igis annual report 10-11

Annual Report2010–2011

IGIS Contact InformationLocation

One National Circuit BARTON ACT 2600

Written inquiries

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security PO Box 6181 KINGSTON ACT 2604

ParLiamentary and media Liaison

Ms Maryanne Gates Phone: (02) 6271 5692 Fax: (02) 6271 5696

GeneraL inquiries

Phone: (02) 6271 5692 Fax: (02) 6271 5696 E-mail: [email protected]

internet addresses

Homepage http://www.igis.gov.au Annual report http://www.igis.gov.au/annual_report/index.cfm

ISSN: 1030-4657

© Commonwealth of Australia 2011

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iv Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2010–2011

Contents

Glossary .................................................................................................................................................... vi

Overview ....................................................................................................................................................1

General Matters .........................................................................................................................................7

Parliament and Legislation .......................................................................................................................11

Parliamentary oversight............................................................................................................................12

Legislative proposals and developments ...................................................................................................12

Performance ............................................................................................................................................15

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation .............................................................................................21

What ASIO does .......................................................................................................................................21

Inspection activities .................................................................................................................................23

Complaints and inquiries .........................................................................................................................34

Australian Secret Intelligence Service .......................................................................................................41

What ASIS does .......................................................................................................................................41

Significant issues .....................................................................................................................................42

Inspection activities .................................................................................................................................44

Complaints and inquiries .........................................................................................................................47

Defence Intelligence Agencies .................................................................................................................49

Defence Signals Directorate .....................................................................................................................51

vInspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2010–2011

Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation .........................................................................................57

Defence Intelligence Organisation ............................................................................................................59

Office of National Assessments ................................................................................................................61

What ONA does .......................................................................................................................................61

The Year 2011–12 in Prospect ................................................................................................................63

Proposed briefing, inspection and review activities ..................................................................................64

Management and Accountability ..............................................................................................................69

Corporate governance ..............................................................................................................................69

External scrutiny .....................................................................................................................................71

Management of human resources ...........................................................................................................71

Other information .....................................................................................................................................74

Summary of Financial Performance and Resources for Outcomes ...........................................................76

Financial Statements ...............................................................................................................................77

Annex 1 .................................................................................................................................................111

Annex 2 .................................................................................................................................................112

Annex 3 .................................................................................................................................................113

Annex 4 .................................................................................................................................................114

Annex 5 .................................................................................................................................................116

vi Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2010–2011

GlossaryAAT Administrative Appeals Tribunal

ACLEI Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity

ADF Australian Defence Force

AFP Australian Federal Police

AGG Attorney-General’s Guidelines

AGS Australian Government Solicitor

AIC Australian Intelligence Community

AML/CTF Act Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006ANAO Australian National Audit Office

APS Australian Public Service

ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

ASIO Act Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979ASIS Australian Secret Intelligence Service

ASL Average Staffing Level

AUSTRAC Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre

CEI Counter Espionage and Interference

DA Director’s Authorisation

DIGO Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation

DIAC Department of Immigration and Citizenship

DIO Defence Intelligence Organisation

DSA Defence Security Authority

DSD Defence Signals Directorate

FAQ Frequently Asked Questions

GST Goods and Services Tax

HSR Health and Safety Representative

IGIS Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

IGIS Act Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986IMA Irregular Maritime Arrival

INSLM Independent National Security Legislation Monitor

IRIC Independent Review of the Intelligence Community

ISA Intelligence Services Act 2001MA Ministerial Authorisation

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NSA National Security Adviser

OH&S Act Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991OIGIS Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

ONA Office of National Assessments

ONA Act Office of National Assessments Act 1977PDA Prospective Data Authority

PID Public Interest Disclosure

PJCIS Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security

PM&C Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

SES Senior Executive Service

T(IA) Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979TILSA Act Telecommunications Interception and Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2011

viiInspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2010–2011

Role of the Inspector-GeneralThe Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) is an independent statutory office holder who reviews the activities of the agencies which collectively comprise the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC). The IGIS has own motion powers in addition to considering complaints from members of the public or requests from ministers.

There are currently six intelligence and security agencies which form the AIC, namely:

• Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)

• Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)

• Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO)

• Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)

• Defence Signals Directorate (DSD)

• Office of National Assessments (ONA)

The office was formally established by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) and commenced operating on 1 February 1987.

The Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (OIGIS) is situated within the Prime Minister’s portfolio and reports to the Special Minister of State for the Public Service and Integrity for administrative purposes.

As an independent statutory office holder, the IGIS is not subject to general direction from the Prime Minister, the Special Minister of State for the Public Service and Integrity, or other Ministers on how responsibilities under the IGIS Act should be carried out.

The role and functions of the IGIS are set out in sections 8, 9 and 9A of the IGIS Act. These sections provide the legal basis for the IGIS to conduct regular inspections of the AIC agencies and to conduct inquiries, of varying levels of formality, as the need arises.

The overarching purpose of these activities is to ensure that each AIC agency acts legally and with propriety, complies with ministerial guidelines and directives, and respects human rights.

The majority of the resources of the office are directed towards on-going inspection and monitoring activities, so as to identify issues, including about the governance and control frameworks within agencies, before there is a requirement for major remedial action.

The inspection role of the IGIS is complemented by an inquiry function. In undertaking inquiries the IGIS has strong investigative powers, akin to those of a royal commission.

The focus of inquiries which were conducted under the authority of the IGIS Act were generally limited to the activities of the six AIC agencies from the date when the IGIS Act first took effect (that is 1 February 1987) until 23 November 2010.

Dr Vivienne Thom Inspector-General

viii Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2010–2011

The IGIS Act was amended with effect from 24 November 2010. Section 9 now provides that the Prime Minister may request the IGIS to inquire into an intelligence or security matter relating to any Commonwealth agency, not just matters relating to an intelligence agency. Further details on the practical effects of this amendment are provided in the General Matters and Parliament and Legislation chapters of this report.

All inquiries which are pursued under the authority of the IGIS Act are conducted in private because they almost invariably involve highly classified or sensitive information, and the methods by which it is collected. The public ventilation of this material could be potentially harmful to those persons involved in its collection, or compromise collection methodologies, neither of which would serve the national interest.

The role and functions of the IGIS are an important part of the overall accountability framework to which the AIC agencies are subject. While the focus of the IGIS is on the operational activities of the AIC agencies, the agencies are also subject to review by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), as well as the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO).

Certain ASIO assessments can be appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Proceedings can also be instituted against AIC agencies in the Courts.

1

Appointment as IGIS

The statutory position of the Inspector-General of

Intelligence and Security (IGIS) was created by the

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act

1986 (IGIS Act), and came into being on 1 February

1987. I was formally appointed as Inspector-General

for a term of five years with effect from 19 July 2010

following a period as Acting IGIS arising from the

retirement of Mr Ian Carnell AM in April 2010.

I have therefore served as Inspector-General for

the full period covered by this annual report.

Ministerial and National Security Leadership Positions

The 2010–11 reporting period saw some significant

changes at a national political leadership level,

which naturally had some consequential impact

upon the oversight and administration of each

of the six agencies which collectively comprise

the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC).

The Hon Julia Gillard MP assumed the

Prime Ministership in late June 2010.

A general election was held on 21 August 2010

and the Governor-General, Her Excellency

Quentin Bryce AC, swore Ms Gillard in as

Prime Minister on 14 September 2010.

As the ONA falls within the Prime Minister’s

portfolio, Ms Gillard continued to exercise

executive responsibility for that agency

following her swearing in.

The Hon Stephen Smith MP

relinquished his position as Minister

for Foreign Affairs to become the

Minister for Defence, and in so

doing assumed executive

responsibility for the

Defence intelligence

agencies, namely

DSD, DIGO

and DIO.

Overview

2 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2010–2011

The Hon Kevin Rudd MP was sworn in as the Minister for Foreign Affairs and consequently assumed executive responsibility for ASIS.

The Hon Robert McClelland MP who was first appointed Attorney-General in December 2007, retained that position in the First and Second Gillard Ministries, and therefore continued to have executive responsibility for ASIO.

The Hon Gary Gray AO MP was sworn in as Special Minister of State and Special Minister of State for the Public Service and Integrity. It is in this latter capacity that Mr Gray has administrative oversight of this office.

Membership of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) also changed significantly following the swearing in of the 43rd Parliament.

There were no changes to the persons heading up the six AIC agencies during the period covered by this report, or the other senior most positions which coordinate and oversee the activities of the AIC.

Major security and intelligence related activitiesOn 23 December 2010, the Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, announced the creation of an Independent Review into the Australian Intelligence Community (IRIC). The purpose of the IRIC is to ensure that Australia’s intelligence agencies are working effectively together and are well positioned to meet the challenges which are presented by a rapidly evolving security environment.

IRIC has been led jointly by Mr Robert Cornall AO (a former Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department) and Associate Professor Rufus Black who is an ethicist, theologian and management consultant. The review satisfies one of the recommendations from the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies, which was conducted by Mr Philip Flood AO in 2004.

During 2010–11 I met with Mr Cornall to offer my perspectives on the way in which the AIC agencies work together and on the architecture and role of my office. The IRIC review was ongoing as at 30 June 2011, but anticipated delivering its report to the Government early in the 2011–12 reporting period. This office will pay close attention to the report and the Government’s response to it, with a view to changing the focus of our inspection and review activities, as necessary or appropriate.

Inquiries undertaken by IGISIn the reporting period I commenced three full inquiries and four preliminary inquiries.

At the request of the Minister for Defence, I initiated an inquiry in late 2010 into suggestions that a test used by DSD pertaining to the application of collection and reporting rules may have been compromised.

In conducting this inquiry, I reviewed the wider compliance testing regime within DSD. I concluded that inadequate controls were in place to ensure the integrity of the test but that the broader testing regime was sound. I provided the Minister with a series of recommendations, all of which have been accepted. Further details of this inquiry are provided in the chapter of this report dealing with the Defence intelligence agencies.

In January 2011, at the request of the Prime Minister, I initiated a full inquiry into the actions of relevant Australian agencies in relation to the arrest and detention overseas of Mr Mamdouh Habib from 2001 to 2005. An inquiry of this nature is provided for under section 9(1) and section 9(3) of the IGIS Act. This inquiry was ongoing as at 30 June 2011 but some additional information is provided in the General Matters chapter of this report.

In May 2011, the Prime Minister again requested that I conduct a full inquiry, this time into allegations of inappropriate security vetting practices at the

3Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2010–2011

Defence Security Authority. As is the case with the Habib inquiry, s 9(3) of the IGIS Act provides authority for me to inquire into intelligence and security matters relating to a Commonwealth agency. This inquiry is also continuing. Additional information on the DSA inquiry is also provided in the General Matters chapter of this report.

The four preliminary inquiries all arose from complaints to me by members of the public. After consideration of our preliminary inquiries into these matters I determined that none of these required progression to a full inquiry. Further details on the subject matter and result of these preliminary inquiries are provided in the sections of this report which deal with ASIO and DSD.

Complaints about the processing of security assessments for visa applicantsIn 2010–2011, we received 1111 complaints about ASIO’s processing of security assessments for visa applicants compared to 1015 complaints of this kind in 2009–10. The vast majority of these complaints were concerned with the timeliness with which these security assessments were being undertaken.

I did not initiate full or preliminary inquiries into any of these complaints but chose instead to process them, and related requests for information, administratively. The rationale for this approach and my decision to change how complaints of this kind will be handled in the future is set out in the ASIO chapter of this report.

There are several reasons why I believe we continued to receive large numbers of complaints about the timeliness of security assessments for visa applicants during 2010–11. As the numbers of visa applicants referred to ASIO for a security assessment has trended upwards in recent years backlogs can develop, particularly in cases where questions of identity are at issue

and in instances where the visa applicants come from countries where it is appropriate for routine background checks to be undertaken.

Another reason is that as the role and functions of this office have become better known amongst particular groups who have resettled in Australia, and amongst migration agents and refugee advocates, it has become almost routine for enquiries to be made to this office about the status of a visa application, even in cases where a referral to ASIO for a security assessment might not yet have been made.

We noted a stabilisation and then a relative decline in the number of complaints made to this office in the last quarter of 2010–11. We attribute this to the implementation by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), in collaboration with ASIO, of a triaging approach to security assessments for visa applicants who meet the criteria for refugee status.

So as to keep properly informed of developments in this field and to ensure that proper oversight occurs of the activities of Commonwealth agencies which are involved in these processes, I participated in several senior level meetings with the Secretary of DIAC, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the President of the Australian Human Rights Commission and the Director-General of Security (the head of ASIO).

My staff and I also sought regular briefings from ASIO seniors and from staff at all levels within ASIO’s Security Assessments Branch on the strategies they used to manage the referrals they received for security assessments.

As we have now found little incidence of error on the part of ASIO in processing security assessments, I have decided that in future this office will adopt a more strategic approach to scrutinising ASIO’s processing of security assessments rather than being driven so much by complaints from, or on behalf of, individual visa applicants.


Two pieces of legislation were introduced into Parliament in 2010–11 which have the potential to significantly reshape the role of IGIS and the oversight activities which we undertake, namely the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Amendment Bill 2011 and the Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2011.

The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Amendment Bill 2011 proposes, amongst other things, to provide IGIS with the power to initiate own motion preliminary inquiries. The Bill also proposes to enable the IGIS to delegate the powers of the office to a suitable senior person subject to ministerial approval.

The Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2011, puts forward a number of proposals which aim to complement and enhance inter-operability between the AIC agencies on intelligence and security matters. This Bill builds on a number of changes brought about by the passage of the Telecommunications Interception and Intelligence Service Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (TILSA Act), which also sought to advance this purpose.

The Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2010, which was passed late in the 2009–10 reporting period, came into effect early in the 2010–11 reporting period. This Act amended the definition of ‘security’ in the ASIO Act, to better enable ASIO to carry out its intelligence functions in relation to border security issues. In conducting inspections of investigations undertaken by ASIO, this office always has regard to whether or not the matters under investigation have a clear nexus to ‘security’ as defined in the ASIO Act. Any change to the definition of security is therefore significant.

The Combating the Financing of People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2011 was passed by the Parliament in June 2011, and received Royal Assent on 28 June 2011. This Act, amongst other things, makes DSD, DIGO, DIO and ONA ‘designated agencies’ for the purposes of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (AML/CTF Act), meaning that they join ASIO

Our objective will be to regularly inspect ASIO’s systems and case management strategies, with a focus on cases which are more than 12 months old. An inspection process has been developed in consultation with ASIO, and this will be implemented from 1 July 2011.

Legislative developmentsSeveral significant legislative changes were introduced or implemented during 2010–11, which have had a significant impact, or have the potential to impact significantly, on this office and the wider AIC. These changes are examined in more detail in the Parliament and Legislation chapter of this report but some of the more significant changes are briefly described here to illustrate the dynamic nature of the environment in which this office operates.

Perhaps the most significant statutory amendment affecting this office during the reporting period was the passage of the National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010, which received Royal Assent on 24 November 2010. This Act amended the IGIS Act by providing IGIS with the legal authority to inquire into an intelligence or security matter relating to any Commonwealth agency (not just the AIC agencies) if requested to do so by the Prime Minister. The amended IGIS Act requires the IGIS to comply with such a request.

As described above, although it was contemplated that this power would be used in extraordinary circumstances, it was used on two occasions during 2010–11, to initiate inquiries into:

• the actions of relevant Australian agencies in relation to the arrest and detention overseas of Mr Mamdouh Habib from 2001 to 2005 (the Habib inquiry)

• allegations of inappropriate vetting practices by the Defence Security Authority (the DSA inquiry).

On both occasions I was given additional funding to carry out these inquiries but it will be important to match resources with workload if this trend continues.


and ASIS as having the capacity to directly access and share financial intelligence information which is collected and stored by the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC).

Appointment of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 received Royal Assent on 13 April 2010. The role of the Monitor is to review and report on the operation and effectiveness of Australia’s counter-terrorism and national security legislation. Mr Bret Walker SC was appointed as the inaugural Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) in May 2011.

I have had constructive discussions with Mr Walker, and believe that the work of our two offices will serve to complement each other in our endeavours to provide independent advice to Government about the practical and likely effects of existing and proposed security related legislation.

Arrangements for Acting IGISThere is currently no capacity under the IGIS Act for me to delegate the powers of the office to another person. I advanced a proposal during 2010–11 that the IGIS Act should be amended to permit this to occur, in limited circumstances. This proposal is discussed in more detail in the Parliament and Legislation chapter of this report.

Section 6A of the IGIS Act does, however, make provision for the Prime Minister to appoint a person to act as IGIS. The Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, signed a standing instrument on 7 December 2010 appointing Mr Philip Moss to act as Inspector-General for any period when the office is vacant, or when the incumbent IGIS is absent from duty, or from Australia, or is for any reason unable to perform the duties of the office.

The standing appointment was made in Mr Moss’s personal capacity rather than tied to his position. Mr Moss is currently the Integrity Commissioner, and as such manages the activities of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI). Mr Moss was not required to perform the functions of Acting IGIS during 2010–11.

Staffing allocations of the officeIn 2010–11, the number of individuals employed in the office on an on-going basis increased to fourteen. One additional staff member was recruited in preparation for the proposed introduction of a Public Interest Disclosure (PID) scheme.

I also engaged an SES Band One Officer, Ms Diane Merryfull, on temporary transfer, to lead the team working on the inquiry I have been undertaking into the actions of relevant Australian agencies in relation to the arrest and detention overseas of Mr Habib from 2001 to 2005.

OIGIS administrative functionsMy staff and I negotiated a new Enterprise Agreement in May 2011. The Agreement was endorsed by Fair Work Australia in June 2011, and came into effect shortly afterwards. Further details are provided in the Management and Accountability chapter of this report.

TrainingI believe that it is important for new and existing AIC staff to have at least a general knowledge of the role and functions of this office, and the types of inspection activities which we regularly undertake.

We made fewer presentations to AIC staff than in previous years but we aimed in those presentations to engage with as many staff as possible, at all levels, across all of the AIC agencies. I personally presented to staff from across AIC agencies on ethics and accountability as well as at various induction courses.


External speaking engagementsI attended several conferences and made a number of presentations in various forums in 2010–11, to promote a better and more widespread understanding of the activities of this office. Some of the conferences and forums in which I participated included:

• Presentation to Graduate Studies in Strategic Defence – Australian National University

• Presentation to the Australian Institute of Administrative Law.

International engagementThis office is often requested to meet with international delegations from intelligence or oversight agencies. In the reporting period I met with visiting delegations from Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States.

7

General Matters

Cross-AIC inspection project – exchanges of information with foreign authoritiesPrior to his retirement my immediate predecessor as IGIS, Mr Ian Carnell AM, initiated a major inspection project to examine the policies, procedures and practices of each of the six Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) agencies relating to the exchange of information with approved foreign authorities.

The purpose of this project was to identify any challenges or risks that might exist relating to exchanging intelligence information and to comment generally on practices across the AIC against considerations of legality and propriety.

I finalised this project in September 2010, and provided a report to responsible Ministers and agency heads. Given the sensitivity of the subject matter and the source material which we drew upon the report is necessarily classified.

I can say, however, that in the final report I drew a number of conclusions and put forward several suggested changes to improve the policies and practices of AIC agencies in this area.

These recommendations related primarily to the need for strengthened risk management strategies to ensure considerations of propriety and respect for human rights are taken into account and appropriately documented at each stage of the process.


to the Attorney-General’s Guidelines (AGGs) in relation to the performance by ASIO of its function of obtaining, correlating, evaluating and communicating intelligence relevant to security.

The extant AGGs were endorsed by the then Attorney-General, the Hon Mr Philip Ruddock MP, in October 2007. Section 10.4 of these AGGs specifically requires that information is only to be obtained by ASIO in a lawful, timely and efficient way, using as little intrusion into individual privacy as is possible, consistent with the performance by ASIO of its functions.

The role and functions of each of Australia’s foreign intelligence collection agencies, namely ASIS, DSD and DIGO, are each set out in the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA). These agencies are sometimes known collectively as the ISA agencies.

While the ISA agencies focus on collecting foreign intelligence, they will sometimes collect intelligence information on Australian persons who are engaged in activities which bring them to official attention, or who can assist the agencies to collect foreign intelligence information.

Section 15 of the ISA requires each of the ISA agencies to have written privacy rules, made by the Minister responsible for each agency, which regulate the communication and retention by those agencies of intelligence information on Australian persons.

Australia’s intelligence assessment agencies, DIO and ONA, do not directly collect intelligence information on Australian persons but do receive intelligence information from a variety of sources, which contribute to the development of the assessments which they provide to senior government decision makers. These assessments sometimes contain reference to Australian persons.

The communication of intelligence information about Australian persons by DIO and ONA is governed by privacy guidelines, issued by the Minister for Defence in the case of DIO, and the Director-General of ONA in the case of ONA.

While I recognised the differences between the intelligence collection and intelligence assessment agencies, I also concluded that effective coordination and shared policy approaches between AIC agencies remained a key area for improved practice.

Since I finalised the report, my office has continued to engage with each of the AIC agencies to monitor current practices across the AIC, including where agencies have identified opportunities to review and improve their internal policies and procedures. I intend to continue to monitor this issue over the coming year.

Privacy related issuesIn order to fulfil their various mandates, each of the six AIC agencies will, from time to time, obtain intelligence information on Australian persons. In order to make proper use of this information the agencies will also have cause to disseminate that information, in controlled circumstances, to other Australian agencies and approved foreign authorities.

The AIC agencies are not bound by the provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 when collecting or providing intelligence information on Australian persons but they each attempt to apply the principles of privacy protection to sensitive information relating to or about Australian persons, to the extent that doing so is not incompatible with their functions.

Although ASIO’s functional interests are not limited by geography, it is Australia’s national security agency and as such it necessarily focuses a lot of its resources on investigating possible threats to Australia and Australian persons. In the course of doing so, ASIO can obtain significant quantities of sensitive personal information about Australian persons.

While ASIO is not bound by the Privacy Act 1988, and there are no specific privacy rules regulating its collection, storage and use of personal information about Australian persons, it is subject


The privacy rules and guidelines which are currently used by ASIS, DSD, DIGO, DIO and ONA are essentially the same, so that consistent standards can be applied across the AIC.

This office conducts regular inspections of the six AIC agencies to ensure that the extent to which the agencies intrude upon the privacy of Australian persons is kept to the minimum which is necessary, consistent with the functions of each agency.

The privacy rules and guidelines which apply to every AIC agency except ASIO were initially developed for ASIS and DSD to coincide with the coming into effect of the ISA in 2001. The DIGO privacy rules were formally endorsed when DIGO was incorporated into the framework of the ISA in 2005. The DIO and ONA privacy guidelines were also adopted in 2005.

As the privacy rules and guidelines are essentially identical, and spring from the ASIS and DSD privacy rules which are now 10 years old, this office has engaged in discussions with a number of AIC agencies with the purpose of ensuring that the privacy rules and guidelines are still relevant and up to date. These discussions were still ongoing as at 30 June 2011.

As the privacy rules and guidelines referred to above seek to protect the privacy interests of Australian persons (that is Australian citizens and persons whose capacity to stay in Australia is not limited by time), I initiated a cross-AIC inspection project in November 2010, which focussed on how each of the six AIC agencies goes about ascertaining whether or not an individual is an Australian person.

I temporarily suspended this project in March 2011, due to the pressure of conducting several full inquiries concurrently, but expect to complete it in 2011–12.

In the meantime, I am pleased to note that the initiation of this inspection activity has served as a catalyst for the six AIC agencies to reflect on how they usually obtain this information, and to

encourage them to work cooperatively together to ensure that this information is shared when the citizenship and residency status is already known by at least one of the agencies.

Habib inquiryIn December 2010 the Prime Minister requested me to inquire into the actions of Australian government agencies in relation to the arrest and detention overseas of Mr Mamdouh Habib from 2001–2005. I commenced the inquiry in January 2011.

Initially the inquiry included within its scope the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Federal Police as well as the AIC agencies. It became apparent to me that officers from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Attorney-General’s Department were also directly involved in decision making at the time and I wrote to the Prime Minister asking her to formally extend the scope of the inquiry to cover these agencies. The Prime Minister agreed to my request on 26 February 2011.

The work of the inquiry has been substantial. By the end of the reporting period a small team of four had examined many thousands of pages of documents and I had formally interviewed twenty five witnesses.

The report should be finalised by the end of 2011.


Defence Security Authority inquiryOn 29 May 2011 the Prime Minister requested me to commence an inquiry into allegations of inappropriate vetting practices by the Defence Security Authority (DSA) and related matters. This followed allegations raised on national television by former contractors at DSA’s facility in Brisbane. I accepted the request and commenced the inquiry in early June 2011.

By the end of the reporting period I had commenced examining documents and formally interviewing a number of current and former staff and contractors of DSA.

The inquiry is scheduled to be completed in October 2011.

11

The following chapter briefly sets out some of the interactions of this office with parliamentary bodies during the reporting period and summarises legislative developments relevant to the office and to the AIC.

Parliament and Legislation


Parliamentary oversightParliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and SecurityThe Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) came into existence on 2 December 2005, as a successor to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD. The composition, role and functions of the PJCIS are prescribed under sections 28 and 29 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA).

The PJCIS comprises eleven members, five of whom must be drawn from the Senate and six from the House of Representatives. At 30 June 2011, six members were drawn from the Government, four from the opposition parties and one was an independent. The Chair of the PJCIS was the Hon Anthony Byrne MP, while the Hon Philip Ruddock MP served as the Deputy Chair.

The PJCIS plays a significant role in oversighting the activities of the AIC agencies, particularly in respect of their administration and expenditure.

Although OIGIS is not one of the six AIC agencies and therefore not itself directly within the remit of the PJCIS, it has been the usual practice of the IGIS to periodically meet with the PJCIS in private, in order to provide an overview of the work of the office and to discuss issues of mutual interest or concern. There are also some matters under the ISA on which the PJCIS can formally seek a briefing from the IGIS.

During 2010–11 the IGIS’s interactions with the Committee included a submission made on 7 February 2011 to the Review of Expenditure and Administration No. 9 (2009–10) – Australian Intelligence Agencies, and a meeting with members of the Committee on 24 March 2011.

Senate Finance and Public Administration CommitteeI appeared before the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration on 21 February 2011 during the 2010–11 Additional Budget Estimates hearings, and on 24 May 2011 during the 2011–12 Budget Estimates hearings.

Legislative proposals and developmentsNew statutory role for the IGISDuring the reporting period, the Parliament broadened the functions of the IGIS through the National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010.

In November 2008 the Hon John Clarke QC presented his report of the inquiry into the circumstances of the arrest of Dr Mohamed Haneef to the Attorney-General. Recommendation One of the report was that:

... the Government consider incorporating in legislation the special arrangements and powers that would apply to inquiries and other independent reviews and investigations involving matters of national security.

In December 2008, the Government announced that it agreed to this recommendation and stated that various options would be considered to address the Clarke Inquiry’s concerns, including broadening the mandate of the IGIS so that IGIS inquiries (at the direction of the Prime Minister) could cover Commonwealth departments and agencies that are not members of the AIC.


The National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010 implemented this decision. The Prime Minister subsequently requested that the IGIS undertake two inquiries during the reporting period utilising the relevant provisions in the Act. Information on the commencement of the inquiry into the actions of relevant Australian agencies in relation to the arrest and detention overseas of Mr Mamdouh Habib between 2001 and 2005, and the commencement of the inquiry into the actions of the Defence Security Authority in relation to allegations of inappropriate vetting practices and related matters is in the General Matters chapter of this report.

Other Proposed Amendments to the IGIS ActThe Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Amendment Bill 2011 was introduced into the Parliament on 23 March 2011. On 12 May 2011, the Bill was referred to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee for inquiry and report, with the IGIS making a written submission to the inquiry on 14 June 2011.

The Bill proposed to:

• update the objectives section of the IGIS Act to expressly recognise the role of the IGIS in assisting the government to provide assurances about the legality and propriety of AIC activities to the Parliament and the public

• provide the IGIS with a capability to undertake own-motion preliminary inquiries

• allow the IGIS to undertake own-motion inquiries into the effectiveness and appropriateness of the procedures of all AIC agencies (noting that the Act currently allows this in relation to ASIO, ONA or DIO, but not ASIS, DIGO or DSD)

• provide a capacity for the IGIS to delegate the powers of the Office, subject to Ministerial approval

• provide a capacity for the IGIS to provide information to any Royal Commission that is prescribed for that purpose

• provide that the Prime Minister may be provided with a copy of the final report of any inquiry conducted by the IGIS

• update and modernise a number of provisions in the Act, without changing their application.

Telecommunications Interception and Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2011The Telecommunications Interception and Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2011 was assented to on 22 March 2011. Among other matters, the Act allows:

• ASIO to provide technical assistance to law enforcement agencies in relation to telecommunications interception warrants

• ASIO more flexibility to share information obtained in the performance of its functions with other AIC agencies and with the broader national security community

• ASIO, ASIS, DSD and DIGO to more closely cooperate and assist one another in the

performance of one another’s functions.

Combating the Financing of People Smuggling and other Measures Act 2011The Combating the Financing of People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2011 was assented to on 28 June 2011. Among other matters, the Act adds DIGO, DIO, DSD and ONA to the list of designated agencies which may have access to information from the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC).


We already regularly inspect the use to which ASIO and ASIS put this capability, and will develop similar inspection activities in consultation with DSD, DIGO, DIO and ONA in the next 12 months.

Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2011The Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2011 was introduced into the Parliament on 23 March 2011 and was referred to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee for inquiry and report. The IGIS appeared before the committee in relation to the Bill on 16 June 2011 and the Committee tabled its report on 22 June 2011.

Among other matters, the Bill included the following three proposed changes to the ASIO Act:

• that the definition of ‘foreign intelligence’ be changed from: intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign power (where ‘foreign power’ means ‘a foreign government; an entity that is directed or controlled by a foreign government or governments; or a foreign political organisation’) to: intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of people or organisations outside Australia

• the conditions for the Attorney-General to authorise foreign intelligence collection be changed, from being satisfied, on the basis of advice received from the relevant Minister, that the collection of foreign intelligence relating to the matter is:

important in relation to the defence of the Commonwealth or to the conduct of the Commonwealth’s internal affairs

to: in the interests of Australia’s national security, Australia’s foreign relations or Australia’s national economic well-being.

• the provisions in the Act which deal with security assessments be amended to ensure that ASIO can share information about its employment decisions with other AIC agencies, without enlivening an employee or prospective employee’s appeal rights in the AAT.

The Bill also included the following proposed changes to the ISA:

• clarifying that privacy rules made under section 15 of the ISA, in relation to DSD, DIGO and ASIS, are not legislative instruments

• adding an additional ground for obtaining a ministerial authorisation to collect intelligence about an Australian person, being that: the Australian person is, or is likely to be, involved in activities related to a contravention, or an alleged contravention, of a UN sanction enforcement law [as defined in the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945].

Public Interest Disclosure SchemeOn 17 March 2010, the Government announced plans for legislation to provide a stand-alone whistleblower protection scheme covering the Commonwealth public sector.

The office contributed to the legislative drafting process for the scheme throughout the reporting period. If enacted, the scheme will include a new role for the IGIS in the conduct and oversight of investigations within the AIC. This would require close monitoring of AIC agencies to ensure that they have appropriate policies and procedures in place.

15

Outcomes and outputsIn 2010–11 the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (OIGIS) had one specified outcome for program budgeting purposes. That outcome was to provide:

Independent assurance for the Prime Minister, senior ministers and Parliament as to whether Australia’s intelligence and security agencies act legally and with propriety by inspecting, inquiring into and reporting on their activities.

The strategy employed to achieve this outcome was for OIGIS to:

• continue and expand the agency’s inspection work, which involves proactively monitoring and reviewing the activities of the AIC agencies

Performance

• where appropriate, initiate ‘own motion’ inquiries and investigate complaints or referrals about the activities of the AIC agencies.

The fact that the office has only one program outcome reflects our small size and the relatively narrow focus of our activities. In other words, OIGIS is a small specialist review agency.

OIGIS’s average staffing level (ASL), excluding the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), increased from twelve in 2009–10 to thirteen throughout 2010–11, to allow the office to keep pace with increases in the size and activities of the AIC. In addition, one Senior Executive Service officer was seconded from another agency during 2010–11 to assist with an inquiry.


Performance indicatorsThe effectiveness of the office can be assessed against several key performance indicators. The following measures take into account the unique role and functions of the OIGIS as a specialised review body for the six agencies that comprise the AIC:

• the breadth and depth of inspection work undertaken

• the timeliness of completion of inquiries and complaint resolution

• the level of acceptance by agencies, complainants and ministers of findings and recommendations of inquiries conducted

• the extent to which there has been change within the agencies as a result of the activities of the office.

Approaches to OIGIS and complaint handling proceduresThe office receives a number of approaches each day from people who wish to draw our attention to issues which are of concern to them. A significant proportion of these approaches are from members of the public who are in regular contact with the office. A much smaller number are from AIC agency employees or people who otherwise have a connection to the AIC.

Approaches to the office are usually initiated by means of email, the completion of an online complaint form (on the www.igis.gov.au website) or by telephone. Contact with the office can also be established through the use of letters, faxes, audio or video recordings and, occasionally, face to face meetings.

Internal OIGIS policy does not allow any member of staff to meet with a person who has a query or concern about an AIC agency, without that person first arranging and confirming an appointment.

This policy exists to ensure that people with such concerns do not make unnecessary visits to our offices, for example, should the issue they wish to raise fall outside the jurisdiction of the office. Importantly, this policy also ensures that the personal safety of OIGIS staff members is not compromised.

For statistical purposes, approaches to the office are divided into two categories, namely, ‘complaints’ and ‘contacts’. An approach is registered as a ‘complaint’ when the information received involves allegations of possible illegality or impropriety on the part of a member of the AIC.

An approach is registered as a ‘contact’ when the matter raised is either not within the jurisdiction of the office to consider, or it is assessed as not relating to the probable actions of a member of the AIC. When a concern is raised by a member of the public which falls outside the jurisdiction of the office, the person is usually referred to another complaint handling body. Such referrals are most frequently made to the Commonwealth Ombudsman or to a state-based ombudsman. Tip-off information is ordinarily passed to the National Security Hotline.

Statistics on the number of complaints raised with the Office can be found at Annex 1 – Complaint and Inquiry Statistics.

Complaints handled administratively Whenever possible, complaints are handled administratively (rather than by means of a formal inquiry) in the first instance. This is the most efficient means of processing complaints and allows for a timely response to be provided to the complainant. However, when it is clear that a complaint has raised complex issues or serious concerns, I may decide to escalate the matter from the outset by initiating a preliminary or full inquiry under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act).


Inquiries Preliminary inquiries provide me with an avenue to write to an AIC agency head in order to formally raise a matter of concern, and that agency is required to provide relevant information in response. This assists in resolving:

• whether any particular matter is within jurisdiction

• whether the agency can demonstrate that it acted lawfully and properly in respect of the matter raised or, if the concern was substantiated, whether the agency has already taken remedial action

• whether, in my view, sufficient issues of concern

remain to justify a more comprehensive inquiry.

The other means by which I can investigate a complaint is through a full inquiry, as provided for under Part II, Division 3 of the IGIS Act. I can also undertake a full inquiry of my own motion or in response to a ministerial referral.

During such inquiries, the IGIS Act provides for the use of strong coercive powers, immunities and protections. These powers include the power to compulsorily obtain information and documents, to enter premises occupied or used by an AIC agency, to issue notices to persons to attend before me to answer questions relevant to the matter under inquiry, and to administer an oath or affirmation when taking such evidence.

In instances when I use these coercive powers, the IGIS Act provides protections to a person who has given me information. That is, the person will not be subject to any penalty under the provision of any law of the Commonwealth or a Territory by reason only of giving information to me or answering a question put by me, where I have required them to do so.

An agency’s responsible Minister is directly advised when I commence a full inquiry and is also advised of any conclusions or recommendations that I may make at the completion of the inquiry.

Inspection and visits programDespite a small increase in staffing in 2010–11, the resources allocated to inspection and visits program of my office remained about the same. The inspection program is designed to identify issues both within and across the AIC before there is a requirement for major remedial action.

In addition to regular inspection activities, the office also conducted a number of inspection projects in several AIC agencies. These projects allowed for a more in-depth examination of the policies, procedures and practices of agencies in relation to particular areas of interest that I identified, but with less formality than required for inquiries under the IGIS Act.

Details of the various visits and inspection activities undertaken by my office during 2010-11 are provided in the chapters on each of the agencies.

Complaint numbersUntil this year, complaint statistics were prepared in OIGIS on the basis that all approaches from members of the public should be registered as ‘complaints’, provided that an AIC agency was named as being of concern. Those statistics were qualified, in part, by commentary recognising that many approaches were from individuals who appeared to be delusional or whose claims were assessed to lack credibility.

As a result, the trend patterns in OIGIS complaint statistics were not necessarily reflective of any change in the behaviour of AIC agency employees, nor the extent to which those agencies were acting with legality and propriety, or with appropriate respect for human rights.


This year, I have changed the methodology of preparing OIGIS’s complaint statistics.

An approach from a member of the public was registered as a ‘complaint’ this year, if it involved a credible allegation about possible illegality or impropriety on the part of a member of the AIC. That is, there was a reasonable basis for the person believing that an intelligence agency or one of its employees had done something wrong. As expected, this change sees a marked drop in the number of ‘complaints’ received by the office in 2010–11, but with the overall number of approaches remaining relatively consistent when compared to previous years.

In summary, there were 1343 approaches made to my office in 2010–11 by persons wishing to express their dissatisfaction or raise a concern with me.

Four of the approaches classified as complaints were of sufficient seriousness for me to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the issues that the complainant raised. This compares to 12 preliminary inquiries which were conducted in 2009–10, and 11 in 2008–09.

Another 1115 approaches classified as complaints were able to be handled administratively by the office. These comprised:

• 1111 complaints about an alleged delay by ASIO in conducting immigration related security assessments. This compared to 1015 such complaints received in 2009–10 and 155 in 2008–09

• 4 complaints about other matters, including one from a member of the AIC about an employment-related issue.1

1 At a Senate Estimates hearing on 24 May 2011, I referred to thirteen complaints being received, including one complaint about ONA. During our end of financial year review, nine complaints about ASIO were reassessed as contacts to the Office, rather than complaints. The complaint about ONA has subsequently been reassessed as a contact raising issues outside the jurisdiction of the Office.

The remaining 224 approaches were classified as ‘contacts’, as the substance of the matter raised was either outside the jurisdiction of the office or assessed as not relating to the probable action of a member of the AIC.

Trends in complaint numbersThere was an increase of nearly 9%, from the previous year, in the number of complaints about ASIO’s processing of visa-related security assessments. This is just over half the size of the increase experienced in the previous year.

The breakdown of complaints handled administratively at Annex 1, Table 1 also shows a decrease in the number of complaints received from AIC employees or ex-employees this year, having received one such complaint in 2010–11, compared with six in 2009–10 and ten in 2008–09.

The significant decrease in complaints relating to non-immigration matters is a result of the change in our method of statistical record keeping as described above.

Inquiry numbersAt the conclusion of the 2009–10 reporting period, one preliminary inquiry remained open and was carried into 2010–11. This preliminary inquiry was in relation to the processing of an immigration related security assessment by ASIO and was closed during the first quarter of 2010–11.

As mentioned above, four preliminary inquiries were initiated in 2010–11 following the receipt of a complaint from a member of the public. Three of these concerned ASIO and the fourth concerned DSD. These comprised:

• two instances of alleged misconduct by ASIO officers in their dealings with members of the public

• a delay in ASIO providing DIAC with the outcome of a security assessment


• the handling of personal information by DSD during a recruitment process.

All four of the preliminary inquiries were closed at the end of 2010–11.

Three full inquiries were commenced in 2010–11. These comprised:

• An inquiry into the integrity of DSD’s training testing, commenced at the request of the Minister for Defence. This inquiry was finalised in 2010–11.

• An inquiry into the conduct of Australian officials in the arrest and detention overseas of Mr Mamdouh Habib in the period 2001–2005, commenced at the request of the Prime Minister. This inquiry remains open at the end of 2010–11.

• An inquiry into allegations of inappropriate vetting practices by the Defence Security Authority and related matters, commenced at the request of the Prime Minister. This inquiry remains open at the end of 2010–11.

TimelinessOf those full and preliminary inquiries which were completed during the year, the average time taken to do so improved from 65 days in 2009–10 to 38 in 2010–11.

The small number of inquiries undertaken by the office means that one complex inquiry will potentially have a disproportionate effect on the average figure. It is expected that the average time taken to complete an inquiry will increase significantly again in the next reporting period, due to the two complex full inquiries that remained open at the end of this reporting period.

Agency responsiveness to issues raisedI write to the relevant agency head following each inspection visit to their agency. These letters detail the outcomes of the visit and, where appropriate, offer suggestions about opportunities to improve agency procedures. During the year, a number of suggestions for procedural changes and reforms were made and these suggestions were generally accepted and acted upon by agencies.

AIC agencies continue to seek my views on internal agency draft policies and procedures, and proposals for formal legislative change. Where the office has an interest or a concern regarding a particular activity, agencies have provided a briefing or additional information, in most cases without question or qualification. The willingness of AIC agencies to seek and accept input from this office demonstrates a commitment on their part to conduct their activities legally and with propriety.

Level of assuranceThe significant number of complaints received by the office has demonstrated the awareness of the role and functions of the office throughout 2010–11. While the number is relatively small compared to other integrity agencies, complaint numbers are nonetheless significant given the size of the AIC and the office.

Public awareness is aided by a presence on the internet which allows information about the role of the office to be readily accessible to larger numbers of people than has previously been the case. The site is reviewed regularly and updated where opportunities for improving useability and further streamlining administrative processes are identified.

Importantly, the office inspection program demonstrates that relatively low levels of genuine errors are occurring in AIC agencies.


None of the inspection activities conducted in 2010–11 revealed any instances of agency staff deliberately acting outside the limits of their lawful authority.

Where individual issues needed to be remedied or better governance and controls put in place, the agencies were responsive in nearly all instances.

21

ASIO is Australia’s national security service. Its role is to collect and evaluate intelligence on threats to security, both in Australia and overseas, and to provide advice to protect Australia, its people and its interests.

ASIO’s functions are set out in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act). It is also subject to guidelines issued by the Attorney-General under the ASIO Act.

Security is defined in the ASIO Act as the protection of the Commonwealth and the States and Territories and the people in them from:

• espionage

• sabotage

• politically motivated violence

• the promotion of communal violence

• attacks on Australia’s defence system, or

• acts of foreign interference.

Security is also defined as including the protection of Australia’s territorial and border integrity from serious threats, and also includes carrying out Australia’s responsibilities to any foreign country in relation to threats to security. ASIO collects information using a variety of intelligence methods including the deployment of human sources, special powers authorised by warrant, through authorised liaison relationships, and from published sources.

The ASIO Act does not limit the rights of persons to engage in lawful advocacy, protest or dissent. ASIO does not carry out criminal investigations nor have powers of arrest, but does cooperate with Australian law enforcement agencies in cases where matters of security interest and criminal activities overlap.

Australian Security Intelligence OrganisationWhat ASIO does


ASIO does not have the statutory authority to engage in surveillance of ordinary members of the community going about their lawful business. ASIO has to obtain external approval for use of its most intrusive powers.

Further information about ASIO, the Attorney-General’s Guidelines (AGG) to ASIO, the ASIO Act, and ASIO’s unclassified annual report to Parliament can be found on ASIO’s website which is located at http://www.asio.gov.au.

Monthly meetings and special briefingsWe continued the practice of conducting monthly meetings with senior ASIO personnel during 2010–11. These meetings typically involved discussions about issues arising out of any current inquiries as well as the on-going inspection activities of the office, and enabled participants to exchange views on other issues in which we have a common interest.

The meetings are also an opportunity for ASIO to proactively brief me on emerging issues. I was pleased with the senior level of representation at these monthly meetings, and the willingness of participants to discuss contentious issues in an informal and candid manner.

The ASIO participants showed a consistent willingness to respond to requests for additional information, which was strongly supported at desk officer level, in the period between meetings. The commitment of all concerned to make these meetings work is both noted and appreciated.

Not all matters of interest to my office are discussed in these monthly meetings. The inquiry, inspection, monitoring and review activities of the office frequently turn up subjects or issues on which we require or would like additional information, or which need to be addressed in a particularly prompt manner. On those occasions I will write to the Director-General of Security seeking assistance. If the issue is more pressing, we may also directly

contact the relevant senior manager. There have been no restrictions placed on whom OIGIS staff can speak to within ASIO, which greatly enhances communication flows.

I received briefings and updates from numerous senior ASIO officers during 2010–11, in addition to the monthly meetings, to discuss issues such as immigration related security checking, the internal structure of ASIO, inter-agency cooperation, revision of internal policies and procedures, the progress of legal actions in which ASIO had an interest, various inspection and inquiry tasks, and some specific operational matters.

Law Council queries about ASIO interactions with the publicThe Law Council of Australia corresponded with the Attorney-General in April 2010, raising a number of concerns about the manner in which ASIO conducts interviews and otherwise interacts with members of the public. In responding to the issues raised by the Law Council, the Attorney-General specifically referred to the role played by this office in providing independent external oversight of ASIO’s activities.

I subsequently met with the Secretary-General of the Law Council and one of his colleagues in September 2010, to gain better insight into the issues of concern to the Law Council.

Following this meeting the Law Council and I separately engaged with senior ASIO officers on what information ASIO has already made available, or could possibly make publicly available, to explain why it sometimes needs to interview members of the public, and the rights of members of the public in these situations.

As a result of these discussions, ASIO undertook significant revisions to the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section of its website in April 2011.


While ASIO has assured me that it is keen to make general information about its interactions with members of the public widely and freely available, and the revised text in the FAQ section of the ASIO website appears to go some way to addressing the Law Council’s concerns, it is likely that there will always be some tension at the interface between community engagement on the one hand and the need to protect sensitive intelligence activities on the other.

I will continue to closely monitor developments in this area, and encourage increased openness on the part of ASIO, to the extent that this is both reasonable and proper.

Protocol on monitoring of communications between IGIS and complainantsSection 34 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) imposes a general obligation upon the IGIS and current and former OIGIS staff, not to disclose information from or about complainants which is obtained in the course of our duties, except where making such disclosures is necessary to perform the duties of the office.

We take this obligation to protect the confidentiality of persons making complaints to our office very seriously, and do not pass on personal information or other identifying information about complainants to any of the agencies we oversee, unless the complainant has agreed to this, or the failure to do so would clearly obstruct any resolution of the complaint.

It is possibly the case that persons making a complaint to our office are, or could be, the subject of a current ASIO investigation. These investigations can, in serious cases, include the use of special powers warrants which permit the lawful interception of the person of interest’s communications.

Although I have absolutely no reason to believe that the communications of this office are the subject of deliberate interception it is plausible that, in a very small number of cases, some of our communications with complainants will be the subject to incidental interception.

The interception of communications in such cases raises obvious sensitivities, particularly if the complainant wishes to make disclosures relating to ASIO’s internal affairs. I have raised this issue with ASIO and my office has worked closely with ASIO to put protocols in place to deal appropriately with such situations.

Inspection activitiesASIO has received substantial funding increases over the past ten years to allow it to respond promptly and effectively to the constantly changing and frequently challenging security environment in which it operates. While this growth has slowed in recent times, there is still an imperative on the part of ASIO’s senior management to ensure that the resources which the Organisation receives are used to maximum effect. This has seen an internal rebalancing of priorities and interests, which has an impact on the nature and range of inspection activities which IGIS undertakes.

There was a consequential modest increase in the number of ASIO-related inspection activities which we undertook in 2010–11. This increase is attributable to my decision to focus more attention on the activities of ASIO’s Counter Espionage and Interference (CEI) Division and also on formal exchanges of information between ASIO and authorised foreign authorities.

The decision to more closely examine the activities of CEI Division was made because ASIO has allocated more funding and focus on building


capability and operational momentum against counter-espionage and foreign interference targets. This activity is highly compartmentalised within ASIO and it is therefore appropriate that I pay this work more scrutiny.

The decision to focus additional attention on the exchange of information between ASIO and authorised foreign authorities was not precipitated by any specific activity or event, but rather to provide assurance that appropriate internal protocols and procedures exist and are adhered to for this sensitive but necessary activity.

In addition to the increase in the overall number of inspection activities in 2010–11, more staff from the office typically attended each inspection, and the duration of individual inspection activities continued to lengthen. So as to make these inspections more focussed and efficient, IGIS has moved away from 100% compliance checking and adopted a risk-based sampling approach with respect to some inspection activities.

While every effort is made to limit the impact of IGIS inspections on ASIO staff, the desirability of the office conducting thorough checks combined with the increasing number of investigations being undertaken by ASIO and the complexity of some of the issues which are presented for review, it is likely that the duration and frequency of inspection visits will continue to increase. We will monitor and review our work practices to continue to match resources to workload in the most efficient manner.

Range of current inspection activitiesThis office inspected records associated with a wide range of ASIO activities including warrant operations, approvals to commence an investigation, reviews of investigations, access to sensitive financial records, access to sensitive telecommunications data, use of prospective

metadata, liaison with law enforcement agencies and the exchange of information about Australian persons with foreign liaisons.

Cross-AIC project relating to the exchange of information with foreign liaisonsI wrote in last year’s annual report2, and also in the General Matters section of this annual report, about the conduct of a major inspection project by this office which examined the policies, procedures and practices of each of the six AIC agencies relating to the exchange of information with foreign organisations. The inspection project was completed in September 2010, when my report was provided to each of the six AIC agency heads.

ASIO made a significant contribution to our inspection project and has subsequently taken a number of actions based on our findings. These actions include:

• regularly reminding staff of the requirements set out in internal policy guidelines relating to the communication of information to approved foreign authorities

• requiring managers at relevant staff meetings to actively raise awareness of the range of sensitivities associated with the passing of information about Australian persons

• reviewing and modifying the content of internal training courses

• implementing a more formal process for its annual review of its liaison relationship with approved foreign authorities.

ASIO is also active in a range of multi-agency groupings which seek to promote a consistent approach by Australian government agencies to the issue of engagement with foreign agencies.

2 IGIS Annual Report 2009–10, pp. 5–6.


ASIO activities overseas and exchanges of information with foreign liaisonsAs a result of the dynamic nature of the global security environment, increasing technological interconnectedness, and widespread dispersal of Australian persons and interests, the proportion of ASIO’s activities which have an overseas element continues to increase.

ASIO maintains a small network of out-posted liaison officers in a range of overseas locations, with the knowledge and consent of the host countries, in order to obtain, correlate, evaluate and communicate intelligence information that is relevant to Australia’s security interests.

In order to fulfil its security related mandate, ASIO can lawfully exchange information about Australian and foreign persons with the authorities of other countries, where those foreign authorities have been approved by the Attorney-General as being capable of assisting ASIO in the performance of its functions.

Although a significant number of the authorities with which ASIO has formal liaison arrangements in place are intelligence agencies, the list of approved foreign authorities is broader than this and includes foreign government agencies that perform a variety of functions in areas such as law enforcement, immigration and border control and whole of government coordination.

So as to ensure that appropriate governance arrangements are in place in relation to ASIO’s overseas activity, I started reviewing the way in which ASIO shares information with approved foreign authorities, as an on-going inspection activity, in March 2007. The primary focus of these inspections has been on exchanges of information on Australian persons, but they have also examined procedures for obtaining and exchanging information on non-Australian persons.

Following consultation with me, ASIO issued classified revised internal guidelines in May 2010. The revised guidelines reinforced that ASIO must maintain appropriate records of decisions and approvals to exchange information with approved foreign authorities, require ASIO decision makers to show that proper consideration has been given to all of the relevant criteria contained in the ASIO policy and reinforce that such records are open to inspection by the IGIS.

I believe that the revised guidelines provide an appropriate framework to regulate the exchange of information between ASIO and approved foreign authorities, and ASIO has taken a number of additional steps to educate and inform relevant staff and decision makers of their obligations.

The first of these inspections in the reporting period focussed on exchanges of information with approved foreign authorities of three countries in our region. I was pleased with the results and identified no issues of significant concern. Now that we have resumed inspections of this kind, we will continue to take a close interest in these matters.

Warrant operationsASIO has access to a range of special powers under the ASIO Act and the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (the T(IA) Act) to assist it to perform the functions set down for it by Parliament. These special powers can only be used in limited circumstances following the issue of a properly authorised warrant.

The range of special powers warrants available to ASIO under the ASIO Act includes:

• entry and search

• computer access

• listening device

• tracking device (on persons or objects)

• postal and delivery service articles


• questioning

• questioning and detention.

ASIO also has access to special powers warrants under the T(IA) Act which permits:

• telecommunications interception

• telecommunications interception for foreign intelligence collection purposes within Australia.

While these categories of warrant are largely self explanatory, there are a number of subcategories of telecommunications interception provided for in the T(IA) Act.

Broadly speaking, these legislative authorities permit ASIO to target specified telecommunications services of persons of security interest, the telecommunications services of named persons (who might suspect that they are subject to interception and use multiple services in an attempt to avoid attention) and, in strictly limited circumstances, the services of associates of persons of security interest (so called ‘B-Party’ warrants).

As the exercise of these special powers will in the vast majority of cases not be apparent to the subject of the warrant, and as they are by their nature highly intrusive, special powers warrants should only be considered for use when other, less intrusive, means of obtaining information are likely to be ineffective or are not reasonably available.

The Attorney-General is the issuing authority for all special powers warrants, with the exception of questioning and questioning and detention warrants, which can only be obtained from an ‘Issuing Authority’ (that is, a federal magistrate or a judge).

In those cases where it is decided that the best way ahead is to obtain a special powers warrant, ASIO must:

• prepare a submission which is ultimately to be put to the Attorney-General

• ensure that all of the information which is put forward is as accurate as possible

• advise relevant functional areas when a warrant has been endorsed, so that they might initiate collection activities

• monitor and respond to any issues which arise while the warrant is active

• coordinate and develop reports to the Attorney-General on the utility of each warrant to ASIO

• commence the process again, should it be decided to renew a warrant.

As can be seen there are many steps and internal and external checks prior to a warrant request being put to the Attorney-General for consideration once the use of special powers has been approved.

We are not involved when warrant proposals are being developed because decisions on the merits or otherwise of seeking and issuing special powers warrants are operational in nature and such decisions rest with the Director-General of Security and the Attorney-General. It would generally be inappropriate to attempt to influence such decisions. We do, however, have a significant role to play in reviewing warrant processes, to ensure that all legislative requirements have been fulfilled and that warrants have been executed in a lawful and proper manner.

The past practice of this office was to review ASIO’s warrant documentation shortly after it had been considered by the Attorney-General and then once again when the warrant(s) in question had been exhausted and a report provided to the Attorney-General on the extent to which any action taken under the warrant had assisted ASIO in carrying out its functions.

In recent years IGIS has adopted the practice of reviewing warrants over the whole of their life (that is, cutting out the intermediary stage of review within one month of issue). This approach has been adopted so as to allow OIGIS staff to


consider each warrant they review from inception to conclusion, rather than in a piecemeal manner, and to cut down the administrative burden on ASIO of presenting files for review twice within a short period.

Outcome of warrant inspectionsASIO’s warrant operations constitute some of its most sensitive and highly classified activities. While inspection findings can be detailed in general terms, there are some issues which, for reasons of security, cannot be included in this report.

Each year the office aims to inspect as many warrants and associated documents as possible. OIGIS staff examined every security intelligence warrant and all foreign intelligence collection warrants which had been issued and exhausted or revoked in 2010–11.

These inspections occur regularly and typically involve three to four OIGIS staff closely examining every document which is presented to the Attorney-General as part of a warrant request submission, as well as a range of associated documents which are kept on related files. These inspections are intensive and go beyond simply ‘ticking off’ each warrant.

Each set of warrant related papers is examined so that we may be properly satisfied that:

• the intelligence or security case that ASIO has made in support of the application is soundly based and that all necessary legislative requirements have been met

• the individuals identified in each warrant are actually identical with, or closely linked to, persons of serious security interest (this is particularly relevant where a ‘B-Party’ telecommunications interception warrant is being sought)

• appropriate internal and external approvals for the request have been obtained

• the Director-General of Security has identified in writing those individuals who may execute the warrant, or communicate information obtained from the warrant

• written reports to the Attorney-General on the outcome of executed warrants are factual and provided in a timely manner

• the activity concerned did not begin before, or continue after, the period authorised by the warrant

• in the small number of cases where unauthorised collection has occurred, that prompt and appropriate remedial action has been undertaken.

While our inspection of ASIO warrant documentation in this reporting period found that the materials presented to the Attorney-General for consideration were of a high standard, I support the view of the Director-General of Security that the detailed supporting documentation presented to key decision makers, could be both shorter and more focussed on contemporary developments that are critical to the decision, rather than on providing a lengthy history of each case.

We have been engaged with relevant ASIO staff on the practical implications of reforms in this area, so as to be satisfied that any changes which are made are sensible and appropriate, while at the same time encouraging increased rather than diminished rigour with respect to warrant processes.

During 2010–11, our inspections of warrant documentation revealed that in each case where a special powers warrant was issued ASIO had:

• reasonable and sufficient grounds for seeking the warrant

• provided sufficient information for the Attorney-General to make an informed decision


While any mistake or error is regrettable, it is important to clearly recognise that most of the errors we identified were not directly within ASIO’s control. This speaks well of the multi-layered control systems which ASIO has put in place to avert such problems arising.

In all cases where mistakes were identified in 2010–11, lawful authority to conduct interception had been sought and obtained from the Attorney-General.

In some of the cases where a problem was identified, a combination of technical, product delivery and administrative errors in preparation for, or subsequent to, the execution of these warrants led to collection occurring against persons who were not the intended target of these warrants, or the potential existed for such collection to occur.

In one instance intercepted material which was intended to be delivered to ASIO was misdelivered to a law enforcement agency which had simultaneously obtained telecommunications warrants on the same person of interest.

In several other instances appropriate preliminary checks had been undertaken by ASIO to properly identify the telecommunications services being used by persons of interest only for that information to subsequently be found to be inaccurate.

In at least one case the telecommunications service which ASIO wished to intercept was disconnected in the period between when subscriber checks were undertaken and when the warrant was issued. Although ASIO should have received advice from the telecommunications service provider that the targeted service had been disconnected, this advice was not provided. After a quarantine period during which the service in question was not allocated, it was then reallocated to an individual with no connection to any matters of security interest.

• appropriate procedures in place to check that the conditions of the warrant were being fulfilled

• reported the results of warrant operations to the Attorney-General in a timely and appropriate manner

• maintained the key accountability documents on the relevant files for examination by this office.

As discussed in this and in previous IGIS annual reports, the use of ‘B-Party’ warrants is sensitive and should only be resorted to when there are no reasonable alternatives.3

‘B-Party’ warrants are targeted at telecommunications services which a person of security interest is likely to be in contact with, rather than actually being owned or directly used by that person.

In the course of our warrant inspections during 2010–11, OIGIS staff accessed and reviewed every ‘B-Party’ warrant which ASIO obtained. On the basis of these activities I am satisfied that this type of warrant continues to be used sparingly, and only where the special circumstances of each case dictated that it was appropriate and necessary.

Errors occurring in the course of telecommunications interception activitiesDuring 2010–11 this office either identified, or had brought to our attention by relevant ASIO staff, nine instances in which an error had occurred in the course of telecommunications interception activities. This compares with a total of seven such instances in 2009–10. Of these nine errors two were directly attributable to ASIO and seven occurred as the result of actions which relevant telecommunications service providers either took or failed to take.

3 See IGIS Annual Report 2006–2007 at p.43, and IGIS Annual Report 2009–2010 at p.21.


While any instance of unauthorised or inappropriate interception is naturally regrettable, the number of such occurrences in 2010–11 is quite small when considered against the number of services which are subject to interception under warrant authority.

It also needs to be acknowledged that the legal framework under which warrants are issued is complex, and given this it would be easy for staff members to sometimes inadvertently overlook a statutory requirement. It is for this reason that most warrants are reviewed by anything up to six officers of varying levels of seniority before they are finally submitted to the Attorney-General for consideration.

No system is infallible and despite these best efforts administrative and technical errors will almost inevitably occur in the course of preparing for and executing interception warrants. Given this reality and the volume of warrants which are processed each year, I am satisfied that the number of unintended or unauthorised intercepts which were identified in 2010–11 remains at a low rate and that when errors do occur remedial action is both prompt and appropriate.

Reports of warrant activityIn addition to ensuring that all warrant documentation is as complete and accurate as possible when submitted to the Attorney-General or an Issuing Authority (in the case of questioning and questioning and detention warrants) ASIO is also required to provide a written report to the Attorney-General on the outcome of every warrant which is issued to it.

Reports on telecommunications interception warrants issued to ASIO under the T(IA) Act must be furnished within three months of expiry or revocation. There is no mandatory deadline for reports on the outcome of the other forms of warrants available to ASIO but ASIO seeks to apply the same standard to all warrants.

Based on our inspection activities during 2010–11, I was satisfied that all reports which needed to be provided to the Attorney-General were presented in a timely manner.

Questioning warrants/questioning and detention warrantsThe authority for ASIO to access questioning warrants and questioning and detention warrants flows from Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act.

It has long been the practice of this office that IGIS or a senior OIGIS staff member will attend for at least the first day where an individual is questioned under such a warrant and for further attendance to be determined on a discretionary basis.

No questioning or questioning and detention warrants were issued to ASIO during 2010–11.

Interception management systemsIn addition to our regular warrants inspections OIGIS staff undertake spot audits of ASIO’s interception management systems. The purpose of these checks is to gain independent assurance that ASIO’s collection activities are only occurring in accordance with the terms of a supporting special powers warrant and related investigative authorities.

I can advise that none of the checks we conducted during 2010–11 revealed any instances of inappropriate or otherwise unauthorised collection.

Authority to investigate – proceduresThe functions of ASIO are set out under section 17 of the ASIO Act. The first function expressed in this section empowers ASIO to obtain, correlate and evaluate intelligence information relevant to security. The circumstances and manner in which ASIO can collect personal information and conduct investigations into persons of possible security


interest are detailed in the Attorney-General’s Guidelines in relation to the performance by ASIO of its function of obtaining, correlating and evaluating intelligence information relevant to security (including politically motivated violence).

The current Attorney-General’s Guidelines (AGGs) were issued by the then Attorney-General, the Hon Philip Ruddock MP, on 12 October 2007 and have continuing effect until they are either amended or rescinded.4 The AGGs are supplemented by a comprehensive package of internal policies and procedures. These policies and procedures are classified for valid security reasons and therefore cannot be made public. The application of these policies and procedures are, however, closely monitored by this office.

Taken together, the ASIO Act, the AGGs and ASIO’s internal policies and procedures require that before an investigation can be commenced a formal and auditable authorisation process must be followed.

The level of seniority at which ASIO officers can provide approval for an investigation is dictated by the nature and sensitivity of the investigation being proposed. The more sensitive or intrusive the proposed investigation, the more senior the approving officer in ASIO is required to be.

During 2010–11 OIGIS staff continued our rolling review of investigation approvals made in ASIO’s Headquarters, and also undertook regular inspections of several of ASIO’s larger regional offices. OIGIS staff also reviewed files from some of ASIO’s smaller offices, in either paper or electronic formats, in Canberra, so as to limit travel expenditure.

4 The Attorney General’s Guidelines were published in IGIS Annual Report 2007–2008, pp 117–123, and can also be obtained from the ASIO website http://www.asio.gov.au/img/files/AttorneyGeneralsGuidelines.pdf (accessed 8 July 2011).

Although the total number of inspections of this kind was similar to previous years, as with our warrant related inspection activities, there was a tendency for each inspection visit to be longer in duration and require more staff.

To manage this trend, we now require ASIO to provide us with a full list of authorised investigations which have been approved in the period between our inspections, and we select a significant sample from this list for close scrutiny (usually in the order of 25% to 33%). The benefit of this is that it allows for a more targeted approach to the inspection task and also smooths out the work load for inspection staff.

As OIGIS staff select which files are presented for review, at our absolute discretion, we are confident that the sample we inspect is properly representative. I believe that this approach effectively balances workload and risk.

During our inspections in 2010–11, the following checks were made:

• whether or not there were reasonable grounds to conduct an investigation

• whether the level of the authority was appropriate for the proposed investigative activities

• whether the proposed duration of the investigation was appropriate

• what limits, if any, had been placed on the investigative activity, and whether these were appropriate, reasonable and adhered to

• if those checks undertaken were conducted within the authorised period

• whether a formal review of an investigation has taken place at the completion of the investigation or where a renewal had been sought

• whether supporting paperwork had been placed on file.


Authority to investigate – inspection resultsAs with the commentary on our warrant inspection activities, detailed discussion of recent and ongoing investigations is not possible or appropriate. I am able to make general comments on the issues noted in the course of our inspection activities.

Overall, I remain satisfied with the manner in which the authority to investigate process operated during 2010–11.

The authorities that OIGIS staff reviewed were generally of a good standard. In the small number of cases where we thought these standards had not been achieved, or where minor administrative or procedural errors were identified, we provided feedback to relevant operational managers in order to encourage continuing improvement in standards and consistency of approach across the Organisation.

Of the many requests for approval to conduct an investigation which we examined, the connection of the proposed investigation to security was always clearly articulated. As has been the case in previous years, we continued to focus closely on the comments and guidance provided by senior ASIO officers when approving investigations.

In previous annual reports we observed that some authorising officers appeared to be using a standard set of words when placing limits on particular investigative activities.5

While this approach is perhaps understandable, I have discouraged this practice as I believe that it is essential for authorising officers to clearly demonstrate that they have properly considered the request to conduct an investigation on its individual merits, and set appropriate boundaries or limits on those investigations which they do approve.

5 IGIS Annual Report 2008–2009, p.27.

I was therefore encouraged to note a significant decline in the use of formulaic comments by authorising officers during 2010–11.

I am also pleased to note that we identified no major systemic concerns in the course of these inspections.

Use of Prospective Data Authority requestsThe T(IA) Act provides legal authority for a small number of ASIO senior managers to obtain prospective telecommunications data from telecommunications carriers and telecommunications carriage service providers.

These authorisations enable ASIO to receive telecommunications subscriber information and other call related data prospectively (that is, from the date of the authorisation rather than requesting historical data) and are valid for a maximum of 90 days. Authorisations of this kind do not provide authority for ASIO to receive actual call content. If this is required, a telecommunications interception warrant is needed.

We review a significant number of requests for Prospective Data Authority (PDA) because the use of this capability has implications for privacy similar to other technologies which require a warrant and has similar strenuous checking requirements to ensure that targets and the telecommunications services or devices which they use are correctly identified.

In order for PDAs to be utilised there must be an underlying investigative authority, or an information requirement which has been endorsed by senior ASIO managers.

The inspections undertaken by OIGIS staff in 2010–11 revealed that most PDA requests which we examined were properly made and endorsed at an appropriately senior level within ASIO. Where errors were made these were generally of a minor administrative nature.


In my previous annual report I noted that some authorisations did not adequately address why other, less intrusive, collection methods were not sufficient or appropriate.6 I am pleased to advise that this shortcoming has been addressed, and PDA requests now typically address this issue in a thoughtful and considered way.

During 2010–11 IGIS also focussed attention on requests to renew PDAs. We did so because it is my view that this capability should not become routine and PDAs should only be renewed where exceptional circumstances continue to exist. On the basis of our inspections, I was satisfied that PDA renewals were limited to those cases where reasonable alternatives did not exist.

In the course of our PDA inspections in 2010–11 we noted a small number of instances where correct administrative procedures had not been followed. In each instance, we noted the occurrence and raised it with the relevant functional area. We will be vigilant in future inspections to ensure that errors of this kind are not repeated.

Overall, we were satisfied that ASIO is using this facility in a suitable manner and that appropriate internal controls exist to ensure that this capability continues to be utilised appropriately.

These inspections will continue to form part of my office’s ongoing inspection program, but given the generally satisfactory manner in which this activity is conducted we will adopt a more targeted approach to the PDAs which we examine.

Information obtained from AUSTRACThe Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (the AML/CTF Act) provides a legal framework in which designated agencies are able to access, in strictly controlled circumstances,

6 IGIS Annual Report 2009–2010, p.25.

information which is held by the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC).

ASIO and IGIS are each designated agencies for the purposes of the AML/CTF Act. This office and ASIO have each been party to separate Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with AUSTRAC since 2000.

The AUSTRAC-ASIO MOU and the AUSTRAC-IGIS MOU each set out the circumstances under which:

• ASIO might access and use information which is collected and kept by AUSTRAC

• OIGIS would monitor ASIO’s access to, and use of, this information.

The key difference between ASIO’s access to financial information through AUSTRAC and other forms of financial inquiries is that properly trained and authorised ASIO officers are able to directly interrogate the AUSTRAC database rather than going through the process of formally requesting and receiving extracted information.

My office devotes significant resources to ensuring that ASIO staff who have access to the AUSTRAC database only undertake searches which serve a clear security related purpose and are suitably focussed, and do not abuse the privileged access they have to these sensitive records by examining records which are not related to an approved investigation linked to the performance by ASIO of its prescribed functions.

The AUSTRAC-IGIS MOU requires that I provide a certificate to the Attorney-General on an annual basis, specifying whether or not ASIO has complied with various requirements specified under the AUSTRAC-ASIO MOU. I provided such a compliance certificate to the Attorney-General on 15 September 2010, in respect of ASIO’s AUSTRAC related enquiries during 2009–10.

In providing this certificate I informed the Attorney-General that there were a small number of instances in which searches conducted within the AUSTRAC database were broader than that


permitted by ASIO’s internal policy but these had occurred early in the 2009–10 reporting period and were attributable to the officers conducting those searches not being fully conversant with a tightening of ASIO’s internal policy settings. Apart from these relatively minor transitional issues, I was satisfied that ASIO was compliant with its AUSTRAC-related obligations.

During 2010–11 OIGIS staff conducted a significant number of AUSTRAC related inspections activities in ASIO. These inspection visits included checks conducted for intelligence and security vetting purposes and the passage of AUSTRAC information to and from ASIO.

I intend completing the annual compliance certificate to the Attorney-General for 2010–11 in the first few months of 2011–12. This certificate cannot be provided until we audit searches conducted in the last quarter of the 2010–11 reporting period.

Access to taxation informationSection 3EA of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 provides that the Commissioner of Taxation may disclose tax information to an authorised ASIO officer if the Commissioner is satisfied that the information is relevant to the performance of ASIO’s functions under subsection 17(1) of the ASIO Act.

ASIO’s access to taxation information is the subject of an MOU between the Director-General of Security and the Commissioner of Taxation, and also ASIO’s internal guidelines and procedures.

ASIO accesses tax information infrequently due to the particular sensitivities associated with information of this kind. I consider this to be a sensible and prudent approach.

ASIO alerted our office in July 2011 to an instance when taxation records were accessed in 2010–11, as part of a significant security related investigation. Due to an administrative oversight, records of this

access were not made available to our office during our periodic inspections during 2010–11. If I have any concerns in relation to this access, these will be reported upon in the next reporting period.

Use of assumed identitiesUntil mid-2008 IGIS reviewed the registers which ASIO maintains for the purpose of recording all instances where an assumed identity has been officially allocated to an ASIO officer for operational purposes.

These inspections were ceased in 2008 because of the high standards that ASIO had displayed in ensuring that these registers were accurate and up to date, and because our inspections found few if any irregularities.

As an alternative to directly inspecting these records, we now obtain from ASIO:

• copies of the ASIO internal audit reports on compliance with the assumed identities provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 and the Law Enforcement and National Security (Assumed Identities) Act 1988 (NSW)

• a certificate at the end of the financial year which satisfies the requirements of section 15LE of the Crimes Act 1914.

I am satisfied on the basis of the provision of these documents that ASIO is fulfilling its legal obligations, and that the authorisation and cancellation of assumed identities continues to be tightly controlled.

ASIO and law enforcement agenciesASIO regularly engages with law enforcement agencies in all Australian jurisdictions because there is frequently an overlap between persons who are planning for or engaged in criminal activities, and persons of security interest.


Close cooperation is also necessary in order to plan effectively for major events where Australia has obligations such as those with respect to the protection of visiting foreign dignitaries, such as the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting which is to be held in Perth, in October 2011.

Whenever OIGIS staff visit ASIO’s state offices they review those files which detail ASIO’s interactions with locally based law enforcement agencies. We identified no substantive issues in our review of these records during 2010–11.

Complaints and inquiriesOne preliminary inquiry about ASIO was open as at 30 June 2010 and carried over into the 2010–11 reporting period. This preliminary inquiry was finalised on 27 July 2010.

During 2010–11 IGIS initiated three new preliminary inquiries about the activities of ASIO. This compares with 12 preliminary inquiries into ASIO which were initiated and/or concluded in the 2009–10 reporting period.

One of these preliminary inquiries involved concerns about the processing of security assessments for an individual seeking a visa (general details of this case are summarised elsewhere in this chapter).

The other two preliminary inquiries revolved around the purported misconduct of ASIO officers in their dealings with members of the public.

Alleged misconduct by ASIO staffA foreign national visiting Australia contacted IGIS alleging that ASIO staff had ‘interrogated’ them at length when they had sought to provide sensitive documents.

The complainant also alleged that ASIO had then breached an undertaking to maintain confidentiality by contacting a foreign government to corroborate the complainant’s identity.

Investigation of the complaint indicated that the complainant had been interviewed by ASIO staff for less than one hour in total. Although the complainant was not informed they could leave at any time, it was noted they had volunteered the information they provided by presenting at the building and offering the documents.

In relation to the allegation that ASIO had breached confidentiality, the IGIS found that, while the complainant had been informed that ASIO would not publicly release any information that had been provided, it was clear that the information provided would need to be validated.

IGIS determined there was no evidence to support the allegation that the interview was conducted in an illegal, inappropriate or unprofessional manner.

Investigation of the complaint highlighted the value of accurate and contemporaneous record-keeping by agencies. The efficient provision of detailed documentation to the IGIS by ASIO enabled a resolution to the complaint to be reached in a timely manner.


A member of the public contacted IGIS alleging that ASIO officers had approached members of their family and associates and in doing so had acted in an unprofessional and inappropriate manner. Following investigation of these concerns, IGIS was satisfied that the complaint was not made out. Investigation of this complaint also highlighted the value of accurate and contemporaneous record keeping by agencies.

In addition to these preliminary inquiries, the Prime Minister asked me in December 2010 to conduct an inquiry into the actions of relevant Australian government agencies in relation to the arrest and detention overseas of Australian citizen, Mr Mamdouh Habib, between 2001 and 2005.

My inquiry into these matters, which was ongoing as at 30 June 2011, involved significant interaction with ASIO. Additional information about the conduct of this inquiry is provided in the General Matters chapter of this annual report.

I did not initiate any full inquiries into ASIO in the 2010–11 reporting period.

In addition to the above inquiries, the office received a number of contacts and complaints specifically about ASIO from individuals seeking to reopen former complaints, or making new complaints raising specific concerns.

While each case is considered on its merits, none were judged to have reached the threshold which necessitated the conduct of a formal inquiry. For the most part, these contacts and complaints were handled administratively at the desk officer level.

In addition to these complaints, we received 1111 complaints from individuals who raised concerns about the timeliness with which ASIO processed immigration related security checks which is comparable to the 1015 such complaints received in 2009–10.

The significant volume of complaints of this kind over the last two reporting periods caused us to reflect seriously on the reasons why this figure remained so high, whether the processing of complaints of this kind led to the actual identification and correction of errors or simply added another layer of process which of itself caused delay, and whether we should change our current approach. In summary, I concluded that our current approach did little to actually resolve complaints and could possibly be diverting ASIO resources.

The manner in which we handled these complaints in 2010–11, and how we plan to deal with these types of complaints in the future, is discussed below.

ASIO security assessments – immigration related complaintsIGIS continued to receive a high level of complaints in 2010–11 from persons expressing concern about the timeliness with which security assessments for applicants for long and short term visas were being completed.

There are a number of reasons why we believe the level of complaint remained at a high level, including:

• it is Government policy that all Irregular Maritime Arrivals (IMAs) who enter Australia are required to be the subject of security assessment

• the volume of IMAs reaching Australia has put stress on the government agencies who are required to process their claims for refugee and permanent residency status

• the role and functions of IGIS are becoming better known to visa applicants, migration agents and advocacy groups.

The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) has overall responsibility for the administration of visas being granted to people wishing to enter Australia. As part of the visa


process, DIAC initiates a number of identity, health, character and security checks. Where visa applicants, or persons acting on their behalf, become concerned about the time taken to process a visa application, they will usually approach the nominated DIAC case officer dealing with the application to obtain an update.

If DIAC requires additional information before it can make a decision, the DIAC case officer will ordinarily advise the applicant or their representative that the department is awaiting input from an external agency. This is frequently construed as meaning that DIAC is awaiting a security assessment from ASIO, but as indicated above, there are a range of checks which need to be undertaken, not just security checks.

While some DIAC case officers do directly refer applicants to this office to inquire about security assessments (suggesting by implication that ASIO is involved) many applicants or their representatives assume that a delay is security related and contact this office directly.

It was our practice during 2010–11 to make inquiries of ASIO as to whether or not they had been asked to undertake security assessments in respect of individuals who had been referred to our office, or who had approached us directly.

In doing so we would seek information as to whether or not ASIO had actually received a request to conduct a security assessment, and if so, we could make an assessment as to whether it had acted unreasonably or had made a processing error. However, we do not make judgments about the merits of any particular security assessment.

I have also been firm in my view that IGIS should not request ASIO to change the priority of a case, or make the process quicker for a particular applicant, as this could lead to claims of queue jumping, and unfairly delay the processing of applications from individuals who have not raised complaints with this office.

We do not ordinarily confirm to complainants that they have or have not been the subject of a security assessment by ASIO, unless this has already been confirmed to them by an external agency, or we were to find a significant issue of concern involving ASIO which would justify this office doing so.

If we are satisfied that there is no evidence of error on the part of ASIO, we will advise complainants that they should seek an update on the progress of their case from the relevant DIAC case officer.

Although we try to be as forthcoming as possible with complainants or their representatives, there is often good reason for this office to be cautious in what information we reveal to complainants. We also make strenuous efforts to rein in expectations about the assistance this office can realistically provide.

In my time as Inspector-General I have taken complaints about delays in processing security assessments seriously and devoted the equivalent of two full time resources to the handling of these complaints during 2010–11. This has been a significant impost on an office comprising only 14 people.

The incidence of error which we have identified in the processing of security assessments for long and short term visa applicants over the past two years has been minute. While delay in the completion of security assessments has been a cause of genuine concern to me, I am satisfied that this has not been caused by error or improper processes by ASIO but has been largely a by-product of external factors over which it has limited control.

The following case studies are drawn from some of security assessment related preliminary and administrative inquiries which I initiated or completed in 2010–11.


Compounding effect of administrative delays on visa applicantI received a series of complaints between October 2008 and May 2010 from a foreign national who entered Australia on a student visa in September 2007, who alleged that his application for permanent residency had been adversely affected due to a series of administrative errors by ASIO and another government agency.

I decided to pursue this matter as a preliminary inquiry in May 2010, and concluded my investigation into it early in the 2010–11 reporting period.

As a result of my investigation ASIO confirmed that a request for a security assessment of the complainant had been referred to it by DIAC in September 2007 but due to several administrative errors, there was a significant delay in the assessment being completed.

Once these issues had been identified, and requisite information had been obtained from several external sources, there was a further delay of two months before the applicant was interviewed to clarify some of the information obtained from the external checks. This was due, in part, to the applicant travelling to their country of origin for several weeks.

The security assessment was eventually finalised in June 2010. By this time, the skilled visa that the applicant had originally applied for was no longer available as the Government had capped the numbers of visas it intended issuing in this visa category.

My office liaised with ASIO, DIAC and the Commonwealth Ombudsman to seek a fair outcome for the complainant who was disadvantaged as a result of actions for which he was not responsible. We also worked closely with ASIO to ensure the currency of the security assessment for the time it would take DIAC to process a new visa application from the complainant.

This complaint highlighted issues relating to ASIO and DIAC communication with each other and with complainants. It also identified areas where improvements could be made by ASIO in terms of the case management of their processing of security assessments for DIAC.

The outcome of this investigation, along with our experience in processing a large number of security assessment related complaints, encouraged me to develop a new inspection activity which I plan to adopt in 2011–12 which will proactively examine ASIO’s processing of security assessments, rather than being complaints driven.


I was advised shortly afterwards that at that time ASIO was focussing on processing security assessments for irregular maritime arrivals and that other categories of visa applications would be progressed as quickly as available resources permitted.

I raised this case in discussions with senior ASIO managers underlining my concern about the importance of making timely assessments, especially for applicants who are being kept in detention.

ASIO advised me in September 2010 that they had rearranged some of the resources available to process visa related security assessments and that they had put in place a dedicated team which would focus specifically on processing complex assessments for applicants who were not irregular maritime arrivals.

In April 2011, DIAC and ASIO began to implement a new approach to the processing of IMAs, which saw a reduction in the number of persons awaiting clearance being held in immigration detention. We noticed a commensurate decline in the number of complaints by persons in this situation towards the end of the reporting period.

Given that this office cannot conduct a merits review of security assessments and is in effect limited to examining issues of process and procedure, I have also seriously considered whether this office is actually adding any value or is inadvertently contributing to the problem by regularly seeking information and advice from ASIO staff, who might otherwise spend that time processing security assessments.

I have decided that rather than being reactive to individual complaints we should adopt a more strategic approach and focus on ASIO’s case management and quality control processes, with a view to identifying if there are any underlying systemic issues which require attention.

Apology by ASIO to complainant affected by administrative errorsA state-based Legal Aid agency lodged a complaint with my office in August 2010 in relation to a client who had applied for a Protection Visa in February 2008. An administrative inquiry by my office confirmed that ASIO had interviewed the individual concerned in September 2009 and had completed their assessment of the individual in October 2009, but due to an administrative error this advice was not provided to DIAC until August 2010.

Although my office had previously offered apologies to complainants on behalf of ASIO when our administrative inquiries had identified error on the part of ASIO, I requested in this case that ASIO apologise directly to the complainant.

The Director-General of Security agreed that this was appropriate and dispatched such a letter in September 2010.

Delays in processing assessments for non-IMA visa applicants A foreign national who was detained as an illegal air arrival to Australia was placed into an immigration detention facility in August 2009. Soon after this, he applied for a protection visa and had his case referred to ASIO for a security assessment.

In March 2010 the individual concerned contacted me to complain about the length of time it was taking to complete the security assessment.


While individuals should still have recourse to my office if they have concerns that they have been misidentified, or that their position has been misrepresented, or they can point to a serious defect in process, I will no longer process complaints which are purely about delay, where an application for long-stay visa has been lodged less than 12 months previously.

I wrote to the CEO of the Migration Industry Association, the Secretary of DIAC, the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Director-General of Security in late June 2010 to inform them of this changed approach, and have also updated the advice we provide to prospective complainants on the IGIS website.

The resources which are freed up from taking this action will be devoted to conducting regular inspections of ASIO’s systems in 2011–12, as described above.

TrainingDuring 2010–11 I and a small number of OIGIS staff delivered several presentations which were tailored for newcomers to ASIO and other ASIO audiences. We also spoke to ASIO staff when making presentations to various courses where participants were drawn from across all AIC agencies.

The delivery of these presentations exposes us to a greater range of ASIO personnel than we would encounter through our inspection activities, and provides a good opportunity to explain the role and functions of our office, and our expectations of agency staff on matters of professionalism and ethical conduct.

Several OIGIS staff also attended short courses run by ASIO, or to which ASIO made a significant contribution.

41

The Australian Secret Intelligence Service was established in May 1952 and operated under a series of government directives until it was put onto a statutory footing in October 2001, with the coming into effect of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA). ASIS’s various functions are set out at section 6 of the ISA, and its activities are regulated by a series of ministerial directions, ministerial authorisations (MAs) and privacy rules, made pursuant to the ISA.

ASIS’s primary function is to obtain and distribute intelligence information which is not readily available by other means, about the capabilities, intentions and activities of individuals or organisations outside Australia. Other functions include communicating such intelligence in accordance with government requirements, conducting counter-intelligence activities and liaising with intelligence or security services, or other authorities, of other countries.

So as to discharge its functions ASIS generally relies on human sources to collect relevant foreign intelligence. This intelligence information is then transformed into intelligence reports and related products which are then made available to key policy makers and select government agencies with a clear and established need to know.

The foreign intelligence collection priorities for ASIS and other members of the AIC are established in a planning document that is endorsed and regularly reviewed by the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

Further information about ASIS is available at http://www.asis.gov.au.

Australian Secret Intelligence ServiceWhat ASIS does


Significant issuesNew Minister for Foreign AffairsThe Hon Kevin Rudd MP was sworn in as the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 14 September 2010, replacing the Hon Stephen Smith in that role. As such, Mr Rudd has executive responsibility for ASIS.

Honour awarded to the Director-General of ASISI was pleased to note in the Queen’s Birthday honours list released on 13 June 2011, that the current Director-General of ASIS, Mr Nick Warner PSM, was named an Officer of the Order of Australia (AO). Mr Warner received this award for distinguished service to public sector leadership through the development of policy, administration and reform in the areas of intelligence, defence and international relations.

We have always found Mr Warner to be very supportive of external review and accountability and I take this opportunity to congratulate him on this deserved award.

Organisational ChangeThere were a number of significant staffing changes in ASIS during 2010–11, with several new positions being created and personnel transferring to, or taking up new positions upon promotion. The organisational structure of the Service was also altered in a number of respects to take into account the changing priorities and needs of government decision makers.

There was also a strong commitment within ASIS during 2010–11 to encourage enhanced cooperation between Australian government agencies to promote a ‘whole of government’

approach to dealing with various issues. The practical effect of this has been the creation of several joint tasks forces or work units to which ASIS has contributed both leadership and resources.

I sought and received regular updates on the rebalancing of structures and priorities within ASIS throughout the reporting period, as well as briefings on recruitment, staffing and training issues.

Special briefingsIn the period since my appointment, I have been pleased by the manner in which the Director-General of ASIS, other ASIS senior managers and other ASIS officers holding key posts, have taken the initiative to brief this office on highly sensitive operational and legal matters affecting the Service.

While I do not see it as being within the remit of the IGIS to interfere in what are rightly ASIS management decisions, it is appropriate that I should be kept informed of particularly sensitive issues as they develop, or shortly after they arise. I find the candour and openness of these briefings reassuring, as they evince a high level of trust between our respective organisations.

Due to the inherent sensitivity of the subject matters raised with me by ASIS I am limited in the extent to which I can make further comment in this report, but some of the specific areas in which my office maintains an ongoing interest are briefly described below.

Contact with staff prior to overseas postingsMy staff and I try to meet with as many ASIS officers as we reasonably can prior to the commencement of their overseas postings. The individuals undertaking these postings will have been employed by the Service for varying lengths of time and their level of experience as intelligence officers will also vary considerably from person to person.


The purpose of these meetings is to remind each ASIS officer, regardless of their length of service or level of experience, of the role and functions of this office and to stress the expectations being placed upon them with regard to their conduct. These meetings also serve to reinforce with ASIS officers that their actions are subject to ongoing external scrutiny no matter where in the world they are posted.

A number of meetings also occurred with senior DFAT officers who were being sent to posts where ASIS officers are located, to discuss any issues they might have prior to their departure. This is a useful means of sharing information relevant to our respective functions.

Periodic roundtable meetingsAs indicated above, and elsewhere in this report, I place significant importance on meeting with key staff in each of the intelligence agencies, on a routine basis, so that we might discuss issues of common interest or concern openly and candidly.

At least every eight weeks during 2010–11, several of my staff and I met with ASIS senior executives and other staff involved in policy development, legal affairs and intelligence production. As with the various ad hoc briefings I received on sensitive and topical issues from ASIS staff during 2010–11, these periodic roundtable meetings were also marked by openness and candour. I appreciate the efforts of all staff involved in facilitating these regular exchanges.

Inter-agency cooperationASIS pursued a range of opportunities throughout 2010–11 to work more closely with other agencies, both inside the AIC and in the wider national intelligence community (that is, with agencies which have a close functional interest in intelligence and security matters, but are not AIC agencies). In particular, I met with staff in several recently established joint operational centres, and was also

engaged in a number of discussions on practical means by which ASIS could provide ongoing support to Australian military operations.

New ASIS Guidelines for the use of self-defence techniques and weaponsThe ISA was amended in 2004 by the inclusion of a new schedule which expressly provided authority for ASIS staff members and agents to be provided with training in the use of self-defence techniques and weapons, and to use self-defence techniques and weapons, in a range of prescribed circumstances.

Training in, and the use of, self-defence techniques and weapons is expressly limited under Schedule 2 of the ISA to instances where an MA has been granted for this to occur, and also requires that a copy of the approval must be given to IGIS as soon as practicable after such approval has been granted.

Item 1(6) of Schedule 2 to the ISA requires the Director-General of ASIS to make and issue guidelines on matters related to the use of weapons and self-defence techniques.

Item 1(7) of the above schedule requires that a copy of these weapons related guidelines must be provided to IGIS as soon as practicable after they have been made.

The then Director-General of ASIS, Mr David Irvine AO, issued the first set of these guidelines in August 2004 and provided a copy to my predecessor as IGIS, as required by this schedule to the ISA.

While the numbers of persons trained in, or authorised to use, self-defence techniques and weapons has always been quite small, ASIS has gathered considerable practical experience in the application of these guidelines in the period since they were first issued. This experience prompted ASIS management to review the adequacy and efficacy of their weapons guidelines during 2010–11.


There is no requirement under the ISA for the Director-General of ASIS to consult with IGIS in reviewing the weapons guidelines, or prior to making new guidelines, but my office was nonetheless engaged in this process. The Director-General of ASIS issued a new set of Self-defence Techniques and Weapons Guidelines on 10 June 2011 which reflected input from my office.

As the new weapons guidelines contain security sensitive information, they have a high level national security classification and cannot be publicly released. I can assure readers, however, that the guiding principles upon which the revised guidelines are based are closely aligned to those contained in the inaugural guidelines. More specifically, the revised guidelines are based on the premise that training in the use of self-defence techniques will only be provided to a limited number of properly authorised individuals, and that such training will focus on unarmed self-defence techniques and the use of non-firearms weapons.

I regard the new weapons guidelines as an improvement on their predecessor, and believe that appropriate training and control mechanisms have been established under these guidelines to regulate the provision of training in, and the use of, self-defence techniques and weapons.

TrainingDuring 2010–11 my staff and I delivered several presentations about the role and functions of the office, and more generally about governance and accountability structures, to ASIS’s leadership and new intelligence officer trainee programs, and to ASIS officers attending the more general AIC training courses.

I also personally observed some elements of the intelligence officer training program at the ASIS training facility. This was useful in providing assurance about the quality of the training being provided to ASIS staff.

Inspection activitiesRange and scopeInspection activities undertaken during the

reporting period included:

• reviewing all MAs issued to ASIS

• reviewing all submissions made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs

• regularly inspecting current operational files

• conducting ad hoc checks of ASIS’s compliance with its privacy rules

• reviewing and reconciling weapons related authorisations.

Review of ministerial authorisationsThe Minister for Foreign Affairs is required by section 8(1) of the ISA to issue a written direction to the Director-General of ASIS setting out the circumstances when ASIS must obtain MAs to undertake certain activities. During 2010–11 we regularly reviewed submissions made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting him to issue an MA to ensure that each MA conformed to the requirements of the ISA and the terms of the ministerial directions to which ASIS is subject.

In the vast majority of MAs which we reviewed, the instrument was clear as to its intended purpose, properly endorsed, and did not exceed the maximum prescribed period provided for such authorisations under sections 9 and 10 of the ISA.

While no issues were identified during these inspections which would invalidate the MA instruments signed by the Minister, we did query whether a particular MA authorising the use of


weapons should have contained more specific information limiting the geographic location where the MA should have effect.

We also noted several instances where there was a significant gap between when an MA was authorised and when it was due to take effect. While there are often very sound arguments for renewing MAs in anticipation of the expiry of a standing MA (for example, the availability of the Minister, or so there is no time gap in the authority provided for intelligence collection activities) the replacement authorisation should not be authorised too far in advance of an expiring authorisation in case the facts and grounds upon which the MA was granted change in a material way prior to it taking effect.

We also noted several instances where ASIS had sought MAs where it was arguable that there was no legal requirement to do so. In these cases we thought that the conservative approach adopted by ASIS was appropriate and removed any possible doubt about the legal basis for the proposed intelligence collection activities.

Ministerial submissionsIt has been our practice, over a number of years, that whenever the office conducts a review of MAs, we also review all of the other submissions which the Director-General of ASIS has provided to the Minister, in the period since our previous inspection. It is unusual for an oversight agency to review all contacts between a Minister and a portfolio agency but by regularly reviewing this material the office is able to be kept informed of a wide range of sensitive operational activities which, because of their sensitivity, this office requires some visibility.

This inspection activity helps to inform the direction of our other inspection activities and frequently alerts me to issues which give rise to requests for additional information. While I have the power under the IGIS Act to demand access to ministerial submissions should I choose to do so, I am grateful to the Director-General of ASIS for freely providing this material for review.

Operational file review activities This office once again devoted significant resources to the regular review of ASIS’s operational case files during the reporting period. This activity is typically conducted by two of my staff over two days per month and, while the task is an ongoing one, we aim to cycle through as many files as possible each year in a targeted way.

During 2010–11 we focussed on the manner in which ASIS collected intelligence information in accordance with ministerial directions issued under section 6(1)(e) of the ISA, as well as the activities undertaken by several of ASIS’s overseas based stations. I believe this is a very important inspection activity as the information contained in these files provides insight into the operational environment in which ASIS’s field officers operate, some appreciation of the special pressures they are placed under, and the extent to which their activities are being directed and controlled by headquarters staff.

While I cannot specifically report the nature and range of issues which have come to light as a result of this particular inspection activity, I can assure readers of this annual report that the examination of this material is rigorous and thorough.

Following each inspection, a letter is sent to the Director-General of ASIS detailing our findings and posing any questions I might have relevant to the conduct of the operations which we have scrutinised.

I had planned to visit several of ASIS’s overseas stations in my first 12 months as IGIS, but this was not possible during 2010–11 due to competing demands on my time. I would hope to remedy this situation in the next reporting period.


Privacy rulesAs discussed in the General Matters chapter of this report, s 15(1) of the ISA requires that written rules be made to regulate the communication and retention by ASIS of intelligence information concerning Australian persons.

The extant ASIS privacy rules were approved by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Stephen Smith MP on 17 September 2008, but are almost identical to the first ASIS privacy rules which were endorsed in October 2001 to coincide with the commencement of the ISA.

As the ASIS Privacy Rules have effectively been in place for nearly 10 years without significant revision or review, I was engaged during 2010–11 in a series of preliminary discussions with ASIS staff about possible changes to the rules. These discussions were ongoing as at 30 June 2011.

During 2010–11 we identified very few irregularities in ASIS’s application of its extant privacy rules and found no significant underlying or systemic issues of concern. I am satisfied that ASIS takes its privacy obligations seriously and that appropriate resources are being spent to ensure that ASIS staff receive appropriate training and guidance on the application of the ASIS privacy rules.

Authorisations related to training in or use of weapons for self-defence purposes and training in self-defence techniquesDuring 2010–11 my staff conducted several inspections of records relating to the provision by ASIS of training in the use of self-defence techniques and weapons. In conducting these review activities we had regard to the ASIS weapons guidelines of August 2004, rather than the revised guidelines issued on 10 June 2011.

Subclause 1(5) of Schedule 2 of the ISA requires the Director-General of ASIS to provide the IGIS with copies of all approvals issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in respect of training in the use of a weapon for self-defence purposes, the provision of a weapon for self-defence purposes, or the delivery of training in other self-defence techniques. This requirement was properly met during this reporting period.

For security reasons I cannot report the precise number of authorisations which were issued, but I can advise that it was not an excessive number, and that each request for an authorisation was soundly based and consistent with the requirements of the ISA.

Clause 3 of Schedule 2 of the ISA also requires the Director-General to provide the IGIS with a written report should a weapon allocated to an authorised person for self-defence purposes be discharged in specified circumstances (other than during training). This requirement was met.

I am satisfied that the powers afforded to ASIS under Schedule 2 of the ISA are reasonable given the high threat environments in which it conducts some of its more sensitive activities, that the numbers of individuals who are authorised to use weapons is quite small and these authorisations are not being misused.

Use of assumed identitiesSection 15LE of the Crimes Act 1914 requires ASIS, as soon as practicable after 30 June each year, to provide me with a report for the preceding 12 months on:

• the number of instances in which formal alternative identity documentation has been obtained

• a general description of the activities undertaken by approved officers and approved persons when using their assumed identities


• whether or not any fraud or other unlawful activity was identified by the agency when auditing use of the assumed identity documentation.

I noted nothing untoward or of concern with respect to the use of assumed identities by ASIS personnel during 2010–11.

Access to AUSTRAC dataASIS is a designated agency for the purposes of the AML/CTF Act, and as such entered into an MOU with AUSTRAC in 2007–08.

The AUSTRAC-ASIS MOU sets out the terms and conditions under which ASIS may obtain direct access to financial transaction reporting information via various AUSTRAC databases. It also includes a role for the IGIS in monitoring ASIS’s compliance with the MOU.

My staff conducted several inspections during 2010–11 of the use which was made by ASIS of its status as a designated agency. While these inspections identified some issues of possible concern, these problems were primarily administrative in nature and did not suggest that this facility was being used for improper purposes. We will continue to work closely with relevant ASIS staff to address the administrative issues which we have identified.

As at 30 June 2011, I was satisfied that ASIS had met its obligations under the AUSTRAC-ASIS MOU during the first three quarters of the 2010–11 reporting period.

A further inspection of relevant ASIS activities which occurred during the last quarter of 2010–11 will be undertaken in the next reporting period. Subject to the results of that inspection I will then provide a certificate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, specifying whether or not ASIS has complied with all of its obligations under the MOU over the full 2010–11 reporting period.

Complaints and inquiriesI did not initiate any preliminary or full inquiries into the activities of ASIS during the 2010–11 reporting period.

Several individuals contacted my office with concerns or complaints about ASIS but as none of these reached the threshold to be formally pursued as inquiries, each of these matters was handled administratively.

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Defence Intelligence AgenciesThree of the six intelligence agencies which comprise the AIC are administered by the Department of Defence, namely, the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD). These three agencies are part of the Defence Intelligence and Security Group.

Leadership of the Defence Intelligence AgenciesThe Minister for Defence has executive responsibility for DIO, DSD and DIGO. The Hon Stephen Smith MP was sworn in as Minister on 14 September 2010, replacing Senator the Hon John Faulkner in that role.

Day-to-day management of the Defence intelligence agencies is the responsibility of the respective agency heads. On functional matters, the three agency Directors are immediately responsible to the Department of Defence’s Deputy Secretary of Intelligence and Security. The current

Deputy Secretary of Intelligence and Security is Mr Stephen Merchant PSM. The Director of DIGO is Mr Steve Meekin AM, the Director of DIO is Major General Richard Wilson AO, and the Director of DSD is Mr Ian McKenzie.

Ministerial DirectionsSection 8 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA) provides that the Minister for Defence must issue written directions to the Director DIGO and Director DSD which, among other things, set out the circumstances in which the Directors must obtain a Ministerial Authorisation before engaging in particular activities.

Section 32B of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) requires the Minister for Defence to provide to the Inspector-General a copy


of all directions given to DIGO and DSD, as soon as practicable after they have been made. I am satisfied that this requirement has been met, and that I have copies of all Ministerial Directions pertaining to DSD and DIGO, which are currently in force or have continuing effect.

Ministerial Directions contain sensitive information and naturally attract a high level national security classification. They cannot be made available to the public.

Privacy of AustraliansDIGO and DSD are foreign intelligence collectors, while DIO’s primary focus is intelligence assessments to support Australia’s military operations. None of these agencies have a domestic intelligence focus. Notwithstanding this, DSD, DIGO and DIO sometimes have legitimate cause to refer to Australian persons in their products and other forms of external communication.

Section 15(1) of the ISA requires the Minister for Defence to make written rules regulating the communications and retention by both DIGO and DSD of intelligence information concerning Australian persons. Such rules were made for DSD by the then Minister for Defence when the ISA came into effect in October 2001, and for DIGO when it was formally incorporated into the ISA in December 2005.

DIO is an assessment agency rather than an intelligence collection agency and as such there is a much more limited prospect of its activities having an impact on the privacy of Australians. Nonetheless, the then Minister for Defence issued privacy guidelines to DIO in December 2005.

This office regularly inspects records within the Defence intelligence agencies to provide assurance that these agencies comply with their respective privacy rules and guidelines. More specific detail of these inspections is provided elsewhere in this chapter.

IGIS interactions with the Defence intelligence agenciesMore detailed information about the role and functions on each of the three Defence intelligence agencies, and this office’s specific monitoring and review activities with respect to these agencies in 2010–11, is provided below. In addition:

• the office completed a major project to examine the policies and procedures in each of the six AIC agencies (including DSD, DIGO and DIO) relating to the exchange of information with foreign organisations, which had been initiated in 2009–10

• the Defence intelligence agencies were obliged to provide information to me that was relevant to the conduct of my inquiry into the actions of Australian government agencies in relation to the arrest and detention overseas of Mr Mamdouh Habib from 2001 to 2005.

Details on both of these activities are in the General Matters chapter of this report.

Joint DSD – DIGO submissions to the Minister for DefenceDuring 2010–11 I observed an increase in the use of joint DSD/DIGO submissions. A joint submission is a co-authored request from DSD and DIGO to the Minister for Defence requesting authorisation for DSD and DIGO to separately conduct a range of sensitive activities for a common purpose. Based on our inspection activities I am satisfied that DIGO and DSD separately determined that the threshold required by Section 9 of the ISA to obtain an MA had been reached in each instance where a joint submission had been put forward.


Defence Signals DirectorateDefence Signals Directorate (DSD) is Australia’s national authority for signals intelligence and for information security. DSD collects foreign signals intelligence and produces and disseminates reports based on the intelligence information it collects. These reports are provided to key policymakers and select government agencies with a clear and established need to know the information.

In performing this function DSD must not intercept communications within the domestic Australian telecommunications network. If the collection of foreign intelligence requires such interception, this can only be conducted by ASIO under warrant as the legal authority.

The other significant function DSD performs is to provide information security products and services to the Australian Government and to the ADF. The underlying purpose of this function is to protect Australian official communications and information systems from unauthorised access and other potential threats. As Australia’s information security authority, DSD also plays an important role in working with industry towards the development of new cryptographic products and in the evaluation and testing of other information security products.

DSD operates some of the most powerful leading edge technology to achieve its objectives. Whilst the majority of these capabilities are classified, further information regarding DSD’s capabilities and activities can be found at http://www.dsd.gov.au.

DSD’s internal compliance measuresDSD’s internal compliance and oversight capability includes a team that is focused on ensuring DSD’s compliance with relevant legislation and fostering awareness of compliance requirements throughout DSD.

DSD’s compliance and oversight team is responsible for developing and maintaining policies, procedures and other forms of guidance for DSD staff. It also monitors DSD’s compliance performance: considering compliance incidents as they arise, consulting with this office as necessary, and developing sound and appropriate remedial actions. These responsibilities include promptly bringing privacy and compliance issues to the attention of this office. Throughout 2010–11 IGIS staff engaged in regular dialogue with DSD’s compliance and oversight staff on a range of issues and the relationship remains positive and constructive.

Significant resources are allocated within the compliance and oversight team to conducting compliance training for new DSD employees and refresher training for existing employees. This program demonstrates DSD’s commitment to comply with its legislative obligations and to ensure that staff across the agency are aware of all necessary legal and policy requirements with regard to compliance.

DSD also has formal compliance oversight responsibilities in relation to the specialist units of the ADF which are involved in the collection and dissemination of foreign signals intelligence and, where applicable, the activities of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation in developing specialist capabilities. While the activities of these units do not fall directly within my remit, I am legally empowered to monitor and review DSD’s interactions with them.


DSD provided regular updates to me about compliance training provided to the staff of these specialised units throughout the reporting period.

Periodic meetings with senior staffMy office places significant importance on meeting with key staff in each of the intelligence collection agencies on a routine basis, so that we might discuss issues of common interest openly and candidly.

During 2010–11 I continued to meet regularly with Director DSD and to attend roundtable meetings with other senior staff approximately every eight weeks.

Nominated DSD staff who attend the roundtable meetings include those involved in policy development, legal advising and compliance.

A detailed report of DSD’s communications security monitoring activities is also tabled for discussion at each meeting. This monitoring ensures that the communications of Australian personnel on Defence deployments and operations are conducted securely, so that sensitive tactical, strategic, diplomatic or other official information is not inadvertently or inappropriately revealed.

As this monitoring has the potential to intrude upon the privacy of individual employees, all staff who are subject to it must be properly notified in advance that the monitoring will occur. I place high priority on being informed in a timely manner about any instances where DSD’s monitoring had revealed some disclosure of information requiring formal reporting.

Special briefingsDuring 2010–11 I also received a wide variety of special briefings from DSD covering matters such as capability development, inter-agency cooperation and organisational change.

Due to the inherent sensitivity of DSD’s operations, I am limited in the extent to which I can make further comment about those briefings in this publicly available report. However, the proactive manner in which DSD seeks to brief this office and responds to our requests for briefings is a valued aspect of the relationship between our agencies.

TrainingIn order to reinforce the importance of compliance with the ISA and increase understanding about the role of the IGIS, this office provided a number of presentations to DSD staff. The themes of these presentations included the importance of compliance to the work of the intelligence community in general, the powers of the IGIS and how they may be utilised in respect of DSD’s work, and the IGIS’s complaint handling functions.

In addition, IGIS staff presented at various AIC-wide induction and senior officer courses which included a number of DSD personnel.

Inspection activitiesInspection activities undertaken during the reporting period in DSD fall into three categories:

• The random sampling of DSD’s Ministerial Authorisation submissions to the Minister for Defence and internal submissions that its staff have prepared in accordance with DSD’s compliance policies. These inspections are conducted every two months.

• The ongoing monitoring of DSD databases for compliance with the ISA and DSD privacy rules, consultations on privacy rules issues and discussions about DSD’s internal compliance reporting.

• The conduct of special inspection projects.


Ministerial authorisationsThe ISA provides a framework within which DSD can deliberately collect the foreign communications of Australian persons in limited circumstances and subject to Ministerial approval. The Director of DSD must provide a comprehensive written submission to the Minister for Defence in respect of each individual about whom DSD wishes to produce intelligence.

The Minister for Defence must, in turn, be satisfied that the person of interest is, or is likely to be, involved in one or more of a range of activities including:

• activities that present a significant risk to a person’s safety

• acting for, or on behalf of a foreign power

• activities that are, or are likely to be a threat to security

• activities relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or

• committing one of a number of specified serious crimes.7

My staff have access to the details of every authorisation and the documentation for most of the new or renewed authorisations is reviewed at least every second month.

DSD privacy rulesSection 15(1) of the ISA requires that written rules exist to regulate the communication and retention by DSD of intelligence information concerning Australian persons. The DSD privacy rules which were in effect throughout the 2010–11 reporting period were approved by the Hon Peter Reith, Minister for Defence, on 28 October 2001.8 These rules have been endorsed by subsequent Ministers for Defence.

7 Section 9(1A) of the Intelligence Services Act 2001.8 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/

F2005B01415 (accessed on 25 July 2011)

The DSD privacy rules enable DSD to include references to Australian persons in its reporting, in limited circumstances, and so long as those references are properly justified in accordance with the rules. The rules also require that DSD consult with the IGIS in the event that intelligence information concerning an Australian person has been communicated inappropriately (that is, contrary to the privacy rules or because the basis for presuming that a particular person is not an ‘Australian person’ has been found to be incorrect). The purpose of the consultation with IGIS is to determine whether the appropriate remedial actions have been taken to best protect the person’s privacy.

During 2010–11 the incidence of Australian persons being identified in DSD reporting continued to be extremely low relative to the number of reports DSD disseminates. The number of incidents where the privacy rules were not applied, or were incorrectly applied, also continued to be small. I remain satisfied that DSD has adequate processes in place for dealing with these issues and is committed to giving appropriate consideration to the application of the privacy rules, notwithstanding the necessarily intrusive nature of its work.

As the DSD privacy rules have been in place for nearly 10 years without significant revision or review, I was engaged during 2010–11 in a series of preliminary discussions with DSD staff about possible changes to the rules. These discussions were ongoing as at 30 June 2011.


DSD’s internal compliance reportingMy office is advised on each occasion when DSD conducts an internal compliance investigation and concludes that its process or systems should be improved. These improvements are intended to ensure that DSD does not inadvertently collect or report information when it is not legally empowered to do so. I was satisfied with the remedial actions taken by DSD in respect of the compliance investigation reports that were completed in 2010–11 and the risk mitigation strategies that it applied, or plans to apply, as a result. I have also advised DSD of my intention to review the outcomes of a number of investigations, which were incomplete at the end of the reporting period, early in 2011–12.

Although I cannot provide more detail in this unclassified report, my office gives high priority to the thorough review of these compliance reports and to following up any recommendations. Due to my confidence in the professionalism of DSD’s compliance and oversight staff in this regard, I do not currently see the need for my office to otherwise conduct a direct compliance auditing program of DSD’s collection systems.

Inspection projectsFour inspection projects were completed in DSD during the reporting period as follows:

• An in-depth review of compliance behaviours in one tasking and reporting area that had been commenced in the previous reporting period.

• A review of DSD’s actions under a particular series of MAs, which constituted a new area of cooperation between DSD and ASIO and appeared to require a somewhat higher level of compliance risk management by DSD than is usually the case. Upon making the authorisation, the then Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon John Faulkner, had suggested that I review this activity on expiry of the MA.

• A review of the policies, procedures, training framework, record keeping and compliance behaviours in relation to one aspect of DSD’s signals intelligence capability that relies on human operator activity to a greater extent than other, automated, capabilities usually would. An awareness of compliance requirements is particularly important for staff employed in these areas.

• A review of the policies and procedures in relation to a further activity that is highly compartmentalised within DSD and it is therefore appropriate that IGIS accords this work more scrutiny.

In carrying out the above inspection projects, I found that DSD had appropriate policy frameworks in place, tailored to the needs of individual teams, and that it continued to undertake its activities with care and professionalism. The projects identified several minor areas where policies or procedures could be strengthened. However, I remained satisfied that DSD was conducting its work in compliance with the ISA and other legal obligations.

Future inspection activitiesAs outlined in the Parliament and Legislation chapter of this report, the Telecommunications Interception and Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2011 introduced changes to the ISA and the ASIO Act to allow AIC agencies to assist each other in the performance of their respective functions.

Following enactment of this legislation, DSD pursued a range of opportunities to work more closely with other AIC agencies. My office has asked to be briefed on new arrangements as they arise and to be kept informed on a range of associated matters, such as governance arrangements. The office will also look to commence inspection projects on these new activities.


Complaints and inquiriesThe number of complaints focusing on DSD is generally low because its function is to collect foreign intelligence information by technical means and its activities rarely come to the attention of the general public.

Complaints handled administrativelyOne complaint about DSD was received by this office in 2010–11 which was handled administratively. The complaint did not identify any systemic issues requiring investigation.

Preliminary inquiriesOne further complaint was received in 2010–11 which was investigated using the preliminary inquiry powers in the IGIS Act. This complaint concerned the handling of personal information by DSD during a recruitment process and delays in that process.

The inquiry found that the time taken to finalise the recruitment process was not unreasonable. However, it also found that there had been a breakdown in DSD’s internal procedures in regard to the handling of certain documents. DSD formally apologised to the complainant for the error and made a commitment to improving its procedural controls in order to prevent any reoccurrence.

Full inquiriesDuring 2010–11 one full inquiry was conducted into a matter relating to DSD at the request of the Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith MP. Details of that inquiry are outlined below.


Inquiry into the possible compromise by DSD staff of a compliance testIn November 2010 DSD identified that a particular compliance testing regime may have been compromised through the use of a ‘study guide’ or ‘cheat sheet’ by DSD staff. The Minister for Defence requested that I conduct an inquiry into the matter and make appropriate recommendations.

DSD staff were required to undertake training on particular subjects and pass a test demonstrating competency. Staff were required to undertake the online training package at their own workstations. The open-book test was also conducted at their workstations and not in a controlled environment.

I found that there was evidence of the use of a number of ‘study guides’ or ‘cheat sheets’ within certain teams in DSD over a period of years. The investigation revealed that the distribution and promotion of the use of the ‘study guide’ was an accepted practice at the junior analyst level and, in some cases, was promoted by first-level supervisors. This finding was supported by the perceived view of a number of interviewed staff members of the relative unimportance of the subject matter and the test.

The investigation also found that staff and team leaders distributed the ‘study guide’ to assist colleagues to overcome significant and ongoing technical issues with accessing an on-line training and testing regime. Despite attempts by staff, these technical issues had not been escalated to senior staff and were not resolved satisfactorily. The use of the ‘study guide’ was seen as a workaround solution by some staff.

I made the following recommendations:

• That all staff within DSD who are required to be competent in this subject matter, be required to re-sit the course and examination in a controlled environment.

• That DSD formally allocate responsibility for all aspects of its compliance testing regime to one team to resolve any issues from staff regarding the content of the course and manage any ongoing technical issues.

• That DSD review the role of first-level supervisors to consider whether there is a need to implement ongoing staff development to ensure that they, as frontline managers and key influencers for new recruits, have developed appropriate ethical judgement required to perform their duties.

Due to the systemic nature of the issue, I decided not to recommend any DSD staff for investigation for possible breach of duty or misconduct.

DSD accepted all the recommendations.

The investigation found that adequate controls had been put in place for other compliance testing regimes within DSD and that there was no evidence of other tests being compromised in a similar manner, including the important training and testing on the requirements of the Intelligence Services Act 2001.


Defence Imagery and Geospatial OrganisationWhat DIGO doesDIGO is principally a foreign intelligence collection agency and in this capacity it is responsible for the acquisition and analysis of satellite and other imagery and for the development, acquisition and exploitation of geospatial data, in support of Australia’s defence and other national interests.

DIGO collects and analyses images of foreign and domestic subjects (for example, landforms, waterways or disputed territories) and develops mapping and imagery intelligence products for the ADF and a range of Commonwealth agencies.

DIGO also has the capacity to combine imagery with other sources of data to prepare highly accurate topographical maps and other aids that are of value in the preparation of plans relevant to national defence and security, and which can be of assistance to Commonwealth and State authorities in times of natural emergency or crisis.

Further information about DIGO can be found on its website which is located at http://www.defence.gov.au/digo.

Inspection activities – ministerial authorisations and director authorisationsSection 8 of the ISA provides that the Minister for Defence must issue written directions to the Director of DIGO that set out the circumstances in which the Director must obtain a ministerial authorisation (MA) before engaging in particular activities. These authorisations are required for particularly sensitive collection activities undertaken by DIGO.

The Minister has delegated a smaller number of less sensitive activities to the Director of DIGO for approval. This delegation includes a requirement for the Director of DIGO to regularly report to the Minister on any activity so undertaken. These authorisations are referred to as a director authorisation (DA). The specifics of both MAs and DAs are classified.

To provide the Minister with assurance that DIGO acts legally and with propriety, members of my staff regularly visit DIGO headquarters to review all the material associated with activities conducted under the authority of either an MA or DA. The number of authorisations issued is not large. There were no instances of collection without a valid authorisation observed during the 2010–11 reporting period.

Privacy rulesUnder section 15 of the ISA the Minister for Defence is required to make written rules regulating the communication and retention of intelligence information collected by DIGO that concerns Australian persons. DIGO’s privacy rules are publicly available on their website.

Where DIGO communicates intelligence information about an Australian, the organisation must do so in accordance with these rules and must keep a record of the communication for inspection by my office.

Early in the reporting period I had reason to note some inconsistency in the application of the privacy rules by DIGO analysts. While I found that no products were inappropriately released, a number of entries in its internal Privacy Rules Register suggested shortcomings in the understanding of the privacy rules by some analysts. Additionally, the decision-making process regarding the application of the privacy rules was not as well documented as it could have been.

Based on input from this office, DIGO took the opportunity to focus their internal training on privacy rules and to provide individual coaching for analysts where required.


I am pleased to report that subsequent reviews of the DIGO privacy rules register reflected an improvement in the understanding and application of the rules and I will continue to monitor this as part of my routine inspection program. DIGO has also undertaken to upgrade their key record-keeping database to improve the documentation of the decision making process.

New inspection programIn November 2010 I wrote to Director DIGO to inform him that I would be changing the focus of my inspection activities to strengthen my assurance to the Minister.

As well as continuing to review activities conducted under authorisation and the application of the privacy rules, the new inspection program, which commenced in January 2011, includes sampling of DIGO tasking to ensure the appropriate legislative basis and approvals have been chosen and review of DIGO’s internal compliance checking to identify areas of concern.

Meetings with senior DIGO staffDuring the reporting period DIGO organised a guided tour of the DIGO headquarters in Canberra and the DIGO facility in Bendigo, Victoria, for those of my staff who are involved in the DIGO inspection program. My staff and I found the tours informative, serving to increase our understanding of the full range of activities undertaken by DIGO.

TrainingDIGO has demonstrated a continuing high level of commitment in relation to its internal training program for new and existing staff. This was reflected in their quick action to rectify shortcomings in the understanding and application of privacy rules as outlined above.

In February 2011 staff from my office gave a presentation on the role of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security to the 2011 DIGO Graduate Intake. There were also a number of presentations provided throughout the year to AIC-wide induction courses and senior officer seminars, which included DIGO personnel.


Defence Intelligence OrganisationDIO is Australia’s strategic level, all-source Defence intelligence assessment agency. DIO provides intelligence assessments to inform the decision-making of the Department of Defence including the ADF, and the broader Australian government.

DIO’s assessments cover strategic, political, defence, military, economic, scientific and technical issues which have the potential to impact on Australia’s security interests. The organisation also plays an important role in assisting with the planning, command and conduct of current and potential operations by the ADF, and assesses the strategic posture, policy and intent and the military capabilities of countries relevant to Australia’s security.

DIO focuses on overseas developments and does not concern itself with domestic concerns or situations within Australia.

DIO also has the responsibility of developing and maintaining a defence intelligence capability for use in time of crisis and conflict in support of ADF deployments around the world.

Further information about the role and functions of DIO can be found on its website at http://www.defence.gov.au/dio.

DIO privacy guidelinesThe DIO privacy guidelines govern the inclusion of references to personal information about Australians in formal and informal communications flowing from DIO.

In recent years this office has conducted four scheduled inspections per year to review DIO’s adherence to the guidelines. Based on the relatively small number of records generated by DIO which

have cause to refer to Australian persons, we judge that the frequency of these inspections is pitched at the right level.

The overall quality of the records we inspected in 2010–11 was good and in the majority of cases we agreed with the judgements exercised by DIO staff when applying the privacy guidelines.

In a small number of cases we queried whether or not the most appropriate clause of the privacy guidelines had been cited to justify the inclusion of the reference but not whether inclusion of the reference itself was reasonable.

Throughout 2010–11 relevant DIO staff contacted my office a number of times seeking our views on how the privacy guidelines should be interpreted. While we were happy to provide general guidance, we also clearly indicated that DIO managers, rather than this office, were the actual decision-makers when considering when and how the privacy guidelines need to be applied.

As in previous years, DIO brought to our attention instances where they may have acted contrary to the privacy guidelines, or where they were unsure of the appropriate clause to apply in a particular instance. The prompt and proactive manner in which issues were brought to our attention served to reassure us that DIO staff give proper consideration to the application of the privacy guidelines.

I will continue to monitor DIO’s application of the privacy guidelines to its external communications to ensure that appropriate standards are maintained.

TrainingDuring 2010–11 DIO continued to undertake training to educate all analysts on applying the privacy guidelines and reporting on compliance with the privacy guidelines.


As at 30 June 2011, 91% of DIO staff had attended privacy compliance training, with the remaining staff either scheduled to participate in this training in the near future, or unable to attend previously scheduled training due to being on long term leave, secondment or on deployment elsewhere.

In 2010–11 I presented to a variety of cross-AIC courses to which DIO staff were allocated places.

Complaints and inquiriesWhile this office has traditionally received only a small number of complaints about DIO, the IGIS Act provides the Inspector-General with only a limited capacity to pursue such complaints. The underlying rationale for this is that DIO is an intelligence assessment agency, and as such its activities are naturally much less intrusive than the activities of the collection agencies.

If this office were to receive a complaint about DIO the Inspector-General can pursue those concerns administratively but there is no capacity to directly initiate a preliminary inquiry or a full inquiry under the IGIS Act into such complaints in their own right.

If an individual or group were to raise an issue of such significance as to justify a preliminary or full inquiry, or if an issue of particular significance arose from our inspection activities, the Inspector-General does have the capacity to initiate an own motion inquiry.

There have been no specific complaints received about DIO in 2010–11.

61

Office of National AssessmentsWhat ONA does

ONA provides assessments on international matters of political, strategic and economic significance to the Prime Minister, members of the National Security Committee of Cabinet and key senior policy makers in the government. ONA bases its assessments on information on a range of sources, both inside and outside government.

While ONA reports directly to the Prime Minister and sits within the Prime Minister’s portfolio, responsibility for the preparation of the assessments and day-to-day management issues falls to the Director-General of ONA. The Director-General of ONA is an independent statutory officer who is not subject to external direction on the contents of ONA assessments.

The Office of National Assessments Act 1977 (ONA Act) charges ONA with responsibility for coordinating and reviewing Australia’s foreign intelligence activities and issues of common interest among Australia’s foreign intelligence

agencies. ONA is also responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of Australia’s foreign intelligence effort and the adequacy of its resourcing.

ONA’s role is complemented by the functions of the National Security Adviser (NSA). The NSA, who sits within PM&C, is responsible for encouraging and enhancing whole-of-government coordination among the national security and intelligence agencies.

Further information about ONA can be found at http://www.ona.gov.au.

Privacy guidelinesONA adopted a set of privacy guidelines in December 2005 which outline standards for the handling, use, and further dissemination of information about Australian persons. The guidelines apply to references to information about Australian


persons contained in any external communication – including reports, briefings, emails and advice – flowing from ONA.

The ONA privacy guidelines currently mirror the privacy guidelines of Australia’s other intelligence assessment agency, DIO, and are essentially identical to the privacy rules which are applicable to ASIS, DSD and DIGO.

During 2010–11 this office conducted four inspections of ONA’s use of the privacy guidelines. The frequency with which ONA assessed products and other forms of external communications referring to Australian persons is quite low, which allows this office to pay close scrutiny to each instance where such references occur.

The overall quality of the records we inspected was good and the only concerns we identified during our inspection visits were either administrative in nature (for example, whether the inclusion of a reference to an Australian person was cleared by an officer of appropriate seniority) or related to whether or not the most appropriate clause of the privacy guidelines had been cited to justify the inclusion of the reference (rather than whether the inclusion of the reference itself was reasonable).

This office will continue to closely monitor ONA’s application of the privacy guidelines to its external communications to ensure that appropriate standards are maintained.

Periodic roundtable meetingsI met the Director-General of ONA on a number of occasions throughout 2010–11 to discuss matters affecting ONA specifically, and the AIC agencies more generally. I intend to continue this practice to ensure pertinent issues can be raised and dealt with quickly and effectively, as circumstances permit.

TrainingSince the ONA privacy guidelines came into being in December 2005, ONA has incorporated training

on the interpretation and application of those guidelines into several of its training courses, including its induction courses for new starters. This training effort is supplemented by internal circulars and policy guidance, and occasional presentations by this office to ONA staff in which issues deriving from our inspection activities are drawn upon.

In 2010–11, I also presented to a variety of cross-AIC courses, to which ONA staff are regularly allocated places.

Complaints and inquiriesWhile this office has traditionally received only a small number of complaints about ONA, the IGIS Act provides the Inspector-General with only a limited capacity to pursue complaints about ONA.

This is because ONA, like DIO, is an intelligence assessment agency and in consequence its activities are far less likely to be intrusive than the activities of the intelligence collection agencies.

If this office were to receive a complaint about ONA the Inspector-General could pursue those concerns administratively with the agency concerned, but IGIS cannot directly initiate a preliminary inquiry or a full inquiry under the IGIS Act into such complaints in their own right.

If an individual or group were to raise an issue of sufficient significance as to justify a preliminary or full inquiry, or if an issue of similar significance arose from our inspection activities, the Inspector-General does have the capacity to initiate an own motion inquiry.

No complaints that were within jurisdiction were received by this office about ONA in 2010–11.

ONA contributed significantly to my cross-AIC review of policies and procedures relating to exchanges of information with approved foreign authorities. This review is described further in the General Matters chapter.

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The Year 2011-12 in Prospect

It was the practice of previous Inspectors-General to write to the heads of each AIC agency in December of each year, detailing this office’s proposed visits and inspection program for the following calendar year. I wrote to each AIC agency head in December 2010, but instead of mapping out our forward program for the next twelve months, only did so for the next six months. I chose to provide the agencies with only a six month forward program so that I could evaluate the relative worth of each inspection activity and whether these tasks should be continued, needed to be modified, or the resources of the office could be better spent on other activities.

Another reason I chose to only provide a six month rather than a twelve month forward program to each agency was that in early December 2010 I was in the midst of one full inquiry which the Minister for Defence had asked me to undertake (relating to the integrity of compliance testing in

DSD) and I was aware that the Prime Minister was about to task me with another full inquiry (relating to Mr Habib).

I wrote to the AIC agency heads again in June 2011 with our proposed program for the rest of the 2011 calendar year and now plan to keep to this six monthly cycle, in order to maintain flexibility in the allocation of our resources to inquiries, inspections and visits.

As our forward program is now provided to the AIC agencies every six months, the following is an indicative summary of the main activities which I propose to undertake during 2011–12, to the extent that they are already known or planned.


Inquiries and complaintsA major focus for the first half of 2011–12 will be the finalisation of the two full inquiries which were initiated in 2010–11 at the request of the Prime Minister. Inquiries of this kind have a number of complex statutory clearance requirements which need to be completed before inquiry reports can be finalised.

Subject to any unforeseen circumstance, my expectation is that the DSA inquiry will be completed in the first quarter of 2011–12, while the Habib inquiry will be concluded in the second quarter of the 2011–12 reporting period.

It is worth noting that the above inquiries could only proceed at the express request of the Prime Minister, following amendment to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) which took effect in December 2010.

It was anticipated that the IGIS would only be called upon to conduct inquiries of this kind in exceptional circumstances, as these inquiries involve the investigation of the activities of Commonwealth agencies which would otherwise fall outside the direct jurisdiction of this office.

This office is not funded on an ongoing basis to conduct inquiries of this kind but had to make special arrangements in each case for the injection of additional funds to facilitate the conduct of our investigations. While I agree that this office is well-placed to conduct such inquiries into intelligence and security matters which would otherwise extend beyond the jurisdiction of this office, additional funding needs to continue to be provided, otherwise these activities or the ongoing regular work of the office will potentially become unviable.

There were no preliminary inquiries outstanding at the end of the 2010–11 reporting period.

As discussed elsewhere in this report, it is proposed that the government will put in place a statutory Public Interest Disclosure (PID) scheme during

2011–12. It is proposed that this office should handle any PID complaints which relate to the activities of any of the six AIC agencies. Significant resources (for an office of our small size) will be used to ensure that we are ready for the implementation of such a scheme.

Proposed briefing, inspection and review activities ASIOASIO always features heavily in the work program of this office. This is not because we harbour undue concerns about its current activities but because it is the intelligence agency which has the most direct and regular dealings with members of the Australian public. This will not change in the foreseeable future.

I therefore plan in 2011–12 to meet with the Director-General of Security on an occasional basis to informally discuss those issues affecting ASIO in which we share an interest. I also intend to continue meeting with senior ASIO officers on a monthly basis so that I can be briefed on issues of topical interest, and in turn, can brief senior ASIO managers on my current inspection and ASIO-related inquiry activities.

During 2010–11 we received briefings from a wide variety of functional areas within ASIO on a number of issues. These discussions were useful in filling in gaps in our knowledge of ASIO’s current practices and in alerting us to new issues in which it was considered likely that we would have an interest. I expect to seek and receive briefings of this kind again in 2011–12.


One of the key inspection activities which this office has traditionally undertaken is to review the special powers warrants which are issued to ASIO. I propose continuing our close scrutiny of warrant documentation in 2011–12.

Although there were no questioning warrants, or questioning and detention warrants executed in 2010–11, I intend in 2011–12 to continue the practice that this office will attend the first day of any questioning which occurs under such warrants, with the option to extend our attendance depending on the circumstances of each case.

As indicated in the ASIO chapter of this report, this office regularly inspects the internal approvals which guide and limit ASIO’s investigative activities. I plan for this activity to continue, on a sampling basis, in 2011–12.

The office will also continue to review materials of this kind which are generated by specialist areas within ASIO and by ASIO’s State and Territory offices, during our periodic visits to these various offices. The files on which actions resulting from the approvals are recorded will also be examined as a part of this inspection process.

As indicated elsewhere in this annual report, during 2010–11 we inspected a significant number of authorisations which permitted ASIO to obtain prospective telecommunications data. We will continue to undertake this activity in 2011–12, but our inspections will be more targeted.

During 2010–11 we conducted a number of checks on ASIO’s interception systems to satisfy ourselves that these collection activities only occurred with lawful authority, and did not exceed the bounds of that authority. I believe that it is appropriate for this office to continue conducting audits of this type in 2011–12.

We will continue to monitor ASIO’s access to, and use of, AUSTRAC and taxation records, to ensure that it continues to comply with the legislation under which such access is granted.

As discussed in the ASIO chapter of this report, during 2010–11 we reinvigorated our inspection of exchanges of information between ASIO and approved foreign authorities. I propose continuing these inspections during 2011–12.

This office usually receives several queries or complaints each year from individuals expressing concern about whether or not ASIO is fulfilling its various obligations under the Archives Act 1983. It is possible that as the period after which access to government records become available for public scrutiny (the so called ‘open period’) is reduced from 30 years to 20 years, we will receive further complaints. While members of the public have recourse to other mechanisms to appeal against the non-disclosure of sensitive documents and files, I will seek regular briefings and updates from ASIO on archives related issues, so that I might be kept informed of developments in this area.

We will continue to make presentations to various ASIO courses which pertain to or are appropriate to the functions of this office. Where circumstances and resources permit, we will also periodically observe training activities associated with ASIO’s intelligence officer training program.

ASIO’s internal audit program will be monitored and I will obtain reports on reviews that are of interest to this office.

This office was frequently consulted by ASIO in 2010–11 on the development of internal guidelines and procedures. Where we are invited to do so, we will in 2011–12 continue to provide constructive and timely input to requests for comment of this kind.


ASISThis office has regularly reviewed all Ministerial submissions which are lodged by ASIS with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. I plan for this inspection activity to continue in 2011–12. In the course of these inspections we will also continue to closely review all Ministerial authorisations which are issued to ASIS to ensure that they are properly made and conform to the requirements of the Intelligence Services Act 2001.

As discussed in the ASIS chapter of this report, new guidelines were issued in June 2011 relating to the provision of, training in, and use of weapons and self-defence techniques by ASIS staff. We will closely monitor the application of these new guidelines in 2011–12.

This office devotes significant resources to regularly reviewing ASIS operational files, to gain insight into ASIS’s current operational activities, and so that we might monitor the legality and propriety of the conduct of ASIS officers. We will continue to devote similar resources to this activity in 2011–12.

I intend for this office to continue our scrutiny of ASIS’s reporting and other forms of external communications to ensure that ASIS continues to comply with the ASIS privacy rules. If the ASIS privacy rules are changed in 2011–12, as is likely to occur, we will closely monitor the implementation of any new rules and review the adequacy of internal guidelines and any new training which is developed.

As was the case in 2010–11, it is my intention in 2011–12 to continue to meet with ASIS’s intelligence coordinators, legal and policy staff approximately every eight weeks, to be briefed on emerging issues and to discuss issues arising from inspection activities.

As discussed elsewhere in this report ASIS has been a ‘designated agency’ for the purposes of the Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism

Financing Act 2006 since 2008. As a designated agency ASIS has the capability to directly access AUSTRAC databases but can only do so in strictly limited circumstances. This office will continue to inspect ASIS’s use of this capability in 2011–12 to ensure that it continues to comply with its statutory and related obligations.

While ASIS’s procedures for controlling the use of alternative documentation associated with assumed identities are rigorous, we will continue to monitor the regular audit reports we receive from ASIS on this subject and follow up any concerns we might have.

My staff and I will continue to be available, as necessary, to address ASIS training courses and other forums on accountability issues. I will also continue to meet with ASIS officers before they proceed on postings to reinforce with them that they are subject to internal and external scrutiny and are accountable for their conduct.

Should circumstances permit, it is also my intention in 2011–12 to visit several of ASIS’s overseas based offices to better acquaint myself with their activities and to inform myself of the conditions in which ASIS staff operate.


DSDDuring the 2010–11 reporting period, members of my staff and I met with key DSD personnel approximately every eight weeks to discuss issues of mutual interest or potential concern. I propose continuing these regular exchanges in 2011–12. I usually meet with the Director DSD either prior to, or following, each of our bi-monthly meetings, and subject to his availability, propose continuing this practice in 2011–12.

In preparation for these meetings, staff from this office will continue to visit DSD to access and review every Ministerial authorisation submission which DSD puts to the Minister for Defence. My staff and I will also continue to monitor DSD’s compliance with its obligations under the DSD privacy rules. This monitoring involves examining relevant registers and hardcopy documents which are maintained for this purpose by DSD.

If the DSD privacy rules are changed in 2011–12, we will naturally review the implementation of the new rules and review the adequacy of internal guidelines and any new training which is developed.

As has been the case for many years, I expect that DSD will, in 2011–12, continue to seek input from this office on possible changes to internal guidelines which relate to some of their more sensitive business operations. I intend to provide detailed input if and when called upon to do so.

My office will also continue to address DSD training courses and other forums on accountability, when requested to do so.

DIGOIn writing to Director DIGO with my six month forward visits and inspection plan in June 2011, I proposed that the frequency of our meetings with relevant DIGO senior managers should be reduced from bi-monthly to quarterly. I did not propose this reduction in the frequency of our meeting lightly but on the basis that few of DIGO’s current activities have caused me concern.

I will review the adequacy of this arrangement during 2011–12, and if there is a need to revert to bi-monthly meetings will happily do so. Of course, should there be a need for consultation outside of these scheduled visits, these can be arranged at short notice.

I also intend to continue in 2011–12 with the full range of inspection activities which we undertook in 2010–11. These inspection activities include reviewing all submissions made by DIGO to the Minister for Defence seeking a ministerial authorisation, and also reviewing all internal submissions made to the Director DIGO specifically seeking authorisation to image Australian territory or Australian interests.

My staff and I will also monitor compliance with the DIGO privacy rules and respond in a timely manner to any queries on privacy related issues which are directed to us.

We will also address DIGO training courses and other forums on accountability, as requested or appropriate.


DIOWe intend visiting DIO on a quarterly basis in 2011–12 to review DIO’s compliance with the DIO privacy guidelines. We will take the opportunity during these visits to discuss issues of mutual interest or concern which may have arisen in the period between our visits.

We will also address DIO training courses and other forums on accountability, as appropriate.

ONAAs is the case with DIO, we intend visiting ONA on a quarterly basis in 2011–12 to review records which are relevant to ONA’s compliance with its privacy guidelines. We will also use these periodic visits to meet with relevant ONA staff to discuss issues of mutual interest or concern which may have arisen in the period between our visits.

Subject to his availability, I intend to meet with the Director-General ONA, on an occasional basis, to discuss matters affecting his agency, or the wider AIC, as circumstance dictates.

We will also address ONA training courses and other forums on accountability, as appropriate.

OIGIS Staffing and recruitmentThe number of staff employed in OIGIS grew to 13 on-going employees during my first year as Inspector-General. I also engaged one SES level officer for part of 2010–11, on a short term secondment, to assist me with one of our full inquiries.

While I believe that the number of staff employed in the office for the range of tasks which we currently undertake is appropriate, I am currently reviewing the adequacy of our legal arrangements and whether there might be utility to engaging an in-house lawyer to deal with the increasing amount of security related legislation, some of the provisions of which are quite complex.

69

Management and AccountabilityCorporate governance

Organisational structureSenior positions occupied during 2010–11 were as follows:

• Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

» Dr Vivienne Thom (acting from 10 April 2010, appointed on 19 July 2010)

• Principal Review and Investigations Officers

» Mr Neville Bryan PSM

» Ms Sharon Dean

» Ms Maryanne Gates (from 17 January 2011)

The full staffing complement for OIGIS in 2010–11 was fourteen, which was comprised of the Inspector-General (who is appointed under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) and thirteen Australian Public Service (APS) staff, employed under the Public Service Act 1999.

As at 30 June 2011 the office was comprised of one statutory office holder, three Executive Level 2 Principal Review and Investigations Officers, seven Executive Level 1/APS 6 Review and Investigations Officers, one Office Accountant, one Personal Assistant to the Inspector-General and one Administration Officer.

Approval was provided for one SES Band One officer to be engaged on a non-ongoing basis, for a nine month period commencing on 10 January 2011, to assist in the conduct of the Habib inquiry.


This position was filled by Ms Diane Merryfull on secondment from the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

Senior management committees The OIGIS Audit Committee is the sole senior management committee for the agency. The functions of this committee are detailed in the ‘Internal Audit and Risk Management’ section of this chapter.

Corporate and operational planningOIGIS’s corporate and operational planning processes are straightforward in nature, reflecting the small size and specialist function of the office.

The office routinely raises and addresses these matters through:

• weekly meetings between the IGIS and three senior staff members, to review and document operational priorities

• monthly meetings between the IGIS and all office staff, during which internal guidelines, procedures and governance issues are discussed

• a six-monthly forward plan for inspection activities in each AIC agency, which is determined in consultation with the relevant agency head (in accordance with s 9A of the IGIS Act).

The Year in Prospect chapter of each OIGIS annual report also documents the longer-term and annual plans of the office.

Internal audit and risk managementThe office has an Audit Committee which is chaired by the IGIS and which also includes external members from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Attorney-General’s Department.

The Committee meets on a periodic basis to consider corporate governance issues including financial compliance, internal and external audit findings, fraud and risk management, occupational health and safety, and significant financial issues.

The Committee reviews the Risk Management Plan on an annual basis and makes amendments as required. The Committee also reviews the office’s risk performance over the previous twelve months.

The Risk Management Plan includes controls designed to mitigate risks including in the following risk categories:

• personnel related

» departure or absence of key staff with little notice (for example, through illness or injury)

» accidental or intentional loss of information

» segregation of duties

• failure or compromise of information technology systems

• physical security of the office and facilities

• corporate liability

• fraud prevention, detection and management

• corporate compliance requirements.

Through its various mitigation strategies, the residual risk accepted by the office is maintained within the low-medium levels in each of the six categories listed above.


Ethical standards and fraud controlWhile the Risk Management Plan is comprehensive in that it includes fraud prevention, detection and management, the office also maintains a separate fraud control plan which explores in greater detail risks of that type and how they are dealt with.

I can certify that my office has undertaken a fraud risk assessment and has a fraud control plan, both of which are reviewed periodically. I can further certify that appropriate fraud prevention, detection, investigation and reporting procedures are in place, which comply with the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines.

Remuneration of SES officersThe office does not currently employ any ongoing Senior Executive Service (SES) officers and therefore has no internal policies on how the nature and amount of remuneration for such officers is determined.

External scrutiny Decisions by the judiciary or tribunals There were no judicial decisions or decisions of administrative tribunals made in 2010–11 which had, or may have, a significant impact on the operations of the office.

Reports by the Auditor General, Parliamentary Committees and the Commonwealth OmbudsmanThere were no reports on the operation of the office (other than the report on financial statements) by any of the above bodies. It should be noted that the office is not within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

The office has received an unqualified audit report from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) in relation to its financial statements.

Further details of OIGIS interaction with parliamentary committees are available in the Parliament and Legislation chapter of this report.

Management of human resourcesWorkforce planning, staff retention and turnoverAs detailed in successive OIGIS annual reports and Portfolio Budget Statements, the office was budgeted to progressively grow from six staff to thirteen staff over a four year period between 2006–07 and 2010–11. The office is further budgeted to increase to fourteen staff in 2011–12 to assist with the proposed introduction of Public Interest Disclosure legislation.

During the reporting period, the office maintained an average staffing level (ASL) of thirteen. Given the small number of employees it is difficult to meaningfully quantify staff turnover or retention


rates but during the reporting period two employees departed to join other Commonwealth agencies and three employees joined the office.

It is my intention to run at least one selection exercise in 2011–12.

Organisational profileAt the end of the 2010–11 reporting period, the office had 13 ongoing APS employees, all located in the Australian Capital Territory.

This compares to 11 ongoing and one non-ongoing APS employees located in the Australian Capital Territory at the conclusion of 2009–10.

The profile of the organisation is summarised in the following two graphs:

orGanisation ProfiLe as at 30 June 2011 (emPLoyment LeveL and status)

Gender BaLance as at 30 June 2011 (By emPLoyment LeveL)

Employment frameworksAt 1 July 2010 all staff were employed under the OIGIS Enterprise Agreement 2009–11. This was replaced by the OIGIS Enterprise Agreement 2011–2014, which came into effect on 10 June 2011.

The main features of the Enterprise Agreement include:

• a 3% increase in base salary and AIC allowance on commencement of the agreement, 1 July 2012 and 1 July 2013

• a nominal expiry date of 30 June 2014.

The cost of implementing the agreement will be absorbed within the existing budget.

The salary range available to APS employees in OIGIS throughout 2010–11 is provided at Annex 2.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

OIGIS Broadband 4 (EL2)


OIGIS Broadband 2 (APS4-APS6)

Part Time Full Time

0

1

2

3

4

5

6



OIGIS Broadband 2 (APS4-APS6)

Male Female


The only notable non-salary benefit for OIGIS staff is a taxable annual allowance in recognition of the requirement to undergo regular and intrusive security clearance processes necessary to maintain a Top Secret Positive Vet clearance, as well as other restrictions placed on employees as a result of reviewing the activities of the AIC. The annual allowance was $1 030 per annum as at 30 June 2011.

Training and staff developmentOIGIS engaged the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) to deliver a tailored legislation training program in 2010–11. The program was developed by AGS in 2009–10 to introduce new staff to the complexities of the IGIS Act and other national security legislation.

The 2010–11 training program ran for one and half days. It was interactive and based on adult learning, with a significant number of group discussion sessions led by more experienced staff members.

Staff were also provided with regular opportunities throughout 2010–11 to attend training courses and seminars relevant to their roles. A studies assistance scheme is available to reimburse employees for approved courses of study up to a limit of $6 000 per annum.

Performance pay OIGIS does not have a performance based pay scheme.

PurchasingAll procurement and purchasing activities conducted by the office were in accordance with the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines.

ConsultantsGenerally a small number of consultants are engaged each year by the office on an ‘as-required’ basis. Consultants are used where short term resources are inadequate or specialist expertise is required.

The security requirements of the office and the specialist nature of the consultancy work often means that consultants are directly sourced.

Where the work is more general in nature the office will, where possible, access consultants selected by PM&C through an open tender or panel selection process.

Total actual expenditure on consultancy contracts for 2010–11 was $161 248.63 (GST inclusive). This comprised:

• $161 248.63 (GST inclusive) for nine new consultancy contracts, all of which were completed during the reporting period. Annex 3, Table 1 of this annual report provides further details on particular consultancies which were valued at $10 000 or more

• There were no ongoing contracts from the previous financial year.

This compares to consultancy expenditure of $191 467 (GST inclusive) in 2009–10 and $97 370 (GST inclusive) in 2008–09.

Annual reports contain information about actual expenditure on contracts for consultancies. Information on the value of contracts and consultancies is available on the AusTender website www.tenders.gov.au.

ANAO access clausesNo contracts for greater than $100 000 were entered into during the reporting period which did not provide for the Auditor-General to have access to the contractor’s premises.


Exempt contractsNo contracts have been entered into during the reporting period that have been exempt from publishing on AusTender.

Legal servicesExpenditure on legal services fluctuates from year to year and is largely dependent upon the nature of the inquiries undertaken.

In 2010–11 legal advice was obtained from:

• Australian Government Solicitor (AGS), to a total cost of $3 625.71 (GST inclusive). This comprised $3 625.71 (GST inclusive) for general legal services. The total expenditure compares to $26 212 (GST inclusive) in 2009–10 and $38 132 (GST inclusive) in 2008–09.

• Dr Melissa A Perry QC, to a total cost of $88 343.15 (GST inclusive). This comprised $88 343.15 (GST inclusive) in respect of tied work pursuant to the Commonwealth Legal Services Directions.

• List G Barristers, to a total cost of $37 990.00 (GST inclusive). This comprised $37 990.00 (GST inclusive) in respect of tied work pursuant to the Commonwealth Legal Services Directions.

• Demir Legal, to a total cost of $8 277.00 (GST inclusive). This comprised $8 277.00 for general legal services.

• E Gass, to a total cost of $828.00 (GST inclusive). This comprised $828.00 for general legal services.

Changes to disability reporting in annual reportsSince 1994, Commonwealth departments and agencies have reported on their performance as policy adviser, purchaser, employer, regulator and provider under the Commonwealth Disability Strategy. In 2007–08, reporting on the employer role was transferred to the Australian Public Service

Commission’s State of the Service Report and the APS Statistical Bulletin. These reports are available at www.apsc.gov.au. From 2010–11, departments and agencies are no longer required to report on these functions.

The Commonwealth Disability Strategy has been overtaken by a new National Disability Strategy which sets out a ten year national policy framework for improving life for Australians with disability, their families and carers. A high level report to track progress for people with disability at a national level will be produced by the Standing Council on Community, Housing and Disability Services to the Council of Australian Governments and will be available at www.fahcsia.gov.au.

The Social Inclusion Measurement and Reporting Strategy agreed by the Government in December 2009 will also include some reporting on disability matters in its regular How Australia is Faring report and, if appropriate, in strategic change indicators in agency annual reports. More detail on social inclusion matters can be found at www.socialinclusion.gov.au.

Other informationOccupational health and safetyDue to the small size of the office a Health and Safety Committee has not been established. Instead health and safety matters are regularly addressed within the office as a standing item at the all-staff meetings and Audit Committee meetings and, as the need arises, directly with me through the team leaders and the Health and Safety Representative (HSR).

The office Health and Safety Management Arrangements were last reviewed in February 2009. In accordance with the requirements of the


Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (OH&S Act), staff were consulted during this process and an OIGIS HSR was elected to serve a two year term. During this reporting period, nominations were again sought for a HSR and the incumbent was re-elected to the position.

No accidents or dangerous events occurred during the year that arose out of the conduct of undertakings by me that required the giving of notice under s 68 of the OH&S Act.

No investigations were conducted relating to undertakings carried out by me and no notices were given to me under s 29, 46 or 47 (relating to provisional improvement notices, prohibition notices and improvement notices respectively) of the OH&S Act.

Freedom of informationThis office is an exempt agency for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 1982.

Advertising and market researchOIGIS did not incur any expenditure on advertising campaigns, market research, polling or direct mailing during the reporting period.

A total of $170.52 (GST inclusive) was paid to Adcorp for recruitment advertising associated with the following employment vacancy:

• Personal Assistant appearing in Seek on 13 August 2010.

Ecologically sustainable development and environmental performanceThe office, through its co-location with PM&C, continues to benefit from that Department’s commitment to energy saving measures.

This includes the large number of energy and water saving measures, designed to reduce greenhouse emissions, which are incorporated into the building

in which we are among the occupants (One National Circuit). These measures include, but are not limited to energy efficient lighting, heating and cooling.

Due to the small size of my office PM&C does not separately measure the utilities used by OIGIS and provides these utilities free of charge. For this reason ecologically sustainable development and details of environmental performance are not specifically quantified in this report.

Nonetheless, the office is committed to ensuring that its activities are environmentally responsible. While the majority of the office’s infrastructure is provided and maintained by PM&C, there are a number of areas for which I am directly responsible in which I take into account the environmental impact and act accordingly to minimise it. These include:

• recycled paper was used for 99 per cent of the office’s photocopying, facsimile reports and document printing (1 per cent new/virgin paper) in 2010–11

• staff configure printers to default to double-sided print

• all unclassified office paper and cardboard waste is recycled

• empty toner cartridges are recycled, except where security considerations apply

• where there is no operational impact, office equipment is shut-down overnight, rather than being placed on stand-by.


Summary of Financial Performance and Resources for OutcomesOIGIS received an unqualified audit report from the Australian National Audit Office for its 2010–11 financial statements.

The office operated within available resources in 2010–11 and ended the year with a surplus of $180 369 compared to a budgeted break even position.

The most significant budget variance consisted of $67 000 underspend associated with delayed expenditure on planned consultancies. Other significant variances included $35 000 underspend on legal expenses and a $35 000 underspend on training expenses (both of which are demand driven). Planned international travel by the Inspector General was also deferred resulting in a further saving of $20 000.

Appropriation funding decreased from $2 107 000 in 2009–10 to $2 095 000 in 2010–11. This decrease relates to net cash arrangements in place from 2010–11 onwards.

Net equity increased from $913 191 in 2009–10 to $1 165 561. Movements in net equity included a $180 369 increase in retained surplus and a $72 000 increase in contributed equity via the departmental capital budget.

The following tables can be found in Annex 4:

• Table 1 – Agency resource statement 2010–11

• Table 2 – Expenses and resources for outcomes 2010–11.

OIGIS has one outcome and one output.

Trends in OIGIS financesSignificant changes to the finances of the office during 2010–11 include:

• A $291 365 increase in Other Income which relates to section 31 funding received to cover the costs of the Habib inquiry and the DSA inquiry and a further $145 595 section 31 funding relating to the transfer of leave liabilities.

• An increase in liabilities due largely to an increase in employee leave liabilities associated with the engagement of senior officers. The other increase in liabilities is related to unearned revenue totalling $183 470 for section 31 funding relating to the Habib and DSA inquiries.

2010–11 OUTCOME 1

$’000

2009–10 OUTCOME 1

$’000

Change from previous year

Revenues from government 2 095 000 2 107 000 –1%Other income 561 552 124 545 +449%

TOTAL INCOME 2 656 552 2 231 545Employee expenses 1 973 173 1 600 947 +23%Supplier expenses 486 403 598 394 –18%Other expenses 16 607 20 923 –25%TOTAL EXPENSES 2 476 183 2 220 264OPERATING RESULT 180 369 11 281Financial assets 2 007 141 1 370 774 +46%Non-financial assets 77 859 52 325 +48%Liabilities 919 439 509 908 +80%NET ASSETS = A + B – C 1 165 561 913 191

77

Financial Statements


Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security


Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and SecurityStatement of Comprehensive Incomefor the year ended 30 June 2011


Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and SecurityBalance Sheetas at 30 June 2011


Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and SecurityStatement of Changes in Equityfor the year ended 30 June 2011


Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and SecurityCash Flow Statementfor the year ended 30 June 2011


Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and SecurityStatement of Commitments and Contingenciesas at 30 June 2011


Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and SecuritySchedule of Asset Additionsfor the year ended 30 June 2011


Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and SecurityNotes to and forming part of the Financial StatementsFor the year ended 30 June 2011

112

Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and SecurityNotes to and forming part of the Financial Statementsfor the year ended 30 June 2011

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2010–2011


Annex 1Table 1iGis act inquiries actioned BetWeen 1 JuLy 2010 and 30 June 2011

Agency SourceDate initiated

Type of Inquiry Finalised Status

ASIO Public 21/05/2010 Preliminary 27/07/2010 Finalised



DSD Public 17/11/2010 Preliminary 24/12/2010 Finalised

DSD Minister 22/11/2010 Full 03/03/2011 Finalised

All AIC agencies, PM&C, DFAT, AGD and AFP

Prime Minister 22/12/2010 Full Open


DSA Prime Minister 01/06/2011 Full Open

Table 2summary of comPLaints handLed administrativeLy By oiGis BetWeen 1 JuLy 2010 and 30 June 2011

AgencyNumber of complaints From public

From AIC employee or

ex-employee

ASIO (general) 3 3 0

ASIO (visa security assessments) 1111 1111 0

ASIS 0 0 0

DSD 1 0 1

DIGO 0 0 0

DIO 0 0 0

ONA 0 0 0

AIC (all) 0 0 0

TOTAL COMPLAINTS 1115 1114 1


Annex 2Table 1saLary ranGes avaiLaBLe for aPs emPLoyees in oiGis in 2010 – 2011

OIGIS Band APS Level Salary Range from 1 Jan 2010 ($)

Salary Range from 10 June 2011 ($)

OIGIS Band 4 EL2 122 599 126 277

119 697 123 288

117 374 120 895

108 914 112 181

103 012 106 102

OIGIS Band 3 EL1 98 661 101 621

95 756 98 629

88 503 91 158

OIGIS Band 2 APS6 82 338 84 808

79 799 82 193

76 897 79 204

73 269 75 467

APS5 69 643 71 732

68 190 70 236

66 376 68 367

64 202 66 128

APS4 62 750 64 633

60 936 62 764

59 487 61 272

57 673 59 403

OIGIS Band 1 APS3 55 858 57 534

54 408 56 040

52 956 54 545

51 870 53 426

APS2 50 417 51 930

48 968 50 437

46 790 48 194

45 339 46 699

APS1 44 252 45 580

42 438 43 711

41 350 42 591

41 308 42 547


Annex 3Table 1consuLtancy services Let durinG 2010-11 of $10 000 or more

Description Description

Contract Price (GST inclusive)

Selection process Justification

Australian Government Solicitor

Delivery of a tailored legislation training program

$15 700 Direct Sourcing B

1. Explanation of selection process terms drawn from the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines (December 2008): Direct Sourcing: A form of restricted tendering, available only under certain defined circumstances, with a single potential supplier or suppliers being invited to bid because of their unique expertise and/or their special ability to supply the goods and/or services sought.

2. Justification for decision to use consultancy:

A – skills currently unavailable within agency B – need for specialised or professional skills C – need for independent research or assessment

3. The definition of a ‘consultancy’ provided by the Department of Finance and Deregulation in its Guidance on Procurement Publishing Obligations, July 2007 (FMG No. 15) was used to determine the proportion of total legal expenditure (listed in the chapter on Management and Accountability) that should also be reported in this table.


Annex 4Table 1aGency resource statement and resources for outcomes 2010-11

Actual available appropriation for

2010-11 $’000

(a)

Payments made

2010-11 $’000

(b)

Balance remaining

2010-11 (a) – (b)

Ordinary Annual Services

Departmental Appropriation

Prior year departmental appropriation

1 368 – 1 368

Departmental appropriation 2 167 1 903 264

S31 Relevant Agency Receipts 620 291 329

Total 4 155 2 194 1 961

Administered expenses – – –

Total – – –

Total ordinary annual services A 4 155 2 194 1 961

Other services

Departmental non-operating – – –

Total – – –

Total other services B – – –

Total available annual appropriations 4 155 2 194 1 961

Special appropriations – – –

Total special appropriations C – – –

Special accounts – – –

Total special accounts D – – –

Total resourcing A + B + C + D 4 155 2194 1 961

Less appropriations drawn from annual or special appropriations above and credited to special accounts and/or CAC Act bodies through annual appropriations

– – –

Total net resourcing for agency 4 155 2 194 1 961


Table 2exPenses and resources for outcome 1

Outcome 1: Independent assurance for the Prime Minister, senior ministers and Parliament as to whether Australia’s intelligence and security agencies act legally and with propriety by inspecting, inquiring into and reporting on their activities

Budget 2010–11

$’000 (a)

Actual expenses

2010–11 $’000

(b)

Variation 2010–11

$’000 (a) – (b)

Program 1.1: Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

Departmental expenses

Ordinary annual services (Appropriation Bill No.1) 2 537 2 335 202

Revenue from independent sources

Special appropriations

Special Accounts

Expenses not requiring appropriation in the Budget year 131 140 (9)

Total for Program 1.1 2 668 2 475 193

Outcome 1 Totals by appropriation type

Departmental expenses

Ordinary annual services (Appropriation Bill No.1) 2 537 2 335 202

Revenue from independent sources

Special appropriations

Special Accounts

Expenses not requiring appropriation in the Budget year 131 140 (9)

Total expenses for Outcome 1 2 668 2 475 193

Budget 2010–11

Actual 2010–11

Average Staffing Level (number) 13 13


Annex 5Table 1List of annuaL rePort requirements

Description Requirement Part of Report Page

Letter of transmittal Mandatory Introductory pages iii

Table of contents Mandatory Introductory pages iv

Index Mandatory Following Annexes 122

Glossary Mandatory Introductory pages vi

Contact officer(s) Mandatory Introductory pages ii

Internet home page address and Internet address for report

Mandatory Introductory pages ii

Review by Agency Head Mandatory Overview 1

Summary of significant issues and developments Suggested Overview 1

Overview of agency’s performance and financial results

Suggested Performance, Management and accountability

15, 76

Outlook for following year Suggested The year 2011–12 in prospect

63

Significant issues and developments – portfolio Portfolio departments – suggested

N/A N/A

Overview description of agency Mandatory Role of the Inspector-General

vii

Roles and functions Mandatory Role of the Inspector-General

vii

Organisational structure Mandatory Management and accountability

69

Outcome and program structure Mandatory Performance, Management and accountability

15, 69

Where outcome and program structures differ from PB Statements/PAES or other portfolio statements

Mandatory Performance 15

Portfolio structure Portfolio departments – mandatory

N/A N/A

Review of performance during the year in relation to programs and contributions to outcomes


Actual performance in relation to deliverables and KPIs set out in PB Statements/PAES or other portfolio statements




Performance of purchaser/provider arrangements If applicable – suggested

N/A N/A

Where performance targets differ from the PBS/PAES, details of both former and new target, and reasons for the change

Mandatory N/A N/A

Narrative discussion and analysis of performance Mandatory Performance 15

Trend information Mandatory Performance 15

Significant changes in nature of principal functions/services

Suggested N/A N/A

Factors, events or trends influencing agency performance

Suggested N/A N/A

Contribution of risk management in achieving objectives

Suggested N/A N/A

Social justice and equity impacts Suggested N/A N/A

Performance against service charter, customer service standards, complaints data, and the agency’s response to complaints

If applicable – mandatory

Performance 15

Discussion and analysis of agency’s financial performance

Mandatory Management and accountability

69

Discussion of any significant changes from the prior year or from budget

Suggested Management and accountability

69

Agency resource statement and summary resource tables by outcomes

Mandatory Annex 4 – Agency resource statement and resources for outcomes

116

Developments since the end of the financial year that have affected or may significantly affect the agency’s operations or financial results in the future


N/A N/A

Statement of the main corporate governance practices in place


69

Names of the senior executive and their responsibilities


69

Senior management committees and their roles Suggested Management and accountability

69

Corporate and operational planning and associated performance reporting and review


69

Approach adopted in identifying areas of significant financial or operational risk


69

Agency heads are to certify that their agency complies with the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines


69

Policies and practices on the establishment and maintenance of appropriate ethical standards

Suggested N/A N/A



How nature and amount of remuneration for SES officers is determined

Suggested N/A N/A

Significant developments in external scrutiny Mandatory Management and accountability

69

Judicial decisions and decisions of administrative tribunals


69

Reports by the Auditor-General, a Parliamentary Committee or the Commonwealth Ombudsman


69

Assessment of effectiveness in managing and developing human resources to achieve agency objectives


69

Workforce planning, staff turnover and retention Suggested Management and accountability

71

Impact and features of enterprise or collective agreements, determinations, common law contracts and AWAs


72

Training and development undertaken and its impact


73

Occupational health and safety performance Suggested Management and accountability

74

Productivity gains Suggested Management and accountability

72

Statistics on staffing Mandatory Management and accountability

72

Enterprise or collective agreements, determinations, common law contracts and AWAs


Annex 2 – salary ranges

72

Performance pay Mandatory Management and accountability

73

Assessment of effectiveness of assets management If applicable – mandatory

N/A N/A

Assessment of purchasing against core policies and principles


73

Summary statement of consultancies in the body of the report (incl. the number of new and ongoing consultancies, total expenditure on new and ongoing consultancies, and reference to information on the AusTender website), and reporting all consultancies valued at $10 000 or more (GST incl).


Annex 3 – consultancies of $10 000 or more

73

115

Any absence of provision in contracts allowing access by the Auditor-General


73

Contracts exempt from AusTender Mandatory Management and accountability

74



Report on performance implementing the Commonwealth Disability Strategy


74

Financial Statements Mandatory Financial Statements 77

Report IAW section 74 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991


74

Report IAW section 8(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982


75

Report IAW section 3111A of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1982 and statement on advertising campaigns


75

Report IAW section 526A of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999


75

Grant programs If applicable – mandatory

N/A N/A

Correction of material errors in previous annual report


N/A N/A

List of Requirements Mandatory Annex 5 118


a

abbreviations vi

acquisition of assets 92

acronyms vi

acting IGIS arrangements 5

Administrative Tribunal decisions 71

advertising 75

amortisation 94

Annual Report requirements 118–21

Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-terrorism Financing Act 2006: 4–5, 32

Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2010: 4

apology by ASIO to complainant 38

appropriations 108

assets

acquisition of 92

contingent 101

derecognition of 93

financial 91, 96

impairment of 91

intangibles 93, 98–9

major classes of 112

non-financial 96–9

recognition threshold 92

schedule of additions 86

assumed identities 33, 46–7

assurance, level of 19–20

Attorney-General’s Department

approves warrant requests 26

certificates of compliance provided to 32–3

foreign authorities approved by 25

in Habib inquiry 9

oversees ASIO 22

Attorney-General’s Guidelines 8, 30

Audit Committee 70

auditors 105

Australian Accounting Standards 88

Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 5

Australian Federal Police, in Habib inquiry 9

Australian Government Solicitor 73–4, 115

Australian Intelligence Community Agencies 7, 19, see also names of agencies

Australian National Audit Office 71, 73, 79–80

Australian Secret Intelligence Service 5, 9, 41–7, 66

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 21–39

alleged misconduct of officers 18, 34

apology to complainant 38

as ‘designated agency’ 4–5

complaints about visa application processing 3–4, 18, 35–9

Cross-AIC inspection project 8

interactions with public 22

proposed activities 64–5

Security Assessments Branch 3–4

telecommunications interception errors 28–9

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979: 21, 29–30

Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre data

agencies with access to 13–14

Index


ASIO access to 32–3, 65

ASIS access to 47, 66

authority to investigate, ASIO’s use of 29–31

B

balance sheet 82

basis of preparation of the financial statements 87

Black, Rufus 2

B-Party warrants 26, 28

briefings 22, 42, 52, 64–8

Bryce, Quentin 1

Byrne, Anthony 12

c

Carnell, Ian 1, 7

cash and cash equivalents 91, 96

cash flow reconciliation 101

cash flow statement 84

changes in equity, statement of 83

Clarke, John 12

Combating the Financing of People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2011: 4, 13–14

Commissioner of Taxation 33

commitments, schedule of 85

compensation 111

complaint handling procedures 16, 23, 64, 113

complaints

numbers of 17–18

regarding ASIO 34–5, 65

regarding DIO 60

regarding DSD 55

regarding ONA 62

compliance index 118–21

comprehensive income 112

consultants 73, 115

‘contacts’ vs ‘complaints’ 16

contingencies, schedule of 85

contingent assets and liabilities 92, 101

Cornall, Robert 2

corporate planning 70

Counter Espionage and Interference Division, ASIO 23–4

credit risk 106

Crimes Act 1914: 46–7

Cross-AIC inspection project 7–8, 24

d

debt relief 111

Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) 57–8

becomes ‘designated agency’ 13

future plans 67

joint submissions with 50–1

privacy rules 9

Defence Intelligence Agencies 49–60

Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) 59–60


future plans for 68

privacy rules 9

role and function of 8

Defence Science and Technology Organisation 51

Defence Security Authority, inquiry into vetting practices 2–4, 10, 13, 19

Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) 51–6


complaint about information handling 19

compliance testing regime inquiry 3, 55–6, 64

future plans for 67

inquiry into training testing 19

Demir Legal 74


external speaking engagements 6

f

fair value of financial instruments 106

Faulkner, John 49, 54

financial assets 91, 96

financial instruments 105–7

financial liabilities 91–2

financial performance 76

Flood, Philip 2

fraud control 71

freedom of information 75

Frequently Asked Questions, ASIO website 22

full inquiries 17, 55–6, see also inquiries

future inspection activities 54

G

gains 89–90, 95

Gass, E 74

Gillard, Julia 1–3, 13, 35, 64

glossary vi

Gray, Gary iii, 2

h

Habib inquiry 2, 4, 9, 13, 19, 35

anticipated end date 64

information provided relating to 50

Haneef, Mohamed, inquiry into arrest of 12

Health and Safety Representative 74–5

i

impairment of assets 91, 95

income 81, 95, 106, 112

independent auditor’s report 79–80

Independent National Security Legislation Monitor 5

Department of Defence 1, 49–51, 67

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

in Habib inquiry 9

ministerial authorisations 44–5

ministerial changes 2

ministerial submissions 45

overseas activities, briefing prior to 43

Department of Immigration and Citizenship 3, 35–8

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 9, 61, 75, see also Gillard, Julia

depreciation 93–4

derecognition of assets 93

‘designated agencies’

additions to 4–5, 13–14

ASIO and IGIS as 32

ASIS as 47, 66

director authorisations for DIGO activities 57

Director-General of ONA 61, 68

Director-General of Security, ASIO 22, 27

disability reporting 74

e

ecologically sustainable development 75

effective interest method 91

employee benefit provisions 90, 94, 100

employment frameworks 72–3

Enterprise Agreement 5, 72

environment performance 75

errors occurring in telecommunications interception 28–9

ethical standards 71

events occurring after the balance sheet date 93

exempt contracts 74

expenses 94–5, 106, 117

external scrutiny 71


internal audit 70

internal compliance 51–2, 54

international activities 6, 25, 42–3, 45

Irregular Maritime Arrivals 35, 38

Irvine, David 43

ISA agencies, see Australian Intelligence Community Agencies; names of agencies

J

judicial decisions 71

L

Law Council inquiries 22–3

law enforcement agencies, ASIO and 33–4

Law Enforcement and National Security (Assumed Identities) Act 1988 (NSW) 33

leadership of Defence Intelligence Agencies 1–2, 49

leave entitlements 90

legal aid agencies 38

legal services expenditure 74

legislative changes 4, 12–14

Letter of Transmittal iii

level of assurance 19–20

liabilities 76, 91–2, 101, 112

liquidity risk 106

List G Barristers 74

loans 91

m

major classes of expenses, income, assets and liabilities by outcomes 112

management and accountability 69–76

market research 75

market risk 106

McClelland, Robert 2

McKenzie, Ian 49

Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010: 5

Independent Review into the Australian Intelligence Community 2

inquiries 2–3

full 17, 55–6

into Australian intelligence agencies 2

into DIO activities 60

into ONA activities 62

numbers of 18–19

planned 64

preliminary 17–19, 55

statistics 113

inspections

Cross-AIC inspection project 7–8

inspections and visits program 17

of ASIO activities 23–4, 31

of ASIS activities 44–7

of DIGO activities 57–8

of DIO activities 59

of DSD activities 52, 54

of ONA activities 62

proposed 64–8

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, see Thom, Vivienne

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986: 1, 4, 49–50, 64

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Amendment Bill 2011: 4, 13

intangible assets 93, 98–9

Integrity Commissioner 5

Intelligence Services Act 2001: 8, 12, 41, 49

Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2011: 4, 14

inter-agency cooperation 43

interception management systems 29


Office of National Assessments Act 1977: 61

Ombudsman, referrals to 16

One National Circuit building 75

operational file review activities, ASIS 45

operational planning 70

Order of Australia for Nick Warner 42

organisational change 42

organisational structure 69–70, 72

Other Trust Moneys Account 111

outcomes, resources for 116–18

overseas activities 6, 25, 42–3, 45

‘own motion’ inquiries 15

P

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 2, 12

Parliamentary oversight 12

payables 99–100

performance 15–20, 76

performance pay 73

Perry, Melissa A 74

preliminary inquiries 17–19, 55

Prime Minister, see Gillard, Julia

Privacy Act 1988: 8–9

privacy rules

Australian Secret Intelligence Service 46

Cross-AIC inspection project 8–9

Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation 57–8, 67

Defence Intelligence Agencies 50

Defence Intelligence Organisation 59, 67

Defence Signals Directorate 53

Office of National Assessments 61–2

property, plant and equipment 96–9

prospective data authority requests by ASIO 31–2

Meekin, Steve 49

meetings

with ASIO staff 22

with ASIS staff 43

with DIGO staff 58

with DSD staff 52

with ONA staff 62, 67

Memorandums of Understanding with AUSTRAC 32, 47

Merryfull, Diane 5, 70

Minister for Defence, see Department of Defence

Minister for Foreign Affairs, see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Ministerial authorisations 44–5, 52–4, 57, 67

Ministerial directions 49–50

Ministerial leadership positions 1–2

Ministerial submissions 45, 66

Moss, Philip 5

multi-agency groupings, ASIO in 24

n

National Disability Strategy 74

National Security Adviser 61

national security leadership positions 1–2, 49

National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010: 4, 12–13

net cost of outcome delivery 111

non-financial assets 96–9

non-salary benefits 73

notes to and forming part of the financial statements 87–112

o

objectives 87

occupational health and safety 74–5

Office of National Assessments 8–9, 13, 61–2, 67


Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee 12

Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee 13

Senior Executive Service 15, 67, 69–70, 102–4

Services for Other Governments and Non-Agency Bodies Account 111

signals intelligence capability 54

significant accounting judgements and estimates 87

six monthly cycle adopted 63

Smith, Stephen 1, 42, 46, 49, 55

Social Inclusion Measurement and Reporting Strategy 74

special accounts 111

special briefings, see briefings

special inspection projects, see inspections

special powers warrants, ASIO’s use of 25–6

staffing

allocations 5

average levels 15, 71

by location, status and gender 72

future plans for 67

human resource management 71–4

organisational change 42

salary ranges 114

statement of changes in equity 83

statement of comprehensive income 81

studies assistance scheme 73

‘study guides’ at DSD 56

summary of significant accounting policies 87–93

superannuation entitlements 90

suppliers 94, 99

public interest disclosure scheme, proposed 5, 14, 64

Public Service Act 1999: 69

purchasing 73

q

questioning and detention warrants 26, 29, 65

questioning warrants 26, 29, 65

r

receivables 91

Reith, Peter 53

remuneration 71, 102–5, 114

reporting of outcomes 111–12

resources for outcomes 116–18

retention rates 71–2

revaluations 92

revenue 88–9, 95

Review of Expenditure and Administration No 9 (2009–10) 12

reviews, proposed 64–8

risk management 70

Rudd, Kevin 2, 42

Ruddock, Philip 8, 12, 30

s

salary ranges 114

schedule of asset additions 86

schedule of commitments 85

schedule of contingencies 85

security, definition of 21

Security Assessments Branch, ASIO 3–4

security clearance processes 73

self-defence techniques, use of by ASIS 43–4, 46, 66

Senate Estimates Hearing 18


v

visa applications, security processing 3–4, see also Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

W

Walker, Bret 5

Warner, Nick 42

warrant operations by ASIO 25–7, 29, 65

weapons, use of by ASIS 43–4, 46, 66

‘whole of government’ approach 42

Wilson, Richard 49

workforce planning 71–2

write-down of assets 95

t

Taxation Administration Act 1953: 33

taxation information, ASIO’s access to 33, 65

taxation issues 93

telecommunications

access to data 25–6, 65

interception errors 28–9

prospective data on 31–2

Telecommunications Interception and Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2011: 4, 13, 54

Thom, Vivienne

appointment as Inspector-General 1

Defence Intelligence Agencies and 50

Letter of Transmittal iii

role of vii–viii

speaking engagements 6

statement by 78

timeliness 19

trade and other receivables 96

training

for ASIO staff 39, 65

for ASIS staff 44

for DIGO staff 58

for DIO staff 59–60

for DSD staff 51–2

for OIGIS staff 5, 73

for ONA staff 62

transactions with the government as owner 90

turnover 71–2

igis annual report 10-11

Documents