implementing change: outcomes from the riot reviews · on june 15, 2011, the vancouver police...

Implementing Change: Outcomes from the Riot Reviews

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Implementing Change:

Outcomes from the Riot Reviews

Prepared by:

The Riot Review Recommendations Implementation Team

Superintendent Daryl Wiebe Staff Sergeant Lee Patterson

Lindsey Jones, Planning & Policy Analyst Helen Wong, Research Assistant

March 2012


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................. 5

Purpose ............................................................................................................................................... 9

Recommendations Summary and Methodology................................................................................. 11

Limitations......................................................................................................................................... 13

Outcomes ‐ VPD Specific .................................................................................................................... 15

Planning......................................................................................................................................... 15 Operational Planning .........................................................................................................................15 Electronic Briefing ..............................................................................................................................16 Debriefings..........................................................................................................................................17 Record Keeping of Planning and Tactical Decisions..........................................................................18 Operational Plans............................................................................................................................... 18 Early Deployment ............................................................................................................................... 19 EOPS Workload and Staffing Assessment .........................................................................................20

Command and Control ................................................................................................................... 21 ARWEN................................................................................................................................................21 Silver Command – Second‐in‐Command............................................................................................22

Communications ............................................................................................................................ 22 Wireless Priority Service (WPS)..........................................................................................................22 Voice Amplifiers for Police Respirators..............................................................................................23 Long‐Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) ..................................................................................................23 Social Media .......................................................................................................................................23

Equipment ..................................................................................................................................... 24

Operations ..................................................................................................................................... 26 Staging Areas .....................................................................................................................................26

Training.......................................................................................................................................... 26

Interoperability.............................................................................................................................. 27 RCMP Tactical Troop ..........................................................................................................................27 Technology..........................................................................................................................................27

Outcomes – Shared or Regional Responsibility................................................................................... 29

Planning......................................................................................................................................... 29 Integrated Planning ...........................................................................................................................29 Risk Assessment Framework..............................................................................................................29 VPD’s Risk Assessment Process..........................................................................................................30 Live Site ...............................................................................................................................................31 Private Security...................................................................................................................................31 Transit Police ......................................................................................................................................32 Research into Crowd Control Strategies ............................................................................................33

Command and Control ................................................................................................................... 34


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Command Considerations ..................................................................................................................36

Liquor ............................................................................................................................................ 37 Liquor Interdiction ..............................................................................................................................38 Liquor Store Closures ..........................................................................................................................39

Communications ............................................................................................................................ 40

Operations ..................................................................................................................................... 41 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) .........................................................................................................41 Volunteers...........................................................................................................................................42

Interoperability.............................................................................................................................. 42 Crowd Management Tactics ..............................................................................................................42 BCAS and VFRS Integration ................................................................................................................43 Mutual Aid ..........................................................................................................................................44 IPREM..................................................................................................................................................45 Intersect Vancouver ...........................................................................................................................45 Regional MOU ....................................................................................................................................45 Regionalization...................................................................................................................................46

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 47

Glossary............................................................................................................................................. 49

Appendix A ‐ Independent Riot Review Recommendations Matrix..................................................... 51

Appendix B ‐ Ottawa Police Service Riot Review Recommendations Matrix ....................................... 61

Appendix C ‐ VPD Riot Review Recommendations Matrix .................................................................. 71

Appendix D ‐ CoV Riot Review Recommendations Matrix .................................................................. 73


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Executive Summary

On June 15, 2011, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) and the City of Vancouver (CoV) were challenged with the largest public order disturbance since 1994. Following the Vancouver Canucks’ loss in the deciding game of the 2011 Stanley Cup Finals, a relatively small number of the 155,000+ people in the downtown core initiated riotous behaviour, resulting in acts of violence and significant property damage. Dramatic police intervention was required, which included assistance from other outside police agencies, the BC Ambulance Service (BCAS), Vancouver Fire and Rescue Services (VFRS) and many from the private sector. Simultaneous riots occurred at various locations throughout the downtown core, and the coordinated response to the events resulted in a return to order within three hours of the outbreak, and without serious injury or loss of life to the police or the public. In the months following the riot, four separate reviews were completed. Although independent of one another, each was designed to examine key points related to the events of that evening and leading up to Game 7, and to provide recommendations to improve processes and encourage organizational change to better prepare for major events. The reviews provided a cumulative total of 129 recommendations, directed at a broad spectrum of groups, including the VPD, the CoV, other first responder agencies, E‐Comm, Transit Police and TransLink, the National Hockey League (NHL), the Vancouver Canucks and the Province of BC. The VPD itself is the principal stakeholder in 25 of the recommendations, and every one of these recommendations has been completed, or is underway and will be completed by the start of the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs. In addition, the VPD is a key partner with other stakeholders in 58 other recommendations. To that end, we have worked collaboratively with different levels of government and our public safety partners to ensure each recommendation has been addressed. The following summarizes key themes within the recommendations, and the organizational change led to better prepare the VPD for future major events: Planning: In spite of the detailed planning that went into the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, several business process gaps were identified. Within weeks of the riot, and as the VPD was completing its own internal review, the VPD began to implement change within the Emergency and Operational Planning Section (EOPS). Preparation was underway for the next major event, the Celebration of Light, and some recommendations were implemented for the event. As the VPD moved into Grey Cup preparations, in November 2011, electronic debrief report processes were implemented and an improved analytical capacity provided detailed intelligence to inform successive operational plans for that event. These processes are now fully entrenched in both the planning activities of EOPS and the reporting responsibilities of VPD members. Moving forward toward the 2012 Stanley Cup playoff run, record keeping and file management processes have been streamlined and improved within EOPS. VPD operational plans are now structured


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differently, and incorporate more information at the front end related to deployment and risk management. Processes have been put in place for the early distribution of these plans, and much of the minutiae will be added after command staff and external agencies have the opportunity to review the plan. A formalized strategy to better inform command staff of the need for an early deployment has been developed, where Advance Intelligence Teams (AIT) will be used to scout event sites, on event day, and identify developing trends relative to the event. The Planning, Research and Audit Section (PR&A) completed a workload and staffing review of EOPS, paying particular attention to the number of assigned resources, the volume and type of work coming into the section, and new business processes flowing from the Riot Review recommendations. That research confirmed that no additional personnel are required; however, tasks and responsibilities needed to change for some personnel, in order to streamline work and deliver efficiencies. From a regional planning perspective, the VPD played a significant role in developing a Risk Assessment Framework with the CoV. Working with the City Large Events Oversight Committee (CLEOC) and the Advance Planning Group (APG) – both City‐led planning groups – the Risk Assessment Framework enables all stakeholders to accurately assess and predict risk with future large events. Further, the VPD has worked collaboratively with the Transit Police to define cooperative policing strategies at events viewed as having regional significance. VPD operational plans and electronic briefings now contain clear guidelines for VPD officers when they are required to work alongside private security. Command and Control: The VPD has completed a review of the suitability of the ARWEN during crowd control situations, and developed an Authority Matrix to structure our use‐of‐force decision‐making and command authority for the use of specialized tactics. Future large events will also see increased command capacity within our Department Operations Centre (DOC), as the reviews showed dramatically increased demands being placed on the Commander. Working with partner agencies, processes have been put in place to establish site command posts that are representative of all emergency services involved. In addition, much discussion occurred regarding the use of the Gold/Silver/Bronze command structure, and how it aligns with the broader Incident Command System (ICS). It is clear that both systems can operate together, and have many parallels within them. While the VPD has expertise, and participates actively in the ICS model, best practices for public order utilize the Gold/Silver/Bronze model of command. The ICS model remains the standard for consequence management at large‐scale disasters or events spanning multiple responder agencies. Liquor: The VPD will continue to work with the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch (LCLB) to identify strategies to combat excessive drinking at major events. Given the predominant role that liquor played in the 2011 Stanley Cup riot, future consideration will be given to liquor store closures, public messaging, broader liquor interdiction strategies with policing partners, and a commitment to enforcement strategies focussing on specific liquor offences. Communication: The VPD has addressed all of the communications concerns identified in the Riot Reviews. Budget approval was received to acquire Wireless Priority Service (WPS) cellular telephones, and the VPD has purchased voice amplifiers for our gas masks, and additional Long‐Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD) for public broadcasts. The VPD is also committed to further entrenching our own social media capability within the DOC, and build roles and responsibilities for the social media officer into the


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operational plans for major events. The value of this tool to communicate with the public cannot be overstated. Working with E‐Comm, the VPD is committed to continue embedding dispatchers within our kiosk to assist with the deployment of large numbers of personnel. Further, the partners are collaborating on a training bulletin to assist all responding police officers from across the region with the finer points of using their police radios. Equipment: The VPD completed a comprehensive list of equipment needs as part of its internal review. All of that equipment has since been purchased, or will be in place within the VPD in time for the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs. This equipment includes Grab ‘n Go bags to equip general Patrol officers for a public order event, a portable facility to store all of this protective equipment, Gator utility vehicles and trailers to move equipment and personnel, and other tactical and protective equipment to assist with crowd management. VPD personnel will receive clear direction on their equipment needs within the operational plan and electronic briefings. Further, specific logistic processes have also been put in place, ensuring that information is sent out to all responding agencies and personnel, clearly identifying the equipment they are to bring with them if called upon to assist. Further, the inclusion of dedicated logistics personnel for major deployments will enable the replacement of defective or faulty equipment in a timely manner. The VPD would like to acknowledge the financial support received from the Vancouver Police Foundation (VPF). The Foundation assisted with the equipment acquisition by coordinating a generous $300,000 donation to the VPD, offsetting the majority of the equipment costs. Operations: The VPD has made operational adjustments to its deployment, as recommended in the Riot Reviews. Staging areas are now established in enclosed areas, reducing the risk to responding police officers. In addition, the VPD is coordinating a series of table top exercises ahead of the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs, and all regional public safety partners will be invited to this valuable preparatory work. The CoV is leading the development of an integrated volunteer program, and the VPD is actively represented in the planning for that project. There is a large pool of volunteers within the community policing programs, and other areas, and the VPD will look to leverage that good will towards other large‐scale events in the city, should the volunteers wish to participate. The CoV is also updating policy on the use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). The VPD is a key stakeholder in CCTV. Our experience during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games and Celebration of Light has reaffirmed the value of CCTV for event management, command and control, public safety, and subsequent investigations. While the VPD acknowledges citizens’ right to privacy, we will continue to advocate for broader use of CCTV at major events and in crowded public areas, as modelled in other areas of the world. Training: The VPD has expanded its crowd management training in two key areas. The Public Safety Unit (PSU) will receive dedicated training in early spring, to work with partners from BCAS and VFRS, as a precursor to the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs. On a broader level, all other VPD personnel will receive training in crowd management and the workings of the PSU in order to familiarize themselves for


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operational deployments, should they be mobilized for future events. This training will be added to the regular cycle training process, and be delivered every two years, ensuring continued learning of best practices in crowd management. Interoperability: The VPD has taken proactive steps to build solid working relationships with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Tactical Troop. When the Troop was deployed during subsequent major events in 2011, a VPD liaison was embedded within their command element, thereby bridging any potential communications concerns. In addition, the VPD Public Order Group (POG) has completed presentations to the RCMP Tactical Troop, and done collaborative training, to ensure familiarity with one another’s approaches to public order and crowd management. The VPD will continue to work with the BCAS having them fully embedded in the PSU. In addition, the VPD has established training dates in April and May 2012 to build knowledge, skills, and abilities within the VFRS. This process will educate VFRS members on the dynamics of crowd management, and educate VPD PSU members on fire fighting needs within a public order setting. On the broader regional level, VPD Executive members are active participants with other police departments in the Metro Vancouver area, working to define an operational Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to address mutual aid and shared resourcing concerns around major events. While this collaborative work will help facilitate the sharing of resources, it does not truly offset the benefits obtained from having one regional police force for all of Metro Vancouver. The VPD maintains that one police department for the entire Metro region would provide a more comprehensive service to the community, and enable decision‐makers to more effectively and seamlessly deploy and coordinate resources for major events and investigations. All of the recommendations directed at the VPD have been addressed, and wherever the VPD has been identified as a stakeholder, it has been an active and engaged partner in identifying solutions and leading change. There remain only four tasks requiring further follow‐up during the lead‐up to the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs:

‐ Completion of the MOU between Metro Vancouver police chiefs ‐ Completion of the MOU between VPD and BCAS ‐ Finalizing a technology solution for the Public Order Unit ‐ Continuing to explore the option of pre‐printed violation tickets for liquor offences

The VPD fully expects to have all outstanding tasks completed prior to the commencement of the 2012 Stanley Cup Finals. The VPD continues to embody continuous evaluation and learning, and has incorporated all of the recommendations into improved business practices, better communication and interoperability, and increased operational effectiveness.


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Purpose

On June 15, 2011, a riot erupted in downtown Vancouver following Game 7 of the Stanley Cup Finals. The riot resulted in numerous acts of violence and millions of dollars worth of property damage. In spite of this dramatic event, the actions of the police and other emergency responders that night were commendable, as they restored public order within three hours of the outbreak. Throughout the summer, four separate reviews of the riot, and the events leading up to it, were conducted. The VPD completed an internal review, identifying key findings and lessons learned, and provided eight recommendations to better prepare and manage major events in the future. The Province of BC, the CoV, and the Vancouver Police Board commissioned an Independent Review, in which Mr. Doug Keefe and Mr. John Furlong provided 53 recommendations. This Independent Review also included a technical review, completed by experts from the Ottawa Police Service, which included a further 51 recommendations. Finally, the CoV conducted a review that contained 17 additional recommendations. Together, these reviews produced 129 individual recommendations. The intention of each of these reviews was to identify successes and areas of improvement, in an effort to better prepare for similar circumstances in the future. While the recommendations contained within these reviews will never prevent a riot from occurring, they do provide guidance and direction to many partner agencies, and intend to help all involved as they prepare for anticipated future runs to the Stanley Cup by the Vancouver Canucks. The recommendations focus on future major events, and on regional and collaborative planning, communications, equipment, training, and interoperability. In August 2011, the VPD formed a Riot Review Recommendations Implementation Team, under the direction of Superintendent Daryl Wiebe. Their mandate was to review all 129 recommendations and to provide a comprehensive plan and implement necessary change within the Department to meet those recommendations. Given the high probability of a return to the Stanley Cup playoffs in April 2012, this work was due ahead of that date, along with a comprehensive report for the Vancouver Police Board in March 2012. The recommendations from the reviews are directed at many different stakeholders in the major event planning cycle. This includes the CoV, the Provincial government, the VPD, Transit Police and TransLink, VFRS, BCAS, the NHL and the Vancouver Canucks, and the local media. Many of these recommendations are well beyond the scope and control of the VPD; however, much of the public safety planning for a major event in Vancouver falls to the VPD. As such, many of the recommendations focus on the planning and preparedness of the VPD and, over the past seven months, the Implementation Team has led the implementation of these recommendations within the Department. In addition, the Team has engaged in collaborative work with all partner agencies where the VPD has a role within the recommendation or the work associated to those agencies. Although there can never be a guarantee that another riot will not occur, the implementation of these recommendations will mitigate the likelihood of a large‐scale public disturbance. These steps will help provide a safe and secure environment for people to enjoy these festivities in the future. The VPD and partner agencies are committed to continuous learning from their experiences. Together, they have


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implemented a number of new initiatives and improved business processes to address Riot Review recommendations, and to improve major event planning and response.


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Recommendations Summary and Methodology

Although the Riot Reviews provided 129 individual recommendations, the Implementation Team identified substantial overlap with many of them. The Team categorized the recommendations into themes, to account for duplication and to simplify the implementation process. An owner was identified for each recommendation and all stakeholders were consulted to ensure owner agencies agreed with the assigned recommendation. This collaborative work ensured that nothing would be missed, and all of the recommendations would receive the requisite attention. Work on the recommendations was underway in earnest even prior to the release of the Independent Review. Stakeholder agencies, including the VPD, reflected back on their experiences and began implementing change before the reports were finalized. To that end, the VPD had already begun streamlining some of its planning processes and accountability measures in preparation for the next series of major events – the annual Celebration of Light fireworks extravaganzas. As the CoV is the owner of this event, it too was actively involved in improved planning processes through the summer to ensure a safe event on the beaches of English Bay. In response to a recommendation made by the Independent Review Team (IR 17), the CoV created the 2011 Stanley Cup Riot Recommendations Implementation Committee. The VPD is represented on this committee, at the executive leadership level. This committee provides an integrated framework for implementing the recommendations, and ensures ongoing communication between all partner agencies named in the Reviews. The Committee meets monthly, and will continue to meet well into the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs, to ensure continued best practices and coordination among all involved.


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Limitations

The Riot Reviews identify a wide range of recommendations directed towards a number of different stakeholders. The VPD has assumed responsibility for those recommendations that are specific to the VPD or require its involvement in their implementation. However, a number of recommendations from the Riot Reviews are beyond the VPD’s scope and control, and so do not require its involvement. For example, recommendations specific to stakeholders such as the NHL and the Vancouver Canucks do not require direct participation from the VPD. As such, where the VPD has no direct involvement, this report will not provide comment on progress.


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Outcomes ‐ VPD Specific

A number of recommendations identify improvements proposed for the VPD related to various elements of event planning and operations. This includes operational planning, command and control, liquor, communications, equipment, operations, training and interoperability. The Implementation Team, in consultation with the CoV’s Riot Review Recommendation Implementation Committee, has agreed that 25 recommendations are specific to the VPD. This section of the report will detail the VPD’s actions to implement these agency specific recommendations. Since the riot, the VPD has developed and implemented several initiatives to enhance its ability to plan and respond to major events. The VPD has improved internal processes, including operational planning, and strengthened partnerships with outside agencies to enhance collaborative planning and emergency response. Inefficiencies identified in the Riot Reviews became the focus of action, and improvements were quickly put in place for the fast‐approaching large events in mid‐to‐late 2011 (Celebration of Light, the Occupy Vancouver protests, and Grey Cup). All of the recommendations specific to the VPD are complete, and implementation of the few remaining associated tasks will be complete by the start of the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs.

Planning

Operational Planning Vancouver is host to hundreds of events every year, including the Celebration of Light, Canada Day celebrations, the Vancouver Pride Parade, and in many years, the Stanley Cup playoffs. The VPD, in collaboration with the CoV and external agencies, is successful in planning and delivering safe events for residents across Metro Vancouver. The 2010 Winter Olympic Games is likely the most memorable event ever held in Vancouver, drawing some of the largest crowds into the downtown core in Vancouver’s history. The success of the Games is attributable to extensive pre‐event planning, practice, and an integrated approach to safety and security across the Metro region. By comparison, the fluid and evolving nature of hockey playoffs presents several challenges to event planners that do not exist in other major events. These include tight timelines, constantly evolving security plans, finite resources and constantly changing crowd dynamics. The VPD’s EOPS includes two distinct planning units. The Operational Planning Unit (OPU) is comprised primarily of police officers, whose responsibility is for operational police planning for special events and sport events within the city. The Emergency Planning Unit is comprised of both sworn and civilian members, and they are responsible for consequence management and emergency preparedness. All of the EOPS planning is done in partnership with the CoV and other applicable agencies. Event planning for the VPD begins with a notification from the CoV to EOPS. EOPS subsequently assigns an OPU planner(s), depending on the scale of the event. For example, a large event such as the Celebration of Light or the Stanley Cup playoffs will require several dedicated planners to be involved during the planning processes. In comparison, a small event, such as a community parade, will be assigned to one planner, as part of a larger portfolio of similar events.


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In addition to internal planning, the VPD is actively involved with planning committees at the CoV, including the newly formed CLEOC and APG. The VPD works cooperatively with all stakeholders to determine the scope of the event, to identify and assess any risks or safety concerns to the public and event participants, and to determine the amount of police resources required. During the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, the VPD was actively involved with the CoV and partner agencies during the planning stages, and cooperatively made all necessary adjustments as the Canucks moved through the successive rounds. However, the Riot Reviews comment that the absence of a comprehensive integrated planning framework resulted in inconsistent planning between agencies, and a lack of defined roles and responsibilities. Further, these reports highlight the need for structured and systematic planning involving all relevant stakeholders responsible for the delivery of an event. The VPD Review recommends that the VPD examine administrative processes regarding event planning, with the goal of utilizing technology to improve briefings, debriefings, and the record keeping of planning decisions and operational tactical decisions (VPD 1). The VPD Review comments that a number of officers did not receive a proper briefing prior to being deployed on the night of the riot. The Independent and Ottawa Police Reviews also identify a need to improve briefings as they found that VPD briefing processes were inconsistent and not inclusive (IR 3, OP 9). Officers briefed on the operational plan for Game 7 were primarily those scheduled to work the event. Therefore, a number of officers that were redeployed to the riot from other duties did not receive a proper briefing. As a result, several officers were unaware of important details contained in the operational plan, including command responsibilities in the case of a riot as well as the availability and location of safety equipment. Electronic Briefing The VPD has taken steps to improve the briefing process to address concerns identified in the Riot Reviews. Beginning with the annual Celebration of Light festival, EOPS created a narrated PowerPoint briefing that was available electronically to all VPD members. In the past, the briefing process consisted of an EOPS briefing to only the supervisory NCOs assigned to police the event, and the NCOs were then expected to brief their respective squads. As a result, the information officers were briefed on was inconsistent. Today, the electronic briefing process that is now in place ensures all members are briefed with the same material, including overall deployment, command structure, availability of equipment, and contingency plans. In addition, the briefings are available on the VPD Intranet; therefore, all officers are able to view the briefing rather than only those officers assigned to work the event. Patrol supervisors provide these briefings to general Patrol officers working regular duty, in the event they may be called upon to assist with policing the event. Electronic briefings were held for all subsequent large events in 2011, including the Occupy Vancouver protests and the Grey Cup. Electronic briefings are now a standard business process in the EOPS’s planning framework, and will continue for all large events in the future. The Independent Review recommends that briefings should also identify the personal issue equipment required by those assigned to special events, and the availability and location of additional protective equipment for other officers who may be called upon to respond (IR 3). A number of officers deployed to the riot did not have the appropriate equipment and were unaware of the availability of additional protective equipment. To address this recommendation, equipment requirements and availability are now included in the electronic briefings to ensure all members are fully aware and have access to this


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important equipment. To illustrate, the Grey Cup briefing included directions for officers to be equipped with respirators, as well as high‐visibility reflective vests, in case of a public order situation. Equipment requirements and availability will form a part of all future operational plans and briefings. These requirements will also be extended to all external policing partners who may get called in to assist. Debriefings The internal post‐event debriefing process has also been improved, to address recommendations in both the VPD and Ottawa Police Reviews. VPD planners and command staff conduct regular internal and external debriefings after large events to discuss what went well and to identify any gaps or adjustments needed for future events. Previously, post‐event debrief reports were submitted by NCOs via email to the OPU Sergeant to provide feedback on the event. These debrief reports provide valuable intelligence on deployment issues such as crowd size and behaviour, liquor enforcement, deployment strategies, and indications of a risk of public disturbance. Debrief reports are particularly important for recurring events with a short turn‐around, such as playoff hockey games, in which operational planning evolves daily, on a per game basis. Debriefings are also conducted externally with public safety partners to document their observations and discuss any necessary adjustments that are required at a regional level. The VPD will consult with partner agencies on evolving event circumstances and modify operational plans, strategies, and deployments to address issues such as increased crowd size and liquor consumption. The Ottawa Police Review identifies the importance of the debriefing process and recommends that all planning partners be included in a timely, formal debriefing process subsequent to each event (OP 4). The Ottawa Police Review comments that external debriefings worked well during the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs; however, the review identifies gaps in the VPD’s internal process. The VPD Review supports this observation and comments that internal debriefs were inconsistent and a number of reports lacked information (VPD 1). To address these recommendations, the VPD has designed a reporting feature within the Provincial Records Management System. The Police Records Information Management Environment of BC (PRIME‐BC) system enables officers to submit and access information in real‐time. It was considered an ideal platform for the new debrief process, and the improvements were achieved with the creation of an event debrief template. The template is now required of every NCO (or supervisor) assigned to an event. For events such as playoff hockey, with games only a few days apart, an analyst will collate the templates immediately following the game and this intelligence will be presented to EOPS planners and the Gold Commander for further discussion. Adjustments will be made to subsequent plans, based on reliable and timely information provided in the debrief reports. The PRIME‐BC template debriefing process was piloted for Grey Cup with great success. All NCOs deployed for Grey Cup events were required to complete the template for each operational period. A total of four operational periods were identified for Grey Cup and operational planning was adjusted based on information collected from the PRIME‐BC debrief templates. To assess the effectiveness of the PRIME‐BC template, a post‐event survey was distributed to the NCOs deployed for Grey Cup to collect their input on the new process. Feedback received was positive and highly supportive of its use for future events. The VPD Audit Unit also conducted an evaluation of the debriefing process, to assess the effectiveness of the new process and to consider any other reporting


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adjustments prior to finalizing the template. These informed adjustments have been completed and the template is currently in use on the PRIME‐BC system. As PRIME‐BC is a provincial system, all operational police officers in the Metro region are wholly conversant in its use. External debrief reports can also be easily delivered, regardless of which police department or RCMP detachment the officer is assisting from. Record Keeping of Planning and Tactical Decisions The VPD Review also recommends that the Department improve the record keeping of their planning decisions and operational tactical decisions (VPD 1). A formalized and consistent method of recording the VPD’s operational decision‐making process was required, as no consistent method of recording and archiving information previously existed. The VPD has addressed this recommendation by creating a Planning Decision Log for use by EOPS planners. These logs are based on a best practice from the UK and captures decision‐making and rationale during operational planning. The VPD will use these decision logs during operational planning for large events to document the decision‐making process. The decision logs enable accurate record keeping for planners and command staff, and serve as a reference tool during collaborative planning discussions with partner agencies to capture joint decision‐making. These decision logs will ensure that all operational and tactical decisions are captured and documented properly. The Command Decision Log has been redesigned to complement the operational planning logs and will be used by commanders during the event. Silver and Gold Commanders will utilize their own specific decision logs, appropriate to their areas of command responsibility, to document strategic and operational decision‐making during the event. In addition, dedicated scribes have been trained to properly capture and document decision‐making by command staff during the event. Operational Plans Operational plans are required for all major events and are created by the EOPS Sergeant. EOPS typically distributes operational plans well ahead of an event to all relevant commanders, officers scheduled to work the event, and any involved partner agencies. In the case of unanticipated events such as the Occupy Vancouver protests, plans are normally distributed the day prior to, or the day of the event itself, due to short notice. This was the case with the operational plans for the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, which were normally distributed the day before or the day of the game, again due to a short timeframe between games. Given the short turnaround times, VPD commanders did not consistently have the opportunity to review plans and provide their input prior to dissemination to other officers and external agencies. This resulted in officers responsible for executing the operational plan having inadequate time for review and to ensure the desirable amount of familiarity with the plan itself. As a result, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that all commanders responsible for implementing operational plans must be given an opportunity to review and provide input into their agency’s plans (OP 8). To address this recommendation, an operational plan template has been developed and will be used for all major events planning completed by EOPS. This template will improve efficiency in the development


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of the plan, increase the accuracy and relevance of the content of the plan, and enable earlier dissemination to VPD commanders and external agencies. This new process and plan will contain all of the relevant information to police the major event, but will leave the addition of much of the minutiae, such as individual officer scheduling, to immediately prior to the event. The result will be fully informed command staff and partner agencies, and will provide them with sufficient time to provide feedback and information relevant to their circumstances or agency needs. Early Deployment One of the greatest challenges the VPD and emergency responders faced during Game 7 was the early arrival of the crowds. Hockey fans began lining up at bars at 9:00 AM, and started filling the Live Site and the downtown core before noon, significantly earlier than previous playoff games. As a result, the VPD was unable to experience the positive gains from a proactive ‘meet and greet’ crowd management strategy. Most of the crowds arrived prior to the deployment of the majority of police officers. In recent years, the VPD had adopted the ‘meet and greet’ crowd management strategy, which focuses on establishing and maintaining a positive relationship with the public through informal interactions preceding large events. This strategy is successful in setting a positive tone with the public, and provides officers with many opportunities to identify individuals in a crowd who may become problematic. The ‘meet and greet’ approach was very successfully used during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games and continues to be a successful crowd management strategy for large events, including the annual Celebration of Light festival. It was also an effective strategy for all games prior to Game 7 of the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs; however, the unique challenges officers faced during Game 7 required a reactive response to the crowds, as the opportunity to set a tone early had been lost due to the unexpectedly early arrival of very large numbers of fans. The Independent and Ottawa Police Reviews recommend that for large public events, the VPD should expand its operational planning to include a contingency plan that allows for earlier deployment should the situation warrant (IR 2, OP 30). The VPD’s operational plans currently do not contain specific triggers or processes that would enable early deployment. To address this recommendation, the VPD has implemented a number of initiatives that facilitate early deployment for large events, or that require an earlier than anticipated police presence. Based on best practices in public order and crowd management from Europe, the VPD has developed the concept of AIT. These teams will be deployed at major events, early in the day, to assess whether the size or demeanour of the crowd requires a modified deployment. For example, on the day of Game 7, AIT could have been deployed at 8:00 or 9:00 in the morning to monitor the influx of people coming into Vancouver to watch Game 7. These teams would then provide Silver Command with timely intelligence that will inform early deployment decision‐making. Had this model been in place in 2011, steps may have been taken to accelerate the deployment of uniformed police officers into the downtown core, either with on‐duty personnel redeployed from administrative or investigative duties in the police buildings, or with an accelerated fan‐out to call in additional officers from home. On‐duty personnel working in administrative and investigative sections provide an additional resource for early deployment. This often‐available resource had not been previously incorporated into event planning, but was successfully utilized during the Occupy Vancouver protests. Reflecting back to Game


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7, many officers working in administrative and investigative units were in the office and some could have been redeployed if required (although, others would have been tied up on duties they could not easily abandon such as serious crime investigations). The availability of these resources provides increased capacity, as officers would primarily be within Vancouver and would not require much travel time to attend and assist. The only limitation with utilizing on‐duty resources from investigations and administration is that most members in these roles work business hours, Monday to Friday. For a weekend event, the fan‐out process would need to be implemented sooner to bring in officers ahead of their planned start time for early deployment. The Department’s fan‐out procedure is currently being reviewed to improve the efficiency of contacting members for large deployments. Fan‐outs are used by the VPD to inform personnel and provide direction for either a major or limited departmental response. Currently, the fan‐out procedure requires that a Department‐wide fan‐out be communicated through the chain of command. Once a Department‐wide fan‐out has been initiated at the Executive level, officers will receive a phone call from their NCO directing them to attend the incident. The current fan‐out procedure is inefficient and time consuming, and does not leverage existing technology in use today. The VPD is identifying electronic solutions (e.g., text messaging, email to BlackBerry, etc.) to advise personnel that they are required for an emergency deployment. Electronic messaging will improve the fan‐out process by instantly notifying all members that have a mobile phone or email that a mass deployment is required. These processes can provide clear direction on where they are to report to, what equipment they are required to bring, and any other relevant instructions or directions pertinent to the situation at hand. EOPS Workload and Staffing Assessment As described earlier, a number of VPD‐specific recommendations highlight inefficiencies relating to briefings, debriefings, and other elements of operational planning. Shortfalls in these areas were believed, in part, to stem from insufficient staffing and/or inefficient work distribution within EOPS. As a result, PR&A has conducted a review of EOPS’ staffing, planning, and business processes. The primary objective of the review was to identify potential inefficiencies to improve the overall planning processes, and determine whether additional resources are required to complete their work. Auditors examined the workflow processes within EOPS, and assessed both the volume of work involved and the efficient use of time and resources to accomplish that work. In addition, that workload had to be assessed in light of pending new business practices resulting from the Riot Reviews. The auditors also interviewed all EOPS staff members, determining roles and responsibilities, further substantiating a number of the recommendations put forth in the Riot Reviews. Recommendations for changes to EOPS staffing and business processes have been put forward to the Executive. There is no need to increase staffing levels within EOPS since efficiencies were identified within the section. In some cases, duties should be reassigned to align better with specific job functions. In other cases, job functions should be shifted to meet new and emerging priorities and areas of organizational risk.


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PR&A and the Riot Review Recommendations Implementation Team are confident that the implementation of these changes will strengthen the planning processes and service delivery within EOPS. While a number of improvements have already been made to EOPS planning processes these changes will further enhance that work and the VPD’s capabilities for planning and responding to major events in the future. Command and Control On the night of the riot, there were different interpretations of command and control between RCMP and VPD commanders. Additionally, some VPD officers, and particularly self‐deployed officers, were unclear about who they were reporting to and from what commanders their orders were coming from. As a result, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that operational plans must clearly specify lines of authority and decision‐making at all times during an event, and that all deployed members be fully briefed on lines of reporting (IR 2, OP 20). In response to this recommendation, all future VPD operational plans will contain organizational charts clearly depicting the command structure and lines of reporting for an event. These charts will address issues identified in the Riot Reviews for all VPD officers, as well as officers and commanders from external agencies, and they will be clearly informed of the command structure and reporting lines. For example, if the RCMP Tactical Troop, or any other external agency, is deployed for an event in Vancouver, the organizational chart will specify where external agencies fall within the command structure of the event, and identify which VPD commanders they will be working alongside. The command structure will also be included in electronic briefings to ensure all members are informed of the command and control elements of the event. ARWEN The use of an ARWEN for crowd management in a riot is an effective force option to consider. It was deployed several times during the riot against individuals threatening the police with projectiles and Molotov cocktails. However, VPD Bronze and Silver Commanders were unaware that the VPD Emergency Response Team (ERT) deployed the ARWEN, given that authorization for its deployment was not provided prior to its use. In spite of this, all agree that, given the demeanour of the crowds, deploying the ARWEN was the appropriate decision and it was effective in controlling individuals who posed a risk to public and officer safety. Nevertheless, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that an updated assessment be conducted by the VPD to determine the value of using an ARWEN in a crowd management response (OP 22). In response, the VPD’s ERT section provided an updated review, identifying the value of the ARWEN to protect police members from possible grievous bodily harm during a crowd management situation. The ERT review commented that the ARWEN was effective on the night of the riot to deal with a hostile crowd intent on injuring police members. The VPD ERT supports the use of the ARWEN as an appropriate use‐of‐force option for future crowd‐management responses. The Ottawa Police Review also recommends that the VPD standardize the use of an Authority Matrix in advance of all major events, in order to confirm specific use‐of‐force authorities for each level of command (OP 23). The use of an Authority Matrix is a common tool used by police agencies to provide


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a clear description of decision‐making authorities and identified use of force options. An Authority Matrix is beneficial for both the jurisdictional police where the event is being held, as well as for partner agencies responding to assist, as it provides an awareness of the appropriate command level to authorize the different use of force options. Including an Authority Matrix in the operational plan will ensure that all members are aware of decision‐making authorities and authorized use of force options. During the event, members will be able to make the appropriate decisions on crowd control tactics within the parameters of the Authority Matrix. Command staff will also be wholly aware of actions taken in the field, and will have greater control of the use of force by police, as they attempt to fulfill their policing objectives for the event. In response to this recommendation, the VPD has created an Authority Matrix that will be included in all future operational plans for large events. Officers will be informed during their briefings of the identified decision‐making authorities and authorized use of force options available to them during public order situations. Silver Command – Second‐in‐Command During the riot, it was difficult for Silver Command to get a clear understanding of the operations on the ground, given the volume of information being streamed to the VPD DOC. At times, there were numerous incidents of violence erupting at various locations throughout the downtown core which proved challenging for Silver Command to interpret and respond appropriately. As a result, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that consideration be given to identifying a second‐in‐command to support Silver Command when the scope of events dictates (OP 26). This recommendation has been addressed and a second‐in‐command was identified for the Celebration of Light, the Occupy Vancouver protests, and the Grey Cup, in support of Silver Command. A Deputy Silver Commander was identified prior to these events and was assigned to the DOC. The Deputy Commander assists in maintaining an overview of the operational deployment and, when required, can be utilized to forecast future resource requirements for future deployment phases. The Deputy Commander can be tasked to other roles while the Silver Commander concentrates on the existing operation. The Deputy Commander can also be considered a contingency for events that have the potential to escalate into a larger public order situation or emergency. Communications Wireless Priority Service (WPS) A number of communication inefficiencies are identified in the Riot Reviews relating to ineffective cellular communication, public warning, police radios and social media. Due to the overwhelming use of the public cellular telephone networks during the riot, a number of command staff could not communicate with one another on their mobile phones. Communication via mobile phones is important for police operations, as radio channels, including command channels, are frequently overwhelmed with operational communication. To address this issue, the VPD Review recommends that the VPD prepare a resolution to be submitted to the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) with the aim of recommending to the Canadian Radio‐television Telecommunications


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Commission (CRTC) that it be mandatory for cellular telephone service providers to deliver WPS to their networks for all emergency services (VPD 4). WPS would ensure that emergency responders are able to communicate with each other over cellular networks during large events when cellular networks often operate at capacity. Although this recommendation was made by the VPD, further research and discussion has revealed that the CRTC is not the agency responsible for WPS. In fact, the role of managing requests for WPS falls to Industry Canada (IC). IC reviews applications for WPS and determines whether an agency meets the standards and conditions of one of the five established priority levels. If a request is approved by IC, the applicant can proceed to a service provider to purchase the cellular telephones and service requested. IC has confirmed that WPS has been and remains open to all telecommunication providers. Currently, there is only one cellular telephone provider in Canada that offers this service. The VPD Review also recommends that a pool of cellular telephones with WPS be acquired for critical command staff and other identified positions (VPD 5). In response to this recommendation, the VPD has applied to IC for the WPS and a limited number of devices, assigned to those positions in need of this service, will be deployed. Funding for this was included within the 2012 operating budget. Voice Amplifiers for Police Respirators The design of police‐issued respirators is not compatible with the use of police radio microphones; therefore, communication at times was unclear between commanders. To improve communication between front‐line commanders during public order situations, the VPD has purchased a number of voice amplifiers to enhance communication on the ground. These amplifiers attach to an officer’s respirator and improve the clarity of their verbal communications. They will be distributed to key commanders and officers assigned to a higher level of responsibility, to improve communication during public order situations. Long‐Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) During the riot, the decision was made to deploy tear gas to assist in dispersing the crowds. It is standard practice that police notify the public prior to deploying tear gas; however, officers were hindered at times during the riot due to a malfunctioning LRAD. As a result, the south zone did not receive any notification and the north zone was hampered by the fact that the LRAD batteries were not charged and required power from a police vehicle, which restricted its mobility. The Independent Review recommends that the VPD use its communication tools earlier, to help set the tone, inform and provide direction to the crowd (IR 6). To address this recommendation, the VPD has purchased two additional LRADs thereby doubling its capacity. A logistics officer assigned to an event will be responsible for ensuring that all equipment, including LRADs, is functioning properly prior to the event. Social Media Social media played an important role during the riot, enabling police to provide accurate and continuous communication to the public. During the riot, a VPD social media officer was responsible for


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using social media to provide real‐time communication updates to the public. The social media officer was situated in the VPD DOC and was responsible for gathering information and disseminating information to the public. Information discrepancies are common among various media outlets during large events; therefore, social media can help police provide timely, accurate and consistent updates to the public on the changing circumstances of an event. Social media is especially valuable during regional events such as the Celebration of Light and the Stanley Cup playoffs given that most of the event patrons are of similar demographics to social media users. During the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, the VPD used Twitter to broadcast real‐time updates on crowd congestion, traffic problems, and public transit. On the night of Game 7, social media was valuable in communicating to the public as well as to respond to tips and questions. The VPD has identified a need for a social media plan to be incorporated into the overall communications framework for large events. The VPD will continue to assign a social media officer to the DOC to ensure accurate information is communicated to the public during large events. As well, the VPD has committed to including the social media plan in the operational plan and within the briefing package for an event. Finally, the requirement to develop a comprehensive social media plan as part of the communications strategy will be included in the Gold and Silver Command planning frameworks that have recently been developed. Equipment A number of recommendations address equipment issues and malfunctions identified in the Riot Reviews. The VPD Review recommends that the VPD review, identify and address equipment requirements for officers in relation to crowd management (VPD 2). During the riot, only 150 Grab ‘n Go bags were available for non‐PSU officers, resulting in a significant number of officers being deployed without any protective equipment. In fact, there were some cases in which officers were unable to be deployed for safety reasons due to a lack of proper equipment. To address this recommendation, the VPD conducted a needs assessment of its public order equipment and determined where additional equipment was required. A number of equipment items were identified in the assessment including additional personal protective equipment Grab ‘n Go bags, a storage container, utility vehicles and trailers, as well as Tactical Support Unit equipment. Overall, the estimated cost for all of the equipment identified was approximately $465,000 (including funding for WPS). The VPD received a substantial private donation from the VPF to assist in funding the equipment acquisition, and improve the VPD’s capacity to respond to incidents of public disorder and crowd management. The VPF generously donated $300,000 to fund the majority of the public order and safety equipment identified in the needs assessment. Specifically, the contribution was used to purchase an additional 150 Grab ‘n Go bags and upgrade the existing 150 bags (see Figure 1), tactical gear, a large storage container, and two Gator utility vehicles with trailers. The remaining equipment costs were included in the 2012 VPD operating budget, approved by City Council on March 5. Acquisition for all of this equipment is underway, and its arrival is expected before the start of the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs.


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Figure 1: Newly Purchased Grab ‘n Go Crowd Management Equipment from the VPF Donation

The Independent and Ottawa Police Reviews also recommend that a process to replace faulty equipment during an event should be communicated to all officers, including partner agencies (IR 2, OP 50). For instance, during the riot, an RCMP commander had problems with a malfunctioning VPD radio and was not able to replace it, forcing him to rely on direct verbal communication with a VPD commander. For all large events, a logistics officer(s) is identified in the operational plan and the officer(s) is responsible for ensuring that all equipment is functioning and ready for use during the event. A logistics officer was assigned for Game 7; therefore, the malfunctioning radio appears to be an anomaly that was not discovered prior to issuing the RCMP officers with radios. Nevertheless, the newly acquired Gator utility vehicles and trailers will enhance the process for transporting the recovery and replacement of faulty equipment during large events. The compact size of the utility vehicle will enable manoeuvrability through large crowds and reach officers more effectively. The trailers will serve a dual purpose: to transport the Gators to a location, and to then be affixed to the Gators to enable the movement of bulkier equipment. Officers with broken equipment can communicate to the logistics officer and request equipment replacement. The officers operating the utility vehicles will subsequently locate the officer in the crowd and replace their broken equipment. The VPD will continue to assign a logistics officer(s) in the operational plan for large events, to ensure that these issues do not occur in the future. Equipment needs were communicated to police members from external agencies, ahead of a Game 7 deployment; however, a number of officers from external agencies arrived to the event without the stipulated equipment. The Ottawa Police Review recommends that equipment requirements must be clearly planned, communicated, and documented for all partner agencies, so they arrive prepared and ready to assist (OP 48). In response to this recommendation, the VPD has created an equipment checklist that will be distributed to external agencies prior to events that may require their assistance. This checklist will outline the equipment that officers from external agencies are expected to bring to the event.


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Operations Staging Areas Staging areas were identified for Game 7 to provide officers a designated area to access equipment and allow VPD PSU members and the RCMP to change from their regular uniforms into full riot gear. The VPD’s staging area was located outdoors, at the intersection of Nelson and Howe Streets, and the RCMP’s staging area was located on the ramp of the Courthouse on Howe Street. The Ottawa Police Review comments that publicly visible staging areas place officers in a vulnerable position. In fact, when officers were ordered to “kit‐up” during the riot, officers in adjacent areas were required to provide cover until officers were prepared for PSU duties. As a result, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that staging areas should be located in an enclosed space and consideration should be given to locating staging areas (multiple, if required) closer to the deployed members who may require their equipment (OP 38, OP 39). Deciding on staging areas is based on the event, the location, and the operational parameters of the police at the event. One of the challenges in identifying appropriate staging areas is the potential for spontaneous incidents erupting near the identified location, similar to the riot that occurred on Granville Street. VPD planners have recognized the significance of the location of staging areas and addressed these recommendations by using enclosed spaces during the Celebration of Light as well as for the Grey Cup. Enclosed spaces were used for staging areas during these events to ensure officers were not visible by the public and this practice will continue into the future. Training The VPD completed an internal questionnaire of all of its employees involved in the riot subsequent to the event. Responding officers identified that a lack of crowd management training created confusion, and they expressed a need for basic crowd management training to enhance their ability to respond in a public order event in support of PSU officers. While training of this nature occurred in 2009, ahead of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, there has been significant turnover in Patrol operations since that time. As a result, the VPD Review recommends that regular crowd management training for non‐PSU officers be examined in the context of VPD training priorities and that this examination is referred to the VPD Training Board (VPD 3). The VPD has identified crowd management training for non‐PSU members as a priority and this training will be incorporated into the VPD’s annual Cycle 2 training in April and May 2012. The training will be mandatory for all VPD members, including non‐Patrol officers in administrative and investigative units. The objective is to train all VPD officers on current crowd management tactics to ensure officers are prepared to respond to incidents of public disorder in the future. Going forward, this training will be conducted every two years, to ensure all officers are trained on current crowd management techniques. The VPD review also recommends that the CoV increase the VPD’s operating budget to incorporate additional funds for PSU training (VPD 8). The VPD Review identifies a need for additional PSU training for all of its members specifically assigned to public order duties. The VPD received $200,000 for PSU training in 2009 in preparation for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games; however, no money was received for PSU training in 2010 or 2011.


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The VPD sought an increase of $250,000 in the 2012 budget, specifically for PSU training. The CoV has reviewed this request and recommended a budget increase of only $100,000 since approved by Council on March 5. Interoperability RCMP Tactical Troop The VPD requested the assistance of the RCMP Tactical Troop for Game 7 to support VPD PSU teams. The RCMP Tactical Troop provided valuable assistance in controlling the crowds during the riot; however, when the order was given to the VPD PSU to “kit‐up”, the RCMP was unclear on its role in support of the public safety operation. As a result, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that for major events, where neighbouring police agencies contribute personnel, the VPD should assign a dedicated liaison officer to physically co‐locate with them to ensure consistent, reliable communications and tactical deployment (OP 21). The VPD has taken the necessary steps to address this recommendation by identifying a VPD liaison to co‐locate with outside police agencies during large events. Beginning with the Celebration of Light, EOPS identified a VPD member to accompany the RCMP Tactical Troop command team and maintain a constant communication link with VPD command. A VPD Commander and Tactical Advisor were also present and provided input at the RCMP Tactical Troop briefing, further enhancing communication between the two agencies. A VPD liaison was subsequently identified for the Occupy Vancouver protests and the Grey Cup and this practice will continue for all large events where outside agencies are deployed with the VPD. The continued partnership between the VPD and the RCMP public order teams will enhance the interoperability for major events, regardless of their location. Technology There was a significant amount of information flow during the riot, resulting in unclear communications between front‐line officers and between command staff. For example, Silver Command faced several challenges gaining an accurate picture of the situation on the ground, given that they were inundated with information streaming into the DOC. During the riot, multiple incidents were erupting at various locations throughout the downtown core, including fights, medical emergencies and looting. As a result, Silver Command had difficulty in organizing the information effectively to make necessary operational decisions. The Ottawa Police Review recommends the VPD explore the use of proven technologies to assist senior commanders in gaining a more thorough awareness of exactly what is transpiring on the ground (OP 27). The Ottawa Police use the examples of mapping technology, such as GPS, be used to track incidents, monitor the movements of emergency services personnel, and provide real‐time updates on crowd movements. In response to this recommendation, the VPD has created a technology working group that includes a Public Order Commander, the Public Order Coordinator, and representatives from our Information Technology Section. The working group is currently researching various options suitable for police


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operations in public order situations and aligned with our current technical infrastructure. The VPD currently has the capabilities to use GPS technology; however, the time required to research these options is significant, and the acquisition of suitable solutions that work with CoV Emergency Management will require further funding.


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Outcomes – Shared or Regional Responsibility 58 recommendations in the Riot Reviews require collaborative implementation from various stakeholders to effectively conclude them. Once an owner agency was identified, discussions with those agencies were initiated by the Implementation Team to determine the best approach to address the various recommendations. The CoV has implemented several initiatives to address recommendations and strengthen coordinated planning processes and response to major events. For example, the creation of the CLEOC and APG provide excellent platforms for all agencies to participate during event planning, and to ensure all elements of an event are adequately addressed. The following section outlines recommendations from the Riot Reviews that require collaborative efforts from multiple agencies to implement the recommendations, and where the VPD has had an active involvement in the outcomes. Planning Integrated Planning The VPD works in cooperation with the CoV and other stakeholders throughout the year to plan events that are safe for the public and event participants. During the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, regular meetings were held to organize events and plans were adjusted according to game dynamics. As the Canucks progressed through each playoff series, planning evolved to address elements such as an increase in crowd size and changes in demographics. A Live Site was created by the CoV as it became apparent that a large number of fans were travelling downtown to watch the game and celebrate the Canucks’ success. Partner agencies were active participants in organizing the playoffs and providing feedback on the logistics of the Live Site. Although collaborative planning was recognized as successful for the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, all four Riot Reviews identify a need to enhance the planning processes and recommend that the CoV develop an integrated framework that includes all relevant stakeholders (IR 2, IR 30, OP 1, OP 6, OP 7, and CoV 3). An integrated planning framework would provide a structured approach to planning events in Vancouver and would include all relevant partner agencies. The CoV has taken steps to address this recommendation by creating a structured planning framework that provides an integrated approach for planning events in the city. The CLEOC as well as the APG have been created to address the lack of a structured framework. The CLEOC and APG incorporate all partner agencies that are responsible for various aspects of an event including policing, emergency response, communications and Transit. All partner agencies are engaged early in the planning process and meet on a regular basis to define roles and responsibilities for various events. The VPD has an active role in both of these working groups. Risk Assessment Framework The reviews also recommend that a risk assessment process be developed by the CoV to provide a structured approach for event planners to determine the level of planning effort required for an event


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(IR 1, OP 5, CoV 3, and CoV 4). Risk assessments are beneficial during event planning to specify criteria that would facilitate modifications to planning in order to adjust to the event. For example, the VPD determines the threat assessment level for each event and adjusts that level based on certain elements of the event. Creating a risk assessment tool that can be utilized by all partner agencies will enhance the event planning process and clearly outline the requirements of an event based on the risk identified. The risks can then be addressed collaboratively with all relevant planning partners. In response to these recommendations, the CoV and VPD created a risk assessment framework, based on best practices from the United States and the UK. The risk assessment tool will be used in cooperation with partner agencies to assess the level of planning required for specific events. It is an excellent tool that will be used for all large events, to identify risks to public safety, emergency responders and event hosts. The framework will be driven by the CoV at the CLEOC and APG levels, and the VPD will actively participate in the process. It will require agencies to conduct pre‐event site inspections to identify any hazards or concerns for the event. The CoV will subsequently consult with the appropriate agency to address any risks identified during the site inspection process. The requirement for site inspections also addresses an Ottawa Police recommendation for coordinated site inspections (OP 36). The Ottawa Police Review comments that site inspections for the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs were not conducted on a regular basis, resulting in a number of hazards within and surrounding the Live Site that were not identified. To illustrate, site inspections were conducted for Game 1 of the Stanley Cup Finals in which fencing was erected at the Granville Street Live Site. The site inspection identified that the design of the fencing hampered a smooth flow of pedestrian traffic through the site. At the time, there was insufficient time to remove it; however, the issue was nevertheless identified as a result of the site visit. On the other hand, pre‐event site inspections were not conducted for Game 7 and, as a result, a number of hazards within the Live Site and the surrounding areas were not identified. For example, a pre‐event site inspection could have identified the need for the vehicles parked in front of the Canada Post building to be removed; instead, they were targeted and lit on fire during the riot. The recently formed CLEOC and APG will be responsible for coordinating site inspections given that all relevant stakeholders are active participants in these groups. The newly designed risk assessment framework will ensure that the identified risks and site inspections are documented properly. VPD planners will continue to work with the CLEOC and APG, and conduct coordinated site visits when initiated by these groups. VPD’s Risk Assessment Process In addition to participating with the CoV planning groups and coordinated risk assessment process, the VPD has also developed a Risk Assessment Matrix specific for policing large events. The VPD risk assessment tool is based on the CoV framework; however, the document has been adjusted to incorporate elements of an event that are specific to policing. VPD command staff or planners may conduct independent risk assessments for events where the CoV does not utilize their framework or require coordinated site visits, but the VPD feels that elements of an event may pose a risk to public safety. This will enable the VPD to facilitate its own risk assessment and pre‐event site visit, based on a


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consistent approach. If risk is identified, and needs to be communicated to the CoV, necessary communication will flow through the new APG and CLEOC processes. To illustrate, the VPD conducted pre‐event site inspections prior to the Grey Cup and a number of issues were identified in and around the event sites. As a result, they were subsequently addressed by the responsible agency, thereby increasing the safety of the event sites. The VPD will continue to work with the CoV CLEOC and APG groups and conduct coordinated site visits when initiated by the CoV as well as conduct independent assessments when the need has been identified. Live Site The CoV created a Live Site for the public to gather and watch the game on large screens in the downtown core. As the crowds began to grow during the playoff series, it became apparent that the CoV needed to provide a venue for fans to congregate and watch the game. The Live Site was a legacy of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in which a number of Live Sites were created throughout downtown Vancouver for the public to enjoy. The Live Site for the Stanley Cup playoffs was originally intended to create a family‐friendly environment, similar to the success of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games Live Sites. However, as the Canucks progressed through the playoffs into the final round, the demographics and demeanour of the crowds changed dramatically. The crowds shifted from a family‐friendly jovial crowd to a highly intoxicated crowd composed primarily of young males. On the night of the riot, approximately 55,000 people were at the Live Site as well as an estimated 100,000 people in adjacent areas throughout the downtown core. The VPD and Independent Reviews recommend that the CoV, in consultation with partner agencies, review and establish standards for Live Site design and acquire improved temporary facilities such as fencing, staging, screen, sound, and light technologies (VPD 7, IR 31). The design, location, and logistics of a Live Site require extensive planning and adequate security plans to ensure public safety. If the CoV wishes to build on the success of Live Sites that were created for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, developing standards to operate successful Live Site venues is crucial. The newly formed CLEOC and APG are where discussions occur about planning elements, including Live Site logistics for large events such as the Stanley Cup playoffs. The VPD, along with other stakeholders, participate in this process, to plan and facilitate large events in Vancouver. The VPD is welcome to provide input and voice any concerns regarding an event including Live Sites. For instance, during the planning phases of the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, the VPD provided input on a number of the logistics with the Live Site. If the CLEOC would like to establish standards for Live Sites, the VPD would be supportive in developing appropriate measures to ensure public safety. Until then, the VPD will be an active participate in the event planning process with the CLEOC and APG. Private Security During the final series of the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, two private security agencies were hired to provide an additional role in the overall security operations at the Live Site. However, problems arose as their ability to provide adequate liquor interdiction such as bag checks and pat downs at the Live Site entry points was inadequate. Compounding this problem, it was unclear to some as to what the role of the police was in supporting private security. As a result, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that


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there must be early agreement, early planning, and a shared understanding about who is responsible for security measures at controlled access points (OP 34). As well, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that when engaging private security services, it is imperative that they possess the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities (OP 35). The decision to hire private security and ensure they are qualified to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities rests with the event organizers. If private security is present, the VPD will work in cooperation with security to ensure that each agency understands its roles and responsibilities for the event. The VPD is very experienced working alongside private security firms at different venues they police. Examples include Rogers Arena, BC Place, and the PNE. BC Place and Rogers Arena host hundreds of events each year, most of which have some VPD involvement. The NCOs deployed to these events are provided with the operational plan that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of police and private security at the venue. Regardless, all future operational plans and briefings will clearly define the roles of both groups. Role clarity is essential for effective operations at these types of special events. Transit Police The Transit Police provide regional policing for Metro Vancouver’s various SkyTrain lines. The Transit Police are active participants in a number of planning groups at both the CoV, and with VPD’s EOPS. Collaborative planning with the Transit Police is pivotal to the successful policing of large events in Vancouver, given the large number of people who use transit for transportation to these events. EOPS and the Transit Police will continue to develop regional liquor interdiction strategies to help mitigate the level of intoxication and public consumption of alcohol during events. Liquor interdiction strategies were developed for the Stanley Cup playoffs; however, the size of the crowds on transit grew significantly in Game 7, thereby liquor interdiction and enforcement strategies were impossible to accomplish. The Independent Review recognizes the importance of the planning partnership between the VPD and the Transit Police and recommends that TransLink and/or the Transit Police participate as appropriate and necessary in the planning of events as well as participate with other event partners in the coordination and oversight of regional events as appropriate (IR 46, IR 47). The Transit Police actively participated with the VPD during the planning stages of the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs and has continued this practice for the Celebration of Light and the Grey Cup. The VPD invites the Transit Police to attend the VPD DOC, to provide real‐time liaison between the two agencies, and to ensure the VPD is aware of the crowd volumes coming in on transit. Further, this liaison also serves to ensure that liquor interdiction is coordinated at both the stations and on the trains. The Transit Police also participate in the CoV’s newly developed planning groups, the CLEOC and APG. Therefore, the Transit Police are actively involved in planning specifically with the VPD for policing purposes, as well as collaboratively with all relevant partner agencies in the region that are responsible for planning large events.


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Research into Crowd Control Strategies Early arrival of the crowds was not anticipated for Game 7 and provided significant challenges to the VPD as most fans arrived downtown prior to police deployment. As a result, the VPD was not able to set the tone for its proactive ‘meet and greet’ policing style that has proven successful with large crowds in the past. As well, the VPD was not able to monitor the crowds early enough as the VPD DOC was not activated until late afternoon. While a transit representative was present in the DOC, the transit operations centre was not operational early enough to monitor the number of people arriving by public transit. As a result, the Ottawa Police and CoV Reviews recommend that strategies to monitor and manage crowd volumes should be in place from the outset as they were for the 2010 Olympics (IR 2, OP 3, OP 29, and CoV 5). The Ottawa Police Review also recommends that additional research should be undertaken to determine best practices domestically and internationally (OP 31). The Ottawa Police Review comments that with another SkyTrain line coming on stream, the value of crowd monitoring will become increasingly important. The VPD has taken steps to address these recommendations by building early intelligence with the AIT through their site visits and crowd monitoring. AIT will provide regular updates to Silver Command on the size and demeanour of the crowds and Silver Commanders will subsequently decide whether early deployment is necessary to address the crowd volumes. As well, the VPD has also conducted research into best practices on crowd management strategies across North American police agencies. The VPD has recognized the potential impact the additional SkyTrain line might have in increasing crowd volumes to large events. A Transit Police member will continue to be present in the VPD DOC to liaise with the TransLink Operations Centre, to assess the number of people traveling by public transit to the event. In addition to the Transit liaison, the VPD has taken the initiative to contact other North American police agencies to determine what crowd management strategies they have employed during large events. A number of police agencies across North America were contacted to determine strategies that may be recognized as best practices in crowd management. Several of the police departments contacted have formal partnerships with local transit authorities and have developed coordinated strategies to monitor and manage large crowds during major events. A number of cities have independent transit police services similar to Vancouver’s Transit Police system and are actively involved with Transit Police during planning for large events. Strategies identified by the departments to monitor and manage crowds during large events include closing down stations when crowds become significant, slowing down trains, and skipping stations. A number of departments commented that cameras in stations and trains allow for constant updates of the size of the crowds on the trains. TransLink and the Transit Police currently utilize a number of these strategies to monitor and manage crowds on the transit systems. Strategies including monitoring station cameras, skipping stops, closing stations, and increasing the number of trains provide additional capacity and are options currently available for Transit Police to help control crowds during large events. These options are worthy of consideration for command staff at major events, with care given that some of these actions can cause considerable inconvenience for individuals, including individuals wishing to leave an incident of public disorder. Strategies to better manage crowd volumes are discussed during collaborative planning with the Transit Police as well as during CLEOC and APG discussions at the CoV. Therefore, crowd monitoring


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strategies will be carefully considered during the event planning process to determine whether the scope of the event may require any of these actions from TransLink and Transit Police. Command and Control The VPD utilizes a Gold/Silver/Bronze command model during public order situations. The CoV, VFRS, and BCAS all follow ICS, locally referred to as the British Columbia Emergency Response Management System (BCERMS). Although the two models are remarkably similar, and can easily operate together, the Ottawa Police Review makes several recommendations related to linking the two different command structures (OP 11, OP 12, and OP 13). The Gold/Silver/Bronze model has been utilized by the VPD since 2006. This model was developed in the UK and focuses predominantly on crowd management and public order policing events. Gold/Silver/Bronze translates to strategic, tactical, and operational levels of command and control, and has been fully endorsed by the VPD at both the planning and operational levels. The Gold Commander is the strategic decision‐maker that is typically assigned for large events. At the strategic level, the Gold Commander determines the policing style and the overall strategy for the event. Silver Command operates as the tactical level of command, and is responsible for the operational aspects of the event. The Silver Commander communicates with the Gold Commander and informs them of what is transpiring on the ground. Bronze Command operates at ground level, and is responsible for carrying out Silver Command’s tactical plans. BCERMS is based on the ICS model, and provides a framework for coordinated and organized response and recovery to all emergency incidents and disasters. The ICS model is a consequence management system designed to enable incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure. For events that have the potential to become emergency incidents or disasters, the ICS structure could be utilized, but this model would need to be identified during planning stages of the event. Game 7, in comparison, was not anticipated or declared an emergency incident during the planning stages. Therefore, the Gold/Silver/Bronze public order command structure continued as the appropriate and effective command structure during the riot. The VPD is fully compliant with the BCERMS model, and is heavily invested in its success within the province. The VPD will operate under this model during emergency situations where an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) is activated, and ICS is required. All VPD officers receive level 100 ICS training at the Justice Institute of British Columbia during recruit training and many officers have subsequently received ICS levels 200, 300, and 400 training. The VPD’s 11 Public Order Commanders have all been trained to ICS level 100, and six have been trained through to level 400. In addition to the ICS training, the VPD DOC is a fully functioning command centre that has been designed according to the BCERMS model. The Ottawa Police Review recommends that all emergency services should work towards the integration of command structures to streamline security operations around major events (OP 11). The review also recommends that, at minimum, emergency services should educate each other on their respective decision‐making models and the linkages between the ICS and the Gold/Silver/Bronze model. The Ottawa Police suggest this can be further enhanced through mock scenarios (OP 12).


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The VPD believes the two command structures can operate effectively together for large events. For events that require public order command, the VPD will continue to use the Gold/Silver/Bronze structure for policing purposes. For emergency incidents or disasters that require the ICS structure to be implemented, the VPD is fully trained to ICS standards and will work cooperatively with partner agencies under this model. Similar arrangements worked extremely well during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games as the RCMP‐led Integrated Security Unit employed a Gold/Silver/Bronze command and control model. Additionally, coordinated table top exercises are conducted for major events; therefore, the linkages between these two command structures can be exercised for an event. A comparative analysis of the two models provides an illustration of the interoperability and adaptability of the Gold/Silver/Bronze and ICS models at both the planning and operational phases. Figure 2: Comparison between Gold/Silver/Bronze and ICS Models

This comparative model was reviewed with CoV Emergency Management and they are wholly conversant in the parallel application of both models. Emergency Management has no expectation that the VPD will plan a public order policing plan using BCERMS. They also acknowledge that both models can freely coexist, and the Gold/Silver/Bronze model can easily be drawn into a larger EOC operation running under the BCERMS model.


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Educating stakeholders on the command structure is essential, and will need to occur during the planning phases with all the necessary stakeholders present. The newly developed CLEOC and APG are excellent platforms to identify and communicate the command structure(s) for an event, and to identify commander equivalents from various agencies to solidify the linkages between the two models. Given that the VPD is one stakeholder within these broader planning groups, it should be recognized that it is not solely responsible for determining if an EOC and BCERMS model are put in place. That said, if the VPD is policing a public order event that does not stray into consequence management, it will continue to utilize best practices from the UK, and operate a Gold/Silver/Bronze command structure for policing. The Ottawa Police Review also identifies a need to develop a common command and control standard for incident/event management across the country (OP 13). The scope of this recommendation is beyond the VPD’s capability of implementing; however, the VPD has taken measures to include the RCMP and other municipal police forces in recent Gold/Silver/Bronze command training in February and March 2012. The VPD has developed a strong partnership with the West Midlands Police Service (UK) and candidates from the VPD, RCMP, and other municipal police departments have actively participated in this experience. This will build on the joint Gold/Silver/Bronze command experiences that the RCMP and VPD shared during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. Further, collaborative command training, with representatives from police agencies across the region, will develop common command and control standards for future major events in Metro Vancouver. Command Considerations In addition to recommendations specific to the command structure for large events, the Ottawa Police Review makes a number of recommendations to co‐locate commanders from the VPD, the BCAS, and VFRS at the Bronze, Silver, and Gold levels (OP 14, OP 15, and OP 16). During the riot, Bronze commanders (or equivalent) from emergency response agencies were located in different areas throughout the crowds. VPD Bronze Commanders were involved in the front‐line operations, the BCAS Commander was located within the GED, and the VFRS Commander was situated atop the Canada Post building. As well, operational commanders (Silver Command) were also not co‐located during the riot. The VPD Silver Commander was located in the VPD DOC, the BCAS Commander was located on the ground, and the VFRS Commander was located in a Deconfliction Unit at BCAS headquarters. To address these recommendations, the decision to co‐locate commanders has been incorporated into the newly developed VPD planning frameworks developed specifically for Gold and Silver Commanders. The Gold and Silver Command planning frameworks deliver planning tools that will be used by the VPD to consider all elements of policing large events, and foster collaborative decision making with relevant stakeholders. Specifically, the Gold Command framework is intended for planning at the strategic level, and includes elements such as resource requirements, police objectives, media strategies, communication requirements, and event ownership. Whereas the Silver Command framework is designed for the tactical and operational levels planners and Silver Commanders. While it covers similar planning elements, they are focussed more at the operational level. Both planning frameworks incorporate the required elements of an event that the VPD must consider during event planning, and much of this will be brought forth collaboratively at the CLEOC and APG meetings. The CLEOC and APG are intended to discuss event elements, including the determination of whether the co‐location of emergency service commanders is required. This decision requires


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consensus from all relevant stakeholders and not solely by the VPD; therefore, the CoV planning groups are excellent platforms for these collaborative decisions. The VPD is presently going through a procurement process to acquire a Multi‐Purpose Command Vehicle (MPCV). This project pre‐dated the 2011 Stanley Cup riot, but is progressing well. Funding for the MPCV was also the result of a generous $500,000 donation from the VPF. This mobile command facility is designed for field command, and has the capability of serving multiple agencies in an event such as the riot. While the MPCV will not be available in time for the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs, delivery is anticipated in early 2013 and it will be an asset available for deployment at all large events thereafter. In addition to whether commanders should be co‐located during an event, the frameworks address recommendations related to event planning that were made in the Independent Review. For example, the Independent Review recommends that the CoV and partner agencies commit to further education and experiences for key organizers so that we can take advantage of best practices that are currently being followed in other jurisdictions at home and abroad (IR 32). In fact, the Independent reviewers attached a planning framework as an appendix to its review and recommend that the CoV accept and adapt the framework and commit to developing a new planning tool to assist with the timely coordination and delivery of events of a regional nature (IR 29). The VPD has taken the initiative to develop planning frameworks specific for policing large events, based on best practices from the UK and from the experiences of VPD’s POG and operational planners. The planning frameworks will ensure that the VPD considers all required elements during the event planning process both internally with EOPS planners and externally with partner agencies. Liquor Alcohol consumption has been recognized as a major contributing factor to the challenges police faced on the day of Game 7 and during the riot. The level of alcohol consumption was substantially higher on the day of Game 7, compared to previous games during the Stanley Cup playoffs. Although liquor strategies utilized by the police were effective in previous rounds of the playoffs, including the early stages of the final series, the density and intoxication levels of the crowds made it virtually impossible for police to intervene. Alcohol factors have been identified in all Riot Reviews as a contributing factor to the riot and a number of recommendations have been made as a result. The Independent Review recommends that the practice of alcohol pour‐outs continue but that the police make greater use of ticketing for offenders; that appropriate fines be attached to these offences as a deterrent to the behaviour; and that a publicity campaign announce stepped‐up enforcement where warranted for a specific type of event (IR 22). Violation tickets have the potential to deter individuals from committing illegal acts such as consuming alcohol in a public place as well as deter those that receive a fine from committing the act in the future. On the night of the riot, issuing violation tickets for liquor offences was not a feasible option given the size and density of the crowd. Issuing violation tickets requires officers to remove themselves from their duties which at times could place the officer at risk.


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Despite these challenges, the VPD is supportive of making greater use of ticketing for those committing liquor offences. The VPD has taken appropriate actions to address this recommendation by re‐educating VPD officers on current liquor offences, violation tickets and their attached fines, as well as recommend that ticketing be used whenever feasible during events. A VPD internal training bulletin has been created and officers are encouraged during briefings to issue violation tickets when possible in addition to pour outs. For example, the electronic briefing for the Grey Cup included the recommendation to issue violation tickets whenever possible. The VPD is also in consultation with the LCLB to discuss the availability of pre‐printed liquor violation tickets. A pre‐printed ticket will streamline the process, reduce errors in ticketing, and expedite the process to free up the officer’s time. The LCLB recognizes the efficiency of pre‐printed tickets and is currently exploring this option with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia to determine whether this is available. This recommendation also requires an examination of liquor fine amounts to determine whether fines are set at an appropriate level that will provide adequate penalty and deterrence. The VPD has consulted with the LCLB on current fine amounts for liquor offences and the LCLB informed the Implementation Team that fine amounts were reviewed two years ago and were increased accordingly (IR 27). If a need is identified for an increase in fine amounts, the LCLB would be supportive if necessary. The recommendation for a publicity campaign on liquor enforcement (IR 28) also falls to the LCLB to facilitate as they are the appropriate agency for such an initiative. The VPD does disseminate public messaging for large events, via traditional social media, and advises the public that liquor enforcement will be increased for an event. To illustrate, the VPD informs the public prior to major events that officers will be lawfully searching for liquor and if found, the alcohol will be poured out and the user will be fined. The VPD’s media messaging supports responsible celebration and encourages everyone to be safe when attending events in Vancouver. Liquor Interdiction During the planning stages of the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, a number of liquor interdiction strategies were developed in collaboration with partner agencies. The VPD worked in cooperation with the Transit Police to provide liquor interdiction at SkyTrain stations to limit the amount of alcohol coming into the downtown core. The VPD also requested that external police agencies dedicate resources to SkyTrain stations to screen individuals boarding the trains for alcohol possession and consumption, although the commitment of resources by other police agencies was inconsistent. Finally, VPD members assigned to the Live Site and surrounding areas provided a strong police presence and liquor enforcement. The Independent Review recommends that TransLink should lead a process for the development of best practices for alcoholic beverage interdiction on and around its system (IR 19). The process should include police services in the region and senior representatives of the LCLB. Further, the Review recommends that these practices include provisions for collaboration between Transit Police, local police services, private security, and carefully selected volunteers, to ensure ample coverage. The VPD supports continued development of robust liquor interdiction strategies on and around the transit system, when they serve to feed the crowds into large celebration areas. Given the contributing


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role alcohol played on Game 7, and during the riot, the VPD recognizes the importance of liquor interdiction on the transit system given the large number of fans that utilize public transit to arrive to events in and around Vancouver. Ahead of the Celebration of Light festival in 2011, the Transit Police and partner agencies developed a regional liquor interdiction plan to ensure that liquor interdiction and enforcement was conducted across all relevant jurisdictions. The Transit Police assigned a Bronze Commander, who was deployed specifically for liquor interdiction, and all police services agreed to dedicate resources to support liquor interdiction strategies. There was a more consistent and robust response from other police agencies for the Celebration of Light, and it was quite effective. Collaborative planning continued for the Grey Cup festival at the CLEOC level which included Transit Police, local police agencies, and representatives from the LCLB. Looking forward to the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs, the VPD will implement high‐profile liquor interdiction strategies in and around known celebration areas. These strategies will begin early in the playoffs and will be a coordinated effort with the Transit Police, other regional police forces on the SkyTrain lines, and with the LCLB. Liquor Store Closures On the night of Game 7, many individuals in the crowds were observed to be openly consuming alcohol and were highly intoxicated, in spite of early liquor store closures by the LCLB. As mentioned, alcohol has been recognized as a major contributor to the riot, contributing to intoxicated, uninhibited and hostile crowds determined to cause harm to property and to the police. Controlling a crowd comprised primarily of young intoxicated males creates a challenging and unpredictable situation for police to effectively respond to. The Independent and Ottawa Police Reviews recommend that in situations where there is a strategic advantage, event planners should consider the option of closing down liquor stores to limit levels of public intoxication (IR 23, OP 40). Liquor stores were closed prior to Game 6 of the Stanley Cup Finals creating an element of surprise for those individuals that planned on purchasing alcohol downtown prior to watching the game. The VPD observed that liquor store closures for Game 6 were successful in limiting the availability of alcohol. Unfortunately, fans anticipated the early closure of liquor stores for Game 7 and either purchased or consumed alcohol prior to arriving downtown. In fact, due to the “crush level” crowds on public transit, individuals were observed openly drinking on the SkyTrain without the ability of police to interdict. During the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, VPD planners and Executive members communicated regularly with representatives from the LCLB. Liquor interdiction strategies were developed during VPD’s operational planning phases, as part of an overall liquor interdiction plan. As well, after the increase in crowd size and alcohol consumption that was observed during Game 5, the VPD voiced its concerns to the LCLB, which made the decision to close the liquor stores early for Game 6 and subsequently for Game 7. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of both the VPD and LCLB, the early and excessive consumption of alcohol was a significant issue on the night of the riot. The VPD believes that it currently addresses this recommendation during its event planning phases with the LCLB. The VPD and LCLB recognize that during the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, the consumption of alcohol increased substantially as the Canucks progressed through the playoffs. Both agencies are


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equally committed to controlling the illegal consumption and distribution of liquor around these events, and will continue to proactively strategize the best methods to accomplish this goal. Communications As previously discussed, the amount of radio traffic during the riot resulted in a number of communications problems. The Ottawa Police Review comments that the communications framework for Game 7 was inadequate and needs to be improved for future large events. To illustrate, the amount of traffic on one of the operational channels became unmanageable during the riot, resulting in unclear communication of decisions to officers, and specifically the order for the RCMP to “kit‐up.” As well, given the amount of traffic on the cell phone networks, Commanders were unable to communicate with one another using their mobile phones. Finally, Commanders and NCOs were not able to receive instruction from Command staff as they could not access the operational radio channel on their radios. The Ottawa Police Review recommends that a scalable communications framework should be in place for each major event. The framework should clearly identify a Command Channel and any other channel that might be necessary based on geography or functional units. It is recommended that E‐Comm be engaged in developing this framework (OP 44). As well, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that a communications radio frequency should be utilized to link all agency commanders during a major event (OP 45). To address these recommendations, the VPD’s EOPS and Communications Section and E‐Comm have committed to enhancing collaborative planning between the two agencies to ensure that communication challenges such as these are prevented in the future. Prior to the riot, E‐Comm was not actively involved with the VPD during major event planning. Since then, EOPS has been in discussion with the E‐Comm police liaison around major events and E‐Comm has been actively involved in the planning for more recent large events, including the Celebration of Light, Occupy Vancouver protests and the Grey Cup. The VPD also has access to five separate event channels which are used during major events that involve a potential multi‐agency response. Radio channels will be requested by the VPD, in collaboration with E‐Comm, and will allow for the inclusion of external agencies assigned or agencies responding as mutual aid. These radio channels are interoperable, which will link all agency commanders during a major event. The designated radio channels will be included in all future VPD operational plans, as well as electronic briefings. To illustrate, electronic briefings for Occupy Vancouver protests as well as the Grey Cup included operational and command channels that were assigned for the event. In addition to inefficiencies relating to VPD’s communications framework and radio frequency, the Ottawa Police Review also comments that some officers were not logged on to the E‐Comm Computer Aided Dispatch system during the riot. As a result, officers were placed at greater risk, as E‐Comm dispatchers were unaware of the officers’ locations if they required assistance. The Ottawa Police Review recommends that an automated process be developed to trigger a formal requirement to situate an E‐Comm staff member within the VPD kiosk at major events. The Ottawa Police Review comments that the E‐Comm staff member would be responsible for capturing the necessary log‐in data from all officers being deployed (OP 46).


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This process has been employed by the VPD in the past, and remains a consideration when planning special events. The requirement of situating an E‐Comm employee within the kiosk is predicated on the number of officers expected to be deployed, and takes into consideration any contingency plans. To address this recommendation, the VPD has included this requirement in the newly developed planning frameworks to ensure that this process is considered during the planning stages of every event. Operations The size and demeanour of the crowds on the night of Game 7 resulted in multiple riots erupting simultaneously in different locations throughout the downtown core. This created significant challenges for the VPD and other emergency responders, as crowd density impeded the ability of the VPD and BCAS to respond to criminal acts and medical emergencies. Additionally, VFRS was unable to manoeuvre through the crowds with their bulky equipment to extinguish fires. These unique challenges were identified in the Ottawa Police and Independent Reviews and, as a result, the reviews recommend that contingency planning should include events with multiple incidents and multiple locations followed by table top exercises to test the effectiveness of those plans (IR 2, OP 28). The VPD conducted table top exercises prior to the 2010 Winter Olympic Games and has committed to developing public order table top exercises for training and problem‐solving, prior to major events. The VPD POG has subject matter experts with capabilities and expertise to develop and facilitate these exercises. They will be coordinating two table top exercises in May 2012, prior to the projected dates of the final rounds of the Stanley Cup playoffs. Partner agencies will be invited to participate in the table top exercises to ensure that event planning is consistent with operational parameters. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) CCTV is used for large events in public areas, under the direction of the CoV, to provide situational awareness and public safety. CCTV provides real‐time information to police and CoV operation centres, and is instrumental for monitoring crowd volumes and movement during large events. For instance, CCTV was beneficial during the riot for tracking crowds and assisting police commanders to direct resources to appropriate areas. The CoV Review recommends that the CoV continue and enhance the use of CCTV for special events and should bring forward updated policy with regard to future CCTV use (CoV 11). As well, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that the CoV should streamline the existing process that provides planners and public safety partners with timely access to CCTV systems for large‐scale events (OP 47). The CoV is responsible for the implementation and maintenance of CCTV, and has a working policy on the use of public camera systems. CoV Emergency Management is currently updating this policy for presentation to City Council. The VPD has long maintained its support for the use of CCTV in the Granville Entertainment District. It has repeatedly proven itself to be a useful tool to enhance public safety for large events, as experienced in limited deployments during the Celebration of Light and Stanley Cup playoffs. A more robust system of CCTV was deployed during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, and this system kept operational decision‐makers fully informed in the EOC, VPD DOC, and RCMP‐led Gold and Silver Command Centres in Richmond. CCTV provides a visual picture of what is happening at ground level,


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thereby enabling commanders to confidently allocate resources to the appropriate areas. As well, CCTV has proven to be exceptionally beneficial for investigators during post‐event investigations, enabling the identification of criminals committing violent crime and destroying property. There is also a crime‐prevention/deterrent benefit, in that if offenders know they are being captured by CCTV, they may be less likely to commit crimes; the deterrent value associated to the images of rioters being frequently broadcast today is likely very high. The value of CCTV for policing cannot be overstated. The VPD will continue to advocate for the reinstallation of the legacy 2010 Winter Olympic Games CCTV infrastructure, and collaboratively develop a robust strategy for using CCTV during high‐risk public events and gatherings of large crowds, while recognizing the privacy interests of law‐abiding citizens on the streets of Vancouver. Volunteers The CoV and Independent Review Teams both recommend that the CoV and partner agencies develop a volunteer program to provide support during large events in Vancouver (IR 33, IR 34, IR 35, IR 36, IR 37, IR 38, IR 51, and CoV 9). Building on the 2010 Winter Olympic Games experience and success, volunteers can be used during events to work in cooperation with police and event organizers to provide a positive sense of community for those that attend the events. The use of volunteers provides an added presence and promotes self‐policing within a crowd. The CoV has taken the initiative to create a City Volunteer Work Group to develop a volunteer program for large events. At the outset, organizers from across Metro Vancouver were invited to discuss their experiences with volunteer programs and provide feedback on the success of their internal volunteer pools. The VPD has committed to participating in this work group to develop an integrated volunteer program, coordinated under the umbrella of our Community and Public Affairs Section. The VPD has many volunteers working in community policing, victim services, citizen’s crime watch and other crime‐fighting programs. The intention is to leverage willing volunteers from these existing groups, under the umbrella of a larger ‘host’ program managed by the CoV, who would then be available to assist at large public events. Interoperability Crowd Management Tactics The Independent and Ottawa Police Reviews identify that the crowd management tactics that the VPD utilize are different than the RCMP use. On the night of the riot, there was some confusion on commanders’ roles and responsibilities, as well as the tactics being utilized. As a result, the Independent Review recommends that the RCMP tactical troop and VPD public order unit should train together and develop common tactics they can use as a unit during joint operations (IR 12). Further, the Ottawa Police Review recommends that partner agencies should conduct training and familiarization exercises on a regular basis (OP 25). Finally, the Ottawa Police also identifies a pressing need to develop provincial and national standards for crowd management (OP 24). While reviews acknowledge it is impracticable for the VPD and the RCMP to integrate their crowd management units or approaches, the VPD has taken steps to ensure that both agencies are familiar


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with each other’s tactics. Training was conducted in October 2011, to familiarize the VPD and RCMP on their respective crowd management approaches. The training successfully accomplished its objectives, familiarizing both agencies on their respective roles and responsibilities in a crowd management situation, as well as the command structure between the VPD and the RCMP. Further joint operational training with the RCMP and VPD Public Order officers is scheduled for April 2012, and the collaborative command training occurring in the UK will further solidify this working relationship. The VPD is also developing crowd management training that will be available for other regional police agencies to familiarize them with VPD crowd management tactics. The Independent Review recommends that all police services in BC continue to update their training and tactics in keeping with the latest research on crowd behaviour and crowd policing (IR 13). The VPD fully meets this recommendation as its PSU command staff have been recognized as subject matter experts in public order training and have developed comprehensive training programs that are offered to partner police and emergency response agencies. The VPD’s Public Order Coordinator ensures current trends in public order tactics are followed, and the VPD practices public order in accordance with international best practices. To illustrate, as there is no current national standard, the VPD has taken the initiative to develop partnerships with several agencies across Canada and within the UK. The VPD is an associate member of the Ontario Public Order Committee and communicates on a regular basis with this group to discuss best practices in public order training. As well, the VPD maintains a strong working relationship with the National Police Improvement Agency Regional Public Order Training Centre in the UK. This training centre has access to state‐of‐the‐art research facilities and shares their practices with the VPD’s Public Order Group. Members of the VPD’s Public Order Group have also been invited to participate on research committees at local universities, and the VPD is an active participant in the public order research conducted by the CACP. BCAS and VFRS Integration BCAS paramedics are embedded within the VPD PSU to enable an integrated response to emergency incidents during public order situations. Game 7 was the first time BCAS paramedics filled this role during a riot and this proved to be invaluable to citizens and police officers requiring medical attention in the crowds. The VPD Review recommends that the VPD continue to develop and formalize the integration of BCAS paramedics into the PSU, and explore the feasibility of integrating Vancouver VFRS members into the PSU (VPD 6). The Ottawa Police Review also recommends that the successful experience of the embedded paramedics should be considered for any future use of this program (OP 32). In response to this recommendation, the VPD and BCAS have committed to formalizing their partnership by creating an MOU. BCAS paramedics have been embedded with the VPD PSU for a number of years and the program has proved to be successful; however, there is no formal agreement between the two agencies. An MOU that defines various roles and responsibilities on elements such as command, equipment, and training is currently being finalized. The only outstanding issue that remains is financial responsibility and cost allocation between the two agencies.


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During the riot, it was challenging for VFRS to successfully deal with the number of fires spread throughout the downtown core, due to crowd density and the size of their apparatus. Most of the fires they dealt with required police escort to maneuver through the crowds. As a result, the VPD review as well as the Independent and Ottawa Police Reviews recommend the integration of VFRS members into the VPD PSU (VPD 6, IR 4, OP 33). Integrating VFRS members with the VPD PSU, similar to the inclusion of BCAS paramedics, would enable a collaborative emergency response in public order situations. Incidentally, the Independent Review recommends that the VPD, VFRS and BCAS undertake joint crowd control training exercises (IR 5). In response to this recommendation, the VPD has also been in discussions with VFRS to further involve firefighters with the PSU. The VPD has developed a joint training course for VFRS and BCAS, scheduled for April and May 2012. The training will educate VFRS members about the VPD’s public order practices, enabling them to become familiar with all public order crowd management tactics that are used during public order situations. The training will provide an invaluable understanding of the capability of police units to respond to riotous situations, and will assist the VFRS to develop their own response for fire suppression during riots. VFRS has committed to training its members in order to respond more effectively with police and BCAS paramedics during situations of public disturbance. BCAS will continue to support the VPD PSU and train their members alongside the VFRS to enable a collaborative response to public order situations where needed. Mutual Aid Police officers from across the Metro Vancouver region responded to assist the VPD on the night of the riot. The VPD initially deployed the RCMP Tactical Troop, as well as 12 members from Port Moody, Abbotsford, and West Vancouver. Once the riot began, Gold Command requested additional resources and a number of agencies provided officers to assist the VPD in controlling the riotous crowds. Police agencies across Metro Vancouver are supportive of their partner agencies for large events and will provide resources if assistance is requested. While there are no formal agreements governing shared resources for civil disturbance, mutual aid is governed by Section 68 – Requests for Temporary Assistance ‐ of the BC Police Act, as cited below: 68 (1) The provincial police force, a municipal police department or a designated policing unit must, on receiving a request for temporary assistance made by another police force, police department or designated policing unit, assign to the requesting police force, police department or designated policing unit the officers and equipment practicable to assign for the purpose. (2) A police force, police department or designated policing unit that requests and receives assistance under subsection (1) is responsible for all costs of that assistance. A number of recommendations have been made that identify a need to formalize shared resourcing and mutual aid for events considered regional in nature (IR 7, IR 8, IR 9, IR 10, IR 11, IR 14, IR 15, IR 48, and OP 17). These recommendations are partly addressed through existing integrated units and programs, including the Integrated Partnership for Regional Emergency Management in Metro Vancouver (IPREM) and Intersect Vancouver, in which the VPD actively participates. To address recommendations relating to shared resourcing for regional events, a regional MOU is currently being developed by Police Services.


44

IPREM IPREM is a collaborative intergovernmental body that focuses on improving emergency management at all levels of government across Metro Vancouver. IPREM was developed in 2009 to facilitate regional emergency management initiatives with support from various private and public organizations across the region. IPREM has recognized publicly that a number of Independent Review recommendations are addressed and can be incorporated within existing IPREM initiatives (IR 7, IR 8, IR 9, IR 14, IR 15). Specifically, solutions can be found within; All Hazard Integrated Regional Concept of Operations (IR 7, IR 9); Emergency Management BC Exercise Programs and IPREM workshops (IR 8); and, IPREM’s Emergency Communications Strategy Working Groups (IR 14, IR 15). Intersect Vancouver Intersect Vancouver is currently being developed to provide a communication and intelligence sharing network between Metro Vancouver municipalities. Intersect Vancouver is based on “Operation Intersect”, implemented in the Ottawa Capital Regional District. It provides an integrated readiness and response framework to mitigate, prevent, respond to, and recover from, emergencies and disasters. Intersect Vancouver includes representation from the CoV, the VPD, VFRS, the RCMP, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, partner police agencies, and Transit organizations. Intersect Vancouver is focused on providing a collaborative approach between emergency management officials for incidents that involve more than one agency. Regional MOU The VPD’s internal review identifies a need that funding be provided for events considered regional in nature that would enable the provincial police force to provide supplementary resources at no cost to the municipality where the event is occurring. Vancouver is host to a number of events every year that can be considered “regional events” whereby the majority of the event attendees are from outside of Vancouver’s boundary; however, Vancouver is currently responsible for policing the event with no financial assistance from outside agencies. Further, the Ottawa Police recommended that there should be an MOU developed among police services in and around the city of Vancouver to formalize and coordinate major event planning and, specifically, liquor interdiction strategies (OP 41). To address this recommendation, Police Services Division, within the Ministry of Justice in British Columbia, has initiated dialogue with the Metro region chiefs of police with the objective of developing an operational MOU specific to policing these extraordinary major events. While there does not appear to be any willingness from the Province to provide provincial policing resources to the CoV without a cost‐recovery model in place, there has been discussion among the chiefs of police relating to their operational policing needs. These discussions have ensued over the past two months and their next session is scheduled for late March. All of the regional chiefs of police are committed to identifying the best strategies and deployment options that ensure public safety, regardless of where these events occur in the Metro region. These strategies and deployment models should encompass all aspects of such events, from planning and


45

logistics, to the actual policing of the event and surrounding communities, to any protracted investigation that flows from large events with regionally‐based criminal activity. A signed MOU is the anticipated outcome of these meetings. Regionalization The Independent Review refers to the events on June 15, 2011 as a “regional riot”, as Vancouver is considered the regional centre of Metro Vancouver. The estimated crowd size of 155,000 for Game 7 was comprised mainly of young intoxicated individuals that lived outside of Vancouver’s city boundaries. The statistics associated to the riot include 432 recommended charges against 150 suspected rioters to date; only 16% of these suspects actually lived within the city limits1. The remaining offenders all came from surrounding municipalities. Nevertheless, the VPD is responsible for policing such events, at the expense of the taxpaying resident in Vancouver. This disproportionate cost burden would not exist if there was one metropolitan police force for the region. The current policing structure in Metro Vancouver creates a situation whereby regional taxpayers do not equally share in the delivery of police services. Metro Vancouver currently consists of 22 municipalities, policed by either the RCMP or an independent municipal police service. This “patchwork” of policing jurisdictions is unique in Canada; in fact, Vancouver is the last remaining large metropolitan area without some form of a regional police force. Proponents of regionalization feel that one regional police force in Metro Vancouver has the potential to improve communication and information sharing, crime prevention and response, investigative continuity, training, recruiting, cost effectiveness, and enable regional deployment. The current policing structure does not provide the opportunity for coordinated regional deployment in the event of a major incident or natural disaster. Although the VPD and partner police agencies are able to provide a collaborative police response as illustrated during the riot, a regional police force would provide a comprehensive structure that enables more efficient deployments. One police agency would control all police resources in the region and would not have to rely on the “good will” of other police agencies for such important strategies as a regional liquor interdiction plan. In addition, policing costs for these major events would be shared by all member municipalities in the regional force. The VPD has consistently advocated for one regional police service across Metro Vancouver. Vancouver is the “core city” of the region in which a large number of individuals travel to Vancouver for business and entertainment purposes. Furthermore, large events in Vancouver are often considered regional events in which the majority of patrons attending the event live outside the city of Vancouver. Regional events such as the annual Celebration of Light festival, the Stanley Cup playoffs and Occupy Vancouver protests are prime examples of events in which the VPD police the event with no financial assistance from outside municipalities or the Provincial Government. Major event policing is just one example of where incredible efficiencies would be found with a single police service. While the Independent Review did not choose to discuss this structural aspect of policing in the region as it related to the 2011 Stanley Cup riot, it is clear that a substantially more coordinated

1 This figure is based on statistics as of March 5, 2012.


46

approach would have been enabled that night if there was only one police department involved, under the command of one Gold Commander.

Conclusion

The events of June 15th left a black mark on the city of Vancouver that will be remembered for years to come. Combined with predictions of another long run in the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs, it also focuses much attention on both the City and the VPD going forward. The sprit of Vancouverites was best demonstrated in the days and weeks following the 2011 Stanley Cup riot, with volunteer clean‐up projects in the downtown core, and an outpouring of support for the VPD and other police and first responders who were protecting the city. The spirit of the VPD continues strong as well. A large and committed group of investigators are conducting the largest investigation of its kind in Canadian history, in an effort to hold all of the rioters accountable for their criminal behaviour. Organizationally, the VPD continues with its model of continuous evaluation and learning, and has embodied all of the recommendations into improved business practices, and increased operational effectiveness. Since the riot, all of the Riot Review recommendations have been examined by the Implementation Team and the appropriate owner agency was identified. All of the recommendations directed at the VPD, as well as recommendations where the VPD is a stakeholder are complete or actions are currently underway to ensure completion prior to the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs. Outstanding items include the regional MOU currently being developed by Police Services, the MOU between the VPD and BCAS, and technology solutions for the POG, as well as the potential for pre‐printed violation tickets for liquor enforcement. All of these initiatives should be complete by the beginning of the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs, the only exception being technology solutions given the wide scope and considerable cost of new technology. Until then, the VPD will utilize existing technology options during any future crowd management events to enhance its operational response. Although the VPD and partner agencies may not be able to prevent a riot in every case – no amount of preparation and no realistic number of police officers can ‐ the VPD remains committed to delivering the best possible policing in crowd management, and to provide a safe environment for the residents and visitors to our city to enjoy.


47


48

Glossary

Acronym Name

AIT Advance Intelligence Teams

APG Advance Planning Group

BCAS British Columbia Ambulance Service

BCERMS British Columbia Emergency Response Management System

CACP Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police

CCTV Closed Circuit Television

CLEOC City Large Events Oversight Committee

CoV City of Vancouver

CRTC Canadian Radio‐television Telecommunications Commission

DOC Department Operations Centre

EOC Emergency Operations Centre

EOPS Emergency & Operational Planning Section

ERT Emergency Response Team

IC Industry Canada

ICS Incident Command System

IPREM Integrated Partnership for Regional Emergency Management in Metro Vancouver

LCLB Liquor Control and Licensing Branch

LRAD Long‐Range Acoustic Device

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPCV Multi‐Purpose Command Vehicle

NCO Non‐Commissioned Officer

NHL National Hockey League

OPU Operational Planning Unit

POG Public Order Group

PR&A Planning, Research & Audit Section

PRIME‐BC Police Records Information Management Environment

PSU Public Safety Unit

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police

VFRS Vancouver Fire and Rescue Services

VPD Vancouver Police Department

VPF Vancouver Police Foundation

WPS Wireless Priority Service


49


50

Appendix A Independent Riot Review Recommendations Matrix

Independent Riot Review Recommendations

Rec # Recommendation Owner Agency

Outcome

1 The City of Vancouver, its agencies and event partners, should develop a formal risk assessment process as a tool to assist in determining the level of planning effort required, the need for coordination, and the overall resource impact for events in the City of Vancouver. This should include a determination of whether the event requires a regional event public safety plan.

CoV External

Risk Assessment Framework created.

See p.30

2 That the VPD’s planning process for major events should include: • Early, meaningful consultation with external partners in planning for large events; • Strategies to monitor crowd volumes including passenger loads on public transit and aerial views from police aircraft; • Contingency plans to respond to a need for an earlier than anticipated deployment; • Contingency plans for multiple incidents and multiple locations within an event, followed by table top exercises to test the effectiveness of those plans; • An analysis of equipment needs and equipment compatibility issues, in particular when external police services will be deployed; • A process to replace faulty equipment; and • Clear lines of authority and decision making at all times during the event.

VPD Complete

Participation in the CLEOC and APG.

Early intelligence gathering with AIT.

TransLink/Transit Police crowd control strategies.

Early deployment contingency utilizing on‐duty personnel from administrative and investigative areas.

Updated VPD fan‐out policy. Table top exercises – May 2012.

New equipment acquired with VPF donation and budget increase.

Gator utility vehicles and trailers for equipment movement and mobile replacement.

Distribution processes to inform responding agencies of equipment needs

Organizational charts and Authority Matrix included in VPD operational plans.

See p.19, p.21, p.25, p.29, p.33 & p.41


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Owner Rec # Recommendation Outcome

Agency

3 That the VPD ensure that all members working during a major event, including VPD members and those from external police services, are briefed on the operational plan, roles and responsibilities and contingency plans prior to the event. The briefing should identify the personal issue equipment required and the availability and location of additional protective equipment.

VPD Complete

Electronic briefings. External distribution of VPD operational plans.

Early distribution of VPD operational plans to command staff.

See p.16 4 That the VPD and VFRS explore opportunities to

incorporate fire fighters into Public Safety Unit tactical units, similar to the inclusion of BCAS medics. This would allow police, fire and ambulance to “surgically” respond to a range of incidents such as burning cars and injured persons with less risk. In support of this, the VFRS, VPD and BCAS should identify appropriate techniques and equipment that can be employed when large apparatus are not suitable.

Partners Complete

VFRS will work with the VPD PSU.

Joint training with the VPD, BCAS and VFRS set for April and May 2012.

See p.44

5 That the VPD, VFRS and BCAS undertake joint crowd control training exercises.

Partners Complete

Joint training with the VPD, BCAS and VFRS set for April and May 2012.

See p.44 6 That the VPD use its communication tools earlier,

to help set the tone, inform and provide direction to the crowd.

VPD Complete

The VPD has purchased two additional LRADs.

See p.23 7 The police and fire services across the region,

together with BC Ambulance, E‐Comm and TransLink should together, and under the leadership of the Minister of Public Safety if necessary, develop a framework for mutual aid that can be adapted for regional events.

Partners External

Coordinated through IPREM.

The VPD is part of IPREM.

See p.44‐45

8 The police and fire services across the region, together with BC Ambulance, E‐Comm and TransLink should conduct mutual aid training exercises to ensure that each organization understands their roles, and that the equipment they use is compatible.

Partners External



See p.44‐45

9 When an event is deemed to be a regional event, there should be a ‘regional event public safety plan’ and it should contain mutual aid elements.

Partners External



See p.44‐45


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Agency

10 That the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General should develop a framework delineating authorities and cost allocation for policing regional events that defines which costs and authorities are municipal and which are provincial.

Provincial Government

External

The VPD is actively participating in MOU discussions led by Police Services Division, Ministry of Justice.

Conclusion expected in April 2012

See p.44 11 Police services in the region should develop a

Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with respect to shared resourcing around security for regional events.

Policing Partners

External


Conclusion expected in April 2012.

See p.44 12 The RCMP tactical troop and VPD public order unit

should train together and develop common tactics they can use as a unit during joint operations.

Policing Partners

Complete

The VPD and RCMP completed familiarization training in October 2011.

Joint VPD/RCMP training scheduled for April 2012.

Collaborative command training in completed in February and March 2012.

See p.42 13 That all police services in BC continue to update

their training and tactics in keeping with the latest research on crowd behaviour and crowd policing.

Policing Partners

Complete

The VPD currently meets this recommendation and is recognized as subject matter experts in crowd management.

See p.43 14 The Minister of Public Safety should, in

consultation with the police and fire services of the Metro Vancouver region, BC Ambulance Service, E‐Comm, and TransLink, determine the best means of enhancing and institutionalizing collaboration and interoperability throughout the region among those services.


External



See p.44‐45

15 The process of bringing all police, fire, and ambulance and 911 services in Southwest British Columbia on to a single system should be completed.


External



See p.44‐45


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Agency

16 The City should establish a protocol requiring the attendance of senior officials at the EOC in accordance with the preparedness levels.

CoV External

17 We recommend that the municipalities, police and fire services of the Metro Vancouver region, BC Ambulance Service, E‐Comm, and TransLink, with the support of the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General as required, develop a governance structure to support the implementation of the recommendations in this report regarding regional events.

CoV External

The CoV and Province established the 2011 Stanley Cup Riot Recommendations Implementation Committee.

VPD is represented on this committee by Supt. Daryl Wiebe.

See p.11 18 We recommend that the Minister of Public Safety

and Solicitor General review the requirement that the mayor of a municipality must serve as chair of its police board.


External

19 TransLink should lead a process for the development of best practices for alcoholic beverage interdiction on and around its system. The process should include police services in the region and a senior representative of the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch. That these practices include provisions for collaboration between Transit Police, local police services, private security, and carefully selected and trained volunteers, to ensure ample coverage.

TransLink External

The VPD works collaboratively with the Transit Police and other Metro Vancouver police agencies to develop a regional liquor interdiction strategy around the transit system, during major events.

See p.38 20 The Minister of Public Safety should in

consultation with municipal leaders, consider legislative authority to prohibit alcoholic beverages on public transit systems, including regional transit systems, on specified occasions or circumstances where it is necessary to give effect to an outlet closure order.


External

21 The Minister of Public Safety should examine whether additional powers of search and seizure are required in order to properly implement recommendations 19 and 20.


External

22 That the practice of alcohol pour‐outs continue but that the police make greater use of ticketing for offenders; that appropriate fines be attached to these offences as a deterrent to the behaviour; and that a publicity campaign announce stepped‐up enforcement where warranted for a specific type of event.

Policing Partners

Ongoing

VPD supports liquor enforcement and encourages ticketing.

VPD training bulletin developed on current liquor offences and enforcement and seizure procedures.

See p.37


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Agency

23 That the powers of the General Manager of the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch be reviewed to consider additional powers to dampen the sale and distribution of alcohol for regional events. This review should include enhancement of existing powers and new measures including closures, restricted hours of operation, limits to alcohol purchases and serving sizes, age restrictions, wider inspections of licensed establishments, and measures known to be effective in other jurisdictions.


External

The VPD currently works with the LCLB during planning phases and supports liquor store closures when the need has been identified.

See p.39

24 That the Government of British Columbia step up public education programs that bring a greater profile to the dangers of alcohol abuse, binge drinking, underage drinking and public intoxication, and initiatives intended to promote moderate and responsible drinking as well as alcohol related crime prevention.


External

25 Excessive drinking should be portrayed among young people the way anti‐ smoking programs were instituted.

Partners External

26 Moderating and health promotion messaging should be stepped up in the days and weeks prior to a major youth oriented event, particularly targeting youth and their parents, advising of the legal consequences of either transporting alcohol on public transit or being found intoxicated in public. And if the event is related to a sporting event such as hockey or football, encourage the host team or league to participate in the health promotion messaging.


External

27 That the British Columbia government examine the adequacy of existing penalties involving alcohol at public events.


External

See p.38

28 Alcohol moderation and the problems of public intoxication and underage alcohol abuse should be a priority message for mainstream public‐service time, particularly with regard to youth oriented events.


External

VPD media messaging supports responsible celebration.

See p.38


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Agency

29 That the CoV accept and adapt the attached IPS planning framework document and commit to developing a new planning tool with its partners to assist with the timely coordination and delivery of events of a regional nature that it may have to deliver in the future. (For example, Grey Cup 2011, Stanley Cup 2012, etc).

CoV External

The VPD has developed new planning frameworks.

See p.37

30 That the CoV form its own ‘Major Event Planning Team’ and draw on the considerable skills and abilities of individuals from within its own family to participate such as the PNE, Parks Board, Engineering and others, and that all key agencies provide resources and personnel to this process.

CoV External

Creation of the CLEOC and APG.

P.29

31 That the COV in concert with its partners take steps to acquire improved temporary facilities such as fencing, staging, screen, sound and light technology and other amenities to help ensure a better experience for all who attend future region wide celebratory events in the Vancouver downtown.

CoV External

VPD will continue to provide input during planning phases at the CLEOC and APG level.

See p.31

32 That given the stated desire to stage wonderful, safe events that the CoV and partner agencies commit to further education and experiences for key organizers so that we can take advantage of best practices that are currently being followed in other jurisdictions at home and abroad.

CoV External

See p.37

33 That the CoV working with multiple partners typically involved in helping to deliver major events of regional interest become cooperative joint sponsors of a new “Everyday Heroes” volunteer initiative to ensure that such a program is developed to meet some of the human and technical needs for staging these events.

CoV External

VPD is represented on the CoV City Volunteer Working Group.

See p.42

34 That the partners involved in "Everyday Heroes" program identify through planning the various volunteer positions and confirm the unique skills and characteristics that will be required to fill them.

Partners External


See p.42 35 That citizens across the region be invited and

encouraged to participate in the "Everyday Heroes" program and that the numbers recruited include a sizeable contingent of personnel to ensure an ability to respond to any event situation.

Partners External


See p.42


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Agency

36 That the "Everyday Heroes" program be designed for easy transfer and distribution to other communities across the province.

Partners External

VPD is represented on the CoV City Volunteer Working Group

See p.42. 37 That businesses that benefit financially from these

events, and professional sports organizations such as the Canucks, be actively encouraged to sponsor this "Everyday Heroes" program.

Partners External


See p.42 38 The City of Vancouver convene a meeting of

community groups and business leaders to form an Every Day Heroes working group to take on the coordination task.

CoV External


See p.42 39 The Attorney General should establish a

procedure or special court specifically for dealing with the prosecution of people accused of a riot‐related criminal act that provides crown counsel and judges with a suitable range of processes and sentencing options necessary to: • respond with appropriate measures to the wide range of criminal acts and criminals; and • takes into account the community harm done by the riot.


External

40 In designing this process the Attorney General should consult recognized experts on community justice, the judiciary, affected businesses and residents. And during both the design and operation stage the Attorney General and presiding judge should consult the community with regard to the court and, in particular, Community Work Service projects.


External

41 That all the partners involved in delivering and benefiting from regional events commit to the development of a special Twitter‐like social media communications tool to be housed at E‐Comm and that this initiative be funded properly so as to achieve immediate and continuing maximum impact.

Partners External

The VPD’s commitment to social media as an information tool.

The VPD’s social media strategy included in the operational plan.

42 That the Vancouver Canucks be urged to embark on a program of activities using its considerable facilities and influence to encourage year‐round responsible fan celebrations and sportsmanship.

Vancouver Canucks

External


57



Agency

43 That the NHL be urged to partner with host cities and NHL franchises competing for the Stanley Cup to help ensure the best, safest public celebrations possible. Furthermore, that the league be urged to develop year‐round programs that encourage responsible fan behaviour and sportsmanship around the game of professional hockey.

NHL External

44 That for all regional events media partners be invited into event planning at the highest level to ensure the information and communication process before, during, and after the event is prepared so as to best help media communicate accurate and timely information to the public at all stages of delivery.

Media External

45 That all major Vancouver media be encouraged to stage their own regional event round table discussions to develop the best approaches to covering regional events so as to best serve the public good without affecting their ability to report on the unfolding events.

Media External

46 That TransLink and or the Transit Police Service participate as appropriate and necessary in the planning of events deemed regional in nature.

TransLink External

The Transit Police actively participates with the VPD and COV planning groups during planning phases for large events.

See p.32 47 That TransLink and or the Transit Police Service

participate along with other event partners in the coordination and oversight (or command structure) of regional event as appropriate and necessary.

TransLink External

The Transit Police actively participates with the VPD and COV planning groups during planning phases for large events.

See p.32 48 That TransLink participate as appropriate and

necessary in training for mutual aid during regional events.

TransLink External

See p.44

49 That TransLink review its operating strategies for regional event with a view to support front‐line workers and build internal capacity and skill to better control passenger volumes and even slow down the system if required for public safety.

TransLink External


58



Agency

50 That TransLink look at the possibility for off‐loading passengers more widely in downtown to reduce the potential of overcrowding at one location.

TransLink External

51 Building on the Olympic experience and success, that TransLink explore the possibility of developing a core of volunteers to support operations during regional events. Roles, training needs, uniforms should be developed to ensure volunteers are supported and to ensure good performance and visibility.

TransLink External

The VPD is represented on the CoV City Volunteer Working Group.

See p.42

52 That the provincial government and TransLink examine the adequacy of rules or policies regarding the consumption or the carrying of alcohol on the Transit system toward a regional event. This includes processes for monitoring and intervention to screen for full compliance.

Provincial Government & TransLink

External

53 That TransLink participate in supporting the delivery of detailed accurate real time information for a special social media APP for smart phones and other devices to ensure that participants at Regional Events can easily locate accurate information to help govern their safe access and egress to and from the “Regional Event” they are attending.

TransLink External


59


60

Appendix B Ottawa Police Service Riot Review Recommendations Matrix

Ottawa Police Service Riot Review Recommendations

Rec #

Recommendation Owner Agency

Outcome

1 Accountability: A new structure within the City of Vancouver should be created to centralize the ownership, coordination and accountability for delivery of major events sponsored by the city.

CoV External


See p.29

2 Event Goals: The practice of locating sites away from the downtown core is an effective crowd management strategy that should be considered for future events.

CoV External

3 Event Goals: When planning for future open air, large‐scale public events, strategies to better manage crowd volumes should be incorporated, as they were for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (e.g. advance ticketing, adequate fencing, and controlled access points).

Partners Complete


Strategies are discussed at the CLEOC and APG.

See p.33 4 Internal Debriefings: That all planning partners be

included in a timely, formal debriefing process subsequent to each event.

VPD Complete

Electronic debriefing reports utilizing the new PRIME‐BC debrief template.

See p.17 5 Risk Assessment: A formal risk assessment

process should be developed as a tool to assist in determining the level of planning effort required, the need for coordination, and the overall resource impact for events in the City of Vancouver.

CoV External


See p.30

6 Integrated Planning: The City of Vancouver and its partners should formalize a framework to support all‐hazard planning and to allow for a structured approach for all responders.

CoV External



See p.29 7 Integrated Planning: The goal of such a framework

should be to help the partners mitigate the effects of a threat in a manner that alerts residents, rather than alarms them, while enhancing public safety and awareness during times of instability and uncertainty (e.g. INTERSECT in the National Capital Region – see Appendix C).

CoV External



See p.29


61


Rec Owner Recommendation Outcome

# Agency

8 Integrated Planning: All commanders responsible for implementing operational plans must be given an opportunity to review and provide input into their agency’s plans. Furthermore, they must be fully conversant with plans from all other partner agencies prior to the event.

VPD Ongoing

New operational plan template.

Timely external distribution of VPD operational plans.

Processes created for the VPD to receive operational plans from partner agencies in a timely manner.

See p.18 9 Police Briefings: All members working major

events should be required to attend at least one pre‐event briefing. This session should cover possible contingency plans and describe respective roles and responsibilities in the event of a riot. Consideration should also be given to videotaping the briefings for later use.

VPD Complete

Electronic briefings. See p.16

10 Partner Involvement: The NHL and the Vancouver Canucks Hockey Club are key partners and should be actively involved in planning with city officials on an ongoing basis and particularly during Stanley Cup playoffs.

NHL External

11 Linking Different Command Structures: All emergency services should work towards the integration of command structures to streamline security operations around major events.

Partners Complete

The VPD is trained on the ICS.

All members trained on ICS 100.

Command staff trained to ICS 300.

Six Senior Commanders trained to ICS 400.

Interoperability between Gold/Silver/Bronze and ICS.

Pre‐determined command structure for events.

See p.34‐36 12 Linking Different Command Structures: At

minimum, emergency services should educate each other on their respective decision‐making models and the linkages between the Incident Command System (ICS) and the Gold/Silver/Bronze model. This approach can be further enhanced through mock scenarios.

Partners Complete

Table top exercises. Comparative analysis agreed upon with CoV Emergency Management and partner agencies.

See p.34‐36


62



# Agency

13 Linking Different Command Structures: There is a pressing need to develop a common command and control standard for incident/event management across the country.

Partners External

Collaborative command training with VPD, RCMP and municipal police services.

See p.34‐36 14 On‐site Commanders: Partners must identify on‐

site commanders and, whenever possible, physically co‐locate to ensure there is regular, proactive communication and collaborative decision‐making.

Partners Complete

Decision to co‐locate commanders included in the VPD planning frameworks.

Multi‐Purpose Command Vehicle will add much needed capability for field command.

See p.36 15 Senior‐level Coordination: Senior‐level decision

makers from police, fire and ambulance should be co‐located during the execution of major event security plans.

Partners Complete

Decision to co‐locate commanders included in the VPD planning frameworks.

Multi‐Purpose Command Vehicle will add much needed capability for field command.

See p.36 16 Executive‐Level Decision Making: Executive

command from all participating police agencies should be physically present in Gold Command when activated.

VPD Complete

The VPD will continue to activate Gold Command and invite partner agencies, as dictated by the scope of the event.

See p.36 17 Executive‐Level Decision Making: Policing

agencies in the Vancouver area should develop formal Memoranda Of Understanding (MOUs) with respect to shared resourcing around security for major events.

Policing Partners

Ongoing



See p.44 18 Senior Policy Decision Making: BC Ambulance

should discuss future involvement with the City of Vancouver to be part of the Policy Committee whenever it is activated.

BCAS External


63



# Agency

19 Senior Policy Decision Making: The City of Vancouver should review current mechanisms that are expected to trigger the activation of the Policy Committee and, once activated, to ensure that all partners are properly represented.

CoV External

20 Decision Making Authorities: Operational Plans must clearly specify lines of authority and decision making at all times during an event. Moreover, all deployed members must be fully briefed on lines of reporting.

VPD Ongoing

Organizational chart included in the VPD’s operational plans.

Electronic briefings include command structure.

See p.21 21 Links Between Agencies: For major events where

neighbouring police agencies contribute personnel, VPD should assign a dedicated liaison officer to physically colocate with them to ensure consistent, reliable communications and tactical deployment.

VPD Complete

A VPD liaison was identified for the Celebration of Light, Occupy Vancouver protests and the Grey Cup.

See p.27 22 Use of Arwen Rounds: An updated assessment

should be conducted by VPD to determine the value of using Arwen rounds in a crowd management environment.

VPD Complete

The VPD ERT completed an updated assessment.

See p.21 23 Use of Arwen Rounds: VPD should standardize the

use of an Authority Matrix in advance of all major events to confirm specific use‐of‐force authorities for each level of command. There are several good examples currently in use by Canadian police services that could serve as a template for VPD.

VPD Complete

Authority Matrix included in the VPD’s operational plans.

See p.21‐22

24 Integration of Crowd Management Tactics: There is a pressing need to develop provincial and national standards for crowd management tactics.

Partners Complete



The VPD is currently developing regional crowd management training.

See p.42


64



# Agency

25 Integration of Crowd Management Tactics: Partner agencies should conduct training and familiarization exercises on a regular basis.

Policing Partners

Complete



The VPD is currently developing regional crowd management training.

See p.42 26 Information Flow: Consideration should be given

to identifying a second‐in‐command to support Silver Command when the volume of events dictates.

VPD Complete

A Deputy Silver Commander was identified for the Celebration of Light, Occupy Vancouver protests and the Grey Cup.

See p.22 27 Information Flow: VPD should also explore the use

of proven technologies to assist senior commanders in gaining a more thorough awareness of exactly what is transpiring on the ground. For example, mapping technology, such as GPS, could be used to track incidents, monitor the movements of emergency services personnel, and provide real‐time updates on crowd movements.

VPD Ongoing

The VPD Working Group is currently exploring technology options.

See p.27

28 Challenging Circumstances: Contingency planning should include events with multiple incidents and multiple locations followed by Table Top exercises to test the effectiveness of those plans.

VPD Complete

Table top exercises – May 2012.

See p.41

29 Challenging Circumstances: Strategies to monitor crowd volumes should be in place from the outset (e.g. real‐time passenger loads on public transit corridors, monitoring of aerial views from police aircraft).

Partners Ongoing

Transit Police liaison provided for in the VPD DOC.



See p.33


65



# Agency

30 Challenging Circumstances: For large public events, VPD should expand its operational planning to include a contingency plan that allows for earlier deployment should the situation warrant.

VPD Complete


Early deployment contingency utilizing on‐duty personnel from administrative and investigative areas.

Updated VPD’s fan‐out policy.

See p.19 31 Challenging Circumstances: Additional research

should be undertaken to determine best practices both domestically and internationally. With a third SkyTrain line coming on stream, the value of the crowd monitoring function will become increasingly important.

Policing Partners

Complete

TransLink/Transit Police crowd control strategies (station cameras, skipping stops, closing stations, adding more trains).

See p.33

32 Emergency Responder Integration: The successful experience of the embedded paramedics should be considered for any future use of this program.

Partners Ongoing

MOU with BCAS and the VPD.

See p.43 33 Emergency Responder Integration: Vancouver Fire

and Rescue Service should work with its partners to explore alternate methods for achieving integrated responses to emergency situations where there are large and potentially hostile crowds.

Partners Complete

VFRS will work with the VPD PSU.

Joint training with VPD, BCAS and VFRS set for April and May 2012.

See p.44 34 Security Gaps: There must be agreement, early

planning, and shared understanding about who is responsible for security measures at controlled access points.

Partners Complete

Roles and responsibilities defined in the VPD’s operational plans.

See p.32 35 Security Gaps: When engaging private security

services, it is imperative that they possess the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities.

CoV External

See p.32

36 Coordination of Site Inspections. Coordinated pre‐event site inspections should be conducted to ensure planning requirements have been met and to address any risks to the effective deployment of emergency personnel.

Partners Complete

Site inspections will continue for large events.

Site inspections completed for the Celebration of Light and the Grey Cup.

See p.30


66



# Agency

37 Need for Fact‐Based Information: A senior representative and decision maker from TransLink should be present in the appropriate decision centre.

TransLink External

38 Safe Staging Areas: Staging areas should be located in an enclosed space.

VPD Complete

Enclosed staging areas employed for the Celebration of Light and the Grey Cup.

See p.26 39 Safe Staging Areas: Consideration should be given

to locating staging areas (multiple, if required) closer to the deployed members who may require their equipment (e.g. the Live Site).

VPD Complete

Multiple enclosed staging areas employed for the Celebration of Light and the Grey Cup.

See p.26 40 Liquor Restrictions: In situations where there is a

strategic advantage, event planners should consider the option of closing down liquor stores to limit levels of public intoxication.

Partners Complete

The VPD and the LCLB will continue to discuss this strategy, as a part of a larger liquor interdiction plan for major events.

See p.39 41 Liquor Restrictions: There should be a

Memorandum of Understanding developed among police services in and around the City of Vancouver to formalize and coordinate major event planning and, specifically, liquor interdiction strategies.

Partners Ongoing



See p.45 42 Liquor Restrictions: Authorities should consider

legislative amendments that would enhance police powers of search and seizure for liquor during major events.


External

43 Liquor Restrictions: Authorities should also consider modifying access rules for public transit that would allow for enhanced security measures during major events to prohibit the possession of alcohol.

Provincial Government and TransLink

External


67



# Agency

44 Communications Management: A scalable communications framework should be in place for each major event. It should clearly identify a Command Channel and any other channel that might be necessary based on geography or functional units. Further, it is recommended that E‐Comm be engaged in developing the framework.

Partners Complete

Enhanced planning between the VPD and E‐Comm.

See p.40

45 Communications Management: A communications radio frequency should be utilized to link all agency commanders during a major event.

Partners Complete

Enhanced planning between the VPD and E‐Comm.

See p.40 46 E‐Comm Access: An automated process should be

designed by E‐Comm and the various public safety partners that will trigger a formal requirement to situate an E‐Comm staff member within the VPD kiosk at major events (i.e. when the number of officers deployed exceeds a specified amount). That staff member would be responsible for capturing the necessary log‐in data from all officers being deployed.

VPD Complete

This process has been employed in the past and will continue in the future for large events with a significant deployment of police officers.

See p.40‐41

47 Closed Circuit Television: The City of Vancouver should streamline the existing process that provides planners and public safety partners with timely access to CCTV systems for large‐scale events. CCTV cameras should be installed using the current infrastructure. Once authorized for use, the public must be made aware via technical means (e.g. light activated on camera).

CoV External

The CoV is responsible for CCTV policy and control; however, the VPD continues to support its use for public safety purposes.

See p.41

48 Equipment Shortages and Safety: Equipment requirements must be clearly planned, communicated and documented for all partner agencies so they arrive properly prepared and trained to assist.

Partners Ongoing

Equipment checklist.

See p.25

49 Technical Issues: The RCMP should conduct a review of its tactical communications equipment to ensure compatibility.

RCMP External

50 Technical Issues: A process to replace faulty equipment during an event should be communicated to all officers, including partner agencies.

VPD Ongoing

Enhanced replacement process with Gator utility vehicles.

Logistics officer(s) for large events will continue to be responsible for equipment.

See p.25


68



# Agency

51 Public Warnings: In the absence of an LRAD, the RCMP should be equipped with functioning loud hailers.

RCMP External


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70

Appendix C VPD Riot Review Recommendations Matrix

VPD Riot Review Recommendations


Outcome

1 THAT the VPD review administrative processes regarding event planning with the goal of utilizing technology to improve briefings, debriefings, and the record keeping of planning decisions and operational tactical decisions. EOPS, with assistance from the Planning, Research & Audit Section, shall be responsible for implementation of this recommendation.

VPD Complete

Electronic briefings. Electronic debriefing reports utilizing the new PRIME‐BC debrief template.

Planning decision logs. Gold and Silver Command decision logs.

See p.16‐18 2 THAT the VPD review, identify and address

equipment requirements for officers in relation to crowd management. EOPS, in conjunction with Police Stores, shall be responsible for the implementation of this recommendation.

VPD Complete

Equipment needs assessment completed.

$300,000 VPF donation. CoV approved remaining $150,000 request.

Purchased 150 additional Grab ‘n Go bags, Gators, tactical gear, storage container.

See p.24 3 THAT crowd management training for non‐PSU

officers is examined in the context of VPD training priorities and that this examination be referred to the VPD’s Training Board. The Training and Recruiting Section shall be responsible for the implementation of this recommendation.

VPD Complete

Crowd management training for all VPD members will be held in March and April 2012.

See p.26

4 THAT the VPD prepare a resolution to be submitted for consideration to the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) with the aim of recommending to the Canadian Radiotelevision Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) that it make it mandatory for cell phone providers to provide wireless priority service to their networks for all emergency service providers. The Communications Section shall be responsible for the implementation of this recommendation.

VPD Complete

Confirmed that IC is the regulatory body not CRTC.

WPS has always been and remains open to all telecommunications providers.

See p.23

5 THAT a pool of cell phones with wireless priority service be acquired for critical command staff and other identified positions. The Communications Section shall be responsible for implementation of this recommendation.

VPD Complete

$20,000 approved for WPS.

Procurement underway.

See p.23


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VPD Riot Review Recommendations


Agency

6 THAT the VPD continue to develop and formalize the integration of British Columbia Ambulance Service (BCAS) paramedics into the Public Safety Unit, and explore the feasibility of integrating Vancouver Fire and Rescue Service (VFRS) members into the PSU. EOPS shall be responsible for the implementation of this recommendation.

VPD Ongoing

MOU between the VPD and BCAS.

VFRS will work with the VPD PSU. Joint training with VPD, BCAS, and VFRS in April and May 2012.

See p.43‐44

7 THAT the City of Vancouver, in consultation with public safety agencies such as the VPD and the BCAS, review and establish standards for live site design, location and logistics, with the aim of following the 2010 Olympic Live Site model. EOPS shall be the VPD lead in advancing this recommendation with the COV.

CoV Complete

VPD provides input at the CLEOC and APG.

VPD’s Risk Assessment Matrix.

See p.31

8 THAT the City of Vancouver increase the VPD’s operating budget to incorporate additional funds for Public Safety Unit training. The DCC of Support Services shall be the VPD lead in advancing this recommendation with the City of Vancouver.

CoV Complete

$250,000 requested through the 2012 budget process.

$100,000 approved for PSU training.

See p.26


72

Appendix D CoV Riot Review Recommendations Matrix

CoV Riot Review Recommendations


Outcome

1 The City should ensure there is a defined external organization responsible for the hosting of any large and complex event in the public domain.

CoV External


2 The City should liaise with city officials in the 2 other Canadian jurisdictions, Edmonton and Montreal, which have recently experienced Stanley Cup riots to share challenges and approaches on sources of funding and organizational details.

CoV External

3 Enhance the event planning process: Establish an executive level City Large Events Oversight Committee, for large, high‐risk events. The committee will be chaired by the Deputy City Manager, with core membership to include: the City Engineer, VFRS Fire Chief, VPD Chief Constable, Director of Corporate Communications, TransLink Chief Operations Officer, BCAS Operations Director, Vancouver Coastal Chief Public Health Officer, and the Director of Emergency Management (secretariat support for the committee). Other senior leaders, from within City staff and from outside, should be added as needed. 1a(i). put an integrated risk‐based framework in place for the City’s work in large event planning and evaluation, with a clear process for escalating issues and decision‐making and a formal process for post‐event analysis. 1a(ii). establish standard documentation expectations, clarity of policy and procedures, including user‐pay schedule, and implement a protocol for the routine recording of key decisions and actions when the City works to enable large events. 1a(iii). In the run‐up to, and during the event, develop stronger coordinating efforts with EOC partners to develop a more defined process for gathering intelligence, deal with escalating issues, and coordinate efforts among EOC partners. 1b. Establish a Senior Technical Advisory Committee, chaired by the CEO of the PNE and with members from key industries and agencies having special expertise in sports and other events management.

CoV External

Creation of the CLEOC and APG. Risk Assessment Framework created.

See p.29‐30


73



Agency

4 Adopt a best practices Event Risk Assessment tool for event planning.

CoV External


See p.30 5 Manage the number of people in the public realm.

The City will work with key external partners and regional police to identify strategies to enhance the ability to quantify on a real time basis the numbers of people coming into the public domain for large events and will identify ways to better manage the surge when risk is increased, particularly in the downtown core.

CoV External

See p.33

6 Create a standardized asset base for celebratory sites. The City, VPD, VFRS, with input from the proposed Senior Technical Advisory Committee, and other appropriate partners, will undertake a process to identify the various locations which can play a role for hosting large and complex public events.

CoV External

7 Work with the Vancouver Sports Group to develop a Fan Code of Conduct that encourages a positive fan environment by establishing appropriate behaviour and conduct for those fans attending NHL games.

CoV External

8 Work with media outlets, the Vancouver Sports Group and key sponsors. Identify actions which could help set the tone for expected behavior at large public events, with an early focus on sport events. This might include crowd engagement strategies and methods to enforce a zero‐tolerance approach for unacceptable behaviors and violence.

CoV External

9 Create a community volunteer corps. CoV External


See p.42


74



Agency

10 a. Improve processes for gathering information and escalating issues needing decisions: EOC partners should develop a more defined process for real‐time information gathering and for the escalation of issues among key partners with respect to numbers, demographics and mood of the crowd, the presence of any instigators, availability of alcohol, and any other risk factors identified through the enhanced risk management tool — this process would be in effect in the preparatory stages as well as during the event and would lead to the ability to make necessary adjustments to the event plan in a more timely way. b. Improve processes for gathering information and escalating issues needing decisions: These processes would include enhanced contingency planning to enable orderly adjustments to an event in the face of escalating risks. This work would be aligned with the Special Event Risk Framework referenced earlier in this report.

CoV External

11 Continue and enhance use of CCTV for special events: The availability of closed circuit televisions (CCTV) was invaluable to the response efforts during the riot in providing real‐time information to all responders. a. The City and VPD should bring forward to Council an updated policy with regard to the future use of CCTV cameras for special events to assist with monitoring crowd activities, deployment of first responders and police, identification of suspects and riot participants in the event of a significant disturbance. b. Continue and enhance use of CCTV for special events: CCTV feeds should be made available to E‐Comm dispatchers to enhance the effectiveness of their dispatch function.

CoV External

The CoV is responsible for CCTV policy and control; however, the VPD continues to support its use for public safety purposes.

See p.41


75



Agency

12 Coordinate with external partners to improve managing the risks of alcohol on special events: a) Improved planning based on data and surveillance around large public events in regard to the impact of alcohol. b) Improved strategies for the containment of alcohol availability in the context of large public gatherings ‐ some of these may involve legislative change specific to large at risk events. c) Development of proactive messaging with the media and event sponsors ‐ the City and VPD should work with leaders in public health, the media, TransLink, professional sports organizations, their sponsors, and members of the alcohol sector to promote responsible consumption of alcohol and emphasize enforcement policies and consequences for irresponsible consumption. Social media should be explored and leveraged where appropriate. In our discussion with the alcohol sector, there was strong support expressed in regard to their willingness to contributing to this kind of strategy.

CoV External

13 Create a potential hazard policy for large events in the public domain.

CoV External

14 Clarify Processes at the EOC: (a) Clarify decision‐making structures at the EOC – The City will work with EOC partners to brief and update them on EOC decision making processes and protocols (b) Clarify EOC activation levels – The City needs to clarify the criteria for each level of EOC activation.

CoV External

15 Clarify Processes at the EOC: (c) Update departmental emergency planning procedures

CoV External

16 Improve communication between non‐first responders during a riot.

Partners External

17 Improve communication to the public during the riot.

Partners External


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implementing change: outcomes from the riot reviews · on june 15, 2011, the vancouver police...

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