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‘

Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)

ICWA-AIIA Dialogue

India-Australia Partnership

in the

Asian Century

Edited by

Rajiv K Bhatia & Pankaj K Jha

July 2014

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(This page has been intentionally left blank)

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All rights reserved .No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,

or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording

or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the Publisher.

The views expressed in this volume are of individual contributors and do not represent the

viewpoint of the editors or the Council.

ISBN-978-81-926825-8-7

First E Report published in India in July 2014.

India - Australia Partnership in the Asian Century

Published by: Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) Sapru House, Barakhamba Road New Delhi -110001. Website- www.icwa.in

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Table of Contents

S. No. Topic Page No.

1 Preface

5-6

2 Security and Cooperation – India, South Asia and the ASEAN Plus

Ambassador Sheel Kant Sharma

7-12

3 India at Crossroads: Prospects of Bilateral Relations with Australia

Prof. (Dr.) Darvesh Gopal

13-20

4 Trick or Treat: Future of Australia’s National Security Strategy

Vijai S. Chaudhari

21-27

5 India and Australia: Towards Politico- Strategic Convergence

Dr. Pankaj K Jha

28-34

6 ICWA Delegation visit to Australia

Report

Profile of the delegation

Programme

35-48

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Preface

A five-member ICWA delegation undertook a five-day visit to Australia to hold

comprehensive discussions with its MOU partner- Australian Institute of International Affairs

(AIIA) at Melbourne. During the dialogue with AIIA, a large number of issues were discussed,

which included contemporary international developments, the utility of new constructs such

as the Indo-Pacific and the changing dynamics within Indo-Pacific region. Discussions were

also held on strategic, maritime, trade and investment ties, as well as non-traditional security

issues. The dialogue clearly reflected the growing strategic importance of Australia.

In the past, Australia’s strategic significance has always been reflected in India’s

thinking. Sixty-seven years ago, Jawaharlal Nehru, the future first prime minister of India,

addressed the Asian Relations Conference. Speaking on 24 March 1947 in Delhi, he referred to

“that deeper urge to the mind and spirit of Asia which has persisted in spite of the isolationism

which grew up during the years of European domination.” He stressed, “Ours is the great

design of promoting peace and progress all over the world.” Nehru welcomed observers from

Australia and New Zealand, pointing out: “….we have many problems in common, especially in

the Pacific and in the Southeast region of Asia, and we have to cooperate together to find

solutions.”

In the past seven decades, and especially in the post-Cold War period, the two

countries have gone through a multi-faceted transformation. The policies both of India and

Australia towards the world and particularly towards each other have factored in the changes

in the international environment. Consequently greater proximity in strategic terms, stronger

political understanding and closer economic cooperation has followed. As one of the key

drivers and beneficiaries of a resurgent Asia, India has noticed and appreciated Australia’s

endeavour to treat the Asian century as ‘an Australian opportunity.’ From India’s point of

view, the White Paper entitled ‘Australia in the Asian Century’ of October 2012 made two

significant points: firstly, Asia would become ‘the biggest economic zone, the biggest

consumption zone and home to the majority of the world’s middle class’, and secondly,

Australia’s continued growth would not occur in ‘a strategic vacuum’; instead, it would require

stable relations among the major powers in Asia and the Pacific.

In this broad context, it would be prudent to briefly delineate India’s worldview as

reflected in its contemporary foreign policy. India favours multi-polar Asia within a world

characterized by dynamic multipolarity. It works for stability, security and prosperity for all,

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including itself. The inevitable link between security and development drives India’s foreign

policy. India adopts a holistic approach, blending purposeful pro-activism in bilateral affairs

and enlightened multilateralism and interest in working through institutions such as UN, G-

20, IORA, EAS and other ASEAN-centred mechanisms. An innate impulse towards

independence of judgment and examining every issue on its merits, perhaps reincarnated as

‘Strategic Autonomy’ in today’s globalised world, motivates policy makers. They are driven by

values and pragmatism and prefer to judge nations by their action rather than mere rhetoric.

Significantly, India’s commitment to peace and peaceful co-existence does not preclude

vigilance and its readiness to face all other eventualities. Finally, India’s external relations are

managed in such a manner that the economic development dimension is kept in constant

focus.

India’s Parliamentary elections are over now, with a single party the Bharatiya Janta

Party (BJP), getting a clear majority in the lower house of the Parliament. It is armed with a

mandate for a stable government and strong leadership. In terms of logistics, the elections

represented the biggest event of its kind in human history. Politically and in other ways, the

outcome of elections will obviously impact India and beyond. A fascinating debate is

underway regarding the nature of blend of change and continuity in India’s foreign policy that

may unfold under this new government.

The dialogue with AIIA revolved around several important themes as mentioned

above. A need was established during the dialogue that bilateral ties should be given the

necessary boost so that the two countries can work together closely in all the relevant areas

and promote security and stability in the larger Indo-Pacific region.

During the visit, the ICWA delegation interacted with other Australian strategic think

tanks such as Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and official institutions such as the

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) at Canberra. Academic interaction with

select academics from the University of New South Wales (UNSW) was also held in Sydney.

The papers presented by the ICWA delegation along with a detailed report on the

discussions held with various think tanks and institutions during the visit are presented to and

shared with interested scholars through this web publication. We hope it represents a useful

addition to the existing knowledge on the subject.

Ambassador Rajiv K Bhatia

Director General, ICWA July 11, 2014

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Security and Cooperation – India, South Asia and the ASEAN Plus

Ambassador Sheel Kant Sharma1

India’s self-image in its diplomacy has almost always been quintessentially trans-South

Asian; reaching out at least to Asia as a whole and beyond. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s

first Prime Minister, had welcomed delegates at the Asian Relations Conference held in Delhi

in April 1947, calling them all great peoples from Asia. There was also representation from

Egypt, Turkey and the erstwhile Soviet Union, and observers were invited from Australia and

New Zealand. Nehru’s vision transcended the geographical boundaries of the India. At this

conference, he supported the “One World” idea under the United Nations- ‘emerging from its

infancy’ but emphasised that, “in order to have One World we must also in Asia, think of the

countries of Asia cooperating together for that larger goal.” He reached out later to all of Asia

and Africa in the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in 1955, and then through the Nonaligned

Movement (NAM) in 1961, and envisioned a group of peoples stretching from Asia and Africa

to Latin America and Europe. India carried on with this legacy in its foreign policy in a major

role, as a leader of the developing world.

Around the same time, regionalism was taking stronger roots the world over. First, it

was the European integration which commenced in 1953 with formation of the coal and steel

community among the wartime foes- France and Germany, joined by the Benelux and Italy.

The great French statesman and proponent of regionalism, Jean Monnet pushed this idea

untiringly sowing the seeds of what fifty years later would emerge as EU. The process

continued gradually and steadily through the entire cold war years, gaining momentum, more

members, and wider areas of cooperation. ASEAN was formed in the late nineteen sixties, and

though India was invited to join it in 1967, Delhi chose to stay out. The League of Arab States

was the regional Middle Eastern body, almost entirely preoccupied by the Arab-Israeli dispute

and related politico-security matters. (The OAS, as the oldest regional association, had been

well entrenched since the turn of 20th century in the western hemisphere as a key regional

body but under the US sphere of influence.)

Influenced by these trends in regionalism, there was a relook, as it were, in South Asia

in the 1980s, then comprising nine States, including Burma and Afghanistan, to forge socio-

economic cooperation. A new grouping, namely, SAARC (South Asian Association for

Regional Cooperation) was formally launched by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan,

1 The author is the former Secretary General of SAARC.

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Sri Lanka and Maldives in 1985, with the goal of fostering cooperation in economic, social and

cultural fields, invoking the shared history spanning millennia. This venture set out to go

forward in sync with all other bilateral and multilateral cooperation avenues among the

member states.

SAARC’s inception during the mid-nineteen-eighties was in a very troubled period

internationally as also regionally. Cold war tensions were running high, yet in the East –West

context the buzz about “security and cooperation” was getting louder, following the Helsinki

process – albeit with greater accent on security than on cooperation. On the other hand, the

SAARC Charter of 1985 eschews any mention of the word security. In retrospect, perhaps it

can be said that its authors may have managed to save centrality of cooperation in spite of the

cold war snarl. SAARC Charter spoke of principles of United Nations, and underlined

interdependence and cooperation as the way for South Asian region.

During the past 28 years, SAARC’s evolution has had nonetheless ceded much space

to the looming shadow of ‘security’ in many ways. One should, therefore give it a hard look.

Conventionally, there are several factors to its analysis: diverse national threat perceptions and

the means to address them with available means, in the given regional and global contexts

which comprise also of conventional security. Since SAARC’s inception, the international

security environment has been in a flux, and has gone through historic transformations.

These have impacted on the attitudes, perceptions and approach of South Asian countries to

security. In security matters, attitudes and perceptions often shape reality.

The facts on the ground for the South Asian region tell a different tale; there are about

a billion and half people in South Asia, people who for various reasons, have not prospered

much (in relative terms) while other regions of the world progressed through interdependence

and economic cooperation. South Asia is the most populous and least connected region, has

two nuclear weapon states within its periphery, two more in its immediate neighbourhood

and fleets and bases of other major powers in its maritime environment. The only global

military alliance of the day, NATO, has been actively engaged here. The new colossus on the

horizon is sitting pretty eying the region for all it can gain, strategically, economically and in

diplomatic terms. In regard to the rift between rich and poor, the region has most poor people

living below one dollar a day, as also those challenged by diseases and endemic scarcity of

life’s essentials like water, air, food, health, education and energy. On top of these is

globalization, which intertwines lives of South Asians with each other, and the rest of the

world.

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There can be two ways to view security from this perspective. One, to continue to

analyse and shape it, business-as- usual, in terms of military balance, advanced weapon

systems and force multipliers, Revolution in Military Affairs( RMA), and the old fashioned

system of deterrents and alliances. The second approach could be to look at the region, its

situation in larger Asian setting with promises of an Asian century, the region’s burning

problems, and the real menaces which impact on people’s lives and habitats, both urban and

rural alike, and provide lion’s share of damage to human development. The second approach

is also borne out of the incapacity of the first approach to make any dent into roots of popular

threat perceptions, anxieties and misery. The militaristic and weapons oriented determinants

of security, no matter how essential and rational, fall short of providing real security to people

and society or coping with the looming menaces. There is a need to reset the traditional

mindset to address this and move towards security and cooperation in a holistic fashion.

While military security proceeds from divisiveness among peoples, the holistic

approach, inter alia, seeks to nourish “commonalities”. There is no reason why both cannot be

mutually complementary, but the former and its trappings have somehow hogged space. But

not any more since the acute perceptions of dangers in ignoring the holistic imperative are

today rooted on scientific findings -- findings that point to global warming and devastations

implied in it, diminishing of human habitats and forest cover leading to dreadful diseases, and

the spectre of inequality and deprivations breeding bloody conflicts beyond the power of

deterrent theories. The global situation is such that no matter how one sees these alarmist

fears, South Asia lies in the middle of it.

The tension between globalising economy and divided global societies endangers the

planet by diminishing cooperation which is sorely needed to meet the challenges. The

confrontational calculus of the Cold War years induced in South Asia a quasi stability on the

one hand and spawned, on the other, elites reared on inevitability of armed conflict. Even

though the challenges to human security in a holistic sense are undiminished, for better or for

worse, the conjunction of events has also led to an impasse in the region and a compelling

need to explore how to cope with a fuller matrix of insecurities, regional, trans-regional as well

as bilateral. For vast populations of South Asia, the list also includes the mounting toll on eco-

system and climate due to global warming as also indigenous activities, a demographic

challenge of vast areas mired in extreme poverty untouched by globalization and posing

unprecedented risks for region and beyond. Cooperative forums, within and across borders for

addressing these problems, have not been effective so far.

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Summits of South Asian countries have consistently valued, at least in declarations,

interdependence, engagement and cooperation and demonstrated common understanding,

determination and commitment to deal with the endemic problems of lack of development,

poverty, disease and scarcity. Their statements emphasise the point that South Asian nations

will have to grow together and not at each other’s expense. It is a different matter that

Summit outcomes are taking time to lead to tangible changes on the ground.

Stalemates in other parts of the globe, notably Europe or Southeast Asia, have changed

over past decades through meticulous and steady regional endeavours. EU’s success in

particular is so comprehensive that the other powerful institution based in Europe i.e. NATO,

suffers in comparison. People in Europe find the agenda of EU much closer to their concerns

than the demands of NATO’s expensive edifice. Relative diminution of prestige of politico-

military approach to problem solving is the result of a prolonged absence of war and the

expansion of democracy with shared prosperity. EU’s expansion - in contrast to NATO’s -

creates a competitive interest among adjacent countries to join the success story.

South Asia’s drive to regional cooperation should be seen in the light of European

example. The long cherished goal of economic integration slips from the grasp despite so

many commonalities which belong to culture, civilization, art, language, literature and even

work ethos exceeding the commonalities found in other regions. Bureaucratic inertia also

hinders traction towards the SAARC objectives. It comes in the way of SAARC moving from

talk to actual action. A holistic approach to security and cooperation in South Asian region

cries out for tapping every window of opportunity with speed before the problems assume

such proportions that no amount of militaristic prowess would solve them. Nearer home, the

ASEAN has also emerged as an important grouping, and is set to enter a new stage in 2015.

ASEAN also has set up security and cooperation vistas like EAS, ADMM, and ARF apart from

its ASEAN plus summits and ASEM. These vistas can lead to a pan-Asian security and

cooperation framework.

Security and cooperation in South Asia cannot be ordained or gifted from outside the

region. It has got to grow from grassroots among its billion and a half people. A whole range

of themes may be relevant in this context, such as people-to-people connectivity, transport

and communication, health and education, energy grid, food bank, poverty alleviation,

empowerment of women, combating crime and trafficking and fighting terrorism. South Asia

and its extended Asian neighbourhood are ripe for action in these areas and demand greater

coherence of planning and operational will on the part of its constituents.

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There are axioms and paradigms which are germane to ‘security’ but which militate

against each other: On one side is the story written by war theorists of a bygone era, a story

rooted in alienation, clash, antagonism, deterrent, zero-sum-games, exclusion, boycott,

attrition, scorched earth and annihilation. On the other side is the path of understanding,

engagement, inclusion, empathy, interdependence, cooperation, positive- sum- games, resort

to diplomacy and bonding among peoples to prevail against impending menaces.

This path commends itself for South Asia in particular, and wider Asia in general.

Pursuit or drift of Clausewitzian security seems to have led it nowhere in solving problems.

South Asia is witnessing different stages of development, governance and polity in the region

and under these circumstances seeking of security, in exclusively conventional terms, risks

being half-baked and chimerical. Drumming up war hysteria or antagonisms can also lead to

catastrophic failures. In this milieu, there are severe limitations to pursuing the policy of

shathe shathyam (which is a Sanskrit adage, ‘tit for tat’ in English may come close to it). This is

because even a tiny lunatic fringe of such large populations, in absolute numbers, can be out

of anyone’s control.

So, while war can no longer deliver from problems nor is it affordable any more given

its humongous costs, the path of pursuing cooperation and understanding would not harm

anyone. But that path offers no escape from the hard time that tension, conflict and

imminence of disasters impose on leadership and people. They require discipline, alertness,

probity, and integrity of purpose and brook no room for prevarication or equivocation and

hedging on action.

Initially, in the immediate post-Cold War years, economic compulsions for

transforming decades of socialistic developmental pattern had impelled the government in

India to turn its full focus on economic diplomacy. India thus went all out in the nineteen

nineties seeking and recovering cooperative linkages in its extended neighbourhood and

explored new and innovative regional groupings. The new initiatives included BIMSTEC

(1997), Indian Ocean Countries Arc of Regional Cooperation (IOC ARC, 1997), MEKONG

GANGA Forum (2000), and Dialogue partnership with the ASEAN (1992). Gradually, India’s

association with the ASEAN developed manifold and it joined the full range of economic and

political forums with ASEAN at the core such as ARF, PMC +1, ASEAN- India summit, East

Asia Summit, Asian Defence Ministers plus Meetings (ADMM) and so forth. In the present

century, India’s Look East Policy (LEP) emerged with serious outreach to the immediate

neighbours, as also to the trans-South Asian neighbourhood in its maritime ambience-

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stretching to East Asia, Australia and Central Asia. In parallel, the relationship with the Gulf

countries too expanded exponentially with considerable goodwill and mutual trust.

These comprise broadly the people whom Nehru had invited to the first Asian

relations conference before independence – it has taken a full six decades plus to receive

positive and largely forthcoming responses and tangible results, as witnessed in the indices of

economic engagement and interdependence. In the uncertain times, it would remain a better

course to chart for a decisive and robust government in Delhi.

---------------×---------------

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India at Crossroads:

Prospects of Bilateral Relations with Australia

Prof. (Dr.) Darvesh Gopal2

India’s current politico-economic scenario3 can be perceived in different ways. Of

course, it depends on which side of the wide spectrum, one is gazing from. For one, most

analyses on the current Indian scenario admittedly tend to reflect the ideological

predisposition with which India is commonly perceived. For another, these analyses more

often draw parallels between the India of 1991 and the India of 2014—considered as the two

important benchmarks in the development trajectory of post-independent India. Strikingly,

there is a near consensus in these narratives that India of 2014 is no differently poised than the

India at the threshold of the decade of 1990s.

Foresight of the ‘Far-Right’!

Placed in the “far-right” of the spectrum, for instance, are those who view the country’s

predicament of 2014 is worse than the 1991 crisis. It is marked by a crisis in the external sector

caused by fast depleting foreign direct capital inflows. Yet, in 1991, these very adverse

circumstances acted as a trigger for the far-reaching and what is often underlined as

irreversible structural economic reforms and trade liberalization schema heralding the

emergence of India as an economic power—“shining” or, otherwise—at the dawn of the new

millennium. Whereas now, in 2014,faced with a crisis—especially in some sectors much worse

than before—the inept ruling political leadership, however, is disinclined to implement the

much-touted second generation of reforms to stimulate and revive growth. Accordingly, those

who share this viewpoint in the far-right of the political spectrum, argue that the UPA ruling

coalition has miserably failed because the coalition was not only fledgling and failing but

worse has even turned fraudulent. So, the argument runs along these lines. The forthcoming

hustling is indeed a ‘God-sent’ opportunity to the Indian electorate to usher in far-reaching

transformative changes in the fundamentals of the economy, which alone can set right the

subterranean fault-lines of the faltering and floundering foundations of the political economy

of India.

2 The author is Director of the School of Social Sciences, Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU). 3 The paper was prepared before India’s Parliamentary Elections in 2014.

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Left-Right-Centre Posturing!

As against these forebodings of the ‘far-right’, somewhere in the centre—occasionally

leaning right, but mostly maintaining a ‘progressive’ posturing, are those who claim that 2014

India is no worse or different from India of 1991. Of them, the self-proclaimed ‘centrists’

actually insist that it is not, in the least. Given however, the ambivalence of their perception,

they are of the view that more of the same kind of past economic liberalisation reforms is

certainly not the answer either. It is because, as they argue, the world of 1991 is very different

from the world of 2014. Indeed, as they say, much water has gone aground or under the bridge

all across the world. In such a rapidly changing global order, the West is looking much more

inward today than before, more so now with Russia’s brazen act of annexing Crimea and the

resultant developments in Ukraine and its ripple effect in NATO countries, and elsewhere in

Europe. In these uncertain circumstances, frenetically the European countries are trying to fix

and mend their own domestic economy and polity, and are in no way concerned about the

adverse long term effects of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in the less developed countries.

No less in a quandary are most of the BRICS economies, which have lost dramatically their

impressive peak GDP growth rates of the past decade as well as riddled by unsettling

developments in their domestic economy.

Concomitant with these shifting events and occurrences, and largely as a consequence

of soaring international price of oil and other raw materials, together with India’s domestic

policy glitches—both legal and political and attendant mismanagement of the supply of key

resources such as coal, iron ore and critical food items—all these have cumulatively funnelled

spiralling spin of sky-rocketing and never-before felt hyperinflation. The cumulative effect of

these developments is already writ large in the low growth rate in the past years, and the

looming large current account deficit for the country.

The only key difference between 1991 and 2014, according to this view, is the

availability of global financial flows. In 1991, capital investment from the West had not

significantly penetrated India. Now, in 2014, a substantial part of foreign direct capital

investment is tied to India. If not used judiciously to enhance productivity in the domestic

economy, such finance will tend to become a veritable external debt trap. Of course, this is a

systemic issue. Yet it needs to be addressed not through ‘big bang’ mega reforms as it is made

out by the political pundits of the “far-right”. According to this, multi-dimensional “left-right-

centre “perspective undoubtedly the economic fundamentals of the country are sound and

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resilient. So, there is still time for the country to insulate itself from the vagaries of global

finance. No need to panic because the turn-around in the GFC is already in sight.

The much-needed initiative for dealing with the current account deficit crisis calls for

allowing higher production of coal and iron ore from the country’s immensely large untapped

reserves. Also, the government must revive the export of iron ore which would stave off the

current account deficit. Once the country is back to its comfort zone, the overall sentiment

about the buoyancy of the economy would definitely change for the better. Of course, these

are simple ideas calling for simple but intelligent and calibrated application and not any

grandiose discourse on development strategies.

Left-of-Centre: Right?

The third narrative is based on the perceptions of an amorphous “Left of Centre”.

Instead of being drawn into the grand-eloquent debate on mega development strategies, the

protagonists of the “left-of-Centre” viewpoint underline the need for attending to the basic

everyday needs of the disadvantaged segments of the society—elegantly rephrased what they

are underlining is the “inclusive growth” strategy predicated on a more rounded food and

other basic security mechanisms for the poor. Admittedly, this needs a dramatic shift away

from the “blame game” as played out day-in and day-out by the national and other major

regional political parties, and move towards dealing with the vital issues of governance.

Instead of being locked in vitriolic debate, time is now for a return to normality in the

otherwise strained relations, sometimes degenerating to confrontational relations, among the

political class, the bureaucracy and the judiciary.

It is in these rather confusing atmospherics, India is moving swiftly towards the day of

reckoning—the general elections scheduled in the coming months. It is like the football fans,

now nervously inching towards the World Cup finals in June. Interim months and days of

course are field days not only for Indian astrologers but also for political pundits and scholars.

India-watchers today are literally drenched and deafened by the torrent of instant ready-

made pre-election expert analysis predictions, most of which say or show what the pollsters

want them to show or say. If past experience is any pointer, notwithstanding claims to the

contrary, pre-poll predictions have always gone awry in India.

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Post-Election Pangs

Something distinct and little understood about Indian democratic tradition and

practice is the predominance and the assertive role and influence of local politics, local issues

and local parties. In turn, this has given each of the 543 Indian parliamentary constituencies—

all of which will go to polls in the coming summer months—its own distinctive political

colour; the dynamics of which, is neither easy to fathom nor any less difficult to adjudge. It is

for these considerations the 2014 elections is sure going to be another complicated yet

spectacular event in the current political process of India. Under such circumstances, the best

one can do is to wait until the actual ballots are counted and the final tally is gazetted.

One could, in the meantime, consider what the different poll outcomes augur for the

country. Of the outcomes of the coming general elections, one that none of the pollsters make

bold to discuss is one where neither of the national parties achieve a key majority nor mandate

in the Lok Sabha (the lower house) signaling thereby the stark possibility of a ‘hung’ or

fractured Parliament. In the past several months, the country has witnessed agonizingly an

utterly divided and dysfunctional legislature. Against this backdrop, a newly elected

legislature severely truncated, with growing popular resentment against the different factions

in the political class further complicated by a series of domestic political, social and economic

issues—is a scenario that could very well confound domestic governance. More critical would

be India’s international standing, and the investor confidence in the prospects of India’s

economy. In the 1990s, and since one of the striking features of India’s development trajectory

has been the semblance of relative political stability ensured by the two major national parties.

But the prospects of a ‘hung’ parliament and the consequent loss of investor confidence in the

economy would without doubt scuttle growth which at this juncture the country cannot

afford.

Prospects of India-Australia Relations

Against all these odds which could divide the Indian political class and the cadre and

ranks of the political parties, however, there has existed tacit understanding between the

political parties and the factions within, when it comes to foreign policy issues. Even on most

delicate and ticklish foreign policy issues, the country as a whole has stood united and firm.

It is against this background an attempt is made here in the concluding two sections to

make brief sketch of India’s evolving relations with Australia, and offer few general remarks on

17

the prospects of the mutuality of India’s bilateral relations with Australia. Traditionally, India’s

relations with Australia, however limited in terms of diplomatic activities and in two-way

exchanges of goods and services, were devoid of any open conflict or visible strains. And, it

was largely governed and nurtured by an array of political traditions and cultural elements

such as the overarching Commonwealth affinities, abiding appeal in the game of cricket and,

above all, the gastronomically popular Indian curry on the other side of the Indian Ocean. As

both India and Australia were erstwhile colonies of Britain, their inheritance of the spirit and

substance of parliamentary democracy together of the bonus of English language with

obvious ‘Indi-Oz’ variations has greatly helped facilitate cutting a great deal, if not of the

physical, but at least the psychological distance between the two countries. Further, with the

revocation of the ‘White Australia’ policy in the 1960s, and the steady stream of Indian

immigrants, largely professionally trained people, reaching the shores of Australia since has

further helped reduce the physical distance between the two countries.

Notwithstanding these, positive developments steadily contributing to the mutuality

of relations and somewhat shared regional perspectives, the rigours of the Super Power Cold

War during most part of the third quarter of the last century had kept the two countries apart

and at a distance from each other for as long a length of time. While Australia assumed the

role as the last outpost ‘down under’ in the Western alliance system, India championed the

cause of non-alignment—of not being entangled in any alliance arrangements subservient to

either of the Super Powers—as the basic diplomatic principle in its nation-building endeavors

as well as in the conduct of its foreign relations. With the termination of the Cold War

following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the murky international nuclear non-

proliferation regime imposed by the nuclear powers kept India away from Australia and

thereby befitted the designation—Australia’s ‘neglected neighbour’. Strangely, however,

through these long years of the Cold War while the relations between the two countries were

marked by unremitting estrangement and concealed mistrust and suspicion, it did not ever

degenerate to an ‘eye-ball-to-eye-ball’ confrontation. Then with the advent of the decade of

1990, the world witnessed a new low in India-Australia bilateral relations; among others now,

both the countries were locked up in a new diplomatic row over India’s detonation of the

nuclear devices in Pokharan in 1998.

Nearly eight years after, about the time normalcy was restored in the bilateral

relations, once again Australia disapprovingly raised its eye-brows when India signed a civilian

nuclear deal with the United States. Australia took the rigid stance, apparently to impress the

18

Asian countries, including importantly China, that it will not supply the much-needed

uranium to India’s nuclear power plants on ground that India has not signed the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, better wisdom prevailed in the following months and

Australia retracted and announced that it will sell uranium, on the basis of an agreement

allowing Australia to satisfy itself that uranium supplied by Australia would be used for

generation of nuclear power for peaceful use only. An agreement such as this was redundant

in view of the fact that India had already complied that its nuclear facilities are subjected to

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard regime.

Australia’s Uranium’-Turn for the Better!

By then, the issue of uranium supply had become a bone of contention between ruling

coalition and the Australian Labour Party. Neither was India overly exercised although

relations turned sour and was further complicated by mounting unrest among Indian students

enrolled in the educational institutions in Melbourne and other major metropolitan cities. To

the credit of both countries’ diplomatic corps, the issues of misperceptions about the

treatment of Indian students have since been satisfactorily addressed. Again, on the vexing

uranium issue, Australian government after taking a couple of uncertain ‘domestic’ U-turns on

the floor of the parliament, finally in December of 2011 took the major ‘U-turn indicating its

inclination to supply uranium to India. To this effect, the Australian government has already

put in place arrangements that would facilitate Australian uranium exports to India’s nuclear

power plants. It is not as yet certain when the first shipment of uranium would dock in India’s

sea-ports. But what needs to be underlined is Australia’s ‘Uranium-turn’ of lifting its blanket

ban on sale and supply of uranium to India has admittedly removed a major political barrier

of lurking mistrust and perceived discrimination of India by Australia.

These positive developments, no doubt, augur well and sure would over time pave the

way for positive and purposive relationship between the two important parliamentary

democracies of the Indo-Pacific Asia with much to share and offer to each other for a future of

mutual benefit—spanning trade, investment, education, science, environmental management,

security and the shaping of Asia's strategic order.Hopefully, these bilateral interfacing would

eventually would open up opportunities for strategic engagements between the two, in respect

of their shared concerns such as transnational maritime issues as well as deepening of

economic and societal links. Over the years, Australia has become a major energy exporter to

India, the demand for which in the coming years by all accounts is certainly going to increase

with the rapid pace at which the Indian economy is growing. Clearly, coal dominates the

19

energy relationship, with Indian investment recognising the coalfields of Queensland as

critical to India's energy needs in the decades ahead. Besides coal as an energy source, there is

scope to increase supply of natural gas and other renewable sources of energy including

importantly solar-powered energy.

Shared Strategic Vision

No gainsaying, India’s skilled migration as well as investments are contributing,

however modestly, to sustain Australia’s economic progress. At the same time, the two-way

trade exchanges have grown exponentially and India has become one of Australia's top four

trade partners. Besides manufacturing, trade in services is becoming significant in bilateral

economic relations. India’s main service exports to Australia are computer and information

services and tourism. Main Australian service exports to India are education, education-

related travel and tourism. No less important is the growing investments through joint

ventures between India and Australia. Together with these positive trends in economic

exchanges is the growing number of immigrants from India. So much so, Indian skilled

migrants constitute one of the largest, fastest-growing and most enterprising communities in

Australia's multicultural society. For its part, India is taking renewed interest in learning about

how Australia's development strategies might have insights for its own enormous challenges.

Australia, for example, has experience in rain harvesting and water management as well as

water irrigation in its arid regions.

The significance of Indo-Australian relations is not simply confined to economic

exchanges. Without doubt, strategists and the policy-making community on both sides are

already looking beyond what is presently seen as purely two-way economic relations. There is

going recognition on both sides that both countries, globally speaking, are strategically

positioned in the evolving security architecture of the two overlapping regions—the Indian

Ocean region and the Pacific Ocean region. No wonder, the Australian and Indian navies are

logical partners in both the regions, but may need a clearer political signal to begin making

this relationship a priority, for instance, through regular bilateral exercises. Unarguably, the

economic and the strategic significance of Asia are growing. From South Asia to East Asia, the

volume of ocean going trade has surged. In the process, the region encompasses some of the

busiest sea-lanes through the Malacca Straits. Suffice it to say, the substantial increase in the

volume and value of trade as well as intra-regional investments in Asia has already underlined

the political and the strategic significance of the larger region, now encompassing countries of

both the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.

20

The emergence of this newly defined—Indo-Pacific region, no doubt, is of significance

not only for the region but for the entire world—a project so dear to the heart of the

architect of modern India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. As far back as 1947 when the newly

independent India hosted the historic Asian Relations Conference, Nehru extended, among

others, invitation to Australia. Welcoming the delegates, Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal

Nehru specially underlined the importance of Australia being in the conference because of its

vital link for Asia in the Pacific region. Quite prophetically, Nehru stated:

“We welcome observers from Australia and New Zealand because we have many

problems in common, especially in the Pacific and in the Southeast region of Asia, and we have

to cooperate together to find solutions”.

This clearly reflected the vision of Nehru which has its relevance even today.

---------------------×------------------------

21

Trick or Treat: Future of Australia’s National Security Strategy

Vijai S. Chaudhari4

It is better to know some of the questions than all of the answers.

-James Thurber

Distance is a recurring image in Australia’s national security strategy. Even when a

security threat was evident, it was often a distant threat in terms of both time and space. To

counter this threat, Australia has always been part of an alliance with a distant ally. At the

same time, Australia has had all the obvious advantages of a distant location in a remote part

of the world. For many outsiders, this is in some ways an extension of the ‘lucky country’

metaphor into the national security domain. Australians as well as foreigners often use the

phrase to describe the country’s weather, lifestyle or history. The phrase also describes the

economy's good economic fortune, and its geographic isolation from the world's trouble spots.

However, it is ironic that Donald Horne, a social critic, coined the phrase as an indictment of

Australian society in the 1960s.

Far from being an indictment or even critical, this is a brief review of the backdrop

against which the Australian national security strategy must play its part in the near future.

The review has a bias towards the maritime domain without entirely excluding related aspects.

The main elements of the strategic backdrop for the review are timeless and therefore a more

or less reliable guide to the possible outcome:

Resources available for national security.

The national security culture.

Likely threats.

Military alliance.

4 Rear Adm (Retd) Vijai S. Chaudhari is a former Rear Admiral of the Indian Navy and is currently Additional Director at the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal.

22

While large parts of the world faced economic hardship, Australia’s economy has

continued to post steady growth. The country now has more than two decades of

uninterrupted economic growth behind it. The achievement is particularly significant as the

period covers the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, the dot-com boom and bust, and the

international financial cataclysm that followed the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Some of

the growth could be due to good luck but prudent management of the economy also had

something to do with it.5 Griffin identifies ten of the most significant economic reforms,

starting in the 1980s that transformed the Australian economy6. Some of the important

reforms on this list include floating the Australian Dollar, deregulating banks, tax reforms,

removing import protection, privatising government businesses, enterprise bargaining, a

national competition policy, Central Bank independence and the Goods and Services Tax.

This shows that Australia may have benefited from a once-in-a-generation commodity boom

and its location but the country could have easily missed this opportunity without an

appropriate policy framework in place. Having created the right economic climate, Australia

now has a growing economy, a low unemployment rate, and a government budget and debt

position that few developed economies can match.

With the resource boom beginning to fade, it remains to be seen if Australia’s skilled

and educated workforce, strong political, social and economic institutions, economic policy

structures, and its location near the emerging economic centre of gravity can sustain its past

economic success. Despite the obvious structural and financial strengths, a note of caution is

unavoidable. The red flags in this regard are obvious. The sluggish global economy, the

continuing Euro zone crisis, slow recovery in the United States, and a moderating of Chinese

growth can only add to the uncertainty about the future. The domestic economy also reveals

certain weaknesses. Households continue to carry high debt burdens and house prices remain

high. The high Australian dollar has reduced competitiveness of the non-resource sector.

However, the traditional Australian advantages still matter because of the huge natural

resources. The country has the world’s largest recoverable deposits of lead, silver, rutile,

zircon, nickel, uranium, and zinc; the world’s second largest reserves of iron ore, bauxite,

copper, gold, tantalum, and niobium; and the fifth largest reserves of black coal. Australia is

5 Mark Thirlwell, “Can Australia Keep Beating the Economic Odds?” Pacific Standard, March 11, 2013, http://www.psmag.com/magazines/magazine-feature-story-magazines/australia-economy-recession-53744/. 6 Ross Gittins, “Economic reforms that transformed Australia,” The Sydney Morning Herald, February

6, 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/economic-reforms-that-transformed-australia-20140206-324y9.html#ixzz2ywtBxSF4

23

the world’s largest exporter of iron ore and coking coal, and the second largest exporter of

thermal coal. Australian exports of agricultural products are also considerable. Despite

possible future vulnerability to climate change and water stress, Australia rates high on food-

security, producing roughly twice the amount of food that it consumes. Shifting patterns of

economic development in the world, particularly the Asia-Pacific region, have created other

advantages for Australia. Throughout Australian history, the country’s location, far from

centres of economic growth, was a constraint. All this has changed with accelerated economic

activity in the Asia-Pacific region. In the 1950s, 85 percent of world GDP was located more

than 6,000 miles from Australia. However, but with production shifting to Asia, Australia’s

once distant location has become an advantage. Today, more than one-third of world GDP lies

within 6,000 miles of Australia. If current rates of growth continue, two-thirds of world GDP

could be within this distance by 2050.7

Whether Australia’s obvious advantages will translate into sustained economic growth

and adequate allocation of resources for national security will depend on various domestic and

international factors. The law of diminishing returns may be beginning to set in as far as the

economic reforms that started in the 1980s are concerned. However, Australia’s record of

pragmatic economic management and fiscal prudence augurs well for maintaining growth

rates that will support at least current levels of defence spending. According to SIPRI

statistics for 2013, Australia ranks a very respectable 13th in the world in terms of military

spending, just behind Brazil and ahead of Turkey.

In more than a century of independence, alliance with a major military power is the

most dominant theme in Australia’s strategic culture. In 1901, for a newly independent

Australia, Britain was the obvious choice. The world’s largest colonial empire and arguably

the leading military power in the world seemed a good insurance against the uncertainties of a

world order that would soon going be going through cataclysmic changes. This relationship

survived the rigours of the First World War and continued until 1942. At this stage, Singapore

had fallen to the advancing Japanese forces, leading to the biggest surrender of British forces

in history. The Japanese Army was continuing its advance across South East Asia. A continent

away, the Battle of the Atlantic hung in the balance. Defence of distant Australia ranked low

among Britain’s priorities for military resources. A military alliance with the United States

became the only viable option, an arrangement that continues to be a cornerstone of

Australian security planning.

7 Thirlwell, ibid.

24

For more than a century, Australian military personnel have distinguished themselves

in battles across the globe. However, they invariably fought overseas as members of a military

alliance. Initially, Britain provided the higher leadership, a role that the United States took

over during the Second World War. The higher direction of war therefore largely remained

beyond the Australian political and military leadership. General Sir John Monash was perhaps

the most notable exception in a limited sense. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery described

him as “the best general on the western front in Europe” during the First World War.

Australia is unique in that it is the only country to occupy an entire island continent.

The lack of contentious land borders and the country’s isolated location in the southern ocean

has ensured that Australia has no current or historical dispute with its neighbours. The

Second World War was perhaps the last and only occasion when a hostile force (Japan in this

case) posed a direct threat to Australia. This leaves Australian national security planners in

the unique position of having no identifiable or immediate threat to national security. Even

the Cold War ran its course in areas far removed from Australia. Generic references to

economic refugees from the North are the nearest thing to a national security threat that

successive defence policy documents in the public domain have identified. There are a few

veiled references to Indonesia, with whom Australia currently maintains very cordial relations.

Most threats are therefore based on uncontrolled migration of people. According to the

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs data, Australia has an area of

7,702,466 square kilometres and a population of 23.4 million. This is one of the lowest

population densities in the world. The nearest countries in South East Asia have much higher

population densities, creating a distant possibility of economic migration in the event of

catastrophic climate changes. Any other threat in the strategic neighbourhood is far in the

future and is unlikely to manifest itself without a warning period of at least ten years. This

lack of an immediate or identifiable military threat clearly takes the sting away from security

planning.

The structure of the Australian Defence Force is a major influence on security

planning. SIPRI data for 2013 puts Australian defence spending at US $ 24 billion for an

Australian Defence Force numbering 57,994 active and 22,072 reserve personnel. On PPP

basis, this amounts to US$ 17.1 billion. By way of comparison, South Korea spends US$ 41.5

billion on a military strength of 639,000 regular and 2,900,000 reserve personnel. Even after

allowing for a large salary difference, this amounts to a significantly higher level of per capita

military spending in the Australian Defence Force. The large disparity in spending between

these two modern armed forces is partly due to the structure of the Australian armed forces.

25

Defence planners have an obvious preference for the ‘balanced’ force, essentially a

force that can undertake every possible type of mission everywhere and under all

circumstances. This implies a force that has every capability in sufficient numbers and with

adequate quality to take on all possible adversaries. A balanced force is obviously an ideal and

usually beyond the means of all but the most powerful nations. All other countries must settle

for a compromise that covers the capabilities to support their national security strategy

without exhausting the economy. The Australian Defence Force is a good example of this

reality. Neither the number of active duty personnel nor the resources are adequate to sustain

armed forces commensurate with the size of the country or its location. The Australian

Defence Force has therefore evolved into a niche player. It relies on maintaining a

technological edge and well-trained forces with niche capabilities instead of sustaining a large

and diversified force that would strain the available resources. Such a force sacrifices

comprehensive capabilities and relies instead on military alliances to fill the gaps. As

successive Australian Defence White Papers have implied, the military alliance with the

United States is not just a political choice but also a necessity. By ensuring a large degree of

interoperability with US forces, Australia furthers its own cause while increasing its value as

an alliance partner for the United States.

The Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force can deploy moderate

numbers of modern ships and aircraft in distant areas. This amounts to a modest capability to

operate modern forces independently in a high-threat environment or an ability to make

significant contributions to a larger military alliance. The relatively smaller Army has a limited

capability for high intensity operations and is less able than the armies of the medium powers

to undertake manpower intensive tasks. Because of these limitations, the Australian Defence

Force can field limited high-quality niche forces for high intensity warfare. Prominent among

these are its submarines, Special Forces and maritime patrol aircraft. Besides, Australian

logistics capabilities would be hard-pressed to support such forces in a distant theatre of

operations for any length of time. This makes it inevitable that the Australian Defence Forces

can only participate in high intensity operations outside Australia's neighbourhood with

support from a military coalition partner. While this may appear a major limitation, military

contingencies since the end of the Cold War have rarely been about high intensity warfare in

distant parts of the world.

High intensity warfare has been a high-impact but low-probability military

requirement since the end of the Cold War. Maintaining ‘good order’ at sea is far more

frequent military requirement. This catchall phrase covers a variety of requirements such as

26

anti-piracy, environment protection, countering terrorism and prevention of organized crime.

This task was first handled by the colonial powers and, after the Second World War, by the

two superpowers. In recent decades, the major military powers have been less inclined to take

on this task on a global scale. ‘Creeping legislation’ at sea has created a large number of

stakeholders who often lack the resources to effectively undertake these tasks even within

their own waters. Pockets of poverty and the transnational nature of many such offences

were largely responsible for the reappearance of piracy in many parts of the world, most

notably off the coast of Somalia. Given the nature of the problem, good order at sea can only

be ensured close regional cooperation or by global power supported by an international

consensus on these issues. The presence of coalition naval forces in the Indian Ocean was a

major factor in containing the threat from Somali pirates. However, with the end of military

operations in Iraq and the imminent draw down of military forces in Afghanistan, the

continued presence of significant coalition naval forces is no longer assured. Good order at sea

issues could therefore again come to the fore. However, the projected rise of China as a world

power raises even more fundamental questions for Australian security planners.

At the end of the Cold War, large segments of the international community acted on

the assumption that the rise of China could be ‘managed’ to some extent through engagement

and cooperation China’s actions seemed to support the assumption. Burgeoning trade

relations, Chinese willingness to join various international arrangements and reticence on

contentious issues also seemed to point in the same direction. However, China has begun to

display an increasing confidence in its own capabilities and an inclination to grow on its own

terms. Simmering disputes with countries in the region are no longer being set aside, in the

interest of good relations, for future generations to resolve. Unfortunately, this has coincided

with a period when the United States has been sending out mixed signals about its willingness

to take a stand against increased Chinese assertiveness. With the United States openly

seeking an exit strategy from Afghanistan and plans for ‘sequestration’ of military spending,

the future looks even more uncertain in the Asia-Pacific. The ‘Asia Pivot’ strategy, and the

‘rebalancing’, have done little to reduce the confusion about US intentions.

As the ripples from proactive Chinese actions continue to spread across the Asia-

Pacific region, a seemingly distant China suddenly seems much closer to Australia’s strategic

neighbourhood. Meanwhile, China has displayed an increasing tendency to escalate disputes

to a level where only military intervention can break the impasse. So far, major incidents have

been avoided but the future is clearly uncertain. The choices for Australian national security

planners are stark. China is Australia’s largest trading partner and important for economic

27

security. In 2011, China accounted for almost one-quarter of all Australian goods trade. A 2012

poll found that the Australian public gave China more credit than Australia’s own policies for

weathering the global financial crisis. On the other hand, the United States is essential for

Australia’s national security, as a military alliance partner. Australian voters remain

ambivalent about Australia-China ties, sceptical about the benefits of Chinese investment in

Australia, and concerned about the longer-term implications of China’s rise for the future of

the region. Polling shows that Australians are becoming more attached to the U.S. alliance

despite their economy becoming more enmeshed with China. In a 2012 poll, 87 percent

believed that the US alliance was either very important or fairly important for Australia’s

security—up from 63 percent in 2007.8A recent book by Hugh White9 advocates coming to

terms with this reality and that it would be best for Australia to convince the United States to

concede some strategic space to a rising China. This view seems to have evoked mixed

responses and little obvious support in decision-making circles. The only other options are to

adopt a ‘wait and watch’ policy or to join the muted murmurs for containing China.

Containment is more a theoretical option than a practical strategy against a country as

large, populous, economically important and militarily powerful as China. There are signs

that Beijing is disappointed by the rather cautious welcome Australia gives to Chinese

investments, and the large disparity between strategic and economic relations.10 Under the

existing circumstances, there seems to be little scope for anything beyond a careful balancing

of the relationships with China and the United States. Besides, it is difficult to conceive of a

situation where Australia can do more without the United States taking an active lead. For

now there seems to be little that Australia can do except be prepared for the possibility of

China moving from the ‘distant abroad’ to the ‘near abroad’.

--------------------×---------------------

8Thirlwell, ibid. 9Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power (Oxford University Press, USA, September

1, 2013). 10Thirlwell, ibid.

28

India and Australia: Towards Politico- Strategic Convergence

Dr. Pankaj K Jha11

The international system is in transition with a preeminent power being challenged by

a rising power and new middle powers. As a result, the complex strategic and politico-security

matrix would decide the course of events in the new world order. In the last decade, issues

like human security, non-traditional security threats have gained maximum media attention

and were debated at multilateral forums. In this decade, the new strategic configurations,

economic trade -offs, geographic trade agreements and resource nationalism are likely to be

the headlines. Although, the traditional security issues are still being addressed in confidential

confines but the non-traditional security issues has become a least common denominator for

multi-nation cooperation. It is also reflected in the final communiqué of a number of

multilateral organisations including ASEAN, ADMM plus, ARF that have been made in the last

three years. Moreover, the new multilateral institutions have started addressing concerns very

specific to their agenda and objectives. In this regard, the organisations like ADMM and plus

formations have created a new role for defence ministers. Furthermore, new consultative

mechanisms within a certain set of organisations have created a more focussed approach such

as ASEAN +1 formulation. New organisations such as BRICS have been carefully expanding

their membership, and have been defining new roles in terms of international financial

structure and development assistance. Existent multilateral organisations like ASEAN have

been incrementally inching towards the goal of ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 and

have successfully preserved its centrality in matters related to the region.

In such a context, it is imperative to probe what role the India- Australia ties would

play in the coming future, especially when India’s new government might like to expand

outreach to its extended neighbourhood and Australia is also outlining its role in the larger

Indo-Pacific region12. On the multilateral horizon, there are a few encouraging developments

which have addressed the feasibility of cooperation between the two countries and this

includes organisations such as East Asia Summit, an informal forum, ASEAN+ configurations

and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).India has reached out to the Pacific Island Forum but is

11

Dr. Pankaj K Jha is Research Fellow at ICWA. 12 India Country Strategy, Australia In The Asian Century-Towards 2025, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, 2013,p.4

29

still in the waiting list for APEC. In terms of geo-political understanding, India wishes to be

seen as the favourite among the countries in West Asia and East Asia, and has devised policy

to show its intent in reaching out to its extended neighbourhood through policy

pronouncements such as ‘Look East Policy’, ‘Look West Policy’ and ‘Connect Central Asia

Policy’. India has also showed its intent in becoming the net security provider in the Indian

Ocean region.

In comparison, Australia has been relatively more forthcoming in its formulations

about the ASEAN+6 mechanisms as a better option. Its pioneering role in APEC is well known

and is increasingly seen stabilising force in South Pacific affairs and Pacific Islands Forum

(PIF). Australia is also the country of first call in case of any incident or event in the Oceania.

For India, South Asia is the theatre of paramount importance while Australia increasingly sees

Southwest Pacific as its area of responsibility. This geographic affiliation and a lack of

rendezvous point have created problems in exchange of ideas and developing a common

understanding on matters related to political and strategic issues. However, Indo-Pacific

construct provides the necessary theatre for strategic convergence and dialogue on common

security and defence matters.

Political Convergence

In terms of strategic outlook, India has steadfastly maintained the immediate

neighbourhood being their area of prime importance but in the Annual Reports of the

Ministry of External Affairs on the ‘Extended Neighbourhood’ phrase has gained salience.

India’s Strategic Outlook has undergone a change in the last decade. India in its Maritime

Strategy Document (2007) has articulated the importance of Malacca Straits and beyond

including South China Sea, Sunda and Lombok Straits. This is also increasingly reflected in the

Annual reports of the Ministry of External Affairs. Moreover, India’s engagement with its

extended neighbourhood, including the Gulf region and Africa, showcases India’s approach

which mirrors the phase of the first Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru who wished to

integrate the interests of Asia and Africa, and promote third world development and peace.

India‘s new approach is more realistic, however, to a certain extent inspired by its post

independence idealistic notions in international relations. Australia too is engaging Asia in a

comprehensive way and this is projected through its White Paper titled ‘Australia in the Asian

Century’ and subsequently through the five country strategy papers, released last year on five

major countries of Asia including India.

30

Is there a case for Strategic Convergence?

In terms of alliance relationship, Australia has been foremost alliance partner of US

and has received necessary assistance from US in terms of equipment, weapons and nuclear

umbrella. Australia has been reciprocating in terms of providing a base at Darwin for US

marines and an airstrip at the Christmas islands. In comparison to Australia, India has always

been a votary of non-alignment and a strong proponent of development of the third world

countries. Therefore, India remained insulated from any alliance formations, even though it

entered into a Friendship Treaty with erstwhile USSR.

Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1971 was perceived by few nations

in Southeast Asia and even in Pacific as India formally accepting Soviet security umbrella. This

created apprehensions related to the proposed building of a military base at the Andaman and

Nicobar islands in late 1980s.Subsequently, India reached out to nations in Southeast Asia

particularly Indonesia and Australia through diplomacy and its “Look East Policy”. India’s

economic liberalisation programme also created complementarities.

Now, after more than a decade and half, India is again building its Joint Command at

Andaman and Nicobar islands which as per the RAND report13 can be a suitable UAV base in

the Indian Ocean. India also wishes to use the islands as the base for projecting its interests in

Eastern Indian Ocean and facilitate its role as net security provider in the Indian Ocean.

Australia has also shown its keen interest in developments in Indian Ocean after it took over

as Chair of IORA and has been projecting Perth as the centre of Indo-Pacific construct. The

growing relevance of the two countries in the Asia-Pacific theatre led to the signing of

Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2009.Therefore, there is need to explore areas of strategic

cooperation, both in the short and long term.

In terms of technology cooperation, India and Japan are cooperating in development of

engines and sale of maritime aircraft such as U-2. Japan and Australia as well as US and

Australia have recently endorsed Defence Technology trade cooperation. This will create a

pool of technology which would be helpful in making future defence systems as well as

enhancing the capabilities of soldiers. In this context, a Defence Technology Forum between

the three countries i.e. India- Japan and Australia would be a good initiative. Moreover, a

trilateral dialogue between the three countries would address a number of issues which

13 Michael J. Lostumbo Et Al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces An Assessment of Relative Costs, Rand Corporation Report prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Santa Monica,2013, p.250

31

concerns the three countries in terms of traditional security issues and non-traditional

security threats.

Indo-Pacific construct can be a template for geo-political and geo-strategic

cooperation and for any contingencies but there is a need for national commitment and

expanse of its politico–strategic objectives, as well as contours of engagement with its

stakeholders and partners. The question is, whether this construct would lead to other

multilateral formulations which would be a successor to Asia-Pacific Forum and whether it

would not challenge the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), if it expands its orientation. An

analogy from the ASEAN multilateral formulation shows that while ASEAN might be

expanding through forums such as East Asia Summit, Indo-pacific would create another forum

which might overlap with ASEAN centric structures. However, the inherent geo-political

objectives would decide the future subscription of these geo-political forums.

Possibilities for Future

The question which needs to be answered is whether there are feasibilities in creating

convergence both at political and strategic level. In 2011–12, India was the largest source of

permanent and skilled migrants for Australia. According to one of the estimates, Indian

community is the fourth-largest migrant community in Australia.

In recent years, tourism to Australia has increased, with nearly 160,000 Indians visited

the country in 201214. An easy visa regime for tourism and education will fulfil the criteria for

enhancing people to people contacts. More importantly, the irritants in the relationship have

been caused by the differing perceptions of media on both countries.

There is a need for sensitising media and use of social media platforms for better

information dissemination. An India-Australia Face book portal, and a website would add

more value to the policy making and research in this area. India already has commissioned an

India-ASEAN website to disseminate information about the developments in the economic,

political and strategic domains with Southeast Asian nations.

Secondly, the trade issue is a little bit complicated because of which the trade has not

gained the necessary traction in the policy circles. The issue has been the stringent

phytosanitary and sanitary measures and also issues like Mutual Recognition Agreement for

14

India Country Strategy, Australia In The Asian Century-Towards 2025, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, 2013,p.4

32

Degrees. As already, India has started Accreditation of Universities and also has provided a

single window for verification of degrees. For India, service sector contributes to more than 55

percent of the annual GDP and any liberal approach towards Mode-IV would enhance Indian

services sector presence. However, there are reservations from both sides but these issues

need to be resolved on a priority basis to enhance ties and take the relationship to the truly

strategic level.

The negotiations on a nuclear deal regarding the supply of Uranium are ongoing and

are stated to be very encouraging. However, given the fact that there are additional protocols

with regard to supply of Uranium to non-NPT signatory country, there might be some justified

reservations from Australian side but given India’s record as non-proliferator, India would like

to be given certain concessions. Moreover, with the no first use principle in its nuclear

doctrine shows the intent of India’s nuclear doctrine.

In terms of humanitarian assistance and relief both the countries have been playing a

major role. Areas of possible cooperation in Non-Traditional security issues including

Pandemics and Disaster Management need to be explored. The same role needs to be

envisaged for different contingencies and there is a need for Standard Operating Procedures in

case of any incident in the Indo-Pacific region. The best example which has been seen is the

search for MH-270 airliner for which different navies have searched in South China Sea and

also in Indian Ocean.

In defence domain, maritime exercises need to be at higher plane rather than primary

PASSEX Exercises. In this regard, the use of naval bases in Andaman and Nicobar Islands and

Australia’s Northern Territory would be good for theatre exercises, and would provide better

coordination and understanding.

In the area of cyber governance there could be good understanding given the utility of

e-commerce as a viable option and e-governance being studied in India in a major way. On

cyber security issues, there is intrinsic mistrust and it would not be very feasible for

cooperation until contours are defined and trust is restored. In science and technology

research, there are problems with regard to coordination and issues related to the rigour

involved in completing the project.

In energy and resources sector, India and Australia have the buyer and supplier

relationship. For India, there is an ever increasing need for coal and uranium, both of which

are important for the sustained economic growth of India. In addition to these, there is a need

33

for cooperation in energy efficiency and reduction in transmission loss. In education also,

there is a need for training/internship for Indian students within Australia, so that Indian

students can contribute to Indian economy when they return.

With regard to the economic cooperation, Australia is also getting into the ASEAN

paradox of selectively not opening services sector to Indian professionals. The inflexible

conditions for migration of labour and skilled professionals under Mode-IV would

disincentivise India-Australia trade ties. As already, it is understood, for India opening up of

services sector would led to bridging the trade deficit and would be a win-win situation. Both

India and Australia need to work together at multilateral forums on issues like generating

employment opportunities, fiscal consolidation and climate finance. As both countries would

have to take in climate change refugees in future, this can be a long term project. Further,

global financial governance needs change which should incorporate the interests of

developing countries.

There are few other areas of cooperation which includes nano-satellites for agricultural

purposes, geo-spatial modelling, simulation and weather forecasting, better seed research and

pest resistant plants, research in cheap medicines for fighting pandemics, disaster

management and counter-terrorism.

For developing understanding in multilateral forums, the issues related to ASEAN

centrality need to be addressed because the reflections of the same can be seen when ASEAN

+China meeting China had tried to undermine Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)

through forcing a Treaty of Good Neighbourliness. India and Australia need to work together

on Ocean economy, so as to provide sustainable economy options for both Indian and Pacific

Island nations. These include working on economic viability options so that most of these

nations should reduce their reliance on economic aid and must not become an easy partner in

strategic calculations which might disturb the regional order. With India still adhering to its

concept of strategic autonomy and Australia incrementally trying to register itself as an Asian

country with independent foreign policy relying less on US support, the future looks bright.

Conclusion

India and Australia have been incrementally addressing their strategic concerns in the

international forums and through regular bilateral dialogues. However, there is a trust deficit

in term of working together on international issues and security concerns. The roots of which

can be found in different fundamentals of foreign policy and strategic outlook.

34

While US has been the binding force to stimulate strategic engagement between the

two countries, the differing perspectives on China, which at times has been at extremes, has

created a disturbing trend. Indo-Pacific, as a geo-political construct, provides a converging

point but it is still nascent for any long term understanding. China remains a concern for both

countries but the relative gradient of concern is varied. This creates problems in forging a

strategic convergence.

China has not yet emerged as a rising power, serious challenging the international and

regional order but the two countries need to address their individual interests and strategic

priorities given the fact that the international situation has been in a flux. While Russia and

China are getting close, US has remain committed to the Asia-Pacific theatre , albeit the fact

remains that many of the US allies have their concerns about the US support and commitment

to Asian security. In this regard the Cold War perceptions overarch the strategic thinking in

both the countries. The major incentive would be for both the countries to create bridges of

trade, energy and defence convergence, so that the strategic understanding can be intensified.

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35

Report on ICWA Delegation Australia Visit

(March 17-21, 2014)

Executive Summary

1) A five member ICWA delegation undertook a five days visit (excluding travel period)

to Australia to hold a roundtable discussion with its MOU partner- Australian Institute

of International Affairs (AIIA) at Melbourne. It also interacted with other Australian

strategic think tanks such as Australian Strategic Policy institute (ASPI) and official

institutions such as Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Office of

National Assessments (ONA) at Canberra. Academic interaction with select academics

from University of New South Wales (UNSW) was held in Sydney.

2) Australian side showed interest in finalising the dates for Australian Prime Minister

Tony Abbott’s visit to India and has suggested a long due visit of Indian Prime Minister

to Australia.

3) During the interaction with a number of Australian think tanks, it was apparent that

Australia wanted to engage India in a more proactive manner and was keen on

finalising the bilateral Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA)

negotiations and uranium supply agreement.

4) Regarding the Mode –IV provisions in the bilateral CECA negotiations, Australian side

was in a non-committal mode because of the looming large scale unemployment.

Owing to the easing of tariffs on foreign automobile imports, Australian domestic

automobile industry has to resort to retrenchment of workers (about 30,000 workers in

the next six months) and possibly close manufacturing units of Holden, Toyota etc.

5) Australia was in the process of finalising the Free Trade Agreements with Japan and

South Korea. After concluding FTA with these countries, Australia would divert its

attention to South Asia, particularly to India for CECA negotiations.

6) Myanmar has become an area of interest for the Australian policy establishment.

During discussion at DFAT, the foreign ministry officials dealing with Myanmar have

proposed coordination and joint initiatives with India. It was also suggested during the

meeting that India can work in Myanmar in two sectors, namely health and education.

Australia would be keen on providing necessary assistance in this regard.

7) On the issue of assimilation of ethnic minorities in Myanmar, DFAT has been

monitoring the developments and has suggested that the Myanmar government

36

should empower the provincial governments. The issue of Muslim persecution was

also raised during the meeting.

8) During the meetings, it was learnt that about 50 Australians of Lebanese descent have

gone to fight against the Assad regime in Syria. Their interactions with Al Qaeda

affiliated groups during the war and subsequent return to Australia would be a matter

of concern for Australian security establishment.

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37

Detailed Report

A five member delegation led by Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia, DG, ICWA visited Australia

(March 17-21, 2014) and held a round table discussion with its MoU partner Australian

Institute of International Affairs (AIIA). The other members of the delegation included

Ambassador Sheel Kant Sharma, former Secy General SAARC, Professor Darvesh Gopal, Dean,

School of Social Sciences, IGNOU, Rear Adm. (Retd) Vijai S Chaudhari, Additional Director,

Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) and Dr. Pankaj K Jha, Research Fellow, ICWA.

Bilateral Dialogue with AIIA

The bilateral dialogue with ICWA’s MoU Partner AIIA was meant to develop new

frameworks to enhance cooperation and collaboration between Australia and India academics

and policy analysts. The dialogue was divided into four technical sessions dealing with the a)

International Situation; b) the Regional Situation: Indo-Pacific Region; c) the State of the

Nations: Australia and India and d) Bilateral Relationship: Political, Economic, Defence and

Strategic issues.

In her welcome remarks, Ms Zara Kimpton, vice-president AIIA while elucidating the

commonalities in the two countries admitted that Australia was trying to reorient its outlook

towards India. She stated that with increasing number of ministerial visits, the irritants such

as uranium exports and attacks on Indian students in the past have diminished in policy

dialogues. Expressing anguish on the attacks on Indian students, she informed that Australia

has adopted a Colombo plan under which Australian students would be able to conduct

studies in India and develop a better understanding about South Asia. She highlighted the

importance of Indian elections and expressed hope that the Indian PM would be able to visit

Brisbane for the G-20 summit in November this year.

In his opening address, DG, ICWA, expressed the necessity to promote an abiding

understanding between the two countries and appreciated Australia’s endeavour to treat the

Asian century as ‘an Australian opportunity’. He stressed on blending purposeful pro-activism

in bilateral affairs and enlightened multilateralism. Professor Amitabh Mattoo, Director,

Australia-India Institute (AII) stated that the ties were at the cusp of transformation and the

strategic community need to provide valuable policy suggestions.

Ambassador Biren Nanda, Indian High Commissioner to Australia, apprised about the

recent developments in the bilateral free trade negotiations and explored the feasibility of

38

uranium exports from Australia. He added that there was inadequate understanding of the

progress in bilateral engagements. He added that with the signing of Strategic Partnership

agreement in 2009, there has been tangible cooperation in the field of resources, science and

technology, anti-malaria medicine and disaster management.

In the first technical session, discussions were held with regard to the evolving

international situation .In his remarks DG, ICWA stated that there is a shift of power from

‘West to East as well as West to Rest’. Advocating a need for multipolarity in the present

circumstances, he stated that there are possibilities existing in terms of trilateral cooperation

and also better coordination in various multilateral forums such as G-20, BRICS etc. He stated

with the emergence of non-state actors in international politics, there is a need to strengthen

P2P ties and also work towards common guidelines for resolving contentious issues. He added

that East Asia Summit need to be strengthened along with multifaceted cooperative structures

related to maritime security and safety of Sea Lanes of Communication.

Melissa Conley Tyler, in her paper, highlighted Australian perspective on the

international situation. She referred to Australian foreign Secretary Mr Peter Varghese

equation of ‘6+2+n’ which signified six important NATIONS(US, China, Japan, Korea, India

and Indonesia), two institutions(G-20 and East Asia Summit) and immediate neighbourhood

as the apt formula for resolving regional challenges and creating opportunities. She advocated

strengthening of G-20 process and also East Asia Summit. She also opined that institutions

such as Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and trilateral arrangements for micro-planning

need to be explored. Addressing Australia’s desire to emerge as a middle power, she stated

that Australia needs to develop political and strategic understanding and should work towards

promoting economic diplomacy in Asia.

During this session, questions were raised related to divergence between Australia and

India on multipolarity, Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and India’s response to

the TPP. A number of Australian scholars raised the issue of how to strengthen EAS and what

could be the structures and processes which need to be reinforced in the informal mechanism.

The second session dealt with the regional situation with particular reference to Indo-

Pacific region. Ambassador Sheel Kant Sharma in his paper stated that there is asymmetric

contribution within South Asia with regard to the integration of South Asia under SAARC

structure. He outlined the work that had been done by SAARC and elucidated that India

desired to come out of the South Asia and connect with its larger extended neighbourhood.

He opined that there can be two ways to view security in South Asian context. One was to

39

continue to analyse and shape it, business-as- usual, in terms of military balance, advanced

weapon systems and force multipliers, RMA, and the old fashioned system of deterrents and

alliances. The second approach could be to look at the region, its situation in larger Asian

setting with promises of an Asian century, the region’s burning problems and the real menaces

which impact on people’s lives and habitats, both urban and rural alike, and provide lion’s

share of damage to human development. He said that tensions between globalising economy

and divided global societies endanger the planet by diminishing cooperation which is sorely

needed to meet the challenges.

In the second paper of the session, Nick Beesley, Editor in Chief of Australian Journal

of International Affairs, highlighted the salient points of the three official policy papers

released by Australian Foreign office and stated that there are still certain reservations about

the Australia’s Asia policy and its advocacy of the Indo-Pacific Region(IPR)as a viable geo-

political alternative. He opined that IPR policy would be an expensive proposition and in

terms of security perspective, the term connotes a different strategic sense. He added that

widespread variation in the economic and political status of Indian Ocean states project an

incoherent picture. Moreover, the Indo-Pak problems as well as very few multilateral

structures in Indian Ocean theatre project a different geo-political construct. Within South

Pacific which has a number of multilateral structures and long standing alliance structure, the

marriage of the two constructs as Indo-Pacific would be a problematic proposition. The Indo-

Pacific has emerged as multilateral proposition to hedge against China instead of enmeshing

the rising power. He stated that even though Indo-Pacific is a balanced concept but there is a

need to look out for more convergence.

During this session question were raised regarding US commitment to the Indo-

Pacific, rise of Taliban in Afghanistan and Australia’s force posture in contingency operations.

Queries were raised also regarding the SAARC process and China, China’s participation in

Indo-pacific construct and Fiji elections in September 2014.

In the third session, two papers were presented which discussed the state of the nation

and internal issues in India and Australia. Professor Darvesh Gopal highlighted the intricacies

of India’s forthcoming elections and how it would define the course of India’s domestic and

foreign policy. Without speculating he added that the new Prime Minister would have to

address the needs of coalition politics, domestic reservations and international obligations.

While comparing the narratives in 1991 and 2014, he apprised the audience of the magnanimity

of these elections and how it would impact the political dynamics in the country. He added

40

that in few sectors, there have been demands for better government participation and this

includes health, education, social security and employment. Most of the parties’ manifestos

have been addressing these concerns but youth power would decide the course of India’s

future.

The second paper of the session was presented by Ms Sushi Das who outlined the

developments in India and how it impacts on the Australian public perception. She said that

in terms of awareness about India and its democracy there are still few misunderstandings and

the media from both countries can help in removing those false apprehensions.

During this session questions were raised regarding gender issues, women

empowerment and employment scenario. A number of questions alluded to eth skepticism

about the next Indian prime Minster and India’s foreign policy priorities.

The penultimate session discussed the contours of engagement between India and

Australia –politically, diplomatically, strategically and in security aspects. In this session two

papers from Indian side were presented by Rear Admiral Vijai S Chaudhari and Dr. Pankaj Jha

while Australian perspective was outlined by Dr. Christopher Kremmer. During this session,

Rear Adm Vijai S Chaudhari stated that in terms of maritime security and disaster relief, there

are a number of convergences. He stated that in terms of issues related to nuclear security,

proliferation and interdiction a number of possibilities exist between India and Australia

which includes proper coordination between armed forces, naval maritime exercises and

frequent port visits. Moreover, interactions during Milan have created a sense of

belongingness among the officers of the two countries with Indian Ocean as the foundation of

defence and maritime interactions.

Dr. Pankaj Jha highlighted the cautious attitude from both sides in terms of

engagement but also opined that in terms of technical, defence and political cooperation there

has been positive approach from both sides but this momentum needs to be sustained

through uranium supply agreement and trade agreement. However, Australia would also have

to make provisions for the services export form India. Christopher Kremer in his remarks

stated that the one bedrock of the ties between the two countries is growth and the

interactions have been bearing fruits. Moreover, he stated that in terms of Scientific Research

fund, there is a sense of dwindling interests and this need to be avoided. He criticised the lack

of funds for the bilateral academic exchanges and also the fund allocation that has been made

for the Australia- India Institute has decreased substantially through all these years. He lauded

that the provincial Victoria government has been giving the necessary momentum to the ties

41

but federal government in Canberra is not fully supportive of the initiatives undertaken by

Victoria government. He also raised apprehensions that China has been trying to alter the

balance of power and it is prudent at this juncture for the democracies to come together for

regional security and stability.

During the Q&A session queries were raised with regard to the migration of Indian

students in Australia, ASEAN centrality , FDI procedures in mining, agriculture and

telecommunication in India, concept of ocean economy and technology cooperation.

In the concluding session, DG, ICWA and CEO, AIIA summed up the discussion

during the bilateral dialogue. DG, ICWA stated that the bilateral relationship has been truly

multidimensional but the relationship should not only be mercantilist in nature. In terms of

trade, investments and geo-political views there is convergence. Moreover, people’s views and

geo-political and geo-strategic spaces such as Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific have built

positive linkages but these need to be nurtured. He stressed on the need for more dialogue

through mechanisms such as Track –II dialogue. He also proposed to hold the next round of

Dialogue in Delhi and invited AIIA delegation to visit Delhi in near future for the dialogue. In

response to DG, ICWA remarks, Melissa Conley Tyler endorsed a need for pull factors in the

relationship to go forward and stated that the deliberations between the two sides would be

communicated to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and this would act as a

catalyst to initiate further dialogue and strengthen understanding between the two sides. She

stated that the future visit to Delhi would be taken up in the right earnest. She thanked all for

enriching the discussions.

Roundtable Interaction at Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)

The ICWA delegation also held discussion with its TDIO partner, ASPI. Discussions

started with a reference to the Trilateral Dialogue on Indian Ocean. Mr. Peter Jennings who is

now the chair of the new drafting committee for Australia’s next Defence White Paper stated

that the TDIO need to expand in future. He expressed that there is a need to work on the

concept of Blue economy and also Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) protocol given

the recent disappearance of Malaysian airlines flight MH-370. ASPI scholars proposed working

groups on major issues in the Indian Ocean and apprised that there is a lack of Track –II

forums within IORA which can provide necessary inputs to the Track –I discussions. He

proposed a senior officials meeting under IORA to discuss issues of contemporary relevance

such as fisheries management issue. He also stressed that the dialogue partners need to be

asked to contribute to the IORA. While lauding the effort under taken by Mauritius last year,

42

he added that there is a need for a high level business conference and establishment of a

genuine Track –II forum, very similar to CSCAP.

In response, Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia stated that the TDIO has become a serious

Track-II dialogue and the TDIO partners need to discuss the fourth country representation in

the TDIO. He also asked for the schedule for the second dialogue and what were the future

plans of the TDIO. In response, Mr. Peter Jennings proposed a September/October 2014 as the

probable months for hosting the TDIO in Australia. He opined that whether there are

possibilities of upgrading the dialogue as Track 1.5 level. One of the scholars proposed that

South Africa can be inducted as an observer. He further added that there should be actionable

policy recommendations which should germinate from the dialogue.

DG, ICWA suggested methods of qualitatively changing the format of the dialogue

both in terms of representation and content. He advised that the sides must consult the

respective colleagues in foreign office and also there is a need to commission an outcome

document. He further added that at this juncture it is important to strengthen the TDIO

rather than inducting South Africa as a member.

Peter Jennings opined that Obama’s second term has been satisfactory but the policy

projection has not been up to the mark. He remarked that with the US drawdown from

Afghanistan, Asia would have to prepare for fallouts of the withdrawal. During the interaction

with ASPI, the scholars from ASPI stated that Australia cannot afford to allow China has been

actively participating in south pacific island nations through its aid programme.

Interaction at Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)

The ICWA delegation visited DFAT and held a meeting with important officials. Two

persons from Myanmar desk also joined in the discussions. During the discussions, DFAT

officials made it clear that Australia was in the process of finalising the Free Trade Agreements

with Japan and South Korea. After concluding the FTA with these countries, Australia would

divert its attention to South Asia particularly to India. He also apprised about the emerging

trends in the region including China, Myanmar and India- Australia ties. DFAT conveyed that

they accepted the Indo-pacific Region as an area to ‘maximise the economic opportunity and

minimise strategic risk’. DFAT officials alluded to the fact that China has become a central

player in this region and their objective was how to enmesh it in the geo-political system.

On India-Australia ties, there was discussion about an early conclusion to CECA

negotiations. The CECA negotiations which included agreements in services also has been

43

going on but has not gained necessary momentum because ‘India’s offer on goods was not good

enough’. There are issues related to the MODE-IV (which deals with movement of skilled

labour) given the reservations related to the Mutual Recognition of Degrees and the dispute

settlement mechanisms between the two countries. The delegation was informed that with

the closing of domestic automobile industry Australia government would have to provide

employment to 30,000 personnel who would be left unemployed because of closure of these

automobile industries. In terms of US drawdown from Afghanistan there are concerns within

Australia as Afghanistan might become a hot bed of terror, in case Taliban is in power sharing

arrangement or recaptures power. It was stated that within Australia a sizeable number of

ethnic Lebanese (rough estimate of 50 persons) have gone to Syria to fight against the Assad

regime and their return would create problems in Australia society because of their suspected

indoctrination by the Al Qaeda cadres.

DFAT officials further added that there is a need for a high level visit from Indian side

and Australia perceived that the visit of new Indian Prime Minister to Australia from the G-20

Summit in Brisbane would provide that opportune moment for the two sides. However, a high

level Prime ministerial visit was expected from India. Tony Abbott was expected to visit China

and this was meant to engage China through trade and diplomatic ties. DG, ICWA was asked

about the political transition in Myanmar and how Aung San Suu Kyi would be important in

the changing political dynamics in the country. Subsequently, queries were raised about the

state of India- Pakistan relations, India’s nuclear energy initiatives and its engagement with

US.

Academic Interaction at University of New South Wales

During the academic interaction at University of New South Wales, select academics

led by Dr. Alan Bloomfield interacted with the ICWA delegation. Discussions were held on the

issues related to the Ukraine crisis, India’s approach towards Southeast Asia, developments in

South Asia and India’s defence diplomacy. India’s elections and India’s policy approach

towards South Pacific. Queries were raised with regard to the immigration laws in Australia,

education and trade with Australia’s neighbours. Further, the discussions were also directed

towards Australia approach towards coastal security and treatment of asylum seekers.

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44

Indian Council of World Affairs – Delegation

Ambassador Rajiv K. Bhatia Director General, ICWA

Ambassador Bhatia was appointed Director General of the ICWA in June 2012

Previously a career diplomat, serving India with distinction for over thirty-seven years

Served as ambassador/high commissioner to Kenya, Myanmar, Mexico and South Africa

Member of the Academic Council of Jawaharlal Nehru University, member of the governing council of the National Institute of Design, and member-secretary of the governing council of ICWA

Qualifications: Masters in political science (Allahabad University)

Ambassador Sheel Kant Sharma Former Secretary General, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

(SAARC)

Belongs to the 1973 batch of India’s diplomatic service, IFS

Served as the Indian Ambassador of India in Vienna and Permanent Representative UN offices including the IAEA (2004-08) and as Governor on its Board of Governors

Headed the Foreign Office Division dealing with Southeast Asia and the Pacific as Joint Secretary (South) 1991 – 1994

Headed Ministry of External Affairs non-proliferation, disarmament and security division, 2000 – 2004

Diplomatic assignments to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Geneva, Algeria and Austria

Qualifications: Ph.D in High Energy Physics (Indian Institute of Technology) and Master of Science, Nuclear Physics (Indian Institute of Technology), distinguished alumnus award (Indian Institute of Technology Bombay) 2007

45

Professor Darvesh Gopal Director, School of Social Sciences, Indira

Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU)

Professor of Political Science and Head, Centre for Gandhi and Peace Studies, School of Social Sciences, IGNOU

Leading Australian Studies scholar, receiving the prestigious Government of Australia (Australia-India Council) Special Award, 2009, for Education

Recent publications include; Australia in the Emerging Global Order: Evolving Australia-India Relations, India-Australia Relations: Convergences and Divergences, Globalisation and Regional Security: India and Australia

Qualifications: M.Phil and Ph.D in International Relations (Jawaharlal Nehru University) and M.A in Political Science (Karnataka University)

R ADM (Retd) Vijai S. Chaudhari Former Indian Defence Advisor to Australia

R ADM Chaudhari is the Additional Director at the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), New Delhi

CENJOWS is an independent think-tank, supported by Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, that studies issues related to National Security

Former Rear Admiral, served four decades in the Indian Navy

Worked on the operational staff of the Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet and as Chief Staff Officer (Operations) of the Western Naval Command

Also worked at the Nigerian Naval College, Port Harcourt, and in the Indian High Commission in Canberra

Dr Pankaj Jha Research Fellow, ICWA

Served as the Deputy Director with the National Security Council Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, 2012 – 2013

Worked as Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for six years, 2005 – 2011

Main areas of interest: Southeast Asia, Indo-Pacific region, counter terrorism, economic issues

Latest publication; India and China in Southeast Asia: Competition or Cooperation?

Qualifications: Ph.D (Jawaharlal Nehru University), Economics Graduate (Delhi University)

46

ICWA-AIIA Dialogue

Indian Council of World Affairs, Australian Institute of International Affairs and

Australia India Institute Dialogue, Melbourne, March 18,2014

Tuesday 18 March 2014

___________________________________________________________________________

Welcome and Opening Remarks

Ms Zara Kimpton, OAM, National Vice-President of the Australian Institute of

International Affairs

Ambassador Rajiv K. Bhatia, Director General, Indian Council of World Affairs

Professor Amitabh Mattoo, Director, Australia India Institute, University of Melbourne

His Excellency Biren Nanda, High Commissioner of India to Australia

Morning Tea

Session I: The International Situation

Trigger Speakers

Ms Melissa Conley Tyler, National Executive Director, Australian Institute of

International Affairs

Ambassador Rajiv K Bhatia, DG, ICWA

Lunch

Session II: The Regional Situation (Indo-Pacific Region)

Trigger Speakers

Ambassador Sheel Kant Sharma, Former Secretary General, South Asian Association

for Regional Cooperation(SAARC)

Professor Nick Bisley, Head of Department of Politics, Philosophy and Legal Studies,

La Trobe University and Editor-in-Chief, Australian Journal of International Affairs

Afternoon Tea

Session III: The State of the Nations (Australia & India)

Trigger Speakers

Ms Sushi Das, Opinion Editor, The Age and author of Deranged Marriage (to be invited)

Professor Darvesh Gopal, Director, School of Social Sciences, Indira Gandhi National

Open University

47

Session IV: The Bilateral Relationship (Political, Economic, Defence and Strategic

Issues)

Trigger Speakers

Defence and Maritime ties - R ADM (Retd) Vijai S. Chaudhari, Former Indian Defence

Advisor to Australia and Additional Director, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New

Delhi.

Politico-Strategic Issues-Dr. Pankaj Jha , Research Fellow, ICWA

Dr Chris Kremmer, University of Melbourne; Author of The Chase, Inhaling the

Mahatma, Bamboo Palace and The Carpet Wars

Concluding Remarks

Ms Melissa Conley Tyler, National Executive Director, Australian Institute of

International Affairs

Ambassador Rajiv K Bhatia, DG, ICWA

___________________________________________________________________________

48

Programme ICWA’s Dialogue with its Counterpart Institutions in Australia

(March 16-22, 2014, Melbourne, Canberra and Sydney)

Sunday, March 16,2014 Departure of ICWA delegation from Delhi Monday, 17 March 2014

Arrival in Melbourne ,Hotel Check in

Monday & Tuesday, 17&18 March 2014(2 nights)

Stay in Melbourne

Monday &Tuesday, 17-18 March 2014

Roundtable Interaction with AIIA, Australia-India Institute

Wednesday,19th March , 2014

Departure from Melbourne, Arrive in Canberra, Hotel Check In

Wednesday &Thursday, March 19-20th,2014 (2 nights )

Stay in Canberra

Wednesday & Thursday, 19-20 March 2014

Roundtable with ASPI, interactions at DFAT and Office of National Assessments (ONA)

Friday, March 21,2014

Departure from Canberra, Arrival in Sydney ,Hotel Check In

Friday, March 21,2014 (1 night)

Stay in Sydney

Friday, March 21,2014

Interaction at University of New South Wales

Saturday, March 22, 2014 Departure for Delhi

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About ICWA

Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) Sapru House, Barakhamba Road

New Delhi -110001. Website- www.icwa.in

According to the Parliament of India, the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) is ‘an

institution of national importance’. The Council has a three-fold vision: to facilitate the study and

research of India’s role in international affairs for developing a body of informed opinion on

policies and policy options; to promote India’s relations with other countries through research

collaboration, institutional dialogue and knowledge sharing in mutually beneficial manner; to

serve as a clearing house of information and knowledge regarding world affairs. Indian Council of

World Affairs (ICWA) is a prestigious, proactive think tank specialising in foreign policy issues

from India’s perspective.