(im)politeness, face and perceptions of rapport

(Im)Politeness, Face and Perceptions of Rapport:Unpackaging their Bases and Interrelationships

HELEN SPENCER-OATEY

Abstract

This paper takes rapport (Spencer-Oatey 2000, 2002) as its central con-cern, since (im)politeness is typically associated in some way with harmoni-ous/conflictual interpersonal relations. The paper discusses the factors thatinfluence people’s dynamic perceptions of rapport, and proposes that thereare three key elements: behavioral expectations, face sensitivities, and in-teractional wants. The paper explores the components of these three ele-ments and uses authentic discourse data to illustrate how people’s judg-ments about rapport can be unpackaged in relation to these elements. Theapproach enables us to gain a deeper understanding of the factors thatinfluence people’s dynamic judgments of rapport, which is essential if weare to understand how and why problems of rapport occur.

Keywords: Face; politeness; rapport; values; identity; culture

1. Introduction

Linguists have been debating the nature of politeness for a very longtime and are still not agreed on exactly what it is. Some have explained itin terms of face (e. g., Brown and Levinson 1987); others have proposedpoliteness maxims to explain it (e. g., Leech 1983, Gu 1990); yet othershave taken a normative approach and argued either that it entails theupholding of a conversational contract (e. g., Fraser 1990) or that it isappropriate but marked behavior (e. g., Watts 2003, Locher 2004). De-spite all of these differences, everyone seems to agree that it is associatedin some way with harmonious/conflictual interpersonal relations, whichSpencer-Oatey (2000, 2002) labels rapport management.

This paper takes rapport management as its central concern, and ex-plores the factors that influence people’s dynamic perceptions of rapport.It does not try to link linguistic structures with these perceptions, be-

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96 Helen Spencer-Oatey

cause as Fraser and Nolan (1981: 96) point out, “no sentence is inher-ently polite or impolite”. Nor does it describe how (im)politeness, faceand/or rapport are dynamically managed in interaction. Instead, it fo-cuses on the bases of rapport management judgments, and proposes thatthere are three key elements: behavioral expectations, face sensitivities,and interactional wants. The paper unpackages the components of thesethree elements, so that we can gain a deeper understanding of the factorsthat influence people’s dynamic judgments. This is essential if we are tounderstand how and why clashes or differing evaluations occur.

2. Rapport (Management)

Rapport refers to the relative harmony and smoothness of relations be-tween people, and rapport management refers to the management (ormismanagement) of relations between people.

As Spencer-Oatey (2000: 29�30) points out, people can hold differingtypes of rapport orientations towards each other. For example, they canhold a rapport-enhancement orientation (a desire to strengthen or en-hance harmonious relations between the interlocutors), a rapport-main-tenance orientation (a desire to maintain or protect harmonious rela-tions), a rapport-neglect orientation (a lack of concern or interest in thequality of relations, perhaps because of a focus on self), or a rapport-challenge orientation (a desire to challenge or impair harmonious rela-tions). People’s motives for these various orientations can be various,and of course, their orientations can change dynamically during thecourse of an interaction or series of interactions.

I take the management of rapport, therefore, to include not only be-havior that enhances or maintains smooth relations, but any kind ofbehavior that has an impact on rapport, whether positive, negative, orneutral.

As people interact with each other, they make dynamic judgments asto whether their rapport has been enhanced, maintained or damaged.These judgments (conscious or otherwise) are based to a large extent onassessments of three key bases of rapport and their interrelationships:behavioral expectations, face sensitivities and interactional wants. Thefollowing sections unpackage these in turn.

3. Behavioral Expectations and (Im)Politeness

3.1 What is (Im)Politeness?

Brown and Levinson (1987), in their seminal work on politeness, pro-pose that face is the key motivating force underlying it. They maintain



(Im)Politeness, Face and Rapport 97

that certain illocutionary acts, such as requests, suggestions, offers andcompliments are inherently face-threatening, and that speakers must se-lect appropriate linguistic strategies in order to mitigate this face-threatand hence be “polite”. They thus take an “absolute” approach to polite-ness, by pre-identifying the types of communicative messages that re-quire politeness and the linguistic strategies needed for conveying it.

Leech (1983) similarly takes an “absolute” approach to politeness. Heidentifies a number of politeness maxims, such as the Tact Maxim (mini-mize cost to other, maximize benefit to other) and the ApprobationMaxim (minimize dispraise of other, maximize praise of other) and im-plies that the more a maxim is upheld, the more polite the person will be.

Numerous authors have challenged this perspective. For example,many people (e. g., Gu 1990, Spencer-Oatey 2000) have pointed out thatthe illocutionary acts identified by Brown and Levinson (1987) as face-threatening are not always so, and others (e. g., Spencer-Oatey and Jiang2003) have claimed that the “universal valences” of Leech’s politenessmaxims do not apply in all cultures or speech contexts. Moreover, manypeople (e. g., Fraser and Nolan 1981, Holmes 1995, Watts 2003, andLocher 2004) have argued convincingly that politeness is a contextualjudgment: that no linguistic structures can be identified as inherentlypolite or impolite, and that we cannot (and should not) try to “predictwhen and how speakers of a language will produce linguistic politeness”(Watts 2003: 160).

In line with this perspective, I take (im)politeness to be the subjectivejudgments that people make about the social appropriateness of verbaland non-verbal behavior. In other words, it is not behavior per se thatis polite, politic (Watts 2003) or impolite; rather (im)politeness is anevaluative label that people attach to behavior, as a result of their sub-jective judgments about social appropriateness. I take (im)politeness tobe an umbrella term that covers all kinds of evaluative meanings (e. g.,warm, friendly, considerate, respectful, deferential, insolent, aggressive,rude). These meanings can have positive, negative or neutral connota-tions, and the judgments can impact upon people’s perceptions of theirsocial relations and the rapport or (dis)harmony that exists betweenthem.

People’s judgments about social appropriateness are based primarilyon their expectations, which in turn are derived from their beliefs aboutbehavior: what is prescribed, what is permitted and what is proscribed.Prescribed behavior is behavior that is regarded as legally and/or sociallyobligatory: people are obliged to produce it, and others expect (and be-lieve they have the right) to experience it. Conversely, proscribed behav-ior is behavior that is legally and/or socially forbidden (e. g., racist re-marks): people are obliged to avoid it, and others have the right NOT




to experience it. Prescribed behavior that is omitted, and proscribed be-havior that is not avoided, is typically experienced as “negativelyeventful” (Goffman, 1967: 7). Behavior that is perceived in this way hasbeen labelled “non-politic” or “impolite” by Watts (2003) and “rude” byKasper (1990).

Permitted behavior is behavior that is allowed, but neither technicallyprescribed nor proscribed. Some permitted behavior is not socially ex-pected, but if it is socially desirable, it is perceived as “positivelyeventful” when it occurs (labeled “polite” by Watts 2003, and Kasper1990). On the other hand, if it is not particularly socially salient, it maysimply pass unnoticed (labelled “politic” by Watts 2003 and “non-polite”by Kasper 1990). However, some permitted behavior is so common andexpected that it comes to be regarded as obligatory, and so if it is omit-ted, it may be regarded as impolite or rude.

As Watts (2003: 160) maintains, a social model of politeness needs to“offer ways in which we as researchers can show when and perhaps whyindividual users of language in socio-communicative verbal interactionclassify utterances as polite”, politic or impolite, and it must allow us to“account for why individuals agree or disagree on what is and what isnot ‘(im)polite’ language.” In other words, the bases of (im)politenessjudgments need too be unpacked, and so the next section focuses on this.

3.2 The Bases of (Im)Politeness Judgments

Behavioral expectations, and the (im)politeness judgments that derivefrom them, have several interconnected bases, as shown in Figure 1.

Some expectations are based on contractual/legal agreements andrequirements, such as the provision of equal opportunities of employ-ment, and the avoidance of discriminatory behavior. Other expectationsare based on role specifications, which can sometimes be explicit (suchas the duties specified in a job contract), but typically involve a verylarge amount of implicit specifications.

Contractual/legal

Agreements & Requirements

Role Specifications

Behavioural Conventions,

Norms & Protocols

Interactional

Principles

Bases of Behavioural

Expectations

Explicit

Implicit

Equity Principle

Cost-benefit

Fairness (incl. reciprocity)

Autonomy-Control

Association Principle

Involvement

Empathy

Respectfulness

Figure 1. The Bases of Behavioral Expectations.




Very frequently, behavioral expectations are based on behavioral con-ventions, norms and protocols. For example, work groups develop con-ventions for handling team meetings, such as whether there is an agendaand if so, how strictly it is adhered to, and whether people can sit wherethey like or whether they sit according to status or role. These conven-tions are normative rather than black-letter duties (Moghaddam et al.2000: 282), but nevertheless they can often develop prescriptive andproscriptive overtones which then influence expectations about behav-ioral responsibilities, and trigger (im)politeness judgments. Closely re-lated to communicative conventions are social protocols and rituals �formulaic and/or ritualistic behaviors that play, for example, a socialindexing function or show consideration for face. For instance, theremay be ritual phrases or behavior that are expected when people meeteach other, when people are about to start eating a meal, or when theyare celebrating a particular event.

Conventions and protocols are typically contextually based, and varyaccording to a range of contextual variables such as the type of com-municative activity, the nature of the communicative setting (macro andmicro), and the nature of the participant relations (e. g., hierarchical orequal). Moreover, these conventions exist across a range of domains,including the following identified by Spencer-Oatey (2000: 19�20):

� the illocutionary domain (the performance of speech acts such as apo-logies, requests, and compliments)

� the discourse domain (the discourse content and structure of an inter-change, including topic choice and the organisation and sequencingof information)

� the participation domain (the procedural aspects of an interchange,such as turn-taking [overlaps and inter-turn pauses, turn-taking rightsand obligations], the inclusion/exclusion of people present, and theuse/non-use of listener responses [verbal and non-verbal])

� the stylistic domain (the stylistic aspects of an interchange, such aschoice of tone (for example, serious or joking), choice of genre-appro-priate lexis and syntax, and choice of genre-appropriate terms of ad-dress or use of honorifics)

� the non-verbal domain (the non-verbal aspects of an interchange, suchas gestures and other body movements, eye contact, and proxemics)

Behavioral expectations can also result from interactional principles. In-teractional principles are similar in many respects to conversationalmaxims (Leech 1983, Gu 1990), except that they are more closely associ-ated with values and/or beliefs, are scalar in nature and are very conte-xtually dependent (cf. Spencer-Oatey and Jiang 2003). I propose thatthere are two superordinate principles: the equity principle and the asso-ciation principle. These two principles complement each other, and can




be given different importance weightings, depending on the context and/or personal preferences.

According to the equity principle, people have a fundamental beliefthat they are entitled to personal consideration from others and to betreated fairly; in other words, that they are not unduly imposed upon,that they are not unfairly ordered about, and that they are not takenadvantage of or exploited. This principle helps to uphold people’s inde-pendent construals of self (Markus and Kitayama 1991), and seems tohave three components: cost-benefit considerations (the principle thatpeople should not be exploited or disadvantaged), fairness and reciproc-ity (the belief that costs and benefits should be “fair” and kept roughlyin balance), and autonomy-control (the belief that people should notbe unduly controlled or imposed upon). The equity principle results inbehavioral expectations in each of these respects; for example, that a“costly” request should be worded differently from a minor request, thata favour should be reciprocated, and that a superior at work can onlymake “work-related” demands on an employee. (Clearly, the exact na-ture these expectations will vary between cultural groups and individ-uals, and also depend on role specifications and behavioral conventions.)

According to the association principle, people have a fundamental be-lief that they are entitled to an association with others that is in keepingwith the type of relationship that they have with them. This principlehelps to uphold people’s interdependent construals of self, and seems tohave three components: involvement (the principle that people shouldhave appropriate amounts and types of “activity” involvement withothers), empathy (the belief that people should share appropriate con-cerns, feelings and interests with others), and respect (the belief thatpeople should show appropriate amounts of respectfulness for others).The association principle leads to behavioral expectations in each ofthese respects; for example, that friends should visit or telephone eachother on a regular basis, that a teacher should show concern for his/her students’ personal welfare, and that a young person should showrespectfulness towards elderly people. (Once again, the exact nature andoutworkings of these responsibilities, and the expectations that are asso-ciated with them, will vary between cultural groups and individuals, andwill also depend on role specifications and behavioral conventions.)

People develop expectations in respect to each of these elements, andthese then form the bases of their (im)politeness judgments.

4. Face

4.1 What is Face?

Brown and Levinson (1987: 61), in their seminal work on politeness,define face as “the public self-image that every member wants to claim




for himself”, and propose that it consists of two related aspects, negativeface and positive face. In their model, negative face is a person’s wantto be unimpeded by others, the desire to be free to act as s/he choosesand not be imposed upon; and positive face is a person’s want to beappreciated and approved of by selected others, in terms of personality,desires, behavior, values, and so on. In other words, negative face repre-sents a desire for autonomy, and positive face represents a desire for ap-proval.

Many linguists have challenged Brown and Levinson’s (1987) concep-tualization of face. For example, Matsumoto (1988), Ide (1989) and Mao(1994) all refer to the importance of “social identity” as a concept inJapanese and Chinese societies. Matsumoto (1988: 405), for instance,argues as follows:

What is of paramount concern to a Japanese is not his/her own terri-tory, but the position in relation to the others in the group and his/her acceptance by those others. Loss of face is associated with theperception by others that one has not comprehended and acknowl-edged the structure and hierarchy of the group. ... A Japanese gen-erally must understand where s/he stands in relation to other membersof the group or society, and must acknowledge his/her dependence onthe others. Acknowledgement and maintenance of the relative positionof others, rather than preservation of an individual’s proper territory,governs all social interaction.

In other words, Matsumoto’s (1988) criticisms of Brown and Levinson(1987) are twofold: that they have ignored the interpersonal or socialperspective on face, and that they have over-emphasized the notion ofindividual freedom and autonomy.

In line with this, Mao (1994) suggests that two competing forces shapeour interactional behavior: the ideal social identity, and the ideal individ-ual autonomy. The ideal social identity motivates members of a com-munity to associate themselves with each other and to cultivate a senseof homogeneity. The ideal individual autonomy, on the other hand, mo-tivates members to preserve their freedom of action and to mark offseparate and almost inviolable space. Mao (1994) labels the preferencefor one over the other “relative face orientation”, and points out thathis distinction corresponds to a large extent to that between independentand interdependent construals of self (e. g., see Markus and Kitayama,1991; Morisaki and Gudykunst, 1994; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998).

Similarly, Scollon and Scollon (1995: 36) distinguish between involve-ment face, which is concerned with “the person’s right and need to beconsidered a normal, contributing, or supporting member of society”,




and independence face, which emphasises the person’s “right not to becompletely dominated by group or social values, and to be free from theimpositions of others” (1995: 37). They explain that both aspects areintrinsic to face, and that an appropriate balance needs to be maintainedbetween them: showing too much involvement threatens a person’s inde-pendence, but granting them too much independence threatens his/hersense of involvement.

In terms of autonomy and imposition, Gu (1998) denies that suchconcerns are only Western concerns. He points out that they do exist inEastern cultures, but that they are not regarded as face concerns.

Ho (1994) identifies a further distinction: that whereas Goffman’s(1967) conception of face is situation specific, the Chinese conception offace is not. For example, Goffman states:

The term face may be defined as the positive social value a personeffectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has takenduring a particular contact. … the person’s face clearly is somethingthat is not lodged in or on his body, but rather something that isdiffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter.

Goffman (1967: 5 and 7) (emphases added)

Ho (1994) points out that the Chinese conception of face is not restrictedto situational encounters:

According to the Chinese conception, face may be defined in terms ofthe more enduring, publicly perceived attributes that function to lo-cate a person’s position in his/her social network. Thus defined, a per-son’s face is largely consistent over time and across situations, unlessthere is a significant change in public perceptions of his/her conduct,performance, or social status.

Ho (1994: 274)

It is important, therefore, to draw a distinction between two fundamen-tal types of face: face that is situation-specific and face that is pan-situa-tional. I propose labeling these respectability face and identity facerespectively.

Respectability face refers to the prestige, honor or “good name” thata person or social group holds and claims within a (broader) community.It incorporates the Chinese notions of mianzi and lian, and correspondsquite closely to Ho’s (1976) definition of face:

the respectability and/or deference which a person can claim for him-self [herself] from others, by virtue of the relative position he [she]




occupies in his [her] social network and the degree to which he [she]is judged to have functioned adequately in that position as acceptablyin his [her] general conduct; the face extended to a person by othersis a function of the degree of congruence between judgments of his[her] total condition in life, including his [her] actions as well as thoseof people closely associated with him [her], and the social expectationsthat others have placed upon him [her].

Ho (1976: 883) cited by Morisaki and Gudykunst (1994:50)

With respectability face, it makes sense to think of it in quantitativeterms, and ask “how much [respectability] face does a person have?” (Ho1994: 275). This is because respectability face is a composite measure thatreflects the relative weights attributed to attributes such as the following:biographical variables (e. g., age, sex), relational attributes (e. g., mar-riage ties), social status indicators (e. g., educational attainment, occupa-tional status, wealth), formal title/position/rank, personal reputation(moral or amoral) and integrity (Ho, 1994: 276). As Ho points out, dif-ferent cultures attach varying degrees of importance to different attri-butes, so the bases of respectability face could be very different in dif-ferent nations and social groups.

Identity face, on the other hand, is a situation-specific face sensitivity,that is highly vulnerable. It corresponds fairly closely to Goffman’s con-ception of face:

The term face may be defined as the positive social value a personeffectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has takenduring a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in termsof approved social attributes �albeit an image that others may share,as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religionby making a good showing for himself.

Goffman (1967: 5) (emphases added)

Key points in this definition of Goffman’s are as follows:

� Claims to (this type of) face reflect people’s social values� Claims to (this type of) face relate to specific social attributes� Claims to (this type of) face occur in specific social encounters/in-

teractions

In addition, I take identity face to include claims to social group mem-bership.

Since it is identity face rather than respectability face that is threatenedor enhanced in specific interactional encounters, the following sectionfocuses on identity face.




4.2 The Bases of Face Sensitivity

As with (im)politeness judgments, people subjectively experience poten-tial or actual face-threats, and these are contextually based judgmentsand reactions. It is very important, therefore, also to understand thebases of face sensitivity. Work within social psychology on self-aspects(Simon 2004) provides some insights here.

Borrowing from Linville (1985), Simon’s self-aspect model of identitymaintains that self-interpretation involves a varying number of self-as-pects, which are defined as cognitive categories or concepts that serve toprocess and organise information about oneself. He suggests that “self-aspects can refer, inter alia, to generalized psychological characteristicsor traits (e. g., introverted), physical features (e. g., red hair), roles (e. g.,father), abilities (e. g., bilingual), tastes (e. g., preference for red wines),attitudes (e. g., against the death penalty), behaviours (e. g., “I work alot”) and explicit group or category membership (e. g., member of theCommunist Party)” (Simon 2004: 45).

I propose that people’s claims to identity face are based on the positivesocial values that they associate with their various self-aspects. Some oftheir self-aspects are more important to their identity than others, and sosensitivities develop around these self-aspects. Then, if these self-aspectsensitivities are challenged or undermined, people may perceive a threatto their face; conversely, if their sensitivities are ingratiated appropri-ately, people may perceive an enhancement of their identity face. Thesesensitivities occur across a range of elements, including the following:bodily features and control (e. g., skin blemishes, burping), possessionsand belongings (material and affiliative), performance/skills (e. g., musi-cal performance), social behavior (e. g., gift giving, rude gestures), andverbal behavior (e. g., wording of illocutionary acts, stylistic choice).

The psychologist Schwartz’s work (e. g., Schwartz 1992, Schwartz etal. 2001) on universal values provides some insights into the types ofpositive social values that people may claim for themselves and hence besensitive to. In his individual-level analyses, he has identified ten valueconstructs, with a structured relationship, that are common across a verylarge number of cultures/nationalities. The structured relationship ofthese constructs is shown in Figure 2. Table 1 explains the meanings ofthe value constructs, and lists some face qualities that are associatedwith each of them and that people may claim. Although the details mayneed some adjustment, the principle of linking work in social psychologywith that in linguistics on identity, face and values is important.

In terms of Brown and Levinson’s (1987) face model, the concernsthat they label as negative face (viz. a person’s want to be unimpeded byothers, the desire to be free to act as s/he chooses and not be imposed




Figure 2. Schwartz’s Value Constructs and their Structured Relationship (Based onSchwartz 1992: 44).

upon) in fact are a reflection of the value construct “self-direction”. Theconcerns they label as positive face (viz. a person’s want to be appreci-ated and approved of by selected others, in terms of personality, desires,behavior, and so on) are much broader in scope, and can reflect manyof the different value constructs, according to people’s personal andcontextually based value systems. For example, people may claim theface quality of competence or intelligence, which is associated with thevalue construct of “achievement”; they may claim the face quality ofhelpfulness, which is associated with the “benevolence” value construct;they may claim the face quality of humility, which is associated with the“tradition” value construct, and so on.

People are likely to vary in the importance they attach to all of thevarious qualities, both because of their personal value systems and alsobecause of the context. For example, a new lecturer may particularlyclaim face for the self-aspects “intelligence” and “competence” in a uni-versity setting, and hence be especially sensitive to any student or peerevaluations that could challenge that claim. With parents, however, s/he




Table 1. Schwartz’s Value Constructs and their associated Qualities.

Value Explanation Illustrative AssociatedConstruct Qualities

Power Social status and prestige, control or Wealthy, authoritative,dominance over people and resources high social status, domi-

nantAchievementPersonal success through demonstrat- Capable, ambitious, in-ing competence according to social stan- telligent, successfuldards

Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for Fun-loving, sensuousoneself

Stimulation Excitement, novelty and challenge in Adventurous, stimulat-life ing, daring, enterprising

Self-direction Independent thought and action-choos- Independent, free, self-ing, creating, exploring sufficient, unrestrained

Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance Understanding, toler-and protection for the welfare of all ant, appreciative, peace-people and for nature loving, considerate

Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the Loyal, helpful, honest,welfare of people with whom one is in forgiving, responsible,frequent personal contact caring

Tradition Respect, commitment and acceptance Humble, conservative,of the customs and ideas that tradi- traditionaltional culture or religion provide theself

Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations and Obedient, restrained,impulses likely to upset or harm others self-disciplined, politeand violate social expectations ornorms

Security Safety, harmony and stability of soci- Protective, nationalisticety, relationships, and of self

may claim greater face for the self-aspects “self-sufficient” and “inde-pendent”, or alternatively for the self-aspects “respectful” and “humble”.Moreover, people may claim face for multiple self-aspects simulta-neously, and the details of their face claims (and associated sensitivities)will always be very dependent on the dynamics of the specific interac-tional context.

4.3 Individual and Group Face

Up to now, it may have seemed as though claims to face are individuallybased and relate to a person’s personal qualities. However, face can bea group-based phenomenon, and apply to any group that a person is amember of and is concerned about. This can include small groups like




one’s family, and larger groups like one’s ethnic group, religious groupor nationality group. Following Simon (2004: 49), I take group facesensitivities to refer to the self-aspects of a person’s identity that arederived from membership in a collective or group, and not to refer tothe identity of a group as a sui generis entity.

As mentioned in section 4.1, psychologists (e. g., Markus and Kitaya-ma 1991) distinguish between independent and interdependent self-con-struals. In terms of Schwartz’s (1992) value constructs, independent self-construals are associated with the values self-direction, stimulation, he-donism and achievement, whilst interdependent self-construals are asso-ciated with universalism, benevolence, conformity and tradition.

Some people (e. g., Gudykunst et al. 1996) argue that different com-municative situations lead to the salience of either an independent self-construal or an interdependent self-construal. However, the two can veryoften be interconnected, as Anderson (2004: 208) explains when discuss-ing adolescents’ use of mobile phones: “They get a sense of affiliationand belonging through using the same brand as their peer group andshared knowledge about what the brand stands for, but at the same timeexpress individuality through choosing a particular model that is thenpersonally modified through ringtones, covers, glue-on ‘jewellery’ orlogos”. Similarly, when people participate in team sports such as footballor ice-hockey, they may want to display individual prowess throughscoring or saving a goal, and hence uphold or enhance their independentself-construal; but at the same time, they may value a sense of belongingand team camaraderie, which appeals to their interdependent self-con-strual.

5. Interactional Goals

Sometimes (but not always) people have specific interactional goalswhen they interact with others, and when this is the case, these “wants”can affect rapport management judgments. People’s goals may be trans-actional and aim at achieving a “concrete” task, such as obtaining writ-ten approval for something, clinching a business deal, or finishing ameeting on time. Alternatively, their goals may be relational, and aimat effective relationship management, such as peace-making, promotingfriendship, currying favour or exerting control.

Very often, the two types of goals may be interconnected, becauseachieving a transactional goal may depend on successfully managing therelational goal. When this is the case, or when people want to achieve aparticular relational goal, then the management of rapport can be verystrategic (Kasper 1990). If this is noticed and judged to be too strategic,such behavior is typically evaluated negatively. On the other hand, if a




transactional goal is perceived to be urgent and important, then peoplemay make allowances for any behavior that would typically be judgedinappropriate in different circumstances.

6. Interconnections between Face, (Im)Politeness and Wants

Very often, there is a close inter-connection between (im)politeness, faceand wants, with each impacting upon our perceptions of rapport in acoherent direction. For example, imagine the following scenario: I makean appointment to see my senior manager in order to discuss a planningidea for a project (a transactional want), and travel to the head office tosee her. When I arrive, I find that the meeting has been cancelled atthe last minute, with no clear explanation why. For many people, thiscancellation would be perceived as rude (a breach of behavioral expecta-tions based on role specifications, behavioral norms, and cost-benefitconsiderations), could be perceived as face-threatening (a threat to theperson’s status, if it is taken as implying that the manager regards heras “unimportant” and hence feels able to cancel the meeting at the lastminute and for no clear reason), and it would likely be perceived as veryfrustrating (because the transactional want cannot be progressed). Inthis instance, all three elements work together to have a negative effecton the employee’s perception of rapport with her senior manager.

However, the three elements of (im)politeness, face and wants are con-ceptually distinct, and can work both independently and in differentdirections. For example, if I am in a shop in Britain and the assistant isindifferent and unhelpful, I may regard her as impolite, but I wouldprobably not find her behavior face-threatening (although I might do,particularly if I interpreted her behavior as due to my social group mem-bership such as ethnic or regional group). Conversely, people’s behaviorcan be face-threatening, even though it does not breach social appropri-ateness. For example, I recently helped a Hungarian student, whose Eng-lish was very weak, to get across London to catch the right train to oneof the London airports. He thanked me profusely, saying “You’re a verykind old lady”. His expression of gratitude was socially appropriate, andso could not be judged as impolite. However, it had a complex impacton my face sensitivities. It upheld my claims to identity face that areassociated with the qualities of consideration and helpfulness (based onthe value constructs of universalism and benevolence). On the otherhand, it undermined my claim to membership of the social group “mid-dle-aged” and hence challenged this aspect of my identity.

Sometimes a breach of expectations can actually be face-enhancing,as the following overheard interaction in a supermarket illustrates. A




very attractive looking cashier went over to two of her cashier colleaguesand excitedly reported that a young man, who was a complete stranger,had just been chatting with her at the check-out desk and had thenasked for her telephone number. All three verbally expressed shock atthe “audacity” of his request (which was a breach of social expectationswithin that context). However, from the tone of their voices it was clearthat the girl was very flattered to be asked, and that the other two“plainer” girls were disappointed that this had not happened to them.In other words, the man’s behavior breached social expectations andhence could be judged as rude; on the other hand, it supported the cash-ier’s desired claim to sexual attractiveness and thus enhanced her identityface in this respect.

Often, though, people’s assessments of face-threat are partly based ontheir behavioral expectations because this helps them evaluate whetherany face-threat is deliberate or not, and these can be quite personallybased. The following incident, which took place at a large linguisticsconference, illustrates this. A well-known applied linguist had given aplenary talk, and afterwards a few people asked a few questions. Thenanother well-known applied linguist stood up, and spoke for about fiveminutes, stating in an authoritative tone why the plenary speaker’s talkwas completely flawed. There was some applause from the audiencewhen he sat down, and this was followed by an embarrassed silence. Theaudience was clearly embarrassed on behalf of the plenary speaker, andprobably regarded the vehemence of the attack as inappropriate for thatcontext. However, after a moment’s pause, the plenary speaker simplysaid, “Don’t worry. I’m used to him behaving like this.” From the chal-lenger’s perspective, the primary interactional want in that context seemsto have been the frank critique of academic positions, and he may havefelt that this gave him the liberty to ignore face sensitivities and to pushthe boundaries of behavioral expectations. Yet for most people, such anattack, even in that context, would be highly face-threatening, undermin-ing their claims to qualities such as competence and intelligence. For theplenary speaker, it was probably also very face-threatening; however, hissense of face-threat seems to have been ameliorated, at least partially,by his knowledge of the individual concerned and the behavior he hasexhibited in the past.

7. Some Analyses

In this section, I use some more extended examples to illustrate how thebases of rapport judgments can be unpackaged.




7.1 Invitation/Offer Exchanges in Chinese

Several authors (e. g., Gu 1990, Mao 1994, Chen 1996, Zhu et al. 2000)have analyzed the discourse of inviting and offering in Chinese, and havereported that the following kind of interaction is common:

A (Host): Come and have dinner with us tomorrow evening.B (Guest): Oh, that’s too much trouble for you, I’d better not come.A: It’s no trouble at all. It will just be a simple meal.B: No, really. I know you’re extremely busy.A: Well, we have to eat anyway, so it won’t cause us any extra

bother. Do come.B: How about if I just come for a chat but not for dinner?

You’re always inviting me for dinner.A: That’s nonsense. You must come. We haven’t seen you

for ages.B: Well, OK then.

Although this example is not fully authentic and the language has beenglossed into somewhat more natural English, it illustrates the repeatedinvite-decline pattern that Gu (1990), Mao (1994) and others report.

As Gu (1990) and Chen (1996) point out, to cultural outsiders thehost’s repeated invitations (which often get stronger) can sound veryimposing, and the guest’s repeated declining behavior can sound un-grateful and/or indicate a lack of willingness to accept. However, in Chi-nese the host’s behavior typically conveys generosity and warmth, whilstthe guest’s response shows humility and self-restraint.

What then are the bases for these judgments? The starting point inthis example is the conventions for handling invitations. In Chinese, itis conventionally expected that the host exhibits insistence, by wordingthe invitation strongly and by repeating it several times, and that theguest displays reluctance by declining the invitation several times. Al-though this pattern is not formally prescribed (i. e., it is permitted ratherthan prescribed behavior), the pattern has become so common and ex-pected in many parts of China that it has come to be regarded as sociallyobligatory (although as Chen (1996: 196) points out, this may not applyin all regions of China).

This pattern may not have developed by chance, though. Rather, itpartly reflects the interactional principles that are important in Chinesesociety. For example, the host’s insistence on the guest accepting theinvitation illustrates the interactional principle of association (involve-ment), and contrasts with common western concerns about imposition(an aspect of the interactional principle of equity) when giving invi-




tations. Interestingly, though, the “polite excuses” used by the guest todecline the invitation, show concern for equity issues for the host andfor their relationship. For instance, “That’s too much trouble for you”illustrates concern for the cost to the host, and “You’re always invitingus” shows concern for fairness and balance. The host’s response is todownplay such concerns.

As Gu (1990), Mao (1994), Chen (1996) and Zhu et al. (2000) all pointout, face sensitivities also play a role. Mao (1994) explains that the hostand the guest each strive to maintain their own and the other person’sface, and that accepting an invitation or offer too quickly would be face-threatening to both the host and the guest. He further explains that thisface-threat would be a direct consequence of the breach of expectations.Can we unpackage this any further then? It seems that an importantaspect of identity face that both host and guest are claiming in theseinteractions is conformity and tradition. For people who attach greatimportance to these value constructs, adherence to the traditionalpattern is very important, and any breach is thus likely to be particularlyface-threatening. On the other hand, among individuals or groups wherethese value constructs are held less firmly, people will feel freer to in-teract in different ways, and the conventional pattern thus becomes lessobligatory. In fact, the upholding of the traditional pattern may cometo be interpreted as hypocritical and insincere, as Chen (1996: 154)found, and then use of the traditional convention can have a negativerather than positive impact on rapport.

7.2 Chinese-British Business Interactions

The second example draws on data obtained by Spencer-Oatey and Xingduring their study of rapport management in Chinese-British businessinteractions, conducted at the University of Luton from 1996 to 2000.The data analyzed here were collected in England, in the summer of1997, at the headquarters of a British company, during a 10-day visit bya Chinese engineering delegation. Three types of data were collected atthat time: video recordings of all the official meetings between the Britishand Chinese business people; (2) field notes of supplementary aspectsof the visits; and (3) interview and playback comments made by theparticipants. The British and Chinese participants were interviewed sepa-rately.

This British company designs, manufactures and sells an engineeringproduct that is used in industrial plants throughout the world. In everycontract signed in China, they agree to host a delegation of up to sixpeople who are involved in some way in the deal. The cost of the delega-tion visit is added to the contract price, and there is an unofficial under-




standing that any balance remaining at the end of the visit is given tothe visitors as “pocket money”.

A number of problematic instances occurred during the visit (for fur-ther details see Spencer-Oatey and Xing 2003; 2004), and two of themare selected for analysis here. All names have been changed; text in italicsis translated from Chinese.

7.2.1 A Problem of Roles

When the visitors arrived, the Sales Manager for China (Tim) was awayon an overseas trip. He was due to arrive back on the Thursday, and sothe Chinese expected to meet him the next day (Friday). When there wasno sign of him by lunchtime, they started asking for his telephonenumber, and this continued all over the weekend. In the follow-up in-terview on the Friday evening, they commented as follows:

Extract 1 (Interview)

Xu: Tim hasn’t shown up yet, right? He should have alreadycome back yesterday. …

Shen: He should have been back yesterday, yesterday. Today to-day he didn’t show up. This morning he should have takenus out. We mentioned it to him [the interpreter]. …

Lin: Does Tim live in London?Researcher: I don’t know where he lives.Chen: In London. London is very close to here, isn’t it? … Thirty-

odd miles, in fact very close. Your old friends from Chinaare here, and as a matter of fact your major market, right?So on this occasion can’t you come and meet them?

Shen: And he knew that Mr Xu, senior engineer, was coming.

Tim, however, explained it as follows:

Extract 2 (Interview)

Researcher: But you were not thinking of meeting them directly afteryou came back, I mean before this meeting [held on theMonday]?

Tim: I was aware they were going to be here, and it was im-portant for me to meet them when I returned, yeah, butI think I got back on the Thursday night or the Fridaymorning. Um, and it was too difficult for me to meetthem during the weekend, um, of course my wife hadexpected to see me, my son, I was tired, so I wanted towait until Monday.




The Chinese visitors believed that it was prescribed behavior for Tim,the sales manager for China, to meet with them right after his return,and were offended when he did not. They based their belief on theirinterpretation of his role obligations towards them as “old friends” �that friends should put themselves out for each other. They also men-tioned his task-based interactional wants (to do business successfully inthe Chinese market), and thought that this should have been an addedincentive.

Tim, on the other hand, did not feel it was socially or professionallyobligatory for him to meet them immediately after his return. In fact, hehad only met one of the delegation members once, and the others hehad never met. So to him, they were not “old friends”. He did not per-ceive, therefore, any role obligations towards them, and felt that his ownpersonal needs for rest and time with his family took priority. Thesediffering perceptions of role obligations are linked to the differing impor-tance that Tim and the Chinese visitors attached to the interactionalprinciples of association and equity, and their interpretations of groupmembership. Tim focused on his personal needs (benefits to himself) andthe needs of his family (involvement with a small social group); the Chi-nese visitors, on the other hand, focused on his obligations to “oldfriends” (involvement with a larger, more diffuse social group) and be-lieved that he should have sacrificed his personal needs for their sake(i. e., downplayed the importance of personal benefit).

As a result of these differing interpretations, the Chinese visitors heldexpectations of Tim that he was either unaware of or was not willing toconform to. They became frustrated, annoyed and disappointed, andmade life very difficult for the British people accompanying them overthe weekend. Rapport between them had been damaged.

7.2.2 A Dispute over Money

On the last day of the delegation visit, a few hours before the Chinesevisitors were due to leave, the British company gave each of the visitorsan envelope containing “pocket money” � the cash left over after thecosts of the visit had been deducted from the figure in the contract allo-cated to the visit. The visitors opened their envelopes, counted themoney, and then claimed that the amount was too little.

Extract 3 (Close-Out meeting)

Phil: I’d just like to say it’s a great pleasure to have you come here.Thank you very much for coming. I’d just like to make a pres-entation to each of you for [company name].




Int: [interprets into Chinese]Phil: [Phil stands up and presents an envelope to Sun. Sun stands

up, takes it, and shakes hands with him. Phil hands one to Ma,who also stands up. They shake hands.]

Chen: Take them all together.Phil: [Phil gives an envelope to each of the others: Chen, Lin, Shen

and Xu.][Visitors open their envelopes and count the money inside. Suntakes a pen and sheet of paper from Sajid, and prepares to signthe receipt.]

Sun: How much?Xu: [Counts the money carefully and openly.]Xu: 570, 570, this doesn’t seem enough.

[Heated discussion in Chinese among the visitors. They agreeto ask for a list of the costs.]

Xu: We must definitely have a list of the costs.Int: How much money did you give them altogether?Xu: US$ 4000. US$ 4000 per person.Int: [interprets into English]Sajid: The contract, the contract doesn’t say we have to give them

money.Int: [interprets into English]Shen: It does, it does.Int: [interprets into English]

…Xu: How much is the airfare? Ask them to show us the list of costsInt: [no interpretation]Sajid: To get a rough idea (???) we (???) that we have to pay you (???)Sun: All we want is a list.Int: [no interpretation]

[Note: (???) � unintelligible speech]

Shortly after this, the contract was brought in for them all to study, andattempts were made to list the expenses. However, the argument overthe money continued for another 2 hours and 26 minutes. During thistime, they disagreed with each other over whether the sum identified inthe contract applied to one delegation visit or to two, and hence howmuch was allocated for each person in this visit. In addition, the Chineseclaimed that the formal dinners (at which British staff were present)should not have been counted as an expense, because that would meanthat they were paying for the British to enjoy themselves. At times, emo-tions ran high.




Extract 4 (Close-out Meeting)

Shen: [speaking to the interpreter] You just tell him. Is it so easy tobully us Chinese (.) so easy to make fools of us? This money iswhat we have been saving out of our mouth. We have had instantnoodles every day just to save some money (.) and now they havegrabbed it. How mean of them to do such a thing.

Int: (5) [interprets into English]

Eventually, Sajid agreed to give them a further £1326, and this washanded to them moments before they left for the airport.

During this final meeting, the Chinese visitors had a clear transac-tional goal � to obtain the “pocket money” that they believed they weredue and were hence expecting. The basis of this expectation was thecontractual agreement between the British and Chinese companies. TheChinese visitors expressed what they wanted bluntly, and argued theirposition for a long time, in order to achieve this interactional want.However, some of the delegation were simultaneously concerned aboutthe impression that they were leaving, and about the impact of the dis-pute on their overall reputation. This can be seen from the following re-mark:

Chen: One thing is that we do not leave people saying that we are stingy,second, don’t give the impression of being too weak, and weshould negotiate in a friendly way.

In other words, Chen was claiming, on behalf of his group (delegationgroup and maybe national group), face for several self-aspects: power(not appearing weak), benevolence (not appearing stingy), and confor-mity (negotiating in a friendly way � the maintenance of harmony istraditionally stressed in Chinese society; e. g., Gao et al. 1996). He ar-gued that during their attempts to obtain the extra money, they shouldsimultaneously try to maintain their face in each of these aspects.

In this interaction, therefore, the management of rapport revolvedround all three elements: behavioral expectations, interactional wants,and face sensitivities. The Chinese visitors believed they were entitled tomore pocket money because of the contractual agreement between thecompanies, and they were thus expecting to receive it. When they didnot receive as much money as they were expecting, this triggered a trans-actional goal (to obtain this extra money) that they then pursued. How-ever, some of the visitors felt that the ruthless pursuit of this goal couldbe damaging to their face, and so they tried to balance their interactionalwants with their claims to face.




8. Dynamic Perceptions of Rapport

As people interact with each other, they make dynamic judgments as towhether their rapport has been enhanced, maintained or damaged (seeFigure 3). These judgments (conscious or otherwise) are based to a largeextent on assessments of the three key bases of perceptions of rapport:interactional wants, face sensitivities, and behavioral expectations.

When interlocutors have specific interactional wants, they make dy-namic judgments as to whether these wants are being achieved, whetherthey are being thwarted, or whether there has been no progress. Simi-larly, if they are paying attention to interpersonal relations, they makedynamic judgments as to whether they have gained face, have main-tained face (or are “in face”), have lost face or have had their face threat-ened. At the same time, they have expectancy reactions to the verbal andnon-verbal behavior that they experience, and perceive it as positivelyeventful, negatively eventful, or (when the expected behavior is fulfilled)simply do not notice it. These assessments can often result in significantemotional reactions, which in turn can have a crucial impact on per-ceived rapport.

For effective rapport management, though, it is essential that peoplenot only assess their own conditions and reactions. Even more impor-tantly, they need to consider their interlocutor’s face “conditions”, theirwants “conditions”, and whether their interactional expectancies are be-ing fulfilled. They then need to find an appropriate balance betweenmeeting their own needs and the needs of their interlocutor(s). A numberof factors can affect the effectiveness with which people can do this,including personality, personal preoccupations, and awareness of cul-tural differences.

Face Condition(Own & Other)

Expectancy Reactions (Own & Other)

Wants Condition(Own & Other)

EmotionalReactions(Own & Other)

Bases ofDynamic Perceptions of Rapport

(Enhanced ----- Maintained ---- Damaged)Gained face

In face

Threatened face

Lost face

Positively

eventful

Neutral (unnoticed)

Negatively

eventful

Achieving

No impact

Hindering

JoyContentment/pleasure

Pride

SurpriseSurprise/amazement

Anger

Irritation/annoyance

Frustration

Disgust/disapproval

Sadness

Disappointment/

displeasure

Shame/guilt

Embarrassment/insult/humiliation

Figure 3. The Base of Dynamic Perceptions of Rapport.




While these “own” and “other” assessments (which occur dynamicallyon an ongoing basis) are made, and as these reactions occur, people haveto decide (also dynamically) how to manage them verbally and non-verbally. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article to deal withthe management process here.

9. Concluding Comments

This paper has explored the bases of three key elements of rapport: inter-actional wants, behavioral expectations and face sensitivities. It has fo-cused particularly on unpackaging the bases of behavioral expectationsand face sensitivities, and has drawn on work in social psychology tohelp gain further insights. Further case study research is now needed todetermine the extent to which the rapport management issues that occurin authentic interactions can be explained with reference to these ele-ments, and whether they are adequate for analysing the similarities anddifferences that occur across cultures, contexts and individuals.

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