income inequality, citizen polarization, and political …...2 income inequality, citizen...
TRANSCRIPT
1
Income Inequality, Citizen Polarization, and Political Protest
John D. Griffin University of Colorado Boulder
Chad Kiewiet de Jonge Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
Abstract
Over the past several decades, two important trends have emerged across the world: a dramatic rise in economic inequality within nations and an increase in the frequency of mass protest. Although it is tempting to link these two trends, prior studies of the relationship between economic inequality and political unrest have proven contradictory and thereby inconclusive. We argue that existing studies centered on deprivation theory do not adequately account for the political mechanisms by which inequality does or does not lead to protest. Building on Gurr’s theory of deprivation, we suggest that research needs to examine not only perceptions of deprivation born of inequality, but also, more importantly, polarization in such perceptions. Using data from 12 separate cross national survey projects, we build an original, comparable measure of political polarization and examine the effect of income inequality on polarization and the effect of polarization on political protest in 93 countries over the period 1973 to 2010. These analyses yield three novel conclusions. First, we find that countries with higher levels of income inequality tend to have more polarized citizens. Moreover, countries with polarized citizens are more likely to endure nonviolent protest. Finally, protests are most likely in countries where average citizen satisfaction is high but this satisfaction is also polarized, a finding somewhat contrary to Gurr’s original theoretical framework.
2
Income Inequality, Citizen Polarization, and Political Protest
I. Introduction
The last five years have seen major political protests in nearly every corner of the globe
including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Venezuela, the United States, the United
Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Ukraine, and Thailand. Indeed,
taking a longer view the incidence of political protest appears to be very much on the rise (e.g.
Norris 2002, 197): “the systematic cross-national survey evidence that is available confirms that
a significant long-term rise in protest politics has indeed occurred. . . . [T]he proportion of
citizens engaged in protest politics has risen, and risen dramatically, during the late twentieth
century.” We could also point to the emergence of anti-protest laws in Canada, the United
States, and Spain (among others) as an indicator of this trend.1 There is substantial evidence that
these political protests have real consequences for governments and citizens alike: “protests can
build political movements that ultimately affect policymaking, and . . . they do so by influencing
political views” (Madestam, Shoag, Veuger, and Yanagizawa-Drott 2013, 1633; see also Collins
and Margo 2007; Lohmann 1993, 1994; Skocpol and Williamson 2011; Finkel and Muller 1998).
Another trend over the last several decades that has attracted considerable attention has
been a widespread and significant increase in income inequality within countries (e.g. Piketty
2013). The Gini coefficient, a common measure of income inequality that ranges from 0 (when
all citizens have identical incomes) to 1 (when all income goes to only one person), stood at an
average of 0.29 in OECD countries in the mid-1980s. By the late 2000s, however, the mean had
increased by almost 10% to 0.316. The coefficient rose in 17 of the 22 OECD countries for
1 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/spain-government-strict-anti-protest-laws
3
which long-term data series are available (OECD 2011).2 Stated another way, since 1980 the
share of wealth owned by the richest 1% has expanded in all but two of the 26 nations tracked by
researchers in the World Top Incomes Database (Puzzhangera 2014).3 This has led to
considerable discussion about the consequences of growing inequality. According to one
commentary, “A consensus has formed around the idea that income inequality is the single most
important challenge facing the world” (Global Post and Ford Foundation).4
It is tempting to link these two trends. However, substantial previous research on the
relationship between inequality and protest has proven contradictory, as studies have theorized
and found positive, negative, curvilinear, and null relationships between inequality and protest.
In this paper, we argue that existing analyses overlook two important components of grievance
theory on which the theories generally are based: (1) the translation of objective sources of
grievance (e.g. inequality) to subjective perceptions of relative deprivation, and (2) societal
polarization in such perceptions. We argue that this second component—polarization in
deprivation—is key for understanding the rise of protest across the world.
Using data from 12 separate cross national survey projects, we develop new measures of
grievance and polarization in such grievances that are comparable across countries. We then
examine the effect of income inequality on political grievance and polarization, and the effect of
political grievance and polarization on political protest in 115 countries from 1973 to 2010. Our
analyses yield three novel conclusions. First, we find that countries with higher levels of income
inequality also tend to have more polarized citizens. Moreover, countries with polarized citizens
are more likely to experience nonviolent protest, despite the fact that that there is no direct
2 http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/49499779.pdf. 3 http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/; http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mo-oxfam-world-economic-forum-income-inequality-20140120-story.html. 4 http://www.globalpost.com/special-reports/global-income-inequality-great-divide-globalpost.
4
relationship between inequality and protest. Finally, protests are most likely in countries where
average citizen grievances are actually rather low, but this satisfaction is also polarized, a finding
that is contrary to key predictions in Gurr’s original formulation.
II. Background and Expectations
According to grievance theory, (e.g. Gurr 1970), mass protest results from a sense of
relative deprivation, including dissatisfaction with poverty, economic conditions, or other
grievances related to living conditions. Scholars with this perspective have sought to test the
relationship between various potential sources of such deprivation and protest, and the
relationship between economic inequality and protest has proven to be one of the most studied
implications of the grievance theory research agenda (Lichbach 1988, 1989; Sigelman and
Simpson 1977; Boix 2003; Russett 1964; Acemoglu and Robinson 2009; Nagel 1974). The
results of such analyses are all over the map, with studies suggesting a positive, negative,
convex, concave, and null relationship (see Lichbach 1989 for a review).
For example, numerous studies argue for a linear relationship between a country’s level
of income inequality and political protest activity (e.g., Lichbach 1988; Sigelman and Simpson
1977; Boix 2003). Similarly, Russett finds that in societies with more equal land distribution
democracy is more stable (Russett 1964). According to one survey piece, “there is little surprise
that inequality is also strongly associated with political instability. While the sources of political
conflict vary from country to country, conflict generally originates from severe social grievances,
including class conflict and the perception of inequality among ethnic, religious or other groups.
. . . [W]e find that unequal societies, in general, are much more prone to political instability, or,
5
in other words, to be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or forceful means, which
includes politically-motivated violence and terrorism” (UNICEF Report).
Others argue that protest is least likely in societies with either very little or a great deal of
income inequality, but for different reasons. In societies with little inequality there is little basis
for grievance. In societies with high levels of inequality, meanwhile, the political opportunity
structure may not facilitate political protest (Acemoglu and Robinson 2009). To explain the
same pattern, Nagel contends that in societies with very high levels of income inequality the poor
are not as sensitive to inequality because in this context the poor are unlikely to compare their
economic position to that of the wealthy (Nagel 1974).
We argue that these studies suffer from two major shortcomings. Their first problem is
that there is a disconnect between the objective (potential) source of grievance (economic
inequality) and actual subjective appreciation of relative deprivation, a key distinction made by
Gurr (1970). In other words, to the extent that economic inequality is positively related to
protest, its effects are dependent on individuals subjectively viewing such inequality as causing a
discrepancy between their “value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr 1970, 12). An
objective source of grievance is thus not enough to spur protest; it is the realization of a gulf
between life outcomes and the results to which individuals believe they are entitled that is also
required.
For two reasons, citizens’ subjective evaluations of inequality may not be a carbon copy
of objective conditions. First, citizens may not hold accurate perceptions of the degree of
income inequality (Delli Karpini and Keeter 1996). For instance, in January 2014 the Pew
Research Center for People and the Press conducted a survey of Americans in which respondents
were asked if “the gap between the rich and everybody else in the U.S. had increased, decreased,
6
or stayed about the same.” Given the widespread attention to growing income inequality in the
U.S., it is rather remarkable that 35% of Americans either thought inequality had remained
unchanged (25%), had decreased (8%), or did not know (2%).5 Similarly, several studies
focusing on the U.S. show that Americans both underestimate (Norton and Ariely 2011) and
overestimate (Chambers et al. 2013) the actual level of income inequality.
Second, even if citizens hold accurate perceptions about the level of income inequality,
their expectations about whether inequality is a legitimate basis of grievance for them will vary.
For instance, if citizens in a country tend to believe that individuals are chiefly responsible for
their own economic circumstances, rather than the government being responsible, then even in
the face of substantial inequality grievances will be less likely to emerge (Verba 1985). For both
of these reasons, income inequality as an objective condition will only be imperfectly related to
income-based political grievance.
While a plethora of studies seeking to tie economic inequality and other objective
grievance sources to protest have essentially ignored this subjective psychological component,
more recent survey-based work has sought to test relative deprivation predictions using survey
items that actually tap into perceived grievances (e.g., Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2009;
Booth and Seligson 2009, ch. 5). Although the shift toward examining subjective grievances
rather than (or in addition to) potential objective sources of deprivation moves analyses closer to
the original logic undergirding Gurr’s grievance theory, results have proven mixed, particularly
in studies focusing on long-standing democracies (e.g., Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2009).
Those who put great stock in the need for collective action have taken this lack of strong or
consistent relationships between expressed dissatisfaction with economic, political, or life
5 http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-questionnaires/4-28-14%20Inequality%20Topline.pdf.
7
outcomes and protest as support for their research agenda, which suggests that protest potential is
essentially unrelated to actual grievances (Lichbach 1996).
The second problem with prior treatments of the grievance/protest relationship is that
they overly focuses on “deprivation” without sufficiently taking into account the “relative”
component of Gurr’s theory. Gurr argues that mobilization will actually be greatest not only
when a particular individual or group is dissatisfied with their lot, but also when other reference
groups in society are not as badly deprived. In other words, it is the inequality in perceived
outcomes that is the largest driver of protest. Neither objective economic inequality nor
subjective grievance—the main focuses of previous work—is sufficient; rather, what is more
important is the polarization of subjective perceptions of deprivation. Protest from this
perspective is thus more likely when some groups in society are particularly aggrieved while
others are quite satisfied with their lives. Thus we argue that the “relative” component of Gurr’s
relative deprivation grievance theory, and in particular the relationship between grievances
arising from economic inequality and protest, has largely been ignored in empirical analyses.
Another way of describing the second hole in the empirical literature that we identify is
to say that studies have overwhelming focused on mean levels of expressed grievances rather
than the dispersion of such perceptions. For example, at the cross national level, studies have
examined the relationship of various subjective measures of perceived grievances with the
democratic political system, expressed in the language of life satisfaction, satisfaction with the
performance of the political system or current government, and sociotropic and egotropic
evaluations of the economy and protest (Anderson and Mendes 2006; Dalton, Van Sickle, and
Weldon 2009; Booth and Seligson 2009). These studies find that a greater sense of grievance
decreases citizens’ interest in politics and their willingness to participate in conventional forms
8
of political activism while at the same time increasing the likelihood of more unconventional
protest activities (Booth and Seligson 2009; Dalton 2004, ch. 8; Norris 2011, ch. 11). High levels
of grievance are likely to reduce good governance and the application of the rule of law, as under
these conditions citizens are less likely to comply voluntarily with laws, including tax
noncompliance and fraudulent application for government benefits (Dalton 2004, 166; Norris
2011, ch. 11; Tyler 2006). Virtually all these studies share a focus on the mean or median
constituent. In so doing, they generally do not attend to the disagreement in evaluations that
exists within countries, or whether citizens are politically polarized.
Admittedly, some scholars have begun to shift the focus from comparing the experience
of the average citizen across democratic systems to comparing the experience of citizens within a
single political system (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; Jacobs and Page 2005; Adams and Ezrow
2009). These studies seek to disaggregate the public, asking whether within countries some
citizens better evaluate the political system than others, or whether judgments are polarized. To
date, though, these studies of citizen polarization have not been truly comparative across
countries. Most comparative studies only include a handful of cases or are single-country case
studies (Adams and Ezrow 2009; Ezrow 2010; see Powell 2007 for review). This is not
surprising, because it is very difficult to compare polarization in multiple countries in an
encompassing manner. And yet, to the extent that Gurr’s (1970) original predictions about the
importance of relative differences in grievances are correct, we also must examine the
polarization in people’s evaluations of their life situation and/or the political system.
Finally, little thought has been given in prior studies to the relationship between the
average level of grievance in a country and the dispersion of the country’s grievances. Figures
1(a) and 1(b) illustrate four different ideal type theoretical distributions relating mean levels of
9
grievances with polarization or dispersion of such grievances. In both figures, 푥̅ denotes the
average level of grievances in a society, with the average level of perceived deprivation lower for
the two distributions in Figure 1(a) compared to the two distributions in Figure 1(b). Examining
Figure 1(a), in countries with what might be termed inclusive distributions, there is a low average
level of grievance and only small differences in such evaluations across groups in society. In
countries with majoritarian distributions, there can be an equally low levels of grievance on
average (푥̅), but much more pronounced differences in evaluations across groups in society.6 In
these countries, most citizens feel well served by the political system but a smaller minority does
not.
Turning to Figure 1(b), which shows distributions with equally high average levels of
grievance, in countries with what could be termed oligarchic distributions, there is a high
average level of grievance and significant differences across groups in society. In these
countries, the vast majority of citizens are dissatisfied with the functioning of the political system
but a small minority feels well served by it. Finally, in countries with exclusionary distributions,
grievance is equally high on average and only small differences in such evaluations occur across
groups in society.
Most tests of grievance theory have assumed that high average levels of grievance are the
key driver of protest, while ignoring the differences in distributions of such grievance. That is,
studies have generally assumed that we would see higher levels of protest in polities with
distributions in Figure 1(b) and lower levels of protest in societies with distributions pictured in
Figure 1(a). What we contend, however, is that protest should actually be highest in distributions
with significant polarization, that is, it should be highest in countries with what we term
6 In this case, we might say that in inclusive distributions, the modal level of satisfaction is lower than it might otherwise be in perhaps due to efforts integrate more citizens into the “coalition of supporters.”
10
FIGURE 1(A): TWO DISTRIBUTIONS
WHEN GRIEVANCE PERCEPTIONS ARE LOW ON AVERAGE
FIGURE 1(B): TWO DISTRIBUTIONS WHEN GRIEVANCE PERCEPTIONS ARE HIGH ON AVERAGE
Perceived Deprivation / Grievance
Inclusive System Majoritarian System
Perceived Deprivation / Grievance
Exclusive System Oligarchic System
푥̅
11
majoritarian and oligarchic distributions of grievances, and lower in countries in which there are
high levels of accord, whether that be low levels of shared grievance (inclusive) or high levels
thereof (exclusive). According to Gurr’s theory, protest should prove particularly high in
countries with oligarchic distributions, where there are both high levels of grievances and large
gulfs in satisfaction between different groups.
III. Measuring Grievances and Polarization Cross-Nationally
In order to test our contention that accounting for both mean levels of grievances and
polarization in such grievances are important for understanding their potential role as mediators
between objective economic inequality and protest, , we constructed new, cross-nationally
comparable measures of the constructs based on a common survey question that has been
included on cross-national surveys across the globe over the last several decades. More
specifically, we utilize the mean and variance, respectively, in citizens’ satisfaction with the way
that democracy works in their country as our key measures of perceived deprivation and
polarization in such views.. While the ubiquity of the item is one of its principal advantages, we
argue that it also serves as a good summary measure of grievances with the political system (see
also Fuchs 1993, 1999; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svenson 1995; Harmel and Robertson 1986;
Klingemann 1999; Lockerbie 1993; McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Pina 1986; Morlini and
Tarchi 1996; Toka 1995; Weil 1989; Widmaier 1988, 1990). As noted by Anderson and Guillroy
(1997, 70), the "satisfaction with the way democracy is working item is indicative of “system
support at a low level of generalization,” meaning that the item captures political evaluations that
lie between diffuse support for the political regime and specific support for the current
government (Norris 2011; Easton 1965). This more medium-term evaluation reflects a person's
perceptions about the ability of the political system to offer the opportunity for his/her views to
12
be implemented, or the level of more deep-rooted grievance. It exhibits the degree to which
strong governmental performance is realized (or not) over a period of time, as well as citizen
agreement with policy outputs when their favored party controls government as well as when it
does not. Thus, when citizens are not only aggrieved with current government policies but also
doubt that future democratic governments will also address their grievances, we would expect
higher levels of protest. Our further argument is that the variance in such grievances is perhaps
even more important than its mean.
We operationalize grievance using this measure of satisfaction with democracy. While
the exact question wording varies slightly across surveys, the standard satisfaction item asks
respondents to evaluate the functioning of democracy in their country using a four point scale.
We compiled surveys from12 cross-national survey projects that include this four-point item,
resulting in data for 93 countries between 1973 and 2010, or a total of 1,029 country-years of
data.7 For each country-year, our measure of grievance is simply the average of the inverted
satisfaction with democracy response scale, rescaled to a range of 0 to 100.8 We restricted our
analysis to countries that were at least semi-democratic (i.e., greater than or equal to “0” on the
Polity combined autocracy-democracy index).
Our measure of polarization is based on the aggregate level standard deviation in
responses concerning citizen grievance. However, since the response scale for the satisfaction
with democracy item is relatively short, the observed variance may be truncated, especially in
cases in which the means approach the scale minima and maxima. For example, if on a four-
7 The sources of data include the Afrobarometer, Asianbarometer, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, AmericasBarometer, LatinBarometer, New Europe Barometer, Post-Communist Publics Study, and the World Values Study. 8 For certain country-years, multiple surveys were available. To create our grievance and polarization measures, we averaged across the survey means and standard deviations, respectively within each country-year.
13
point scale the country average is 3.5 (a high average performance evaluation), it is likely that
some respondents would have chosen a higher value (say a response corresponding to 5 or 6) if it
were available to them.9 In other words, there is a structural dependency between the mean and
standard deviation. To account for this problem, we follow the adjustment proposed by Dehly
and Kohler (2011), which divides the observed standard deviation by the maximum possible
standard deviation at the corresponding mean value.10 As a consequence, our measure of
polarization is in effect the percent of the maximum standard deviation at the respective mean
value.11
Figure 2 plots polarization versus grievance on the y and x axes, respectively. Country-
year values are indicated with small grey labels while country averages across all survey years
are plotted with larger black labels. The level of grievance in the sample ranges from a low of 41
in Denmark in 2006 to a high of 87.4 in Paraguay in 2002, with a median value of 63.9 in
Mexico in 2012, and country average ranging from a low of 46.5 in Ghana to a high of 80.4 in
Ukraine. On the other hand, polarization ranges from a low of 36.4 in the case of South Korea in
2001 and a high of 84.9 for Lesotho in 2000, with country averages ranging from 41.1 in South
Korea to 76.8 in Lesotho.
9 More generally, the variance of a mean is partially dependent on the relative placement of the mean for items with definite endpoints. As a result, variance estimates for countries demonstrating relatively high or low means may understate the true amount of disagreement among citizens about the quality of representation in the country. For a detailed discussion in terms of measures of inequality of happiness, see Kalmijn and Veehoven (2005) and Delhey and Kohler (2011). 10 The maximum standard deviation at a given mean value is calculated as follows: max(휎) =
( )∗( )∗ , where u and l represent the upper and lower bounds of the satisfaction with democracy
scale, µ is the mean satisfaction with democracy, and N is the number of respondents. 11 We also rescaled the polarization item to a 0-100 scale.
14
FIGURE 2: SCATTERPLOT OF GRIEVANCE AND POLARIZATION, BY COUNTRY-YEAR AND COUNTRY AVERAGES
There is evidence of a slight positive correlation between the mean level of grievance and
polarization (r=0.25), although the figure makes clear that there are countries that approach the
four ideal type distributions described in Figure 1. Figure 3 plots the distribution of responses to
the satisfaction with democracy item for four country-years that best approximate these ideal
types. Norway in 1997 perhaps best approaches the inclusive ideal type distribution, since in that
year Norwegians overwhelming were satisfied with democratic performance, with fewer than 10
percent of respondents expressing dissatisfaction. While the average level of grievance is
essentially equal for both Norway 1997 and Ghana 2008, there is significantly greater
disagreement in the latter case, with over half of all respondents saying they were “very
AL92
AL93
AL94AL95
AL96
AL02AL05
AL08
AR95AR96
AR97
AR98
AR99AR00
AR01
AR02
AR03
AR04AR05
AR06 AR07
AR08
AR09
AR10
AM92
AM93
AM94
AM95
AM08
AU96
AU04
AU07
AT95 AT97
AT98AT99
AT00AT01
AT03
AT04AT05AT06AT07
AT08AT09
AT10
AT11
BD02
BY92BY93
BY94
BY95BE73
BE76
BE77 BE78
BE79
BE80
BE81
BE82BE83
BE84BE85
BE86BE87BE88
BE89BE90BE91
BE92BE93BE94
BE95
BE97BE98
BE99BE00
BE01
BE03
BE04
BE05BE06BE07 BE09
BE10
BE11
BJ05BJ08
BO96BO97
BO98 BO00
BO01
BO02
BO03
BO04
BO05
BO06
BO07BO08
BO09
BO10
BW99 BW03
BW05BW08
BR95
BR96
BR97
BR98
BR00
BR01
BR02
BR03BR04
BR05
BR06BR07
BR08
BR09
BR10
BG92
BG93
BG94
BG95 BG96BG97
BG99
BG01BG02BG03 BG04
BG05
BG06BG07
BG08
BG09
BG10BG11
BF08
KH08
CA97
CA00
CA04
CA06
CA08
CA10
CV02
CV05
CV08
CL95
CL96
CL97CL98
CL00 CL01
CL02
CL03
CL04
CL05
CL06
CL07
CL08
CL09
CL10
CO96
CO97
CO98CO00
CO01CO02
CO03
CO04
CO05
CO06
CO07
CO08
CO09
CO10
CR96
CR97
CR98
CR00
CR01
CR02
CR03
CR04
CR05
CR06
CR07
CR08
CR09
CR10
HR99
HR05HR06
HR07
HR08
HR09
HR10
CY02
CY03
CY04CY05
CY06
CY07
CY08
CY09
CY10
CY11
CZ93
CZ94
CZ95
CZ96
CZ97
CZ99
CZ01
CZ02
CZ03CZ04
CZ05
CZ06CZ07CZ08
CZ09 CZ10
CZ11
DK73
DK76DK77
DK78DK79
DK80
DK81
DK82
DK83
DK84DK85
DK86
DK87
DK88
DK89
DK90
DK91DK92
DK93DK94
DK95DK97
DK98 DK99
DK00DK01
DK03
DK04DK05DK06
DK07DK08
DK09DK10DK11
DO04DO05
DO06
DO07
DO08
DO09
DO10EC96
EC97
EC98
EC00
EC01
EC02EC03EC04
EC05
EC06
EC07
EC08
EC09
EC10
SV96
SV97SV98SV00
SV01
SV02SV03
SV04SV05SV06
SV07
SV08
SV09
SV10
EE92
EE93EE94
EE95
EE96EE97
EE99
EE01
EE02EE03
EE04EE05EE06
EE07
EE08EE09
EE10EE11
FI93
FI94
FI95
FI97FI98
FI99FI00
FI01
FI03
FI04
FI05
FI06
FI07
FI09
FI10
FI11
FR73FR76FR77FR78 FR79 FR80
FR81
FR82
FR83FR84FR85
FR86 FR87
FR88FR89
FR90
FR91
FR92FR93
FR94 FR95FR97
FR98
FR99FR00FR01FR02
FR03 FR04
FR05
FR06FR07
FR08FR09
FR10
FR11
GE92
GE94
GE95
GE96
GE08
DE91DE92
DE93DE94
DE95
DE97DE98DE99
DE00 DE01
DE02
DE03 DE04
DE05
DE06DE07
DE08
DE09DE10
DE11
GH99
GH02
GH05
GH08
GR80
GR81
GR82
GR83GR84
GR85
GR86
GR87
GR88GR89
GR90
GR91
GR92GR93
GR94
GR95
GR97
GR98
GR99
GR00
GR01
GR03
GR04GR05GR06GR07 GR08
GR09GR10 GR11
GT96
GT97
GT98 GT00
GT01
GT02
GT03
GT04
GT05GT06
GT07
GT08
GT09
GT10
GY06
GY10
HT06HT08
HT10
HN96HN97
HN98
HN00 HN01
HN02
HN03
HN04
HN05
HN06
HN07
HN08
HN09
HN10
HU92HU93
HU94
HU95HU96
HU97HU98
HU99HU01
HU02
HU03
HU04
HU05HU06 HU07
HU08
HU09
HU10
HU11
IN01
ID01
ID06
IR00
IE73
IE76IE77
IE78
IE79IE80
IE81
IE82IE83IE84IE85IE86IE87IE88IE89IE90
IE91
IE92IE93
IE94
IE95IE97
IE98
IE99IE00IE01
IE02
IE03
IE04IE05
IE06
IE07 IE08
IE09
IE10IE11
IL96 IL03
IL06IT73
IT76IT77IT78
IT79
IT80
IT81IT82
IT83IT84IT85
IT86IT87
IT88IT89 IT90IT91 IT92IT93
IT94
IT95IT97
IT98
IT99
IT00
IT01
IT03
IT04IT05
IT06
IT07
IT09
IT10
IT11
JM06
JM08JM10
JP96
JP00
JP03JP04JP07
KE03
KE05
KE08
KR00 KR01
KR03
KR04
KR06
KR08
KG05LV92
LV93 LV94LV95
LV96
LV97
LV99
LV01
LV02LV03
LV04
LV05
LV06LV07
LV08
LV09
LV10
LV11
LS00
LS03
LS05
LS08
LR08
LT92
LT93LT94
LT95
LT96
LT97
LT99
LT01
LT02LT03
LT04
LT05LT06
LT07
LT08
LT09LT10
LT11
MK93
MK94
MK95
MK96
MK01
MK07
MK08
MK09 MK10
MG05 MG08
MW99
MW03 MW05
MW08
MY06
ML01ML02
ML05
ML08
MX95
MX96
MX97
MX98
MX00
MX01
MX02
MX03
MX04
MX05MX06
MX07
MX08
MX09
MX10MD92
MD96
MD02
MD08MN03
MN06
MZ02
MZ05
MZ08
NA99
NA03
NA05
NA08
NL73
NL76
NL77NL78NL79
NL80
NL81
NL82NL83NL84
NL85
NL86NL87NL88
NL89NL90NL91NL92
NL93NL94
NL95
NL97NL98
NL99
NL00
NL01
NL02
NL03NL04
NL05
NL06
NL07NL08
NL09
NL10
NL11
NZ96
NZ02
NZ08
NI96NI97
NI98 NI00
NI01
NI02
NI03
NI04
NI05
NI06
NI07
NI08
NI09
NI10NG00
NG03 NG05
NG08
NO90NO91NO92
NO93NO94 NO95NO97
NO01
NO05
NO08
NO09
PA96
PA97
PA98PA00
PA01
PA02
PA03PA04
PA05PA06
PA07PA08
PA09
PA10
PY95
PY96
PY97
PY98
PY00
PY01
PY02PY03
PY04
PY05PY06
PY07
PY08
PY09
PY10
PE95
PE96
PE97
PE98
PE00PE01 PE02 PE03
PE04
PE05
PE06PE07
PE08
PE09
PE10
PE11
PH01
PH02
PH04
PH05PH10
PL92
PL93PL94
PL95 PL96
PL97PL99
PL01
PL02 PL03
PL04PL05
PL06
PL07
PL08
PL09
PL10PL11
PT85
PT86
PT87PT88
PT89PT90
PT91 PT92
PT93PT94
PT95
PT97
PT98PT99 PT00
PT01
PT02
PT03
PT04
PT05
PT06
PT07
PT08PT09
PT10 PT11
RO92
RO93
RO94
RO95
RO96
RO97
RO99RO01
RO02
RO03RO04
RO05RO06RO07
RO08
RO09
RO10
RO11
RU92RU93
RU94RU95RU96
RU99
RU00
RU04RU08
SN02
SN05
SN08
SK93SK94
SK95
SK96SK97
SK99
SK01SK02
SK03
SK04
SK05
SK06
SK07
SK08
SK09
SK10
SK11
SI92
SI93
SI94SI95
SI96
SI97
SI99SI01
SI02
SI03SI04SI05
SI06SI07
SI08
SI09SI10
SI11
ZA00
ZA01
ZA02ZA06
ZA08
ZA09ES85ES86 ES87
ES88
ES89
ES90
ES91
ES92
ES93 ES94
ES95
ES96
ES97
ES98
ES99ES00
ES01ES03
ES04
ES05ES06
ES07
ES08
ES09
ES10
ES11
SR10
SE95SE97
SE98
SE99
SE00SE01
SE02
SE03
SE04
SE05SE06
SE07
SE09SE10
SE11
CH99CH03
CH07CH08
TW96
TW01
TW04
TW06
TW08
TH01
TH02TT10
TR01
TR02TR03
TR04
TR05
TR06TR07
TR09
TR10
TR11
UA92
UA93
UA94
UA95
UA96
UA98
UA99
UA00UA04 UA08
GB73
GB76GB77
GB78
GB79
GB80
GB81
GB82
GB83GB84
GB85GB86GB87
GB88
GB89GB90
GB91GB92
GB93GB94
GB95GB97
GB98GB99
GB00
GB01
GB03
GB04
GB05
GB06GB07
GB09GB10GB11
US96
US99
US04
US06
US08US10
UY95 UY96UY97
UY98
UY00UY01
UY02
UY03
UY04
UY05
UY06
UY07
UY08
UY09
UY10
VE95
VE96VE97
VE98
VE00 VE01
VE02
VE03
VE04VE05
VE06
VE07
VE08ZM99 ZM03
ZM05
ZM09ZW09
ALB
ARG
ARM
AUSAUT
BGD
BLRBEL
BEN
BOL
BWA
BRA
BGR
BFA
KHM
CAN
CPV
CHL
COL
CRI
HRVCYP
CZEDNK
DOM
ECU
SLV
EST
FIN
FRA
GEO
DEU
GHA
GRC
GTM
GUY
HTI
HND
HUNIND
IDN
IRN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JAMJPN
KEN
KOR
KGZ
LVA
LSO
LBR
LTU
MKD MDG
MWI
MYS
MLI
MEX
MDAMNG
MOZ
NAM
NLD
NZL
NIC
NGA
NOR
PAN
PRY
PER
PHL
POLPRT
ROURUS
SEN
SVK
SVN
ZAF
ESP
SUR
SWE
CHE
TWNTHA
TTO
TUR
UKR
GBR
USA
URY
VEN
ZMB
ZWE
3545
5565
7585
Pola
rizat
ion
40 50 60 70 80 90Grievances
15
satisfied” in the latter, while over 15% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction. As a
consequence, Ghana in 2008 perhaps best represents the majoritarian distribution. In contrast,
while average levels of grievance are equally low in the cases of Georgia in 1994 and Moldova
in 1996, there is much greater polarization in opinions in the former than in the later. A sizeable
minority of Georgians (20%) are actually satisfied or very satisfied with democratic
performance, while 55 percent are very unsatisfied, indicating an oligarchic distribution. On the
other hand, there is significantly more accord among Moldovans in 1996, as over two thirds said
they were unsatisfied, and less than 7 percent expressed satisfaction.
FIGURE 3: EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES OF IDEAL TYPE DISTRIBUTIONS
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
Very Unsatisfied Unsatisfied Satisfied Very Satisfied
Perc
enta
ge R
espo
nse
Norway 1997 Ghana 2008 Georgia 1994 Moldova 1996
16
IV. ADDITIONAL DATA AND METHODS
Beyond the polarization and grievance measures described above, the main explanatory
variable in the analysis is economic inequality, which we hypothesize to predict polarization and
grievance, but to have a negligible impact on protest once we control for the latter two variables.
Our measure of inequality is the gini coefficient for income net taxes and transfers included in
the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2009), which compiles distributional
data from a variety of sources. To take into account the uncertainty of the estimates, the
inequality dataset provides 100 imputed estimates for each country year. As a result, all models
were run using multiple imputation techniques based on the 100 imputations for each country
year provided in the inequality the SWIID database. Since both linear and curvilinear
relationships have been hypothesized (see above), all models include both the (mean centered)
gini coefficient and its quadratic.
Our measure of protest is based on the number of anti-government protests and strikes
recorded in a given year by the Cross National Time Series (CNTS) Data Archive (Banks 2011).
The event counts are based on coding of mentions in news sources, primarily the New York
Times. Details of the operationalization and measurement of these measures are available from
CNTS.
In terms of control variables, the literature on protest provides a plethora of potential
variables, including those associated with grievance theory as well as political opportunity
structure theories.12 Grievance theory models include the natural log of GDP per capita, growth
12 Many argue that changing economic circumstances in a nation are a key determinant of citizen protest, including inflation and the growth rate, which lead to a sense of grievance (Gurr 1970; Hendrix and Haggard 2014). Dissatisfaction with the provision of collective goods has also been tied to protest activity (Finkel and Muller 1998). Others stress instead the level of economic resources the average citizen possesses, where resources are thought to facilitate mobilization (e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977),
17
in GDP per capita, and the natural log of inflation (inflation <0 set to 0). Political opportunity
structure models include dummy variables indicating if an executive or legislative election took
place, the level of democracy (Polity 2), regime durability, a measure of repression/political
terror, and the level of urbanicity. Additional time invariant variables included in the robustness
checks include the natural log of population, a dummy variable indicating presidential or
parliamentary systems, and ethnic fractionalization. The descriptive statistics of all of the
variables are available in Appendix A.
We present two sets of models. The first set of models examines the relationship
between economic inequality as an explanatory variable predicting two outcome variables –
citizen grievance (country mean) and citizen polarization (adjusted country standard
deviations).13 The second set of models predicts the incidence of nonviolent political protest as a
function of income inequality, grievance, and polarization. The first set of models include linear
models with fixed effects as well as lagged dependent and independent variables. 14 Since the
protest variable is a count variable, we report negative binomial regressions for the protest
models.
or where resources increase an individual’s willingness to pay the costs of protest activity (Cicchetti, Freeman, and Haveman 1971). Rather than this focus on the level and change in a country’s economic conditions, the “political opportunity structure” approach to explaining protest activity emphasizes that institutional structures and political processes influence the level of protest activity by establishing a level of political “openness” (Dalton et al. 2009; Vrablikova 2014). Consistent with this general orientation, studies have found that party identification is a predictor of protest activity (Finkel and Opp 1991). In contrast, others argue that protest activity emerges precisely when governments attempt to stunt conventional channels of participation (Kitschelt 1986). 13 Both the grievance and polarization variables are mean centered since in the protest models we include interactions between these two variables. 14 Hausman tests suggest that in all cases fixed effects models are preferred to random effects specifications.
18
V. RESULTS
Table 1 presents the results of the models predicting grievance and polarization. Income
inequality is significantly related to both grievance and polarization, with a strong positive effect
of inequality on polarization and a curvilinear effect of inequality on grievance. Since the
inequality variables are mean centered, the significant coefficient for inequality squared in the
grievance model indicates that the positive association with grievance accelerates as inequality
increases. The lagged dependent variables, poor economic growth, high levels of inflation,
political terror/repression, and regime durability are also predictive of high levels of grievance
and polarization.
TABLE 1: PREDICTING GRIEVANCE AND POLARIZATION
Grievance Polarization Grievance (t-1) 0.374** (0.037) Polarization (t-1) 0.210** (0.039) GINI (t-1) 0.247** (0.082) 0.154* (0.07) GINI^2 (t-1) 0.011* (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) GDP/cap (t-1) -1.484 (1.567) 0.428 (1.388) Growth (t-1) -0.174** (0.04) -0.119** (0.036) Ln Inflation (t-1) -0.429* (0.206) -0.581** (0.189) Legislative Election (t-1) 0.350 (0.34) -0.203 (0.308) Executive Election (t-1) -0.487 (0.496) -0.365 (0.446) Polity (t-1) 0.427+ (0.22) -0.037 (0.189) Regime Durability (t-1) -0.155** (0.05) -0.159** (0.045) Political Terror (t-1) 1.071** (0.333) 0.214 (0.299) Urbanicity (t-1) 0.149+ (0.09) 0.049 (0.08) Constant 2.872 (15.436) -1.725 (13.729) N 755 755 + denotes p<0.10; * p<0.05; **p<0.01. Both models include fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance stars are based on two-tailed tests.
Table 2 reports models predicting protest, with Model 1 including income inequality and
the control variables but not grievance and polarization. Against most existing theories, yet
19
consistent with others, the model suggests that inequality is negatively and significantly related
to protest. The addition of the grievance and polarization variables in Model 2 suggests that what
is most important about the grievance/protest relationship is not the mean level of grievance but
rather the dispersion of such grievances. The coefficients reveal that grievance is unrelated to
protest, but polarization of grievance is positively related to protest (p<0.05, one tailed test). As
polarization increases, the likelihood of protest also increases.
TABLE 2: PREDICTING POLITICAL PROTEST Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Protest 0.075+ (0.046) 0.084+ (0.046) 0.086+ (0.046) Grievance 0.009 (0.018) 0.024 (0.020) Polarization 0.037+ (0.023) 0.046* (0.024) Grievance*Polarization -0.004+ (0.002) GINI -0.117** (0.044) -0.123** (0.045) -0.130** (0.044) GINI^2 0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) GDP/cap 0.768 (0.966) 1.018 (0.981) 1.721+ (0.888) Growth -0.054* (0.022) -0.046* (0.022) -0.062** (0.024) Ln Inflation 0.051 (0.112) 0.070 (0.112) 0.147 (0.108) Legislative Election 0.116 (0.197) 0.095 (0.197) 0.259 (0.195) Executive Election -0.124 (0.284) -0.094 (0.286) -0.284 (0.287) Polity 0.004 (0.082) -0.002 (0.085) -0.005 (0.066) Regime Durability -0.015 (0.024) -0.012 (0.024) -0.007 (0.021) Political Terror -0.245 (0.170) -0.257 (0.171) -0.235 (0.172) Urbanicity -0.129* (0.057) -0.123* (0.057) -0.120* (0.055) Constant -0.023 (8.076) -2.686 (8.222) -4.556 (8.242) N 897 897 897 + p<0.10 * p<0.05 **p<0.01. Cell entries report the results of fixed effect, negative binomial egressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance stars are based on two-tailed tests.
20
Gurr’s (1970) theory also suggests that we would expect an interactive relationship
between grievance and polarization on the one hand and protest on the other. According to
grievance theory, we would expect the highest level of protest when grievances are most
widespread (high average grievance) and there are large grievance differences across groups
(high polarization). That is, adopting our language above we would expect to observe the most
protests in oligarchic contexts. Model 3 tests this hypothesis and points to a different conclusion.
That is, the model predicts that protest is actually most frequent in majoritarian contexts, or
when average grievance is fairly low, but there is significant polarization in such opinions. That
is, protest is most likely when many members of society are well served by the political system
but a significant minority very clearly does not feel well served.
To illustrate this relationship more clearly, Figure 4 plots the predicted probability of at
least one protest event across three different levels of grievance and a range of polarization
values. In countries with high average levels of grievance, protest is essentially unrelated to
polarization, with the predicted probability of at least one protest never more than 20% and
actually declining modestly as polarization increases. On the other hand, while the probability of
protest is quite low among polities with low to moderate levels of grievance and low levels of
polarization (inclusive distributions), the predicted probability of protest increases significantly
among more majoritarian distributions. At high values of polarization (80) and satisfaction (40),
the model predicts that there is a 78 percent probability of at least one protest. This relationship
perhaps suggests that the existence of aggrieved minorities who have doubts about the efficacy
of more conventional participation channels are most likely to protest.
21
FIGURE 4: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF AT LEAST ONE PROTEST, BY LEVELS OF POLARIZATION AND GRIEVANCE
VI. Conclusion
To recapitulate our findings, we have observed that countries with higher levels of
income inequality also tend to have more polarized citizens. Moreover, countries with polarized
citizens are more likely to experience nonviolent protest. Finally, protests are especially (indeed
most) likely in countries where average citizen satisfaction is high but satisfaction is also
polarized. These findings are new, and they prompt a number of additional puzzles.
First, the analysis suggests that while inequality leads to both greater levels of grievance
and polarization, and that polarization and grievance are related to protest, the negative
relationship between inequality and protest suggests that it is unclear how perceived grievances
mediate the inequality/protest relationship. Indeed, the negative and significant coefficient
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Pred
icte
d Pr
obab
ility
of 1
or m
ore
prot
ests
Polarization
Low Grievances Moderate Grievances High Grievances
22
estimates for the effect of inequality on protest are hardly changed across the models, suggesting
an effect independent of perceived grievances and variation in such grievances.
A possible explanation for this puzzling result could reflect the interaction between
grievances and polarization. In contrast to Gurr’s predictions, we found that protest is most likely
when most citizens are relatively satisfied, but when there are aggrieved minorities, that is, what
we term majoritarian systems. However, high levels of inequality are more likely to lead to what
we termed oligarchic systems in which the majority of citizens are dissatisfied with the political
system while a minority is satisfied. In direct contrast to Gurr, our findings suggest that such
systems are actually the least likely to see protest. This finding is consistent with other works
that suggest a demobilizing effect of inequality on participation (e.g., Solt 2006). Our
contribution is to illuminate a mechanism by which inequality leads to this result.
An important final implication of our finding that polarization leads to protest is that it
underscores the importance of political knowledge among citizens. Only when citizens are
aware of how well the democratic process works for them relative to how well it works for their
fellow citizens do they take to the streets.
23
VII. References
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. 2009. "Reevaluating
the Modernization Hypothesis." Journal of Monetary Economics 56(8): 1043-58.
Adams, James, and Lawrence Ezrow. 2009. "Who do European Parties Represent? How Western
European Parties Represent the Policy Preferences of Opinion Leaders." The Journal of
Politics 71(1): 206-23.
Anderson, Christopher J., and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction
with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems."
American Political Science Review, 91(1): 66-81.
Anderson, Christopher J., and Silvia M. Mendes. 2006. "Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes,
Democratic Experience and Political Protest Potential." British Journal of Political
Science 36(1): 91-111.
Banks, Arthur S. 2011. "Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, 1815-[2011].".
Bartels, Larry M. 2008. "Unequal democracy." New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Boix, Carles. 2003. “Democracy and Redistribution”. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2003.
Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. “The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America:
Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations.” Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Chambers, John R., Lawton K. Swan, and Martin Heesacker. 2014. "Better Off Than We Know
Distorted Perceptions of Incomes and Income Inequality in America." Psychological
science 25(2): 613-18.
24
Cicchetti, Charles J., A. Myrick Freeman, Robert H. Haveman, and Jack L. Knetsch. 1971. "On
the Economics of Mass Demonstrations: a Case Study of the November 1969 March on
Washington." The American Economic Review, 61(4): 719-24.
Collins, William J., and Robert A. Margo. 2007. "The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots in
American Cities: Evidence from Property Values." The Journal of Economic History
67(4): 849-83.
Delhey, Jan, and Ulrich Kohler. 2011. "Is Happiness Inequality Immune to Income Inequality?
New Evidence Through Instrument-Effect-Corrected Standard Deviations." Social
Science Research 40(3): 742-56.
Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. "What Americans Don’t know About Politics
and Why it Matters." New Haven, Yale University Press.
Dalton, R., Van Sickle, A., & Weldon, S. 2009. “The Individual-Institutional Nexus of Protest
Behaviour.” British Journal of Political Science 40, 51 –73
Easton, David. 1965. “A Framework for Political Analysis. Vol. 25.” Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
Prentice-Hall.
Eriksson, K., & Simpson, B. (2012). What do Americans know about inequality? It
depends on how you ask them. Judgment and Decision Making, 7, 741-745.
Finkel, Steven E., and Edward N. Muller. 1998. "Rational Choice and the Dynamics of
Collective Political Action: Evaluating Alternative Models with Panel Data." American
Political Science Review, 92-(1): 37-49.
Finkel, Steven E., and Karl-Dieter Opp. 1991 "Party Identification and Participation in
Collective Political Action." The Journal of Politics 53(2): 339-71.
25
Gilens, Martin. 2005. "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness." Public Opinion Quarterly
69(5): 778-96.
Gurr, Ted. 1970. "Why men rebel." Princeton, Paradigm Publishers.
Harmel, Robert, and John D. Robertson. 1986. "Government Stability and Regime Support: A
cross-National Analysis." The Journal of Politics 48(4): 1029-40.
Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Benjamin I. Page. 2005. "Who influences US foreign policy?."
American Political Science Review 99(1): 107-123.
Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1986. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear
Movements in Four Democracies." British Journal of Political Science 16(1): 57-85.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, and Bernhard Wessels. 1999. "Political Consequences of Germany's
Mexed-Member System: Personalization at the Grass-Roots?."
Lichbach, Mark Irving, ed. 1996. “The Cooperator's Dilemma.” University of Michigan Press,
1996.
Lockerbie, Brad. 1993. "Economic Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation in Western Europe."
European Journal of Political Research 23(3): 281-93.
Lohmann, Susanne. 1993. "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political
Action." American Political Science Review 87(2): 319-33.
Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1989. "An Evaluation of “Does Economic Inequality Breed Political
Conflict?” World Politics 41(4): 431-70.
Lohmann, Susanne. 1994. "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday
Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91." World politics 47(1): 42-101.
26
Madestam, Andreas, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger, and David Yanagizawa-Drott. 2013 "Do
Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement*." The Quarterly
Journal of Economics: 21(2):1-59
McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A
partial Theory." American Journal of Sociology, 86(2): 1212-41.
McDonough, Peter, Samuel H. Barnes, and Antonio López Pina. 1986. "The Growth of
Democratic Legitimacy in Spain." The American Political Science Review 80(3): 735-60.
Nagel, Thomas. 1974. "What is it like to be a Bat?" The Philosophical Review 83(4): 435-450.
Norris, Pippa. 2011 “Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited.” Cambridge University
Press, 2011.
Norton, Michael I., and Dan Ariely. 2011. "Building a Better America—One Wealth Quintile at
a Time." Perspectives on Psychological Science 6(1): 9-12.
Russett, Bruce M. 1964. "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics."
World Politics 16(3): 442-54.
Sigelman, Lee, and Miles Simpson. 1977. "A Cross-National Test of the Linkage Between
Economic Inequality and Political Violence." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21(1): 105-
28.
Skocpol, Theda, and Vanessa Williamson. 2011. "The Tea Party and the Remaking of American
Conservatism." New York, The Oxford University Press.
Solt, Frederick. 2009. "Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database."Social Science
Quarterly 90(2): 231-42.
Toka, Gabor. 1995. "Political Support in East-Central Europe." Citizens and the State: 354-82.
Tyler, Tom R. 2006. “Why People Obey the Law”. Princeton University Press, 2006.
27
Verba, Sidney. 1985. “Equality in America: The View From the Top”. Harvard University Press,
1985.
Widmaier, Ulrich. 1990. "Political Stability in OECD Nations." International Political Science
Review 11(2): 219-42.
28
VIII. Appendix A: Summary Statistics
N Mean St. Dev. Min Max Grievance 1042 64.93581 8.526368 40.96777 87.40012 Polarization 1042 53.85091 6.258634 36.36218 84.86587 Gini (average imputation) 1007 35.26988 9.63852 19.3986 69.10886 Protest 1015 0.4157635 1.213236 0 22 Ln GDP/cap 1008 9.354813 0.930272 5.703587 10.85082 Growth 1030 2.776054 4.790745 -44.9 18.28661 Ln Inflation 1030 1.727786 1.322055 0 8.706424 Legislative Election 1033 0.2904163 0.4541744 0 1 Executive Election 1034 0.1276596 0.3338719 0 1 Polity2 1042 8.692898 1.792215 0 10 Regime Durability 1042 30.59021 31.78594 0 201 Political Terror 1020 1.903922 0.9839658 1 5 Urbanicity 1037 67.58535 15.04106 13.444 97.4854