in the high court of the republic of singapore · high court — magistrate’s appeal no...

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

[2018] SGHC 137

Magistrate’s Appeal No 9012/2018/01

Between

Ma Wenjie… Appellant

And

Public Prosecutor… Respondent

Magistrate’s Appeal No 9012/2018/02

Between

Public Prosecutor … Appellant

And

Ma Wenjie … Respondent

JUDGMENT

[Criminal Law] — [statutory offences] — [Passports Act] [Criminal Procedure and Sentencing] — [sentencing] — [appeals]

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1

BACKGROUND FACTS ................................................................................3

PROCEEDINGS BELOW ..............................................................................4

THE DECISION BELOW......................................................................................6

THE APPEAL ..................................................................................................8

THE ACCUSED’S SUBMISSIONS ........................................................................8

THE PROSECUTION’S SUBMISSIONS ...............................................................10

MY DECISION ..............................................................................................13

APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION ......................................................................13

What constitutes “reasonable excuse”? ..................................................13

Burden of proof ........................................................................................16

Application to the facts.............................................................................20

APPEALS AGAINST SENTENCE ........................................................................23

Sentencing precedents ..............................................................................23

Sentencing considerations........................................................................27

Application to the facts.............................................................................31

CONCLUSION...............................................................................................33

This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports.

Ma Wenjie v

Public Prosecutor and another appeal

[2018] SGHC 137

High Court — Magistrate’s Appeal No 9012/2018/01 and 9012/2018/02See Kee Oon J25 April 2018

8 June 2018 Judgment reserved.

See Kee Oon J:

Introduction

1 The Accused, Ma Wenjie, was convicted after trial in a District Court

on 17 charges under s 47(5) of the Passports Act (Cap 220, 2008 Rev Ed). He

was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for each charge, and a global

sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment. The Accused appealed against his

conviction and sentence, while the Prosecution appealed against the sentence.

2 The 17 charges against the Accused relate to his possession of People’s

Republic of China (“PRC”) passports without reasonable excuse. The charges

are phrased identically, with the only differences being the identity of the holder

and the serial number of the foreign travel document that is the subject of each

charge. Each charge is worded as follows:

Ma Wenjie v PP [2018] SGHC 137

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You … are charged that you, on 05.03.2017 at Changi Airport, Terminal 1 Arrival section, Singapore, without a reasonable excuse, had in possession of a foreign travel document namely a People’s Republic of China Passport bearing serial number [serial number] and particulars issued under “[name]”, which you knew was not lawfully issued to you and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 47(5) of the Passports Act, which is an offence punishable under the same section of the said Act.

The serial numbers and names stated in the 17 charges respectively are:

S/N [serial number] [name]

1. G44824755 MA ZHELAIYE (Female / 01.03.1949)

2. E49953456 YANG JIANCHENG (Male / 01.02.1968)

3. E55120002 MA GUANGHUI (Male / 13.08.1947)

4. G44827120 YANG JINMING (Male / 01.05.1972)

5. G44824754 MA FATUMAI (Female / 01.06.1972)

6. E64334641 ZONG DEFU (Male / 07.08.1950)

7. E64374705 MA GASUO (Female / 03.08.1961)

8. E55120001 MA HAIJICHE (Female / 09.06.1949)

9. E18223704 MAI JIANRONG (Male / 04.11.1977)

10. E67166685 MA ZHILIANG (Male / 18.02.1962)

11. E67166684 MA SHANGZHEN (Female / 30.10.1964)


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12. E16606983 MAI JIANJUN (Male / 03.10.1974)

13. E64374710 ZHOU ZHANSHAN (Male / 08.03.1968)

14. E40037737 ZHOU HUSAINI (Male / 01.01.1963)

15. E49950050 MA SUMU (Female / 01.03.1970)

16. E21437243 MA GADE (Male / 17.02.1954)

17. E65711499 HAN ZHONGXIAO (Male / 05.10.1989)

3 Having heard submissions from the parties, I dismiss both the

Prosecution’s appeal against sentence and the Accused’s appeal against

conviction and sentence.

Background facts

4 The key background facts are largely undisputed. The Accused got to

know one Habibu sometime in 2015 when he was working in Saudi Arabia. He

continued to keep in contact with Habibu after he returned to Beijing in 2016.

The Accused told Habibu that he intended to come to Singapore to survey the

market for potential business opportunities, and Habibu asked the Accused to

do him a favour by bringing some PRC passports into Singapore. Habibu told

him that there were no problems with the PRC passports and he agreed to help

Habibu. Habibu did not tell him the purpose of bringing the PRC passports into

Singapore and he did not ask Habibu about the purpose.

5 The arrangement was that a friend of Habibu would hand the PRC

passports to the Accused in Beijing, since Habibu was in Saudi Arabia. The


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Accused was to call Habibu after he entered Singapore and Habibu would then

make arrangements for someone to collect the PRC passports from the Accused

in Singapore. The Accused was not told the name nor the contact details of the

person who would be waiting to collect the PRC passports. Neither did the

Accused ask Habibu for the details of this person.

6 On 4 March 2017, the Accused received a call from an unknown Chinese

male claiming to be Habibu’s friend. Subsequently, the unknown male met the

Accused at the Beijing airport and passed the Accused a red bag, telling the

Accused that there were more than 10 passports inside. The Accused took the

passports out of the red bag without counting them or looking at their contents,

and put them into his hand luggage. The Accused then boarded a plane to

Singapore.

7 Upon his arrival in Singapore at Terminal 1 of Changi Airport, while the

Accused was going through immigration clearance, it was discovered that his

entry visa into Singapore had expired. He was stopped and his hand luggage

was searched. 17 passports issued by the PRC were found in his hand luggage.

These 17 PRC passports are the subjects of the charges the Accused faced.

8 While the Accused was not promised and did not receive anything from

Habibu for bringing the 17 PRC passports into Singapore, he hoped that by

helping him, he would get business opportunities from Habibu in the future.

Proceedings below

9 The Accused claimed trial to all of the 17 charges. He did not dispute

that the ingredients of the Passports Act charges had been made out, since he

was in possession of the 17 PRC passports while knowing that they were not


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lawfully issued to him. His main argument was that he had a reasonable excuse

under s 47(7) of the Passports Act for possessing the 17 PRC passports.

10 The Accused testified and also called two witnesses in support of his

defence. First, the Accused called Zhou Xingwen, who was known to him as

Habibu, as a witness to testify that he had arranged for one Ma Mingzhe to pass

the 17 PRC passports to the Accused to be brought into Singapore. Habibu said

that the purpose of doing so was to apply for visas to Saudi Arabia for the

passport-holders of the 17 PRC passports. The Accused tendered a letter

purportedly from Zangari Travel & Tourism (“the Zangari letter” and “Zangari”

respectively) stating that the Accused worked “as a tour agent to bring Chinese

tourists to visit the Arabian Gulf countries” and listed the names of the holders

of the 17 PRC passports. It was also stated in the Zangari letter that the purpose

of the Accused holding these passports was “to issue them visa from the

Embassy of Kingdome [sic] of Saudi Arabia and Qatar Embassy in Singapore”.

Habibu and the Accused however conceded that the Accused was not a tour

agent with Zangari, which was purportedly a travel company from Bahrain, and

he was not entrusted with the 17 PRC passports in that capacity. The Accused

also attempted to adduce 17 letters of invitation purportedly issued by the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia (“Letters of Invitation”), one for

each of the 17 PRC passports, inviting the passport-holders to visit Saudi Arabia

on commercial visas. However, since only three of the 17 Letters of Invitation

were translated, only these three translated Letters of Invitation were admitted

in evidence.

11 The Accused also called Yang Guojiang (“Yang”), a Chinese national,

to testify that it was possible to have his visa application to Saudi Arabia applied

for in Singapore without having to come to Singapore personally. Copies of his

passport and a commercial visit visa were adduced in evidence. However, Yang,


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who was elderly and illiterate, was not one of the passport-holders named in the

17 charges. Yang said he did not know why he was issued a commercial visit

visa since he had only wanted to travel to Saudi Arabia for religious purposes.

The decision below

12 The grounds of decision of the District Judge is reported at PP v Ma

Wenjie [2018] SGDC 41 (“the GD”). The District Judge found that the elements

of the offence under s 47(5) of the Passports Act were fulfilled: the Accused did

not dispute the actus reus or the mens rea of the offence; he admitted that he

was in possession of the 17 PRC passports and he knew that they were not issued

to him. Therefore, the decision turned on whether the Accused could avail

himself of the defence of reasonable excuse under s 47(7) of the Passports Act.

Section 47(7) states that subsections (2) to (6) “shall not apply if the person has

a reasonable excuse”.

13 The District Judge analysed the law on reasonable excuse before

deciding that the Accused had no reasonable excuse on the facts ([30]–[41] of

the GD). She held that the burden was on an accused person to prove, on a

balance of probabilities, that the defence of reasonable excuse applied (at [27]).

In analysing the elements of reasonable excuse, she relied on the case of

Madiaalakan s/o Muthusamy v PP [2001] 3 SLR(R) 580 (“Madiaalakan”),

which involved the failure to provide an adequate breath specimen. The accused

in that case argued that he suffered from chronic obstructive lung disease, and

this afforded him a reasonable excuse for his failure. Yong Pung How CJ stated

the elements of reasonable excuse in the context of failing to provide an

adequate breath specimen as follows: (a) no excuse was reasonable unless the

accused had tried as hard as he could; (b) whether the accused had a reasonable

excuse (this included both subjective and objective elements); and (c) whether


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the Prosecution had negatived the defence. The District Judge also relied on

Chan Chun Yee v PP [1998] 3 SLR(R) 172, where it was held that there must

be objective evidence showing that an accused’s belief in a fact constituting a

reasonable excuse was reasonable in the circumstances. Blind reliance was not

sufficient.

14 On the facts, the District Judge found that the Accused did not have a

reasonable excuse. At the material time when he came into possession of the 17

PRC passports, all he could say was that he assumed that the passports were to

be brought into Singapore for the purpose of visa applications (at [36] of the

GD). The Accused attempted to rationalise his possession of the passports only

ex post facto, by calling Habibu and tendering the Zangari letter stating that the

passports were entrusted to Zangari for the purpose of applying for Saudi Arabia

visas (at [36]–[38] of the GD). The District Judge found that the Zangari letter

was fabricated and held that the material time for determining when the Accused

had a reasonable excuse was when he was found in possession of the 17 PRC

passports. At that time, he did not even know why he was bringing them into

Singapore. Therefore, there was nothing to show that the Accused had “tried

hard” to ascertain why he was in possession of these passports (at [39] of the

GD). There was also no evidence to support the allegation that the Accused had

implied authority from the passport-holders to be in possession of their

passports (at [40] of the GD).

15 In relation to sentencing, the District Judge agreed with the Prosecution

that the foremost sentencing consideration was general deterrence. The

precedents showed that fines had never been imposed and there was nothing

exceptional or especially mitigating about the facts of this case that justified a

departure from the usual custodial norm (at [47]–[49] of the GD). She found the

Accused’s culpability to be low because there was little planning and


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premeditation on his part, and there was no real personal gain to him (at [51] of

the GD). With regard to the harm caused, she did not accept that the passports

were indeed being brought into Singapore for the purpose of visa applications

to Saudi Arabia. Taking into account potential harm, she found the harm caused

to fall somewhere at the higher end of the low scale (at [54] of the GD).

16 The District Judge was generally in agreement with the sentencing

matrix proposed by the Prosecution (reproduced at [25] below). However, she

did not agree with the Prosecution that 12 months’ imprisonment for each

charge was necessitated in the light of the precedents (at [55] of the GD). She

found the case of PP v Trinh Van Thao (District Arrest Case No 932669 of 2014

and another) (“Trinh Van Thao”) to be the most similar to the present case. In

that case, the accused had agreed to bring a passport issued to another person

out of Singapore as a favour for a friend. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced

to four months’ imprisonment. Considering that the Accused had claimed trial

in the present case and was not entitled to any discount in sentence, the District

Judge sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment for each charge, with the

sentences for two charges to run consecutively. In arriving at this sentence, the

District Judge was mindful that the sentence imposed should not be crushing (at

[58] of the GD).

The Appeal

The Accused’s submissions

17 On appeal, the Accused again argued that he had a reasonable excuse in

possessing the 17 PRC passports. From the outset, his counsel argued that the

burden of proof was on the Prosecution to show that he had no reasonable

excuse to possess the passports, based on the case R v Chuks Emmanuel Charles

[2010] 1 WLR 644 (“Chuks Charles”).


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18 The Accused submitted that he had a reasonable excuse because he was

given implied authority to bring the passports into Singapore for visa

applications. He agreed to help Habibu to bring the passports into Singapore

after he was assured that there were no problems with them. It was not disputed

that Habibu did not tell him the purpose of bringing the passports into Singapore

beforehand and the Accused did not ask. He believed that the passports were for

the purpose of visa applications, and it was submitted that he had reason to

believe so because he knew that Habibu was in the visa business. The Accused

argued that his authority to possess the 17 PRC passports was given to him by

Habibu who was an agent of Zangari. Zangari in turn had the authority to

possess the passports by virtue of Ma Mingzhe, who had obtained authorisation

from the passport-holders.

19 The Accused further submitted that possessing the 17 PRC passports

after being assured that there were no problems with them constituted a

reasonable excuse at the time he came into possession of the passports. It was

submitted that reasonable excuse as to how he came into possession of the

passports should not be confused with the reason for bringing the passports, ie,

for visa applications. Further, it was submitted that the law did not place a

burden on the Accused to know why he had to be in possession of the passports,

and the law did not require him to conduct further checks as to the reason why

the passports were brought into Singapore.

20 The Accused also took issue with the District Judge’s characterisation

of the Zangari letter as “fabricated”. His position was that although it was falsely

stated in the letter that he was a tour agent of Zangari, the letter was not false in

showing that the passports belonged to Zangari and were brought into Singapore

for visa applications.


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21 In the event that the appeal against conviction failed, the Accused

submitted that the sentence of six months’ imprisonment for each charge was

manifestly excessive. It was argued that while a deterrent sentence was

justifiably used as a means to check or to reduce the prevalence of a particular

kind of offence, it should not be so excessive as to be crushing. A custodial

sentence was not necessarily the only or even the best form of deterrence against

offending. The Accused sought for a fine to be imposed instead, or in the

alternative, for his sentence to be reduced.

The Prosecution’s submissions

22 The Prosecution agreed with the District Judge’s holding that the burden

of proof was on the Accused to prove that he had a reasonable excuse in

possessing the passports. It also agreed with the District Judge’s analysis on

what constituted a reasonable excuse, and added a further condition: it would

not be appropriate for a court to find that there was a reasonable excuse if the

excuse offended some other provision in civil or criminal law. The Prosecution

was also in agreement with the District Judge’s holding that the relevant

timeframe to consider the Accused’s conduct and mental state was when he was

first found to be in possession of the 17 PRC passports.

23 In the circumstances, the Prosecution submitted that the Accused did not

have a reasonable excuse – he had no information whatsoever at the material

time on why the passports had to be brought into Singapore. It was also

submitted that there was some evidence in the trial below that applying for

commercial visas for the purpose of pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia was in breach

of Saudi law. Thus, the court should be very slow to find that there was a

reasonable excuse.


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24 With regard to sentencing, the Prosecution submitted that the

appropriate sentence should be 12 months’ imprisonment for each charge, with

a global sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment. The Prosecution argued that

while it was not impossible for fines to be imposed for offences under s 47 of

the Passports Act, the starting point should be a significant custodial term

because the dominant sentencing consideration for these offences was general

deterrence. As a matter of general principle, offences relating to public

institutions and offences affecting public safety or security would warrant the

application of general deterrence in sentencing. Further, there was clear

Parliamentary intent to impose “heavy penalties to send a clear message to

potential perpetrators” (Luong Thi Trang Hoang Kathleen v Public Prosecutor

[2010] 1 SLR 707 (“Kathleen Luong”) at [13], citing Singapore Parliamentary

Debates, Official Report (16 July 2007) vol 83 at col 1094 per Mr Wong Kan

Seng, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs (“DPM

Wong”)). It was further submitted that deterrence was the paramount

consideration because these offences were very difficult to detect since the small

size of passports made them easy to conceal. It would be an impractical strain

on resources to have exhaustive checks on the millions of travellers who pass

through Singapore yearly.

25 Taking into account the dominant consideration of deterrence, the

Prosecution proposed the following sentencing framework for claim trial cases

under s 47(5) of the Passports Act:


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Culpability

Low Medium High

Low At least 6

months

At least 1.5

years

At least 3

years

Medium At least 1.5

years

At least 3

years

At least 4.5

years

Potential

Harm

High At least 3

years

At least 4.5

years

At least 6.5

years

26 The Prosecution agreed with the District Judge’s finding that the

potential harm in this case was on the higher end of the low scale, and that the

culpability of the Accused was low. According to the sentencing framework

proposed, the starting point for low culpability and low potential harm was 6 to

18 months’ imprisonment. The Prosecution further submitted that adducing the

Zangari letter, which contained false information the Accused knew to be false,

was an aggravating factor. It was submitted that there were no significant

mitigating factors. In all the circumstances, the sentence for each charge should

be 15 months’ imprisonment. However, the Prosecution gave some discount

having regard to the fact the Accused was in possession of the passports at the

same time, and submitted that the appropriate sentence was 12 months’

imprisonment for each charge, with a global sentence of 24 months’

imprisonment.


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My decision

27 I will deal with the appeal against conviction and the appeals against

sentence in turn.

Appeal against conviction

28 The Accused did not dispute in the court below and on appeal that the

elements of s 47(5) of the Passports Act are satisfied. The sole issue on appeal

is whether the Accused has a “reasonable excuse” under s 47(7) of the Passports

Act in possessing the 17 PRC passports.

What constitutes “reasonable excuse”?

29 There has only been one reported case, PP v Ma Yuxiang [2017] SGDC

311 (“Ma Yuxiang”), that deals with the meaning of “reasonable excuse” in the

context of s 47(7) of the Passports Act. The district judge in Ma Yuxiang first

approached the issue by looking at the dictionary meaning of “reasonable

excuse” and found that “the literal meaning of the term means a sound, fair and

sensible reason or explanation” and that it “cannot be any or a mere explanation”

(at [101] of Ma Yuxiang). She agreed with the House of Lords in R v G & Anor

[2010] 1 AC 43 in holding that whether or not an excuse is reasonable has to be

determined in the light of the particular facts and circumstances of the individual

case (at [103]–[104] of Ma Yuxiang). She opined that where an accused is

retaining a passport on behalf of the passport holder with lawful authority, the

situation can potentially amount to a reasonable excuse for being in possession

of someone else’s passport (at [106]). In support of this, she referred to the

Parliamentary Debates during the 2nd reading of the Passports Bill on 16 July

2007, where DPM Wong stated “While we can allow travel agents to

temporarily hold on to our passport to facilitate our travel documents, e.g. for


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visa applications, we should not hand over our passports to persons who demand

them as a form of security or surety for any form of goods or services rendered.”

30 Yong Pung How CJ in Lim Ghee v PP [1997] 1 SLR(R) 849 (“Lim

Ghee”) had also interpreted the meaning of “reasonable excuse” in a similar

way. The context of reasonable excuse in Lim Ghee involved non-compliance

with an order of the Building Control Division under s 23 of the Building

Control Act (Cap 29, 1990 Rev Ed). Yong CJ adopted (at [23]) the definition

set out in South East Asia Firebricks Sdn Bhd v Neo-Metallic Mineral Products

Manufacturing Employees Union [1975] 2 MLJ 250 (at 254) where Abdul

Hamid J said, in the context of s 15(2)(a) of the Employment Ordinance 1955,

that a reasonable excuse:

… is an excuse which can be deemed by the court to be reasonable in the sense that a reasonable man would regard as an excuse, consistent with a reasonable standard of conduct according to reason. In Re A Solicitor [1945] KB 368 it was said that: ‘the word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those existing circumstances of which the actor called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know’. Latham CJ in Opera House Investment Pty Ltd v Devon Buildings Pty Ltd (1936) 55 CLR 110 speaking of the word ‘reasonable’ said: ‘The word “reasonable” has often been declared to mean “reasonable in all the circumstances of the case” …’

[emphasis added]

Yong CJ held that whether an accused had a reasonable excuse must be

answered from the perspective of a reasonable person in the accused’s shoes at

the relevant time without the benefit of detailed arguments presented in court

(at [24]).

31 I agree that whether or not an excuse is reasonable has to be determined

in the light of the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case, from


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the perspective of a reasonable person in the accused’s shoes at the relevant time

of the offence.

32 Both the District Judge and the Prosecution have referred to the cases of

Madiaalakan and Lim Eng Guan Derek v PP [2004] 1 SLR(R) 221 (“Derek

Lim”) in determining the meaning of “reasonable excuse” (at [32]–[34] of the

GD). The brief facts of Madiaalakan have been set out above (at [13]). Yong

CJ held that there are three questions to be answered (at [9]–[12]): firstly, what

amounted to a reasonable excuse; secondly, whether the offender had a

reasonable excuse; thirdly, whether the Prosecution has negatived the defence.

Regarding the first question, Yong CJ held that no excuse can be deemed

reasonable unless the person had tried as hard as he could to perform what he

was legally bound to do. In relation to the second question, he held that there

were both objective and subjective elements. Regarding the third question,

Yong CJ held that the Prosecution had negatived the defence because the

offender did not tell the officer administering the Breath Evidentiary Analyser

test about his alleged illness at the point his breath specimen was taken.

Madiaalakan was later followed in Derek Lim, which also involved the issue of

reasonable excuse in the context of failing to give an adequate breath specimen.

The District Judge and the Prosecution opined that Madiaalakan and Derek Lim

were applicable to the present case, so an accused had to satisfy the first question

set out by Yong CJ, ie, that he must have tried his best.

33 With respect, I disagree with the District Judge and the Prosecution in

this regard. The criterion that an accused must have tried his best before he can

rely on the “reasonable excuse” defence was established in the context of failing

to provide a breath specimen in Madiaalakan. It is notable that in setting out

this criterion, Yong CJ (at [9]) adopted the tests set out in R v Lennard [1973] 2

ALL ER 831 and Cotgrove v Cooney [1987] RTR 124, both of which are also


16

cases involving the provision of sufficient breath specimens. There is no

indication that this criterion is equally applicable to cases outside the context of

the provision of breath specimens. In fact, the need to try one’s best is only

appropriate in cases of provisions of breath specimens (or other bodily

specimens) where the law imposes a positive duty on a person and there is an

element of physical exertion in performing that duty. In my assessment, the

criterion of whether one has tried one’s best should be narrowly confined to

scenarios requiring forms of physical exertion, in the context of fulfilling a

positive legal duty. An analogous example would be the failure to provide a

urine specimen in relation to suspected drug consumption.

34 To illustrate this point, take the case of a person who stumbles upon a

passport on the street and is initially unsure what to do with it. He eventually

concludes that he should hand it over to the police but he decides to do so only

over the weekend, after attending to his work and personal commitments.

Meanwhile, he retains possession of the passport and is arrested. To be

considered to have done his best in such circumstances, he may arguably have

to take immediate leave of absence from work and proceed to the nearest police

station without delay to surrender the passport. This would surely contradict the

meaning of what is “reasonable”, ie, fair, sound and sensible, and impose an

unreasonably onerous burden on the accused to make out the defence. What is

considered a reasonable excuse has to be judged in the light of the entire context.

Burden of proof

35 I agree with the District Judge and the Prosecution that the burden of

proving a “reasonable excuse” under s 47(7) of the Passports Act falls on an

accused and the applicable standard is that of a balance of probabilities. The


17

district judge in Ma Yuxiang has held the same after analysing the burden of

proof in detail in her grounds of decision (at [83]–[95]) and I agree with her

analysis.

36 From the outset, the burden of proof is not stated within s 47(7). In such

a case, the position in Singapore has been set out by the Court of Appeal in PP

v Kum Chee Cheong [1993] 3 SLR(R) 737 (“Kum Chee Cheong”). This case

was considered by the High Court in Chua Hock Soon James v PP [2017] 5

SLR 997, where Chan Seng Onn J set out the approach to determine on whom

the burden of proof lies (at [68]–[77]): it must be determined, on a true

construction of the statute (what Chan J termed as the “construction of statute”

approach in Kum Chee Cheong), whether the positive or negative facts are

intended, when established, to constitute a true exception or proviso within the

meaning of s 107 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed). If so, the accused

is to bear the burden of proof. Section 107 of the Evidence Act states:

Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions

107. When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the general exceptions in the Penal Code (Cap 224), or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the Penal Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.

In determining whether the statute is an exception or proviso that falls under

s 107 of the Evidence Act, substance is favoured over form. In this vein, a key

consideration is the relative ease of proof. This is statutorily reflected in s 108

of the Evidence Act, which states:

Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge

108. When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.


18

37 A consideration of how ss 47(5) and 47(7) of the Passports Act work

together shows that s 47(7) is an exception that falls within s 107 of the Evidence

Act. An offence under s 47(5) is made out once the elements of actus reus, of

having or retaining possession or control of a foreign travel document not issued

to the accused person, and mens rea, of knowing that the travel document was

not issued to him, are made out. Section 47(7) works as an exception to the

finding of an offence under s 47(5), to exonerate the accused person. It only

comes into play after an offence under s 47(5) is established.

38 The Explanatory Statement to the Passports Bill (“Explanatory

Statement”) confirms this interpretation of s 47(7). The Explanatory Statement

is material not forming part of the written law (ie, extrinsic material) that is

capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of s 47(7). It can be

considered by virtue of s 9A(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev

Ed) to confirm that the meaning of s 47(7) is the ordinary meaning conveyed by

the text of the provision, ie, that it acts as an exception to s 47(5). A reference

to extraneous material under s 9A(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act can be useful

for demonstrating the soundness – as a matter of policy – of that outcome (Tan

Cheng Bock v AG [2017] 2 SLR 850 at [49]). In the Explanatory Statement, it

was made clear in clause 47 that s 47(7) of the Passports Act operates as a

defence. Clause 47 states:

Clause 47 is in similar terms to clauses 36, 37 and 41, but will cover foreign travel documents and the misuse of these in Singapore. The clause also provides for a defence of reasonable excuse.

[emphasis added]

The Explanatory Statement confirms that s 47(7) of the Passports Act is

intended by Parliament to operate as a defence – in other words, an exception –


19

to offences covering foreign travel documents, including the offence under

s 47(5).

39 Furthermore, the fact of any reasonable excuse would be especially

within the knowledge of an accused. Applying s 108 of the Evidence Act, the

burden of proof would be on the accused. It is unlikely that Parliament would

have intended to place the burden on the Prosecution to prove the absence of a

reasonable excuse. One would expect clear statutory language to that effect had

Parliament intended to place the burden of proving a negative on the

Prosecution.

40 Turning to the Accused’s submissions, his counsel argued that the

burden of proof lies with the Prosecution, following Chuks Charles. This

submission is clearly wrong. Chuks Charles involved the determination of the

incidence of the burden of proof for s 1(10) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998

(c 37) (UK) (now repealed and overtaken by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime

and Policing Act 2014 (c 12) (UK)), which stated, “[i]f without reasonable

excuse a person does anything which he is prohibited from doing by an anti-

social behaviour order, he is guilty of an offence”. The court in that case agreed

with R v Hunt [1987] 1 AC 352 on the proposition that in determining where

the burden of proof lies, each case must turn upon the construction of the

particular legislation (at [9] of Chuks Charles). The court then turned to the

construction of s 1(10) and concluded, after analysing Parliamentary intention,

that the burden of proving reasonable excuse for the specific provision of s 1(10)

lies with the Prosecution. The holding in Chuks Charles is that the incidence of

the burden of proof for any provision depends on its construction. A

construction of s 47(7) of the Passports Act shows that the burden of the proof

lies on the Accused, as explained above at [35]–[39].


20

Application to the facts

41 The question on appeal is whether the Accused has proved, on a balance

of probabilities, that he had a reasonable excuse in possessing the 17 PRC

passports at the time of the offence, in the light of the particular facts and

circumstances of this case. This has to be examined from the perspective of a

reasonable person in his shoes (supra [31]).

42 The particular facts and circumstances of this case were that Habibu had

asked the Accused to bring 17 PRC passports belonging to persons the Accused

did not know from the PRC into Singapore. Habibu was hardly a close friend or

someone with whom the Accused had a long-standing business relationship.

Habibu and the Accused had met in a restaurant in Saudi Arabia in 2015, and

the interactions that the Accused had with Habibu before the date of the offence

cannot be considered to be extensive. He had only met up with Habibu

occasionally as he wanted to learn some business skills from Habibu because

Habibu owned a transport company in Saudi Arabia. Even if the Accused had

genuinely felt favourably disposed towards Habibu and inclined to trust him,

there was no reasonable basis for him to have agreed to perform a favour on

Habibu’s request without even inquiring what the favour really entailed.

43 It was not disputed that when the Accused was found in possession of

the 17 PRC passports, he did not actually know the purpose of bringing these

passports into Singapore. He did not know exactly how many passports he had,

as he did not check or count them upon receiving them. Even allowing for some

slight shifts in his explanations, what they essentially boiled down to was that

he assumed that they were brought into Singapore for visa applications. This

was reflected in the statements recorded by the Police and in his oral testimony

in court. In the first long statement recorded on 5 March 2017, he stated that


21

although Habibu had told him there were no problems with the 17 PRC

passports, he did not know the purpose of bringing the passports into Singapore

as he was not informed by Habibu. He stated that he “believed” that Habibu

might want to apply for entry visa for the 17 passport holders, and that he was

just doing Habibu a favour. In his second long statement recorded on 6 March

2017, he repeated his stance that he was assisting Habibu to bring the 17 PRC

passports into Singapore and pass them to someone whom he did not know. He

had “guess[ed]” the passports would be brought to Saudi Arabia for visa

applications. In court, he testified that at the time of arrest, he was “not very

sure” of the purpose of bringing the 17 PRC passports into Singapore but he

“believe[d]” the purpose was “for visa”. He claimed that he agreed to do Habibu

a favour to bring the passports into Singapore without asking for the reason

because he trusted Habibu as a Muslim. He conceded that he was not authorised

or given permission by the passport-holders of the 17 PRC passports to possess

the passports, and further conceded that there was no evidence that the passport-

holders had given their passports to Zangari.

44 In the court below, the Accused attempted to adduce 17 Letters of

Invitation to demonstrate that the 17 PRC passports were in fact brought into

Singapore for the purpose of visa applications, since such letters of invitation

would have to be submitted before visas to Saudi Arabia would be issued. Only

three of the Letters of Invitation had been translated into English and only these

three were admitted in evidence. In any case, the Letters of Invitation were only

applied for and obtained after the Accused had been charged for the offences.

They do not change the fact that at the material time of the offence, the Accused

did not know the purpose of bringing the passports into Singapore and did not

inquire at all as to what the passports were being brought into Singapore for. He

only guessed that they were for the purpose of visa applications.


22

45 Moreover, considerable doubt was cast on the credibility of his defence

when he sought to rely on the Zangari letter. When confronted, both the Accused

and Habibu had to concede that the contents were untrue – the Accused was not

a tour agent employed by Zangari. The District Judge rightly found (at [38] of

the GD) that the letter was fabricated in a desperate bid to exonerate the

Accused. No other conclusion would have been logical or tenable in the

circumstances.

46 It has also been established that the Accused was not told who to pass

the 17 PRC passports to after he reached Singapore. He was only informed by

Habibu that someone would be waiting to collect the passports and would

contact him after he had cleared immigration.

47 Having regard to all the circumstances, from the perspective of a

reasonable person in the Accused’s shoes at the relevant time, there was no

reasonable excuse in carrying passports belonging to persons whom he did not

know into Singapore on the mere basis that he was doing a favour for an

acquaintance. He did not find out at all what he was carrying the passports into

Singapore for. All he could muster was a mere guess that it was for the purpose

of applying for visas. This is all the more unsatisfactory considering that

passports are important identification documents. It is not enough to satisfy the

defence of reasonable excuse simply to be assured that there were no problems

with the 17 PRC passports in the sense that they were not fake.

48 It is unnecessary to determine whether the passports were in actual fact

brought into Singapore for the purpose of visa applications, because the

Accused’s mere belief and complete failure to inquire into the reason for his

possession of the passports are insufficient to establish a defence of reasonable

excuse on a balance of probabilities.


23

49 The Prosecution has urged the court to be slow in finding that there was

a reasonable excuse in the present case, because there was some evidence that

the alleged purpose of applying for commercial visas for pilgrimages to Saudi

Arabia was in breach of Saudi law. However, there is no positive proof of

illegality beyond reasonable doubt or sufficiently cogent and reliable evidence

to compel the court to draw an irresistible inference of illegality. There was no

expert on Saudi law called to testify, nor any evidence adduced, as to the

illegality of the alleged arrangement. Therefore, like the District Judge, I decline

to make any finding as to the legality of the alleged arrangement to apply for

commercial visas to Saudi Arabia for pilgrimages. Such a finding is in any event

unnecessary, as I concur with the District Judge’s conclusion that the defence

of reasonable excuse is unsustainable. I also agree that Yang’s evidence is

irrelevant and of no assistance to the court.

Appeals against sentence

50 The Prosecution submitted that this is a good opportunity to set out a

sentencing framework for s 47(5) offences and presented one for the court’s

consideration (see above at [25]). I will proceed to analyse the sentencing

precedents before considering the appropriateness of setting out a framework at

this juncture and considering the sentence in the present case.

Sentencing precedents

51 There are three reported District Court judgments on s 47(5) of the

Passports Act: PP v Sulaiman bin Pungot [2010] SGDC 471 (“Sulaiman bin

Pungot”); PP v K Ramakrishna Kannusamy [2016] SGDC 333

(“Ramakrishna”); and Ma Yuxiang (supra [29]).


24

52 In Sulaiman bin Pungot, the offender pleaded guilty, inter alia, to one

charge under s 47(5) of the Passports Act. An acquaintance had passed him an

Indonesian passport issued to one Helmi and requested him to make enquiries

with the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority regarding the reasons why

Helmi was not allowed to enter Singapore. The accused did so, and later

informed the acquaintance that Helmi needed to obtain permission in writing

from the Controller of Immigration before he could enter Singapore. The

accused tried to return the passport back to the acquaintance but she refused to

take it back. The accused placed the passport inside his motorcycle, and it was

later discovered at Woodlands Checkpoint. The district judge imposed a

sentence of nine months’ imprisonment for this charge, on the basis that the

misuse of foreign travel documents was to be viewed seriously. However, on

appeal, the sentence was reduced to 166 days’ imprisonment (about five and a

half months) on the ground that nine months’ imprisonment was manifestly

excessive. The accused was released on the day of the appeal hearing.

53 In Ramakrishna, the offender pleaded guilty to three charges under

s 47(5) of the Passports Act, two charges under s 41(4) of the Passports Act, 15

charges under s 5(1) of the Moneylenders Act (Cap 188, 2010 Rev Ed) and one

charge under s 22(1)(f) of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Cap 91A,

2009 Rev Ed). He had 68 foreign passports not issued to him in his possession

because he kept them as collateral for his illegal moneylending business. A

sentence of six months’ imprisonment was imposed for each s 47(5) and s 41(4)

charge. In coming to this sentencing decision, the district judge found that

although there was a large number of passports and the commission of the

offences was not a one-off act, there was no evidence to suggest that the

retention of these passports was intended for an unlawful future use nor was

there evidence of any direct monetary gain from the possession of these


25

passports (at [50] and [51] of Ramakrishna). The district judge had also

helpfully listed some factors affecting the sentence for s 41(4) and s 47(5)

offences (at [49]):

(a) Planning and premeditation;

(b) Circumstances leading to the possession of the travel documents;

(c) Level of culpability;

(d) Whether the future use of the false document is intended and the

manner of intended usage;

(e) Large scale or syndicated operation;

(f) Frequency and length of commission of the offence;

(g) Personal gains or benefits;

(h) Consequences of the offence;

(i) Difficulty in detection;

(j) Ultimate objective/purpose of the illegal act; and

(k) Safeguarding of national security/protection of public interest.

54 In Ma Yuxiang, the accused, a Chinese national, was acquitted after trial

on s 47(5) charges. While this case is not relevant as a sentencing precedent, I

note that on the facts, it was found that the accused had a reasonable excuse

since he possessed the five PRC passports on the authority of the passport-

holders for the purpose of applying for visas in Singapore.


26

55 The Prosecution has also presented unreported cases in the proceedings

below. In PP v Kabir Mansur Ali (District Arrest Case No 911396 of 2017 and

others) (“Kabir Mansur Ali”), the accused pleaded guilty to one s 47(5) charge

and two charges under the Immigration Act (Cap 133, 2008 Rev Ed), and was

sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for the s 47(5) charge. He was a

Bangladeshi national who was arrested while trying to enter Singapore illegally

by swimming, and was found with a passport bearing another’s particulars but

his photograph. In PP v Kumaresan Piranavan (District Arrest Case No 910031

of 2016) (“Kumaresan Piranavan”), the accused pleaded guilty to one charge

under s 47(5) and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. He was a Sri

Lankan national who was arrested while attempting to leave Singapore. He was

found with an Indian passport bearing his particulars but not lawfully issued to

him. He had wanted to go to Germany to escape the political instability in his

country. In PP v Thurairajah Ganenthiran (District Arrest Case No 914637 of

2014 and another) (“Thurairajah Ganenthiran”), the accused pleaded guilty to

one charge under s 47(5) and was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment. He

was a Sri Lankan national who was arrested while trying to leave Singapore. He

was found with a Malaysian passport bearing another’s particulars not lawfully

issued to him, and had wanted to go to France to seek employment. In PP v Ali

Sowkot (District Arrest Case No 934252 of 2015 and others) (“Ali Sowkot”), the

accused pleaded guilty to two charges under s 47(5) and one charge under

s 15(1) of the Immigration Act with four charges under s 47(5) taken into

consideration, and was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment for each charge

under s 47(5) with a global sentence of 11 months’ imprisonment and four

strokes of the cane. The accused was a Bangladeshi national who was arrested

as an over-stayer. Six Bangladesh travel documents not lawfully issued to him

were found on him and he had attempted to use two of these documents to apply

for pre-paid SIM cards. In Trinh Van Thao (supra [16]), the accused pleaded


27

guilty to one charge under s 47(5) and one charge under s 15(1) of the

Immigration Act, and was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment for the

s 47(5) charge. A friend had sought the accused’s help to bring a luggage back

to Vietnam and had told the accused that the luggage contained a Vietnamese

passport issued to someone who had been arrested by the Singapore Police. The

accused agreed to help out of goodwill. In all of the above cases, with the

exception of Ma Yuxiang, the accused persons had pleaded guilty.

56 Precedents under s 41(4) of the Passports Act, which is the equivalent

provision to s 47(5) for the possession of Singapore travel documents, are also

relevant to sentencing for offences under s 47(5) because s 47 of the Passports

Act “seeks to punish … with penalties equivalent to that imposed [for] the

tampering, forgery and misuse of Singapore passports and travel documents”

(Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (16 July 2007) vol 83 col

1096 per DPM Wong). However, the only case reported on s 41(4) of the

Passports Act is Ramakrishna, which has been set out above at [53].

57 There has yet to be a sufficient body of sentencing precedents to guide

the formulation of a well-informed sentencing framework. Nevertheless, it

would be helpful to set out the relevant sentencing considerations to guide the

development of sentencing jurisprudence for s 47(5) offences.

Sentencing considerations

58 I agree with the Prosecution that the dominant sentencing principle for

s 47(5) offences is deterrence. Firstly, the Parliamentary intention in increasing

the imprisonment term from a maximum of six months (in s 3(1)(o) of the

Passports Act (Cap 220, 1985 Rev Ed)) to 10 years in 2007 is clear. As stated

by DPM Wong, the passport offences “carry heavy penalties to send a clear


28

message to potential perpetrators” (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official

Report (16 July 2007) vol 83 col 1094). Any form of passport abuse is viewed

seriously and Singapore cannot condone any abuse of passports in Singapore

even if the passports are foreign. Secondly, deterrence is the paramount

sentencing principle because the detection of the unauthorised possession of

passports is very difficult given the impracticality of thorough security

surveillance (supra [24]). Nevertheless, despite the focus on general deterrence,

the sentence has to be proportionate in all the circumstances of the case and does

not always have to be custodial. The prescribed punishment ranges from a fine

to imprisonment of up to 10 years, catering for the myriad circumstances that s

47(5) may encompass.

59 The two principal parameters which a sentencing court would generally

have regard to in evaluating the seriousness of an offence are: (a) the harm

caused by the offence; and (b) the accused’s culpability (Lim Ying Ying Luciana

v PP [2016] 4 SLR 1220 at [28]; PP v Koh Thiam Huat [2017] 4 SLR 1099 at

[41]). “Harm” is a measure of the injury which has been caused to society by

the commission of the offence, whereas “culpability” is a measure of the degree

of relative blameworthiness disclosed by an offender’s actions and is measured

chiefly in relation to the extent and manner of the offender’s involvement in the

criminal act.

60 In the context of s 47(5) offences, the level of harm relates to the harm

caused to the legitimate passport-holders and the public interest, including any

abuse, forgery and tampering of passports and any use of passports for unlawful

purposes. It includes actual harm caused and potential future harm, ie, the

potential of actualising the intended harm. Potential harm has to be assessed in

relation to the intended outcome of possessing a passport in any particular case.

It cannot be simply potential harm at large, ie, taking into account all possible


29

uses of the passport, because the criminalisation of possession simpliciter

already takes into account all such possible uses that may be intended by anyone

in possession of a passport not issued to him. Moreover, if potential harm at

large is taken into account, it would be over-extensive and over-reaching; the

level of harm in all cases would be high since the worst possible kinds of

intended use are always included in its determination. Factors affecting the level

of harm include, non-exhaustively:

(a) the scale of the commission of offences (including the number

of passports affected); and

(b) the presence of any syndicate activities.

61 The factors affecting the culpability of the offender include, non-

exhaustively:

(a) the presence of planning and premeditation;

(b) circumstances leading to the possession;

(c) the degree of involvement;

(d) the intended use of the passport;

(e) efforts to avoid detection or apprehension; and

(f) personal gain.

62 The precedents show that the sentences imposed for s 47(5) offences

generally range from four months to nine months. At the lower end of the

spectrum are cases such as Trinh Van Thao and Sulaiman bin Pungot, which

display low levels of harm and culpability. In each case, the possession of the


30

passport was not for the accused’s own benefit and there was no indication of

any plan to use the passport for any unlawful purpose. The sentences imposed

in the cases were four months’ and 166 days’ (about five and a half months’)

imprisonment respectively. In cases of low harm and culpability, the harm

occasioned would generally be characterised by the lack of a serious impact on

public interest and the lack of substantial harm caused to the passport-holder.

Syndicate activities would also be absent in these cases.

63 On the other hand, where there was indication that the passports would

be put to an unlawful use, such as in Kabir Mansur Ali, Kumaresan Piranavan,

Thurairajah Ganenthiran and Ali Sowkot, the sentences imposed ranged from

six months’ to nine months’ imprisonment. Where there was no indication that

the passports would be put to an unlawful use but the possession was for the

accused’s benefit, as in Ramakrishna (where the benefit was in using the

passports as collateral for loans), the sentence imposed was six months’

imprisonment. These are cases that display a higher level of harm and

culpability. In these cases, the accused persons possessed the passports for their

own benefit, often in the furtherance of an unlawful purpose. Nonetheless, these

cases are not of the highest culpability. Cases of the highest harm and culpability

would more likely than not include syndicate activities involving the use of

passports to further unlawful activities.

64 After considering the harm caused and the culpability of the offender,

the court should take into account the mitigating and aggravating factors present

to calibrate the appropriate sentence. Examples of relevant mitigating factors

may include an offender’s timely plea of guilt and evidence of remorse.

Relevant aggravating factors may include the existence of similar antecedents.

In all cases, it cannot be over-emphasised that the court must apply its mind to


31

the facts of each case before it and determine the appropriate sentence

accordingly (Kathleen Luong, supra [24], at [25]).

Application to the facts

65 I agree with the District Judge that the culpability of the Accused is low.

There was little planning or premeditation and there was no real personal gain

to him ([51]–[54] of the GD). There was no intended use of the 17 PRC

passports found by the District Judge on the facts, as she did not accept that they

were brought into Singapore for the purpose of visa applications (at [53] of the

GD). Her reasoning was that apart from Habibu’s bare assertions, there was no

contemporaneous evidence to show that this was indeed the intended purpose.

The Zangari letter and the Letters of Invitation were plainly afterthoughts,

created well after the Accused had been charged, and both the Accused and

Habibu had conceded that the contents of the Zangari letter were untrue. There

was no contemporaneous independent and objective evidence produced by the

defence and none of the passport-holders were called to give evidence.

66 The District Judge was entitled to find that the purpose of bringing the

passports into Singapore was not for visa applications, and this finding is not

against the weight of the evidence. Due regard must also be given to the

evidence of Investigation Officer Mohamed Rudy bin Mahabut (“the IO”), who

had testified that his investigations did not reveal that the 17 PRC passports

were to be used for illegal purposes. Since there is no finding as to what the

passports would be used for, the intended use of the passports is a neutral factor.

67 The level of harm is also low. There is no evidence of any harm, and

since there is no finding as to what the passports would be used for, the potential

harm cannot be determined with any certainty and is thus a neutral factor. It


32

would be unfairly speculative to impute a high degree of risk (eg, of the

passports falling into the wrong hands or being misplaced or misused) when

there is no such evidence at all before the court, and particularly when the IO’s

unequivocal evidence was that his investigations did not show that the passports

were to be used for illegal purposes. In the same vein, the number of passports

possessed by the Accused (and hence the number of charges) is also not a

particularly weighty factor in the present case. The number of passports is

ordinarily an aggravating factor insofar as the harm, actual or potential, would

be multiplied as the number of passports increases. Since the potential harm

caused by possessing each of the 17 PRC passports is a neutral factor, and they

were all part of the same transaction, there would be no compounding effect in

terms of the harm caused. In addition, and crucially, there is no indication of

any syndicate activity nor any large scale operation.

68 As for the mitigating factors, the Accused claimed that his full

cooperation with the authorities should be given mitigating weight. However,

his cooperation with the police consisted only of giving two statements.

Notwithstanding that, he had elected to claim trial, hence depriving himself of

any sentencing discount that he might otherwise have obtained if he had pleaded

guilty in a timely manner.

69 I further note that the Accused had not sought to conceal the 17 PRC

passports in his hand luggage and had apparently not made any effort to evade

detection. I also note that he had tried to enter Singapore with an expired visa.

Although these points were not specifically raised on appeal, they are neutral

considerations at best, because it was more probable that he might not have

expected to have been stopped and checked as he was entering Singapore. It

could not be immediately inferred from his failure to ensure that he was

travelling with a valid visa that he must have acted innocently or without proper


33

planning, since he could merely have been careless. It would be strange if he

should be given credit in mitigation for his carelessness. Similarly, the lack of

concealment is not a mitigating factor. At the highest, it only goes to show that

he took no active steps to evade detection or apprehension, and thus it does not

aggravate his commission of the offences.

70 The production of the Zangari letter, knowing that it contained untrue

and patently misleading information, is the sole aggravating factor. The

production of evidence containing untrue information that may mislead the

court must be viewed with great disapprobation. Nevertheless, in the light of the

low levels of harm and culpability, the sentence of six months’ imprisonment

per charge and the global sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment are appropriate

and in line with the sentencing precedents. The sentence is neither manifestly

excessive nor manifestly inadequate on the facts.

Conclusion

71 For the reasons set out above, both the Accused’s appeal against

conviction and sentence and the Prosecution’s appeal against sentence are

dismissed.

See Kee OonJudge


34

Ong Lip Cheng Peter (Chung Ting Fai & Co.) for the appellant in Magistrate’s Appeal No 9012/2018/01 and the respondent in

Magistrate’s Appeal No 9012/2018/02;Ang Feng Qian (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the respondent in

Magistrate’s Appeal No 9012/2018/01 and the appellant in Magistrate’s Appeal No 9012/2018/02.

in the high court of the republic of singapore · high court — magistrate’s appeal no...

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