in the - sconet.state.oh.us in the supreme court of ohio ... 3517.04 and lcrp bylaws section ......
TRANSCRIPT
No. 10-0488
In The Supreme Court of Ohio
ORIGINAL ACTION IN PROHIBITIONExpedited Election Case
STATE OF OHIO EX REL. PAUL M. HOAG,Relator,
V.
LUCAS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS,Respondent.
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA HOWE
Douglas G. Haynam(0019773)Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP1000 JacksonToledo, Ohio 43604-5573Telephone: (419) 241-9000Telecopier: (419) 241-6894E-mail: [email protected]
Scott R. Branam(0080654)Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP41 South High StreetSuite 2400Columbus, Ohio 43215Telephone: (614) 463-9441Telecopier: (614) 463-1108E-mail: [email protected]
Counsel for Relator
Julia R. BatesLucas County Prosecuting AttorneySteven J. Papadimos(0005317)John A. Borell (0016461)Andrew K. Ranazzi(0040617)Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys700 Adams Street, Suite 250Toledo, OH 43624Telephone: (419) 213-2001Telecopier: (419) 213-2011E-mail: [email protected]
Counsel for Respondent
Anthony J. DeGidio(0069064)712 Farrer StreetMaumee, Ohio 43537Telephone: (419) 509-1878Telecopier: (419) 740-2556E-mail: [email protected]
Scott A. Ciolek(0082779)520 Madison AvenueSuite 820Toledo, Ohio 43604Telephone: (419) 740-5935Telecopier: (419) 890-0419E-mail: scott.ciolekgmail.com
Co-Counsel for Intervenors
I, LINDA HOWE, being duly sworn, state:
1. I am over the age of 18, am competent to testify as to all matters herein and I havepersonal knowledge of all such matters.
2. I am currently employed by the Lucas County Board of Elections as the Director andhave been so employed at all times relevant hereto.
On February 27, 2010, Relator filed protests of the candidacies of 52 individualsrunning for the Central Committee of the Lucas County Republican Party. Thenames of these 52 individuals are contained in Exhibit A of Relator's originalaffidavit.
4. Relator's protests stated that he was filing the protests in his capacity as chair of theLucas County Republican Party Central Committee.
5. The protests filed by Relator of the 52 candidates were based on the assertion thateach candidate was not a qualified elector at the time that the Declaration ofCandidacy was circulated, since each candidate did not have a registration card onfile with the Respondent Lucas County Board of Elections at the time theDeclaration of Candidacy was submitted.
6. Each of the 52 challenged candidates did submit a voter registration card prior to, orat the same time as, the filing of the Declaration of Candidacy.
7. The Relator's protests were rejected by the Respondent Board of Elections on thebasis that the Relator was not a qualified elector who was eligible to vote at theprimary election for the candidate whose declaration of candidacy the Relator hadobjected.
8. In addition, the Lucas County Common Pleas Court, in tviegharr Gallagher v. Lucas
County Board of Elections, et al., Case No. CI10-1192, held that neither of thecompeting groups that claimed to be the Lucas County Republic Party had lawfullyorganized. Therefore, the Board found that, based on the Court's holding, neither ofthe competing groups could file a protest on behalf of the controlling or centralcommittee of the Lucas County Republican Party. The Court's holdings are onappeal, but a stay has not been issued. True and accurate copies of the Court's two
2
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and 2.
9. After receiving the 52 protests from the Relator, I consulted with the Ohio Secretaryof States Office regarding the legal basis of the protests. True a accurate copies ofthe instructions that I received from the Secretary of State's office are attachedhereto as Exhibits 3 and 4. The Respondent Board of Elections fotlowed theSecretary of State's interpretation of Ohio election law when it placed the 52candidates of the May, 2010 primary ballot.
^
^^`3•(;^^ - -ev 4_"\LINDA HOWE
Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of March, 2010.
c
NOTARY PUBL IC-
DIANAMINORNOTARY PUBUC - OHIO
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES3/17114
3
• _, r.
F`^1\ At0^520W
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LUCAS COUNTY, OHIO
Megan Gallagher,*
Plaintiff, Case No. CI0201001192
vs. FINDINGS OF FACT,* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
Lucas County Board of Elections, et al., AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendants.Hon. Charles J. Doneghy
Following an oral hearing on January 28, 2010, this matter is before the Court on the
motion for a preliminary injunction filed by the plaintiff, Megan Gallagher, and on the motion to
intervene filed by Jeffrey Simpson and Paul Hoag ("Simpson and Hoag"). Upon review of the
pleadings, arguments of the parties, testimonial and other evidence, and applicable law, the Court
finds it should overrule Ms. Gallagher's motion and should sustain Simpson and Hoag's motion.
Accordingly, the Court issues the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(The Court intentionally leaves the remainder of the page blank.)
^®^auRNALIZEDFEB 1d 2©1CI 1
EXHIBIT 1
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Voters in Lucas County, Ohio participated in a primary election on March 4, 2008. (See
Plaintiffs Exh.F, certificate of election of Megan Gallagher ["Gallagher Certificate"].) In that
election, Republican voters in Ward 12, Precinct G, elected Ms. Gallagher as a member of the
Central Committee ("Central Committee") of the Lucas County Republican Party ("LCRP").
(Gallagher Certificate; see, also, Complaint Exh.B,p.011/023.) Republican voters in Ward 24,
Precinct A elected Mr. Simpson as a member of the Central Committee. (Complaint
Exh.B,p.016/023.) Similarly, Republican voters in district "Spr-1 S" elected Mr. Hoag as a member
of the Central Committee. (Id. at p.020/023.)
2. Defendant Lucas County Board of Elections ("Board") "declared" the results, including
the election of Ms. Gallagher, Mr. Simpson, and Mr. Hoag as Central Conimittee members, on April
3, 2008. (See Gallagher Certificate.)
3. After the Board declared the election results, and in order to comply with requirements
of R.C. 3517.04 and LCRP Bylaws Section A, Article IV, the LCRP convened an organizational
meeting ("Organizational Meeting") meeting of the members-elect of the Central Committee. (See
Complaint Exh.B.) The LCRP held the Organizational Meeting on June 14, 2008. (See id.)' At the
'While the parties did not discuss the following in any practical depth in briefs or at oralargument before the Court, the Court takes judicial notice of an Opinion and Judgment Entryissued by the I-Ionorable J. Ronald Bowman sitting in this Court by assignment in consolidatedcases under the caption Haynam v. Lucas Ctv. Republican Partv Central Committee (May 6,2008), Lucas C.P. No. CI0200803283 ("Haynam Entry"). (The plaintiff attached the HavnamEntry to her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed in this case on February 8,2010.) 'Che consolidated cases arose following the March 4, 2008 primary election, and, inrelevant part, the cases challenged the Central Committee's scheduling of its post-primaryorganizational meeting for April 12, 2008. In the consolidated cases, the Court entered aTemporary Restraining Order enjoining the April 12 meeting based on allegations that theCentral Committee had failed to comply with the notice requirements of R.C. 3517.04. (See
2
Organizational Meeting, members-elect were sworn in, and the new Central Committee members
elected Ms. Gallagher as Chair of the Central Committee (Complaint Exh.B.p.005/023), Mark
Nowak as Secretary of the Central Committee (Complaint Exh.B.p.005/023), Jon Stainbrook as
Chair ofthe LCRP Executive Committee (Complaint Exh.C.p.002), and Hans Schnapp as Secretary
of the LCRP Executive Committee (Complaint Exh.C.p.002).
4. At a meeting of the Central Committee on or about December 21, 2009, committee
members split into at least two factions over an intemal govemance matter. (See Board Exh. 1, Letter
pp.1-2.) One faction remained affiliated with Ms. Gallagher ("Gallagher faction"), and the other
faction ("Simpson/Hoag faction"), opposing Ms. Gallagher's group, affiliated with Simpson and
Hoag. (See Complaint paras.10-17.)
5. On or about December 24, 2009, Mr. Nowak, as "Secretary, Republican County Central
Committee," and in affiliation with the Gallagher faction, submitted to the Board an "updated" list
of Central Committee members. (Board Exh.2.) On or about January 8, 2010, also in affiliation
April 11, 2008 Judgment Entry, in relevant part enjoining the April 12 meeting.) The Courtassigned the consolidated cases for hearing, scheduled for April 28, 2008, on the pending motionfor preliminary injunction; the Court further enjoined any organizational meeting pendingcompliance with the statutory requirements of R.C. 3517.04. (Id.) After conducting the April 28hearing, Judge Bowman issued the May 6 Havnam Entrv in which he ruled in relevant part asfollows:
"It is further ORDERED that the [LCRP] Central Committee [organizational]meeting, pursuant to R.C. 3517.04, shall be scheduled and held within fifteen davsof the date of this [Havnam] Entry." (I-laynam Entry p.9.)
By Joumal Entry dated May 15, 2008, the Honorable Denise Dart overruled a motion forreconsideration filed on other grounds in the consolidated cases. On May 16, 2008, the LCRPappealed the matter to the Sixth Appellate District. The journal re0ects that no party requested astay of the orders contained in the Havnam Entry. Alter transferring the appeal to its accelerateddocket on June 11, 2008, the Sixth District dismissed the appeal on June 27 following the motionof the appellant 1'or voluntary dismissal. (See Joumal C10200803283.) Again, the LCRP heldthe Organizational Meeting on June 14, 2008.
3
with the Gallagher faction, Hans Schnapp, as "Secretary" of the LCRP Executive Committee,
submitted to the Board an "updated" list of Executive Committee members. ( Board Exh.2.)
6. On or about January 7, 2010, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Hoag, and two other individuals, in
affiliation with the Simpson/Hoag faction and in opposition to the Gallagher faction, sent a letter and
a seventeen-page list of individuals they claimed to constitute the Ccntral Committee and another
two-page list of individuals they claimed to constitute the Executive Committee. (Board Exh.l.)
In the letter, Mr. Simpson represented himself to be "Chairman, LCRP Executive Committee"; Mr.
Hoag represented himself to be "Chairman, LCRP Central Committee"; Christine Seles represented
herself to be "Secretary, LCRP Executive Committee"; and Jan Lowe represented himself to be
"Secretary, LCRP Central Committee." (Board Exh.l .) On or about January 1 1, 2010, Simpson and
I-toag sent an addendum to their January 7 list. (Id.)
7. By letter dated January 12, 2010, the Board "certified" the lists submitted by each faction
(consolidating the submissions from each faction into one unified list from each) "to the State
Republican Party as instructed in [R.C.] 3517.05." (Board Exh.3.)
8. Later that day, Ms. Gallagher filed the instant action seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against both the defendant Board and the defendant Ohio Republican Party State Central
Committee ( "State Central Comniittee") "due to the Defendants failure to comply with R.C. 3517.04
[through 3517.06]." ( Complaint para.l.) Essentially, Ms. Gallagher contends that the Board is
without authority to refer this "conflict" to the State Central Committee for resolution, and that the
State Central Committee is :rithout authority to resolve the disputc as to which iactiun properly
should control the LCRP Central Committee and Executive Committee.
9. Simpson and Hoag seek to intervene in this action claiming they have an interest in this
4
matter that no existing party will protect adequately.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. INTERVENTION: Pursuant to Civ.R. 24(A),2 the Court concludes that Simpson and
Hoag have an interest in this action that will not be protected adequately by the current defendants.
Sce Central Committee of Hamilton County Republican Partv v. Kohnen (Aug. 9, 1991), 1 st Dist.
No. C900603, 1991 Ohio App.Lexis 3800, (a court action involving two competing factions of the
Itamilton County Republican Party). Accordingly, the Court will sustain Simpson and Hoag's
motion to intervene.
2. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: As a general proposition, an injunction is an extraordinary
remedy which is equitable in nature. Prairie Twp. Bd. ofTrustees v. Ross, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-509,
2004-Ohio-838, at ¶ 11. Ohio courts generally apply the following factors when determining whether
preliminary injunctive relief shall issue:
"( I) the likelihood or probability of a plaintiffs success on the merits;(2) whether the issuance of the injunction will prevent irreparable harm to theplaintiff; (3) what iniury to others will be caused by the granting of the injunction;and (4) whether the public interest will be served by the granting of the injunction."(Emphasis added.) Corbett v. Ohio Bldg. Auth. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 44, 49, 619N.E.2d 1145.
To obtain injunctive relief, the candidate must prove these required elements by clear and convincing
evidence. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 260, 267, 747 N.E.2d 268;
''The rule reads in pertinent part as follows:"Rule 24. Intervention"(A) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: * * * (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property ortransaction that is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition ofthe action may as a practical matter impair or imoede the applicant's ability to protect that
parties." (Emphasisinterest, unless the applicant's interest is adequatel ^Lrepresented bv existinyadded.)
5
Lemlev v. Stevenson (1995), 104 Ohio App. 3d 126, 136, 661 N.E.2d 237. A trial court's judgment
on this issue will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse ofdiscretion. Corbett v. Ohio Bldg.
Auth. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 44, 49, 619 N.E.2d 1145. "In order to obtain a permanent injunction,
a party must show by clear and convincing evidence that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the applicant and that there is no adequate remedy at law." lst Natl. Bank v.
Mt. Agencv. LLC, CA2008-05-056, 2009-Ohio-2202, at ¶47. "Irreparable harm is an injury for
which there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, and for which money damages would
be impossible, difficult, or incomplete." Id.
3. GOVERNING LEGAL AUTHOI2ITY: 'fhis dispute is governed by the LCRP Bylaws
and by R.C. 3517.02 through 3517.06.
4. MEMBERS: R.C. 3517.03 makes the LCRP Central Committee the "Controlling
Committee" of the LCRP. The Central Committee members are to be elected from local precincts
by direct vote at even-year state primary elections. Id. The Central Cotnmittee elects the Executive
Committee. Id.
5. "ORGANIZATION": R.C. 3517.04 mandates that the LCRP's retiring Central
Committee chair "shall" call, and the retiring Central Committee secretary "shall" provide notice to
the "members-elect" about, an "organizational meeting". See R.C. 3517.04 ("the committee shall
proceed to organize" [emphasis added]); R.C. 3517.05 (noting the proper timing set forth in R.C.
3517.04 for the "organizational meeting"); Bylaw Section A, Article IV. The statute requires that
the party hold the organizational meeting within six (6) to ffteer, (15) days "following the
declaration of the results" of the priniary election. R.C. 3517.04; Central Committee of I-iamilton
Countv Republican Party v- Kohnen, supra, 1991 Ohio App.Lexis 3800, *9-10. At the meeting, the
6
members-elect shall be swom and "the committee shall proceed to organize" by electing officers.
R.C. 3517.04.
6. TENURENACANCIES: R.C. 3517.05 provides that ail party committees and officers,
generally, "shall * * * serve until the date of the [next] organizational meeting provided for in R.C.
3517.04." See, also, Bylaws Article III ( "All members of the Central Committee shall be ***
elected for tenns of two (2) years ***"). "[V]acancies caused by death, resignation, failure to elect,
or removal from the precinct ***" are to be filled by the a majority vote of the Central Committee
(or, if authorized, by the Executive Committee). R.C. 3517.05; Bylaws Section B, Article V (only
Central Committee is authorized).
7. DISPUTES OVER CONTROL: R.C. 3517.05 provides that "[i]f more than one
organized group claims to be the rightful county central or executive committee, each such group
shall file a list of its officers and members [to] the board of elections [which] shall cenifv them to
the state central committee." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3517.05. Then, "[t]he state central committee
shall * * * determine and certifv which committee shall be recognized as the rightful county central
or executive committee." (Emphasis added.) Id.
8. COURT DETERMINATION:
a. Generally, courts are to defer to the State Central Committee for that body to
determine the proper groupto "recognize." R.C. 3517.05; Federspiel v. Ohio Republican Party State
Cent_ Comm. (S.D.Oh.1994), 867 F.Supp. 617, 622; Central Committee of Hamilton Countv
Republican Partv v. Kohnen, supra, 1991 Ohio App.Lexis 3800, *12. See, also, id. at *6 ("the
legislature has provided that the state central coininittee of a political party resolve intra-party
disputes as to the rightful leadership of county ccntral committees").
7
b. However, a group which fails to call an "organizational meeting" within the proper
time or which fails to call and/or provide propernotice of an "organizational meeting" via the proper
retiring officers, has no "valid claim to the leadership" of the central or executive conimittees. See
Central Committee of Ilamilton Countv Republican Partv v. Kohnen, supra, 1991 Ohio App.Lexis
3800, *11-16. "Thus, [an organized group is] entitled to iudicial relief upon demonstrating their *
** eompliance with the applicable statutes and the [county party's governing rules]" if the group will
be "deprived oF" rightful leadership of the county party. (Emphasis added.) Id. at *6.
c) Injunetion Mav Be Proper: An injunction properly may issue to protect the
public office of one being challenged by an adverse clain-iant, until the claimant establishes her title
by law. Id. at * 16, citing State. ex rel. Garrison v. Brough (1916), 94 Ohio St. 115, syllabus 3.
9. NEITHER FACTION COMPLIED WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS:
a. The Gallagher faction: The primary election at which the Central Committee
members were elected most recently occurred on March 4,2008. (Gallagher Certificate.) The Board
declared the results of that election on or about April 3, 2008. (Id.) Thus, in order to comply with
the six-to-5fteen-day time requirements of R.C. 3517.04, the LCRP was to hold its organizational
meeting between April 9 and April 18. After Judge Bowman enjoined the scheduled April 12
organizational meeting, Judge Bowman ordered the LCRP to hold its R.C. 3517.04 "organizational
meeting" within "fifteen days" of the Havnant Entry, i.e., on or before May 21, 2008. (See Haynam
Entry, p.9.) However, the evidcnce indicates that the Central Committee did not conduct the
"Organizational Meetine," at wliich the committee menibers elected the Gallagher faction, until June
14, 2008. (Complaint Exhs.B,C.) Thus, the Court concludes that the clection of inembers of the
Gallagher faction was out of compliance with both the express time requirements of R.C. 3517.04
8
and the time limit Judge Bowman ordered in the Haynam Entry.' See Central Committee of
Hamilton Countv Republican Partv v. Kohnen, supra, 1991 Ohio App.Lexis 3800, *9-10 (addressing
the "clear and unambiguous" 6-tol5-day time requirement).
b. Simpson(Hoag faction: The Simpsonllloag faction has not established that it
"organized" and elected Simpson and Hoag within the proper April 9 to April 18,2008 (or any other
proper) time frame. Thus, the Court concludes that the Simpson/Hoag faction was out of compliance
with R.C. 3517.04.
10. STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: When both competing groups are out ol'
conformity with the requirements of R.C. 3517.04, the State Central Committee is the proper body
to resolve leadership questions of the LCRP and its committees. See Central Committee of Hamilton
Countv Republican Party v. Kohnen, supra, 1991 Ohio App.Lexis 3800, * I 1-12 (finding that "neither
claimant could legitimately claim party leadership [and the ] dispute was ideally suited forresolution
[by the State Central Committee] under R.C. 3517.05").
11. SUCCESS ON THE MERITS: The Court concludes that Ms. Gallagher has failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that she is likely to succeed on the merits, i.e., she has
failed to establish, pursuant to R.C. 3517.04 through 3517.05, that the State Central Committee is
not the proper body to resolve this dispute. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Ms. Gallagher is
not entitled to the relief she requests at this juncture.
(The Court intentionally leaves the remainder of this page blank.)
'Again, the Court observes that the plaintiff has failed to establish to this Court in ttie
instant matter a proper reason (including a proper stay of the Havnain Entry) for the excessivedelay in holding the Organizational Meeting.
9
12. STAY CASE AND REFER MATTER TO STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:
Thus, the Court concludes that it should stay this case and should refer the dispute between
the Gallagher faction and the Simpson/Hoag faction to the State Central Committee.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
In conformity with the forgoing CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, the Court hereby
ORDERS that the motion to intervene filed by Jeffrey Simpson and Paul Hoag is sustained. The
Court further ORDERS that the intervening defendants' answer be filed. The Court further ORDERS
that the motion for preliminary injunction filed by the plaintiff is overruled. The Court further
ORDERS that this matter is hereby STAYED pending action on the subject matter herein by
defendant Ohio Republican Party State Central Committee.
1^11C, lt ,2010
pc: Anthony J. DeGidio
Scott A. Ciolek
William Todd
Steven J. Papadimos/Andrew K. RanazziR. Kent Murphree/Gary O. Sommer
Charles J. Doneghy, Judge
10
F I ^.^UrnJ "O^.y^l^..7 q̂ ^.•'^• 10 A,..j5Q[ R^. ^s-^.'^y
k ^i^bJpY6^^t^AlLJ"4sN \wa W, i.a.
3 ^'^ p
2o^n 4E8 I a F' 2`
^n,hNON PLE1^SjEP 01^tlE ^t^l^ S
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LUCAS COUNTY, OHIO
Megan Gallagher,•
Plaintiff, Case No. C10201001192*
vs. FINDINGS OF FACT,* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
Lucas County Board of Elections, et al., AND JUDGMENT ENTRY* UPON RECONSIDERATION
Defendants. Hon. Charles J. Doneghy*
Following an oral hearing on February 17,2010, this injunctive-relief and declaratory-
judgment case is before the Court: 1) on opposing motions filed by the plaintiff, Megan Gallagher,
and by intervening defendants Jeffrey Simpson and Paul Hoag for reconsideration of the Court's
"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment Entry" ("Findings and Conclusions Entry")
filed February 11, 2010'; and 2) for a decision on the merits of this matter.' Upon review and
'In the Findings and Conclusions Entry, the Court in relevant part ovenvled Ms.Gallagher's motion for preliminary injunction and ordered this case stayed in order to allowdefendant Ohio Republican Party State Central Committee ("State Central Committee") todecide, pursuant to R.C. 3517.05, the dispute betwcen the Gallagher faction and the
Ea^^^ .°,°'k^E-B 16 2910
I
E - JOURNALIZEDLUCAS COUNTY IMAGINGSYSTEMJOURNALIZED: 211812010JOURNAL ID: 4261796
EXHIBIT 2
reconsideration of the pleadings, arguments of the parties; stipulations, testimonial and other
evidence, and applicable law, the Court finds it should overrule Ms. Gallagher's request for
injunctive and declaratory relief, and should order the matter forwarded to the State Central
Committee for its decision. Accordingly, the Court issues the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
1. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Voters in Lucas County, Ohio participated in a primary election on March 4, 2008. (See
Plaintiffs Exh.F, certificate of election of Megan Gallagher ["Gallagher Certificate"].) In that
election, Republican voters in Ward 12, Precinct G, elected Ms. Gallagher as a member of the
Central Committee ("Central Committee") of the Lucas County Republican Party ("LCRP").
(Gallagher Certificate; see, also, Complaint Exh.B,p.01 1/023.) Republican voters in Ward 24,
Precinct A elected Mr. Simpson as a member of the Central Committee. (Complaint
Exh.B,p.016/023.) Similarly, Republican voters in district "Spr-15" elected Mr. Hoag as a member
of the Central Committee. (Id. at p.020/023.)
2. Defendant Lucas County Board of Elections ("Board") "declared" the results, including
the election of Ms. Gallagher, Mr. Simpson, and Mr. Hoag as Central Committee members, on April
3, 2008. (See Gallagher Certificate.)
3. After the Board declared the election results, and in order to comply with requirements
Simpson/Hoag faction as to which faction can legitimately claim Ieadcrship of the Lucas CountyRepublican Party ("LCRP").
=1n the February 17 hearing, pursuant to Civ.R. 65(B)(2) and upon notice to the parties,the Court consolidated the trial in this case with the hearing on Ms. Gallagher's motion forprcliminary injunction.
2
of R.C. 3517.04 and LCRP Bylaws Section A, Article IV, the LCRP scheduled its post-primary
organizational meeting for April 12, 2008. Haynam v. Lucas Cty Republican Party Central
Committee (May 6, 2008), Lucas C.P. No. C10200803283, p.6 (Bowman, J.; "Haynam Entry").'
4. Prior to the April 12 meeting, several litigants filed cases in this Court which the Court
consolidated ("consolidated cases") which challcnged the Central Committee's scheduling of its post-
primary organizational meeting for April 12, 2008. In the consolidated cases, the Court entered a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the April 12 meeting based on allegations that the Central
Committee had failed to comply with the notice requirements of R.C. 3517.04. (See April 11, 2008
Judgment Entry, in relevant part enjoining the April 12 meeting.) The Court assigned the
consolidated cases for hearing, scheduled for April 28,2008, on the pending motion for preliminary
injunction; the Court further enjoined any organizational meeting pending compliance with the
statutory requirementsofR.C.3517.04. (Id.) After conducting the April 28 hearing, Judge Bowman
issued the May 6 Haynam Entry in which he ruled in relevant part as follows:
"It is further ORDERED that the [LCRPJ Central Committee [organizational]meeting, pursuant to R.C. 3517,04, shall be scheduled and held within ftfteen daysof the date of this [Haynam] Entry." (Emphasis added; Havnam Entry p.9.)
5. On or about May 16,2008, the LCRP appealed the matter to the Sixth Appellate District!
On May 16, the Sixth District entered a decision and judgment entry ("May 16 Entry") in response
'The plaintiff attached the Haynam Entry to her proposed findings of fact and conclusionsof law filed in this case on February 8, 2010.
'Prior to filing her motion for reconsideration of the Court's Findings and ConclusionsEntry, Ms. Gallagher failed to inform the Court about, and failed to present evidence regarding,the decisions made and actions taken by the Sixth District following the May 16 appeal. ThisCourt now must address the impact of the Sixth District's decisions and actions on the plaintiffscase. The Court will do so bclow.
3
inc-
;L
to a motion for temporary restraining order filed by two parties. In relevant part, the May 16 Entry ^^n
reads as follows:
"[W]e will treat this motion as an application, pursuant to App.R. 7, to stay executionof the judgment or order of the trial court pending appeal.11V M•
"Upon consideration, the CouR grants a temporary stay of execution of the trialcourt's judgment. The intent of this temporary stay is to maintain the status quo sothat appellee has an opportunity to respond to the appellants' motion for stay ofexecution. Therefore, the [LCRP Central Committee's] organization meeting shallnot be held during the period of temporary stay of execution hereby imnosed. •"."(Emphasis added; May 16 Entry.)
6. On June 4, 2008, the Sixth District entered another decision and judgment entry ("June
4 Entry"). The Sixth District stated in relevant part as follows:
"• •' On May 16,2008, upon appellants' motion, this court issued a temporary stavof execution of the trial court's May 6, 2008 judgment in this case to maintain thestatus auo and allow appellee an opportunity to respond.
"We have thoroughly reviewed appellants' motion as well as appellee'sresponse and, upon consideration whereof, appellant's motion is denied. Thetempgrary stay issued by this court on May 16. 2008 is hereby lifted." , , *." (Emphasis added; June 4 Entry.)
7. Thereafter, the LCRP convened an organizational meeting ("Organizational Meeting")
meeting of the members-elect of the Central Committee on June 14, 2008. (See Complaint Exh.B.)
At the Organizational Meeting, the LCRP swore-in members-elect, and the new Central Committee
members elected Ms. Gallagher as Chair of the Central Comtnittee (Complaint Exh.B.p.005/023),
Mark Nowak as Secretary of the Central Committee (Complaint Exh.B.p.005/023), Jon Stainbrook
as Chair of the LCRP Executive Comnrittee (Complaint Exh.C.p.002), and Hans Schnapp as
Secretary of the LCRP Executive Committee (Complaint Exh.C.p.002).
8. At a meeting of the Central Committee on or about December 21, 2009, committee
members split into at least two factions over an intemal govemance matter. (SeeBoardExh.l,Letter
4
pp.1-2.) One faction remained affiliated with Ms. Gallagher ("Gallagher faction"), and the other
faction ("Simpson/Hoag faction"), opposing Ms. Gallagher's group, affiliated with Simpson and
Hoag. (See Complaint paras.l0-17.)
9. The Gallagher faction claims it is the faction legitimately entitled to lead the LCRP. At
the February 17 hearing, this faction told the Court the faction bases its claim to leadership upon the
June 14 Organizational Meeting.
10. The Simpson/Hoag faction claims it is the faction legitimately entitled to lead the LCRP.
At the February 17 hearing, the Simpson/Hoag faction told the Court the faction bases its claim to
leadership upon the December 21, 2009 meeting.
1 I. On or about December 24,2009, Mr. Nowak, as "Secretary, Republican County Central
Committee," and in affiliation with the Gallagher faction, submitted to the Board an "updated" list
of Central Committee mambers. (Board Exh.2.) On or about January 8, 2010, also in affiliation
with the Gallagher faction, Hans Schnapp, as "Secretary" of the LCRP Executive Committee,
submitted to the Board an "updated" list of Executive Committee members. (Board Exh.2.)
12. On or about January 7, 2010, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Hoag, and two other individuals, in
affiliation with the Simpson/Hoag faction and in opposition to the Gallagher faction, sent a letter and
a seventeen-page list of individuals they claimed to constitute the Central Committee and another
two-page list of individuals they claimed to constitute the Executive Committee. (Board Exh.l.)
In the letter, Mr. Simpson represented himself to be "Chairman, LCRP Executive Committee"; Mr.
Hoag represented himself to be "Chairman, LCRP Central Committee"; Christine Seles represented
herself to be "Secretary, LCRP Executive Committee"; and Jan Lowe represented himself to be
"Secretary, LCRP Central Committee." (Board Exh.l .) On or about January 11, 2010, Simpson and
5
Hoag sent an addendum to their January 7 list. (Id.)
13. By letter dated January 12, 2010, the Board "certified" the lists submitted by each faction
(consolidating the submissions from each faction into one unified list from each) "to the State
Republican Party as instructed in [R.C.] 3517.05." (Board Exh.3.)
14. Later that day, Ms. Gallagher filed the instant action seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against both the defendant Board and the defendant Ohio Republican Party State Central
Committee ("State Central Committee") "dueto the Defendants' failure to comply with R.C. 3517.04
[through 3517.06]." (Complaint para.l.) Essentially, Ms. Gallagher contends that the Board is
without authority to refer this "conflict" to the State Central Committee for resolution, and that the
State Central Committee is without authority to resolve the dispute as to which faction properly
should control the LCRP Central Committee and Executive Committee.
15. The Court granted Simpson and Hoag's motion to intervene in this action.
11. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. MERGING TRIAL AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IIEARING: Pursuant to
Civ.R. 65(B)(2),' and after notifyingthe parties at the February 17 hearing, the Court concludes that
it shall consolidate the trial on the merits and the hearing on the preliminary injunction in order to
save the Court and parties the additional time and expense of multiple hearings. See Ohio Serv.
Group. Inc. v. Integrated & Open Sys.. L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-433, 2006-Ohio-6738, at ¶10
(addressing the notice requirement and cost savings of consolidafion).
'The rule reads in relevant part as follows:"(B) Consolidation of hearing with trial on merits. Before or after the commencement of
the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of theaction on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application, *•*."
6
2, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: As a general proposition, an injunction is an extraordinary
remedy which is equitable in nature. Prairie Two. Bd, ofTrustees v. Ross, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-509,
2004-Ohio-838, at ¶ I 1. Ohio courts gcnerally applythe following factors when determining whether
preliminary injunctive relief shall issue:
"(1) the likelihood or probability of a plaintiffs success on the merits;(2) whether the issuance of the injunction will prevent irreoarable harm to theplaintiff; (3) what injury to others will be caused by the granting of the injunction;and (4) whether the public interest will be served by the granting of the injunction."(Emphasis added.) Corbett v. Ohio Bld .g Auth. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 44, 49, 619N.E.2d 1145.
To obtain injunctive relief, the candidate must prove these required elements by clear and convincing
evidence. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 260, 267, 747 N.E.2d 268;
Lemley v. Stevenson (1995), 104 Ohio App. 3d 126, 136, 661 N.E.2d 237. A trial court's judgment
on this issue will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Corbett v. Ohio Bldg.
Auth. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 44, 49, 619 N.E.2d I 145. "In order to obtain a pennanent injunction,
a party must show by clear and convincing evidence that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the applicant and that there is no adequate remedy at law." l st Natl. Bank v.
Mt. Agencv. LLC, CA2008-05-056, 2009-Ohio-2202, at 1147. "laeparable harm is an injury for
which there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, and for which money damages would
be impossible, difficult, or incomplete." Id.
3. GOVERNING LEGAL AU7'IIORITY: This dispute is governed by the LCRP Bylaws
and by R.C. 3517.02 through 3517.06-
4. MEMBERS: R.C. 3517.03 makes the LCRP Central Committee the "Controlling
Committee" of the LCRP. The Central Committee members are to be elected from local precincts
7
(,
by direct vote at even-year state primary elections. Id. The Central Committee elects the Executive [`
Committee. Id.
5. "ORGANIZATION": R.C. 3517.04 mandates that the LCRP's retiring Central
Committee chair "shall" call, and the retiring Central Committee secretary "shall" provide notice to
the "members-elect" about, an "organizational meeting". See R.C. 3517.04 ("the committee shall
proceed to or ag nize" [emphasis added]); R.C. 3517.05 (noting the proper timing set forth in R.C.
3517.04 for the "organizational meeting"); Bylaw Section A, Article IV. The statute requires that
the party hold the organizational meeting within six (6) to fifteen (15) days "following the
declaration of the results" of the primary election. R.C. 3517.04; Central Committee of Hamilton
County Republican Party v. Kohnen (Aug. 9, 1991), I st Dist. No. C900603, 1991 Ohio App.Lexis
3800, *9-10. The statute requires five-day notice of the organizational meeting. R.C. 3517.04. At
the meeting, the members-elect shall be swom and "the committee shall proceed to organize" by
electing officers. Id.
6. TENURE/VACANCIES: R.C. 3517.05 provides that all party committees and officers,
generally, "shall * * * serve until the date of the [next] organizational meeting provided for in R.C.
3517.04." See, also, Bylaws Article III ("All members of the Central Committee shall be * * *
elected for terms of two [2] years ***"). "[V]acancies [in the central committee] caused by death,
resignation, failure to elect, orremoval from the precinct ***"are to be filled by the a majority vote
of the Central Committec (or, if authorized, by the Executive Committee). R.C. 3517.05; Bylaws
Section B, Article V (only Central Committee is authorized). Central Committee members may
"rcmove" officers by majority vote of all Central Committee members. Bylaws Section F, Article
8
^-::o.:r.
7. DISPUTES OVER CONTROL: R.C. 3517.05 provides that "[ilf more than one
or ang ized rg ouu claims to be the rightful county central or executive committee, each such group
shall file a list of its officers and members [to] the board of elections [which] shall certi them to
thestatecentralcommittee." (Emphasis added.) R.C.3517.05. Then,"[t]hestatecentralcommittee
shall *** determine and c rti which committee shall be reeopnized as the rightful county central
or executive committee." (Emphasis added.) Id.
8, COURT DETERMINATION:
a. Generally courts are to defer to the State Central Committee for that body to
detennine the proper group to "recognize." R.C. 3517.05; Federspiel v. Ohio Reoublican Party State
Cent. Comm. (S.D.Oh.1994), 867 P.Supp. 617, 622; Central Committee of Hamilton Countv
Republican Party v. Kohnen, supra, 1991 Ohio App.Lexis 3800, * 12. See, also, id. at *6 ("the
legislature has provided that the state central committee of a political party resolve intra-party
disputes as to the rightful leadership of county central committees"),
b. However, a group which fails to call an "organizational meeting" within the proper
time or which fails to call and/orprovide proper notice of an "organizational meeting" via the proper
retiring officers, has no "valid claim to the leadership" of the central or executive committees. See
Central Committee of Hamilton County Reoublican Party v. Kohnen, supra, 1991 Ohio App.Lexis
3800, * 11-16. "Thus, [an organized group is] entitled to judicial relief upon demonstrating their *
•* compliance with the applicable statutes and the [county party's goveming rules]" if the group will
be "deprived of' rightful leadership of the county party. (Emphasis added.) Id. at *6.
c) Inianction May Be Pro ter: An injunction properly may issue to protect the
public office of one being challenged by an adverse claimant, until the claimant establishes her title
9
bylaw. Id. at *16, citing State. ex rel. Garrison v, Broueh (1916), 94 Ohio St. 115, syllabus 3.
9. NEITHER FACTION COMPLIED WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS:
a. The Gallaeher faction - Timing: The primary election at which the Central
Committeemembersmostrecentlywereelectedoccun-edonMarch4,2008. (Gallagher Certificate.)
The Board declared the results of that election on or about April 3, 2008. (Id.) Thus, in order to
comply with the express six-to-fifteen-day time requirement of R.C. 3517.04, the LCRP was to hold
its organizational meeting between April 9 and April 18. After Judge Bowman enjoined the
scheduled April 12 organizational meeting, Judge Bowman ordered the LCRP to hold its R.C.
3517.04 "organizational meeting" within "fifteen days" of the May 6 Haynam Entry. (See Haynam
Entry, p.9.) However, following the LCRP's May 16 appeal of the Haynam Entry, which occurred
ten days after the Haynam Entry, the Sixth District "grant[ed] a temporary stay of execution of the
trial court'sjudgment [in order] to maintain the status auo." (Emphasis added; May 16 Entry.) Then
on June 4, the Sixth District, after noting that it had "issued [the] temporary stay of execution of the
trial court's May 6, 2008 judgment in this case to maintain the status quo," the Sixth District "lifted"
the temporary stay. (Emphasis added; June 4 Entry.) The Central Committee did not conduct the
"Organizational Meeting," at which the committee members elected the Gal lagher faction, until June
14, 2008. (Complaint Exhs,B,C.)
b. The Gallagher faction -- Non-Compliance: The Court concludes that the June
14 organizational-meeting election of inembers of the Gallagher faction was out of compliance with
both the express time requirements of R.C. 3517.04 and the fifteen-day mandate Judge Bowman
ordered in the Haynam Entry which the Sixth District tolled in its May 16 and June 4 Entries. The
Court concludes, and the parties acknowledge, that courts may extend through express orders the
10
ro.b
specific time limits contained in statutes. The Court concludes that Judge Bowman properly
extended the six-to-fifteen day time period of R.C. 3517.04 with his fifteen-day mandate in the
Haynam Entry. The Court also concludes that, ten days into the fifteen-day period mandated by
Judge Bowman, the Sixth District issued its "temporary stay of execution of the [ nam Entry in
order] to maintain the status auo." The Court further concludes that, in so doing, the Sixth District
intended to maintain "the existing state of affairs" in the appealed consolidated casesb; specifically,
ten days into the fifteen-day mandate (contained Maynam Entry), the Sixth District entered its
temporary stay thus tolling the fifteen-day time period with ten days having already lapsed. The
Court concludes that the state of affairs "maintained" by the Sixth District's temporary stay, included
the remaining five days contained in Judge Bowman's fifteen-day mandate. The Court concludes
that the LCRP conducted the Organizational Meeting ten days after the Sixth District lifted its
temporary stay; the LCRP conducted the Organizational Meeting five days too late. The Court also
concludes that, in the same way Judge Bowman modified the express statutory five-to-sixteen day
meeting requirement of R.C. 3517.04, Judge Bowman also modified the express five-day notice-of-
meeting requirement of R.C. 3517.04 and merged that requirement into his express fifteen-day
mandate.
c. SimpsonlHoag faction: 'fhe Simpson/Hoag faction has not established that it
"organized" and elected Simpson and Hoag within the statutory Apri19 to April 18,2008 time frame
or within the fifteen-day mandate of the Ha nam Entry. Thus, the Court conclndes that the
6i[ tat s uo **'" the state in which something is: the existina state of affairs (as inpolitical or social relationships) at the time in question <seeks to preserve the status auo> <has avested interest in the status auo>." (Emphasis added.) Webster's Third New Internatl. Dictionary(1993), 2230. "Status auo. The existing state ofthings at any given date." (Emphasis added.)Black's Law Dictionary (4 Ed.1951) 1581.
11
Simpson/Hoag faction was out of compliance with R.C. 3517.04.
10. STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: When both competing groups are out of
conformity with the requirements of R.C. 3517.04, the State Central Committee is the proper body
to resolve leadership questions of the LCRP and its committees. See Central Committee of Hamilton
County Republican Party v. Kohnen, supra,19910hio App.Lexis 3800,' 11-12 (finding that "neither
claimantcould legitimately claim party leadership [and the) dispute was ideally suited for resolution
[by the State Central Committee) under R.C. 3517.05").
11. BOARD OF ELECTIONS: The Court concludes that when competing groups within
a political party in Lucas County submit competing lists to the Board, the Board is to submit the
competing lists to the state central committee of that political party.
12. SUCCESS ON THE MERITS: The Court concludes that Ms. Gallagher has failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that she is entitled to the injunctive and declaratory relief
she seeks, i.e., she has failed to establish, pursuant to R.C. 3517.04 through 3517.05, that the State
Central Committee is not the proper body to resolve this dispute. Accordingly, the Court concludes
that Ms. Gallagher is not entitled to the relief she requests.
13. REFER MATTER TO STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:
Thus, the Court concludes that it should enter judgment against Ms. Gallagher on her
complaint. The Court also concludes that it should order this dispute between the Gallagher faction
and the Simpson/f-loag faction to the State Central Committee, The Court also concludes that the
State Central Committee has thirty days from the filingof this entry to complete its statutory dispute-
resolution duties.
(The Court intentionally leaves the remainder of this page blank.)
12
JUDGMENT ENTRY UPON RECONSIDERATION
In conformity with the forgoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, the Court hereby ORDERS the trial on the merits of this matter to be consolidated with the
hearing on the plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction. The Court further ORDERS that
judgment is entered against the plaintiff on her complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief. The
Court further ORDERS that defendant Ohio Republican Party State Central Committee resolve this
matter in conformity with its statutory duties. The Court further ORDERS that defendant Ohio
Republican Party State Central Committee has thirty days from the filing of this entry in which to
complete its duties. The Court finds no just reason for delay.
41z4 • 1 ', V , 2010
pc: Anthony J. DeGidioScott A. CiolekWilliam ToddSteven J. Papadirnos/Andrew K. RanazziR. Kent Murphree/Gary O. Sommer
13
Page 1 of 2
John Borell - Fwd: Questions
From: Linda HoweTo: John BorellDate: 3/12/2010 10:24 AMSubject: Fwd: Questions
>>> "Seskes, Brandi" <[email protected]> 3/11/2010 4:41 PM »>Linda,
egistration Question:
In general, qualifications are determined at the time of filing. A person who files a declaration of candidacy tobe a write-in candidate signs a statement that reads as follows:
I declare that I am an elector qualified to vote for the office I seek.
In order to sign this statement, a person would need to be registered to vote either before he or she files apetition or would need to register to vote at the same time he or she files a petition.
Address Discrepancies_
Ohio law requires a candidate to provide his or her current qualifying voting address in the statement ofcandidacy; however, nothing in law mandates that address in the statement of candidacy be the same addressthat is on file with the board of elections.
Please note that state law provides a residency requirement for a person seeking election to an office createdunder the constitution or laws of Ohio (i.e., the person must be an elector of the territory of that office). If thecandidate's qualifying voting address is located within such territory, the legal residency requirement is satisfied- even if that address is not the same as the candidate's voting address on file with the board of elections. Ohiois the only state subject to NVRA that has always applied the "provisional voter" status on a statewide basis; seeR.C. 3503.16(B) and (C). See also the protest provision of R.C. 3513.05 that states: "If they find that suchcandidate is not an elector of the state, district, county, or political subdivision in which the candidate seeks aparty nomination or election to an office or position, or has not fully complied with this chapter, the candidate'sdeclaration of candidacy and petition shall be determined to be invalid and shall be rejected; otherwise, it shallbe determined to be valid."
Thus, the address on a person's statement of candidacy may be different from the address on file with theboard. It is possible that a person failed to update his/her registration (or attempted to update his/her addressbut, for whatever reason, it was never received by the board). If a discrepancy exists, the board may want toquestion the candidate about it (i.e., why the address in the statement of candidacy is different than that on filewith the board). However, the fact that the two addresses differ is not automatically fatal to the person'scandidacy.
I have "cc'd" my colleagues on this email. If any of them have anything to add or disagree with my analysis, I will
let you know.
EXHIBIT 3file://C:\Documents and Settings\jat 4B9A1641LC_... 3/30/2010
Page 2 of 2
Please let me know if you have additional questions.
Thanks,BrandiBrandi Laser SeskesElections Counsel,Office of Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner
file://C:\Documents and Settings\jaborell\Local Settings\Temp\XPgrpwise\4B9A1641LC_... 3/30/2010
Page 1 of2
John Borell - Fwd: RE: Questions
From: Linda HoweTo: John BorellDate: 3/12/2010 11:34 AMSubject: Fwd: RE: Questions
>>> "Shinn, Brian" <[email protected]> 3/12/2010 11:29 AM »>I agree with Brandi that under R.C. 3501.38 the facts of qualification are determined as of the date of
filing. So, if a candidate filed a VR form with your office or a designated agency before or on the samedate that the candidate filed his/lier petition, thc petition is not invalid based upon the candidate not
being a qualified elector (assuming that the VR form is complete and valid).
Brian
From: Linda Howe [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 12, 2010 11:28 AMTo: Shinn, BrianSubject: Fwd: Questions
Brian, Thank you for the clarification - however, could you please confirm that in an e-mail to me.Please read my attached original question. Thank you again. Linda
>>> "Seskes, Brandi" <[email protected]> 3/11/2010 4:41 PM »>Linda,
Registration Question:
In general, qualifications are determined at the time of filing. A person who files a declaration of candidacy tobe a write-in candidate signs a statement that reads as follows:
I declare that I am an elector qualified to vote for the office I seek.
In order to sign this statement, a person would need to be registered to vote either before he or she files apetition or would need to register to vote at the same time he or she files a petition.
Address Discrepancies:
Ohio law requires a candidate to provide his or her current qualifying voting address in the statement ofcandidacy; however, nothing in law mandates that address in the statement of candidacy be the same addressthat is on file with the board of elections.
Please note that state law provides a residency requirement for a person seeking election to an office createdunder the constitution or laws of Ohio (i.e., the person must be an elector of the territory of that office). If thecandidate's qualifying voting address is located within such territory, the legal residency requirement is satisfied- even if that address is not the same as the candidate's voting address on file with the board of elections. Ohiois the only state subject to NVRA that has always applied the "provisional voter" status on a statewide basis; see
EXHIBIT 461e:/IC:\Documents and Settings\j e\4B9A26B3LC_... 3/30/2010
Page 2 of 2
R.C. 3503.16(B) and (C). See also the protest provision of R.C. 3513.05 that states: "If they find that suchcandidate is not an elector of the state, district, county, or political subdivision in which the candidate seeks aparty nomination or election to an office or position, or has not fully complied with this chapter, the candidate'sdeclaration of candidacy and petition shall be determined to be invalid and shall be rejected; otherwise, it shallbe determined to be valid."
Thus, the address on a person's statement of candidacy may be different from the address on file with theboard. It is possible that a person failed to update his/her registration (or attempted to update his/her addressbut, for whatever reason, it was never received by the board). If a discrepancy exists, the board may want toquestion the candidate about it (i.e., why the address in the statement of candidacy is different than that on filewith the board). However, the fact that the two addresses differ is not automatically fatal to the person'scandidacy.
I have "cc'd" my colleagues on this email. If any of them have anything to add or disagree with my analysis, I willlet you know.
Please let me know if you have additional questions.
Thanks,Brandi
Brandi Laser SeskesElections Counsel,Office of Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner
file://CADocuments and Settings\jaborelllLocal Settings\Temp\XPgrpwise\4B9A26B3LC ... 3/30/2010
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of the foregoing Affidavit was sent by E-mail on the 1 S` day April, 2010
to:
Douglas G. HaynamShumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP1000 JacksonToledo, Ohio 43604-5573Telephone: (419) 241-9000Telecopier: (419) 241-6894
Scott R. BranamShumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP41 South High StreetSuite 2400Columbus, Ohio 43215Telephone: (614) 463-9441Telecopier: (614) 463-1108
Anthony J. DeGidio712 Farrer StreetMaumee, Ohio 43537Telephone: (419) 509-1878Telecopier: (419) 740-2556
Scott A. Ciolek520 Madison AvenueSuite 820Toledo, Ohio 43604Telephone: (419) 740-5935Telecopier: (419) 890-0419E-mail: scott.ciolekgmail.com
Co-Counsel for IntervenorsCounsel for Relator
J8hn A. BorellAssistant Prosecuting AttorneyCounsel for Respondent Lucas CountyBoard of Elections