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Page 3lessons from ladakh standoffWe keep repeating the mistakes. The Chinese PLA incursion in Ladakh, across the LAC, has been again a collective intelligence failure for India. There is much to be learned for India from the current scenario.lt General p.c. Katoch (retd)

Page 4disengagement to demobilisation: resetting the relationsChina is a master of spinning deceit and covert action exploiting strategy and statecraft as means of “Combative coexistence” with opponents. Throughout their history Chinese have had their share of brutal conflicts at home and with neighbours.lt General J.K. sharma (retd)

Page 5way ahead for the Indian armed forces

The threat of the virus is all-pervasive and to ensure Force Protection, an essential towards operational readiness, the Armed Forces have issued exhaustive instructions/guidelineslt General r.K. Jagga (retd)

Page 6reading the Tea leaves — pm at frontline: defining national strategyPrime Minister’s personal appearance on the frontline has unequivocally reinforced that entire of Ladakh is Indian Territory and any intrusion and aggression will be met with full might and resolve of the nation. With this the PM has clearly defined the National Strategy.lt General J.K. sharma (retd)

Page 8dhanush — ‘make in India’ success story

lt General naresh chand (retd)

PlUselectronic warfare – denying electromagnetic advantage to enemy 9lt General p.c. Katoch (retd)

weapon locating and Battle field surveillance radars 10lt General naresh chand (retd)

news in Brief / special reports 11

SP’s A N S P G U I D E P U B L I C A T I O N

The ONlY magaziNe iN asia-Pacific DeDicaTeD TO laND fORces

>> LEAD STORYIn ThIs Issue

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ILLuSTrATIoN: SP Guide Publications / Vipul

LACLine of Actual Control

Demchok

Leh

Zoji La

Shyok

Galwan Valley

Pangong-TSO Lake

Patrol Point 14

Nubra Valley

NJ 9842

Skardu

Kargil

Karakorm Pass

Depsang La

Line Of Control

LOC

INDIA

CHINA

PAK

Aksai Chin

Siachen Glacier

Teram Shehr

Bilafond La

Jammu & Kashmir

LADAKH

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

Gilgit

Baltistan

Wakhan Corridor Territory ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963

(Shaksgam Valley) The LAC

CLASheS ALong

May 5 Indian and Chinese soldiers

clash at Pangong TSO lake.

May 10 Face-off at the Muguthang Valley

in Sikkim.

May 21 Chinese troops enter into the Galwan River Valley

in Ladakh region.

May 24 Chinese camps at 3 places: Hotspring, P14 and

P15.

June 15 Violent Face-off” between Indian

and Chinese Soldiers. A Colonel and 19

soldiers martyred from the Indian side

while China (PLA) suffered 43 to 49

casualties including a Colonel, killed in

the scuffle

The original State of J&K which acceded to India in october 1947 comprised 2,22,236 sq km. But today India is in physical occupation of only 1,06,566 sq km of the original state of J&K. Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) is 72,935 sq km less 5,180 sq km of Shaksgam Valley leased to China in 1963. China occupied Kashmir (CoK) consists of 37,555 sq km of Aksai Chin plus Shaksgam and territory nibbled over the years, all totaling up to 42,735 sq km.

LT GENERAL P. C. KATOCh (RETD)

BackgroundPost Partition of undivided India in 1947, the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) was acceded to India by the then ruler of J&K, Maharaja Hari Singh through an Instrument of Accession signed on October 26, 1947 post massive Pakistan infiltration. For the Partition, British barrister Cyril Radcliffe arrived in Brit-ish India for the first time on July 8, 1947. He was given exactly five weeks to draw the bor-ders between an independent India and the

newly created Pakistan. Radcliffe had never visited India earlier and probably had never seen a map in his life. He chaired two boundary commissions, one for Punjab and one for Ben-gal, consisting of two Muslims and two non-Muslims – none from military or with military background. Over a Century of British rule in India and five weeks to Partition the Country by a novice - Radcliffe! Mountbatten declared Inde-pendence only on August 15 though the result-ing boundary award was announced on August 17. Radcliffe sailed back for England on August 18, Partition along the Radcliffe Line ended in

facTs that led to the creation of paKIsTan occupIed KashmIr (west of loc) & chIna occupIed KashmIr (east of lac)

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violence that killed one million people and displaced 12 million.

The original State of J&K which acceded to India in October 1947 comprised 2,22,236 sq km. Independent India’s bor-der in the northwest touched Wakhan Cor-ridor of Afghanistan and border to north with China Occupied Tibet (COT). Pakistan had no border with China. But today India is in physical occupation of only 1,06,566 sq km of the 2,22,236 sq km of the origi-nal state of J&K. Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) is 72,935 sq km less 5,180 sq km of Shaksgam Valley (Indian Territory) illegally leased to China in 1963. China Occupied Kashmir (COK) consists of 37,555 sq km of Aksai Chin plus 5,180 sq km Shaksgam and territory nibbled over the years, all total-ing up to 42,735 sq km. US and regional Pakistani media had reported in February 2012 that Pakistan was considering leasing Gilgit-Baltistan (72,971 sq km) to China for 50 years. Today we have a Line of Control (LOC) with Pakistan and Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.

POK and British TreacheryOn Partition of India, the British conspired an invasion and capture of J&K through Mountbatten (Governor General of inde-pendent India), Lockhart (C-in-C Indian Army) and Douglas Gracey (C-in-C Pakistan army), keeping Nehru in dark and Jinnah in picture. Pakistani invasion of so-called Razakars had a mix of Pakistani Army regulars – all armed by Pakistan Army.

Clement Atlee had become Prime Minis-ter of Britain but Churchill was still in the advisory loop. Churchill hated India despite 2.5 million Indians fighting in World War II that enabled British victory. Churchill instructed Douglas Gracey, C-in-C Pakistan army to let India-Pakistan fight but “keep a piece of India”, so that both keep fight-ing in perpetuity. Douglas Gracey organ-ised fall and massacre of Skardu Garrison, which was holding on for eight months. The complete garrison including women and children were massacred. Gracey, however, spared Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jung Thapa, the Garrison Commander. Gracey who in his younger days was commanding a Gorkha Training Centre in India liked play-ing hockey. He had noticed Thapa’s hockey skills and coaxed him to join J&K State Forces. Fall of Skardu threatened Kargil and Leh, for which Indian Army had to mount attacks, including to securing Zoji La, with more loss of lives.

British officers of Pakistan Army guided Pakistani infiltrators into Shyok and Nubra Valleys of Ladakh but the Nubra Guards of Ladakhis fought and made them retreat. When the Indian Army was going after the retreating Pakistani infiltrators, Mountbat-ten and Lockhart persuaded Nehru to call a ceasefire and approach the United Nations for arbitration – another trap which Nehru fell for. British plan was for Pakistan army to get a foothold in J&K, making it party to dispute when referred to UN. Importantly, British wanted to keep Gilgit–Baltistan with a country of their making (Pakistan) to

fight communist threat of Russia and China on borders of Kashmir. What an irony that Pakistan today has become vassal state of Communist China and is wooing Russia too for armament.

During the India-Pakistan Karachi Agreement of 1949 held under aegis of the United Nations, the Ceasefire Line (CFL) marked went east only till NJ 9842, beyond which it only said “thence North to the Glaciers”. According to Captain S.K. Sinha (later Lieutenant General and Gov-ernor J&K) orders to mark the CFL only up to NJ 9842 came from Delhi – another Brit-ish mischief. Also the CFL was marked on a 1:2,50,000 map with thick sketch pen and did not follow the watershed principle. Marking a 1:2,50,000 map with a thick sketch pen itself meant a difference of up to one kilometer at any point – cause for perpetual friction. 1972 onwards CFL was termed Line of Control (LOC).

During 1967-70, maps by Pakistan, UN and other global atlases depicted CFL cor-rectly. But in 1967, the US Defense Mapping Agency began showing Indo-Pak boundary on Tactical Pilotage Charts from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram (KK) Pass without justifica-tion or any documentation; cartographi-cally giving entire Siachen-Saltoro area to Pakistan. This possibly was by design because of the soft corner US-UK had towards Pakistan. In addition, US wanted to establish relations with China that eventu-ally led to President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972. Following the US Defense Mapping Agency began showing Indo-Pak boundary

on Tactical Pilotage Charts, many official-private cartographers and atlas produc-ers followed suit and Pakistan eventually started claiming this as boundary. India ironically slept.

In late 1970s/early 1980s, many expe-ditions applied to Pakistan to climb peaks in the Siachen area due to Pakistan claim-ing the area. In 1978, a German Siachen-Kondus Expedition with a Pakistani liaison officer entered Siachen via Bilafond La and established the base camp on the confluence of Siachen and Teram Shehr. The documen-tary “Expedition to the longest glacier” was shown on German TV in 1979. In April 1984, India successfully pre-empted Paki-stani designs to occupy the Saltoro massif – a fact and admission of the strategic sig-nificance of Saltoro admitted by Musharraf in his autobiography ‘In the Line of Fire’. Ever since then Pakistan has been looking to grab more Indian Territory, its last big ven-ture being the failed Kargil intrusions dur-ing 1999. It has not given up and still hopes to capture J&K in conjunction with China.

COK and India’s NaivetéThe McMohan Line is the demarcation line between Tibet and Northeast region of India, negotiated between Tibet and Great Britain at the end of the Shimla Conference (October 1913–July 1914) and named after the chief British negotiator, Sir Henry McMahon. The document has been signed by the Tibetan representative but China refuses to acknowl-

LEAD STORY

Covid was overshadowed by China’s surprise action on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) thus the lead article by Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) gives a very comprehensive background on how Pakistan occupied Kash-mir (LoC) and China occupied Kashmir (LAC) was created. As a result the original State of J&K which acceded to india in octo-ber 1947 comprised 2,22,236 sq km but today india is in physical occupation of only 1,06,566 sq km of the original state of J&K. Since then problems on LAC and LoC continue.

Regarding lessons learnt from the LAC in Ladakh, Lt Gen-eral Katoch laments the norm to appoint committees after conflict situations whose reports are either buried or lessons forgot-ten. Result is that we tend to keep repeating our mistakes thus the author has suggested 12 points for focus. We hope somebody higher up is listening.

After protracted military-to-

military talks, both sides had agreed to disengage but then PLA has reestablished its posts and built ups at various points. in an article on the disengage-ment and de-escalation, Lt General J.K. Sharma (Retd), a China expert warns not to take the Chinese pull-back on its face value as China’s history of back stabbing is well known and can repeat itself.

The world and india are in the grip of Covid-19 thus in an article on the subject Lt General R.K. Jagga (Retd) defines the role of Armed Forces under the threat of the virus and how to keep them operationally fit in the all pervasive environment of the Covid-19.

Writing about the unsched-uled and surprise landing of Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Leh on July 3, 2020, along with the CdS and the CoAS, Lt Gen-eral J.K. Sharma (Retd) claims that india has seized the initia-tive and taken the challenge to

Chinese camp and have sent a clear message that india shall resist every expansionist move with courage and resolve. The visit has been a great morale booster for the troops on the front line in Ladakh and whole of the armed forces and their families. With special focus on the strategy of some countries without mentioning China the Prime Minister stated that “those who are driven by expansion-ism have always posed danger to the world. History bears tes-timony that such forces have either been destroyed or forced to return back. it is due to this experience that world is coming together against expansionism”. The PMs trip was followed by a two day trip by defence Minister Rajnath Singh to LAC and LoC from July 17-18.

Then there are a few articles on technologies which play a key role specially in gathering intelligence and border manage-ment. Weapon Locating Radar,

Battlefield Surveillance Radar and Electronic Warfare are all systems of the moment. dha-nush is another success story of ‘Make in india’ which is also included.

This issue as usual wraps up with the News digest. All person-nel who are involved in publish-ing newspapers and magazines like this one, are all Corona Warriors as they are risking their life to reach you all to keep you updated with key news.

Happy reading!

ED

IT

OR

IA

L

Jayant BaranwalPublisher & Editor-in-Chief

during the India-pakistan Karachi agreement of 1949 held under aegis of the united nations, the ceasefire line (cfl) marked went east only till nJ 9842, beyond which it only said “thence north to the Glaciers”. 1972 onwards cfl was termed line of control (loc).

In 1962 when nehru directed the army to throw pla out of one illegally occupied post, china launched a massive pre-planned invasion. In 1963, pakistan leased shaksgam Valley in pakistan occupied Kashmir (poK) to china in exchange for military and nuclear technology.

PHoToGrAPH: INC

File Photo: India’s first Home Minister Sardar Patel with India’s first Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru

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32-3/2020 sp’s land forces

edge the McMohan Line. In sharp contrast, China used an old sketch of the Kuomin-tang Regime which it had overthrown to claim the nine-dash line in South China Sea. Unfortunately, Jawahar Lal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister was inclined excessively towards China at the cost of India’s strategic interests. When General Robert Lockhart, first C-in-C of India took a strategic plan for a Government directive on defence policy to Nehru, he took one look at the paper and shouted, “Rubbish! Total rubbish! We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is ahimsa (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. Scrap the army! The police are good enough to meet our security needs.” Instead of helping Tibetans against Chinese inva-sion, Nehru was supplying rice to PLA. He also told US, UK and UN to go ignore Tibetan protest to UN saying that would distract from the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commis-sion in the Korean Peninsula – as scripted by former ambassador R.S. Kalha.

Sardar Patel had written to Nehru on November 7, 1950 saying, “We have to con-sider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates…… We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. …..Chinese irre-dentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperi-alism of the western powers…. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist.

While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India’s defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously.”

Simultaneously, the Commandant of Defence Services Staff College at Wellington told students in October 1950: India’s back door has been opened, and Himalayas have become the boundary with a large, power-ful and expansionist China; India’s eastern regions have become vulnerable - within range of bombers from bases in Tibet; defence of mountainous frontier would cost India more than it can afford; if Kash-mir issue is not solved, India would have unmanageable defence burden, and; India would have to pay dearly for failure to act before China became stronger and was free

of her commitment in the Korean War. About 2.5 million Indians participated

in World War II, most of who were dis-banded at the end of war in 1945. India could have easily mobilised 2-3 Divisions from these trained soldiers and helped Tibet retain its independence from the rag-tag PLA but we did not. Nehru continued to believe China’s legitimate interests must be acknowledged to reduce international ten-sions. A.G. Noorani writes that “integrating the China into the international commu-nity by conceding its right to the Chinese seat at the UN Security Council was in fact a central pillar of Nehru’s foreign policy.” India became aware that China had built a road through Aksai Chin (Indian Terri-tory) and established PLA posts there much after all this was completed. Aksai Chin was annexed by China without firing a shot or violence – compared to killing close to one million Tibetans in Tibet till now.

In 1960 Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai visiting India said there would be no war but was waiting for an opportunity with the Indian Army poorly equipped. In 1962 when Nehru directed the Army to throw PLA out of one illegally occupied post, China launched a massive pre-planned invasion. Indian’s could have continued fighting in some places but the weak higher military leadership ordered withdrawal. PLA eventu-ally withdrew because of inability to sustain itself across the Himalayas through winters. Nehru died a disillusioned man backstabbed

by China. In 1963, Pakistan illegally leased Shaksgam Valley (Indian Territory in Paki-stan occupied Kashmir (POK) to China in exchange for military and nuclear technol-ogy. Zhou En Lai visited Pakistan and sug-gested to Ayub Khan that Pakistan should prepare for a prolonged conflict with India instead of short-term wars, advising Paki-stan to raise a militia force (read terrorists) to act behind enemy (India) lines.

In 1966, Zhou En Lai meeting a Paki-stani military delegation in Beijing raised his clenched fist and said, “This is capable of delivering a forceful blow, but if you cut off one finger, the fist loses its power, not by one-fifth, but by fifty per cent. If you wipe out a couple of hundred thousand of the enemy spread over a long front, its impact is not as great as wiping out an entire bat-talion or a brigade but enemy’s morale is dealt a devastating blow. We know this from practical experience.” China supports Paki-stani terrorists both at the UN and against India-Afghanistan. Through a bloodied Maoists insurgency, China has successfully brought Communists to power in Nepal, drawing Nepal in its strategic sphere. China has announced it will bear costs of teach-ing Mandarin in Nepal’s schools which the government has accepted. Naturally, teach-ers will come from China well versed in ideological and psychological treatment of the upcoming generation. PLA deployment

LEAD STORY

In 1963, pakistan illegally leased shaksgam Valley (Indian Territory in pakistan occupied Kashmir (poK) to china in exchange for military and nuclear technology.

lessons from ladakh standoffWe keep repeating the mistakes. The Chinese PLA incursion in Ladakh, across the LAC, is once again a collective intelligence failure for India. There is much to be learned for India from the current scenario.

LT GENERAL P.C. KATOCh (RETD)

THE NORM WE FOLLOW is to appoint committees after conflict situations whose reports are either buried like Henderson Brooks report of 1962 or lessons forgotten

like of Kargil Review Committee. Comment-ing on shortcomings ‘during’ the conflict is taboo – even considered anti-national. Result is we tend to keep repeating our mistakes.

But there is much to be learned from the current scenario.

One, Jarnail Singh, former joint secre-tary in PMO has blamed R&AW for intelli-gence failure for the 1999 Kargil intrusions in his book ‘With Four Prime Ministers – My PMO Journey’. 21 years later we suffered similar intelligence failure with Chinese aggression in Eastern Ladakh, even though NTRO was raised after 1999. Mere intima-tion of PLA exercise in Aksai Chin, which is training area for PLA mechanised forces, was hardly enough. China had constructed a new road four kilometers short of Galwan which satellite imagery should have picked up. The NSA and the Joint Intelligence Com-mittee failed to warn the Cabinet Committee on Security of the impending threat, as did the Director General, Defence Intelligence Agency to the Defence Minister.

Two, China has had 24x7 satellite cover astride the LAC but we have been focused on Pakistan and failed to do so against China despite missions to the Moon and Mars.

Three, China had reacted strongly to our map of Union Territory of Ladakh issued in October 2019 which included Aksai Chin. This was reason for us to be more vigilant. In fact, intelligence reports indicate that China was to intrude into East-ern Ladakh last year itself but the operation

was delayed because of COVID-19. Four, prior to Kargil Intrusions, Paki-

stan had observed that our reserve Division at Nimu in Ladakh had been moved to the Kashmir Valley to deal with the heightened insurgency. In the current context, India was busy battling COVID-19 and because of the lockdown the routine exercises were called off and mobilisation hampered because of limited rail movement. Did we anticipate that China will seize this opportunity? Our Army too must share the blame for not tak-ing precautions knowing that PLA’s Western Theatre Command was exercising.

Five, a foreign scholar has written a detailed article on how PLA rehearsed the aggression on a full-scale model (satel-lite imagery provided) before advancing into Eastern Ladakh. Why did we miss out detecting this?

Six, we failed to read the enemy (China’s Communist Party) and President Xi Jinping despite the fact that every Chinese action since 1962 was anti-India and China never

respected border protocols and agreements. Seven, without a Strategic Defence

Review and National Security Strategy, we went about the exercise to reduce the Army strength by 1,00,000 plus. In doing so we glossed over China’s illegal claims on Indian Territory. The Division looking after Eastern Ladakh has a frontage of about 800 km – does it have adequate manpower, surveillance means and reserves to deal with intrusions?

Eight, the ITBP deployed in Eastern Ladakh even in sensitive areas of Depsang and Chumar is not under command of the Army, as required by the Kargil Review Committee and follow up Group of Min-isters headed by the then Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani. ITBP follows its own chain of command through their IG and DG to Ministry of Home Affairs. This creates avoidable operational problems militating against requirements of unity of command. In 2013 also China made a 19 km deep intrusion in Depsang.

Nine, during the Kargil Conflict, then Army Chief General V.P. Malik was con-strained to say, “We will fight with what we have.” In the current context, witness the mad rush to procure weaponry, ammunition, rifles, helmets, bullet proof jackets, unmanned aerial vehicles and the like. This has happened because of the political belief that there would be no war and as a result successive defence budget allocations that have been negative in actual terms - even adversely commented by former diplomats as lowest since 1962.

Ten, China and for that matter Pakistan also understands power. Soft Power has no value without Hard Power. While Soft Power ‘softens’ blow of Hard Power for the recipient, both Soft and Hard Power must be employed in tandem. Hybrid Warfare is now the pre-ferred form of conflict, which India has not fully acknowledged. We need a road map for building hard power holistically with a time-table, plugging operational gaps on priority.

Eleven, there will be no bigger fools than us if we still believe in China’s promises and peaceful intentions despite being warned periodically starting with Sardar Patel’s let-ter to Nehru on November 7, 1950. Despite the motions of disengagement, China still has presence inside Depsang and a Mecha-nised Division lined up opposite Depsang and Demchok which implies PLA could still initiate conflict.

Twelve, theory provides cumulative wis-dom through cumulative strategic study of previous conflict that helps exploit practical opportunities. Clausewitz had said, “Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and ploughing through it, but will find it ready at hand and in good order”. We need to draw right lessons from the Ladakh Standoff to deal with China in future. SP

Continued on page 10...

ILLuSTrATIoN: Vimlesh Yadav

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LT GENERAL J.K. ShARmA (RETD)

THE NARRATIVE ON THE Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China and in the Sub Sector North (SSN) and rest of Eastern Ladakh since July 5, 2020

has been of disengagement. This has mani-fested only in to minor thinning and some withdrawal of opposing forces on the LAC, particularly the areas of Hot Spring, Gogra, Galwan and Fingers along the Northern Bank of Pangong Tso. Much of this has happened after series of talks at the level of Corps Commander from military side and then political and diplomatic parleys of July 5 between the Special Representatives of two countries, i.e National Security Advi-sor of India and Foreign Minister of China. How the disengagement is translating itself on ground and it’s implications on the sta-tus quo ante that India has been seeking for has become a matter of debate, especially on the mechanism of disengagement and what kind of concessions are being given by either side in terms of real estate. This whole matter further is of even greater con-cern as the analysts and strategists are yet to get a clear insight to the explanation as to why China adopted this stance at all. The reasons could be many from India’s cosying up with USA, issues of domestic legitimacy

of Xi Jinping, India’s infrastructure develop-ment close to the LAC and/or many more, but it will not be business as usual for very long. The relation in which Prime Minister Modi had been investing ever since 2015, never loosing an opportunity to strike a per-sonal rapport, are heading further South-ward with every passing day.

The PLA has moved back by 1.5 to 2 kms at varying locations but has contin-ued to consolidate in the rear all along including those areas where disengage-ments are happening. The PLA is building up defences, constructing concrete bunkers and while there is thinning out from the show window to avoid direct confrontation; however they are definitely not leaving the sector. Similarly the Indian Army troops have also thinned out and moved behind. So there is disengagement (thinning out) but not de-escalation (demobilisation) making the consequences implicit. Because of lack of authoritative commentary from the government it is difficult to interpret

on the interactions that have taken place at the political and diplomatic level on the process and procedures as also the limits of pull back involved. Therefore, what is hap-pening on ground leads to perceptions and perceptible and not concrete deductions? From all this emerges is that both sides have moved some distance. A buffer zone of anything between 3 to 6 kms has been created which will be inviolable for some time till the situation normalises. And that normalisation remains a big question mark for some time to come. This also implies that the patrolling rights of Indian forces at multiple points have been forfeited for this duration or forever, as in international poli-tics, possession is not just nine-tenths of the law, it is the law. It actually means that we have withdrawn from the boundaries that we had controlled, even if it was by patrol-ling, as we can’t go to the same points again. This is rather a dangerous precedence with great disadvantage to India.

Brahma Chellaney rightly comments,

“The setting up of Buffer Zone creates a new status quo, even if temporary. However since the new status quo suits China, it may push to enforce it indefinitely until a settlement is reached thus depriving India of patrolling rights. The revised status quo would be firmed in by applying the percept that “possession is nine-tenths of the law.” The Buffer Zone creates a huge advantage for China1.” Post Doklam, Chinese had established a strong position on plateau which was only being patrolled earlier. There should have been polit-ical and diplomatic initiatives to call out for changing the status quo. To believe that rela-tions, because of the Wuhan Summit and at Mamallapuram were normal would be naïve. Why would other wise PLA had continued pressing forward on multiple points along the LAC, push for changing the definition of LAC coupled with a significant change in their behaviour. This put to question the whole construct and structure of agreements since 1988-1993 and the confidence building mea-sures in 1993, 1996 and 2013 in an effort to prevent the use of force on the borders.

Every narrative points towards China’s intentions being questionable. 58 years ago, the Headlines of July 15, 1962 read “Chi-nese troops withdraw from Galwan Post; Great courage shown by Indian Jawans: Delhi warning has telling effect.” Exactly 96 days after this banner headlines on October 20, 1962, war happened. Para 6 of the leaked Secret Handerson Brooks Report gives out how and where the clashes happened before the war. “The clashes started from Longju in Aug 1959 and then Kongka La in Oct 59. India adopted the forward policy in Nov/Dec 1961 and then Galwan happened on 10 Jul 1962 followed by Dao La on 08 Sep 62 and finally the war on 20 Oct 1962”. This no way implies that the cur-rent disengagement albeit thinning out and neither de-escalation nor demobilisation may lead to war. However the trust deficit that has erupted and only reinforced over a period in dishonouring of the various CBM’s and Treaties resulting in murderous assault on Indian troops and build up and consoli-dation with thinning out as an alibi is to be

Even 58 years ago, newspaper headlines of July 15, 1962 read “Chinese troops withdraw from Galwan Post; Great courage shown by Indian Jawans: Delhi warning has telling effect.” Exactly 96 days after

these banner headlines, on October 20, 1962, India-China war happened.

ILLuSTrATIoN: Vimlesh Yadav

LAC STAND-Off

disengagement to demobilisation: resetting the relations

China is a master of

spinning deceit and

covert action exploiting

strategy and statecraft

as means of “Combative

coexistence” with

opponents. Throughout

their history Chinese

have had their share of

brutal conflicts at home

and with neighbours.

The pla is building up defences, constructing concrete bunkers and while there is thinning out from the show window to avoid direct confrontation; however, they are definitely not leaving the sector.

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addressed with caution and guards on.Tactical actions can have grave strate-

gic implications if red lines are not clearly visible and defined. History has shown that adversaries never respond to weakness. China is a master of spinning deceit and covert action exploiting strategy and state-craft as means of “Combative coexistence” with opponents. Through out their history Chinese have had their share of brutal con-flicts at home and with neighbours. Bite by bite, China has been nibbling away at India’s

borderlands, even as successive Indian PMs have sought to appease it. The present dis-course risks locking India in a “no war, no peace” situation with China and imposing huge security costs. This path aids China’s time-tested strategy of attrition, friction and containment to harass, encumber, encircle, deceive and weigh India down2. The pressing forward and selective withdrawal and mak-ing No Man’s land as their territory could just be an exploratory attempt for a con-firmed expansionist state to gauge the world opinion and reaction for much larger design.

India needs to view the entire strate-gic landscape as part of single whole. What may appear at this stage to us and the rest of the world as a miscalculation could well be manoeuvred in to a great victory with deploy-ment and holding on to areas which till this far was No Man’s land giving patrolling rights to both sides. China may for the time being would have lost the public opinion warfare with “expansionists design”, “Covid crisis”

and also “Cyber warfare” launched covertly through e companies. The consequences of New Delhi’s decision of banning 59 applica-tions and it’s emulation by other countries may have also shattered Beijing’s long term ambition to replace the US as world’s domi-nant technical power in the immediate. But quite acceptance of Chinese expansionist design in revising and redefining the LAC and Indian claims to other areas would be our greatest geopolitical and strategic setbacks.

On the one hand India will have to deter-mine the operational and tactical warning sign that we missed because of which we have been taken by surprise at every level. On the other, being the largest neighbour and at least this far even the largest trad-ing partner, India need to re-set it’s relation with China, offcourse with the backdrop of recent crisis. This Resetting will have to be in the entire spectrum encompassing all aspects of military, strategic, diplomatic and economic perspectives. Just as China

has continued with it’s assertiveness over the East and South China sea without letup, the assertiveness on the LAC will have to be confronted with resolve and favouring India strategically. While the new alliances must be reinforced, the neighbourhood also must be secured. The Middle Kingdom (China) has had no hesitation in attacking India’s core interests and wants to redeem it’s ter-ritorial claims. India also must shed all hesi-tations to create as much turmoil for China. Endeavour should be towards Re-setting the relation from least of all strategic equilibrium if not from strategic superiority by leveraging the Comprehensive National Power in entirety. SP

The Author is Former Chief of Staff (COS), Central Command, Indian Army. Retired in April, 2019, he is an expert on Siachen and Ladakh with experience in counter insurgency operations in J&K and North East and is also an expert on Information Warfare.

COVID-19 / LAC STAND-Off

LT GENERAL R.K. JAGGA (RETD)

INDIAN ARMED FORCES SINCE its inception have been the first responders to any disaster situation. Even after rais-ing of NDMA (National Disaster Man-agement Authority), the Indian Armed

Forces have been at the forefront of these efforts. The Indian Armed Forces have the necessary logistical infrastructure and dis-ciplined and skilled manpower to mount a suitable response in any situation.

While the Indian Armed Forces con-tinue to carry out their essential tasks, they have made available all resources, capabili-ties and their expertise at the disposal of civil administration; from augmenting the over-whelmed medical resources to flying in the stranded Indians from abroad; from trans-porting men and material to the remotest locations in the country to sending medi-cal teams to friendly foreign countries. The Armed Forces, in conjunction with Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Ordnance Factory Board, have worked to augment vital medical equip-ment. Probably the civil administration could have also asked the armed forces to assist in the migrant issue.

Military Operational ReadinesslStrict vigil is being maintained on the

LC and LAC. Despite COVID-19, intelli-gence based counter-insurgency opera-tions are being carried out relentlessly; the terrorists are on the run and in hiding in safe houses. However, COVID or no COVID, Pakistan continues to pursue their state policy of fomenting terrorism; the ceasefire violations, the infiltration bids, the recent encounters in Handwara and the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen leader Riyaz Naikoo are a grim reminder that the cycle of violence in Kashmir will ebb and flow till we make it cost-prohibitive for Pakistan. Since the

abrogation of Article 370, a lot has been achieved. Indian strategic planners need to recast their policy and plans and use all resources at the nation’s disposal to make Pak pay dearly in every which way. At the same time there is a need to keep a window open for talks; talks with people who matter and call the shots rather than the front-facing puppets.

lThe threat of the virus is all-pervasive and to ensure Force Protection, an essential towards operational readiness, the Armed Forces have issued exhaustive instructions/guidelines. The field exer-cises and other training activities which can raise the chances of spread of the virus have been suspended.

The Way AheadlThe Armed Forces have to be Battle

ready at all times. However, military operational readiness will get impacted

if little or no training takes place due to the coronavirus for a prolonged period.

lAmidst the need to follow corona pan-demic guidelines and yet be ready for all eventualities, including assisting the civil administration to fight the invisible enemy – second round of COVID-19/ another epidemic; the Armed Forces have to think of novel ways to train and prepare. Some of the measures that can be undertaken are:

– Virtual Training & Simulators. The Army is presently not ready to conduct virtual and simulator-based training at a large scale. The pres-ent pandemic can be a driver to move towards training using virtual reality and augmented virtual technology. There is a need to induct simulators which use augmented virtual real-ity to give a feel of the real environ-ment. In present corona times, virtual

training will not only be able to meet today’s requirements but will also pre-pare the Armed Forces for future vir-tual based training needs.

– Biological/Chemical Warfare Training Exercises. The Armed Forces need to give more impetus to Biological/Chemical Warfare train-ing. There is a need to carry out regu-lar exercises to check our readiness to combat such an epidemic in future. These exercises have to be carried out not only within the armed forces but also with PMF/other civil agencies. Sol-diers have to be trained and made more aware of fighting at the individual/unit level as even on how to assist the civil administration in such situations.

– Military Intelligence. With con-spiracy theories abound of the origin of the coronavirus, it is the need of the hour to include biological/medi-cal intelligence as part of intelligence gathering. The armed forces need to expand their activities from pure mili-tary intelligence to gathering informa-tion about the invisible enemy – the next pandemic/biological agents. More coordinated effort by the Defence Intel-ligence Agency with other Intelligence Agencies is paramount.

– Stocking of Resources. The nation was caught unawares as we did not have adequate stockpiles of medical equipment/supplies to fight the corona pandemic. Like other stockpiles of arms, ammunition, equipment, etc. which the Armed Forces maintain as war wastage reserves, there is a need to stock PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) and other medical equipment which may be required for such a situation. SP

The author retired in December 2019 as Director General, Mechanised Forces, Indian Army.

The threat of the virus is all-pervasive and to ensure Force Protection, an essential towards operational readiness, the Armed Forces have issued exhaustive instructions/guidelines

way ahead for the Indian armed forces

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh holding a meeting with the National Security Advisor, the Chief of Defence Staff and the Tri-Service Chiefs, in New Delhi on May 1, 2020

PHoToGrAPH: PIB

There is disengagement (thinning out) but not de-escalation (demobilisation) making the consequences implicit.

References:

1. Brahma Chellaney, Hindustan Times, 2020-07-09; China may win, without fighting | Opinion 2. Brahma Chellaney, Hindustan Times, 2020-07-09; China may win, without fighting | Opinion

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6 sp’s land forces 2-3/2020

NATIONAL SECURITY

reading the Tea leaves —pm at frontline: defining national strategyPrime Minister’s personal appearance on the frontline has unequivocally reinforced that entire of Ladakh is Indian Territory and any intrusion and aggression will be met with full might and resolve of the nation. With this the PM has clearly defined the National Strategy.

LT GENERAL J.K. ShARmA (RETD)

wITH THE UNSCHEDULED AND surprise landing of Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Kushol Bakula Rim-pochee Airport at Leh on

July 3, 2020, along with the first Chief of Defence Staff and the Chief of Army Staff, India has seized the initiative and taken the Challenge to Xi’s camp and have sent a clear message that India shall resist every expansionist move with courage and resolve. The visit is even more significant as it has happened amidst critical stand off at the Line of Actual Control where a brutal clash resulted in martyrdom of 20 braves of Indian Army. With this visit and in his 26 minute speech at Nimu to the troops, while paying glowing tributes to the bravery of the martyrs and the Armed Forces, PM has sent out a very clear message to the Nation, the adversaries and the rest of the world that India is prepared and will stand up to defend its territorial integrity under all circumstances.

The visit has been a great morale booster for the troops on the front line in Ladakh and whole of the armed forces and their families, especially at a time when arm chair analysts and dooms-sayers within our camp noise about the asymme-try of power and seek India to re-caliberate it’s strategy. PM’s personal appearance on the frontline, recalling the sacrifice of people of Ladakh with special mention of Rimpochee and acknowledging Ladakh as India’s pride, has unequivocally rein-forced that entire of Ladakh is Indian Ter-ritory and any intrusion and aggression will be met with full might and resolve of the nation. With special focus on the strat-egy of some countries without mention-ing China on Vistarvad (Expansionism), he stated that “those who are driven by expansionism have always posed danger to the world. History bears testimony that such forces have either been destroyed or forced to return back. It is due to this experience that world is coming together against expansionism”. With this the PM has clearly stated India’s future approach to it’s Foreign Policy and National Secu-rity. By mentioning that India has always pursued the path of peaceful coexistence,

however the same can only happen from a position of strength, our resolve to repulse any incursion, irrespective of its potential cost has been conveyed unambiguously.

At the highest battlefield of the world, the PM in his speech, straight from the heart, punctuated with quotes in Sanskrit, Veer Bhogya Vasundhara (Only the brave shall inherit the earth), Tamil and Hindi, has glorified the sacrifices. His mention on his government’s special focus on Border Area Development Programme (BADP), push to the infrastructure development under the same programme, which remained neglected for decades, equipping the armed forces with latest state of the art technology, weapons and equipment, as also a word on

integration and the office of the CDS was for reassuring the troops that there is every endeavour to be better equipped than China. The mention of unparalleled and universally acknowledged bravery of Indian soldiers during the World War I & II, in the Peace Keeping Operations across the globe and various wars fought post independence was to invoke the pursuance of internal strength. This surely has touched the heart and spine of every Indian soldier. Taking the time out to meet the injured of Galwan Valley clash at 153 Base Hospital at Leh on his way out was the finest gesture from the leader of the nation. His prudence in using the occasion to draw a comparison between India’s pur-suit of Vikasvad (the path of Development)

vis Vistarvad (Expansionism) is symbolic of his statesmanship and admirable.

A special mention of Lieutenant General Y.K. Joshi, the GOC-in-C of Northern Com-mand who briefed the Prime Minister on this occasion. The nation couldn’t have had a more experienced and dedicated Military commander in such critical times. He was commanding the unit when they captured the Tiger Hill in Kargil war. Commanded his Unit, Brigade, Division and the Fire & Fury Corps in Ladakh in same area and was also Defence Attache to China for three years. Who would know Chinese better and hence the confidence of troops in him.

The visit of PM Narendra Modi to Leh and Nimu, to get briefed in person, away from the power point presentations, meet the injured who were involved in the bru-tal clash, and interact with troops on the ground that are preparing in case the situ-ation transits from diplomatic negotiations to military zone, has been a game changer. On one hand as head of the nation and true leader he has given a big boost to the confidence of the nation and shut up the doom-sayers. He has also in no uncertain terms messaged that banning of the Apps was just the beginning and more is yet to come and no matter what is the potential cost, the country is prepared for the same. On the other, he has given a very clear mes-sage to the world and especially China, that India lead by Modi shall stand up with resolve backed up by it’s full might against any incursion or aggression of any kind/any form.

China, which to date relied on Sun Tzu’s Art of War and followed the tactics of decep-tion, deceit and delay and then stab from the back has no option but to respond. The Global support for India has grown expo-nentially. It is not a coincidence that when PM was delivering his speech at Nimu to his troops, Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the same time was announcing to the world that Japan opposes any “unilateral attempt to change the status quo” on the LAC. Earlier, USA, France, Australia and UK had already come out against China and it’s policies of economic and territorial aggres-sion. Russia, which was perceived to be under the influence of China, has already promised to advance it’s delivery of S-400 by one year. With such antagonism and dis-approval from the world on its hegemonistic stance, now it is for China to Read the Tea Leaves right. Statements such as “avoid any miscalculation on China” or “time not right to add to tensions” will not cut ice with India any more. India is talking from a posi-tion of strength.

Modi has given a very clear message that India will not back off. And China must restore the status quo on the LAC at the ear-liest. However if it decides to take it to a long haul, India is well prepared for the same in every domain. SP

The visit has been a great morale booster for the troops on the front line in ladakh and whole of the armed forces and their families

(Top) “The enemies have seen your fire and fury” - Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressing soldiers at Nimu in Ladakh. The Leh based 14 Corps is also known as the Fire and Fury Corps;

(Above) Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat (left) & Army Chief General M.M. Naravane (front right) during his visit in Ladakh.

PHoToGrAPHS: PIB

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THE BATTLE TANK, OR the Armoured Fighting Vehicle, ever since it made its first appearance on the Battlefield of Somme in 1916, has retained its pre-eminent

position as the primary means to carry the battle to the enemy and deliver the decisive edge in a land based engagement between Armed Forces. The appearance of tanks led to development of anti-tank munitions. In the early stages of this race, the only protection against new munitions was to enhance armor thickness which increased the weight and decreased the mobility of the AFV. This method was not practically effective against defeating Munitions like High-explosive Anti-tank (HEAT) rounds, or Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs). This led to next level of evolution of pas-sive protection viz use of better performing, lighter alternatives to Steel, like Composites and the deployment of ‘add on’ armour as spaced armour, explosive reactive armour.

In recent years, the Battle field saw the advent of a large variety of anti-tank guided missiles and unguided rockets rapidly evolv-ing from simple First Generation Wire Guided Missiles to TOW, to Beam Riding to the 3rd generation fire-and-forget, guided, top-attack modern missiles and TOW missiles that were capable of defeating passive and add on armour & destroy their target with tandem war-heads. This proliferation of Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM) capable of being launched from a variety of Platforms/Config-urations soon outstripped threats posed to a tank from conventional tank fired projectiles and munitions. This necessitated a paradigm shift in AFV protection and spurred develop-ment of new technologies within the given weight limitations to counter them known as Active Protection Systems (APS). These systems utilise electronic sensors to detect & track incoming direct-fire ATGMs and HEAT munitions & Laser Threats, and defeat them by launching countermeasures to deflect/destroy them. APS thus changed the calcu-lus, by enhancing AFV protection without significantly impacting vehicle weight.

HENSOLDT group core competence has been to recognise a wide range of threats and to provide practical and optimal solu-tions to improve the safety and operational effectiveness of military platforms. Evolu-tion of HENSOLDT’s MUSS (Multi-func-tional Self-protection System) has been the endeavour in the same direction. MUSS is the most advanced in-service, cost effective and practical solution to improve the surviv-ability of Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) or Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) platforms.

Col. Ravin Kumar, a former-Tank man of Indian Army, now Director Marketing & Busi-ness Development, Hensoldt Private Limited, had an interesting conversation with Dr Oliver Rudow, Head of Ground Protection Systems and Mr. Franck Friedlander, Sales Director at HENSOLDT in Germany about this fascinat-ing product. Below are some excerpts:

what are the key criteria that influence the choice of customers worldwide in selecting active protection systems (aps) for afV/IcV?While the choice of APS largely depends on experience and respective military doctrine, however some key drivers that influence the decisions are:

lThe system should not degrade/adversely impact AFV/IFV operational role and capabilities and provide 360 degree cov-erage to cater for all angles of arrival of threats including top attack munitions.

lCapable of detection, tracking and neu-tralisation of multiple threats (ATGMs of all types, CE & KE projectiles) that the AFV/IFV is likely to encounter in the battle field simultaneously and deploy appropriate countermeasures.

lNo resultant collateral damage by deployment of countermeasures to crew/other dismounted personnel/soft-skinned vehicles in vicinity/optical & Optronics devices and other soft points of the AFV/IFV.

lThe System should have minimum Size, Weight & Power (SWaP) specifications. External components should not enlarge vehicle profile, block/impede access or functioning of any existing hatches/ports/Observation devices and Arma-ment. Internal Components should not displace existing combat loads and sys-tems and with no additional environ-mental/EMI impact.

lCost effectiveness is a key driver. Initial and through life costs should be optimised.

lThe APS should be modular with open architecture and future ready-to-inte-grate additional sensors and counter measures as per requirements for a given platform limitations/threat perception and levels of protection required.

could you describe hensoldT muss® aps system which is already on the Ger-man army’s puma IfV and what are its key differentiators?MUSS® is a Passive Detection (PD) with a Soft Kill (SK) effector based Active Protec-tion System (APS), delivering a KEY protec-tion layer against Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) and Laser (guided) Threats (LT).

The system mainly comprises two pas-sive sensors, a Missile Warner (MW) and a Laser Warner (LW), with two counter-measures – a 360 degree rotatable IR Jam-mer (IRJ) and Directable Smoke Dispenser (DSD). The System is modular, flexible, easy to install and a cost effective solution for the customer. The modular system architecture makes it easy to customise the configuration for specific vehicle ergonomics and opera-tional requirements by combining selected sub-systems to deliver a desired effect.

MUSS is an In-Service system fitted on the SPz PUMA, the most modern IFV of the

Bundeswehr Armoured Infantry Brigades. MUSS was ‘designed’ into the protection solution of the SPz PUMA.

The Key product differentiators include:lModular and scalable system for dif-

ferent vehicle (wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles) types and opera-tional requirements for overall protec-tion.

lHighly cost-effective solution.lSignificant SWaP advantages over APS

using Hard Kill effectors. lUndetectable and Jamming proof.lNo Collateral Damage to host Platform

or Local Area.lEasy to integrate, no strong provisions

needed. Does not significantly alter/degrade platform.

lComplimentary to traditional Hard Kill APS. HK APS protection are only against certain threats and not against all RPGs.

lProduct Roadmap includes Interface to Hard Kill Effector, Laser Jamming & Daz-zling, Tracking & Confirmation Sensor, Integration into Surveillance and C2 system and Platform Interoperability.

what are key differences between hard Kill (hK) and soft Kill (sK) solution? and what are the global trends in customer prefer-ences that you see?APS can be broadly classified into “Soft Kill” systems, intended to prevent the oncoming threat from accurately targeting the vehicle whereas “Hard Kill” systems are designed to use direct explosive force to destroy/deflect/degrade incoming projectiles. The Key dif-ferentiators between the two being, nature of sensors used to detect and track threats - Passive versus Active and the type of coun-ter-measures deployed to neutralise the threat. Both systems defeat the threat before impact, SK by EO Jammer (or Laser Dazzle) or with obscuration and a HK system by deploying counter kinetic effect using Mul-tiple Explosively Formed Projectiles (MEFPs) to destroy/deflect/degrade any threat.

Whilst today some Armies have tested and in some cases, have even fitted Hard Kill Systems as an interim solution, major challenges with technological readiness & maturity of HK systems, significant inte-gration constraints and operational restric-tions coupled with usage issues are causing them to review this choice! The experience of users with Hard Kill solution seems to be triggering interest in adopting an evolution-ary modular approach starting with a base-

line of Soft Kill systems and incrementally building capabilities on it.

I.e. the German Army recognised the advantages of a layered approach protection. Against ATGMs, where the armour is not sufficient, they use MUSS. Accordingly, the PUMA IFV is designed on a 2-step approach:lwith a level A protection armour, which

can protect from ballistic threats, which weighs 31,45 tons and can be air-trans-ported in the Airbus A400M, MUSS fitted.

lwith a level C enhanced protection armour, which can protect against RPGs and which weighs around 43 tons, MUSS also fitted.Global armed forces are now realising

the need to have scalable and modular solu-tion which has the potential to be config-ured as per the limitations or operational imperatives of the platform.

could you please elaborate your views on the Indian market? what are your plans to introduce muss to Indian customers? The Indian market, with its large inven-tory of Tanks and ICVs as well as its future platform development programs offers huge potential. We are also cognizant about India’s uncompromising focus on Military self-reliance through “Make in India” policy.

It is important to reiterate the fact that MUSS system is already in-service on ~350 SPz PUMA, which is the most modern IFV of the German Army with its existing capa-bilities to defeat a wide range of ATGMs and low SWaP profile. The MUSS Product road-map envisages adding Hard Kill capability by Interfacing Active Tracking & Confirma-tion Sensors, kinetic effectors against KE/CE projectiles, Laser Jamming & Dazzling, Integration into Surveillance and C2 system and Platform Interoperability and achiev-ing Fleet level protection.

Therefore our approach would be to offer complete Active Protection Systems (APS) framework to Indian customers wherein Indian capabilities could be lever-aged by means of Joint development, build-to-print and/or build-to-specs to realise the indigenous APS solution in the most practi-cal and incremental way.

MUSS with its inherent modularity of design, multi-pronged evolutionary approach involving technology and capa-bility enhancement across the system in all components – sensors and effectors, feasi-bility of integration of parallel systems or add on sensors and effectors in its architec-ture fits in well with this approach. SP

HENSoLDT group core competence has been to recognise a wide range of threats and to provide practical and optimal solutions to improve the safety and operational effectiveness of military platforms. HENSoLDT’s MuSS (Multi-functional Self-protection System) has been the endeavour in the same direction - protecting armoured vehicle while maintaining manoeuvrability with no collateral damages.

muss – The Invisible shield of the Tank

MUSS fitted to IFV PUMA

mARKETING fEATURE

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8 sp’s land forces 2-3/2020

INDIGENISATION

LT GENERAL NARESh ChAND (RETD)

INDIAN ARTILLERY ACQUIRED 410 guns of 39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers way back in 1987. Since then there was no acquisitions as this deal got mired in corruption and was known

as the Bofors scandal. Lack of prolonged acquisitions led to alarming voids in fire power. Finally the stake holders woke up and formulated a fresh blue print of artil-lery modernisation in 2000 called Field Artillery Rationalization Plan (FARP). FARP was rather ambitious which involved the acquisition of about 3,000 guns of various types to suit every role and terrain in which the Artillery would be employed. FARP also selected 155mm/52 calibre or 45 calibre for majority of the gun systems. Such an approach would accrue great dividends in terms of increased range and intensity of the fire power. The planned period for 3,000 guns was up to 2025. This was indeed a tall order both in terms of technology and budgetary constraints. Until now Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and its 41 factories were the sole provider of weaponry, ammu-nition and other military hardware but it was now planned to involve the private industry to broaden the defence industrial base of India and also accelerate the rate of production. It was also hoped that India would be able to take the first baby steps towards export.

Indian Ordnance FactoriesThe Gun Carriage Factory (GCF) at Jabal-pur had been making guns since 1904 which included 105 Indian Field Gun (IFG) and the 40mmL/70 Bofors Air Defence Gun on transfer of technology but these production lines were closed due to lack of demand. The 105mm IFG was designed by the Armament Research and Develop-ment Establishment in 1972 and handed over to GCF for its production jointly with a Gun Development team from Artillery headed by Brigadier Gurdayal Singh, an eminent gunner of Second World War vintage. Brigadier Gudayal Singh was a legend within the Gunners who could not read a blue print but could guide the production process at GCF due to his inti-mate knowledge of guns. The IFG was in service with the Indian Artillery for many decades. The other factory involved in gun/tank manufacture is the Ordnance Factory Kanpur which manufactures ord-nances, spare barrels and other spares for all Artillery and Tank guns. It also manu-factures ammunition which includes large to medium calibre shells, bombs and stabi-lisers for Pinaka Rockets. Interestingly the factory was conceived in the year 1942 as Transplantation Project in the wake of impending threat of axis powers emerging from eastern front during World War II. At present OFB has a strong base for the manufacture of higher calibre ordnance and has the only barrel manufacturing capability in India. With such a strong technical base, OFB can greatly leverage joint ventures with private companies who will bring in corporate culture.

DhanushWhile exploring for the solution to moder-nise Artillery, it was discovered that Bofors of Sweden who supplied 410 guns of 39-cal-ibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers had also provided transfer of technology for the man-ufacture of FH-77B in India but this fact was lost in the offices of Ministry of Defence.

Development and TrialsIt was a challenge to develop the gun from voluminous blue prints and documents running over 12,000 pages which were delivered to India under the first phase of transfer of technology around 1987 but OFB took the challenge head on by develop-ing a gun which was about 20-25 per cent better than the original gun in parameters like range, accuracy, consistency, low and high angle of fire and shoot-and-scoot abil-ity. High angle fire is especially useful in high altitude like Siachen for crest clearance to reach targets located behind a high moun-tain range. Shoot and scoot is very much required to fire and change (scoot) the gun position quickly to avoid counter battery fire. It was more challenging due to high

weight of the gun. It is also very complex to design a weapon system for the Indian envi-ronment as it is required to operate from the icy Siachen to the blazing desert of Rajast-han and the plains of Punjab.

Three Dhanush guns were handed over to the Army for user trials during July 2016. It was hoped that after the successful trials, Dhanush will enter service in phases-with 18 guns in 2017; 36 guns in 2018 and 60 guns in 2019, making a total of 114 guns. But a hurdle turned up in the form of the shell hitting the muzzle brake while exiting the barrel. Muzzle brake is a device con-nected to the muzzle or barrel of a gun that redirects a part of propellant gases to coun-ter recoil and unwanted muzzle rise. Possible solution was to redesign the muzzle brake but later on it turned out that the culprit was the faulty ammunition. The final trials of Dhanush were completed by June 2018 and in February 2019 it was cleared for series production with its induction formally starting on April 8, 2019.

IndigenisationThe Defence Ministry said in a statement that, “Indigenisation to the extent of about 81 per cent has already been achieved. By the end of 2019, the indigenisation level of the gun will go up to 91 per cent,”

Handing over of first batch of Dhanush Guns“The OFB has handed over six Dhanush guns to the Army in the first phase. Dha-nush is the first indigenously built 155mm x 45 calibre long-range artillery gun with strike range of 38 kilometres,” said the then OFB Chairman Saurabh Kumar, adding that the weapon was a major success story of the ‘Make in India’ initiative. The OFB on April 8, 2019, handed over the first batch of six Dhanush artillery guns to the Army in an ceremony held at GCF. It was reported that the first Dhanush regiment with 18 guns

is expected to be ready by the end of 2020. The GCF has received the Bulk Production Clearance (BPC) to manufacture 114 guns from the Army on February 18, 2019. Some salient features of the gun are:lAutomated technology allows three to

six guns to be fired simultaneously at a single target, each gun having a capacity to fire 42 rounds in an hour.

lThe weight of the gun is under 13 tonnes, making it easy to move and deploy in hilly terrain and remote areas.

lIt is a versatile weapon that can oper-ate in all climatic conditions applicable in the Indian environment. The gun is fitted with inertial navigation sys-tem with global positioning system (GPS)-based gun recording and auto-laying, an enhanced tactical computer for onboard ballistic computations, an onboard muzzle velocity record-ing, an automated gun sighting sys-tem equipped with camera, thermal imaging and laser range finder which enables it to fire by day and night. It can also carry out direct firing on to a target to destroy a target like a tank or a gun.

lThe self-propulsion unit allows the gun to negotiate and deploy itself in the field.

lThe existing Bofors gun is a 155mm/39 calibre gun with a range of 28 km. The Dhanush developed by OFB is 155mm/45 calibre gun has a range of 38 km. Normally for guns, the length of the barrel is the diameter of the bore multiplied by the calibre thus larger the calibre, longer will be the barrel which will enable a longer range. Thus the range of Dhanush is 38 km. The ammu-nition of Dhanush is compatible with all North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 155mm ammunition system. The range of 38 km gives Dhanush a big advantage over other gun systems.

lProjected cost of one gun is `15.5 crore which is quite cost effective.

Mounted Gun System (MGS) A vehicle mounted variant of the Dhanush called MGS was showcased by OFB at the Defexpo 2018 show. The gun is mounted on a 8x8 Tatra truck license manufactured by BEML and has a 30 kmph cross country speed and 80 kmph road speed.

ConclusionThe making of Dhanush Gun System is a stupendous achievement by OFB sup-ported by other organisations like the Army, Defence Research and Development Organ-isation, Directorate General Quality Assur-ance, PSUs Bharat Electronics Limited, SAIL, and private firms. The OFB is confident of producing 8-10 guns a month within two to three years. Its longer reach of 38 km, auto-mation and state of art sighting system gives a great edge to Artillery over other gun sys-tems. No wonder it was displayed during the 2020 Republic Day Parade. SP

The Author is former Director General, Army Air Defence and was a member of Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme.

It was a challenge to develop the gun from voluminous blue prints and documents running over 12,000 pages but oFB took the challenge head on by developing a gun which was about 20-25 per cent better than the original gun in parameters like range, accuracy, consistency, low and high angle of fire and shoot-and-scoot ability.

dhanush — ‘make in India’success story

It is very complex to design a weapon system for the Indian environment as it is required to operate from the icy siachen to the blazing desert of rajasthan and the plains of punjab

Dhanush 155mm artillery guns made by Ordnance Factory Board

PHoToGrAPH: MoD

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TEChNOLOGY

LT GENERAL P.C. KATOCh (RETD)

THE IMPORTANCE OF ELECTRONIC Warfare (EW) has gained momen-tum with rapid advances in tech-nologies in the modern era – both in warfare and the civil arena.

EW exploits the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to control it for offensive and defen-sive actions. This ability to collect and make sense of signals in an environment when combined with radar provides capabilities to detect threats, take evasive action and also launch countermeasures against any attack and its source. Complexities of EW have increased with the telecommunica-tions boom including networks of signals for billions of mobile phones and computers, creating massive congestion in the radio-frequency spectrum; it is more difficult to find ‘signals of interest’ in military terms especially with arrival of 5G telecommu-nications and the Internet of Things (IoT). Technology is driving nation states toward achieving political objectives by other means; such means also include technology in general and the role of EW in particular.

EW can be applied from air, sea, land or space by manned and unmanned systems; targeting humans, communications, radar or other assets, both military and civil. In present day security scenario, it is impera-tive that forces spread over vast areas remain connected with one another in every possible way. The integration and conduct of EW to support military missions across all services is therefore critical. EW follows the basic step of signal processing from analogue to digital allowing sampling the signal environment digitally; the signals are analysed utilising Artificial Intelligence (AI) to ascertain their identity and the result is the separation of what is valuable from the worthless. The process undergoes three stages: lfirst, EW provided Electronic Intelligence

(ELINT) – providing details of emitters of interest in the EW Spectrum to create their electronic signatures for later pro-cessing by AI algorithms to identify them;

lsecond, electronic support through pro-vision of situational emitters of all emit-ters that are tracking you or having the ability to strike you with a weapon sys-tem, and,

lthird, electronic protection by detecting incoming weapon, setting the stage for defensive measures. For EW, the Indian Army has the

‘Samyukta’ EW System developed jointly by DRDO, Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) and Corps of Signals of the Indian Army and private companies like CMC and Tata Power SED. Some 40 companies also contributed by producing various com-ponents indigenously, challenge being to tackle US sanctions post the Pokhran nuclear test banning import of advanced electronic components. CMC and Tata power SED jointly developed the Command and Control Software having 10 million

lines of codes even though the project was not commercially attractive.

The Samyukta EW System is fully mobile and is meant for tactical battlefield use. It covers wide range of frequencies and cover-age of EMS is handled by the communication segment and the non-communication seg-ment. Its multiple functions include ELINT, Communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) including electronic attack. Each Samyukta EW System operates on 145 ground mobile vehicles which has three communication and two non-communication segments and can cover an area of 150 km by 70 km. The system has the capability for surveillance, analysis, interception, direction finding, and position fixing, listing, prioritising and jamming of all communication and radar signals from high frequency (HF) to milli-meter wave (MMW) communications.

Samyukta also gives useful inputs to the IAF. DRDO has become a ‘single window’ supplier of EW systems for the Army, Navy and Air Force. ‘Sangraha’ is a joint EW pro-gramme between DRDO and Indian Navy for provision of EW suites for use on differ-ent naval platforms capable of detecting, intercepting, and classifying pulsed, carrier wave, pulse repetition frequency agile, fre-quency agile and chirp radars. These sys-tems can be deployed on multiple platforms like helicopters, vehicles, and ships. Certain

platforms, along with electronic support measures (ESM) capabilities have ECM capa-bilities. DRDO has also developed a static as well as mobile ESM system ‘Divya Drishti’ capable of ‘fingerprinting’ sensors. It has also upgraded ESM capability of the ground based as well as airborne platforms of the IAF. The airborne early-warning and con-trol (AEW&C) aircraft have such capability.

In the South Asian context, it is quite clear that India’s main rival is China, not Pakistan. Information warfare (IW) capa-bilities of China are an integration of cyber warfare (CW) and EW; recognising comple-mentarities between the EW and CW and the role that EMS plays for both. In context of land warfare, EW and CW support army operations and missions. Most immediately relevant to land operations are ground-based EW systems and aerial EW systems. For China, both these kinds of warfare are linked, which China calls integrated network electronic warfare (INEW) and its relation-ship with ground warfare. According to PLA, EW and CW are not mutually exclusive; it is necessary to recognise their convergence and integration to dominate information operations during wartime – hence the term INEW. China does not have a formal doc-trine for INEW that is available in the pub-lic domain. PLA’s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) integrates the functions of intel-ligence, technical reconnaissance, EW and CW. This synergy has tremendous advantage both during periods of war and non-war.

Pakistan Air Force has EW aircraft for airborne warning and control. Its Navy’s ‘RIBAT’ EW system supports command and control platforms and keeps commanders aware of the battlefield. RIBAT has a variety of ground, surface, and airborne applications, especially in maritime scenario. Pakistan is also using Software Defined Radio (SDR) that provide automatic integration with tactical and strategic networks to provide “cellular phone” services to tactical users. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works have devel-oped ELINT Threat Perception and Identifi-

cation System for all kinds of emitters offer-ing broadband coverage, high accuracy and sensitivity, automatic and manual operating modes, classifier for automatic emitter recog-nition and GUI based electronic order of bat-tle. In recent months, Chinese-origin JY-27A counter-very-low-observable radar has been sighted at Mianwali Air Base in Pakistan.

In India, the tri-service Defence Cyber Agency (DCA) was established last year and tasked with handling cyber security threats. Going by media reports, DCA would have capability to hack networks, mount surveil-lance operations, lay honey-pots, recover deleted data from hard drives and cell phones, break into encrypted communication chan-nels, and perform other complex operations in addition to framing a long-term policy for the security of military networks and pre-paring a CW doctrine. It is doubtful whether DCA will incorporate EW functions on lines of PLA’s INEW strategy. This may be due to lack of synergy (and focus?) between Army Training Command (ARTRAC) responsible for formulating doctrines, and other agencies like Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) with DG DIA directly under Ministry of Defence (MoD), Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency (DIARA) under HQ IDS, Corps of Signals and National Technical Reconnaissance Organisation (NTRO), with DCA added now.

Indian Army’s quest for acquiring net-work centric warfare (NCW) capabilities too have been killed because of multiple reasons: inability of hierarchy to understand tech-nology and long-term plans sacrificed with changes in senior hierarchy; DRDO causing inordinate delay due inadequate capability causing time delays and high costs, and; poor defence budget allocations forcing closure of projects disregarding operational disadvan-tage when fighting NCW-capable enemy. Mil-itary Survey developing the GIS was moved out from Directorate General of Information System (DGIS). Battlefield Management Sys-tem (BMS) was shut despite two prototypes ready because of poor overall defence budget allocations. The CIDSS too has been closed, which was the nerve centre of Army’s Tac C3I programme. BMS was one of the Operational Information System (OIS) of Army’s Tactical Command, Control, Communications and Information (Tac C3I), which was to be the mainstay of NCW capability of the Army. The Command Information Decision Sup-port System (CIDSS) which was to integrate all the OIS including BMS, Battlefield Surveil-lance System (BSS), Air Defence Control & Reporting System (ADC&RS) and the Artil-lery Command Control and Communication System (ACCCS), as well as the ‘Samyukta’ EW System and military intelligence systems. To-date only the ACCCS has been fielded in the Army and ADC&RS is partially func-tional. The officer strength of DGIS has been cut down by more than half under the plan to reduce the Army’s manpower by 100,000 to 150,000 in absence of a national security strategy. Army’s Tac C3I appears dead, and so does its pursuit for NCW capabilities. SP

electronic warfare – denying electromagnetic advantage to enemy Electronic Warfare (EW) represents the ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum to sense, protect, and communicate. At the same time, it can be used to deny enemy the ability to either disrupt or use these signals.

complexities of ew have increased with the telecom boom including billions of mobile phones and computers, creating massive congestion in the radio frequency spectrum

Electronic Warfare Jammer passes through the Rajpath during the Republic Day Parade

PHoToGrAPH: PIB

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10 sp’s land forces 2-3/2020

inside Nepal is likely in very near future. China-Pakistan have proxies in Myanmar

like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the United Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (ULF WSEA) bringing together nine insurgent groups of northeast including NSCN and ULFA. Insur-gent and banned organisations in India have China-Pakistan links. Despite overt bonho-mie, China has been against India’s entry into the NSG and UNSC as a permanent member. All Chinese companies and individuals work-ing abroad are pledged to help gather intelli-gence for their country and Chinese develop-

ment projects have PLA presence. The recent PLA intrusions in Eastern

Ladakh during May 2020 took us by com-plete surprise. Ironically same had happened in Kargil during 1999. The brutal surprise attack on our troops in Galwan Valley by PLA using swords and clubs was in complete dis-regard to border protocol. Our brave soldiers gave a befitting reply to the PLA, killing over 43 of them compared to losing 20 of our own braves. Both sides took hostages which were later exchanged. The pre-meditated attack was to convey a message to Prime Minister Narendra Modi. After protracted

military-to-military talks on June 22, both sides had agreed to disengage but then PLA has reestablished its post at Patrol Point 14 and has built up in Depsang. China’s history of backstabbing has been repeated.

ConclusionOur policy makers were of the belief there will be no war. As such defence allocations were minimal and military modernisation dumped. We failed to realise that China’s policy was always based on surprise, ambi-guity and deceit and that it is power that China and Pakistan understand – hard

power is a deterrent by itself, soft power not backed by hard power is ineffective and soft power coupled with diplomacy is no substi-tute for hard power. The dual threat across the LOC and LAC and China baring its fangs should serve as a wakeup call. To add to this, Nepal has gone hostile and possible PLA deployments in Nepal will compound our problems manifold. The next surprise by China may be around the corner. SP

The Author is Former Director General of Information Systems and a Special Forces Veteran, Indian Army.

RADARS / LEAD STORY

LT GENERAL NARESh ChAND (RETD)

aIR DEFENCE, WEAPON LOCAT-ING and Battle Field Surveil-lance Radars are employed by the land forces. This article will focus only on Weapon Locating

Radars (WLR) and Battle Field Surveillance Radars (BFSR).

WLRWLR is employed to locate the hostile artil-lery guns, mortars and rockets so that rapid counter bombardment can be resorted to in order to neutralise them. Time is of essence as hostile artillery can resort to shoot and scoot tactics. During an insurgency sce-nario it greatly helps in locating them if the insurgents are resorting to artillery fire. The technology employed for WLR is radar based arrays which detects and tracks the trajectory of round/mortar/rocket in various stages of the flight and then extrapolates the origin of the fire with the help of a computer. Earlier acoustic technology called ‘Sound Ranging’ was employed for WL but had limited range and was termed sound ranging however both the technologies can be used in tandem.

BFSRThe early technology for BFSR was developed to provide detection of both fixed and moving targets, along with detection and tracking of ground targets. The system operational requirements varied from a long range to a small range of a tactical UAV. These diverse applications resulted in significant develop-ment of lightweight electronically scanned antennas, adaptive detection of targets in severe clutter, and transmission of critical target information over modest bandwidth data links. Another recent trend is micro-wave photonic technologies. Due to the broad bandwidth, flat response, low loss transmis-sion, multidimensional multiplexing, ultra-fast analogue signal processing and electro-magnetic interference protection provided by modern photonics, implementation of the radar in the optical domain can achieve better performance in terms of resolution, coverage and speed as compared to current technology. There is a growing market for manportable BFSR. As per Market Research and Market Future 10 per cent growth is expected from 2018-23 due to insurgency

and terrorism threat, amounting to a figure of $4,700 million.

IndiaSwathi. Swathi WLR is a mobile phased array radar developed jointly by Electron-ics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) of Defence Research and Develop-ment Organisation (DRDO) and Bharat Elec-tronics Limited (BEL). The WLR is similar to the AN/TPQ-37 radar in design with a passive electronically scanned array radar. In 2008, the Ministry of Defence ordered 30 Swathi and some have been exported to Armenia. Large calibre artillery rounds

(105mm and 155mm) can be tracked from a distance of 30 km. The WLR utilises a C-Band radar, an azimuth range of -45 to +45 degrees, and an up-down slew-able range of -135 to +135 degrees. Swathi is a great achievement of India.

PJT-531 BFSR. BFSR Short Range (BFSR-SR) is a man portable 2D short-range battlefield and perimeter surveillance radar developed by the LRDE of DRDO and is being manufactured by BEL. PJT-531 has been extensively deployed on the Indian border and LOC in Jammu and Kashmir. It is reported that about 1,400 units are in use by the Indian Army. Foreign countries have

also placed orders for the BFSR. It can detect a crawling man at 700 m, walking man at 3 km, group of people at 7 km, light vehicles at 10 km and heavy vehicles at 14 km.

A BFSR that can penetrate foliage is under development. This will be very use-ful in carrying out operations against Left Wing Extremism.

Latest TrendsThe latest trends in both type of radars are:

Phased Array. In older radars there was one point of transmission and the antenna had to move in two D (range and bear-ing) to cover a larger area for surveillance which was a major limitation. If height was required then another antenna or radar was required. This problem was solved with the development of phased array which pro-duced a beam of radio waves through com-puter controlled multiple emitting arrays.

Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA). This is a further development of phased array system in which the beam of sig-nals can be steered electronically in any direc-tion without physically moving the antenna. Electronic steering is carried out by control-ling the phase of the radio waves whereas the digitally controlled scanning enables rapid scan in any direction. AESAs are mainly used in radars providing detection, targeting, track-ing, and self-protection capabilities. In AESA, every element has its own transmit/receive module (TRM), which makes this system more reliable as the failure of a single element won’t hinder the functioning of the system.

Dual role WLRs. The latest trend is to combine air defence and WLR function in a single radar platform with 3D AESA tech-nology which can detect long range missiles as well UAVs. Lockheed Martin’s Q-53 has the capability to identify and track UAVs thus combining air surveillance simultane-ously with counter target acquisition in a single sensor.

BFSR. Employment of BFSRs has been for shorter ranges and man portable versions with the use of narrow band with high PRF for accuracy, use of electronic scan for rapid detection and also systems being developed to detect through the foliage which could be particularly useful in jungle and dense forest terrain where India’s Left Wing Extremists operate. Another trend is to detect movement through doppler effect with aural detection. SP

weapon locating and Battle field surveillance radarsWLr is employed to locate the hostile artillery guns, mortars and rockets so that rapid counter bombardment can be resorted to in order to neutralise them

(Top) SWATHI Weapon Locating Radar (WLR) by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL); (Above) Lockheed Martin’s AN/TPQ-53 Radar has demonstrated ability to identify and track unmanned aerial systems (UAS)

“facts that led to creation of pakistan occupied... Continued from page 3

PHoToGrAPHS: BEL, Lockheed Martin

>>

112-3/2020 sp’s land forces

Defence Minister on a two Days (July 17-18) visit to laDakh anD J&kDefence Minister Rajnath Singh started his trip by visiting Ladakh on July 17. He arrived early morning at Leh airport accompanied by the CDS General Bipin Rawat and Army Chief General M.M. Naravane. The aim of the day long visit was to carry out a security review of the region due to the LAC conflict with China. From Leh the Defence Minister went to Stakna and Lukung. At Stakna he reviewed the readiness of the troops which included a para drop and scoping of weapons. Lukung is the last Ladakhi village north of Pangong Tso where he addressed and inter-acted with Indian Army and ITBP personnel. Later on the Defence Minister visited the holy cave of Amarnath and offered prayers. After reviewing the LAC, the Defence Minister then took stock of the LOC including a visit to the forward post near LoC in Kupwara and interacted with the soldiers deployed there.

Dac approves capital acquisition worth `38,900 croreDefence Acquisition Council (DAC) in its meeting held on July 2, 2020 held under the chairmanship of Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh accorded approval for capital acqui-sition of various platforms and equipment worth about `38,900 crore (about $5.2 billion). Focused on indigenous design and development these approvals include acqui-sitions from Indian industry of `31,130 crore which include Pinaka ammunitions, BMP armament upgrades and software defined radios for the Indian Army, Long Range Land Attack Cruise Missile Systems and Astra Missiles for the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force. SP

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>> NEwS IN BRIEf / SPECIAL REPORTS

THE INDIAN ARMY’S PLANS to counter minefields restricting its tank movement in enemy territory

received a shot in the arm with the sign-ing of a Make in India contract on July 20 for 1,512 mine ploughs for its frontline T-90 tank fleet.

A `557 crore ($74.18 million) con-tract for the T-90 mine ploughs was signed by the Acquisitions Wing of the Ministry of Defence with the public sector Bharat Earth Movers Limited.

“The contract has Buy and Make (Indian) categorisation with a minimum of 50 per cent indigenous content in make portion of the contract,” according to an official statement of the Ministry of Defence.

“These mine ploughs will be fitted on T-90 Tanks of Indian Armoured Corps which will facilitate individual mobility to Tanks while negotiating mine field. Mobility of Tank Fleet will enhance mani-

fold, which in turn would extend the reach of Armoured Formation deep into enemy territory without becoming mine causality,” the Ministry of Defence state-ment added, suggesting that “the combat capability of the Army will be further enhanced” consequently.

The induction of these 1,512 mine ploughs is scheduled to be completed by 2027. SP

—Vishal Thapar

$74.2 million contract to equip Indian army’s T-90 Tank fleet with mine ploughs for

extended armoured reach

a SPECIAL MEETING OF THE Defence Acquisition Coun-

cil (DAC) on July 15, chaired by Defence Min-ister Rajnath Singh, delegated powers for making urgent capital acquisitions up to `300 crore ($40 million) to the armed forces.

This step has been taken “considering the security environment due to prevailing situation along the Northern Borders and the need to strengthen the Armed Forces for the Defence of our borders”, a senior officer of the Ministry of Defence said.

“The DAC delegated the powers for progressing urgent Capital Acquisition

Cases upto `300 Crore to the armed forces to meet their emergent operational require-ments. This will shrink the procurement time-lines and ensure place-ment of orders within six months and com-mencement of deliver-ies within one year,” the officer elaborated.

This is the first time that financial powers for capital procure-ments have been delegated to the armed forces for capital purchases. It’s in addition to the delegation of powers to Vice-Chiefs to make revenue purchases of up to `500 Crore per procurement on their own. SP

—Vishal Thapar

THE INDIAN ARMY HAS moved a case for importing from the US a second batch of an estimated 72,000 SiG Sauer

SiG-716 assault rifles for its frontline troops.The first batch of these 72,400

7.62x51mm calibre rifles has been inducted following a 647 crore contract in Febru-ary 2019 under the Fast Track Process of India’s Defence Procurement Procedure.

The process for a repeat order to meet an urgent requirement has been initiated amidst a combination of factors including border tensions with China and slow prog-ress on the Joint Venture (JV) with Russia to manufacture AK-203 rifles at Korwa in Uttar Pradesh.

The AK-203 was intended to fulfil the bulk of the requirement of an estimated 8,00,000 assault rifles to replace the over two-decade old INSAS inventory of the Indian Army. The JV between India’s Ord-nance Factory Board and Russia’s Roso-boronexport has reportedly hit an impasse over the “unreasonable and unacceptable” price quoted by the Russians.

An ‘Acceptance of Necessity’ was

accorded by India’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) in January 2019 to purchase a reported 6,71,427 AK-203 assault rifles from this India-Russia JV for an estimated 4,358 Crore. It has been reported that the Ministry of Defence has set up a new ‘cost-ing committee’ to arrive at a reasonable price with the Russians.

In the meanwhile, the case for a repeat order for 72,000 SiG-716 rifles will be taken to the DAC for approval under the fast-track process, as was done earlier.

With Infantry modernisation deemed a priority by the present dispensation, the Indian Army has sought limited numbers of up to date small arms through fast track procurements on account of very slow progress of programmes to acquire these weapons in larger numbers, the bulk of which are intended to be manufactured in India with foreign tie-ups.

The Indian Army’s case for replacement of INSAS assault rifles and Sterling carbines for its 382 Infantry battalions dates back to 2005. In 2009, it made a case for a new Light Machine Gun (LMG). With little head-

way on these procurements, it was decided in 2018 to kick start Infantry modernisa-tion with limited imports.

Under this process, a 880 crore deal was signed with Israel’s Negev in March this year to import 16,479 7.62x51mm LMGs. Like the SiG Sauer, the Negev LMG is also intended to meet part requirement urgently. UAE’s Caracal was shortlisted similarly to acquire close quarter battle carbines, but a deal has not been signed so far.

Italian Beretta .338 Lapua Magnum Scorpio TGT and American Barret .50 M95 sniper rifles have also been inducted recently in limited numbers for equipping forces along the Line of Control with Pakistan.

To shore up the Army’s precision fire-power, deals with the US and Israel respec-tively were also signed in 2019 for an unspecified number of Excalibur precision guided munitions for 155mm artillery and a reported 210 Spike anti-tank guided missiles along with 12 launchers as part of financial powers delegated to the Vice-Chiefs for emergency purchases. SP

— Vishal Thapar

Indian army seeks repeat order for american assault rifles

Lack of progress on AK-203 JV forces case for importing 72,000 additional Sig Sauer rifles under fast track process

armed forces Given free hand for procurements up to $40 million

APPOINTMENTSLieutenant General Raj Shukla, YSM, SM is the GOC-in-C Army Training Command who assumed office on May 1, 2020.

Lieutenant General Manoj Chandrashekhar Pande, AVSM, VSM is the Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Com-

mand (CINCAN) who assumed office on June 1, 2020,