevaryingneedsofgoodgovernmentintl:Iecountryand, latterly,to satisfythe growingaspirationsofthepeopleof the countryforashareinthe government oftheland.TheIndian Constitution,therefore,bears allthemarksofBritishpolitical andinstitutional arrangements,sofarastheycouldbefound applicableto this country,It exhibits,for instance, the resultsof that distaste forviolentor radicalchange aridthatdisposition todealwiththeneeds6fthebour,astheyarise,ratber thanwiththe' requiromentsandpossibilitiesofthefuture, whichareassociatedwiththeBritishpeople.Itexhibits, again,thattendencytowards"legal"formsofpoliticaltutions -i.e., institutionsin respect ofwhichlegalremediesand judicial control areprovided-thatregardforthemaintenance ofwhatProfessorDiceycallsthe" RuloofLaw,"whichis 0,.peculiarlyBritishorAnglo-Saxonfeature.Atthesame therequiremontsofthonocessarilybureaucraticformof. 2THEINDIANCONSTITUTION governmentinIndia,formorathanacentury,ha.vealso producedandperfectedanadministrativeandconstitutiotlal systemwhoseefficiencyisitsmostconspicuousmerit,but whosedrawbacksfromthepointofviowofconstitutional developmentarenotinconsiderable. I BritishIndia, asthoStatute of1858' putsit; isgoverned Est.'\blishmentof} byandinthenameof, His:Majestythe British SovereigntytRing-Emperor,HowtheBritishCrown ;nlnd;.t' h''tddrfI came0aeqmret19vasanwoneu countryisamatterofhistorywhichiscommonknow-ledgeamongeducatedpeopleinIndia.TheCharterissued Ito the EastIndia Companyin1600byQueenElizabethand I thesuccessiveChartersrenewingoramplifyingthesame, conferredonatradingcorporationinEnglandmonopoliesof I tmae in the East and, for that purpose, authorised the acquisition I,of territories Iand their fortification and defence hymilitary levies. ThoCompany pushedits fortunesvigorousl),in themidstof Ithepolitical chaosinIndia inthe18th"'ntury... Atfirstthe I agent, itbecame the master of princes.Itfoughtandconquered withanarmyofitsown andauxiliaryforceshiredfromthe , Crown."Onitsbehalf,RobertClivein1765 obtained from theEmperor atDelhi,the Di waniofthe richandfertileterri . toriesofBengal,Bih.randOrissa.Inthedifficultiesand troubles whicharose over the administrationof these provinces. arosethefirstParliamentaryassertionofrightsofcontrol and so'Vereignty overtheCompany'saffairsintheEast.The Act -2L1773containsthefirstParliamentary anddefmition oftheCompany's politicalpowers and I thofirstimportantconstitutionaldocumentoftheIndian Goyernment.It introduced the system ofParliamentary control ove;Indianaffairs,andateachsubsequentronewalof theCompany'sCharter,whenevernecessary,thoParlia-mentenactedlawsforexpandingandrevisingthecon-stitutionoftheIndianGO'rcrnmentand forprovidingforjust; e.ndaqministratiot! BRITISHSOYEilEi(}}[TYOVERINDIA BytheRegulatingAct,theGovernorofBengalwas' raisedtothorankofGovernor-Generaland,inconjunc-tionwithhisCounciloffourother'Members,wasen-trustedwiththeauthorityofsupervisingandcon-trollingtheGovernmentsofMadrasandBombayinimpor-tant ASupremeCourtofHis:Majesty'sJudges wasestablishedatCalcutta-similarCourtswereestablish-edlaterin andBombay-andthepoweroflegisla-tionwasconfened on thoGovernor-GeneralinOouncil.The India Act of1784,knownbeforeitbecamelawasPitt'sBill, ofCommissionersfortheAffairsof India-oommonlyknownastheBoardofControl-which virtuallyabsorbed allrealpowerfrQ}l1_the.Company'sofThe .'\.ctof1813did away withth.eCompany's tffia.-monopoly,exceptinChina,andthatof18i!1L. took thelatteralsoawayandintroducercdirectresponsibilitytoParliament.The Councilof "IndiaestablishodbythoAct of1858toadviseandassistthe Secretary ofState in thetransaction of Indian businessisalso. in asimilar sense,thesuccessortothe oldCourtsofDirectors and Proprietors ofthe Company.Totheextent towhichthis Coun-cilassists andinterposesintheSecretaryofState'sactionor policyinregardto the affairsofIndia,the position oftheIndian Sccrotaryof State differs insomerespectsmarkedlyfromthat of other Secretaries ofStateofHisMajesty.Similarly,thoughhis officeisthe creature ofaBritishstatute,theGoyernorGeneral hasandexercisesrights,powers' andprivilegeswhichdonot come\vithinthoseenumeratedin thestatutes ofParliament,but whichhaveaccruedtotheGOyenlment ofIndia asthesuccessor of tho previousNativeRulers in the land and as the revresontath-e ofthe Crown and the accreditea agent for its prerogativesinIndia. The importantrights oftheSt.ateto thelandrevenueinIndia arise,forexa.mple,fromwhat is claimedto bethecustomary and ancientIndianrighttotbeRajabhaaam orthoKing'sshare of thel)1"OOuooofthelandinIndia. It may,therefore,beinferred(romthoabovethatParlia-Indifferenceof Pa.rliamentill .mentary control oyer Indian affairs, even from theconstitutionalpoint ofview,mustneals practicebeimperfectowingtothecomplicatedorigin ofBritish authorityinIndia and the difficultyof exercisingdireot INDIAANDPARLIAMENTARYSOVEREIGNTY31 supervision.In actualfact,moreover, theindifferenceof Parlia-mentandtheBritishelectorstotheGovernmentofIndia-thebrightestJewel intheBritishCrown-isastoundingand their ignorancoofIndian affairsis'abyssmal.'"The extent ana thelimitsoftheauthorityordinarilyexercisedbyParlia-> mentoverIndianadministration,asfixedbystatute,are ComprisedintlWfollowingprovisions:-(1)that."although thewholeoftheIndianrevonuesareatthedisposalofthe SecrtltaryofStateandtheCouncil.tohebythemdrawn uponforallexpenditurerequiredfortheserviceofIndia, theymustmakeknowntoParliamontallexpenditurein-currodanamaynotincreasethedebt ofindiawithoutthe sanction oftheHouse ofCommons;(2)that,onthe otherhand, .lthoughtheIndianBudget isannuallylaidbeforethatHouse withareportonthe'Homeaccounts'byanindependent auditorandastatement showingthe moralandmaterialpro-grossofIndia-toenableitsmemherstooffersuggestions, askforinformation,p.ndgenerallycriticisethepolicyof thoGoyernmcntinrelationtoIndia-thefinancialstate-mentisfollowedbynoapplication foranyvotetocontrolor influencethota.xationofIndic1,butmerelybyacertainformal resolutionsetting forththe actualrevenueandexpenditurein India forthocurrentyear";(3)that,exceptfor0::-repellinga.ctualinvasionofHisi\fajesty'sIndianpossessions,or under other sudden and urgentnecessity,the revenuesofIndia arenot,withoutthoconsentofbothHousesofParliament. applicabletodefraying theexpensesofanymilitaryoperation carried onbeyondtheoxternalfrontiersofthose possessionsby Hi. Majesty'sforcesorcharged uponthoserevenuesand(4)that ...Theintention,however,cftheframersoftheActof1858,which tra.nsferredthe rule ofIndia fromtho Company to the Crown,appearsto havo been that theHonse of Commonsshouldexercise adirectand regu-larsupervisionoverthe ofIndin.,Thehlstoryofthat measure is, froma.constitutional point ofview,interesting and an admir-ablesummary ofit bythe late IIlr.GeorgeYule in hisPresidentialAd-dresstothe fourthIndian Nationa.lCongressisreproducediij.a.Noto at the end ofLhischapter,.. 32THEIXDIA..'{all regulationsafl.qrulesundertheIndian CouncilsAct,1909,otherthanr:,ules made,byaLieutenant-Governorforthemorecon venient ofbusinessinhis Council,shallbelaidbeforeboth 'Houses ofJ::arliament assoon ... maybe aftertheyaremade.-" Whileit istruethat'ParliamentarycontrolJ?j'erIndian affairs hasthuslendedtobecome unreal,because ofits difficulty. it hasbeenmaintainedby nolessan authority 'than )lr. Leonard (nowLord)Courtneyinhisbookon' the WorkingConstituti';n oftheUnitedKingdom',"that ithasbeenpart oftheoverruling mindwhichhasshar.l6dthe organisationofIndian>Government tomakeitnottooresponsh;etothe. varyingtemperof theHouse ofCommons,thoughintheend,thenationalwill musthaveitsway."Howboththesecouldbesecuredby placingtheIndianSecretaryofState'ssalary ontheBritish Estimates, is explained by Mr.(now Lord) Courtney as follows:-iI TIleSecretaryofStateisaoftheCabinetwhich mustpossesstheconfidenceoftheHous'eofCommons. Intheend,thenationalwillmusthaveitswayhereaselse-"... here;but checksandobstaclesareinterposedwhich,perhapsinsen-siblYlmoderateitsforce.Xopartoftheexpenseinvoh'edin theGoyemmentofIndiacomesbeforetheHouseofCommons inCommitteeof Supply.Thesalaryofthe ColonialSecretaryisvoted hyParliamentandthereisthnsapossibilityofannuallyreview-inghit)policyinthefullactivityoftheParliamentarySession.The salaryof theIndianSecretaryof State ispaid byIndia andne,'ercomes beforetheHouseofCommons.AttheendoftheSession, generally after the AppropriationBiHhasbeen readasecondtime,theIndian Builgetissubmitted;andthi!:!consists ofthf'lre\'iewofthefinancud situationinIndia followed,aftera desultory discussion,bya Resolution simplynffinning thatthe IndianAccountsshow certnintotalsofincome andexpenditure.It maydoubtedwhethel'thisdoesnotbetraytoo great a jealousy of theHouse ofCOlUmolls.If the salaryoftheIndian Secretaryof Statewerosubmittedlikethe ColonialSecretary'stoa vote, t.heopportunityforarealdebatowouldbegivenwhich,experience su,s-sests,wouldbeqsedratherthanabQsed," INDIAANDPARLIAMENTARYSOVEREIGNTY33 "NOTE (E:ctract from tJuPI'lsi4etltijJlAddress ofMr.GeorgeYule,asPresi-dentof theFourth. Indian Oongresshol(1in Allahabad illDecem-ber 1888.)'.,. '. U 'Vhenthe '861A ofthis('.ountry\vastakeno ...erby thoCrownin1858}it felltotheJotofLordPalmerstonwhowasthen ','.). Primel\Iinister,'tointroduceintotheHouseof' Commons,aBill whichwas'a'iterwardsknownasImliaBillo.1.Themainpro-visionsof this,Bill';vcre,that the Governmentof Indiawasto"cstina Yicerq:yandCouncil inIndiaandaCouncilofeightretiredIndian officials'pre'sidedoverby aSecretaryof State inLondon.Theproceed-ings oftheset\)'Oseparatebodies)eachofwhomhadcertainindepen-dentresponsibilities,weretobE;subjectto the redewandfina)decision of theHouseof Commons.The chiefobjectiontothis Bi1lwasthat noprovisionwasmadefortherepresentationofthepeopleofthe country.1fr. Disl'aeli,wh?wasleado:lrof the Opposition,objectedtoit onthe groundofthe insufficientcheckwhichit providedjaodhasai d that withsuchCouncilsasthoseproposed,(youcould notbesllrethat theinhabitants of India"',,'ouldbeabJetoobtainredressfromthe underwhich suffered, that EnglishprotectionolIghtto insure.'Almost immediatelyaftertheintroductionoftheBill,Lord PalrnerstonwasdefeateduponasidequestionandLordDerbybecame Prime.MinisterwithMr. asLeaderoftheHonseofCommons. Notime'was 10EtbythenewMinistryinintroducing IndiaEiJINo.2. :Mr.Disraelidweltuponthedesirabilityofhayingtherepresentative principleappliedto theGovernment ofthe countryandhisschemewas toincreasetheCoullcilinLondon,whichwasproposedbyLord Palmerston,fromeigllttoeighteenMembers,halfofwhomweretobe electedandwen.')inallotherrespectstobeentirelyindependentof Government.Heregret.tedthat theunsettledstateof thecountrydid notadmitof arepresentationof thepeopleioIndio.itse1f}andalltha t conldbedoneinthemeantimewas to approach as neartothat formof governmentas thecircnmstanceswouldpermit.Theprovisionsofhis Billtoeffectthatpurposewerebriefl.rthese.Four of the electedha.lf of the Councilwereto beMembersoftheIndianCiviJandMilitary servicesoftenyears'standing andtheremainingfivemllstha\-ebeen engagedintradingwithIndia forat least fiveyears.The constituency eleetingthefourMembersconnectedwiththeserviceswasto conl'listof allomeeraofhotl) oftheIlldiaService&ndalso84THEINDIANCONSTITUTION allresidentsinIndiaowning2,000of anIndianRailwayor1,000 ofGovernmentStock.Thofivemercantilemembersweretobeelected bytheParliamentarycoqstitucnciesofLondon,Belfast,Liverpool, MutJcllcstcrandGlasgow- Sodeeply jog-rainedistbisnotionof govern-mentby representationinthemindsofEnglishmenthat,ratherthan lea\'eit outofsight altogetherindealingtheaffairs of India, the Government of thatdaymadetheproposal}IJavestated.Although theintentionunderlyiugtheseproposalswasapplauded,thescheme itselfwasfelttobe,fromtheimperfect character of the constituencies, whollyinadequatetosecurethecheckthat wasdesired.It wascleaT orrather it soonbecameclear,that theinterestsofonesetof'voters werendverf'letotheinterestsof themassof thepeopleandthatthe otherletknewabsolutelynothingoftliecountryoritswants. Receivedwithfayourat first,theBiilsoonbecametheobject ofjest andderision Oilthepartof the Oppositionandeveoitsmoreimpartial criticssaidofittbatitwasuselessofferingtothepeopleof India underthenalileofbrend,whatwouldcertainlytumoutto ben stone.AtthesuggestionofLordJohnRussell,theBillwas withdrawnandtheproceededbywayofresolutions to con-struct the frame\\lorkofanotherBill.Theplanfinallyadoptedwas this-the legislativeandadministrativepowersweretobeentrustedto aViceroyandaCouncilinIndia andthecheckuponthemwastobea Councilof fifteen sittinginLondon.This Councilwastobe responsibletotheCabinet throughaSecrewryofState,whowastobe responsibleinturntotheHouseofComlllons.Thisarrangement'Was regardedmerelyasaprovisionaloneandthepolicy tobepursuedwas toworkuptotheconstitutionalstandard.Education wastobelargely extendedandimprovedandthenati,'esofthe country were to be drafted intotheserviceof Govel'llment astheybecamequalifiedwiththeviewt amongotherreasons,tofitthemforthe anticipated enlargement oftheir politicalpowerl;.Theprovisionsmadeandtheprospects held out in the debatesinParliaments deri\'edalustrefromthe famousProclamationof tlte {,lueen-that half_fulfilledCharter of Illdiall rigllts-wbichwas first readandpublishedtothepeopleofIndio.inthis,"erycityofAllahabad thirtyyearsago. Nowj whatIwishtoimpressuponyourmimIbythisbrief tivcj isthg. greatimportancethatwasattachedatthat timeto some sortof check..lfailiuS"toho,veitinformthatthe 1NDiAANDPARLIAMENTARYSOVEREIGNTY35 Englishpeople!themselvesappro'\'edamifollowedinthemanagement tlf theirownaffairs,theydevisedthesubstitutewithitscheckthat Ihavementioned.Parliamentitselfwasfullofgushing enthusiasmastothepartit would takeinthe busine!:iB.If.}theabseuce oftitrepresentativebodyinIndia,theHouseofCommonswastoplay ther61eofoneonourbehalf.Hwastoregardtheworkil.:Sagreat andsolemntm!;tcommittedtoitby anall-wiseandinscrutableProvi-dence, the dutiesof whichitwouldfaithfullyandfully discharge.Such was thestyleof lauguage employedbothinand"ut of Parliament at the timeIalludeto.Andnowwhatistheactualstate ofthocase? itissUlUmedupinasinglesentence:thereisnocheck.Theill underwhichouraffairsareadministeredappear:,.;likemanyother Billstobeopelltomorethanoneinterpretation.Theinterpretatioll put uponit at thetime,andwhatwasprobablytheintentionofParHa-ment, was, the Government of India was to have theright of initiative; theCouncilinLondontherightofrevisionandtheSecretary of State,subjecttothe ultimato judgmentoftheHouse of Commons,the rightofveto..AndOliswaspracticallytherelationofthepartiesuntil 1870.[nthat year,theDukeofArgyllwasSecretaryofState; andin acontroverllY onthissubjectwith Lord:Jlayowhowas thenViceroy, he laiddown quiteanotherdoctrine.He heldthat theGovemment inIndia hadnoindependentpowerat allandthat the prerogative of the Secretary of State wasnot limitedtoayetoof themeasures passedinIndia.; The Government in India, 'hemaintained,'were merely executive officersof theHomeGovernment,whoholdtheultimatepowerofrequiringthe Governor-Generaltointroduceameasureandofrequiring alsoallthe OfficialMembersof theCounciltovoteforit.'Thispower-absorbing Despatchisdated24th 1870.1'hesupposedpowersandpri-vilegesoftheCouncilinLondonhavebeensimilarly dealtwithand the Councilisnowregarded merely as an adjllnct of the offiee of the Secretary of State,him with informatioll or ad .... ice when he chooi:ies toask forit.Thepresentpositionisthis: tlieGovernmentof India has110 power;theCouncilillLondonhas nopowerjtheHonseof Commons hastiie power,but it.refut:lcsornegiectstoexerciseit.Tile650 odd 11crnbers, .... lIoweretoLethepalladiumof Inuia'srightsandliberties ha\-'ethrown4thegreat andsolemlltrust of allinscrutablebackuponthehaudofProvidencetobelookedafterasProvidence thinksbest." CHAPTERIII THECROWNANDTHEINDIAOFFICE - $ ...,.-. The executive authority of theCrownover India is not a thing which arose with the Act of 1858.As has been TheColoniesand India:adistinctionpointed out in the last chapter,ithasexisted fromthemiddleoftbeeighteentbcentury andheenexercisedthroughvariousbodiesfromtimetotime. What the Act of 1S58didwastovostthat authority directlyin a Secretary ofState,assistedbyaCouncil.newlycreated.It is in thisrespect that thefmmers of the Act madea departurefrom the methodsfollowedasregardatheColonies.Thereasonstherefor were then indicated to consist in adesire to haye expert advice and guidanceon,andtosome extentcontrolover,the affairsofIndia entrusted to theSecretary ofState.In respectoftheColonies, theconstitutionaltheoryhasbeenthattheauthorityofthe CrowninregardtolChrislationandadministration,isexercised hytheKinginCouucil(i.e.,the PrivyCouncil).Parliament, of course,issnpremeandmightintervenoandmakeprovisionfor theCovernmentofanyColony-for,intheword.ofLord j\lansfield, "there cannot exist allYIXlwcr in the Crown exclusive of Parliament."But,orclinarily,ithasbeendeemedto be specially withintheprovinceoftho'King inCouncil'todealwiththe ~ o o dgovernmentoftheoverseasEmpire.Thistheory,toa lu.rgeextent,heldgoodinrespectofIndiatoo,andY8stigesof itstillremaininthema.tterofissuingmilitarycommissions. WiththepMsing,howeyer,oftheRegulatingActin1773,the THECROWNANDTHEiNDIA:\7 Parliamentcamouponthe sceneandthe authority oftheKing inCouncilrecededandwaspracticallythereafterconfinedto the "settledDrerogativeoftheCrowntoreceiveappealsinall colonialcauses" -a powerwhichisnowstatutorilyvestedin the JudicialCommittee. Thus,whilatheauthorityoftheCrownoverColonial affairscontinued,tobeexercisedbythe KinginCounciLthat overIndiacametobeexercisedthroughspecialbodies,suchas theBoard ofControlandtheSecret Committee ofthoCourt of Directors,themain reasonbeing,itmaybepresumed,tokeepa zealouswatchovertheCompanyandtoprovidewellinformed andexpertguidanceintheadministrationofsucha vastand variedterritoryastheIndianEmpire.Theevolutionofthe ColonialSecretary,therefore,becameassociated withtheKing's Council,whilethatoftheIndianSecretarybecameassociated with aspecial andnewbodyknown asthe Council ofIndia.In book on('TheJ.. awandCustomof theConstitution,"Sir \VilliamAnsonhaslaid) downthisdistinction inthofollowing terms:-"Apartfromthelegislativesupremacy of which is thesameforall parts oftheKing'sdominions, the Colo-niesaregovernedby theKinginCouncil.orbytheKing acting ontheadviceoftheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies.But IndiaisgovernedbytheEmperor ofIndia.acting ontheadvice oftheSecretaryofStateforIndiainOouncil.TheSecretary ofState,nodoubt,representstheKingErol>erol'ofIndiainthe exerciseoftheroyalprerogative,buthisCouncilisnotthe PrivyCouncil,buttheConneilof Indt"a". TheAct of1858whichinauguratedthe 'directGovernment 'l'heIndianSe-cretaryof Stn te ofIndiabytheCrown,recitesthatall rightswhich,iftheActhadnotheen passeJ,mighthaveheenexercisedbythe EastIndiaCompanyinrelationtoanyterritories,maybeox ercisedbyandinthenameofHisMajestyasrightsincidental tq;theGoyernment ofBritishIndia.In virtueofhisposition, theIndianSecretary is .ahXaysaMemberofthcCabinet-the THEINDIANCONSTITUTION bodyinwhomthe ultimate executiveauthorityoftheCrown overthewholeoftheBritishEmpireisbyconstitutional con-vontion vested.ThoSecretary ofStateforIndiaadvisesthe Sovereif,'Ut accordingtolegaltheory IinhiscapacityofPri vy Councillor,havingbeen'sworn oft ~ ePrivyCouncil'as amat-ter of course.The Cabinet,therefore,in itssolidarity,joins in hiscounsels andsharosinhis responsibilities.TheAotof1858, however,aswehaveseen,hasassociatedwiththeIndianSe-cretaryaCouncilwhosefunctionitis"to conduct,underhis direction,thebusinesstransactedintheUnitedKingdomin relationtotheGovernment ofIndia and the correspondencewith India."Itsconcurrence,moreover,onsomeimportant mattersrelatingtoIndianaffairs,hasbeenmadeessential totheSecretaryofStatetakinganyactioninrespect thereto. Theconsti tutiona!positionoftheIndianSecretary ofState hasthusbeenmadetodiffersomewhat Hisposition:In theorymarkedlyfromthatofotherMinisters. Accordingtoconstitutional usage,heisthe personresponsibletoParliament fortheadministrationofIndia. But in regardtocertainspecifioo.questions-one ofthembeing theappropriationoftherevenuesofIndia-the determination thereofisreservedbystatutetotheSecretaryandamajority oftheIndia Council,abodywhichisunrepresentedinParlia-mentandisstatutorilydisqualifiedfromdirectrepresentationin Parliament.The onlyexceptiontothis rnleisthatnoappro-priationofIndianrevenueslor anylmilitaryoperationsbeyond theIndian frontierscanhemadewithoutthesanctionofPar-liament.This,ofcourse,isofveryrarooccurrence.It would, therefore,seemasif thoprincipleofministerialresponsibility toParliamentcouldnotheenforcedagainsttheIndian Secretaryinsuchcases- whichwould.virtuallymeanthat ParliamentcouldnotexerciseefIecti vecontrolover' the financesandexpenditureofIndia.Adiscussionaroseonthis questionintheIlou.eofCommonssometimeaftertheAct THECROWNANDTHEINDIAOFFICE39 of1858waspossed,in1869,andthematter has boenvirtually sottledby the statement ofalateSecretary ofStatoforIndia. ThepropermodeofregardingtheIndia Council wouldappear to betotreatit asabody deputedbyParliamenttoexercisea speciesofquasi-Parliameqtarycontrolincertainmattersoyer theSecretary ofState, andtheauthority so delegatedis,inthis view,liabletobeJ,"evoked."TheHouseofCommons isso whelmedwithbusiness nearerhome,"hesaid,"that ithasn6 opportunityofmaking itself acquaintedwithallthosevastfields ofknowledgethat,villenableittoexerciseanefficientinfluence overtheSecretary ofState forIndia.Therefore, it has institnt odthisCouncil to beits deputy,&sit were,to watch himand see that thepowersplacedinhishands arenotabused.It ought, however,tobeclearlyunderstoodthatthemomenttheHouse stepsinandexpressesanopiniononasubjectconnected",ith India,thatmomentthejurisdiction ofthe Council oughtto cease. It isnot, beenduredinthisconstitutionalcountryfora mo-mentthattheCouncilshqulclset itself against the cxprcss opinion oftheHouse." ThestudentofIndianconstitutionalhistoryhasyettolook In practice in the abovewords. forthedevelopmentandsubsequent useofa constitutional conventionsuchasisindicated Theconsciousnessthatthe will of theHouse of Commons is ultimatelyboundtoprevailhas notactedsomuch inthe direction ofpreventingthe Council of Indiafromassuming afactiousorobstructiveattitudeintheexerciseofitspowers,as inthat ofstrengtheningthehandsoftheBritishCabinet,which couldrelyonthesupport cf the Housetosubordinateand some times to sacrifice the interests ofIndia-now unrepresentedinthe House-to BritishorImperialexigencies orinterests."'Vhilc theobject,andtosome extent,theeffectoftheActwas,"writes SirC.P.Ilbol't,"toimposeaconstitutionalrestraintonthe powersofthe Secretary ofState withrespectto the expenditure ofmoney.yetthisrestraintcouldnotbeeffectivelyassertedin ()l\Ses,eSl'ociallywhereImperialareinvolv\ld,J,'Qf 40THEINDIANCONSTITUTION instance,thepowertomake war necessarilythoexpendi. ofrevenues,butitisapowerfortheexerciseof ,,,hichthe ofamajorityofyatesatameetingbf.theCouncil cannotbemadeanecessarycondition.TheSecretary ofState isMember ofthe CabinetandinQabinetquestions,the deci sionoftheCabinetmust prevail.".Thebelief that theAetof 1858 hodvestedin ther nili. Councilthe power to veto absolute lyany expenditurewhichtheyconsideredIndia shouldnotbe chargedwith,wassoondiscovered to be unfounded.Inpractice, theCouncilhasQUenbeenoverborneandsometimesnot evenconsulted.TheSecretary ofState has hodto bowtothe decisionoftheCabinetinthesematters ofthein terestsofIndia. Thisfactwasclearlybrought out inthe examinationofthe MarquisofSalisbury,whenSecretaryof TheIndiaCoun cil inciIectiveStateforIndia.bytheCom mittoeon IndianFinanceoT"If, withthe supportofthe Council,the Se",.ta:ry ofState should op poseademandfromtheTreasury,"saidSalisbury," the resultwouldhe'to stopthe mwhine'."He"''lISthereupon asked: "You musteitherstopthe machine orresignor goontacitlysub-mitting to injustice.""I shouldacceptthatstatement",here-plied,"borring theword,'tacitly.'Ishould goon submittingwith loudremonstrances."., Remonstrances,how"everloud,"remarks an authority, * "might be unavailing unless backed by the force of externalopinion.Andherewastheconstant difficultyindicated byanother of Lord Salisbury's replies.Under the pressure applied bythe HouseofCommons,",'crydepartment desirestoreduce its estimates.It is,therefore,tempted,withoutanydesireto beunjust,togetmoneyinthedirectionof leastresistance.So longastheHouseoCCommonsisindifferenttoIndian finance, there will, therefore, bea.\eody temptationto shiftburdensupon India.ThozealouswatchfulnessoftheHouseofCommons. saidLordSalisbury,wonlahotho host protection ofthepeople of Leslie Stephen-Life ofHenry THECROWNANDTHEINDIAOFFICE41 Indiaagainstsuchinjustice,andhespokeofthedesirabilityof exciting publio apinioninEngland' uptothe point of integrity'.'!. It has Ihus'hlippened that the body constituted by Parliament .towatch overandactasa.checkonthe TheConstitutIOn.." oftheCcmnoil'IndIaD,SecretaryIIItheexerCISeofhIS POWeI:Shasbean,bytheParliament'sown subsequentaction"doprivedofits power andthat the object of the framersoftheActhasbeandefeated.TheIndiaCouncil,in fact,possesseslittlerealpower anditsonlyfunctionis toconsti-tute itselfinto a body of advisers to the Indian Secretary, who are deemedspeciallyconversant withIndianaffairs.Theconsti-tutionaldistinction,however,betweentheSecretaryofState inCouncil:andtheSecretaryofStateisstill,inmanycases, ofpracticalimportanca.ThepowersoftheSecretaryof State,oftheIndiaCouncilandoftheSecretaryofStatein Council willhe.foundfullysetoutin theAct of 1858, andthe subsequent arne';dingActswhich arepublishedintheAppendix; only a brietreference to a few- note\"\'orthy points is herenecessary. Ingoneral,nnde;. thetermsoftheCharterActof1833, theSecretaryofState may,asinheriting thepowersofthe Boardof Control,"superintend,directandcontrolallacts, operationsandconcernswhichinany wiserelatetoorconcern theGovernmentorrevenuesofIndia."TheCouncilofIndia, undertheterms ofSection 19of theAct of1858, conductsunder his directionUthebusinesstransactedintheUnitedKingdomin relationtotheGovernmentofIndiaandthecorrespondence withIndia."TheCouncilofIndia,asatpresentconstituted, istoconsist of notmore than fourteen !'I1em bers andnotlessthan tenMembers.These a.reappointedbytheSecrehtryofStateto holdoffice-withtheexceptionofonehavingprofessionalor peculiar qualifications who maybe appointedlVlemberduringgood behavioUl--for illtermof tenyearswhichmayforspecialreasons be extendedforafurthertermoffivcyears.TheSecretaryof Statemay also appointtothe Cotincil a Member having profession. alor othersPecialqualificatioDs.TheMembersoftheJudi 42INDIANCONSTITFTIOI' CouncilMnonlyberemoved,likeHisMaiesty's.r uagegin England,byanaddressofbothHousesofParliament.AU powersroquiredtobeexercisedbytheSecretaryofState inCounciltudaUpowersofthoCouncilmaybeoxercised atmootingsofthoCouncilat whicllnotlessthanfive:llem-borsaropresont.ThoSecrctaryofStateisauthorisedto dividethoCouncilintocommitteesforthe.moreconvenient transactionoJbusinessanlltoappointa Vice-President. The IndianSecretary andhisCouncil,betweenthem,have TheControlof the India Office succeeded,aswe haveBOOU,to allthepowers proviouslyexercisedby the Boam of Control, withandwithouttheCourtsofDirectors andProprietors oftheEastIndia Company.The natureofthe controlwhich,priorto1858,thisBoardexercisedoverthe administrationiuIndiawasthusdcscribedbyJohnStuart MiIl:- -. "Itisnot"heI:uliil,IIr;OlIluuhanexecutivel\ijadeJibel'R-tivebody- TheExecnti'-eGovernmentgofIndiaisandmllstbe seatedillIndiaitself.TheprincipaloftheHomeGovel'D..-mentis notto directthedetailsofadministration,buttoscrutiniseand revisetilepastactsof theIndianGovernment,tolaydownprincipleg nndissuegeneralinstructionsfortheirfutureguidanceandtogive.or refusesanctiontogreatpoliticalmeasureswhicharereferredHome for approval. II Sir JohnStrachoy isofopinionthat thisdescriptionbolds goodeven at thepresentday ... TheworkoftheSecretaryof State,"is,accoruingtoSirJohn,I,mainlyconfinedtoanswering roferencesmadeto himbytheGovornmentinIndia andapart fromgreatpoliticalandfinancialquestions,thenumberand nature of those roforoncos mainlydependon the characterofthe forthotimoboing.Some meninthatposition liketominimisepersonalresponsibilitiesandtoaskforthe orders oftheHomoGovernmentboforetaking action.Oohers prefertoaotontheirowniyc1gmentandonthatoftheir India:Itsrl.ndProgress.ThirdEdition, (Macmillan]l)'78. I THECROWNANDTHEINbiAOFFICE43 Councillors.The Secretary of State initiates almost nothing."The laststatement, however, appears too broad.Thoughit is supported inprinciplebythepronouncementofthepresentViceroythatin thematter ofthenewreforms,theinitiativecamefromthe Gov"ernmentofIndiaandnotfromLordl\lorloy tstill instances canbeqnotedinwhichtheSecretary ofState initiatedmeaSures of reCormowing to pressure of public opinion in India andEngland, in oppositionto 'theviewsoftheGovernmentinIndia.Other instancescanalsobequotedinwhichthe"Home"Government initiatedandforcedonthiscountrymeasuresoffinancialor fiscalpolicynnderthepressureofpowerfulinterests inEngland and against the declaredintentions and policyofthe Government inIndia aswellasofpUblicopinioninthiscountry. TheworkoftheCouncilofIndiaisusuallytodealwith TheBusinessof theCouncil" suchbusinessasisplaoedheforeit bythe SecretaryofSt.ate.Hemayoverrulebis Councilinallmatterswherethorois differ enceofopinionbetweenhimandhisCouncil,excepta.stothose inwhichtheirconcurrc"nceisobligatoryunderthestatute.He may despatch letters and issue orders directlyto the authoritiesin inthe"SecretDepartment",whereverthematteris,in his opinionorinthat of. theIndianauthorities,onerequiring secrecyorurgency,orconcernsthemakingof waror. peace,or thepolicyrespectingthoNativeStatesandPrinces,orfor whichamajorityofvotes.oftheCouncilisnotdeclaredtohe necessary.A majorityofsuchvotes necessaryfordecisions onthefollowingmatters;-(i) ApproprintionoftherevenuesofIndiaorproperties. (ii)Ext':rciReofhon'owiugpowcrsandenteringjnto contralJts. (iii) !'If. f:alnrieRt furloughrnleR,etc. (iv)AppointmentsofXntivcRof India.toofficesreserved,.fort!U! IndianCivilService.andthelUilldngofpro\'isionalapp()ir:'tmenteJf:! theGovel'llor-Gcneral'sCouncil. For thepurposesoftheexerciseinEngland ofthe powersanddutiesinrespectoftherevenuesofIndiaorother 'tUEINDIANCONSTITUTION proportios which o.roby lawvcstod in "thoCrowD,and tho inourring of rightsandliabilitiosundercontracts,the SecretaryofStato hasbeon doclarodbythoActof1858 a juristic person.The Act basalsoprovidedthat theSecretaryofState inCouncilmay sue a.ndbe suedaswollinIndia asinEnglandasabodycorpOrate andthatoyery person hasthe same remOCliesagainst the Secretary ofState inCouncilashomighthavehad against theEast India Company. Inthisrespeot,animportantconstitutionaldistinction existsbetween himandthe other Secretaries Aninteresting distinction in lawoCState.InEngland,anactiondoesnotlie againsttheCrown.Theonlylegalremody againsttheCrownisbyPetition ofRight.Ontheotberhand, MinistersinEnglandare not protected,exceptwhere expressly so providedbystatute,inrespectoflegalwrongsbypleadingtho autbority oftheCrown,wbereasinrespectofIndia,theSecre-tary ofState andevery Member oftheIndia Council are express-lyexemptedfrompersonalliabilityinrcspectofallcontmets, covenantsorotherengagementsentoredintobythornintheir officialcapacity,and"allcostsanddamagesinrespect thereof are bornebytherevenuesofIndia.""Moreover,asSirC.P. Ilbertpeintsout",it hasbeenbeldthat aPetition ofRight does not lieforawrongcommitted,inpursuanceofthemaximthat theKingcan donowrong;andforawrongdonebyapersonin obedienceorprofessedobediencetotheCrown,theremedyis against thewrong-doerhimself andn ~ tagainst theCrown.Butt inIndia,itwouldseemasifastatutoryremedywilllieagainst tbe Secretary ofState inCouncilasabody corperate,notInerely incasesinwhicht\PetitionofRight\\TilllioinEngln.nd,butin allcasesinwhichtheright.ofsuitisgivenbystatutesandin respectofnctsdoneinthecomluctofundertakingswhichmight becarriedonhyprivateindividualswithout sovereignpowers . TheGovernmontofIndia.-Second Edition,p.171. CHAPTERIV THEIMPERIALGOVERNMENT We hayedealt,in thelasttwochapters,withthepowers, TheExecutivefunctionsand ordinarybusinessofthoSu-authority inIndia premeLegislativeandExecutiveauthority over theIndian Empire, vested in the Parliamentof Great Britain andIreland andtheCrown ofthe UnitedKingdom.The direct administration ofan Empi;e likeBritishIndiacouldnot,hO\y-eyer,beconductedbya body orbodiesconstituted inLondonand it is tothe organsand institutions, evolvedand establishedin India during morethanacentury and ahalf,that wemustnext look toobtain an ideaofhowtheadministrationiscarriedOll.In doingso,we- mayfirstofalldealwiththeexecutive authority,. as beingthe olderinpoint oforiginandasthe onefromwhichthe legislative authority subsequently ilxpandedandbecamedistinct. The'superintendence,direct.ionanil-control'.inIndia- of- the civil andmilitaryGovernment ofBritishIndiaisvested inthe ViceroyandGovornor-GeneralofIndia in Council.Statutorily, ofcourse,the oldprovisionintheRegulating Act of1773 requir-ingand directing theGovernor-GeneralinCouncil.. toobeyall such orders astheyshallreceivefromtheCourtofDirectors", oftheEastIndiaCompanyisstilloperativeandvestsillthe Secrebtry of State-who has succeededtothe)lowersof the Court 01DiroctorsundertheActof1858-thepowerofrequiring similarobediencetohis: orders.,-I 46 THEINDIANCO:;STITUTION The constitutional question,however, in this connection is not Thepositionofsomuch astothosubordinateor delegated the man on the spotexecutivo authorityoftheinCouncil,which is undisputed,"" tothecxtontandlimitsof suchauthority.Therelations between the Secretary ofStato and theofIndiaarcnow'regulated,accordingtoSir CourtenayIlbert,hyconstitutioualusage.Sir JohnStrachey, however,as stated before, seems to think that the usageis not quite settled, at least sofar"" the everyday w:1ministration is concerned, andthat it varieswiththe character oftheGovernorGeneral for the time being.It is notpossiblefor tbosenotdirectly ""'luainted withtheadministrativebusinessandmethodsoftheImperial Governmenttoventureany opiniononthissubject.Norcould any definiteandpetrifiedu"'gein thisreSllectbeexpectedto outlivetherequirements ofthedailyprogressiveandexpandiug administrationof India.Therearethose who belie"oeimplicitlyin .. theman onthespot"theory,whilethereareotberswbo believeinthecorrective influcnccsofcontrolfromthe democracy inEnglandanditsagents,theMinistersofHis:llajesty, undertheguidanceofpublic opinionandprogressh'eideas, Whateverbetherightprincipleinthisrespect,we HisinitiativeinmayrefertoODeortwounderstandings Legislatienwhichhavebecomesettledinregardtothe relationsbetweentboGovernor-GeneralinCouncilandtb. SecretaryofState, asaresultofcontroversieswhicharoseafter the Actsof1858 and1861werepassed.Theinterpretationput upon theAct of1858at thetimeit waspassedbyParliament IV"", asMr.GeorgeYulepointedont inthe speechquotedin tbe NotetotholastChapter,thattheGo"ernmentofIndia wastohavethorightofinitiative,theCouncilinLonelon therightofrevisionandtheSooretaryofSmtothoright of".to,.suhjecttotbeultimatejudgmentoftheBouseof Commons ..Similarly,tbeIndian CouncilsActof1861vested theJXlwerofprevioussanctionnecessaryfortheintroduo tionofcertainimportantmeasuresintheLegislative THEDIPERIALGOVERNMENT 47 Councils,intheGovernor-General,andnotintheSecretary ofState-thepowerofsubsequentdisallowancebytho OrowD,exorcisedthroughtholatter,beingtheonlycheck retainedinhishandsundortheStatute.Disputes.however, aroseoverthisdivision qfpowors.ThefirstofitskindWaG in 1870,whentheDuke ofArgyllwasSeoretaryofStatefor IndiaandLord1,IayotheViceroy.There,'\'"oredifferencesof opinionbetween theSecretary ofState and'heGovernmentof ,India in connectionwith someofthe legislativeproposals oftbe I.tter,thenbeforetheLegislativeCouncil.Amongthese tbePunjabDroinageandCanalAct whicbsetthewhole subjectofirrigationworksonafootingasregardedthe Punjab,wasthesubjaetofagreatcontroversybetweenLord MayoandtheDukeofArgyll.In aDespatcb,datedthe24th November1870,theDuke ofArgylllaidit downthat theprero-gative oftheSecretaryofState wasnotlimitedto aveto ofthe measures passed in India.liTheGovernment of India,"he observ-ed,Uweremerely executiA-eofficers of the . Government, whoholdtheultimatepowerofrequiringtheGovernor-General to introduce ameasure andofrequiringalso alltheOfficialMem-berstovoteforit."ThePunjab CanalActwasafterwards repealedandre-enactedwithmodifications. Tbenextimportantdisputewasin1874andwasbut tbenaturaldevelopmentofwhattookplacein1870.If theSecretaryofStatecouldandoughtto dowhattheDuke ofArgyllsaidhehadthepowerofdoinginrespectofthe legislativeproposalsofthe Governmentof India,it followsthat in order effaetuallyto such apower,actionsnbseqneut tothepassingofmeasureshytheCoullcilsin .India,eitherby exerciseofvetoorbyrequiringtheGovernorGeneraltorepeal andreenactthemwiththenecessarymodifications,isnot ThiswasexactlyhowitstrucktheMarquisof SalisburywhowasSecretary01StateforIndia in1874.In a DespatobtoLordNorthbrook,theGovernor-General,the Secre-tary of Statedirectedthat theGovernmentofIndia should in 48 THE CONSTITUTION futurecommunicatetohim-inardorthnthemayhayenn opportuuityofproviouslyexpressinghisopinionanddirections thm;oon-inforrnationregarilinganyexoovtthoseof slightimportanceorthoserequiringurgentaction.whichthey mightintendtointroduceinto the Ler:islativeCouncil.Asimilar coursewastobefollowedin caseanyimportantalterationswere madeJurinsthoprogressof ameasurethroughtboLegislative Councilandtheorders oftheSecretaryof State wereto he await-edthereon.TheProvincialGovernments ,verealsoaskedsimiI lady to follow the same procedure.The Government of India point-edout difficultiesinfollowingthiscourse,aftsronceameasure hadbeenlaunched,andsuggestedthattheunderstanding shouldhethat themeasuremightheproceededwith,ifnoreply werereceivedtotheircommunicationswithintwo months;and in regardtothe ProvincialLegislativeCouncils,LordNorth-brook'sGovernmentpointedout that the courseproposed hy the Secretary ofStatewaslikelyto interferewiththepower andthe obligation,imposedbystatuteupontheGovernor-General,of snvast fore8t property,:mdit>t\largemanufl1ctureroft:;altandopium.It owne thebulkoftherailway!>ofthecountryIlllddirootlymanages a eonsidembleportionofLhellljnndilbasconstructedandmaiutains THEIMPERIALGOVERNMENT77 mostofthe,importantirrigationworks.It ownsandnu,loagesthe postalandtelegraphHystems.It hasthemonopolyof noteis!:\uc1 yerythingdoneintheprovincefo!,blltit wouldbeseenfrom 80 nndS3of theDespatchof December183Hlmt they we!'e llltelHICIltotlil'criminateiJetweenmatterswhich wouldbeprima1'ilywithintheHoapeofthe localgovernment!:>wlleretheirinterferellcewonldbeofaveryex-ceptionalcharacl.erandmnttersinregardtowhichtheircontra] wouldbemoredetailedandconstant.Nodefinitestepstowardstile, immediate attainment of thisohjectappear,howeyer,tolun-ebeen takenandthepresentii!:'criminationbetween functionsof'the andlocalgovernments,andtheextentofthecontrolmany exercised_bytheformeroyerthelatter aretheresultsofgra-dualadministrativeevolution, .Politicalaridmilitary exigencies,andthegrowthof servicesgene-rallyrecognisedassuitablefordirectmanagementbyn.central Governmenth,o.vegiven. tlleGovernmentofIndin.anumberoffunc- independentlyoftheprovincialGovernmentt;- AI" regardsthedepartmentswhiyhhasebeenrecognif'edaslyingprima-tily w'ithin 'the!-;Copeoflocalgovernments,thecontrolexercisedby theGovernment ofIndiahasdifferedat,arious periods.Speaking generally,itmaybesaidthatalthoughthepowersofthe MadrasandBombayGovernments,theonlysubordinateadminiRtra-tion8thenexisting,,veremateriallyreducedin1833,thoseofallthe presentmajorprovinces,includingthetwopresidencyGo'\ernments, aredecidedlylargerthanweretheprerogatiws ofanylocalGovern-ment fiftyyearsago,,vhentheermvntookovertheGovernmentof India.For example,noprovincehadanyseparatepowersoflegis-lation,any separatefinancialresourcesorpracticallyanypowerof creating ormodifyingnnyappointmentinthepublicservicejandtbe referencestotheGovernmentofIlldinwhichthiHlastrestrictionin-volvedgavethat Goverlilnenttheopportunityof interference,\lithall the details ofprovincial admilliHtration." In actual experience,however, the carrying out of the prin-Tendency towards closer control ciplesand instructions of the Court of Direc-torshasvariedfromtimetotime,butthe tendoncyhas steadilybeentowards thening thepowerand authority ofthe Imperial Government by PROVINCIAI,.GOVERNMENTS9! various means.In the solution of tho difficult question of dofining the exact limits between' ajustcontrol and petty, vexatiousand meddling interference', the Government ofIndia have generally had theadvantageon theirside.Onereasonforthismay perhaps lie in the fact that Ihe Local Governments as such do not yet reprosent thopeopleoftheprovinceand arcnot therefore constitutionally hackedupbythatpopularfeelingandpublic support whichwouldhavesustained effectuallytheclaimsof localfreedomandaction.Ontheother hand,theauthority oftheImperialGovernment,backedupbythe Secretary ofState,isusuallysustainedbytheauthority ofthe King's ThIinisters who representthe will in the last resortoftheParlia-mentandthepeopleoftheUnited Kingdom.Howeverthis maybe,itisessentialtoremember,asthe reportofthe Royal Commission on Decentralizationbasput it, ,OJthatmutual relationsofthe Indian Governmentsare' nottho-sebf statesorcoloniesvoluntarilyassociatedinafederalsY$tem where awrittenconstitution is_necessarytopreserve origirial rights of thecontractingportions". The gradualevolutionof "theadministrative control ofthe Natureand:Me-thodsofPresent Control GovernmentofIndia.hasbeenesta-blishedand exercised,a"coraingtothe Commission,inthe following .. . jBy financialrulesand includingtho::;e "laiddownby Imperial departmental codes.- . ii.By generalorparticular checksof- amorepurelyadtninistrative nature,which may(a)belaiddownby-lawor-byrules . having. of law,. or- (b)havegrown- up-iu.practice. iii.Bypl'eliminaryscrutinyof..propos.cJ." P..rovincial.legislatwDi and 8fl.lH!tionofActs inthe'h.Sygenerall'ef;oiutions011_Illlcst'ioll8ofpolicy,issuedforthe ,) . ',. guidn.nceofthe GoVe1'lllUcnts.-TheseoftenthereportsoforCommittees,. appointed fi:om'timetotimeby Govcrnn,lenttoinvestigate tlle' workingof with ;the"Governmenhiareprimarily coi:wemed.v.' vtop,\di(;111arLo(:.tl tu' THEINDIANCONSTITUTION malters whichmayhave attractedthenoticeoftheGovern-lIlent,ofIndiainconnexionwiththedepartmentalndmillis-trationreport!!periodicnllysubmittedtoit,ortheproceed-ings-volumesof aLocalGovernment. vi.Byactiontake IIUpOIl tonoticeoftheIm-perialInspector:-;-General. vii.Inconnexionwiththehugerightof nppealpossessedbyper-sonsdissatisfiedwiththenction!!orordersof nProvincial Government. Thepositionofthe ProvincialGovernmentsisthus one of Presidency Govern-mentspossessun-enumera.tedpowers subordination,nodoubt,tothatofthe Governor-GeneralinCouDcil,butit cannot be said that the Presidency Governments at . .anyrate,aremeredelegatesoragentsof the Imperial Government.It would seem indeedthat they must bedeemedtobefree,inallthosedepartments ofadministra tion'yhicharonot speciallyreservedfortheImperialGovern directadministration,toexercisethefunctionswhich havestatutorilydevolveduponthem fromthe earliesttimes. Applyingthe languageofpoliticalphraseologyusedwithreo ferencetoEuropeanConstitutions,wemaysaythatthe unenumeratedpowers inIndiaseemto rest inthePresidencies with -theProvincialGovernments, subject:to a power of concur-rent' actiononthepartoftheImperial Government.This view isstrengthenedby the factthat undertheIndianCouncilsActs position ofthe ProvincialLegislativeCouncilsismadeone ofa concurrentandplenarycha.racter,subjecttosomospecial reservations andtheright ofvetoonthe part ofthe Imperial Government andthe Secretary ofState. Madrasand Thespecialposi-tiouofPresidcDcy Governments Bombayand,sincethisyear,Bengal,as PresidencyGovernments,areinasome what special. position. Though the tendency has bean,tillrecentIy:.to treat them inthe samewayasthelargeProvincessubsoquentlycreated. theyretainthefollowingvestiges ofthoirseparatooriginand formerinuependence :-PROVINCiALGOVERNMENTS93 i.Theyare underaCouncil Government, consiHtingofaGovernor usuallyappointedfromhome,withtwoCivilianandonc IndinncolleagueH,whoaTenominated 'bytheCrown,onthe adviceof theSecretaryofState.Theordinarybusinessof Governmentisdistributedbetweentilemembersofthese CoullcilsinmuchdIesamewayasinthelargerCOLlIICiiof theGovernor-General,butthetJistiuetionofportfoliosiH notsodefinite,Governurcan, liketheViceroy,overrule hiscolleaguesincasesof emergency; otherwisedecisiollsof the GovernorinCouIlcilarebyamajority. ii.ThePresidencyGovernmentshavetIlerightofdirectcorres-pondence",.-iththeSecretary ofState,exceptinmatters whichraisefinancialissuesandcanappealtohimagaill8 t ordersoftheGovernmentof India; butsuchanappealmust through,orbecommunicatedtothatGovernment. iii.They have fuBdiscretionintheselectionsforcertail]post!:', whichinotherProvincesrestsfinallywiththeGovernment ofIndia,(e.g.,)nominationstotheBoardofRevenueand totheProvincial-Legislative Councilsl andtheappointment of Chief andSuperillteudillgEugineersill thePublicWorkt:= Department,andConservatorsof'Forests. iv.Theyhave,inpractice,afreehandinthedetailsoftheir dititridlandrevenuewhichillotherprovinces 'aresubjecttocontrolbythe Govcnllllelitof India.Similarly theyarelesssupervisedillforestTheauthorityoftheGovernor-GeneralandhisCouncil TheLieutenant-Governorships: their originandgreater subordination overthePresidencyGovernmentsisthus exercisableonlywithreferencetothe statuteswhich have giventhemthe power ofsuperintendenceandcontrol,but their powerovertheLieutenant-Governorsand their administration ofthe provincesentrustedto them,hasbeenmademuchmore specificand .directandiscapable ofbeingincreasedor dimi-nishedaccordingtocircumstances.Theprovincesofthe Lieutenant-Governorshavebeencarvedout oftheterritories which werepreviouslyunderthodirectadministrationofthe Goverl?-0r-ger;teralin CQuncil, and their .. ,administra-94THEI'iDIANCONSTITUTION torsnecessarilyderivedthoir authority, throughtheGonoralandofhim.In nextplace, Section4oftheActof1854whichcreatedthotwoolder Lieutenant-Governorshipshaslaiddownthat..itshanbe la,viul forthesaid ofIndiainCouncilwith thelikesanctionandapprobation,thatis,oftheCourtof and the Board ofControl from timeto time, to declare andlimitthe oftheauthorityofthe Governorin CouDcil,GovernororLieutenantGovernorofBengal.ofAgra or theNorth- \Vcstern Provinces whoisnowor may behere-afterappointed."Thisappliesinterms onlytoBengal and theUnitedProvinces,but,accordingtoSir C.P. Ilbert,would seemtogivepowerto theGovernor-GeneralinCouncilto ..declareandtolimit"theextentoftheauthorityofany Lieutenant-Governor.Lastly,the appointmentofLieutenant-Governorsrestsinthe hands oftheGovernor-General,subject-tothe approval ofHis :Majesty.andthis giveshimapower of personalcontrolwhichin the case ofuhePresidencyGovern-mentshedoesnotpossess,astheirGovernorsareusually appointedfromamongpoliticians" atHome". The ChiefCommissionerisevenmorerestrictedinhis authorityas thehead ofhislocalAdminis-TheChiefGom-missioncrships: primarilydelcga ofimperial a.uthority tration.Theterritoriesunder the adminis-tration ofa Chief Commissioner arclegally speaking those which areplaced the immediate authority and management of the Governor-General in Council, whothereupon givesallnecessary orders anddirectionsrespecting the administrationofthat part or otherwiseprovidefortheadministration thereof."A Chief Commissionershi!,.thereforo,consistsofterritorieswhichwere eitheralreadyunder tho directadministrationoftheGovernor .. Generalor which como underhisadministration atthetimo'it is COIl5titutcd..Territorieswhich are already under the ailministra..; tionofGovernorsorLieutenant-Governors,accordingtotho interl)retation oftho statutos,couldnotbebroughtbythe Gover-nor-Gonor.l undertho directofaChiefCommis-,...'.,_":......... J., ' .......... '............ - '.a,:.-,,','... ; PROVINCIALGOVERNMENTS95 sioner,umlar thepowersvestodinhimtoalter the limits of pro.. vinces.A ChiefCommissionership, apparently,isviewedasa lessdeveloped formofGovernmentthan thatofa.Governorship orLieutenant-Governorship,It isusually createdbymoans of aResolutionoftheG9vernmentofIndia-Iollowedby a. Proclamation,whoneveraterritorypreviouslyunderthe Viceroy'sdirectcontrol ismadeover to theChief Commissioner, who,according to theview taken ofhis functionsby the Govern-ment ofIndia,merelyadministers aterritoryonbehalfofthe Governor-General- inCouDcil,andthe doesnotdivest himselfofanyofhispowersinmakingovertheProvincial administrationtoaChiefCommissioner.(Vide"Bhart," page194.) . Theundefinednature and character ofthesupervisionand Genera.lCha.rac-terofImperial Supervisionn.n d Control controlofthe Government ofIndia over the PresidencyGovernments,have,as inthat ofthelatter to theIndia Office,ledto many historicdisputesandisregulatedbythe specificrules whichhavebeenquotedabove andalsobyusage and precedents,someofwhicharetreated asmore or le;ssdential.Thepositionofpartialfreedomandprestigew bich thePresidencyGovernmentshaveenjoyedhasnotbeen v;rithoutadministrativedifficultieseveninrecentyears.A masterfulpersonalitylikeLordCurzon-whodisbelieved in devolutionanddecentralisation,whohadafirmfaithina strongGovernmentofIndia,Hgathering intoitshandandCOIl-trollingall thereins,"andwho" wouldridelocal governments ou the snaffle, "thoughnot au the curb-was able toboast that thereneverhadbeenatimewhentherelationsbct",'een,the Supreme andthe PresidencyGovernmentshadbeen so free {rc,m frictionorso harmonious,asinhis days.But otl;ael'masterful rulers likeLordMayoorLordLyttonwerenotabletoavoid the frequencyof" pepperyletters or indignantremonstrances, " or"thespectacleofinfuriatedpro-consulsstruttingupand downthestage."Duringthelamine011877inMadras, lorexample,Lord.Lyttonwasbard.put .!oit.tomanreuvre a 96THEINDIANastisfactoryarrangement'withtheDukeofBuckinghamin }[nc1ras,inrega.rdtoallefficientanduniformfaminepolicy jfor, ashesaid,hewasunable'Itoforceup:mthe :Madras Government advicewhichitwillneitherinvitonoraccept."Presidency Governments,itwouldthenseem,wereorten"morestrongly representedthantheSupremeGovernment,notonlyinthe India Council,hutthroughoutthe_whole regionofAnglo-India." The dangerof provokingthe resignationof provincial pro-consuls even by theuseofslight pressure fromabove,which Lord Lytton feared, is perhaps less likely now than before,bqt the opportunities thereforhavealsobecomelessowingtothegrowthofsystem, routineanduniformityinadministrativemethods.Intruth, however,the legalpowers ofcompelling obedienceinthecase of obstructive Provincial Governments in the ordinary course of busi ness are,asLordLyttonfoundout,muchfeeblerandfewerthan mightbesupposed.Now-a-daysmuchmoredependsondiplo-macyandinfluenceandthe personalqualitiesandcharacteristics oftheSupremeandtheProvinciali"ulersthanonstatutory JXlwersandrules,inenforcingtheduelimitstotheautho-rityoftheSupremeGovernmentontheonehandand the amountof independenceand autonomyoftheProvincialGovern ments onthe other. The checks againstthewrongful exercisebythe Lieutenant-Governorof arbitrarypowersare,however,muchmore complete thaninrespect of Governors and Councils.Thereisnobranch of the administration,accordingtoSir John Strachey,inwhich heisnotboundeitherbythepositive laworbythe standing orders oftheSupreme Government or hythe systemwhichhas graduallygrownap underhispredecessors.Anygreatchanges whichhomaydesiretointroducemustfirstreceive theapprov-aloftheGovernor-GeneralinCouncil.It isnotperhaps so wellknownthatthistendencytosecure thepreviousapproval oftheGovernment ofIndiaissilently,butsteadily,finding expressioninthemethodsoftheProvincialGovernmentsofthe t'\10olderPresidenciesalso,atendencywhich,ifal}.owedto persist,will.,9!}4'l-Iimited PROVINClALGOVERNMENTS97 sphereillwhichtheyareat presentabletoexerciseit.The freedomof actionoftbe Chief Commissioner isstill morerestrict-ed, forit merely exists at the discretion oftheSupreme Govern-ment to whomtheChiefCommissionerhasnotonlytolookfor thesupportwhichisnecessarytocarryonhisadministration, butfortheapprovalandcredit on whichhisfutureandfurther prospects depend. TheExecutiveCouncilsofMadrasandBombayandof Provinoial depart-mentalisation Lieutenant-Governorswhohavebeenpro-videdwithExecutive Councils are modelled onsimilarlinestothoseoftheGovernor-General.TheGovernors.wholiketheGovernor-General, areusuallyappointedfromEnglandfromamongdistinguished politiciansoradministrators.andthe havethepowerofoverrulingtheirCouncilsundercircum-stances similartothosedefinedinthecaseofthe Governor-GeneraLAdministrative,yorkintheirprovinceshas .. alsobeen"departmentalised/'moreorleSBinthe sameway asthat ofthe Governor-GeneralinCouncil,underthepowers givenbytheActsof1861and1909tothemtoframemles for theefficientconductofbusiness.TheLieutenant-Governors' provinceswhichhavenoExecutiveCouncilsareassistedby BoardsofRevenue1 orasinthePuniabandBurma,by FinancialCommissioners.EachProvincialGovernmenthas aSecretariat ofvaryingstrengthaccordingto its needs,andthe departmentsofadministrationarepresidedoverbyheads variouslytermedindifferentprovinces,whiletherearealso special departmentspresidedover by special Qfficers. CHAP'fERVI DISTRICTADMINISTRATION TheImperiala.ndProvincialExecutive authoritiesinIndia' Divisionofadmi. nistrativefunc-owetheirconstitution andpowers,moreor lessdirectlyto statutesofParliament.The tions departments of administrationwhich carryon the work oftheCentml Government,Provincial and Imperial, as wellastheLocalandMunicipalbodieswhich performfunctions oflocaladministration,depend fortheir authority,onthoother hand, on la\vs passedby the Indian legislatures and on administra-tiveregulations,organisationandtradition,noteasily susceptible ofgenemltreatment.But while adescriptionandstudy ofthe functionsperformedbythemanyministerialofficersdirectly undertheGovernmentisnotofmuchconstitutionalimpor-tance,thedivisionofadministrativefunctionsbetweenthe Imperial,Provincial andLocal authoritiesinitsgeneraloutlines ought to henoted.Fromthestandpointofpolitical development, theformofLocal,ProvincialandImperialorgacisationwill undoubtedlyroactwithmomentouseffoctonthenationalchar-acter.* ..Asareocntwriterallconstitutionshasputi t ~ - "Thecitizen whofromboyhoodexpootstota.kesometimeorotherofhisown froowill,anactivepartinthe administrationof 1000.1affairs,is likelyto befounda.very differentcitizenfromtheman who marbeauthoritatively commandedatthemostinconvenientjunctureofnfia.irstoservehis loca.litywithout.remunera.tion,andbothfromthe citizen whoperpetually findshimself cabined,cribbed,confiuedbIthecrampinginfluences ofaD .. II pervadingbureaucracy ".(Loon.udAlston,M,A.,inhis'Modern Constitutions',) DISTRICTADMINISTRATION99 Anattempthasboonmruleinthelastchaptertodednce Centralisation andDevolution from the statutes andthe prevailingpractice, traditionsandunderstandings,theexactre-lationswhichsubsistbetweentheProvincial andtheImperialGovernmentsintheexerciseofexecutive authorityandthe general division ofexecutivefunctionswbich haveflowedtherefrom.Apartfromstatutoryprovisions,the distribution of executive functions in India, does not exactly follow the Hnes which are to befoundinordinaryunitaryConstitutions in the West onthe one hand, or in the federal Constitutions on the other.The reason for this lies,inthe first place, in what has been explained in detail inthelastchapterviz.,thatthedivisionof powers in Indiaisinthenatureofdevolutionandnot of federa-tion.In thenoxtplace,itarisesfromthefactthatexecutive authority in India has proceededfromthe centre outwards inall the provincesandstartedwithamore or losshighlycentralised administrativemachinery.Administrativeauthoritywas,first ofall,devolvedupontileagentsofthe CentralProvincial Go vornments,andonlylateron entrustedinsmallandvarying measurestoLocalandMunicipalCouncilssubjecttoa dealofsupan"isionandcontrolon the partof thecentralautho rityandits agents.The principlethat it isbut a smallportion ofthepublicbusinessofacountrywhichcanbewelldone or safelyattemptedbythecontralauthorities,wasbut slowly andbuttoocautiouslyrecognisedinthiscountry,wherethe capacityfor self-Governmentevenin localaffairson thepartof thepeople,vasassumedtobelessthantheminimum.The primaryprincipleonwhichDistrictandProvincialadministra-tionmaybosaidtorestinIndia,isoneofdivisionoflabour. Popular controlover theperformanceofLocalandProvincial administrativedutieswasamattoroflaterandslowergrowth. Thustheexistingsystem,whileithassecuredbetter Devolutielland localSelf-Govern-ment organisation,hasleftlesslibsrtytothe cith:onsthaninothercountrieswbere ..Britishinstitutionshavegrown.That the '100tHEINDIANCONSTITUTION . 'growthofpopular institutions. andthe grantofsomemeasure ofpopular controlover theexerciso of administrativefunctions isinevitablein the growth ofallmoilern(ormsofgovernment, not onlyaninferenceeasilydrawn(romthe lessons of tory inthe past, but isODe which necesb8.rily arises from the vory nature oftheprogress ofmodElrnadministrations.The growth a.ndpersistenceofthokindofsubordinategovernmentwhich impliespopularcontrol,isdue,asProfessor:Uontagueonce observed,.. practicallyto theneedofrelievingthecentral 'authority inthe State andtoexperience 01lailure 01a completely centralisedbureaucracy"" Indeed."theadministrationofacivilizedStateisso Local Self-Govern-'ment a.ndPolitical Educa.tion seriousataskastodemand allthepowers ofburen,ucracyandSelf-Government com-bined."The steps,therefore,whichhave beentakeninIndiafromtimetotimeforassociatingthe 'poople in the actualadministrationofthecountry,bothin the *ProfessorAshleyinhisbookonII LocalandCentralGovern ment .,ha.selucidated the samepositionintbefollowingterms:-;-"Whatever may have beenthepreviousoourse oftheir constitutional bi-storythe persistent andrapidgrowthof the functionsofthe State, and t}loconsta.nt assumptionofnew andonerous duties and responsibilities in the last centurybave rendered some attempts atdecentralization"and some grantsofSelfGovernmentabsolutelynecessary,if thenational tIodministrationistobecarriedon withsuccess.Experie[lce, ancient and , modernaJike,hasshownconclusivelythata.completelycentralised '.bureaucracy-thatis, aself-recruitingbody ofofficialsworking froma single centre,andresponsibleonly to itself-cannotcarryon infinitely the administration ofa.largecountry;ittendsto ignore the varietiesof , localconditions,tobecomestereotypedinitsideals and methods,and , overburdened;and sooner or later a.breakdownbecomes inevitable.And iwheretho peoplehavebeendisoouraged fromtaking an interest in the task of Government,where theyhave notbeen habituated to the mmage-mcnt ofpublicaffairs,thocolla.pse,whenthobureaucracyfails,isGO muchthe greater,sincet.here is nothingwhich OBnbesubstituted fortbe broken-downofficialorganisation.For thesepraoticalreasons, amongst 'others of a.moretheoretical andpoliticalchamct.er,inallpr4!lgressi\'c States, dating thelast century,attempt.shavebeenmade at dceentrali.-.a-tion and the development of8elf.Qovernment in twoways:(a)by entrust-irt!:rthe inhabitantsoflocalities,or theirchosenrepresentatives,with the conduct{undergreutcrorlessoontrol)ofthosemattersofpublic interc::;tandutilitywhichconcern thelocalities chieflyorentirely; and (b)by providing forthoparticipation ofunofficialcitizensinthe man.1.ge-ment ofS3me at least ,ofthoseotherma.ttersofudministr;i.tionwhich .. cdtobelongpart.icularlytotho l>phcrcoftho CentralGovern-'w.ent ... DISTRICTADMINISTRATIONiOl LogislativeCouncilsandinthor..,caland Municipalbodies, arebutthenecessaryconsequencesofadevolutionwhich becameinevitablewiththegrowingburdenofadministra-tion.There are,however,alongwiththese purely requirements,otherconsidorationsofamoretheoreticaland political character whichhavealsotosomoextent influenced the associationofthepeopleinthetaskofGovernment.These areusually summed upin the phrase,"political education,"which it isdeemed to be tbeduty ofall modern progressive governments to impart tothecitizensoftheState.Theimportanceofthat portionofthe operations ofpoliticalinstitutionswhichiscom-prisedinthepoliticaleducationofthecitizenshasbeenthe theme 01allwritersonpoliticssincethedays ofMill.Both these aspects ofLocalGovernmenthavebeenwellsummed upbythe lateProfessor Sidgwickinthelollowingterms :-"Mostinternalexecutivefunctionswhethercoerciveorin-dUl:itriai,obviouslyneedofficialslocallydispersed,-policemenand soldierl:iforthe maintenance,}oorder,collcctorsoftaxesdirectand "indirect,Ill!l.llagersofroadl'landpub:iclandofallkinds,postmasters andotller officials occupiedincOII\'eyanceandcommunication,relieving officen;,I:lanitaryinspectorsawlsoforth.Inspeakinghowever,of Hlocalgovernments"illauuitary 8tate, wechieflylIleaDorganswhich, thoughcompletely 8ubordinatetothecentrallegislature,areindepclI-dentof the centralexecutiveinappointmentandtosomeextent,in theirdecisionsandapartially independentcontrolovercertain parts ofpublicfinance. Theprimaryreasonforthislocal independenceisthat it is.required torealisethe fullad\'antages of thatreactionof thegovernedonthe governingorganswhichrepresentativeorresponsiblegovernment seeks tobringabout.SuchadvantageslIIaylieill thedirectioneitherof greater efficiencyorof greater economy,Fil'st,nswesay,thetheory of responsible goVel'Umelltrests011theprincipletho.ttheinterestRof anygroup of governedper80USwillbemostsafely entrustedto govern-iugper80llSwhomtheyhavethepower,froUltimetotime,todismiss directly orilJ(lirectly,It is obviollsinferencefrolllthis principle that goverllluentalfunctionswhichaffectHolelyor mainlythe inh.\bitnnls of alimitedpUl'tionoft\St;\t"eshouldbeplacedulHlerthe!:ipecialcontrol TallINDIANCONSTITUTION of I:)ectiolloft.hecOllllnunityiinorderthatthecriticismofthis sm:tioll,backedbythepower of appointmentlIlaybring aiJuut a adaptntiullofadministrativeactivity toits peculiar needs. EspeciallyinInatters-Sllcilas education aud poor-relief-in whichvalu-a.bleaidcanandshouldbegiventogovernmentalworkbythevolun-tary efforts of privatepersons,weInaycxpect tosecureimportant gains bylocalisingthe controlof the electorate o\"erthework.Again,sofar fit! any c1aRsof governmental services are rendered exclusivelyormainly toa group ofpersonswholivewithinacertaindistrict,itisobviously equitabletothrowthewholeormainexpense of suchI:)cn'icesonthese personsjand-so farasthisexpensecannotconvenientlybemotby paymentsvoluntarilymndobytherecipientsof theservicesthopari!>onofcostwithutilityislikelytobemoreaccurately performedif thefinancialmanagement of this departmentofgovernmental business isentrustedtoaseparate organ. But there areotherrea80nswhya developmentof local govel'llmenti!:limpOl-tant,ifnot indispensable,totho effectiveworkiug ofrepresontativeinstitutions inacommunityas largeas lIIostmodern state!:>areovercclltraJisatioll,illsnch&cQ.mmunitYlintroducestwoop' positedangers.Inthefirstplace,ifthoonlyactionthat anordinary t!itizenis calledupontotake 1illreferenceto publicof any o'1"e3ot interest orimportance,isthatofvotillgatintervalsofseveralyears, as auuitinagroupof lUallythousandelectors,foramemberofthe centrallegislature-orevenfor headofthecxecuti .... e-thereisa dangerthatthecontrolof the citizcnsgenerallyovertheirgovernniellt willbecomeslackandineffcctiye;sothatexerciseofthevote wiHbeespeciallyliabletobeperverteduythesinisterinfluenceswhich wehavebeforeoxmnined.Butagainthesamecausethattendsto renderthepoliticalcons.cionsneBs ofthe ordinarycitiilelltoolanguidat Ol'diMrytimesalsotendstoincre:l.setheriskfromoccasioonlgusts of discontcntandexcitement, callRingllnrel\twnnbleexpectationsand complaint$;of gO\'erHmcnt;theilia!'!!'!ofthecommunitycannot hut lackthatgeneral diffusedknowledgeoftherealnature of govern-mentalbusineHs.andthe conditionsandlimitationsnnderwhichit is carriedon.whichf'omheingbrought intointimate:::ocialrela' tionsWitJlthepl..!ruolIsadnllUyresponsihle01"it.IIIIJ(lul..!ativevaluebrightlyaltrihutcdtorCI)resentati\egovernment hugely d.epelld;,lUIItimucVclOplllCIlLoflocnlDISTRWTADMINISTRATION103 'Vemn!':talsotakeintoflcconnttheflnnge]'of the centralgovernmentwithwork.The importanceofflangergrowl! iuproportionamoreextendedviewiHtakenoftheproperfunctions of governmentjifthotenuC"ncyactuallyoperativeinEnglandtowards increasinglyextensive [l,udcOlnplexgovernmentaliuterferenceisillthe mainjl.l::;tifiable-as wehave secu rCtUlOIlto hecomeH increasing-lyimportantthatthe,yorktobedOlleHilOUldbe distributed amongdifferent orgalls 150that IlOIlC may be overLnrdened".["Elements of Politic, ", pp.511-.013J. Theprincipleofpopularpoliticaleduca.tionasaraison d'etreofLocalSelf-Government didnot findreadyacoeptancein India foralongtime,thoughit waslaiddownbyLordRipon inhisfamous onLocalSelf-GovernmentinIndia in 1882 in no unambiguousterms.Lord Morley,while Secretary ofState forIndia,reiteratedthis.speetofthematterinhis well-knownReformDespatch in1908,andit isnotyetknown, to what extent it will be carriedout intheproposalswhichare nowunderconsideration,inconsequenceoftherecommenda-tions oftheRoyalCommissiononDecentralisation,forthe improvementofthemachineryoflocalanqdistrict government inIndia.Theassociationofthepeopleortheirrepresentatives inthe highertasksof government abovethoseofdistrictand localadministration,isstill ofaverylimited character,butis likelytobeappreciablyenhancedwiththeprogressofthe ReformedLegislativeCouneils. A devolution of administrative functionswhichinvolves the Fouradministra-ti ....e authorities grant of some measureofSelf-Government cannotbeinIndiaamerematterof definingtherelationsbotweenthelocal andcentral government,but involvesadivisionofpowersand uutiesbetweenfourdifferentauthorities.Thereis,firstof all,theImperialGovernmentwhich,aswehaveseen,has gotdiroctcontrolofcertainservices_Thereisnext,the ProvincialGovernmentinwhosehandsareentrustedthe normalfunctionsofadministrationwithintheprovince,but subject tosupervisionbythe Imperial Government.There are VII'"vdiif - "'YJI""..,'r'osoft lOiTHEINDIANnext tho district officialswhoarctho agentsordeputiesofthe ProvincialGovernmentandexercisetheirpowersunderits ordersandinstructions inthe several districtswhich constitute, mol'Sor less,the uniform administrativeunit in all the provinces ofIndia.And,lastly, thoroarc the Local andMunicipal bodies towhomhavobeancntrustopectswithanimmensenumberof pettypensant-pl'oprietOl's.Hei:-;likewise,inmostProvinces, concernedwiththeadjndicationofdif:1.pnlcsbetweenland-lords andtenantsandabowiththeadministrationofe:;tatestaken underthemanagement oftheCuurtsof\Vards. *Hetokeep a. carefulwatchoverthegelleralcirculllstfLl1Cet;of hilldistrict,and in timesof famineorsevereagriculturaldistresl:!,heisresponsihle forthe administrationofreliefandotherremedialmealSurelSoHealsodeals withthe grant of loanstoagriculturists,andwiththepreparationof ngriculturulandotherstathitics ;andhehasageneral controloverthe workingofthe"ForestDepartmentinhisdh,trict,insofarasthi::; touchesonmatters affectingtheecollomicOrotherillterestlSof the people. It i!:lIlisdutyto guideand oontroltheworkingoflUullicipalities clUdhei'::\oftentheactualchairmanor officerof oneorlIlore of these.Hcusually,also, overthedistrictboard,which, withtheaidof subordinatelocalboardswheresuchexist,maintains roads,bchooh-,anddispellsaries,anddealswithvaccinationand sanitaryimprovements,inruralareas.Finally,he hastofurnishin-collectiuHoftherevenuefromtheIfLIHlandothert;Qurce:,;;heisalsoa revenuealHlcriminal judgebothof installceallIlillappenJ.nut hi!JItitlebynomean::; hi:;multifarious,n:::all'eadynoted,hn!'!ageneralont:;;idecon-lrol,innon-technicalmatterl