[GREAT LAKES WATER POLICY AND WAUKESHA’S DIVERSION REQUEST]

2010

POL SCI -914

Cameron Stearns, Joseph Wantoch

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There is a great deal of speculation about the future of Waukesha County’s water supply.

Whether or not to tap Lake Michigan for water remains a highly contested issue among residents

and politicians. There are concerns about what the effect of a Lake Michigan diversion to

Waukesha may have on the city of Milwaukee, and the region as a whole. (Hill, 1999) There is

speculation of benefits to one or both municipalities, as well as consequences. In order to be

granted access to Lake Michigan water, Waukesha must gain permission of eight Great Lakes

governors and meet several standards imposed by the Great Lakes Water Compact. Enacted in

2008, the Compact is a marvel of complexity, and by nature of the agreement, intertwines many

levels of government on a considerable scale. In order to better understand the future of Great

Lakes water management, we can examine the history of water policy, current political climate,

previous diversion attempts, and established academic theory to improve the estimated effects of

the potential Waukesha diversion.

History of Water Policy

The Great Lakes are the world’s largest system of surface freshwater, and as the issue of “access

to water” is increasingly thought of as an impending future crisis, a comprehensive policy plan to

protect the natural resource is necessary.

The Great Lakes Water Compact is not the first implementation of water policy concerning the

Great Lakes region. There is a history of intergovernmental agreements dating back to 1909 that

attempt to regulate diversions of water. All of these policy actions were born out of difficulties

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and disputes apportioning the water supply. These agreements were spurred on by the need for a

better management system, and also in part, to protect the environment. We can see that the

need for a more comprehensive water-management system increases in accordance with a greater

sense of environmental protection. Considering the effects of past policy agreements, it is also

possible to speculate about the effectiveness of current and future intergovernmental policies on

managing and protecting water resources.

In 1909, the International Boundary Waters Treaty was signed as an agreement over a method to

settle any future dispute over the waters that border Canada and the United States. Article IV of

the treaty also prohibited pollution by either country. A Joint Commission was then established

to identify the major sources of pollution in the Detroit and Niagara rivers. The Commission

reports a few years later that the “…situation along the frontier is generally chaotic, everywhere

perilous and in some cases, disgraceful.” (Clinton, 2009) This is in reference to pollution of the

Great Lakes. The International Boundary Waters Treaty proves unsuccessful in reducing

pollution. This was primarily because of American and Canadian industrial pollution—

especially during World War II. The United States proved it could not hold its end of the

bargain, and despite several lawsuits, the Canadian government passed legislation that made it

easier for manufacturers to legally pollute rivers and streams. Heavy industrial pollution

continued into the 1970’s. Here we see the environmental impact of a failed agreement. This

example of an intergovernmental agreement also illustrates how a pact may become nullified if

there are not strict standards, or consequences imposed by the other side for breaches of the

agreement.

In 1925, the diversions of Lake Michigan water to Chicago caused a great amount of concern for

surrounding state economies. These concerns stem from Chicago’s destruction of the natural

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ecosystem. (Forer, 1961) Chicago had been diverting water from Lake Michigan, along with its

sewage, since 1900. The volume of water diverted increased every year until, in 1925; the U.S.

Federal Government challenged the right of Chicago to obtain water from Lake Michigan

without the consent of the surrounding state governments. In a series of lawsuits the surrounding

states claimed that they would suffer economic loss of major fishing and other industries because

of the extreme use and pollution caused by the city of Chicago. Chicago actually lies outside of

the Great Lakes Basin, and is therefore not eligible for water under the Great Lakes Water

Compact. However, Chicago had been using the lake water long before the compact was

established. This series of “water wars” against the city caused the U.S. Supreme Court to

dramatically reduce Chicago’s limit on water usage. However, it was not until 1967, after

decades of negotiation, that the Supreme Court limited Chicago’s usage to 2,100 million gallons

per day (21 MGD). In 1980, the decree was amended to include town lying just outside Chicago

as well. Fourteen years later, it had been revealed that Chicago had actually used more that 14%

of maximum allowed usage per year—since 1980. Consequently, Chicago’s water usage was

reduced by 14% for the next 14 years. (EPA, 2009)

By 1972, environmental issues were becoming more prevalent, and the United States and Canada

signed the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. This provided the framework for restoring

and protecting the biological, physical, and chemical makeup of the Great Lakes Basin. Both

Canada and the United states were concerned that pollution being caused on one side was

inflicting environmental damage on the other. The IJC reported that there indeed was industrial

pollution being caused by both Canada and the US, and both countries were affected. (Donahue,

1999) The agreement was considered to be “unprecedented in scope” The agreement spawned

the Great Lakes Water Quality Board, which was composed of members of the US federal, state,

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and Canadian provincial governments. This board gave two specific assignments to the IJC;

first, to examine impacts of poor water quality on land-based industries, and to measure water

contamination in Lake Huron and Superior. In 1978, the agreement was significantly amended,

and was redirected toward eliminating any toxic substance from entering the Great Lakes. This

is the first time we can see policy taking a more regional approach to the health of the Great

Lakes, as emphasis was not only put on toxic substances entering the Lakes directly, but on

substances being leaked into the larger geographical region of the Great Lakes Basin.

Many policy measures during the 1980’s, such as the Clean Water Act, were merely extensions

of the the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972. The agreement and it extensions are

considered to be success stories, as they have led to the increase in quality of sewage treatment

facilities, lowering of phosphate levels (an oxygen depleting pollutant), and the reduction of

agricultural contamination from runoff. All of this led to massive improvements in Lake Erie’s

water quality.

One of the most significant policy developments of the 1980’s was the Great Lakes Charter of

1985. This was implemented to include all Great Lakes states and Canadian provinces in the

decision to allow water diversions of 5 MGD or more. Although this action was not legally

binding, and subsequently ineffective, it is here we begin to see the kind of agreement that will

eventually become the “Great Lakes- St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact.”

In the 1990’s and early 2000’s, the United States and Canada made strides toward achieving a

comprehensive policy for the regulation of diversions. In 2001, the Great Lakes Charter Annex

provided a basis for regulating future agreements regarding water diversions and the exportation

of water from the Great Lakes. Finally, after seven years of reconciliation among U.S. states,

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Canadian provinces, large corporations, non-profits, scientists, environmental groups, municipal

governments, water management agencies, lawyers, and the general public, produced The Great

Lakes- St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact (also known as the Great Lakes

Water Compact). Signed into law by President Bush on October 3, 2008, it is the most complex

water management intergovernmental agreement to date.

The Compact takes a regional approach to environmental management. There are plenty of

successful implementations of regional or bioregional approaches to ecosystem management;

however this is on a larger scale, and involves more levels of government than most. It involves

the Federal, State, and hundreds of local municipal governments. These governments are all

located within the Great Lakes Basin, which is the geographical portion of land which drains into

a larger body of water. The agreement gives these governments the exclusive rights to access the

water—thereby managing the amount of water which can be diverted from the lakes. It also

provides standards and provisions that must be followed in order to sustain lake levels. All who

are granted access to the water are required to meet these standards. There is a procedure that

must be followed if a certain municipality which either straddles, or lies outside of the Great

Lakes Basin must abide by, if they are to receive Great Lakes water as well. One of the major

restrictive policies of the compact requires that all eight United States governors unanimously

approve the diversion. Needless to say, a local government applying for water must make quite a

convincing case for it. There have been past diversions of water that have not had to live up to

such standards, and we must examine them in detail in order to better predict the ramifications of

future diversions—such as the one proposed to Waukesha.

Policy and Previous Diversions

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In order to better understand why the policy of the Great Lakes Water compact exists, and why it

is important, we must also examine what can possibly happen when governments fail to put

policy into action. The Aral Sea, located between the countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and

Turkmenistan in Eastern Europe, is considered to be one of the worst environmental disaster

zones in the world. Since the 1960’s, there have been many water diversions from the Aral Sea

that has directly resulted in a striking depletion of water levels. So much water has been diverted

that it has exposed much of the underlying sea bed. The grainy sea floor is highly susceptible to

wind, and dust storm activity within the region has increased dramatically. Besides the

destruction of thousands of acres of agriculture, dust mixed with pesticides that were formally

used to grow crops now blow in the wind. The harmful health impacts of the dust are staggering.

Statistics show there have been large increases in prenatal death, lung cancer, anemia, and

interstitial lung disease in the areas downwind of the Aral Sea. The environmental destruction

and rapid depletion of this natural resource has had a domino effect on public health, local

economies, and food production. This is considered to be one of the worst environmental

disasters of the twentieth-century. In the case of the Aral Sea, the results may be extreme, but it

exemplifies the kind of harm that can be caused by careless water diversions, and lack of

governmental policy to regulate them. It also illustrates that the environment can deteriorate

rapidly, and the need for conservation policy is urgent.

The need for water conservation policy is not only a concern of environmentalists and political

leaders with a “green” agenda; it is also a widely held position of the general public—more

particular, the residents within the Greater Milwaukee-Waukesha Metro Area. A survey

conducted in October of 2008 by the University of Wisconsin Survey Center shows that 83% of

poll people not living within lakeshore communities are in support of the Compact, and 77% of

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people who do reside in lakeshore

communities are in support of the Compact.

The decrease in percentage for residents

living in lakeside communities is surprising,

since one might think these residents would

be more apt to policy protecting water

resources. Republicans and Democrats are

almost equally in favor of the compact, 83%

to 76% respectively. The higher percentage

of Republicans in favor of more government

regulation may also go against one’s

intuition, however more Democrat voting

communities were surveyed than Republican. In any event, it is safe to say the need for water

conservation and sustainability of the Great Lakes is an issue that Wisconsin residents feel

strongly about.

Policy concerning water resources is a complicated web of bureaucracy. There is a substantial

overarching opinion that administration and current laws are deficient in dealing with this issue.

As we can see within the current issue of diversion of Lake Michigan water to Waukesha

County, the most effective means to create policy may not be to rely on public officials to

produce effective governance of water resources; but rather to view the issues within the interest

of the public (Consent, 20XX). This method may seem to be contrary to the current state of

affairs but may offer a more sustained approach to local governance. In many instances the

participation of the public can go a long way at having policy buy-in to a political framework.

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To gain a better understanding of diversion requests, an examination of actual requests should

help to better understand the requisite elements of approval that are not arbitrary in nature. In

many cases political decisions may seem convoluted and in the case of water diversion

legislation, that is certainly no exception. Water diversion approvals and denials can seem to

hang by a thread with unanimous approval of governments required in many cases. All parties

must approve the diversion as it pertains to the great lakes compact which adds multiple hurdles

for the requesting government to negotiate. In a case in which an improperly completed

assessment or an overly aggressive request was made, it would most likely result in rejection.

However, the approved requests are not the only instances that will help to illustrate the

complexities of such water diversion requests.

In the early 1991 Lowell Indiana made a request to divert Lake Michigan water for public

drinking water and other public uses. The existing groundwater that was being used had

critically high levels of fluoride that presented a public health problem. It is not unusual for

groundwater sources to have high levels of hard chemicals that require treatment, or in this case

the procurement of an alternative source. The request would have Lake Michigan water sources

supplied to Lowell Indiana which is approximately 5 miles outside of the Great Lakes Basin by a

pipeline that would be approximately 14 miles long. The request initially requested

approximately 3.7 gallons of water a day and was later reduced to about 1.7 million gallons per

day (Heinmiller, 2007). Despite its close proximity to Lake Michigan and the need of the

citizens for clean drinking water, the request was ultimately denied. The denial came in the form

of a veto by the then Michigan governor John Engler. The reasons for the denial were focused

on the lack of alternative solutions being examined. Engler argued that Lowell could remedy the

water shortage by drilling new wells outside of the Great Lakes Basin and that the diversion was

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not essential for them to have potable water. As a result groundwater remained the primary

supply for drinking water in Lowell.

A key element to water diversion requests and the approval thereof is the notion of full return.

Essentially full return is the principle that all water diverted from the basin be returned to the

basin with requisite waste treatment being performed before return. With the above example,

Lowell Indiana did not include the full return doctrine in their request which is part of the reason

that the request was denied. They later added the full return policy but one could conclude that

the damage was already done as the proposal appeared to not be well thought through by Engler

by not including full return or better discounting alternatives to diversion. Since that instance,

proposals for diversion have included full return as a cornerstone of any request before anything

is submitted for review. Full return ensures that the water levels from the supplying water body

will not be lowered by the diversion and there will be no net loss. Although the quality of the

return water is a main determinant of the overall supply quality, the actual level will be

sustained. In addition, most water return policies will stipulate that the water must be treated

suitably for return to the supplying body.

In contrast to the Lowell Indiana diversion request, two similarly situated communities (close to

the great lakes basin but still outside) had their requests approved. Both Pleasant Prairie

Wisconsin and Akron Ohio included a full return policy before making their final requests for

diversion. In the case of Pleasant Prairie, the initial request did not have a full return policy and

as a result was going to be halted during the construction of the diversion infrastructure until the

full return policy was included within the language of the agreement so that a suitable

infrastructure plan for return water was in place. Pleasant Prairie straddles the continental divide

in the most southeastern corner of Wisconsin. They needed to seek an alternate source for

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potable water because the groundwater had toxic levels of radium, more than 4 times the federal

maximum (Noone, 2006). In 1989 the diversion was approved and in 1990 the diversion began

in the amount of approximately 3.2 million gallons a day. The return infrastructure was not

required initially but will be required to be functional by 2011, returning the same volume

diverted after treatment through the Kenosha Water Utility. Despite the fact that this diversion

request preceded the request of Lowell Indiana and initially did not have a full return policy in

place, they were approved. In addition, the Pleasant Prairie diversion request was over 50%

more volume than that of the Lowell request. This apparent inequity may call into question the

overall equity in water resource protection and how uniform its application is.

In the case of Akron Ohio, in 1998, a request for water diversion of 4.8 million gallons a day was

approved for public use. Although the approved amount is over double that of the rejected

Lowell request, only .32 million gallons a day are currently used (GLWI, 2008). The request for

Akron had stipulations about full return from its very inception. Having the full return element

helped to gain approval of all Great Lakes Governors as well as the fact that Akron narrowly

resides within the great lakes basin (see figure 4).

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Figure

4: Map of Great Lakes Basin

Another diversion request that bears mentioning is the more recent approval of Lake Michigan

water to the city of New Berlin, WI. The city of New Berlin requested an average 2.38 million

gallons a day to essentially replace the amount that was being obtained through groundwater

sources west of the subcontinental divide (WI DNR). A major factor when considering the

diversion request is that the city of New Berlin is a straddling community which means that the

city is situated on (or straddles) both sides of the subcontinental divide. A straddling community

is afforded a unique advantage within the Great Lakes Compact because diversion requests that

are from straddling communities do not require the approval of the other compact states

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governors. Ultimately the request was granted and New Berlin is now able to divert up to 2.14

million gallons a day, a slight reduction from their application amount (WI DNR). Because of

the terms of the compact, full return was a part of the diversion request from its inception. Partly

because of the compliance to the full return doctrine, as well as local water conservation efforts,

the diversion was approved and the city continues to be supplied with Lake Michigan water by

the city of Milwaukee. The treated wastewater is returned via MMSD.

With respect to the aforementioned requests for diversion, it is hard to clearly understand why

the Lowell case was rejected by comparison with the other requests. It brings into focus a key

element of intergovernmental relations and the power that each of the states and provinces hold.

Without unanimous approval, no diversion is allowed which provides massive veto power to

each governor. It is this power balance that can offer some interesting interplays between the

states and provinces. In order for a mutually beneficial result to be had, the political players

must work cohesively to ensure a favorable outcome. In many cases a vote in favor of a

diversion plan may not be ideal for a particular state but a later political favor for one’s own

diversion request can create a quid pro quo situation. The only exception to this concept is the

state of Michigan which lies entirely within the Great Lakes Basin and is somewhat immune to

veto leveraging. Any diversion from the lakes by Michigan will result in a net zero reduction in

the basin which politically puts Michigan in a driver’s seat if there were one to have.

Conversely, Michigan will still need approval for any diversions that they would seek so they

must temper any veto with a calculated political approach.

Local Issues and Political Climate

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Waukesha County currently has high levels radium in their wells which they draw their drinking

water from. Needless to say, these levels are dangerous, and exceed EPA imposed limits.

Therefore, Waukesha must devise a plan to solve the problem. The option highly sought by

Waukesha is to obtain water from Lake Michigan. If this is achieved, Waukesha will become the

first location outside of the geographical Great Lakes Basin to receive water from Lake Michigan

since the enactment of the Great Lakes Compact. While other diversion approvals occurred,

none have occurred since the compact became law. This compact is the most recently

implemented form of water management policy in the region, and a painstaking institutional

arrangement between states and provinces. This intergovernmental agreement assures that

Waukesha’s quest for water will be an uphill political and bureaucratic process.

The request for diversion to Waukesha is a complicated matter that has a substantial impact on

multiple layers of government. The city government of Waukesha has concluded that the

diversion of Lake Michigan water will be the most economical option available. The Great

Lakes Compact requires that no reasonable alternative be available, and to this end Waukesha

has conducted research and based on their conclusions the only viable alternative to water

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treatment or additional ground water sources is the procurement of Lake Michigan water.

Figure 5: Population and Water Usage

Despite the fact that Waukesha has a continued drop in usage as evidenced by their shrinking

consumption of water (see Figure 5), their request for diversion is estimating a usage of over 12

million gallons a day beyond 2035 while at present, the demand is less than 7 million gallons a

day (SEWRPC, 2008). In part, the request for water illustrates the intent by Waukesha to further

develop the area likely by courting industry. If the estimates were based strictly on limited or

moderate developments, the water volume request would likely be projected much lower. It

would appear then that a major consideration with respect to the request is the amount of

expected development that is to take place. Based on the projections a substantial amount of

industry is expected

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There are three primary methods for return water flow that are being proposed and

considered by Waukesha. Each of the return methods offers a different monetary as well as

environmental cost. The cost of water diversion in this instance is substantial and the different

costs can be seen in Figure 6 below. These options are all on the table and do meet the full

return doctrine

Figure 6: Return flow cost comparison

Figure 7: Underwood Creek return flow

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Figure 8: Root River return flow

Figure 9: Direct return to Lake Michigan

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(Alternatives overlooked) While there are many instances of water pollution that require

remediation for sustained population – current proposal application – lacking alternatives

(Fractious resource management)

Figure 6: Local water usage (Ruekert & Mielke, Inc. and SEWRPC)

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Local political climate and government issues complicate the Waukesha diversion, and tend to

convolute the original intentions of the Great Lakes Compact. Several Waukesha public officials,

such as Water Utility General Manager Dan Duchniak, were in support of the Great Lakes

Compact before it was signed into law. It might seem contradictory that Duchniak, along with

others, would be supportive of an agreement that would make it more difficult for Waukesha to

obtain water from a larger source, however, a new source might mean a loss of control, and a

job, for people like Duchniak and other people employed by Waukesha utility management

services.

(May 13, 2010 – While the City of Waukesha has notified the Department of their intent to

submit an application for a diversion from the Great Lakes Basin under the Great Lakes – St.

Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, the Department has not yet received such an

application.)

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The Concern of Sprawl and Continued Decline of the City

Many political leaders and environmentalists view Waukesha’s interest in a Lake Michigan

diversion as a threat to the ecological health of the Great Lakes Basin. There are also critics of

the diversion that view it as a license for greater suburban sprawl, which would only add to

Milwaukee’s woes by attracting water-intensive industries, and moving economic development

out of the city. A common tool for local governments to restrict growth of urban areas is to limit

accessibility to essential services—such as water and sewer services. (Hanson and Jacobs, 1989)

It seems the city of Milwaukee could possibly use this tool to restrict the growth of Waukesha, if

it is in their best interest to do so. It is a very real possibility that a diversion to Waukesha would

further increase suburban sprawl, and produce an unsustainable growth pattern detrimental to the

natural environment. Sprawl encourages the increase of greenhouse gases, and can easily

contaminate water supplies by increasing the amount of storm water runoff from paved surfaces.

The possibility of water contamination is extremely serious, as consequences could reach to the

entire Great Lakes Basin. The decision to allow a diversion must be viewed through the lens of

economic and environmental sustainability.

In order to better predict the outcomes of Waukesha’s diversion, we can analyze the outcomes of

the Chicago diversion from both an environmental and economic prospective. Is there evidence

to suggest that Chicago’s access to Lake Michigan’s water has produced negative effects on

surrounding State economies? Convincing arguments can be presented each way. The first way

to examine the question is to compare the rate of economic growth to that of other metro areas

which border the Great Lakes. Currently, Chicago is considered one of the most successful of

the Midwestern “rustbelt” cities. This is largely due to a reinventing of the economy, after the

decline of industrial and manufacturing jobs which began to leave Midwest cities in a hurry

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during the 1970’s. Meanwhile, the Great Lakes cities of Detroit, Cleveland, and Buffalo have

the highest poverty rates of any U.S. city. While the rest of the Great Lakes cities have suffered

great economic loss at the hand of globalization, Chicago thrived by merging into the global

economy. On its face, the argument that Chicago has been successful in a global economy

because of its access to Lake Michigan as a water resource may seem a bit farfetched. However,

we can see that industry growth in Chicago has increased dramatically in the years after it began

using lake water to pump it’s sewage down the Ohio River. It is also important not to

underestimate the effect of Chicago’s low water rates on industry location. As most other

Midwestern cities charge a higher rate for commercial water use, Chicago charges the same low

rate to industries as it does to residents. Considering all of these points, we must assume that

Lake Michigan played vital role in transforming Chicago into a global center of commerce that

enabled a transition into the global marketplace.

Figure 2: Timeline of industry growth in Chicago.

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Figure 3: A global comparison of Chicago’s water rate.

Has Chicago’s success contributed to the hardships of other Great Lakes cities? In order to

answer this question, we must examine some environmental effects of the Chicago diversion.

The primary environmental consequence of the Chicago diversion is a lowering of lake levels.

Even small decreases in lake levels change shorelines and beaches—which, in turn, would affect

property values. Studies have shown that decreases in water levels leave boat access properties,

and shipping access above the water line thereby decreasing shorefront property values.

Hydropower is also decreased by lower lake levels. The decreased amount of hydropower has a

ripple effect, raising the price of energy, and compromising any energy intensive industry. The

University of Wisconsin-Madison has conducted studies that show water diversions greater than

10,000 cubic feet per second result, have an aggregate annual impact between 60 and 100 million

dollars. However, in 1967 the United States Supreme Court ordered that a limit of 3,200 cubic

feet of water per second be imposed upon the Chicago diversion. This has planners scrambling

to find new aquifers to accommodate a population growth of nearly 35% in Cook County by

2030. 3,200 feet of water per second still has a significant environmental impact. As the lake

water is pumped out of the basin, and then though a network of rivers, it has a negative impact

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on local ecosystems. As the water moves faster and faster down these channels, erosion

becomes a problem- which can also lead to flooding. It also has a negative impact on native fish

and creates conditions for invasive species to infiltrate. These environmental and economic

detriments present the issue of imposing limits on future development for areas with diversions

outside of the Great Lakes Basin.

As mentioned before hydropower is affected by a small decrease in water levels. New York and

Michigan rank first and second respectively in hydroelectric production. Chicago does not

withstand to suffer any economic loss by affecting this hydroelectric market. The other industry

most heavily affected by a decrease in water levels is manufacturing. It is necessary to examine

the loss of manufacturing jobs from the Great Lakes region, and speculate on how a lower lake

level may have indirectly given Chicago an advantage in entering the global economy. Although

valid arguments can be made either way, we must at least consider the possibility in order to

better define the ramifications of future diversion.

According to many academic investigations, Milwaukee’s denial of a Lake Michigan diversion

would not mean eliminating growth in Waukesha permanently. If Milwaukee denies a diversion,

Waukesha could get water from another municipality—one eager to strike a deal and boost

public funds. Is it truly within Milwaukee’s interest to deny a diversion? The answer may be

more complicated than a simple case-study analysis can provide. The benefits of a Lake

Michigan diversion can be most easily seen though the adoption of a regional view of economic

development.

The Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel has published articles that offer reasons for why allowing

Waukesha access to water might be beneficial. As other states look to Wisconsin as a potential

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state to provide drinking water through Lake Michigan, the move to allow Waukesha access to

water may bring them one step closer to receiving water themselves—thereby making

Milwaukee a place of great importance, and attracting economic development to the region.

Other academics have noted that, although economic growth must take place and be maintained

within ecological limits, environmental protection and economic development can be

complimentary issues and not antagonistic processes. (Downs, 1999) By combining resources,

such as the water from Lake Michigan, this may spur economic development of the region as a

whole, and begin to expunge societal division lines that reinforce inefficient local decision

making policies. It is upon this basis that the decision to expand water provision into Waukesha

is a step toward the sustainability of Milwaukee, and the region as a whole.

According to these theories, this might be exactly why the City of Milwaukee should be happy to

sell the access to water to the surrounding suburbs. In a case of “if you can’t beat ‘em, join

‘em,” The city of Milwaukee may look to the future, and consider not just their own urban

boundary—but the growth of the entire metropolitan area. After all, the suburbs will indeed

contain most of the future growth in the area. City government may also want to adopt a more

regional viewpoint, and consider integrating with the suburbs in as many ways possible to ensure

the future prosperity of the city. Obvious use of access fees, and taxes on the use of water, could

help the city make much-needed repairs and upgrades to infrastructure. If Milwaukee really

wants to attain the status as a world leader in the provision of water, as local political leaders

have recently implied, perhaps it should not always view growth outside the city boundary as a

detriment to itself.

In Conclusion

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Within the light of history of Great Lakes water management policy, the strength and precision

of the Great Lakes Compact will decide the future ramifications of a Waukesha diversion. If

Waukesha can resist the temptation to develop beyond its infrastructure capacity, it may avoid

the proliferation of industrial pollution—consequences of the inadequate policy implementation

of the International Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. As the Chicago Supreme Court Decree of

1967 has shown us, the IJC, or other federal regulating agencies may need to intervene before the

point of crisis, and set legally binding limits of Waukesha water usage. It must be a point to

ensure Waukesha is regulated with legally enforceable standards, as to not lead same

shortcomings of the 1985 Great Lakes Charter. Without strict monitoring and usage limits based

on Waukesha’s current size, the rise industry could quickly lead to over-consumption. The Great

Lakes Water Quality Agreement managed to successfully set new environmental standards. The

current Great Lakes Compact is attempting to do the same thing through the use of policy

legislation. A diversion outside the Great Lakes basin could possibly cause unprecedented

environmental issues, and as new concerns continue to manifest, the Compact will prove its

worth by spawning the same types of environmental policy successes—such as the Clean Water

Act of the 1980’s. As the Waukesha diversion would be the first of its kind, it will test the

capacity of the Great Lakes Compact to evolve into the most effective piece of water policy

legislation to date.

As we have seen, viewing the Waukesha diversion through the lens of sustainability does not

necessarily mean the sacrifice of regional growth and economic development. However, the

City of Milwaukee will most likely not gain any short term-benefits from further development in

Waukesha—unless the two municipalities can agree on a creative contract that will allow for the

much-needed improvement of city services. As this is unlikely to come from a purely financial

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contract with Waukesha (Peterson, 2008), and considering the contentious political climate, the

long-term benefits of regional development may prove to be mute. For the sake of argument, if

the municipalities were able to come to an agreement which benefits both in the long and short-

term, would the diversion be an environmental detriment? Again, the answer lies within the

untested strength of the Great Lakes Compact. Although the compact has the benefit of a

century of policy-making hindsight, many have a reasonable concern that Waukesha will be

unable to limit its future development, and contribute to the problem of suburban sprawl. If

doubts are based upon the history of Waukesha’s achievement in creating sustainable

development, the disquiet of critics is well-justified.

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Annotated Bibliography:

Hill, James P.; “The New Politics of Great Lakes Water Diversion: A Canada-Michigan Interface; The Toledo Journal of Great Lakes' Law, Science & Policy, Fall 1999

Wriiten in 1999, this article by James Hill outlines the consequences of future Great Lakes Water Diversions, focusing heavily on exportations from Canada, and the relationship of Michigan and Canada within present water policy.

Hanson, Mark E.; Jacobs, Harvey M. “Private Sewage System Impacts in Wisconsin: Implications For”; American Planning Association. Journal of the American Planning Association. Spring 1989 ABI/INFORM Global; pg. 169

This article describes how certain tools, such as zoning, sewer, and city services, are to be used by local governments to control growth in urban areas. These tools, however, do not permanently control development.

Forer, L.G.; “Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation” Harvard Law Review, 196; pp. 332-349; Vol. 75, No. 2 (Dec., 1961),

Written in 1961, this article describes the poor conditions of the Great Lakes from an environmental prospective. He details the country’s “water shortage” problem, and largely points the finger at Chicago industry, and the lack of comprehensive water policy at the federal level.

Clinton, Hillary; “Remarks at the 100th Anniversary of the Boundary Waters Treaty” (Speech) US Department of State; Rainbow Bridge, Niagara Falls; June 13, 2009

In this speech by Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, Praise is given to the relationship between Canada and the United States on the 100 year anniversary of the treaty. She speaks of all the progress made on water policy and environmental legislation between the two countries.

EPA; “State of the Great Lakes - 2009”;

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This report goes over the main problems currently facing the Great Lakes states as water levels continue to decrease. The report refers to over-consumption of water, and measures taken to remediate past causes of lowering lake-levels. This is divided into separate sections for each indicator. The section detailing indicator #7056 refers to the Chicago diversion and how it was over consuming water for years.

Downs, Anthony; “Some Realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline”; Housing Policy Debate, the Brookings Institution, Volume 10, Issue 4 Fannie Mae Foundation 1999

Downs describes why not all suburban sprawl is bad. He also asserts that the proliferation of sprawl does not necessarily mean neglect to the environment. The article mostly focuses on suburban housing.

Donahue, Michael; “The Case for Good Government: Why a Comprehensive Review of the Great Lakes Water Compact is Needed”; Toledo Journal of Great Lakes' Law, Science & Policy (Vol. 2 No. 1, Fall 1999).

This article reviews the provisions made in the 1972 Water Quality Agreement in terms of it’s current effectiveness in meeting new environmental challenges. He cites specific events that acted as catalysts towards creation of the Agreement, and relates them to new emerging environmental issues.

Peterson, Anne; “The Utilization of Interlocal Service Agreements, Reshaping The Local Government Landscape”; August 7, 2008

This paper, written in 2008, discusses the incentives and reasons why local governments are most likely to benefit from agreements with each other; as well as why some agreements (such as one between Waukesha and Milwaukee) are unlikely to take place.